[
	{
		"section_header": "A. Speech discussing the issue of abortion from a pro-life viewpoint receives full First Amendment protection",
		"context": "These organizations, like Petitioners, are mission-oriented, formed primarily to advocate and implement their core pro-life values as well as to express these views publicly and privately. As this Court has recognized, such nonprofits often engage in \"dissemination of information, discussion, and advocacy of public issues, an activity clearly protected by the First Amendment.\" Sec'y of State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the First Amendment protects an organization's ability to advocate for viewpoints in accordance with its mission, free from government interference with that expression. See Agency for Int'l 133 S. Ct. 2321.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Speech discussing the issue of abortion from a pro-life viewpoint receives full First Amendment protection",
		"context": "Sec'y of State of 467 U.S. 947. Indeed, the First Amendment protects an organization's ability to advocate for viewpoints in accordance with its mission, free from government interference with that expression. See Agency for Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 The speech of these pregnancy centers about the issue of abortion rests at the core of the First Amendment. Advocacy related to abortion is fully protected expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Speech discussing the issue of abortion from a pro-life viewpoint receives full First Amendment protection",
		"context": "Advocacy related to abortion is fully protected expression. See e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Although the State argues that the Act regulates commercial speech, the Ninth Circuit rightly dispensed with that argument in a footnote. Pet.App.18a n.5 (\"We find unpersuasive Appellees'",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's attempts to limit and distinguish Reed should be rejected",
		"context": "In Reed , the court of appeals had reasoned that the sign code was \"content neu- tral because it 'does not mention any idea or viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment.' \" 576 U .S. at 168 ( quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But, as this Court explained, such analysis \"conflates\" content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality. See ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "587 F.3d 966",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jeffers Indicates That Sacrificing Double Jeopardy Rights to Avoid a Prejudicial Trial Is an Unfair Hobson's Choice",
		"context": "While not every hard choice a criminal defendant faces is invalid, the principles above apply with full force where \"compelling the election impairs to an appreciable extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], judgment vacated sub nom. , 408 U.S. 941. Indeed, after the Court decided McGautha , a plural- ity of this Court observed that forcing a defendant to choose between waiving double jeopardy protection or the admission of prejudicial evidence at a single trial could result in the very Hobson's choice this Court has found impermissible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jeffers Indicates That Sacrificing Double Jeopardy Rights to Avoid a Prejudicial Trial Is an Unfair Hobson's Choice",
		"context": ", 408 U.S. 941. Indeed, after the Court decided McGautha , a plural- ity of this Court observed that forcing a defendant to choose between waiving double jeopardy protection or the admission of prejudicial evidence at a single trial could result in the very Hobson's choice this Court has found impermissible. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the defendant successfully opposed the government's motion fo r a consolidated trial on two indictments charging grea ter and lesser offenses. Id. at 143.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos announced a new procedural rule that would apply retroactively on federal collateral review only if it were a \"watershed rule of criminal procedure\"",
		"context": "at 306 (citation omitted). A decision issued after tha t time is automati- cally retroactive \"[o]nly when [it] appl[ies] a settled rule.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ramos , however, did not \"apply a settled rule,\" but instead announced a \" 'new rule ' \" of criminal proce- dure, ibid., which would appl y retroactively only if it were so uniquely critical to accuracy and fairness as to be a \"[w]atershed rule[],\" id. at 347 n.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters",
		"context": "at 563 (1870). Numerous courts of appeals have rejected this argument and have held that the waters covered by the Rivers and Harbors Act are identical to the The Daniel Ball waters. Lykes Bros. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]501 F.2d 1156 (\"[A] navigab le water of the United States within the meaning of Sections 9, 10 and 13 of the Ri vers and Harbors Act must be 11 construed in line with the interpretation in The Daniel Ball , as contemplating such a body of water forming a continued highway over which comme rce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries, by water.\") ; Stoeco Homes, Inc. , 498 F.2d at 609 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting the The Daniel Ball two-part test); See also Sierra Pac.",
		"citation_value_orig": "64 F.3d 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters",
		"context": "at 563 (1870). Numerous courts of appeals have rejected this argument and have held that the waters covered by the Rivers and Harbors Act are identical to the The Daniel Ball waters. Lykes Bros. , 64 F.3d 630[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A] navigab le water of the United States within the meaning of Sections 9, 10 and 13 of the Ri vers and Harbors Act must be 11 construed in line with the interpretation in The Daniel Ball , as contemplating such a body of water forming a continued highway over which comme rce is or may be carried on with other states or foreign countries, by water.\") ; Stoeco Homes, Inc. , 498 F.2d at 609 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting the The Daniel Ball two-part test); See also Sierra Pac.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 F.2d 1156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Rivers and Harbors Act Waters",
		"context": "; Stoeco Homes, Inc. , 498 F.2d at 609 (3d Cir. 1974) (quoting the The Daniel Ball two-part test); See also Sierra Pac. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Minnehaha , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit addressed waterbodies like those in Sackett . In Minnehaha , plaintiffs challenged the Corps assertion of Rivers and Harbors Act authority over Lake Minnetonka.",
		"citation_value_orig": "681 F.2d 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's Blaine Amendment Harms Montanans Who Benefit From Montana's Student-Aid Program",
		"context": "This provides Montana families, especially the most needy, with educational options, and benefits all Montanans. In 2016, an estimated 14,857 of the 99,861 18–24 year-olds residing in Montana did not have a high school diploma.6 Montana's per capita income (2013- 2017) was $28,706, with 12.5% of Montanans living in poverty.7 Increased education opportunity increases both incomes and employment rates.8 This in turn represents increased revenue to the state, which at present secures over half of its revenue from individual income tax.9 Indeed, the financial cost of a Montana student that drops out of high school is an estimated $888,460 of income over 30 years to that student and nearly $300,000 in social service costs to the state.10 Montana can ill-afford to be discriminating against and propounding historical animus towards needy Montana students who happen to be religious by using \"religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://act.acescholarships. org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/ 2017-Value-of-a-Diploma.pdf. 7 QuickFacts Montana , U.S. Census Bureau, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U. S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Montana's Blaine Amendment Harms Montanans Who Benefit From Montana's Student-Aid Program",
		"context": "Yet that is precisely what the decision below requires. All Montana parents participate in the burdens and obligations of our civil society but now, because of Montana's Blaine Amendment, are being excluded from participating in any corollary benefits that would otherwise inure to them simply because they choose to integrate their religious faith in their education and daily life. Parents are placed in the position of exercising their fundamental right to raise their children according to their religious tenets and beliefs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with the very real financial reality that they must do so on their own. Such social injustice should not be allowed to stand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1782 does not encompass an investor-state arbitration before a nongovernmental arbitral panel",
		"context": "For example, w hether a party to an arbitration with a foreign state could seek discovery assistance under Section 1782 would depend on whether the person from whom the ev- idence was sought was \"a person [who] resides or is found\" in the dis- trict, 28 U.S.C. 1782(a); cf. Al [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and might implicate questions of foreign sovereign im- munity, cf. 28 U.S.C. 1602 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "229 F.3d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "The natural reading of the phrase \"clear and unmistakable error\" in Section 7111 therefore does not encompass the 1977 Board decision at issue here. Lower federal courts confront an analogous situation when a Supreme Court decision \"direc tly controls \" an issue but that precedent is perceived to \"rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When this Court has overrule d a precedent and reverse d the lower court that had faith- fully applied it, the Court has emphasized that the infe- rior court was \"correct\" to reject claims that th e prece- dent had foreclosed. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "Be- fore 1988, judicial review of the VA's denial of an individual's bene- fits claim was generally barred by 38 U.S.C. 211(a) (1982), which provided that \"decisi ons of the [VA] Administrator on any question of law or fact\" made under a veterans -benefit statute were \"final and conclusive\" and not subject to judicial review, ibid . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But several courts of appeals had held , in light of the strong presumption of judicial re- view , 485 U.S. 535 , that Section 211(a) did not bar direct judicial challenges to a VA regulation based on its alleged inconsistency with the governing statute. See 641 F.3d 1313.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "211(a) (1982), which provided that \"decisi ons of the [VA] Administrator on any question of law or fact\" made under a veterans -benefit statute were \"final and conclusive\" and not subject to judicial review, ibid . See 562 U.S. 428. But several courts of appeals had held , in light of the strong presumption of judicial re- view , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that Section 211(a) did not bar direct judicial challenges to a VA regulation based on its alleged inconsistency with the governing statute. See 641 F.3d 1313. 26 supplemental application .",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "See 562 U.S. 428. But several courts of appeals had held , in light of the strong presumption of judicial re- view , 485 U.S. 535 , that Section 211(a) did not bar direct judicial challenges to a VA regulation based on its alleged inconsistency with the governing statute. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 supplemental application . 38 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 1313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "Before 1997, \"[r]egional office decisions [we re] reversible on this ba- sis [i.e., for clear and unmistakable error] by regulation, but [Board] decisions [we re] not.\" Id. at 2 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In en- acting the 1997 statutory amendments, Congress sought both (1) to \"codify [in 38 U.S.C. 5109A the] ex- isting regulations which ma [d]e decisions made by the Secretary at a r egional office subject to revision on the grounds of clear and unmistakable error, \" and (2) to \"make decisions made by the Board subject to re- vision on the [same] grounds\" by including pa rallel lan- guage in Section 7111.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 1516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "For example, t he Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) , 28 U.S.C. 2412(d), involves a similar inquiry that examines \"not what the law now is, but wh at the Government was substantially justified in believing it to have been\" be- fore the court ruled against it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under the EAJA , a court 's de- termin ation that an unambiguous statute forecloses the government's position \"on Chevron step one grounds\" does not resolve whether \"the Government 's [losing] po- sition \" was nevertheless \"reasonable[ ].\" 206 F.3d 1205 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "487 U.S. 552 . Under the EAJA , a court 's de- termin ation that an unambiguous statute forecloses the government's position \"on Chevron step one grounds\" does not resolve whether \"the Government 's [losing] po- sition \" was nevertheless \"reasonable[ ].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Likewise, it is not uncommon for M embers of this Court to disagree about whether a statute unam- biguously resolves a question.3 A majority's determina- tion that no ambiguity exists will finally resolve th e in- terpretive issue, but it does not establish that other Jus- tices have committed \"clear and un mistakable error.\" See ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 F.3d 1205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "(observing that \" Chevron step one cases \" can \"present [] quite difficult issues\"). This case illustrate s the point. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Federal Circuit found that 38 C.F.R. 3.304(b) in its then- current form was in- consistent with the presumption of soundness in 38 U.S.C. 1111 after tracing the evolution of the statutory text through multiple laws enacted from the 1920s to 3 See, e.g., SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 F.3d 1089",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "In 370 F.3d 1089, the Federal Circuit found that 38 C.F.R. 3.304(b) in its then- current form was in- consistent with the presumption of soundness in 38 U.S.C. 1111 after tracing the evolution of the statutory text through multiple laws enacted from the 1920s to 3 See, e.g., SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 the 1940s and surveying legislati ve history that in- cluded floor statements made during World War II. Wagner , 370 F.3d at 1094- 1096; see pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The term \"clear and unmistakable error\" is not naturally understood to encompass decisions in which an agency adjudicator faithfully applies a regulation that it is legally required to follow",
		"context": "9- 10, supra . But in finding the regulation deficient because it merely re-quired sufficient proof of a preexisting condition to re- but the presumptio n of sound condition at entry into service, the court acknowledged that the statute was \"somewhat difficult to parse\" and recognized , like the VA General Counsel , that the provision appeared on its face to be \" 'illogical' \" and \"somewhat self -contradic- tory\" because it requires proof of non -aggravation dur- ing service in order to rebut a presumption of sound condition at entry into service. Wagner , 370 F.3d at 1093 (citation omitted) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 Vet. App. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "The Court Of Appeals ' Decision Is Wrong 1. a. This Court has long recognized the doctrine of international comity, which permits U.S. courts to take account of the \"legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, \" giving \"due regard both to interna- tional duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protec- tion of its laws. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. International comity discourages a U.S. court from \"reexamin[ ing]\" the \"validity of the acts of [a for- eign] sovereign S tate\" in a way that could \" 'imperil the amicable relations between governments. ' \" 246 U.S. 297.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "159 U.S. 113. International comity discourages a U.S. court from \"reexamin[ ing]\" the \"validity of the acts of [a for- eign] sovereign S tate\" in a way that could \" 'imperil the amicable relations between governments. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One strand of comity is \"adjudicatory comity, \" under which a U.S. court may abstain from exercising juris-diction in deference to adjudication in a foreign forum. See 771 F.3d 580 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "246 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "\" 246 U.S. 297. One strand of comity is \"adjudicatory comity, \" under which a U.S. court may abstain from exercising juris-diction in deference to adjudication in a foreign forum. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 690 ; Royal & Sun Alliance Ins. 466 F.3d 88 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "771 F.3d 580",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Courts therefore have dis- cretion to abstain based on the weighing of interests at stake in a particular case . See, e.g. , Republic of Philip- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sometimes the Executive Branch may assist the courts by provid- ing its view that abstention is appropriate in a particu- lar case. See Altmann , 541 U.S. at 701-7 02 (recognizing that, when the FSIA does not confer immunity, the State Department's view that exercising jurisdiction would be harmful to foreign policy \"might well be enti- tled to deference\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 851",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See Altmann , 541 U.S. at 701-7 02 (recognizing that, when the FSIA does not confer immunity, the State Department's view that exercising jurisdiction would be harmful to foreign policy \"might well be enti- tled to deference\"). At other times, a court may itself determine whether international comity favors absten- tion by examining the factors that are typically relevant in a comity analysis: \" the particular facts, sovereign in- terests , and likelihood that resort to [those] procedures [of the foreign state] will prove effective .\" Soci été Na- tionale Industrielle A [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Adjudicatory comity also differs from sovereign im- munity in that the doctrine may be applied even when the sovereign is not itself a party to the litigation. In- ternational comity co ncerns may arise in any \"case[] touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states,\" Soci été Nationale , 482 U.S. at 543 n. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "In- ternational comity co ncerns may arise in any \"case[] touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states,\" Soci été Nationale , 482 U.S. at 543 n. 27. Ac- cordingly, courts may abstain in favor of a foreign fo-rum even when the litig ation is between private parties. E.g., Ungaro [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mujica , 771 F.3d at 614-6 15. Comity abstention is thus akin to other common -law abstention principles applied by federal courts, such as forum non conveniens , and federalism - based abstention. See 517 U.S. 706.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 F.3d 1227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "E.g., Ungaro 379 F.3d 1227; Mujica , 771 F.3d at 614-6 15. Comity abstention is thus akin to other common -law abstention principles applied by federal courts, such as forum non conveniens , and federalism - based abstention. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. The FSIA contemplates that these non- immunity defenses will remain available to foreign states even when a U.S. court has jurisdiction because an exception to sovereign immunity applies . Under 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The comity question warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "\" Pet. App. 19 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir. ), cert. denied,135 S. Ct. 2817).",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE CONDITIONS THAT AFFECT STUDENT BODY DIVERSITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION HAVE WORSENED",
		"context": "\"[C]ontext matters when reviewing race -based gov- ernment action under the Equal Protection Clause.\" Grutter , 549 U.S. at 327 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . In Grutter , this Court expressed hope that the context of higher education would change by 2028 such that race -conscious admis- sions would no longer be necessary. Unfortunately, that context has not improved—to the contrary, dis- parities in the underlying conditions that impact pro- spects f or college and university admissions remain, and in some respects have worsened in recent decades.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Madison's proposed extension of Ford and Panetti will lead to false claims, manipulation, and abuse",
		"context": "First, Madison's position would give talismanic importance to an inmate's mental disorder diagnosis, even though precise mental health diagnoses are shifting, debatable, and subjective. \"[P]sychiatrists disagree widely and frequently on what constitutes mental illness [and] on the appropriate diagnosis to be attached to given behavior and symptoms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, \"a particularly acute need for guarding against error inheres in a determination that 'in the present state of the mental sciences is at best a hazardous guess however conscientious.'\" Ford , 477 U.S. at 412 (quot- 339 U.S. 9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Madison's proposed extension of Ford and Panetti will lead to false claims, manipulation, and abuse",
		"context": "470 U.S. 68. For that reason, \"a particularly acute need for guarding against error inheres in a determination that 'in the present state of the mental sciences is at best a hazardous guess however conscientious.'\" Ford , 477 U.S. at 412 (quot- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Powell ex- plained, Unlike issues of historical fact, the question of petitioner's sanity calls for a basically subjec- tive judgment. And unlike a determination of 42 whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case, the competency determina- tion depends substantially on expert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nu- ances.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Madison's proposed extension of Ford and Panetti will lead to false claims, manipulation, and abuse",
		"context": "As Justice Powell ex- plained, Unlike issues of historical fact, the question of petitioner's sanity calls for a basically subjec- tive judgment. And unlike a determination of 42 whether the death penalty is appropriate in a particular case, the competency determina- tion depends substantially on expert analysis in a discipline fraught with 'subtleties and nu- ances.' Ford , 477 U.S. at 425 at 426 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (citations omitted). The diagnosis of cognitive disorders, in particular, is not nearly as straightforward as Madison claims. The DSM-5 classifies vascular dementia as a \"major neurocognitive disorder\" characterized by progres- sive memory loss, general cognitive decline, and di- minished executive functioning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Madison's proposed extension of Ford and Panetti will lead to false claims, manipulation, and abuse",
		"context": "Third, a rule prohibiting the execution of those who cannot remember committing their crime would create new opportunities for malingering and evasion. \"False pleas of amnesia by criminal defendants are both common and difficult to detect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although there are tests for detecting false claims of amnesia, \"'there is still ... no \"gold standard\" measure for distinguishing between cases of genuine and feigned amnesia.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "637 F.3d 831",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "1. As this Court has repeatedly recognized, the fi- nality of criminal judgments is \"essential to the opera- tion of our criminal justice system.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once a district court has pronounced a sentence and the sen- tence becomes final, the court may not alter tha t sen- tence except as Congress allows. See, e.g., United 21 442 U.S. 178 , which provid es that a court generally \"may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been im- posed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "489 U.S. 288. Once a district court has pronounced a sentence and the sen- tence becomes final, the court may not alter tha t sen- tence except as Congress allows. See, e.g., United 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which provid es that a court generally \"may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been im- posed.\" 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "2. The adjudication of a Section 404 motion is not a plenary resentencing akin to an initial sentencing. Alt- hough this Court has not directly considered the scope of a proceeding under Section 3582(c)( 1)(B) and Section 404 specifically , the Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], has address ed the scope of Section 3582(c) sentence -modification proceedings , in 22 the context of a request for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) . Section 3582(c)(2) codifies an ex- ception , analogous to a Section 404 modification for modifications based on retroactive Guidelines amend- ments, providing that \"in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentenc ing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "Neither Section 3582(c)(1)(B) nor Section 404 contains such an express reference to the Section 3553(a) factors. If anything, therefore, the textual dis- tinctions between the relevant provisions only under- score the narrow scope of a distr ict court's adjudication of a Section 404 motion. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. In accord with the text, context, and this Court's decision in Dillon , the courts of appeals have uniformly recognized that Se ction 404 motions are much more lim- ited than plenary sentencings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "See Pet. App. 18a -20a; 975 F.3d 84; 975 F.3d 318; 943 F.3d 175; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (5th Cir. ), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 285; 958 F.3d 494 (6th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "934 F.3d 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 404 motions operate as a limited exception to the general rule of finality in criminal sentencing and do not require a plenary resentencing",
		"context": "2020 ); 963 F.3d 1080; see also 836 Fed. Appx. 468. That distinction carries important procedural and sub- stantive consequences. For example, unlike a defendant at an initial sentencing or a plenary resentencing , an 25 offender seeking a sentence modification has no right to appointed counsel , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Dillon , 560 U.S. at 828. Correspondingly, as the Second Circuit has explained, Section 404 does not \"oblig [e] a court to reconsider all aspects of an original sentenc- ing,\" because \"[b]y its express terms, \" it \"does not re- quire plenary resentencing or operate as a surrogate for collateral review .\" Moore , 975 F.3d at 90 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 F.3d 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "It would be unseemly at best for U.S. courts to police allegations of infringement occurring in Germany, thereby ignoring or disregarding decisions made in a foreign judicial system according to the laws that apply in th at system , especially when those laws implement international treaty obligations that equally bind the United States. For more than two hundred years, this Court has, in the name of comity, avoided meddling in extraterritorial affairs. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sterling Drug, 14 F.3d 733 (\"It is one thing … to be barred under United States law from boycotting activity that they might be free to engag e in without violating British law. But it is quite a different thing for the holder of rights in a mark under German law to be ordered by a United States court to refrain from uses of that mark protected by German law.\"). 29 The instant matter presents an ev en more compelling case to respect sovereign boundaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "It would be unseemly at best for U.S. courts to police allegations of infringement occurring in Germany, thereby ignoring or disregarding decisions made in a foreign judicial system according to the laws that apply in th at system , especially when those laws implement international treaty obligations that equally bind the United States. For more than two hundred years, this Court has, in the name of comity, avoided meddling in extraterritorial affairs. See, e.g., 6 U.S. 64; Sterling Drug, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"It is one thing … to be barred under United States law from boycotting activity that they might be free to engag e in without violating British law. But it is quite a different thing for the holder of rights in a mark under German law to be ordered by a United States court to refrain from uses of that mark protected by German law.\"). 29 The instant matter presents an ev en more compelling case to respect sovereign boundaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 F.3d 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides: \" all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under th e Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. \" While \" treaties may comprise international commitments ... they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 564 U.S. 940; Weil Ceramics & Glass, 878 F.2d 30. Here, Congress has consciously enacted implementing legislation for the Paris Convention , which on its fac e also applies to TRIPs : \"Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks … to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law.\" 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "Article VI, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides: \" all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under th e Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land. \" While \" treaties may comprise international commitments ... they are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implementing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be 'self-executing' and is ratified on these terms. \" 552 U.S. 491 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Weil Ceramics & Glass, 878 F.2d 30. Here, Congress has consciously enacted implementing legislation for the Paris Convention , which on its fac e also applies to TRIPs : \"Any person whose country of origin is a party to any convention or treaty relating to trademarks … to which the United States is also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law, shall be entitled to the benefits of this section under the conditions expressed herein to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or reciprocal law.\" 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 940",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "15 U.S.C. § 1126. See, also e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]252 F.3d 1278; Barcelona.com, 330 F.3d at 628 (\"Section 44 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126, incorporates the Paris Convention into United States law, but only to provide foreign nationals with rights under United States law which are coextensive with the substantive provisions of the treaty involved. \" (quotations omitted)); H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.3d 1207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "Thus, enactment of this bill will be c onsistent with the terms of the agreement, as well as the Paris Convention, of which the U.S. also is a member. \").11 These implementing statutes make it even more dubious that Congress intended to rebut the presumption against exterritorial application of the Lanham Act. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is not a case where there is \"no clear indication of an extraterritorial application. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "Rather, there is a clear indication of the opposite intent . In implementing the Paris Convention and then TRIPs, Congress said plainly \" that United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world .\" See Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To hold otherwise would risk disrupting the territorial, international system to which the United States has subscribed via the Paris Convention and 11 The Second Circuit in Vanity Fair Mills noted, \"Plaintiff would appear to be correct in arguing that no special legislation in the United States was necessary to make the International Convention effective here. \" 234 F.2d at 640.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Extraterritorial Application Of The Lanham Act Risks Disrupting The International Trademark Regime, And Violating The United States' Obligations Under International Law",
		"context": "This point, however, is academic because even if the Second Circuit were wrong, Congress has clearly transposed the Paris Convention into United States law . 32 TRIPs , both as a treaty party and by implement ing those treaties through the Lanham Act. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Eu ropean Union has upheld its commitments under of these treaties. The European Court of Justice has forcefully confirmed the Union 's international obligations in the area of intellectual property rights, especially in the treatment of foreign nationals who benefit fully from national treatment for acts of use that take place in the Union in relation to their rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The uniqueness of an artist's speech does not lessen First Amendment protection.",
		"context": "Public-accommodation laws focus on the reason that people cannot access goods or services, i.e., discrimination, not th e mere existence of access. C.R. Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, access is but an effect of Colorado's true interest: \"eradica ting discrimination.\" 44 Pet.App.111a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The uniqueness of an artist's speech does not lessen First Amendment protection.",
		"context": "For First Amendment purposes, the message cannot be the medium. Second, a \"monopoly does not exist merely because\" someone's speech \"differs from others.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, most speakers create products that are, by their nature, unique and different from other content. As \"NBC is just another television network,\" Smith is one of many graphic designers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The uniqueness of an artist's speech does not lessen First Amendment protection.",
		"context": "Glob. Disc. Travel Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So long as \"there are market alternatives\"—which cannot logically be limited to \" identical products\"—a market remains free and competitive. E.I.",
		"citation_value_orig": "960 F. Supp. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The uniqueness of an artist's speech does not lessen First Amendment protection.",
		"context": "Edison Co. , 447 U.S. at 534 n.1 (\"regulated monopoly\" status did not \"preclude … First Amendment rights\"); PG&E , 475 U.S. at 17 n.14. The newspaper at issue in Tornillo enjoyed extensive market power akin to a \"local monopoly.\" 418 U.S. at 250 & n.15; accord U.S. Telecom [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the First Amendment protects actual monopolies from compelled speech in these cases, then it surely protects a singular artist like Smith who custom creates all her websites. 47",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
		"context": "1225(b)(2)(C) . Congress's use of the word \"may\" unmistakably indi- cates that contiguous -territory return is a discretionary tool that the Secretary has \"the authority, but not the duty ,\" to use. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 20 This Court has \"repeatedly observed\" that \"the word 'may' clearly connotes discretion.\" 140 S. Ct. 1601 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
		"context": "531 U.S. 230 . 20 This Court has \"repeatedly observed\" that \"the word 'may' clearly connotes discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The court of appeals' construction of Section 1225(b)(2)(C) as a springing mandate that the Secretary must implement w henever detention capacity is lacking is at war with the ordinary meaning of the term \"may .\" The court effectively rewrote the provision to say that the Secretary \"may return\" land -arriving noncitizens \"unless DHS lacks adequate detention capacity, in which case the Secretary must return\" them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
		"context": "But the court had no license to \"blue -pencil\" the statute in that manner. Free Enter . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The court of appea ls acknowledged that Section 1225(b)(2)(C) \"obviously \" is \"discretionary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
		"context": "Instead, Congress sought to ad- dress the flow of inadmissible noncitizens in large part through IIRIRA's new expedited -removal procedure, see 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1), which Congress crafted with the goal of \" weeding out patently meritless claims [for ad- mission] and expeditiously remov ing the aliens making such claims from the country.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But n othing in IIRIRA's text, context , or history suggests that Congress in- tended to obligate the Executive to return hundreds of thousands of land -arriving noncitizens to Mexico or Canada due to a lack of detention space. Indeed, contiguous -territory return received no sig- nificant attention as Congress considered IIRIRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is not a mandatory safety valve for a lack of detention capacity",
		"context": "The reports of the House Judiciary Committee and the Conference Com- mittee did not meaningfully discuss that authority at all. That silence is not surprising. As the Board of Immigration Appeals has explained , the contiguous - territory -return authority was added to Section 1225 principally to provide a statutory basis for INS's prior 23 discretionary return practice, shortly after the Board had found that it required express authorization in In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] an d its implementing regulation \"simply add[ ] to statute and regulation a long -standing practice of the Service.\" 62 Fed. Reg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 I. & N. Dec. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Administrative rulemaking is uniquely unresponsive to religious concerns",
		"context": "Ibid. This Court perhaps best summarized — and rejected —agencies' sometimes blinkered decision - making in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal , noting the \"classic rejoinder of bu- 20 reaucrats throughout histor y\" when asked for reli- gious exemptions: \"If I make an exception for you, I' ll have to make one for every body, so no exceptions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast , although Congress can and does also overlook religious liberty interests , \"Congress is f ar more sensitive to religious sensibilities than adminis- trators.\" Hamburger, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "Pet .App. 17a. This Court's deci- sion in Exxo n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , fully supports that proposition. In Exxon , a Maryland statute imposed bur dens on the oil industry, leading to a lawsuit by oil refin ers. T he plaintiffs produced ev idence that, because of the statute, some \"refiners will stop selling in Ma ryland\" altogether.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "12, § 2, traces all the way back to colonial times. 559 U.S. 4 .11 Proposition 12 ensures Cali- fornia purchasers are not unwittingly turned into eco - nomic supporters of practices they find morally repre- hensible, cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and ensures that California standards regard - ing California -raised animals can be effectively enforced, see, e.g., New York ex rel. 211 U.S. 31; 444 U.S. 51. Petitioners are free to promote their self -serving opin - ions that Proposition 12's minimal space standards are unnecessary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "559 U.S. 4 .11 Proposition 12 ensures Cali- fornia purchasers are not unwittingly turned into eco - nomic supporters of practices they find morally repre- hensible, cf. 501 U.S. 560 , and ensures that California standards regard - ing California -raised animals can be effectively enforced, see, e.g., New York ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 444 U.S. 51. Petitioners are free to promote their self -serving opin - ions that Proposition 12's minimal space standards are unnecessary. They are free to ignore substan tial and growing sci entific evidence demonstrating the link be- tween extreme con finement of farm animals and threats to human health.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "559 U.S. 4 .11 Proposition 12 ensures Cali- fornia purchasers are not unwittingly turned into eco - nomic supporters of practices they find morally repre- hensible, cf. 501 U.S. 560 , and ensures that California standards regard - ing California -raised animals can be effectively enforced, see, e.g., New York ex rel. 211 U.S. 31; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners are free to promote their self -serving opin - ions that Proposition 12's minimal space standards are unnecessary. They are free to ignore substan tial and growing sci entific evidence demonstrating the link be- tween extreme con finement of farm animals and threats to human health.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "The majority of Cal iforn- ians, how ever, feel oth erwise. Absent some showing that Prop osition 12's stat ed objectives are not genuine, this 11 See also Cresenzi Bird Imps. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,831 F.2d 410 (\"'New York has a legitimate interest in regulating its local market conditions which lead to the unjustifiable and senseless suf - fering and death of thousands of captured wild birds.' The State has an interest in cleansing its markets of commerce which the Legisla - ture finds to be unethical.\" (citation omitted) ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F. Supp. 1441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "The majority of Cal iforn- ians, how ever, feel oth erwise. Absent some showing that Prop osition 12's stat ed objectives are not genuine, this 11 See also Cresenzi Bird Imps. , 658 F. Supp. 1441, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"'New York has a legitimate interest in regulating its local market conditions which lead to the unjustifiable and senseless suf - fering and death of thousands of captured wild birds.' The State has an interest in cleansing its markets of commerce which the Legisla - ture finds to be unethical.\" (citation omitted) ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.2d 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "(citation omitted) ). 35 Court is \"'not con cerned with the wis dom, need, or appropriateness of legislation. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Singleton was poorly reasoned",
		"context": "at 118. But the \"effectiveness\" of the ad- vocate is not the test, as standing concerns the limits of the courts ' power. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even so, as described above, abortion providers cannot bring these claims under the proper test .",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Adopting the United States' and Tribes' narrow questions presented will create vehicle problems",
		"context": "8-11. 13 two placement preferences within the overall placement preferences section , will likely generate more questions about the constitutionality of the provisions for which this Court denies certiorari. A ruling finding section 1915( a)(3) unco nstitutional, for example, may implicate the constitutionality of sections 1915(a)(1) and (2) , as the Court will need to determine whether the Indian classi- fications in ICWA are subject to strict scrutiny as racial classifications or some less -demanding st andard under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There is no need for this Court to constrain its ability to address the deci- sion below by granting certiorari on only the questions the United States and the Tribes would like to see re-versed . The questions presented by Texas and the Indi- vidual Plaintiffs provide the Court the opportunity t o re- solve the larger constitutional issues raised by ICWA without engaging in a disfavored, piecemeal approach to merits review .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. The nature of the property on which this Cross stands makes the government’s imprimatur unambiguous",
		"context": "Pet.App.94a. Cf. Amer- ican Atheists, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, this solitary \"Calvary Cross\" was deliber- ately placed on Town property and remains alone on the government traffic island as a government- dedicated war memorial . No one is free to erect other displays on that median.",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "Separate and apart from its desire to ensure that otherwise qualified foster parents are not turned away on the basis of their protected characteristics, the City also has an independent policy goal to eliminate discrim- ination against LGBTQ couples, including those who seek to become foster parents. It is permissible for the City, consistent with its desire to protect the dignity of LGBTQ Americans—a value that has been recognized as 11 significant by this Court on numerous occasions, includ- ing as recently as last term—to insist that a private agency, if it seeks to avail it self of the City's funds and provide a government function, comply with the City's express nondiscrimination policy. The City's policy is founded in a recognition that \"denial [] of equal access to public establishments\" and services creates a \"deprivation of personal dignity,\" Heart of Atlanta Motel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and a desire to ensure that the foster care system it administers does not expose same-sex couples to potential humiliation and the stigma that they are somehow unfit to parent, ev ery time they seek to be- come a foster parent, see , e.g. , 576 U.S. 644. The City's policy ensures that pro- spective LGBTQ foster parents do not face the particu- larly harmful stigma of being rejected as potential foster parents, based solely on their protected characteristics, by the City or another party that bears the imprimatur and public funding of the State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "It is permissible for the City, consistent with its desire to protect the dignity of LGBTQ Americans—a value that has been recognized as 11 significant by this Court on numerous occasions, includ- ing as recently as last term—to insist that a private agency, if it seeks to avail it self of the City's funds and provide a government function, comply with the City's express nondiscrimination policy. The City's policy is founded in a recognition that \"denial [] of equal access to public establishments\" and services creates a \"deprivation of personal dignity,\" Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. 241, and a desire to ensure that the foster care system it administers does not expose same-sex couples to potential humiliation and the stigma that they are somehow unfit to parent, ev ery time they seek to be- come a foster parent, see , e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The City's policy ensures that pro- spective LGBTQ foster parents do not face the particu- larly harmful stigma of being rejected as potential foster parents, based solely on their protected characteristics, by the City or another party that bears the imprimatur and public funding of the State. 3 In demonstrating the LGTBQ foster parents are worthy of equal treatment, 3 Notably, while the amicus brief from the United States suggests that the City's decision to terminat e a contract with Catholic Social Services (CSS) caused similar harm to individual foster parents who held licenses through CSS, this is not an apt comparison.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "12 the City also preserves the dignity of LGTBQ children in the City's care. By adopting its policy of nondiscrimination against LGBTQ persons in carrying ou t governmental services, whether directly or through its agents, the City adheres to a fundamental precept rooted in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, however, of whether the Constitution re- quired the City to adopt this policy of nondiscrimination as part of its program, there should be no question that the City may , consistent with the Constitution, adopt a policy of nondiscrimination with respect to its own pro- grams, and then require compliance with that policy choice by parties that vol untarily choose to carry out that governmental program. Indeed, even the Bostock dissenters recognized the legitimate state interest in re- specting the dignity of its citizens.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "Indeed, even the Bostock dissenters recognized the legitimate state interest in re- specting the dignity of its citizens. 140 S. Ct. at 1823 (Ka- vanaugh, J., dissenting) (\"[G]ay and lesbian Americans 'cannot be treated as social ou tcasts or as inferior in dig- nity and worth.' \" (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])); see id. at 1783-1784 (Alito, J., dissenting) (rec- ognizing the \"humane and gene rous impulse[]\" that mo- tivates a desire for \"gay, lesbian, or transgender [Amer- icans] to be treated with the dignity, consideration, and fairness that everyone deserves\"). While this Court's precedent makes plain that the government may not require private parties accepting 13 government funding \"pledge allegiance to the Govern- ment's policy,\" the government equally plainly may seek to ensure that recipients do not use government funding to \"undermine the government's program and confuse its message.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "at 1783-1784 (Alito, J., dissenting) (rec- ognizing the \"humane and gene rous impulse[]\" that mo- tivates a desire for \"gay, lesbian, or transgender [Amer- icans] to be treated with the dignity, consideration, and fairness that everyone deserves\"). While this Court's precedent makes plain that the government may not require private parties accepting 13 government funding \"pledge allegiance to the Govern- ment's policy,\" the government equally plainly may seek to ensure that recipients do not use government funding to \"undermine the government's program and confuse its message.\" Agency for Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan , this Court rejected the ar- gument that \"the restrictions on the subsidization of abortion-related speech contained in the regulations [were] impermissible because they condition[ed] the re- ceipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of a consti- tutional right,\" observing that \"the Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone, but [] instead simply in- sisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.\" 500 U.S. 173.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "Agency for Int'l 570 U.S. 205. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan , this Court rejected the ar- gument that \"the restrictions on the subsidization of abortion-related speech contained in the regulations [were] impermissible because they condition[ed] the re- ceipt of a benefit on the relinquishment of a consti- tutional right,\" observing that \"the Government [was] not denying a benefit to anyone, but [] instead simply in- sisting that public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were authorized.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where the government pursues a policy goal through the administration of a public program, it has no obliga- tion to \"at the same time fund[] an alternative program [or viewpoint] which seeks to deal with the problem in another way,\" id. at 193, and is empowered to manage its \"internal affairs\" as it sees fit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In addition to protecting the interests of children, the City's nondiscrimination policy furthers the City's permissible policy goal of eliminating unequal treatment of LGBTQ couples in the context of the City's own programs",
		"context": "Where the government pursues a policy goal through the administration of a public program, it has no obliga- tion to \"at the same time fund[] an alternative program [or viewpoint] which seeks to deal with the problem in another way,\" id. at 193, and is empowered to manage its \"internal affairs\" as it sees fit. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the City has chosen, as part of the administra- tion of its foster care program, to require same-sex cou-ples be treated equally to different-sex couples. Alt- hough this policy of nondiscrimination furthers the City's interest in ensuring optimal outcomes for the chil- dren in its care, see pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Pentobarbital will render Bucklew insensate to pain within 20 to 30 seconds, and probably sooner",
		"context": "272 (emphasis added) . Thus, Dr. Zivot's estimate that pentobarbital would take 52 to 240 seconds to achieve iso electric EEG \"blatantly contradicted\" the study from which it was drawn, \"so that no reasonable jury could believe it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[A] court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedents Do Not Support the Application of a \"Conclusive\" Deference Standard Under Rule 44.1",
		"context": ". The Second Circuit misread this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , to require the application of \"conclusive\" deference to \"an official statement or declaration from a foreign government clarifying its laws.\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Precedents Do Not Support the Application of a \"Conclusive\" Deference Standard Under Rule 44.1",
		"context": "One needs to be no expert in Russian law to know that the expropriation decrees intended to sweep the assets of Russian companies taken over by that government into Russia's control no matter where those assets were credited.\"). Further, the substantive dispute in Pink involved weighty separation -of-powers concerns , including the President's power as the \"sole organ\" of foreign affairs to recognize the validity of foreign governments. See Pink , 315 U.S. at 229 , (explaining that the Executive's active participation in the litigation, on the heels of granting diplomatic recognition to the USSR and negotiating a comprehensive treaty with its government, implicated the President's Recognition power and his status a s the \"sole organ\" of foreign affairs) (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This case, by contrast, does not implicate the Executive's recognition power or a foreign legal statement solicited and endorsed by the U.S. government in the course of its diplomatic activities. Instead, the United States has urged this Court to hold that the Ministry's legal statement should not be granted conclusive deference, just as the United States does not receive conclusive deference for its legal statements offered in foreign courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB",
		"context": "II, § 1 . As Jus- tice Scalia noted in his persuasive (and hist orically vindicated) dissent in Morrison v. Olson , \"this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Article II also imposes on the President the duty to \"take Care that the L aws be faithfully executed.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB",
		"context": "II, § 3 . Because a President obviously cannot carry out the entire business of the executive branch himself, he must be able \"select those who [are] to act for him un- der his direction in the execution of the laws \" if he is to be able to exercise his constitutional aut hority and fulfill his constitutional duty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As J ames Madison noted in the First Congress, \"if any power whatsoever is in its nature Execu tive, it is the power of appointing, over- seeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.\" 1 Annals of Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB",
		"context": "The Framers therefore intended the President to have re- moval power because that power is necessary to \"to keep officers accountable. \" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This removal authority allows the President to hold his subordinates accountable. Denying the President this oversight authority would create the potential that a \"subordinate could ignore the Presi- dent's supervision and direction without fear, and the Preside nt could do nothing about it. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB",
		"context": "This removal authority allows the President to hold his subordinates accountable. Denying the President this oversight authority would create the potential that a \"subordinate could ignore the Presi- dent's supervision and direction without fear, and the Preside nt could do nothing about it. \" PHH [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress structured the CFPB in a way that is contrary to this basic constitutional command, under- mining the President's ability to \"take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution's Separation of Powers Prohibits the Current Structure of the CFPB",
		"context": "This would be constitutionally troubling if the CFPB were headed by a multi -member commission, but the fact that all thi s unaccountable power is vested in a single Director makes it even more consti- tutionally infirm, as there are not even the sort of in- ternal checks that exist with a multi -member body. That, and the fact that the Director cannot be removed by the President himself except in the narrow circum- stances of \"i nefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea- sance in office ,\" § 5491(c) (3), makes him \"the single most powerful official in the entire U.S. Government, other than the President\" himself. PHH [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, in the expansive areas under his jurisdic- tion, the Director is arguably even more powerful than 6 the President. As a result, the President simply can- not \" be held fully accountable for discharging his own responsibilities ,\" and such \"diffusion of authority … greatly diminish [es] the intended and necessary re- sponsibility of the chief magistrate himself ,\" as this Court has already recognized when it found the for - cause removal provision applicable to the Public Com- pany Accounting Oversight Board to be unconstitu- tional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Courts of Appeals Continue to Discard the Rule of Lenity in Favor of Reflexive Deference to the BIA",
		"context": "As this case demonstrates, the split in interpretation over the statutory question arises solely because of the larger confusion about the proper role of Chevron deference in this context. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, as the Ninth Circuit recognized while addressing the statutory question at issue here, deferring to the BIA's understanding of t he phrase \"offense relating to obstruction of justice\" \"raises serious constitutional concerns\" concerning the proper role of the rule of lenity. Valenzuela Gallardo , 968 F.3d at 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Courts of Appeals Continue to Discard the Rule of Lenity in Favor of Reflexive Deference to the BIA",
		"context": "Even when an agency's reading of an ambiguous statute results in unforeseeable consequences like expulsion from the United States or even incarceration, some courts claim not to be able to adopt a contrary reading. See Silva , 27 F.4th at 112 –13. The culprit, it seems, is this Court's opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], wh ere the majority deferred to an agency's interpretation of a law that carried criminal penalties. See, e.g. , Silva , 27 F.4th at 112 (concluding that applying the rule of lenity to BIA interpretation is \"flatly inconsistent\" with Babbitt) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Courts of Appeals Continue to Discard the Rule of Lenity in Favor of Reflexive Deference to the BIA",
		"context": "Id. And since Babbitt, this Court has affirmed that it has \"never held that the Government's reading of a criminal statute is entitled to any deference.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 573 U.S. 169 ; Cargill , 57 F.4th at 467 (\"Several courts cite Babbitt for the proposition that the Chevron framework applies with equal force to criminal regulations and di splaces the rule of lenity, but it does not support that conclusion. \"). Yet the lower courts remain insistent that their hands are tied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Courts of Appeals Continue to Discard the Rule of Lenity in Favor of Reflexive Deference to the BIA",
		"context": "At least twice this Court has granted certiorari to finally redirect the lower court s, but each time it resolved the cases on other grounds. See, e.g. , Esquivel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Meanwhile, a growing choru s of judges on the courts of appeals has expressed concern for Chevron deference's victory over the rule of lenity. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents are not \"direct purchasers\" in the sense in which the Illinois Brick Court used that term",
		"context": "But t here is no basis for assuming that tens of thousands of developers would all have re- spond ed in the same way if Apple had lowered its com- mission to a particular level. Indeed, the likelihood that different third -party app developers react ed to the com- mission in different ways is heightened by the fact that different apps compete in very different markets. A n 28 \"app[] for improving your romantic life,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, may compete with other such apps, and may compete as well with matchmaking services or the like in the broader economy. Such an app would not compe te, however, with \"apps for planning your budget\" or \"apps for track- ing pregnancy symptoms.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. EO-3 exceeds the limits of Section 1182(f)",
		"context": "Second , EO-3 does not follow but instead subverts congressional policy. Congress has established an intricate scheme for identifying and vetting terror- ists. That system includes \"specific criteria for determining terrorism-related inadmissibility,\" Kerry v.Din, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The President has effectively overridden Congress's scheme and replaced it with his own. EO-3 excludes aliens who do not satisfy any of the criteria set in the statutory terrorism bar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. EO-3 exceeds the limits of Section 1182(f)",
		"context": "27 Congress made and gut its careful scheme for over 150 million foreign nationals. The President has thus taken \"measures [that a]re incompatible with the expressed will of Con- gress.\" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.Sawyer , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The immigration laws vest the President with broad authority, but that authority must be exercised subject to the limits set by Congress. EO-3 trans- gresses those limits, and was properly enjoined.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Creates No Tension with the Decisions of Any Other Circuit",
		"context": "Be- fore the Second Circuit, the agencies excluded the 2013 Jeopardy Opinions from the administrative record, cit- ing the deliberative process privilege. Cooling Water , 905 F.3d at 65 n.9. The Second Circuit saw \"nothing in the privilege log that would disturb the 'presumption of regularity' afforded to the agencies' certified record,\" under Citizens to Preserve Overton [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and therefore denied a motion to com- pel amendment of that record. 905 F.3d at 65 n.9. As the court of appeals below explained, the Second Cir-cuit's ruling on the adequacy of the privilege log—in a footnote, with no analysis of either the requirements of 25 the deliberative process privilege or the facts sur- rounding the documents—does not \"suggest[ ] a differ- ent result\" from the one reached by the court below on the FOIA issue presented by this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Creates No Tension with the Decisions of Any Other Circuit",
		"context": "The court of appeals here assessed the Services' privilege invocation under FOIA, in which Congress specified that \"the burden is on the agency\" to sustain any exemption from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Senate of Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Sec- ond Circuit applied a \"presumption of regularity,\" de- manding instead \"a strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior,\" from the parties seeking to add the 2013 Jeopardy Opinions to th e administrative record. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park , 401 U.S. at 420.",
		"citation_value_orig": "823 F.2d 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court of Appeals' Decision Creates No Tension with the Decisions of Any Other Circuit",
		"context": "N.Y. Times , 939 F.3d at 490. The decision below is also entirely consistent with the D.C. Circuit's decision in National Security [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. National Security Archive found, first, t hat the draft agency history at issue preceded \"any final agen cy decision on the rele- vant matter.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests",
		"context": "In the absence of Williamson County 's state litigation doctrine, the ripeness inquiry in takings cases properly focuses on whether the issues relevant to takings liability are postured for review . 473 U.S. at 191 (explaining that the \"final decision \" ripeness requirement ensures that a court can apply regulatory takings tests to decide if a taking occurred); MacDonald, Sommer & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The considerations relevant to determining whether the government has caused a taking are generally fit for review once the government arrives at \"a definitive position\" that inflicts \"an actual, concrete injury\" to property. Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 193; Lujan , 497 U.S. at 891.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests",
		"context": "Just compensation issues raise remedial concerns that do not affect the issue of takings liability or a court's ability to decide that question . Tahoe-Sierra 42 Pres. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" [A] cash payment from the government would not relate to whether the regulation 'goes too far' (i.e., restricts use of the land so severely as to constitute a taking. \")). Thus, when the government causes concrete harm to property without initiation of condemnation proceedings — whether through enactment of a law that burdens property or conclusive application of an existing regulation —an affected property owner may assert that the result is a compensable taking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests",
		"context": ". .\"' (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). This injury-based ripeness inquiry may vary slightly depending on the type of alleged taking.16 See 16 The ripeness inquiry may be more intensive when a case involves a regulatory takings claim. In this context, a \"final agency decision\" may not exist unt il the property owner exhausts administrative procedures that allow the government to clarify the scope and effect of its regulations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests",
		"context": "Palazzolo , 533 U.S. at 620. This rule arises from the nature of regulatory takings analysis. 43 generally Brubaker Amusement Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in no case must the claimant prove that state remedies will not provide compensation before suing to establish a taking. \"The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused bef ore the federal one is invoked.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 F.3d 1349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Takings Claims Ripen When the Government Clearly Injures Property Interests",
		"context": "But in no case must the claimant prove that state remedies will not provide compensation before suing to establish a taking. \"The federal remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused bef ore the federal one is invoked.\" Monroe , 365 U.S. at 183 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Home Tel. & Tel . Co., 227 U.S. at 284- 85.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Smith Gave Passing Attention To The Text Of The Free Exercise Clause",
		"context": "But the First Amendment is different. Its liberties \"occupy a preferred position\" in our nation, and the right to exercise them \"lies at the foundation of free government by free men.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]573 U.S. 464. The First Amendment affords no less protection to the free exercise of religion. Smith eliminated heightened scrutiny for claims made under the Free Exercise Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Exception Should Continue To Exclude Homes",
		"context": "\"In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is the most basic application of the Amendment, securing private homes from warrantless government trespass. This Court's recent cases on trespass ory searches make clear that this original meaning of the amendment still applies when the government invades private property, as it did when seizing Mr. Caniglia's gun.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Expansive Interpretation May Pave the Way for Election Subversion.",
		"context": "At its extreme, Petitioners' theory could pave the way to subvert legitimate is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter.\" It would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for a state legislature to seek to retroactively disenfranc hise its own voters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Justin Levitt , Failed Elections and the Legislative Selection of Presidential Electors , 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1052, 1071 (2021) (\"[T]he Due Process Clause would be implicated in any attempt to replace, after the election had begun, the popular election processes currently authorized by statute with another means of elector selection.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "43 F.3d 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The Eleventh Circuit in 2011 Argued Well for Severability",
		"context": "Also deserving mention here is the appellate opinion the Court reviewed in 2012 before producing the NFIB v. Sebelius opinion , i.e., the Eleventh Circuit opinion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Following is a pertinent excerpt : In light of the stand -alone nature of hundreds of the Act's provisions and their manifest lack of connection to the individual mandate, the plaintiffs have not met the heavy burden needed to 30 rebut the presumption of severability . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "648 F.3d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Anti-Discrimination Laws Promote Religious Liberties",
		"context": "See Madison Letter (noting \"the equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution \"). 14 For exampl e, this Court has observed, \"it was 'historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.'\" Church of Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 532 (quoting Bowen , 476 U.S. at 703); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] confirms that preventing religious discrimination has been a key driver of such statutes. Indeed, it was squarely contemplated by Congress when it adopted that anti -discrimination law. See , e.g., H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Corr. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , prefigured : \"'where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good th e wrong done .'\" Bivens , 403 U.S. at 396 (quoting Bell, 327 U.S. at 684 ). And Bell made clear that the entire enterprise was based on federal - question jurisdiction: \"Whether the petitioners are 11 entitled to recover depends upon an interpretation of [the federal -question statute] and on a determination of the scope of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments ' protection [.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "There is a widely -held – but incorrect – assumption that federal -question jurisdiction is available for any federal claim. As Justice Holmes recognized, \"a page of history is worth a volume of logic. \" New York Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Until 1875, the lower federal courts did not have federa l-question jurisdiction. Merrell Dow Pharm., 478 U.S. at 807.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "As that histor y shows, unexamined assumptions cannot and do not accurately define the bounds of the lower federal courts ' federal -question jurisdiction. 12 Instead, \"because the Framers believed the state courts would be adequate for resolving most disputes, they generally left Congress the power of determining what cases, if any, should be channeled to the federal courts. \" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Whatever Congr ess did not expressly empower the lower federal courts to hear falls outside their jurisdiction: [T]he uniform and established doctrine is, that Congress having by the act of 1789 defined and regulated this jurisdiction in certain classes of cases, this af firmative expression of the will of that body is to be taken as excepting all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States extends, than those enumerated. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall. )",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "As creatures of statute, the lower courts have only the jurisdiction that Congress gave them, which need not extend to the full Article III limits , whatever those limits may be vis-à-vis the extraterritorial application of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments . In enacting the federal -question statute, Congress would have understood the Constitution 's geographic scope as limited to th is Nation : By usage as old as the Nation, such statutes have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which Americ an law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; United Fruit , 213 U.S. at 356 ; Belmont , 301 U.S. at 332 . As this Court has explained – early and often – \"general 13 words must … be limited … to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them. \" 16 U.S. 610 ; Lauritzen , 345 U.S. at, 578 (quoting Palmer ); 544 U.S. 385 , which nothing rebuts here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "345 U.S. 571 ; United Fruit , 213 U.S. at 356 ; Belmont , 301 U.S. at 332 . As this Court has explained – early and often – \"general 13 words must … be limited … to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them. \" 16 U.S. 610 ; Lauritzen , 345 U.S. at, 578 (quoting Palmer ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which nothing rebuts here. Even if this Court wanted to find that the Constitution applie s abroad, the lower courts ' federal - question jurisdiction would not apply . Nothing has happened since 1875 to e xpand the scope of the statutory grant of federal -question juris - diction to the lower courts: \"no changes of law or policy are t o be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Even if this Court wanted to find that the Constitution applie s abroad, the lower courts ' federal - question jurisdiction would not apply . Nothing has happened since 1875 to e xpand the scope of the statutory grant of federal -question juris - diction to the lower courts: \"no changes of law or policy are t o be presumed from changes of language in the revision unless an intent to make such changes is clearly expressed. \" Fourco Glass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Quite simply, federal -question jurisdiction as enacted d id not allow extraterritoriality, and nothing has changed. In a related context involving statutory subject - matter jurisdiction, t his Court has accepted prior decisions as limiting the seemingly -broad scope of the subject -matter jurisdiction statutes: Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congres - sional grant [in 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "In a related context involving statutory subject - matter jurisdiction, t his Court has accepted prior decisions as limiting the seemingly -broad scope of the subject -matter jurisdiction statutes: Whatever Article III may or may not permit, we thus accept the Barber dictum as a correct interpretation of the Congres - sional grant [in 28 U.S.C. §1332]. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 A similar reading here should convince this Court that Congress did not authorize this Court 's foray into an extraterritorial Constitution. To the contrary, for cases like the one here, Congress directed the courts to resolve such cases with diversity jurisdiction and choice -of-law analyses. Plaintiffs ' amici press examples of extraterritorial applications of U.S. law from our early history, Const 'l Accountability Ctr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Second, the choice -of-law analysis for these decisions is neither developed in the decisions themselves nor – necessarily – consistent with current choice -of-law principles. As explained in Section II, infra , Plaintiffs ' action now – and in 1789 – is properly viewed as a diversity action. 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 C. Constitutional avoidance counsels for requiring Plaintiff s to proceed under diversity jurisdiction and Mexican law before considering extraterritorial application of the U.S. Constitution. Two canons of construction counsel for avoiding a constitutional issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Two canons of construction counsel for avoiding a constitutional issue. First, courts interpret statutes to avoid raising co nstitutional questions unnecessarily. Edward J. DeBartolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 570 U.S. 1. Second, courts avoid issuing consti tutional decisions in cases that a narrower ground could decide: \"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless such adjudication is unavoidable. \" Spector Motor Serv., 323 U.S. 101; Elk Grove Unified Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Two canons of construction counsel for avoiding a constitutional issue. First, courts interpret statutes to avoid raising co nstitutional questions unnecessarily. Edward J. DeBartolo 485 U.S. 568 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, courts avoid issuing consti tutional decisions in cases that a narrower ground could decide: \"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless such adjudication is unavoidable. \" Spector Motor Serv., 323 U.S. 101; Elk Grove Unified Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Edward J. DeBartolo 485 U.S. 568 ; 570 U.S. 1. Second, courts avoid issuing consti tutional decisions in cases that a narrower ground could decide: \"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless such adjudication is unavoidable. \" Spector Motor Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Elk Grove Unified Sch. 542 U.S. 1. Both canons are relevant here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Federal-question jurisdiction is lacking for injuries arising abroad",
		"context": "Second, courts avoid issuing consti tutional decisions in cases that a narrower ground could decide: \"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality … unless such adjudication is unavoidable. \" Spector Motor Serv., 323 U.S. 101; Elk Grove Unified Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both canons are relevant here. Both canons counsel against expanding the flawed \"de facto \" sover eignty holding in Boumediene to new constitutional rights before first finding that Congress gave the lower courts federal -question jurisdiction over extraterritorial application of the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "4a, 42a. The statute has similarly been applied to acts of pro- curing and providing fraudulent documents and identi- fication information to unlawfully present aliens . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the defendant paid a gov- ernment employee to fraudulently issue a Social Secu- rity number to an alien. See id. at 1277 -1278, 1297 -1298; see also, e.g., 900 F.3d 721.",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "In 982 F.2d 133 , the defendant paid a gov- ernment employee to fraudulently issue a Social Secu- rity number to an alien. See id. at 1277 -1278, 1297 -1298; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute has also provided the basis for prosecut- ing schemes to provide assistanc e for unlawful entry, or to misleadingly lure aliens into the country for unlawful work. In 456 Fed. Appx. 267, for example, the defendant sold aliens fraudu- lent paper s to travel from Kenya to Cuba and provided instructions for unlawfully entering the United States from Cuba.",
		"citation_value_orig": "900 F.3d 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "See id. at 269. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the defendant sold an alien counterfeit papers to work in the Un ited States and led the alien to a hole in the border fence to enter unlawfully from Mexico . See id. at 11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 F.2d 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "See 791 F.3d at 1198-1199. Smuggling activities, too, are within the plainly leg it- imate sweep of the statute. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the defend- ant led aliens through an airport to their flight to the United States , \"timed their arrival at the boarding gate so that they could enter the aircraft without having to wait or be questioned extensively by airline employees,\" and sat behind them on the plane. Id. at 1150 -1151; s ee also, e.g., 301 F.3d 535 , the defendant picked an alien up at a Ca- nadian airport, drove the alien to the vicinity of the U.S. border, and arranged to meet the alien on the U.S. side of the bord er after the alien crossed on foot.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 F.3d 1145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "In 303 F.3d 1145, for example, the defend- ant led aliens through an airport to their flight to the United States , \"timed their arrival at the boarding gate so that they could enter the aircraft without having to wait or be questioned extensively by airline employees,\" and sat behind them on the plane. Id. at 1150 -1151; s ee also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the defendant picked an alien up at a Ca- nadian airport, drove the alien to the vicinity of the U.S. border, and arranged to meet the alien on the U.S. side of the bord er after the alien crossed on foot. See id. at 113-114. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 F.3d 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "Williams , 553 U.S . at 298 ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The pre -Framing common law treated \"persons counselling, abetting, and en- couraging\" the commission of a completed felony as ei- ther accessories before the fact or principals, depending on whether they were present for the commission of the crime . 2 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of Eng- land 182 (6th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "236 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "Gr eenawalt 690. More generally , it \"has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of lan- guage, either spoken, written, or printed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Court has explained, \"th e constitutional freedom for speech\" does not \"extend[] its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal statute .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plainly legitimate sweep of the statute encompasses significant real-world criminal activity",
		"context": "Williams , 553 U.S. at 298. Such \" 'prevention and punishment ' \" of \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" has \" 'never been thought to raise any C onstitutional problem. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment",
		"context": "They argued only that no reasonable factfinder could conclude that nitrogen hypoxia would substantially reduce the risk of Bucklew's suffering. As a result o f respondents' strategic choice, Bucklew had no obligation in opposing summary judgment to explain the factual basis for his assertion that lethal gas was a feasible and readily available alternative. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ricci , 557 U.S. at 586; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Instead, Bucklew properly focused on the comparative risk of suffering, and how a reasonable finder of fact could find, based on the record as a whole, that the lethal - gas alternative would substantially reduce a significant risk of severe pain. See supra Part III.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment",
		"context": "Ct. R. 15.2; id. R. 24 (merits briefs may not raise additional questions or chan ge the substance of ques- tions presented); United Props. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although respondents may generally advance any properly preserved argument in support of a judgment without taking a cross-appeal, 265 U.S. 425, this Court has declin ed to reach an argument 17 raised by the state as re spondent where that argu- ment was not made in the lower courts or in the peti- tion stage. See 510 U.S. 222.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 F.2d 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment",
		"context": "R. 24 (merits briefs may not raise additional questions or chan ge the substance of ques- tions presented); United Props. 379 F.2d 55. Although respondents may generally advance any properly preserved argument in support of a judgment without taking a cross-appeal, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has declin ed to reach an argument 17 raised by the state as re spondent where that argu- ment was not made in the lower courts or in the peti- tion stage. See 510 U.S. 222. Put simply, respondents are raising a new ground for the first time in this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "265 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Did Not Dispute That Lethal Gas Was A Feasible And Readily Available Alternative Method When Moving For Summary Judgment",
		"context": "379 F.2d 55. Although respondents may generally advance any properly preserved argument in support of a judgment without taking a cross-appeal, 265 U.S. 425, this Court has declin ed to reach an argument 17 raised by the state as re spondent where that argu- ment was not made in the lower courts or in the peti- tion stage. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put simply, respondents are raising a new ground for the first time in this Court. This is not a properly preserved alternative ground for affirmance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress did not suggest an intent to deviate from this consensus",
		"context": "Br. 30 -46 (citing statutes and cases from the District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachu- setts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ok- lahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Caroli-na, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, and West Virginia). 5 While the Court of Criminal Appeals is the highest court for criminal matters in Texas, the language of Texas's burglary statute construed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is unique. That provision had (and still has) three prongs: (1) unlawful entry with intent to commit a cr ime; (2) \"remain[ing] concealed\" unlawfully with intent to commit a crime; and (3) unlawful entry followed by commission of a crime. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 S.W.2d 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress did not suggest an intent to deviate from this consensus",
		"context": "There is no indication that Congress intended to do so. Under the rule of lenity, \" it would require statu- tory language much more explicit than that [ present here] to lead to the conclusion that Congress intend- ed\" to eliminate such a deep -rooted and longstanding feature of the criminal law . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In The Absence Of Diplomatic Concerns, Separation-Of-Powers Principles Present No Obstacle To ATS Liability In This Case",
		"context": "This precisely reflects the First Congress's intent. That purposive approach to ATS liability undergirded Jesner 's analysis. Central to that reasoning was Correctional Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which this Court declined to permit Bivens actions against corporate defendants. To allow such cases to proceed \"would have been a 'marked extension' of Bivens that was unnecessary to advance its purpose.\" Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1403 (quoting Malesko , 534 U.S. at 74); see also Malesko , 534 U.S. at 71–72 (discussing how the plaintiff's proposed remedy deviates from the \"core premise\" of Bivens ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In The Absence Of Diplomatic Concerns, Separation-Of-Powers Principles Present No Obstacle To ATS Liability In This Case",
		"context": "This argument once again sidesteps context. The TVPA provides a caus e of action for torture against \"individuals,\" a statutory term that excludes corporations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reiterating prudential concerns, the plurality in Jesner concluded that \"Congress' decision to exclude\" corporat ions from TVPA liability \"illustrates that significant foreign-policy implications \" counsel a restrained view of the ATS. Jesner , 138 S. Ct. at 1404 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. In The Absence Of Diplomatic Concerns, Separation-Of-Powers Principles Present No Obstacle To ATS Liability In This Case",
		"context": ". appear to violate internatio nal law only when committed by or at the behest of government officials.\" Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act after [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Prudential concerns with respect to for eign policy have counseled in favor of judicial caution in past cases. Here, in sharp contrast, those concerns decidedly weigh in favor of exercising jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "15. That is precisely the sort of \"excessively broad job description[]\" that this Court's precedent precludes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It would eliminate any avenue for teachers and coaches to engage in private religious expression on school grounds, a result four members of this Court have already found \"troubling .\" Pet.App.211 (Alito, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "That was of course their constitutional right, not any form of government speech. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That showing of solidarity was also an entirely predictable consequence of the district's suppression of Kennedy's private religious speech. Intolerance of private religious speech is neither popular nor constitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Once it is accepted that Kennedy's religious speech is his own, and not the government's, there are no remaining Establishment Clause concerns, let alone violations. 7 To the c ontrary, this Court has squarely and repeatedly rejected the proposition that the possibility that observers would mistake private religious speech for government endorsement justifies the suppression of private religious exercise. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Good News 533 U.S. 98 ; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Once it is accepted that Kennedy's religious speech is his own, and not the government's, there are no remaining Establishment Clause concerns, let alone violations. 7 To the c ontrary, this Court has squarely and repeatedly rejected the proposition that the possibility that observers would mistake private religious speech for government endorsement justifies the suppression of private religious exercise. See, e.g., 515 U.S. 819 ; Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Once it is accepted that Kennedy's religious speech is his own, and not the government's, there are no remaining Establishment Clause concerns, let alone violations. 7 To the c ontrary, this Court has squarely and repeatedly rejected the proposition that the possibility that observers would mistake private religious speech for government endorsement justifies the suppression of private religious exercise. See, e.g., 515 U.S. 819 ; Good News 533 U.S. 98 ; Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "of Educ. of Westside Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Everywhere except the Ninth Circuit, it has long been settled that government efforts to convert schools into religion -free-zones with respect even to private religious speech are not a benign form of Establishment Clause over -compliance , but a free - speech violation that reflects the kind of hostility to religion affirmatively prohibited by the Religion Clauses. The district can defend the Ninth Circuit's holding only by disregarding its premise that schools can suppress even private religious speech under the guise of Establishment Clause compliance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Everywhere except the Ninth Circuit, it has long been settled that government efforts to convert schools into religion -free-zones with respect even to private religious speech are not a benign form of Establishment Clause over -compliance , but a free - speech violation that reflects the kind of hostility to religion affirmatively prohibited by the Religion Clauses. The district can defend the Ninth Circuit's holding only by disregarding its premise that schools can suppress even private religious speech under the guise of Establishment Clause compliance. For example, the district claims that the Ninth Circuit simply engaged in a \"prosaic application of the settled legal test\" under Santa Fe Independent School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2000) , and 482 U.S. 578 . But Santa Fe and Edwards involved what the Court deemed to be government speech. Pet.App.100 -01 (O'Scannlain, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Everywhere except the Ninth Circuit, it has long been settled that government efforts to convert schools into religion -free-zones with respect even to private religious speech are not a benign form of Establishment Clause over -compliance , but a free - speech violation that reflects the kind of hostility to religion affirmatively prohibited by the Religion Clauses. The district can defend the Ninth Circuit's holding only by disregarding its premise that schools can suppress even private religious speech under the guise of Establishment Clause compliance. For example, the district claims that the Ninth Circuit simply engaged in a \"prosaic application of the settled legal test\" under Santa Fe Independent School 530 U.S. 290 ( 2000) , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But Santa Fe and Edwards involved what the Court deemed to be government speech. Pet.App.100 -01 (O'Scannlain, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 F.3d 1139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.3d 1105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const. : Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const. : Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const. : Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 22 533 U.S. 678 ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const. : Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ....... 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 546 U.S. 500 ....................... 2 575 U.S. 320 ................................ ................................ 7 442 U.S. 682 ..................... 7, 10 342 U.S. 524 .............................. 20 Catholic Social Services, 232 F.3d 1139 ................................ ............... 5 543 U.S. 371 (20 05) ............................... 16 403 U.S. 443 .............. 22 538 U.S. 510 .......................... 4, 19, 20 Facebook, 141 S. Ct. 1163 .................... 22 397 U.S. 254 ................................ . 23 419 U.S. 565 ................................ ....... 23 IV Cases —Continued: Page Harris Trust & Savings 530 U.S. 238 ........................... 16 562 U.S. 428 ......................... 2 138 S. Ct. 830 ..................... 22 349 U.S. 302 ............................... 22 408 U.S. 471 ........................... 23 498 U.S. 103 ....................... 4 139 S. Ct. 954525 U.S. 471 ................................ ........... 7 591 F.3d 1105 .............. 5 407 U.S. 345 ............... 22 419 U.S. 393 ................................ ...... 12 272 U.S. 1 ................................ ................................ . 22 535 U.S. 625 ........................ 2 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power 435 U.S. 519 ................................ .............................. 15 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. 338 ................................ .............................. 12 421 U.S. 35 ................................ 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, regulations , and rule s: U.S. Const. : Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "16) and in the petition for a writ of certiorari. But questions of subject -matter jurisdic- tion \"can never be forfeited or waived.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Federal courts \"have an independent o bligation to determine whether subject -matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.\" 546 U.S. 500.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "535 U.S. 625. Federal courts \"have an independent o bligation to determine whether subject -matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents contend (Br. 47) that Section 1252(f )(1) \"does not concern jurisdiction\" because \"[i]t only limits the relief courts may provide.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "1252(f )(1). And al - though the scope of relief is often a merits rather than a jurisdictional question, Congress \"is free to attach the conditions that go with the jurisdictional label\" to re- strictions that courts would not otherwise deem juris- dictional. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress did that here by using the word \"ju- risdiction.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "1252(a)(2)(A). \"Since iter- ation is obviously afoot in the relevant passage, there is no justification for extr uding an unnatural meaning\" simply \"to avoid iteration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" The Sec- retary shall develop a system to detect any fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in the operation of such programs . \"); cf. 538 U.S. 510's proviso that it applies \"[r]egard- less of the nature of the action or claim\" confirms that it bars injunctions purporting to enforce the covered provisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "498 U.S. 103 (\" The Sec- retary shall develop a system to detect any fraud, abuse, or mismanagement in the operation of such programs . \"); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s proviso that it applies \"[r]egard- less of the nature of the action or claim\" confirms that it bars injunctions purporting to enforce the covered provisions. 8 U.S.C. 1252(f )(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "But the statute already says that, so respondents' interpretation renders the proviso sur- plusage. Under the government's interpretation, the proviso eliminates any doubt that the bar applies to claims, like those here, \" alleg [ing] that the Executive 's action does not comply with the statutory grant of au- thority .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Respondents' interpretation conflicts with vari- ous background rules of interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' bond-hearing regime is not necessary to avoid serious constitutional doubts",
		"context": "52) that their interpre tation does not single out constitutional claims, because \"[c]lasswide injunctions are prohibited if they seek to enjoin the statute's operation, regardless of whether the claim for that injunction arises under the Constitution or a statute,\" such as \"the Religious Free- dom Restoration Act.\" But respondents offer no exam- ple of the dismissal of a statutory claim for lack of juris- diction, confirming that their interpretation disfavors constitutional claims in practice. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( reversing",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.3d 1105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Bob Richards Rule Is Unlawful",
		"context": "That rule holds that, absent an \"unambiguous[ ]\" agreement to the contrary, a tax refund \"belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund,\" and that a parent merely holds that refund for the subsidiary in an \"agency\" or \"trust\" capacity. Id. (citations omit- ted); see Capital Bancshares, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re473 F.2d 262. Bob Richards thus offers a readymade an- swer to the central ownership question at stake in disputes over affiliated tax refunds: Unless the parties \"unambiguously\" agree otherwise, Bob Rich- 9 ards instructs, a tax refund is a subsidiary's proper- ty, not the parent's. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "957 F.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Bob Richards Rule Is Unlawful",
		"context": "That rule holds that, absent an \"unambiguous[ ]\" agreement to the contrary, a tax refund \"belongs to the company responsible for the losses that form the basis of the refund,\" and that a parent merely holds that refund for the subsidiary in an \"agency\" or \"trust\" capacity. Id. (citations omit- ted); see Capital Bancshares, 957 F.2d 203; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bob Richards thus offers a readymade an- swer to the central ownership question at stake in disputes over affiliated tax refunds: Unless the parties \"unambiguously\" agree otherwise, Bob Rich- 9 ards instructs, a tax refund is a subsidiary's proper- ty, not the parent's. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 F.2d 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE COURT SHOULD RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW RULE AND DISAVOW THE MARKS RULE",
		"context": "This Court has found the Rule not \"useful. \"12 In recent years, this Co urt has failed to follow the Rule (that is why Brunetti uses \"disavow\" rather than \"overrule\"). As the argument in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], illustrated, the Court is aware of the problems created by the Rule, but concerned about what would replace the Rule. Brunetti suggests that the Court should return to the common law rule for stare decisis : a majority on the judgment and majority on the reasoning (hereinafter referred to as the Dual- Majority maxim). 13 of products, updated versions of th e mark, or file again if it failed to renew a registration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. THE COURT SHOULD RETURN TO THE COMMON LAW RULE AND DISAVOW THE MARKS RULE",
		"context": "Brunetti suggests that the Court should return to the common law rule for stare decisis : a majority on the judgment and majority on the reasoning (hereinafter referred to as the Dual- Majority maxim). 13 of products, updated versions of th e mark, or file again if it failed to renew a registration. 12 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Brunetti proposes Dual-Majority as an unambiguous term for the common law rule for stare decisis : majority on the judg- ment and majority on the reasoning. Note that the term \"dual majority\" has been used to refer to a majority that includes the reasoning of dissenting opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Catholic Church exemplifies numerous religious groups who face discriminatory treatment under the Ninth Circuit's approach",
		"context": "This disparate treatment is intolerable under the Establishment Clause. Some religious groups recognize the concept of ordination broadly, some recognize it \"only as to certain offices,\" and some do not recognize it at all. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Formal titles and training might therefore be relevant to determining ministerial status for Lutherans, a tradition in which such markers strongly correlate to religious leadership. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 1238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The statutory structure, history, and purpose further support the Secretary's interpretation",
		"context": "B. At a minimum, as the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have recognized, the Secretary's interpretation represents a reasonable reading of the statute that is entitled to defer-ence under Chevron U.S.A. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent the statute does not unambiguously compel the Secretary's interpretation , it at least permits that approach . The Court can resolve this case on that basis without determining whether HHS 's reading is the best or only reasonable one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "cades. The Court has on many occasions discussed in great depth the origin of our First Amendment Religion Clauses. See e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 397 U.S. 664, 465 U.S. 668, Van 545 U.S. 677, Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067, These discussions remain by and large 4 the same regardless of the myriad of situation s to which the Religion Clauses are applied. Employment disputes between religious employers and their employees are included in this myriad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "cades. The Court has on many occasions discussed in great depth the origin of our First Amendment Religion Clauses. See e.g., 330 U.S. 1, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 465 U.S. 668, Van 545 U.S. 677, Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067, These discussions remain by and large 4 the same regardless of the myriad of situation s to which the Religion Clauses are applied. Employment disputes between religious employers and their employees are included in this myriad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "cades. The Court has on many occasions discussed in great depth the origin of our First Amendment Religion Clauses. See e.g., 330 U.S. 1, 397 U.S. 664, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Van 545 U.S. 677, Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067, These discussions remain by and large 4 the same regardless of the myriad of situation s to which the Religion Clauses are applied. Employment disputes between religious employers and their employees are included in this myriad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "cades. The Court has on many occasions discussed in great depth the origin of our First Amendment Religion Clauses. See e.g., 330 U.S. 1, 397 U.S. 664, 465 U.S. 668, Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Am. 139 S. Ct. 2067, These discussions remain by and large 4 the same regardless of the myriad of situation s to which the Religion Clauses are applied. Employment disputes between religious employers and their employees are included in this myriad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2067, These discussions remain by and large 4 the same regardless of the myriad of situation s to which the Religion Clauses are applied. Employment disputes between religious employers and their employees are included in this myriad. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explicitly found that in matters of \"church government as well as those of faith and doctrine,\" religious organizations had the right to be free from governmental interference. Included in this guaranteed right to be free from governmental interference was the \"freedom to select clergy.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "244 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "Courts also applied the exception to a wide variety of religious employers and employees and did not restrict the exception to heads of religious congregations. Hosanna -Tabor , 565 U.S. at 664. 5 For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the plaintiff school music director and part- time music teacher at the Catholic elementary school was barred by the ministerial exception from bringing an employment discrimination lawsuit. The Fourth Circuit held that music was an integral aspect of religious worship and as such, the plaintiff's \"primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 F.3d 795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "Plaintiff was considered by the court to be a \"minister\" for the purposes of the exception. Id . And in Alicea [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff , an Hispanic communications manager , \"can functionally be classified as ministerial.\" The court looked at the plaintiff's duties and determined the pl aintiff \"served a ministerial function.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F.3d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "at 704. While the circuits have not articulated one specific method of applying the McClure holding, lower courts generally looked to the \"function of the position\" rather than to titles or ordination. Se e e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 462 F.3d 294, Rayburn, 772 F.3d at 1168- 69, 474 F.3d 223, EEO 676 F.2d 1272, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff seminarian was a \"minister\" within the meaning of ministerial exception because, unlike the secretary in Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n , the plaintiff's role went to the \"heart of the church's function.\" And in 375 F.3d 951, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee was barred from pursuing claims which \"necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's decision to terminate her ministry.\" The Court rested its \"function over ordination\" decision on similar circuits which had focused their analysis primarily on the function served by the employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "83 F.3d 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "at 704. While the circuits have not articulated one specific method of applying the McClure holding, lower courts generally looked to the \"function of the position\" rather than to titles or ordination. Se e e.g., 83 F.3d 455, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Rayburn, 772 F.3d at 1168- 69, 474 F.3d 223, EEO 676 F.2d 1272, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff seminarian was a \"minister\" within the meaning of ministerial exception because, unlike the secretary in Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n , the plaintiff's role went to the \"heart of the church's function.\" And in 375 F.3d 951, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee was barred from pursuing claims which \"necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's decision to terminate her ministry.\" The Court rested its \"function over ordination\" decision on similar circuits which had focused their analysis primarily on the function served by the employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 F.3d 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "at 704. While the circuits have not articulated one specific method of applying the McClure holding, lower courts generally looked to the \"function of the position\" rather than to titles or ordination. Se e e.g., 83 F.3d 455, 462 F.3d 294, Rayburn, 772 F.3d at 1168- 69, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], EEO 676 F.2d 1272, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff seminarian was a \"minister\" within the meaning of ministerial exception because, unlike the secretary in Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n , the plaintiff's role went to the \"heart of the church's function.\" And in 375 F.3d 951, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee was barred from pursuing claims which \"necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's decision to terminate her ministry.\" The Court rested its \"function over ordination\" decision on similar circuits which had focused their analysis primarily on the function served by the employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 F.3d 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "at 704. While the circuits have not articulated one specific method of applying the McClure holding, lower courts generally looked to the \"function of the position\" rather than to titles or ordination. Se e e.g., 83 F.3d 455, 462 F.3d 294, Rayburn, 772 F.3d at 1168- 69, 474 F.3d 223, EEO [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff seminarian was a \"minister\" within the meaning of ministerial exception because, unlike the secretary in Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n , the plaintiff's role went to the \"heart of the church's function.\" And in 375 F.3d 951, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee was barred from pursuing claims which \"necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's decision to terminate her ministry.\" The Court rested its \"function over ordination\" decision on similar circuits which had focused their analysis primarily on the function served by the employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "676 F.2d 1272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Ministerial Exception\" Is Grounded in the First Amendment Religion Clauses and Has Been Applied by Courts for Decades",
		"context": "While the circuits have not articulated one specific method of applying the McClure holding, lower courts generally looked to the \"function of the position\" rather than to titles or ordination. Se e e.g., 83 F.3d 455, 462 F.3d 294, Rayburn, 772 F.3d at 1168- 69, 474 F.3d 223, EEO 676 F.2d 1272, the Ninth Circuit held the plaintiff seminarian was a \"minister\" within the meaning of ministerial exception because, unlike the secretary in Pacific Press Publishing Ass'n , the plaintiff's role went to the \"heart of the church's function.\" And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff employee was barred from pursuing claims which \"necessarily involve an inquiry into the Church's decision to terminate her ministry.\" The Court rested its \"function over ordination\" decision on similar circuits which had focused their analysis primarily on the function served by the employee. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "Ibid. ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 Before the Founding, Anglo -American criminal law treated someone who successfully counseled, abetted, encouraged, or otherwise incited a criminal offense as an accessory to that offense. See Kent Greenawalt, Speech and Crime , 1980 Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "236 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "There is ac- cordingly no tenable argument that the original under- standing of t he First Amendment limited \" statutes that penalize encouragements to specific crime s.\" Ibid. It therefore \"has never been an abridgment of free- dom of speech to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evi- denced, or carried out by means of language, either spo- ken, written, or printed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As th is Court has ex- plained, \"th e constitutional freedom for speech\" does not \"extend[] its immunity to speech or writing used as an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid crimi- nal st atute .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "Williams , 553 U.S. at 298. Such \" 'prevention and punishment' \" of \"speech integral to criminal conduct\" has \" 'never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Court's decisions reflect, when speech is \"in- tended to induce or commence illegal activities ,\" it has \"no social value\" and \"enjoy [s] no First Amendment protection .\" Williams , 553 U.S. at 298 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "Williams , 553 U.S. at 298 . That principle applies irrespective of whether the proscription of the underlying activity is criminal or civil. In Pittsburgh Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, this Court upheld the application of a civil ban on aiding unlawful employment practices to a newspaper's sex -discriminatory place- ment of help -wanted advertisements. Id. at 378, 388 - 389.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "158(b)(4) (Supp. II 1948); 43 see also International Bhd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] likewise \"carries no unconstitutional abridgement of free speech,\" IBEW , 341 U.S. at 705. Its criminal prohibition on so- liciting or facilitating certain civil immigration offenses reflects more than a ce ntury of congressional recogni- tion that criminal penalties may be appropriate for someone who induces unlawful activity by a noncitizen , even when criminal penalties are not imposed on the noncitizen who is induced. See Lees , 150 U.S. at 480 (explaining t hat \"the [criminal] penalty\" in Section 1324(a)'s predecessor was \"visited not upon the alien la- borer,\" who was merely subject to deportation, \"but upon the party assisting in the importation\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "\" Building Serv. Emps. Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A legislature's choice to, say, make prostitution a civil rather than criminal offense should not come at the price of constitutionally invalidating criminal sanctions against facilitating or soliciting pros- titution . And a constitutional line between civil and crim- inal illegality in this context would introduce unwarranted complexities into First Amendment law by requiring determinations of whether a potential \"civil\" penalty might in fact be \"criminal\" in nature, s ee, e.g., 522 U.S. 93 , or whether a third party's conduct satisfied all of the elements ( in- cluding the mens rea element) of a crime, see, e.g., Helver- 303 U.S. 391; 26 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "Int'l 339 U.S. 44 . A legislature's choice to, say, make prostitution a civil rather than criminal offense should not come at the price of constitutionally invalidating criminal sanctions against facilitating or soliciting pros- titution . And a constitutional line between civil and crim- inal illegality in this context would introduce unwarranted complexities into First Amendment law by requiring determinations of whether a potential \"civil\" penalty might in fact be \"criminal\" in nature, s ee, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , or whether a third party's conduct satisfied all of the elements ( in- cluding the mens rea element) of a crime, see, e.g., Helver- 303 U.S. 391; 26 U.S.C. 7201 (crim- inal penalty for willful tax-law violation). Nothing in this Court's First Amendment jurispru- dence foreclosed Congress from criminalizing respond- ent's conduct here, in which he induced his victims to violate the civil immigration laws .",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv)'s application to speech involved in facilitating or soliciting unlawful activity presents no First Amendment concerns",
		"context": "Int'l 339 U.S. 44 . A legislature's choice to, say, make prostitution a civil rather than criminal offense should not come at the price of constitutionally invalidating criminal sanctions against facilitating or soliciting pros- titution . And a constitutional line between civil and crim- inal illegality in this context would introduce unwarranted complexities into First Amendment law by requiring determinations of whether a potential \"civil\" penalty might in fact be \"criminal\" in nature, s ee, e.g., 522 U.S. 93 , or whether a third party's conduct satisfied all of the elements ( in- cluding the mens rea element) of a crime, see, e.g., Helver- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 26 U.S.C. 7201 (crim- inal penalty for willful tax-law violation). Nothing in this Court's First Amendment jurispru- dence foreclosed Congress from criminalizing respond- ent's conduct here, in which he induced his victims to violate the civil immigration laws .",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Opinion Diverges from Four Circuits' Precedent on Potential Harm to Third Parties",
		"context": ". too late to ta ke safety precautions.\" Larsen's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, an officer shot an in dividual who had just stolen the officer's cruiser. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 F.3d 1255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The First Circuit Similarly Allowed the Government's Speech Restriction To Transform a Public Forum into Government Speech",
		"context": "Thus, 576 U.S. 200, held license plates to be government speech because they served \"the governmental purpo ses of vehicle regis- tration and identification.\" The Government could therefore determine which messages would impede its purpose of an effective government identifier. Likewise, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the funding at issue was for \"acceptable and effective family planning methods and services,\" and the government had the power to determine what it would define as \"acceptable and effective\" methods. Once that boundary of what t he government wanted to say was established, its exclusion of opposing view- points was consistent with the court's protection of the government's ability to choose its own message. And in Summum , the city allowed monuments to be erected in the park that wer e \"directly relate[d] to the history\" of the city, or \"donated by groups with longstanding ties\" to the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The First Circuit Similarly Allowed the Government's Speech Restriction To Transform a Public Forum into Government Speech",
		"context": "Pet.App.137a. Having \"opened\" its property for \"ex- pressive activity,\" any restrictions on that activity are subject to \"the same limitations as that governing a tradi tional public forum.\" Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Con- sciousness, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But instead of following the plain language of the government's policy and application, the court below ignored this Court's admonition to exercise \"great caution before extending…government -speech prece- dents,\" 137 S. Ct. 1744. Rather, the court determined that \"the City engages in government speech when it raises a third -party flag,\" Shurtleff , 986 F.3d at 94, because, while the City has let many groups raise a wide variety of flags (at over 280 flag raisings), id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The First Circuit Similarly Allowed the Government's Speech Restriction To Transform a Public Forum into Government Speech",
		"context": "Having \"opened\" its property for \"ex- pressive activity,\" any restrictions on that activity are subject to \"the same limitations as that governing a tradi tional public forum.\" Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Con- sciousness, 505 U.S. 672. But instead of following the plain language of the government's policy and application, the court below ignored this Court's admonition to exercise \"great caution before extending…government -speech prece- dents,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the court determined that \"the City engages in government speech when it raises a third -party flag,\" Shurtleff , 986 F.3d at 94, because, while the City has let many groups raise a wide variety of flags (at over 280 flag raisings), id. at 83 –84, the court be- lieved these flags have fit in a \"narrow set of accepta- ble secular designs,\" for \"countries, civic organiza- tions, or secular causes,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. SECTION 20913(d) FAILS TO SUPPLY AN \"INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,\" AS REQUIRED BY THE PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT",
		"context": "This Court ha s repeatedly affirmed that the Constitu- tion forbids Congress from giving lawmaking powers to executive or agency official s—even as the \"nondelegation doctrine \" moniker has misdescribed and downplayed the offense to the Constitution. In Marshall Field & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court observed: That congress cannot delegate legislative power to the president is a principle universally recog- nized as vital to the integrity and maintenance 17 of the system of government ordained by the constitution. Id. at 692.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WARRANTS REVIEW AND A THIRD QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDED ON AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY",
		"context": "at 15; see also Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 8, Am. Isuzu Motors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]511 U.S. 164. There, the Court explained that \"when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant's violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 1028",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION WARRANTS REVIEW AND A THIRD QUESTION SHOULD BE ADDED ON AIDING-AND-ABETTING LIABILITY",
		"context": "at 15; see also Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners 8, Am. Isuzu Motors, 553 U.S. 1028[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Court explained that \"when Congress enacts a statute under which a person may sue and recover damages from a private defendant for the defendant's violation of some statutory norm, there is no general presumption that the plaintiff may also sue aiders and abettors.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PREVALENCE OF PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS MOOTS STARE DECISIS CONCERNS",
		"context": "Federation of State, County, & Municipal. Emps., Council 31 , 138 S . Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 1 U.S. 808). Accordingly, t he Court has not hesitated to depart from \"continued adherence to . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PREVALENCE OF PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS MOOTS STARE DECISIS CONCERNS",
		"context": ". erroneous precedent \" where it was appropriate to do so. Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]501 U.S. 827. Importantly , \"'[t]he doctrine [of stare decisis] is at its weakest when [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution because [that] interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendmen t or by overruling [the Court 's] prior decisions. '\" Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting 521 U.S. 203); see also Casey , 505 U.S. at 995 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (\" Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PREVALENCE OF PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS MOOTS STARE DECISIS CONCERNS",
		"context": "Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485501 U.S. 827. Importantly , \"'[t]he doctrine [of stare decisis] is at its weakest when [the Court] interpret[s] the Constitution because [that] interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendmen t or by overruling [the Court 's] prior decisions. '\" Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2478 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also Casey , 505 U.S. at 995 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (\" Not only did Roe not, as the Court suggests, resolve the deeply divisive issue of abortion; it did more than anything else to nourish it . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PREVALENCE OF PREGNANCY HELP ORGANIZATIONS MOOTS STARE DECISIS CONCERNS",
		"context": "In constitutional cases, therefore, ensuring that the Court 's rulings are correct takes on outsized importance . See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828 ( \"[T]he Court has during the past 20 Terms overruled in whole or in part 33 of its previous constitutional decisions. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As shown below, the reliance concerns asserted by the Casey plurality have been overtaken by societal developments, including the expansion of the pregnancy help network . Such concerns do not 14 warrant adhering to Roe and its progeny if the Court determines that those cases were wrongly decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": "\"The interpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same is true for Indian treaties. The \"starting point for any analysis\" of Indian treaties \"is the treaty language itself .",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": ". interpreted in light of the parties' intentions[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Fishing Vessel , 443 U.S. at 675 (a treaty \"between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations\"). Although \"treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,\" Oklahoma Tax 515 U.S. 450. This Court has therefore rejected claims that lacked support in treaty 32 language.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": "interpreted in light of the parties' intentions[.]\" 526 U.S. 172; see also Fishing Vessel , 443 U.S. at 675 (a treaty \"between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations\"). Although \"treaties should be construed liberally in favor of the Indians,\" Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has therefore rejected claims that lacked support in treaty 32 language. See, e.g., Chickasaw , 515 U.S. at 466 (\"[L]iberal construction cannot [overcome] a clear geographic limit in the Treaty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": "This Court has therefore rejected claims that lacked support in treaty 32 language. See, e.g., Chickasaw , 515 U.S. at 466 (\"[L]iberal construction cannot [overcome] a clear geographic limit in the Treaty. \"); Oregon Dep't of Fish & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in interpreting this very clause, this Court held that because \"the Treaty is silent as to the mode or modes of fishin g that are guaranteed,\" the treaties allowed nondiscriminatory state regulation of fishing methods. Puyallup Tribe , 391 U.S. at 398.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": "Instead, this Court has held that the language means that \"[b]oth sides have a right, secured by treaty, to take a fair share of the available fish. That, we think, is what the parties to the treaty intended when they secured to the Indians the right of taking fish in common with other citizens.\" Fishing Vessel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]-85. Indeed, inferring a promised standard of living that implicitly secures powe r to limit off-reservation development contradicts clear treaty language. This reading would mean that the Treaties reserved what the Tribes have called an implied \"negative easement or negative servitude\" in all of the ceded lands, JA 109a, requiring current landowners to avoid development that might affect fish abundance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit's Inferred Right is Unsupported by Treaty Language",
		"context": "But none include language granting the Tribes a right to control development in the future State. Instead, the cession in the treaties was intended to \"further[] the national program\" of allowing development. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The treaty language also contradicts the notion that the tribes would make a living solely from fishing. Five of the treaties promise that the United States would send teac hers of blacksmithing, carpentry, and farming, and help \"break up a sufficient quantity of land for cultivation\" within their reservations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles of tort law impose a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers of a product",
		"context": "The Third Circuit's test aligns with not only general maritime law and the predominant law on the land, but also traditional common-law tort principles. For over a hundred years, this Court has recognized that \"[i]t is well settled that a man who delivers an article which he knows to be dangerous or noxious, to another person, without notice of its nature and qualities, is liable for any injury which may reasonably be contemplated as likely to result, and which does in fact result, therefrom, to that person or any other who is not himself in fault.\" Waters-Pierce Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965). And since 111 N.E. 1050, the law has recognized that the justification for this rule arises from the \"foreseeability of harm if proper care is not used;\" the \"representation of safety implied in the act of putting the product on the market;\" and \"the economic benefit derived by the manufacturer from the sale and subsequent use of the chattel.\" Restatement Second (Torts) Section 395 47 comment (b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles of tort law impose a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers of a product",
		"context": "at 1051. By 1945, general maritime law adopted MacPherson's holding that a manufacturer is responsible for the foreseeable harms arising from use of its product . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,328 U.S. 85. The principle that duty arises from, and is limited by, foreseeability is hornbook law. The McKown case cited by petitioners, Pet.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 F.2d 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles of tort law impose a duty to warn of foreseeable dangers of a product",
		"context": "at 1051. By 1945, general maritime law adopted MacPherson's holding that a manufacturer is responsible for the foreseeable harms arising from use of its product . 149 F.2d 98, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle that duty arises from, and is limited by, foreseeability is hornbook law. The McKown case cited by petitioners, Pet.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "1. Over the course of the twentieth century, federal courts had gradually developed a set of limited re- strictions on repeat habeas applications, representing a \"modification of the common -law rule allowing endless [habeas] applications \" to the federal courts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those \"abuse of the writ\" restrictions grew out of language in the habeas statute and the federal habeas rules that allowed, but did not require, judges to refuse to entertain habeas ap- plications in circumsta nces where considering the appli- cation would not serve the \"ends of justice. \" See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "\"). 17 That discretionary standard, which the State could invoke as an affirmative defense, generated substantial disagreement and confusion. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, Justice Powell and three other Justices took the view \"that the 'ends of jus- tice' require federal courts to e ntertain [successive] pe- titions only where the prisoner supplements his consti- tutional claim with a colorable showing of factual inno- cence. \" Id. at 454 (opinion of Powell, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "Other Jus- tices , however, favored an approach that left \"the deci- sion whether to hear successive petitions to the 'sound discretion of the federal trial judges. ' \" Id. at 463 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); see id. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ( \"[A] 'colorable claim of innocence ' is not an essential element of every just disposition of a successive petition. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "AEDPA eliminated that confusion by adopting strict and non discretionary limits on habeas applicants' ability to seek readjudication of their right to federal habeas relief. The statute both \"codifies some of the pre-existing limits on successive petitions, and further 18 restricts the availability of relief to habeas petitioners. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The \" added restrictions \" include not only a precise delineation of the narrow circumstances in which second or suc cessive applications may be entertained , but also a \"transfer[] from the district court to the court of appeals [of the] screening function\" for such applications. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "In any event , to the extent that pre -AEDPA abuse -of-the-writ practices are relevant, they do not support petitioner. The only pre -AEDPA decision that petition er identifies (Br. 45) that squarely addresse d whether a state prisoner's submission invoking Rule 59(e) was a second or successive application held that presenting a \"claim in a 59(e) motion was the functional equivalent of a second petition, and as such was subject to dismissal as abusive, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] as an \"outlier, \" but cites no con- trary, on -point authority. Tellingly, neither petitioner nor his amici has identi- fied a single pre -AEDPA case in which a district court held that a habeas applicant's request for reconsidera- tion under Rule 59(e) was exempt from the standards for s econd or successive habeas applications. Petitioner instead relies (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 F.3d 1434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "4. Petitioner asserts (Br. 26) that when it enacted AEDPA, \"Congress was presumptively aware of \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which he describes as \"hold- ing that use of Rule 59 by habeas applicants is 'thoroughly consistent with the spirit of the habeas cor- pus statutes. ' \" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Rule 59(e) exception to AEDPA's relitigation bar would flout congressional design",
		"context": "Some of AEDPA's procedural limitations —such as 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(E)'s preclusion of certiorari re- view of an appellate decision authorizing or denying a second or successive habeas applicati on—apply to both parties . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The limitations on second or suc- cessive habeas applications , however, are by definition specific to habeas applicants .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "A state court may exercise personal jurisdiction with the defendant's consent, even if it would have lacked the power to proceed without th at consent. See Insurance Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a Sta te may require a party to consent to suit as a condition of engaging in an activity, or deem the party to have consented by engag- ing in that activity. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316 -317 (citation omitted). Those requirements apply to state consent statutes no less than they apply to other jurisdictional statutes. See Insurance Corp. , 456 U.S. at 703 (considering \"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justi ce\" in the context of consent) (citation s omitted); Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pennsylvania's long -arm statute does not comply with those standards. As discussed above, i t is neither fair nor reasonable in our federal system for a State to exercise unlimited ju risdiction simply because the de- fendant does business (and so must register to do that business) in the forum .",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "10-13, supra . c. A state law requiring a company to consent to general jurisdiction to operate in the State would also violate the unconstitutional -conditions doctrine —a gen- eral principle of constitutional law that limits a State's power to require a person to give up a constitutional right in order to receive a benefit . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying that doctrine, this Court has long held that a State generally may not require a company, as a condition of doing business, \"to surrender a right and privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws 16 of the United States.\" Sout hern Pacific 146 U.S. 202.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "See 570 U.S. 595. Applying that doctrine, this Court has long held that a State generally may not require a company, as a condition of doing business, \"to surrender a right and privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws 16 of the United States.\" Sout hern Pacific [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any waiver or consent secured through such a condition has \"no validity or effect.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "Ibid. The Court has applied that principle in a variety of cases and to a variety of rights. See 44 Liquormart, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]265 U.S. 17 . In particular, this Court has applied that principle in the context of territorial limits on state power. The Due Process Clause limits each State's power to regulate conduct and to tax property in other States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "Ibid. The Court has applied that principle in a variety of cases and to a variety of rights. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. 484[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In particular, this Court has applied that principle in the context of territorial limits on state power. The Due Process Clause limits each State's power to regulate conduct and to tax property in other States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "265 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "In particular, this Court has applied that principle in the context of territorial limits on state power. The Due Process Clause limits each State's power to regulate conduct and to tax property in other States. See North Carolina Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Allstate Ins. 449 U.S. 302. The Court has held that a State may not evade those limits by requiring compa-nies, as a condition of operating in the State, to consent to the regulation of activities or the taxati on of property in other States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "The Due Process Clause limits each State's power to regulate conduct and to tax property in other States. See North Carolina Department of 139 S. Ct. 2213; Allstate Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has held that a State may not evade those limits by requiring compa-nies, as a condition of operating in the State, to consent to the regulation of activities or the taxati on of property in other States. See Fidelity & Deposit 270 U.S. 426; Western Union Telegraph 216 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "449 U.S. 302. The Court has held that a State may not evade those limits by requiring compa-nies, as a condition of operating in the State, to consent to the regulation of activities or the taxati on of property in other States. See Fidelity & Deposit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Western Union Telegraph 216 U.S. 1. No good reason exists to treat due process limits on personal jurisdiction any differently. \"[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "449 U.S. 302. The Court has held that a State may not evade those limits by requiring compa-nies, as a condition of operating in the State, to consent to the regulation of activities or the taxati on of property in other States. See Fidelity & Deposit 270 U.S. 426; Western Union Telegraph [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No good reason exists to treat due process limits on personal jurisdiction any differently. \"[T]hose who live or operate primarily outside a State have a due process right not to be subjected to judgment in its courts as a general matter.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "216 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "50) that the unconstitutional - conditions doctrine does not apply to waivable litigation rights. But this Court has applied the doctrine to pro- cedural rights, such as the right to remove cases from state to federal court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On petitioner's contrary view, a State could require a person to give up his pro- cedural rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and trial by jury as a condition of doing business in the State. Pet itioner also argues (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Registration to do business does not constitute valid consent to general jurisdiction",
		"context": "On petitioner's contrary view, a State could require a person to give up his pro- cedural rights to confrontation, compulsory process, and trial by jury as a condition of doing business in the State. Pet itioner also argues (Br. 49) that in Insurance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court suggested that the unconstitutional -conditions doctrine does not apply to laws requiring consent to personal jurisdiction . That is incorrect; in fact , the Court in Morse stated that conditions imposed in such consent statutes must com- port with \"the Constitution and laws of the United States\" and \"those rules of public law which secure the jurisdiction and authority of each State from encroach- ment by others.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "20 Wall. 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. \"Full scope\" enablement is an unduly rigid rule that the Patent Act does not envisage.",
		"context": "This \"full scope\" test is the kind of rigid, atextual test this Court has rejected. Cf. KSR Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]579 U.S. 93 . 14 Courts might be tempted to count species of included chemical compounds because there are scientific ways to come up with a real sum of the permutations, but should not assume that those counts show unusual or illegitimate breadth compared to patent claims in other arts. To illustrate: Any open -ended claim could embrace virtually infinite variations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Documentary Evidence and Expert Opinions May Be Presented in Affidavits",
		"context": "A patent applicant may use an affidavit under 37 C.F .R. § 1.132 to submit any evidence or expert opinion other than evidence required to be submitted by another means.2Typically , such a declaration is used to provide evidence of \"secondary considerations\" that tend to prove that an invention is not obvious and thus patentable. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see MPEP ,supra , § 716.01(a). Expert opinion is a common subject of affidavits un- der § 1.132. Practitioners explain that the affidavit can be used for, among other things, \"expert statements sup- porting unexpected results, commercial success, solution to a long-felt need, inoperability of the prior art, or ev- idence supporting attribution of a reference to the Ap- plicant or prior public disclosure of subject matter de- rived from an inventor.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Arguments premised on prior versions of the statute do not demonstrate any ambiguity today",
		"context": "24) that the deadline in the prior provision was not jurisdictional is unfounded. Even before 2006 , multiple courts had reached the op- 36 posite conclusion . See, e.g., 2005 WL 2739105; 2002 WL 523880; 2002 WL 507821; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That consensus comports with the fact that the Tax Court's jurisdiction over collection - due-process appeals existed solely by virtue of Section 6330(d)(1) ; jurisdiction , then as today , extended only to appeals that Section 6330(d)(1) authorized , i.e., those commenced in 30 days . It also aligned with longstand- ing precedent construi ng Section 6213(a)'s similar deadline to be jurisdictional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "117 T.C. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Arguments premised on prior versions of the statute do not demonstrate any ambiguity today",
		"context": "\"When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amend- ment to have real and substantial effect.\" Intel Corp. Inv. Policy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The current text and context contain no residual uncertainty : the filing deadline is jurisdic- tional in the Tax Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. EPA's attack on the Rapanos plurality's wetland test is no reason to deny review",
		"context": "Necessarily, then, the agency has no authority to regulate discharges to non- waters, e.g., land. To be sure, determining where land ends and water begins can be challenging. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (observing that \"the transition from water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one,\" and that \"the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land begins,\" given the \"inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable waters\"). But that difficulty does not mean that EPA can regulate any and all moist land or, as the Ninth Circuit concluded below, a \"soggy residential lot,\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "Title VII is on e of the most frequently litigated federal statutes, and requiring district courts to determine sua sponte wh ether every Title VII claim is properly exhausted would drain scarce judicial resources. That is particularly true because Title VII's exhaustion requirement differs markedly from the \"[s]imple jurisdictional rules\" this Court ordinarily prefers in order to ensure that courts can \"readily assure themselves of their power to hear a case.\" Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A reader of petitioner's brief might assume that Title VII exhaustion questions typically arise when an employee \"skip[s] the admini strative process\" entirely. Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "See id. § 2000e-16(c) (providing that an employee \"aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5\"). 32 that there was no administrative submission.8 In the others—as in this case—the issue was the adequacy of the administrative submissions: whether they were sufficient to qualify as a char ge or otherwise start the administrative process9; whether the charge was procedurally proper10; whether the claims asserted in court were sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge 11; whether a charge naming related entities was sufficient to exhaust a claim against an unnamed defendant 12; whether an employee could rely on a 8 645 Fed. Appx. 573; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.2d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "§ 2000e-16(c) (providing that an employee \"aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5\"). 32 that there was no administrative submission.8 In the others—as in this case—the issue was the adequacy of the administrative submissions: whether they were sufficient to qualify as a char ge or otherwise start the administrative process9; whether the charge was procedurally proper10; whether the claims asserted in court were sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge 11; whether a charge naming related entities was sufficient to exhaust a claim against an unnamed defendant 12; whether an employee could rely on a 8 645 Fed. Appx. 573; 786 F.2d 1108. 9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891.",
		"citation_value_orig": "255 F.3d 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "§ 2000e-16(c) (providing that an employee \"aggrieved by the final disposition of his complaint, or by the failure to take final action on his complaint, may file a civil action as provided in section 2000e-5\"). 32 that there was no administrative submission.8 In the others—as in this case—the issue was the adequacy of the administrative submissions: whether they were sufficient to qualify as a char ge or otherwise start the administrative process9; whether the charge was procedurally proper10; whether the claims asserted in court were sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge 11; whether a charge naming related entities was sufficient to exhaust a claim against an unnamed defendant 12; whether an employee could rely on a 8 645 Fed. Appx. 573; 786 F.2d 1108. 9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.2d 1344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "32 that there was no administrative submission.8 In the others—as in this case—the issue was the adequacy of the administrative submissions: whether they were sufficient to qualify as a char ge or otherwise start the administrative process9; whether the charge was procedurally proper10; whether the claims asserted in court were sufficiently related to the allegations in the charge 11; whether a charge naming related entities was sufficient to exhaust a claim against an unnamed defendant 12; whether an employee could rely on a 8 645 Fed. Appx. 573; 786 F.2d 1108. 9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166.",
		"citation_value_orig": "48 F.3d 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "739 F.3d 1127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "767 F.3d 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 F.3d 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 F.3d 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 F.3d 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "9 Artis , 630 F.3d at 1034-38; 255 F.3d 704; 708 F.2d 1344. 10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 835 F.3d 1289; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 F.3d 891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 475 F.3d 166. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), even routine exhaustion issues can require a court to make factual findings based on \"evidence beyond the pleadings,\" including all of the employee's communica- tions with the EEOC and the \"documents generated\" during the investigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 1289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "10 48 F.3d 134; see Br. for Appellees at 14, 739 F.3d 1127; 603 Fed. Appx. 607; 767 F.3d 413; 504 Fed. Appx. 237; 383 Fed. Appx. 503; 551 F.3d 297; 359 Fed. Appx. 726; 263 Fed. Appx. 814; 478 F.3d 433; 306 F.3d 636; Gibson , 201 F.3d at 991; 31 F.3d 891. 12 835 F.3d 1289; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because the administrative process is informal and employees may supplement or amend their allegations during the EEOC's investigation, see 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b), even routine exhaustion issues can require a court to make factual findings based on \"evidence beyond the pleadings,\" including all of the employee's communica- tions with the EEOC and the \"documents generated\" during the investigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 F.3d 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "212 Fed. Appx. 729. If the exhaustion requirement were jurisdictional, courts—including courts of appeals—would be oblig-ated to undertake those fact-intensive inquiries sua sponte. And because a federal court \"may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction,\" Sinochem Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], courts would have to answer complex or difficult exhaustion 2007); McKinnon , 83 F.3d at 504-05; 852 F.2d 1231; 678 F.2d 992. 13 Robinson , 359 Fed. Appx.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "212 Fed. Appx. 729. If the exhaustion requirement were jurisdictional, courts—including courts of appeals—would be oblig-ated to undertake those fact-intensive inquiries sua sponte. And because a federal court \"may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction,\" Sinochem Int'l 549 U.S. 422, courts would have to answer complex or difficult exhaustion 2007); McKinnon , 83 F.3d at 504-05; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 678 F.2d 992. 13 Robinson , 359 Fed. Appx.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.2d 1231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "212 Fed. Appx. 729. If the exhaustion requirement were jurisdictional, courts—including courts of appeals—would be oblig-ated to undertake those fact-intensive inquiries sua sponte. And because a federal court \"may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction,\" Sinochem Int'l 549 U.S. 422, courts would have to answer complex or difficult exhaustion 2007); McKinnon , 83 F.3d at 504-05; 852 F.2d 1231; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Robinson , 359 Fed. Appx.",
		"citation_value_orig": "678 F.2d 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "13 Robinson , 359 Fed. Appx. at 729; De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jackson , 678 F.2d at 1011. 14 440 F.3d 1259; 186 F.3d 1322. 34 questions even in cases that could easily be dismissed on the merits.15 b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "686 F.2d 997",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "Appx. at 729; De 686 F.2d 997; Jackson , 678 F.2d at 1011. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 186 F.3d 1322. 34 questions even in cases that could easily be dismissed on the merits.15 b. Next, consider the opportunities for vexatious behavior by defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 F.3d 1259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "Appx. at 729; De 686 F.2d 997; Jackson , 678 F.2d at 1011. 14 440 F.3d 1259; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34 questions even in cases that could easily be dismissed on the merits.15 b. Next, consider the opportunities for vexatious behavior by defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "186 F.3d 1322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "If the exhaustion requirement were jurisdictional, an employee's asserted failure to satisfy it could be raised at any time—even after trial, on appeal, or for the first time in this Court. Defendants faced with unfavorable outcomes—such as an adverse verdict or, as here, the reversal of summary judgment—would have powerful incentives to scour the record to find some ar guable failure to exhaust in the hopes of securing a jurisdictional dismissal. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those \"[t]ardy jurisdictional objections\" would \"result in a waste of adjudicatory resources\" and \"disturbingly disarm litigants.\" Auburn , 568 U.S. at 153.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 F.3d 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "The district court, the Fifth Circuit, and this Court devoted substantial resources to the merits of Ms. Davis's claim during the five years before petitioner raised the exhaustion issue. The Fifth Ci rcuit's prior decision has become an important precedent on religious dis-crimination, which Westlaw indicates has been cited in nearly 150 other cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Ms. Davis's claim were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, that decision would be vacated and all of the courts' 15 See, e.g. , Hill, 383 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A jurisdictional exhaustion requirement would undermine Title VII litigation",
		"context": "But it is not clear that the Commission or the courts would routinely find equitable tolling appropriate under those circumstances. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even if they did, it would make little sense to allow a defendant's belated objection to compel the dismissal of a case after years of litigation, only to have the parties start all over again following the exhaustion of the EEOC process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Testimonial hearsay is admissible under this rule based on a defendant's strategic waiver, not an exception to the Confrontation Clause",
		"context": "15 Moreover, a defendant would not waive his confrontation rights merely by maintain ing his innocence or assert ing a general defense theory that contradicted the prosecution's theory or evidence. \"Presenting a theory of the case that can be effectively rebutted by otherwise -inadmissible evidence … does not by itself open the door to using such evidence; only partial, misleading use of the evidence itself can do so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Or as the New Hampshire Supreme Court has recognized, a defendant waives his confrontation rights only when he \"introduce[s] evidence that provides a justification, beyond mere relevance, for the opponent's introduction of evidence that may not otherwise be admissible.\" White , 920 A.2d at 1221- 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 F.3d 1021",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Testimonial hearsay is admissible under this rule based on a defendant's strategic waiver, not an exception to the Confrontation Clause",
		"context": "This waiver -based rule is distinct from the common- law forfeiture -by-wrongdoing exception, but shares some of its characteristics. The forfeiture- by- wrongdoing doctrine is a Confrontation Clause exception that existed at the founding. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It admits testimonial hearsay from an unavailable witness when the defendant made that witness unavailab le, but only if the defendant acted with the specific intent to prevent the witness from testifying. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Testimonial hearsay is admissible under this rule based on a defendant's strategic waiver, not an exception to the Confrontation Clause",
		"context": "at 359- 61. 16 The exception operates to prevent the Confrontation Clause from giving a \"criminal a windfall.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[W]hen defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims, the Sixth Amendment does not require courts to acquiesce.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Cannot Be Squared With the MLA, the Trails Act, or the Park Service Act",
		"context": "But if Congress really did take such a momentous step, it would be reasonab le to insist that it do so in a more obvious and discernable manner tha n in the definition of a park system unit or the like. Congress neither hides elephants in mouseholes nor buries major obstacles to economic development in definitional provisions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "15. 13 13 Any presumption against preemption is limited to federal legis- lation \"[i]n areas of traditional state regulation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The federal employ- ment verification system \"is hardly 'a field which the states have traditionally occupied.'\" Buckman , 531 U.S. at 347 (citation omit- 41 We begin with field preemption before turning to conflict preemption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "Buckman , 531 U.S. at 347 (citation omit- 41 We begin with field preemption before turning to conflict preemption. But thes e doctrines \"are not 'rigid- ly distinct.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the comprehen-sive federal employment verification system that IRCA established occupies the field , and the effort by Kansas to prosecute fraud on this system conflicts with federal prerogatives. These arguments fit hand-in-glove.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "14 A. IRCA preempts the field of fraud on the federal employment verification system. Field preemption occurs where (1) Congress's \"framework of regulation [is] 'so pervasive that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it'\" or (2) where \"there is a 'feder al interest so domi- nant that the federal system will be assu med to pre- clude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.'\" Arizona , 567 U.S. at 399 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And \"[w]here Congress occupies an entire field, even comple- mentary state regulation is impermissible.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "at 402 (quotations omitted; alterations incorporated). Prior to Arizona , the Court reached the same result as to earlier alien registration laws. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress had cre- ated a \"harmonious whole\" that declined to require al- iens to \"carry cards\" and punished only \"wilful failure to register.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "See also, e.g., id. at 395 (\"The federal power to determine immigra- tion policy is well settled. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Especially in view of the importance of a \"uniform\" national immigration policy (see U.S. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "In any event, \"[q]ue stions which 'merely lurk in the record' are not resolved, and no resolution of them may be inferred.\" Illinois State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] disregards this Court's holding that \"the existence of an 'e xpress preemption provision does not' impose a 'special burden' that would make it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause.\" Arizona , 567 U.S. at 406 (quoting 529 U.S. 861). 15 In short, Congress has comprehensively regulated the employment verification system, and it has made this field \"central to '[t]he policy of immigration law.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The statute is limited in scope",
		"context": "Illinois State Bd. of 440 U.S. 173 disregards this Court's holding that \"the existence of an 'e xpress preemption provision does not' impose a 'special burden' that would make it more difficult to establish the preemption of laws falling outside the clause.\" Arizona , 567 U.S. at 406 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 15 In short, Congress has comprehensively regulated the employment verification system, and it has made this field \"central to '[t]he policy of immigration law.'\" Hoffman Plastic , 535 U.S. at 147.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 861",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "But trib es \"are not part of this constitutional order,\" and thus their \"sovereignty is not guaranteed by it.\" Lara , 541 U.S. at 219 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgme nt). Tribes \"were not at the Constitutional convention,\" Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 756, nor did they subsequently \"accept[] that plan\" as did later-admitted states, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, tribes are barely mentioned at all in the Constitution. James Madison had originally proposed 11 giving Congress the power \"[t]o regulate affairs with the Indians,\" 2 T HE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 324 (M. Farrand ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "B. Tribes Should Not Receive Common-Law Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct. Although it is \"doubtful\" that tribes retained any sovereignty after adoption of the Constitution, Lara , 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment), the Court need not resolve that question in this case. Even assuming tribes enjoy sovereignty of a \"modest scope\" extending \"to what is 'necessary to protect tribal self-governmen t or to control internal relations,'\" Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 819 (Thomas, J., 12 dissenting) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), \"there is scant substantive justification for extending tribal immunity to off-reservation commercial acts\" like those at issue here, id. at 820. 5 First , the Court has held that those tribal sovereign powers that are truly necessary for tribal self-governance are limited to the \"power to punish tribal offenders, to determ ine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "at 820. 5 First , the Court has held that those tribal sovereign powers that are truly necessary for tribal self-governance are limited to the \"power to punish tribal offenders, to determ ine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Nor is immunity for off- reservation commercial actions necessary to protect tribal self-governance.\"). If it were otherwise, then almost all tribal activity would be classified as necessary for tribal self-governance, but the Court has repeatedly rejected a broad construction of trib al sovereign power, even over activities technically on a reservation. In Montana , for example, the Court held that a tribe could not regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on lands within the reservation but that 5 Nor would the Court need to resolve its \"schizophrenic\" Indian law precedents at this time because even setting aside Congress's power over tribes ( vel non ), there still would be no constitutional basis for the broad common-law tr ibal sovereign immunity this Court has conferred.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "And Kiowa acknowledged that \"modern, wide-ranging tribal enterpri ses extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities\" likewise do not implicate core tribal self-government. Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 757–58. Second , although immunity is sometimes couched in terms of comity, see Verlinden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398, such concerns have long been re garded as insufficient to grant immunity for foreign nations' commercial activity, see, e.g. , Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. 682; see Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 817 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). Congress has accordingly refused to provide immunity to foreign nations for their commercial activities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "And Kiowa acknowledged that \"modern, wide-ranging tribal enterpri ses extending well beyond traditional tribal customs and activities\" likewise do not implicate core tribal self-government. Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 757–58. Second , although immunity is sometimes couched in terms of comity, see Verlinden 461 U.S. 480; Banco Nacional de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], such concerns have long been re garded as insufficient to grant immunity for foreign nations' commercial activity, see, e.g. , Alfred Dunhill of London, 425 U.S. 682; see Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 817 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). Congress has accordingly refused to provide immunity to foreign nations for their commercial activities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "Kiowa , 523 U.S. at 757–58. Second , although immunity is sometimes couched in terms of comity, see Verlinden 461 U.S. 480; Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398, such concerns have long been re garded as insufficient to grant immunity for foreign nations' commercial activity, see, e.g. , Alfred Dunhill of London, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 817 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (same). Congress has accordingly refused to provide immunity to foreign nations for their commercial activities. 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Hold that Tribes Do Not Possess Sovereign Immunity for Off-Reservation Commercial Conduct",
		"context": "Third , even setting aside the commercial-activity aspect, declining to recognize tribal sovereign immunity for off-reservation conduct would align with the traditional rule that immunity did not extend to courts beyond the sovereign's borders. See Franchise Tax Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Rejecting tribal sovereign immunity for off- reservation commercial activity would return that issue to the political branches and states, where it belongs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Hold That the Constitution Protects the Right to Life Instead of a Right to Abortion",
		"context": "The first question presented in this case is whether the Fifth Circuit's decision below conflicts with Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which established the \"undue burden standard. \" Casey , in turn, was based on Roe v. Wade , which recognized for the first time a constitutional right to an abortion. 410 U.S. 113.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Hold That the Constitution Protects the Right to Life Instead of a Right to Abortion",
		"context": "The first question presented in this case is whether the Fifth Circuit's decision below conflicts with Whole Woman's 136 S.Ct. 2292, which established the \"undue burden standard. \" Casey , in turn, was based on Roe v. Wade , which recognized for the first time a constitutional right to an abortion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The constitutional basis for Roe was 4 supposedly the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Did Not Transfer To Oklahoma Jurisdiction Over The Creek Reservation",
		"context": "Oklahoma ultimately concedes that Congress must speak in \"'plain terms'\" to alter the MCA. Br. 27 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But it ignores what this standard means. Whenever Congress has shifted Indian-country jurisdiction to States, it has spoken clearly to say that \"[j]urisdiction is conferred on\" the State—including in 21 Oklahoma, where Congress in 1908 transferred limited jurisdiction over restricted allotments by saying that they \"shall ... be subject to [state-court] jurisdiction.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "The United States and the Tribes ask this Court to review, as a standalone question, whether Individ- ual Respondents have standing to challenge ICWA's 1 The United States further contends (at 29 –30) that the pref- erences should not be declared facially unconstitutional. But when ever a provision impermissibly discriminates on the basis of race, it is invalid on its face. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in any event, Individual Respondents have also challenged ICWA as applied to them. See Ct. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "§ 1915, are \"con- trary to constitutional right,\" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), and therefore cannot be the basis for valid federal regula-tion, see Ct. App. ROA.654 –57, 661 ; see also Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because Individual Respondents have Article III stan ding to bring the APA claim , they have standing to raise all arguments in support of that claim, including that ICWA itself violates equal protection. B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "60a n.15, were concrete and real, rather than hypothet- ical, and that their challenge was not moot. Thus, the Brackeens were entitled to submit documentation of those efforts as those events were unfold ing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 C. Individua l Respondents' injuries are also fairly traceable to the challenged action s of the defendants. Under Article III, \"no more than de facto causality\" is required, and the injury need only be attributable \"at least in part\" to the government's action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "18 C. Individua l Respondents' injuries are also fairly traceable to the challenged action s of the defendants. Under Article III, \"no more than de facto causality\" is required, and the injury need only be attributable \"at least in part\" to the government's action. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. at 220a–21a (Duncan, J.) (\"injuries are traceable, in part, to the Federal Defendants' implementing ICWA … and to their inducing state officials to apply ICWA\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "(\"injuries are traceable, in part, to the Federal Defendants' implementing ICWA … and to their inducing state officials to apply ICWA\"). If not for ICWA 's federal placement prefer- ences, Individual Respondents would have \"the oppor-tunity to compete\" for selection as adoptive or foster parents \"on an equal basis.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The United States and the Tribes claim that Indi- vidual Respondent s have not shown an injury tracea- ble specifically to \"Section 1915(a)(3) or (b)(iii) .\" U.S. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "ROA. 662.3 Redressability is satisfied if \"the practical conse- quence\" of a decision \"would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would ob- tain relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, a favorable decision \"would redress the In- dividual [Respondents'] injuries in numerous ways.\" Texas Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE QUESTION OF STANDING DOES NOT MERIT A SEPARATE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "22 1a (Duncan., J.). \"Victory,\" even in the lower courts, \"would mean a declaration\" that ICWA's preferences violate constitutional rights , and it is \"substantially likely that\" state courts conducting adoption proceedings would consider such a ruling \"an authoritative interpretation.\" Utah , 536 U.S. at 463 – 64; see also , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Redressability turns on whether an injury \"will ' likely ' be redressed,\" not whether an in- jury is guaranteed to be redressed. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 170–71 (emphasis added) (redressability satisfied even though agency was \"free to disregard\" court).",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Myriad of Advances in Science and Technology Have Occurred Since Roe Requiring the Court to Re-examine the Outmoded Viability Standard",
		"context": "For example, Special Care Baby Units, the precursors of the modern NICU, used incubators that provided heat, humidity, and oxygen for the babies. 72 In the 1990's, there was an increase of technology and medical knowledge about premature infants that gave hope that babies as young as twenty-three weeks and as small as 500 grams could survive. 73 In addition, new technology that al- lowed for the precise fluid delivery, maintaining tem- perature and proper ventilation also contributed to the survival of these infants.74 Because of these technolo- gies, survival of premature infants is turning from the exception to the standard.75 Some of the technology developments that have been made since Roe include: • The electronic fetal monitors (EFM) are used to continually read the fetus' heart- beat and the woman's contractions when 71 City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], avail- able at https://www.nicuawareness.org/blog/a-brief-history-of- advances-in-neonatal-care. 73 Id. 74 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the excep-tion is narrow: Exigent circumstances exist only when officers confront a \"compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether that standard is met depends on \"the totality of circumstances.\" McNeely , 569 U.S. at 149 (citing Brigham 547 U.S. 398); see Mitchell , 139 S. Ct. at 2535 n.3 (plurality 14 opinion).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2525. Whether that standard is met depends on \"the totality of circumstances.\" McNeely , 569 U.S. at 149 (citing Brigham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see Mitchell , 139 S. Ct. at 2535 n.3 (plurality 14 opinion). Over the years, this Court has concluded that exigent circumstances can exist in a variety of situations, including when immediate action is needed to \"prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,\" to \"fight a fire and investigate its cause,\" or to \"assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.\" Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "Over the years, this Court has concluded that exigent circumstances can exist in a variety of situations, including when immediate action is needed to \"prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,\" to \"fight a fire and investigate its cause,\" or to \"assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.\" Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403. The Court has also stated that exigent circumstances exist if immediate action is necessary to \"prevent a suspect's escape,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or to protect officers or the public, Riley , 573 U.S. at 388 (citing 387 U.S. 294). The shared feature that unites those scenarios is that the delay required to seek a warrant would have \"some real immediate and serious consequences.\" Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "Over the years, this Court has concluded that exigent circumstances can exist in a variety of situations, including when immediate action is needed to \"prevent the imminent destruction of evidence,\" to \"fight a fire and investigate its cause,\" or to \"assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury.\" Brigham City , 547 U.S. at 403. The Court has also stated that exigent circumstances exist if immediate action is necessary to \"prevent a suspect's escape,\" 495 U.S. 91, or to protect officers or the public, Riley , 573 U.S. at 388 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The shared feature that unites those scenarios is that the delay required to seek a warrant would have \"some real immediate and serious consequences.\" Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "Welsh , 466 U.S. at 751 (citation omitted). In contrast, the Court has long held that exigent circumstances do not exist when the only cost of seeking a warrant would be \"inconvenience\" or \"some slight delay.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, officers may enter a home without a warrant only if they could reasonably conclude that seeking one would threaten a \"compelling\" law-enforcement need. 563 U.S. 452.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "365 U.S. 610. Instead, officers may enter a home without a warrant only if they could reasonably conclude that seeking one would threaten a \"compelling\" law-enforcement need. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In making that determination, officers must consider \"technological developments that enable police officers to secure warrants more quickly.\" McNeely , 569 U.S. at 155.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "Some courts use it to encapsulate the traditional exigency inquiry. Judge Sutton, for example, has explained that a pursuit is \"hot\" only if \"the emergency nature of the situation\" demands \"immediate po lice action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But other courts, including the courts below, use the term to describe any immediate pursuit, regardless of exigency. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F.3d 926",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. As in any other exigency case, a pursuit justifies a warrantless home entry only if an emergency leaves no time to seek a warrant",
		"context": "3. Rather than applying the traditional case- specific exigency standard, courts that have adopted a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit rule hold that pursuit, \"in and of itself, is sufficient to justify a warrantless entry\"—regardless of the circumstances. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That per se rule flouts this Court's repeated instruction that \"the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case .\" Riley , 573 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added); see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 N.E.3d 1079",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "The BIO claims that \"no recent development in this Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence justify upsetting longstanding precedent,\" BIO at 2, and this Court has not \"questioned Apodaca\" and cited it \"without reservation.\" Id. at 5, citing inter alia [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 136 (1979 ), 447 U.S. 323 . However, a plain reading of McDonald v. City of Chicago reveals that Apodaca is far less definitive than the BIO woul d suggest. McDonald made clear that this Court has: abandoned \"the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered -down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,\" stating that it would be \"incongruous\" to apply different standards \"depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "The BIO claims that \"no recent development in this Court's Sixth Amendment jurisprudence justify upsetting longstanding precedent,\" BIO at 2, and this Court has not \"questioned Apodaca\" and cited it \"without reservation.\" Id. at 5, citing inter alia 441 U.S. 130 , 136 (1979 ), [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . However, a plain reading of McDonald v. City of Chicago reveals that Apodaca is far less definitive than the BIO woul d suggest. McDonald made clear that this Court has: abandoned \"the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered -down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,\" stating that it would be \"incongruous\" to apply different standards \"depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "However, a plain reading of McDonald v. City of Chicago reveals that Apodaca is far less definitive than the BIO woul d suggest. McDonald made clear that this Court has: abandoned \"the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered -down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights,\" stating that it would be \"incongruous\" to apply different standards \"depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, not only has the Court rejected the notion of a \" watered down \" Bill of Rights, it has forcefully rejected the premise of Apodaca that \"[I] n determining what is meant by a jury we must turn to other th an purely historical considerations. 1 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "Moreover, not only has the Court rejected the notion of a \" watered down \" Bill of Rights, it has forcefully rejected the premise of Apodaca that \"[I] n determining what is meant by a jury we must turn to other th an purely historical considerations. 1 See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Our inquiry must focus upon the function served by t he jury in contemporary society.\" Apodaca at 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "Apodaca at 410. This Court has subsequently broadly rejected the idea that t he Sixth Amendment derives it s meaning from functional assessments, and has strictly adhered to historical origins of the amendment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 554 U.S. 353 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Brief in Opposition Erroneously Claims that This Court's Recent Sixth Amendment Cases Do Not Cast Doubt Upon Apodaca v. Oregon",
		"context": "Apodaca at 410. This Court has subsequently broadly rejected the idea that t he Sixth Amendment derives it s meaning from functional assessments, and has strictly adhered to historical origins of the amendment. See 541 U.S. 36 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pattern Bargaining Limits the Scope of Labor Negotiations",
		"context": "53 See OLR Report, supra note 48, at 14; App. § 13.V. 54 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 55 See App. § 7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "653 F.3d 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The More-Than-De-Minimis Standard Is Dictum and Finds No Refuge In Stare Decisis.",
		"context": "Hardison's more-than-de-minimis standard deserves no stare decisis protection because it is dictum. The Court is not \"bound by dicta [when] more complete argument demonstrates\" the dicta is wrong. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]467 U.S. 526 (rejecting dictum from 421 U.S. 560, which related to union elections governed by 29 U.S.C. § 482). In Hardison , the employee was terminated before the 1972 amendment to Title VII's definition of religion which added the \"undue hardship\" standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The More-Than-De-Minimis Standard Is Dictum and Finds No Refuge In Stare Decisis.",
		"context": "Hardison's more-than-de-minimis standard deserves no stare decisis protection because it is dictum. The Court is not \"bound by dicta [when] more complete argument demonstrates\" the dicta is wrong. 568 U.S. 519[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (rejecting dictum from 421 U.S. 560, which related to union elections governed by 29 U.S.C. § 482). In Hardison , the employee was terminated before the 1972 amendment to Title VII's definition of religion which added the \"undue hardship\" standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The More-Than-De-Minimis Standard Is Dictum and Finds No Refuge In Stare Decisis.",
		"context": "Hardison's more-than-de-minimis standard deserves no stare decisis protection because it is dictum. The Court is not \"bound by dicta [when] more complete argument demonstrates\" the dicta is wrong. 568 U.S. 519467 U.S. 526 (rejecting dictum from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which related to union elections governed by 29 U.S.C. § 482). In Hardison , the employee was terminated before the 1972 amendment to Title VII's definition of religion which added the \"undue hardship\" standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Minntac",
		"context": "17 Federal courts have held that \"when mining activities re- lease pollutants from a discernible conveyance, they are subject to NPDES regulation, as are all point sources.\" Trs. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2014 WL 274077. During the or e-extraction process, U.S. Steel mixes the waste – known as fine tailings – with water to create a slurry. Minntac EIS at S-5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Minntac",
		"context": "¶¶ 6-7. As a result, the tailings basin discharges tailings basins. Wash. Wilderness [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Trs. for Alaska , 749 F.2d at 558 (sluice boxes); Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 984 F. Supp. 2d 589.",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F. Supp. 983",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Foundation's analysis would gut protection for photographs",
		"context": "The nature of the licensing market for photo- graphs, although connected to purpose and character, also deserves to be weighed as part of the fourth stat-utory factor in the fair use analysis. Considering the potential adverse impact on photographers and licen- sors of allowing secondary artists to utilize original works without obtaining a lic ense militates against a finding of fair use. See Harper & Row Publishers , 471 U.S. at 568 (stating that widespread use that \"ad- versely affects\" the market negates a finding of fair use); see also VHT, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 F.3d 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Its aim is thus to permit immedi - 6 Parties concerned about the effects of consolidati on on their appeal rights also may seek an immediate appeal of the consol- idation order itself, either through section 1292(b ) or a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., 2 Motions in Federal Court 8:46 (3d ed. 2017 update); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United Air Lines, 286 F.2d 302. 44 ate appeal of claims sufficiently independent from the merits of the remainder of the case as to justi fy appeal.7 Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 8; Mackey , 351 U.S. at 436-437. This Court has made clear that Rule 54(b) certifica - tion is available in fully consolidated cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 F.2d 711",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Its aim is thus to permit immedi - 6 Parties concerned about the effects of consolidati on on their appeal rights also may seek an immediate appeal of the consol- idation order itself, either through section 1292(b ) or a writ of mandamus. See, e.g., 2 Motions in Federal Court 8:46 (3d ed. 2017 update); see also 477 F.2d 711; United Air Lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 ate appeal of claims sufficiently independent from the merits of the remainder of the case as to justi fy appeal.7 Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. at 8; Mackey , 351 U.S. at 436-437. This Court has made clear that Rule 54(b) certifica - tion is available in fully consolidated cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.2d 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. at 906 n.7. The import of these cases is cl ear: Rule 54(b) provides a route to appeal if a matter 7 Courts have developed legal standards—which are in turn subject to appellate review—for determining whether such appeals are appropriate. See, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 782 F.2d 58; Allis- Chalmers 521 F.2d 360, abrogated on other grounds by Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. 1. 45 involving multiple claims would constitute a single judicial unit under section 1291.8 Indeed, the Federal Rules themselves link Rule 42(a) and Rule 54(b). The advisory committee notes to Rule 42 explicitly direct the reader to \"Rule 54 (b)\" for cases involving \"entry of separate judgments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 1331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. at 906 n.7. The import of these cases is cl ear: Rule 54(b) provides a route to appeal if a matter 7 Courts have developed legal standards—which are in turn subject to appellate review—for determining whether such appeals are appropriate. See, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d 1331; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Allis- Chalmers 521 F.2d 360, abrogated on other grounds by Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. 1. 45 involving multiple claims would constitute a single judicial unit under section 1291.8 Indeed, the Federal Rules themselves link Rule 42(a) and Rule 54(b). The advisory committee notes to Rule 42 explicitly direct the reader to \"Rule 54 (b)\" for cases involving \"entry of separate judgments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "782 F.2d 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. at 906 n.7. The import of these cases is cl ear: Rule 54(b) provides a route to appeal if a matter 7 Courts have developed legal standards—which are in turn subject to appellate review—for determining whether such appeals are appropriate. See, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d 1331; 782 F.2d 58; Allis- Chalmers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated on other grounds by Curtiss-Wright , 446 U.S. 1. 45 involving multiple claims would constitute a single judicial unit under section 1291.8 Indeed, the Federal Rules themselves link Rule 42(a) and Rule 54(b). The advisory committee notes to Rule 42 explicitly direct the reader to \"Rule 54 (b)\" for cases involving \"entry of separate judgments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.2d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. at 906 n.7. The import of these cases is cl ear: Rule 54(b) provides a route to appeal if a matter 7 Courts have developed legal standards—which are in turn subject to appellate review—for determining whether such appeals are appropriate. See, e.g., Braswell Shipyards, 2 F.3d 1331; 782 F.2d 58; Allis- Chalmers 521 F.2d 360, abrogated on other grounds by Curtiss-Wright , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45 involving multiple claims would constitute a single judicial unit under section 1291.8 Indeed, the Federal Rules themselves link Rule 42(a) and Rule 54(b). The advisory committee notes to Rule 42 explicitly direct the reader to \"Rule 54 (b)\" for cases involving \"entry of separate judgments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Since consolidated cases become a single un it for purposes of section 1291, see supra pp. 22-27, 8 The courts of appeals have also almost uniformly r ecognized that Rule 54(b) certification is available in fully consolidated cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bergman , 860 F.2d at 567; Ringwald , 675 F.2d at 771; Sandwiches, 822 F.2d 707; 946 F.2d 1401; Huene , 743 F.2d at 703; Trinity Broad. Corp., 827 F.2d at 675; Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. , 737 F.3d at 692-693; U.S. ex rel. Hampton , 318 F.3d at 216; Spraytex, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1382.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F.2d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Since consolidated cases become a single un it for purposes of section 1291, see supra pp. 22-27, 8 The courts of appeals have also almost uniformly r ecognized that Rule 54(b) certification is available in fully consolidated cases. 851 F.2d 69; Bergman , 860 F.2d at 567; Ringwald , 675 F.2d at 771; Sandwiches, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 946 F.2d 1401; Huene , 743 F.2d at 703; Trinity Broad. Corp., 827 F.2d at 675; Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. , 737 F.3d at 692-693; U.S. ex rel. Hampton , 318 F.3d at 216; Spraytex, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1382.",
		"citation_value_orig": "822 F.2d 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Since consolidated cases become a single un it for purposes of section 1291, see supra pp. 22-27, 8 The courts of appeals have also almost uniformly r ecognized that Rule 54(b) certification is available in fully consolidated cases. 851 F.2d 69; Bergman , 860 F.2d at 567; Ringwald , 675 F.2d at 771; Sandwiches, 822 F.2d 707; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Huene , 743 F.2d at 703; Trinity Broad. Corp., 827 F.2d at 675; Fla. Wildlife Fed'n, Inc. , 737 F.3d at 692-693; U.S. ex rel. Hampton , 318 F.3d at 216; Spraytex, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1382.",
		"citation_value_orig": "946 F.2d 1401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "P. 30-36. The notion that this readin g would have jurisdictional consequences is simply incorrect; each claim in a multiple-claim action mu st be considered independently for jurisdictional pur- 47 poses regardless. DaimlerChrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, service of proces s almost invariably precedes a consolidation order, a nd so would be unaffected by the scope or import of su ch an order. The practical consequences for settlemen t and voluntary dismissal would also be minimal— nothing would stop parties to a particular claim fr om reaching a contractual agreement not to proceed, an d when that happens the Rules authorize the court to remove the relevant claims, either by formally dis- missing them or permitting an amended complaint omitting them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Parties May Seek Discretionary Appeal Under Rule 54(b), Section 1292(b), And Mandamus",
		"context": "Id. This provision thus authorizes appeal from im- portant questions of law. See Swint, 514 U.S. at 46 (stating that the provision enables review of \"orde rs deemed pivotal and debatable\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And this provision thereby addresses the atypical circumstance in which a judgment on one claim in a consolidated case is sufficiently import ant that it would be more efficient, rather than less, to send it directly up to appellate review. If both t he district court and the court of appeals think a que s- tion sufficiently critical that an early appeal is proper, then section 1292(b) provides an avenue for them to grant an appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 F.3d 1251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "Id. The Framers understood this language to require that every individual residing in the United States be included in the census and apportionment count. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Alexander Hamilton stated, arguing in support of apportionment based on total population: \"There can be no truer principle than this—that every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of government.\" 1 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 473 (M. Farrand ed., 1911) (quoted in Evenwel , 136 S. Ct. at 1127).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "3 (\"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law[.]\"). In addition, when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, this Court has consistently held that \"[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,\" are encompassed within the broad term \"persons.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Yick 118 U.S. 356. The Fourteenth Amendment's drafting history confirms that provision's reference to \"persons\" as encompassing all constituents, not just citizens or voters. Like the Framers, the Amendment's drafters debated this point extensively and deliberately chose a total-population basis for the apportionment of Representatives in the House.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "3 (\"[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law[.]\"). In addition, when interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, this Court has consistently held that \"[a]liens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful,\" are encompassed within the broad term \"persons.\" 457 U.S. 202; Yick [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourteenth Amendment's drafting history confirms that provision's reference to \"persons\" as encompassing all constituents, not just citizens or voters. Like the Framers, the Amendment's drafters debated this point extensively and deliberately chose a total-population basis for the apportionment of Representatives in the House.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "Setting aside that the term \"inhabitant\" does not appear in the relevant 9 constitutional text, the proposition that the drafters intended the Amendment to encompass all \"inhabitants\" is not in dispute. Indeed, as this Court has emphasized, the Constitutional Convention debates make \"abundantly clear\" that \"when the delegates agreed that the House should represent 'people' they intended that in allocating Congressmen the number assigned to each State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Administration errs, however, in its insistence on limiting the term \"inhabitants\" in a manner that contravenes the constitutional text and history. The term, the Administration contends, is sufficiently \"indeterminate\" that the President may construe it to exclude an entire class of residents from the apportionment based solely on their legal status.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "35–38. In a treatise later quoted by Chief Justice John Marshall in a concurrence, Vattel described \"inhabitants\" as \"strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country.\" The Venus , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, as a federal court recently recognized, \"neither Vattel's statement nor The Venus has any relation to apportionment or the census.\" City of San 2020 WL 6253433 was not discussing U.S. domestic law but rather \"the law of nations.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "The Administration notes, for example, that some undocumented immigrants, such as inadmissible noncitizens paroled within the United States, are subject to a legal fiction that they have not \"entered\" the country even when they are physically present within its borders. Appellants' Br. 36–37 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But that legal fiction applies only to the notion of \"entry,\" distinguishing between those \"on the threshold\" of entering and those who are already \"within the United States after an en try, irrespective of its legality.\" Leng May 357 U.S. 185.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": "36–37 (citing 267 U.S. 228). But that legal fiction applies only to the notion of \"entry,\" distinguishing between those \"on the threshold\" of entering and those who are already \"within the United States after an en try, irrespective of its legality.\" Leng May [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That distinction is irrelevant here, because individuals in either category—those who are excludable because they have not \"entered,\" and those who have entered but are removable because their presence here is unlawful—still may be deemed \"inhabitants\" (or \"persons \") and included in the enumeration and apportionment. Surely, in common speech people would use the term \"inhabitant\" to include a person who lived in a community for years, regardless of whether such a person did or did not 14 possess appropriate immigration papers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution requires apportionment based on total resident population",
		"context": ", Final 2020 Census Residence Criteria and Residence Situations, 83 Fed. Reg. at 5,526 (exp laining that the Census Bureau counts inhabitants based on their \"usual residence\" or \"usual place of abode,\" citing the Act of March 1, 1790); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 1 Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (unpaginated) (defining \"usual\" as \"[c]ustomary; common; frequent; such as occurs in ordinary practice, or in the ordinary course of events\"; and defining \"residence\" as \"[t]he act of abiding or dwelling in a place for some continuance of time\"). Kaplan , on which the Administration relies (at Appellants' Br. 36–37, 41), itself proves this point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "In examining copyright laws, the Court has often recognized the importance of interpreting the Copyright Act to further th is purpose. See, e.g. , Kirtsa [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 510 U.S. 517 ; Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340 ; Sony Corp. of 464 U.S. 417; Twentieth Century Music 422 U.S. 151. Interpreting the law in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act both rewards creators and serves the public interest . As the Court in Twent ieth Century Music.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "In examining copyright laws, the Court has often recognized the importance of interpreting the Copyright Act to further th is purpose. See, e.g. , Kirtsa 136 S. Ct. 1979; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340 ; Sony Corp. of 464 U.S. 417; Twentieth Century Music 422 U.S. 151. Interpreting the law in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act both rewards creators and serves the public interest . As the Court in Twent ieth Century Music.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "In examining copyright laws, the Court has often recognized the importance of interpreting the Copyright Act to further th is purpose. See, e.g. , Kirtsa 136 S. Ct. 1979; 510 U.S. 517 ; Feist Publications, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Sony Corp. of 464 U.S. 417; Twentieth Century Music 422 U.S. 151. Interpreting the law in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act both rewards creators and serves the public interest . As the Court in Twent ieth Century Music.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "In examining copyright laws, the Court has often recognized the importance of interpreting the Copyright Act to further th is purpose. See, e.g. , Kirtsa 136 S. Ct. 1979; 510 U.S. 517 ; Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340 ; Sony Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Twentieth Century Music 422 U.S. 151. Interpreting the law in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act both rewards creators and serves the public interest . As the Court in Twent ieth Century Music.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "In examining copyright laws, the Court has often recognized the importance of interpreting the Copyright Act to further th is purpose. See, e.g. , Kirtsa 136 S. Ct. 1979; 510 U.S. 517 ; Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340 ; Sony Corp. of 464 U.S. 417; Twentieth Century Music [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interpreting the law in light of the purposes of the Copyright Act both rewards creators and serves the public interest . As the Court in Twent ieth Century Music.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S INTERPRETATION OF 17 U.S.C. section 505 TO ALLOW RECOVERY OF \"FULL COSTS\" ADVANCES THE PURPOSES OF COPYRIGHT LAW",
		"context": "Likewise, in Fogerty v. Fant asy, Inc. , when the Court first examined 17 U.S.C. § 505 —the statutory provision at issue in this case —the Court explained that \"copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access to creative works.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 This Court has recognized the symbiotic relationship between incentives to create and the ultimate public benefit. In each of these seminal cases, as well as the other examples cited above, the Court interpreted copyright law in light of Congress's ultimate goals and considered whether the underlying purposes are best served by the proposed interpretations before the Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Measuring the asserted injuries against the purported justifications",
		"context": "at 790. But this Court does not declare a question non-justiciable merely because it may be hard. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Far from defying judicial application, resolving an issue of constitutional law by measuring First and Fourteenth Amendment injuries against state justifi- cations is a \"familiar judicial exercise.\" Zivotofsky , 566 U.S. at 196.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IX. The presumption against preemption is inapplicable",
		"context": "This Court has rejected Florida's premise that a threat to terminate a State's Medicaid eligibility is meaningfully distinguishable from a federal mandate. See Nat'l Fed'n of Inde p . B u s [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whichever way the Court resolves this case, all States must conform their laws and comply. Florida's argument only underscores that the state law at issue does not involve a tradi-tional area of state regulation: It concerns only man- agement of a federally funded program and was en-acted to comply with that program's requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IX. The presumption against preemption is inapplicable",
		"context": "See Wos, 568 U.S. at 640. The subj ect of such a law \"is in- herently federal in character because the relationship [it concerns] originates from , is governed by, and ter- minates according to federal law.\" Buckman [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 22 presumption against preemption places no thumb on the scales on either side of the issue.5",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees — prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
		"context": "The government is profoundly mistaken. The govern- ment does indeed have the opti on to \"level down,\" but it has to redress the constitutional violation in the relevant time period . See, e.g., McKesson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 509 U.S. 86. This is why it errs in invoking cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief (rather than monetary damages) in suppor t of its non-remedy. See, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 1678.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees — prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
		"context": "The government is profoundly mistaken. The govern- ment does indeed have the opti on to \"level down,\" but it has to redress the constitutional violation in the relevant time period . See, e.g., McKesson 496 U.S. 18; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is why it errs in invoking cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief (rather than monetary damages) in suppor t of its non-remedy. See, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 1678.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees — prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
		"context": "See, e.g., McKesson 496 U.S. 18; see also 509 U.S. 86. This is why it errs in invoking cases seeking declaratory or injunctive relief (rather than monetary damages) in suppor t of its non-remedy. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When all relief is forward-lookin g, it is relatively easy to set a prospective rule by refusing to extend future bene- fits. But this Court has made clear that a prospective fix is inadequate when a party seeks redress for past unequal treatment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees — prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
		"context": "When all relief is forward-lookin g, it is relatively easy to set a prospective rule by refusing to extend future bene- fits. But this Court has made clear that a prospective fix is inadequate when a party seeks redress for past unequal treatment. McKesson , 496 U.S. at 35, 39-40; Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In those circumstances, the government can only \"level down\" by tracking down the favored class and demanding equal retrospective payments. That alone serves as a per- missible substitute for full mon etary relief (read: a proper refund).",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper remedy is a full refund of fees — prospective relief cannot redress a past constitutional monetary injury",
		"context": "In those circumstances, the government can only \"level down\" by tracking down the favored class and demanding equal retrospective payments. That alone serves as a per- missible substitute for full mon etary relief (read: a proper refund). See McKesson , 496 U.S. at 43 (\"only an actual 32 refund (or other retroactive adjustment of the tax bur- dens borne by petitioner an d/or its favored competitors during the contested tax period) can bring about the [re-quired] nondiscrimination \"); see also Allegheny Pitts- burg Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor do we need to guess about Congress's ultimate preferences because Congress has already made its pref- erences clear: when amending Section 1930(a)(7) in 2021 to (finally) make fees ma ndatory in all districts, it elected to apply that change prospectively only . See Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Federal Circuit's Decision Does Not Square with Pfaff's Requirement That the Invention Be Public to Be On Sale",
		"context": "On the one hand, the Federal Circuit rejected the legislative history argument that the post-AIA on-sale bar excludes secret sales because the cases discussed by Congress were public use cases, but \"not any sale cases that would be overturned by the amendments.\" Helsinn 855 F.3d at 1369. On the other, the Concurring Opinion embraced this Court's endorsement of the general principles set forth in a public use case, Metallizing Eng'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], regarding when an invention is ready for patenting. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharms. USA Inc. , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 F.2d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Peace Cross fits within an undisputed tradition of displaying crosses as symbols of sacrifice and military valor",
		"context": "31-33. Respondents' cases only confirm as much. In Walz v.Tax Commission of City of New York , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that while \"no one ac- quires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution,\" an \"unbroken practice\" engaged in since 1802 without \"the remotest sign of leading to 18 an established church or religion\" was \"significant\" in showing that the practice was \"not a violation of the Religion Clauses.\" Id.at 677-680; accord Town of Greece , 572 U.S. at 576 (explaining that history does not excuse a violation but rather shows that a practice is permitted). In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.Nyquist , 413 U.S. 756, the Court distinguished Walz and struck down a different program in part because it could identify \"no historical precedent\" for it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Peace Cross fits within an undisputed tradition of displaying crosses as symbols of sacrifice and military valor",
		"context": "In Walz v.Tax Commission of City of New York , 397 U.S. 664, the Court explained that while \"no one ac- quires a vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution,\" an \"unbroken practice\" engaged in since 1802 without \"the remotest sign of leading to 18 an established church or religion\" was \"significant\" in showing that the practice was \"not a violation of the Religion Clauses.\" Id.at 677-680; accord Town of Greece , 572 U.S. at 576 (explaining that history does not excuse a violation but rather shows that a practice is permitted). In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.Nyquist , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court distinguished Walz and struck down a different program in part because it could identify \"no historical precedent\" for it. Id.at 792. In the remaining cases respondents cite, seeResp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Peace Cross fits within an undisputed tradition of displaying crosses as symbols of sacrifice and military valor",
		"context": "78, does not suggest that history has abandoned this practice. Cf. Marsh v.Chambers , 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].7",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": "Nothing in the text, history, or purposes of Rule 44.1 suggests that a federal court determining foreign law must give greater weight to the views of a foreign sovereign. This Court has long held that \" [t]he law of any State of the Union is a ma tter of which the courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 223 2007) (suit by Ecuador seeking to stay arbitration); Republic of Tur- 146 F.R.D. 24464 U.S. 78421 U.S. 684; see Salve Regina Coll. , 499 U.S. at 227. In deciding questions of state law, the views of the State as expressed by its attorney g eneral are \"entitled to weight.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": "Nothing in the text, history, or purposes of Rule 44.1 suggests that a federal court determining foreign law must give greater weight to the views of a foreign sovereign. This Court has long held that \" [t]he law of any State of the Union is a ma tter of which the courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.\" 114 U.S. 218, 223 2007) (suit by Ecuador seeking to stay arbitration); Republic of Tur- 146 F.R.D. 24[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]421 U.S. 684; see Salve Regina Coll. , 499 U.S. at 227. In deciding questions of state law, the views of the State as expressed by its attorney g eneral are \"entitled to weight.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": "Nothing in the text, history, or purposes of Rule 44.1 suggests that a federal court determining foreign law must give greater weight to the views of a foreign sovereign. This Court has long held that \" [t]he law of any State of the Union is a ma tter of which the courts of the United States are bound to take judicial notice, without plea or proof.\" 114 U.S. 218, 223 2007) (suit by Ecuador seeking to stay arbitration); Republic of Tur- 146 F.R.D. 24464 U.S. 78[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Salve Regina Coll. , 499 U.S. at 227. In deciding questions of state law, the views of the State as expressed by its attorney g eneral are \"entitled to weight.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": ", 499 U.S. at 227. In deciding questions of state law, the views of the State as expressed by its attorney g eneral are \"entitled to weight.\" 19 Wright & Miller § 4507, at 15 7-158; see Arizonans for Official [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has made clear , however, that those views are not entitled to \"controlling weight.\" 530 U.S. 914; see, e.g., 484 U.S. 383.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": "19 Wright & Miller § 4507, at 15 7-158; see Arizonans for Official 520 U.S. 43. This Court has made clear , however, that those views are not entitled to \"controlling weight.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 484 U.S. 383. The court of appeals gave no sound reason for requiring that federal courts give greater weight to the views of foreign governments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The court of appeals' rule of binding deference is inconsistent with this Court's treatment of analogous submissions from U.S. States",
		"context": "19 Wright & Miller § 4507, at 15 7-158; see Arizonans for Official 520 U.S. 43. This Court has made clear , however, that those views are not entitled to \"controlling weight.\" 530 U.S. 914; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals gave no sound reason for requiring that federal courts give greater weight to the views of foreign governments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Consistent with the FCA's Procedural Scheme, section 3731(b) Equates the Government and Relators",
		"context": "In choosing to name the \"United States\" here, Congress was not distinguishing between relators and the Government. Indeed, under default burden of proof rules, the relator bears this same burden in non-intervened suits. See Desert Pal- ace, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also United States ex rel. 764 F.3d 699. Congress's choice of \"United States\" in subsec- tion (d) does not mean that it intended to excise non-intervened cases from (b)(2), as Petitioners suggest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Consistent with the FCA's Procedural Scheme, section 3731(b) Equates the Government and Relators",
		"context": "Indeed, under default burden of proof rules, the relator bears this same burden in non-intervened suits. See Desert Pal- ace, 539 U.S. 90; see also United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress's choice of \"United States\" in subsec- tion (d) does not mean that it intended to excise non-intervened cases from (b)(2), as Petitioners suggest. Pet'rs' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bremerton Violated Coach Kennedy's Freedom of Speech and Religious Liberty",
		"context": "Coach Kennedy's religious expression was protected by the First Amendment. In Garcetti v. Ceballos , this Court stated that the \"controlling factor\" in determining whether an employee's speech is constitutionally protecte d is whether it was made \"pursuant to his duties.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In explaining that Mr. Ce ballos' speech was his employer's speech and not protected, the Court noted that he \"wrote his disposition memo because that is part of what he, as a calend ar deputy, was employed to do.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "Rather than address whether the Lan ham Act 's text contains a \" 'clear, affirmative indication '\" of ex trater ritor- iality, the Tenth Circuit ruled that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"already answered\" the extrater - ritoriality \"question in the affir mative.\" Pet.App. 22a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "Steele does not reach this case on its own terms. And where prior decisions rest on since- discarded con sidera- tions, this Court has \"refuse[ d] to extend\" them . Shear- son/American Express, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].13 That includes decisions that, like Steele , are \"at odds with [the Court's] current extraterritor iality doctrine.\" RJR, 579 U.S. at 354. In RJR, the Court \"decline[d] to extend\" a decision, dating from \"before [the Court] honed [its] extraterritor iality juris prudence,\" that improperly relied on a reference to for eign commerce, failed to appreciate that private causes of action raise heightened extrater ritoriality concerns, and tried to divine what Con gress wanted instead of asking whether the statute itself gave an unmistakable indica tion of extra - territorial effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "In RJR, the Court \"decline[d] to extend\" a decision, dating from \"before [the Court] honed [its] extraterritor iality juris prudence,\" that improperly relied on a reference to for eign commerce, failed to appreciate that private causes of action raise heightened extrater ritoriality concerns, and tried to divine what Con gress wanted instead of asking whether the statute itself gave an unmistakable indica tion of extra - territorial effect. Id. at 353 (discussing Pfizer [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Steele suffers the same defects . 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "3. While not necessary to resolve this case, the same considerations could warrant hold ing that Steele \"'retain[s] no vitality '\" in light of intervening precedent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 141 S. Ct. 1547. Steele is a remnant of an era when \"the presumption [against extraterritoriality] fell into disuse.\" Dodge 1585 , 1595- 1597; Hol brook 463.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "See pp. 34- 35, supra . 13 See, e.g., McMahon , 482 U.S. at 232- 234 (refusing to extend [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , because it rested on \"mistrust of a rbitra- tion\" this Court later \"rejected\"); 417 U.S. 506140 S. Ct. 741. 37 Even Steele's central pillar —the defendant's U.S. citi- zenship—has crumbled. While the presumption against extraterritoriality has special force with respect to foreign defendants, see pp .",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Steele Does Not Counsel a Different Result",
		"context": "See pp. 34- 35, supra . 13 See, e.g., McMahon , 482 U.S. at 232- 234 (refusing to extend 346 U.S. 427 , because it rested on \"mistrust of a rbitra- tion\" this Court later \"rejected\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S. Ct. 741. 37 Even Steele's central pillar —the defendant's U.S. citi- zenship—has crumbled. While the presumption against extraterritoriality has special force with respect to foreign defendants, see pp .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "A test that treats a rule as content based whenever officials must read the sign contradicts the Reed majority's own analysis and would require overruling countless precedents of this Court about what \"content based\" means. 1. The Reed majority identified several cases in which the Court had previously found laws \"content neutral on [their] face before turning to the law's jus- tification or purpose,\" including [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Members of City Coun- cil of Los 466 U.S. 789. Reed , 576 U.S. at 166. Under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Reed , neither of the laws at issue in those cases would be considered facially con- tent neutral because an official would have to exam- ine the speech's content to determine the law's ap- 25 plicability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "A test that treats a rule as content based whenever officials must read the sign contradicts the Reed majority's own analysis and would require overruling countless precedents of this Court about what \"content based\" means. 1. The Reed majority identified several cases in which the Court had previously found laws \"content neutral on [their] face before turning to the law's jus- tification or purpose,\" including 496 U.S. 310, and Members of City Coun- cil of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reed , 576 U.S. at 166. Under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of Reed , neither of the laws at issue in those cases would be considered facially con- tent neutral because an official would have to exam- ine the speech's content to determine the law's ap- 25 plicability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "As a general matter, the Court has treated a regulation as content based if it regu- lates speech on a specific subject matter or targets a particular viewpoint. When a regulation \"accords preferential treatment to\"—or discriminates against—\"the expression of views on one particular subject,\" the Court has subj ected the regulation to strict scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a 27 subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.\" 515 U.S. 819.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "447 U.S. 455. \"When the government targets not subject matter, but particular views taken by speakers on a 27 subject, the violation of the First Amendment is all the more blatant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Multiple cases illustrate th at \"content discrimina- tion\" refers to government regulations that either fa- vor or discriminate against speech on a particular subject. Police Department of 408 U.S. 92, often cited as foundational to the Court's doctrine on content-based regulation, makes this point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "515 U.S. 819. Multiple cases illustrate th at \"content discrimina- tion\" refers to government regulations that either fa- vor or discriminate against speech on a particular subject. Police Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], often cited as foundational to the Court's doctrine on content-based regulation, makes this point. Mosley involved an ordinance that banned picketing near a public school during school hours, ex- cept for \"peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Similarly, in Carey , Illinois prohibited picketing in residential neighborhoods, except picketing on the subject of labor disputes, which meant that the \"stat- ute discriminates between lawful and unlawful con-duct based on the content of the demonstrator's com- munication.\" 447 U.S. at 460. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], th e Court held that pro- hibition of religious sp eech was subject-matter dis- crimination. And in Arkansas Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221, the Court found content discrimination where the state law ex- empted from taxation ma gazines that \"were uni- formly devoted to religion or sports,\" but taxed maga- zines that reported on othe r subjects. All of these 28 cases designated laws as content based when they sin- gled out specific subjects or topics.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "447 U.S. at 460. In 454 U.S. 263, th e Court held that pro- hibition of religious sp eech was subject-matter dis- crimination. And in Arkansas Writers' Project, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court found content discrimination where the state law ex- empted from taxation ma gazines that \"were uni- formly devoted to religion or sports,\" but taxed maga- zines that reported on othe r subjects. All of these 28 cases designated laws as content based when they sin- gled out specific subjects or topics. In contrast, \"laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without re ference to the ideas or views expressed\"—that is, laws that do not suppress or favor speech on a particular subject or from a par- ticular viewpoint—\"are in most instances content neutral.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "In contrast, \"laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without re ference to the ideas or views expressed\"—that is, laws that do not suppress or favor speech on a particular subject or from a par- ticular viewpoint—\"are in most instances content neutral.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is true even where application of the regulation requires some consideration of con- tent. For instance, in 452 U.S. 640, the Court held that a rule limiting handbilling and solicitation of donations to a specific location at a state fair was not content based.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Sys., 512 U.S. 622. That is true even where application of the regulation requires some consideration of con- tent. For instance, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a rule limiting handbilling and solicitation of donations to a specific location at a state fair was not content based. It explained that, even though the rule specifically restricted soliciting, it \"applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds\"; no par- ticular subject ( e.g., religious solicitation) or view- point was subject to less fa vorable treatment. Yet, distinguishing solicitation from other forms of speech inevitably would require some consideration of con- tent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "It explained that, even though the rule specifically restricted soliciting, it \"applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds\"; no par- ticular subject ( e.g., religious solicitation) or view- point was subject to less fa vorable treatment. Yet, distinguishing solicitation from other forms of speech inevitably would require some consideration of con- tent. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that the prohibition on disclos- ing illegally intercepted communications, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c), is \"a content-neutral law of general ap- plicability.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Metro- m e d i a , I n c . v . C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (political speech at polling places); City of 512 U.S. 43424 U.S. 828418 U.S. 298395 U.S. 367 at the content is often required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , 453 U.S. 490, and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (political speech at polling places); City of 512 U.S. 43424 U.S. 828418 U.S. 298395 U.S. 367 at the content is often required. Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , 453 U.S. 490, and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (political speech at polling places); City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]424 U.S. 828418 U.S. 298395 U.S. 367 at the content is often required. Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , 453 U.S. 490, and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (political speech at polling places); City of 512 U.S. 43[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]418 U.S. 298395 U.S. 367 at the content is often required. Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , 453 U.S. 490, and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (political speech at polling places); City of 512 U.S. 43424 U.S. 828[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]395 U.S. 367 at the content is often required. Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "C i t y o f S a n D i e g o , 453 U.S. 490, and has framed rules appropriate to each me- dium. See, e.g. , Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876 (political speech at polling places); City of 512 U.S. 43424 U.S. 828418 U.S. 298[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at the content is often required. Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Thus, in most of those cases, an of- ficial would have to identify the communication by taking note of expressive aspects of the medium. Similarly, \"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' ele- ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regu- lating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 30 limitations on First Amendment freedoms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the earlier discussion of Eichman demonstrates, deter- mining that the First Amendment is even implicated in such cases requires considering the expressive con- tent of the speech. Only then does intermediate scru- tiny apply, demanding proof of an \"important or sub- stantial governmental interest … unrelated to the suppression free expression\" and a showing that \"the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further- ance of that interest.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Singling out a specific medium of communication or speaker for regulation, the Court held, does not require strict scrutiny where \"the dif- ferential treatment is 'justi fied by some special char- acteristic of the medium being regulated.'\" Id. (quot- ing Minneapolis Star & Tribune [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 4. These authorities show that the essence of con- tent-based regulation is favoring (or disfavoring) par- ticular topics or viewpoints.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"Read The Sign\" Test Is Incompatible With Reed And This Court's Longstanding First Amendment Precedents",
		"context": "Those concerns are not implicated in every in- stance in which an official must read a sign to apply a rule. As the D.C. Circuit explained in Act Now to Stop War and End Racism Coalitio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], under Reed , a \"bare distinction\" that requires an official to read a sign does not automatically trigger strict scru-tiny unless the regulation discriminates \"based on [the sign's] subject matter\" or viewpoint, or had a dis- criminatory justification. That is why a sign ordi- nance targeting event-related signs for removal \"once an event has passed\" is not content based. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (alterations and quotation marks omitted). Allegations supporting standing, like those supporting the elements of a plaintiff's claim, must contain sufficient factual support to \"plausibly 9 establish[] injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, the complaint must plausibly allege that the claimed statutory violation resulted in real-world harm or a sufficient risk of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 895 F.3d 1166; 839 F.3d 998; 837 F.3d 523; 830 F.3d 511.4 Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy that standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "902 F.3d 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "902 F.3d 873. In other words, the complaint must plausibly allege that the claimed statutory violation resulted in real-world harm or a sufficient risk of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 839 F.3d 998; 837 F.3d 523; 830 F.3d 511.4 Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy that standard. 4 Petitioners cite the remand opinion in Spokeo (Reply Br. 26), but the Ninth Circuit noted that \"even when a statute has allegedly been violated, Article III requires such violation to have caused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harm to the plaintiff.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "895 F.3d 1166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "902 F.3d 873. In other words, the complaint must plausibly allege that the claimed statutory violation resulted in real-world harm or a sufficient risk of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 895 F.3d 1166; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 837 F.3d 523; 830 F.3d 511.4 Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy that standard. 4 Petitioners cite the remand opinion in Spokeo (Reply Br. 26), but the Ninth Circuit noted that \"even when a statute has allegedly been violated, Article III requires such violation to have caused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harm to the plaintiff.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 998",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "902 F.3d 873. In other words, the complaint must plausibly allege that the claimed statutory violation resulted in real-world harm or a sufficient risk of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 895 F.3d 1166; 839 F.3d 998; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 830 F.3d 511.4 Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy that standard. 4 Petitioners cite the remand opinion in Spokeo (Reply Br. 26), but the Ninth Circuit noted that \"even when a statute has allegedly been violated, Article III requires such violation to have caused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harm to the plaintiff.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "902 F.3d 873. In other words, the complaint must plausibly allege that the claimed statutory violation resulted in real-world harm or a sufficient risk of harm to the plaintiff. See, e.g., 895 F.3d 1166; 839 F.3d 998; 837 F.3d 523; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 Plaintiffs' allegations do not satisfy that standard. 4 Petitioners cite the remand opinion in Spokeo (Reply Br. 26), but the Ninth Circuit noted that \"even when a statute has allegedly been violated, Article III requires such violation to have caused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harm to the plaintiff.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.3d 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The complaint does not allege facts that establish the named plaintiffs' standing",
		"context": "4 Petitioners cite the remand opinion in Spokeo (Reply Br. 26), but the Ninth Circuit noted that \"even when a statute has allegedly been violated, Article III requires such violation to have caused some real—as opposed to purely legal—harm to the plaintiff.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 931. A plaintiff in the Ninth Circuit still must \"demonstrate how the 'specific' violation of [the statute] alleged in the complaint actually harmed or 'present[ed] a material risk of harm' to him .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 211B.11(1) Does Not Discriminate On The Basis Of Viewpoint",
		"context": "Because petitioners' challenge is only a facial one, see Pet. i, the viewpoint-neutrality prong of the applicable test for a nonpublic forum is satisfied. See, e.g., Kokinda , 497 U.S. at 736 (upholding prohibitio n on solicitation on postal office premises, in part because \"nothing suggests the Postal Service intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another\") (citatio n and internal quotation marks omitted); see also National Endowment for the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 998) (upholding re- striction that \"do[es] not enge nder the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination th at would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its face\"). Petitioners nevertheless contend ( e.g., Br. 22, 35) that Minnesota's restriction leaves too mu ch room for discretion in its enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 211B.11(1) Does Not Discriminate On The Basis Of Viewpoint",
		"context": "See, e.g., USPS , 453 U.S. at 130- 31 (explaining that a high degree of official discretion is to lerable in nonpublic forums); Perry , 460 U.S. at 47 (discretion over use of an inter- school mail system); Greer , 424 U.S. at 838 n.10 (discre- tion to prohibit \"political\" speeches while allowing oth- ers); see also Finley , 524 U.S. at 576, 589-590 (approving broad discretion to take in to consideration \"general standards of decency and resp ect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public\" in NEA grant pro- cess); 288 F.3d 1309. In some circumstances, a law may be vague enough that it gives officials too unfettered an opportunity to enforce their own viewpo int preferences. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But petitioners have not made a vagueness argu- ment in this Court, or pres erved such an argument in the lower courts. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 211B.11(1) Does Not Discriminate On The Basis Of Viewpoint",
		"context": "App. A7, B29-B30, C19, they \"cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 55 an argument have merit. Minnesota's restriction— which is not a criminal one—has a definite, ascertaina-ble meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The United States' Position Contravenes The Statutory Text",
		"context": "36, 38-39. It requires the settlement to extinguish the settling party's liability to the government—\"valid\" or not—in a way that is \"not susceptible to further dispute or negotiation.\" Asarco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The United States offers an interpretation unmoored from the statutory text. Despite professing agreement that the term \"'resolve' connotes finality and conclusiveness,\" the United States ultimately replaces that requirement with a rule applicable whenever settling parties merely agree \"to perform or pay for a response action.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Make Clear That Deciding Whether The Section 1 Exemption Applies Requires Analysis Of A Nationwide Class Of Workers",
		"context": "The residual clause covers \"any other class\" of workers, 9 U.S.C. 1 (emphasis added), thus refer- ring back to the classes of \"seamen\" and \" railroad em- ployees\" expressly identified earlier in the provision. The definition of a class must therefore \"be controlled and defined by reference to th[ose] enumerated cate-gories of workers,\" Circuit City Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 251 U.S. 210 —and only a \"class\" 6 that extends across the country is consistent with the two nationwide classes that Congress named in Sec- tion 1. Any other a pproach would be unworkable. Carving classes of workers up by state, region, or city would introduce considerable \"complexity and uncertainty\" to the analysis, Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123; create anomalies based on, say, the fortuity of whether a plaint iff happened to work near a state border; and clash with the FAA's purpose of establishing a na- tional rule requiring enforcement of arbitration agree- ments, see Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Make Clear That Deciding Whether The Section 1 Exemption Applies Requires Analysis Of A Nationwide Class Of Workers",
		"context": "The residual clause covers \"any other class\" of workers, 9 U.S.C. 1 (emphasis added), thus refer- ring back to the classes of \"seamen\" and \" railroad em- ployees\" expressly identified earlier in the provision. The definition of a class must therefore \"be controlled and defined by reference to th[ose] enumerated cate-gories of workers,\" Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —and only a \"class\" 6 that extends across the country is consistent with the two nationwide classes that Congress named in Sec- tion 1. Any other a pproach would be unworkable. Carving classes of workers up by state, region, or city would introduce considerable \"complexity and uncertainty\" to the analysis, Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123; create anomalies based on, say, the fortuity of whether a plaint iff happened to work near a state border; and clash with the FAA's purpose of establishing a na- tional rule requiring enforcement of arbitration agree- ments, see Buckeye Check Cashing, 546 U.S. 440.",
		"citation_value_orig": "251 U.S. 210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court Should Make Clear That Deciding Whether The Section 1 Exemption Applies Requires Analysis Of A Nationwide Class Of Workers",
		"context": "The definition of a class must therefore \"be controlled and defined by reference to th[ose] enumerated cate-gories of workers,\" Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105; see 251 U.S. 210 —and only a \"class\" 6 that extends across the country is consistent with the two nationwide classes that Congress named in Sec- tion 1. Any other a pproach would be unworkable. Carving classes of workers up by state, region, or city would introduce considerable \"complexity and uncertainty\" to the analysis, Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123; create anomalies based on, say, the fortuity of whether a plaint iff happened to work near a state border; and clash with the FAA's purpose of establishing a na- tional rule requiring enforcement of arbitration agree- ments, see Buckeye Check Cashing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, the relevant \"class\" for purposes of Sec- tion 1 cannot be defined solely by litigants' own asser- tions about who they think a class includes in a partic-ular case. That would contravene Section 1's tex t: \"seamen\" and \"railroad employees,\" which define the scope of the residual clause, are not subsets of workers specific to a particular litigation, but rather classes that exist independently of any given suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Federal Circuit Law of Assignor Estoppel Follows and Fairly Implements This Court's Jurisprudence",
		"context": "\"[A]n assignor should not be permitted to sell something and later assert that what was sold is worthless, all to the detriment of the assignee.\" Id. ; accord Pandrol USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2017, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the \"continued vitality of the doctrine of assignor estoppel.\" Mentor Graphics 851 F.3d 1275.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 1161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Federal Circuit Law of Assignor Estoppel Follows and Fairly Implements This Court's Jurisprudence",
		"context": "; accord Pandrol USA, 424 F.3d 1161. In 2017, the Federal Circuit reaffirmed the \"continued vitality of the doctrine of assignor estoppel.\" Mentor Graphics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it did so again in the panel decision below, recognizing that: nothing in Lear eliminated assignor estoppel and that an important distinction existed between assignors and licensees: The public policy favoring allowing a licensee to contest the validity of the 10 patent is not present in the assignment situation. Unlike the licensee, who, without Lear might be forced to continue to pay for a potentially invalid patent, the assignor who would challenge the patent has already been fully paid for the patent rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F.3d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Federal Circuit Law of Assignor Estoppel Follows and Fairly Implements This Court's Jurisprudence",
		"context": "As discussed in further detail below, \"[p]rivity, like the doctrine of assignor estoppel itself, is determined upon a balance of equities.\" Shamrock Techs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In other words, '[i]f an inventor assigns his invention to his employer company A and leaves to join company B, whether company B is in privity and thus bound by the doctrine will depend on the equities dictated by the relationship between the inventor and company B in light of the act of infringement.'\" Juniper Networks, 15 F. Supp. 3d 499.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.2d 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The petition raises important federal questions that warrant this Court's review",
		"context": ". The decision below allows federal agencies to insulate illegal agency action from challenge by forcing would -be plaintiffs to not only \"'bet the farm,'\" see Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but risk their freedom as well, see 26 U.S.C. §7203. Respondents spend several pages discussing the regulatory scheme in painstaking detail, BIO at 2- 8; see also BIO 28 -29, but they fail to even mention, let alone contest , the fact that CIC could face criminal penalties if it is forced to violate the law in order to 2 obtain judicial review of the regulat ory mandate .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The petition raises important federal questions that warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "26-28. The threat of criminal prosecution and prison time is decisive here because it wholly undermine s the legitimacy and feasibility of an \"alternative l egal way\" to challenge Notice 2016 -66. See South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Gerald S. Kerska, Criminal Consequences and the Anti - Injunction Act , 52 Minn. L. Rev. 51 (2020) . Respondents' position is also inconsistent with this Court's oft-repeated holding that a plaintiff should not have to \"first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitle d to challenge \" an illegal mandate .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The petition raises important federal questions that warrant this Court's review",
		"context": "51 (2020) . Respondents' position is also inconsistent with this Court's oft-repeated holding that a plaintiff should not have to \"first expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitle d to challenge \" an illegal mandate . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also App. 55a (Sutton, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) . But even aside from the \"financial ruin and criminal prosecution,\" App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY UNMOORED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT",
		"context": "Contemporary jurisprudence concerning the Constitution's Establishment Clause is, in a word, confused . Criticized by legal scholars, lower court judges, and even members of this very Court , the muddled and sometimes contradictory rules governing how courts should address Establishment Clause issues have been described as \"murky,\" Freethought Soc. Of Greater [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"muddled,\" 132 F.3d 542 , and \"flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.\" County of 492 U.S. 573. Each of the various tests this Court has developed over the years have proven difficult for lower courts to apply —when they are even able to determine which test ought to apply in the first place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY UNMOORED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT",
		"context": "Contemporary jurisprudence concerning the Constitution's Establishment Clause is, in a word, confused . Criticized by legal scholars, lower court judges, and even members of this very Court , the muddled and sometimes contradictory rules governing how courts should address Establishment Clause issues have been described as \"murky,\" Freethought Soc. Of Greater 334 F.3d 247 , \"muddled,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and \"flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.\" County of 492 U.S. 573. Each of the various tests this Court has developed over the years have proven difficult for lower courts to apply —when they are even able to determine which test ought to apply in the first place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 F.3d 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY UNMOORED FROM THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT",
		"context": "Criticized by legal scholars, lower court judges, and even members of this very Court , the muddled and sometimes contradictory rules governing how courts should address Establishment Clause issues have been described as \"murky,\" Freethought Soc. Of Greater 334 F.3d 247 , \"muddled,\" 132 F.3d 542 , and \"flawed in its fundamentals and unworkable in practice.\" County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Each of the various tests this Court has developed over the years have proven difficult for lower courts to apply —when they are even able to determine which test ought to apply in the first place. Unfortunately, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has become hopelessly unmoored from the original public meaning of the Constitution 's text.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither Constitutional Avoidance nor Judicial Economy Justifies Abstention",
		"context": "To be sure, there m ay b e \"good reason[s ]\" why parties ordinarily cannot go straight to federal district court any time the FTC takes one of \"myriad preliminary steps \" that precedes \"a final order.\" U.S.Br.15 -16. But 5 The constitutional inju ry here and in Free Enterprise Fund goes well beyond \"the expense and disruption of defending itself in protracted adjudicatory proceedings ,\" U.S.Br.48 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ), which is inherent in any scheme that defers judicial review until final agency action . That suffices to distinguish Standard Oil, where the party sought to challenge \"[t]he Commission's issuance of its complaint\" for lack of statutory authority. 449 U.S. at 239 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
		"context": "46 Moreover , Kennedy's test would extend not just to religious speech ; it would necessarily require govern- ment employers to navigate a constitutional ma ze for all speech. The F irst Amendment mandates \"neu- tral[ity] toward religion.\" Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While r eligious speech must not be disfavored , neither may it receive uniquely preferred status.5 At the very least, s peech on \"sensitive political topics,\" which \"occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,\" must receive the same \"special protection .\" 138 S. Ct. 2448 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
		"context": "Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719. While r eligious speech must not be disfavored , neither may it receive uniquely preferred status.5 At the very least, s peech on \"sensitive political topics,\" which \"occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,\" must receive the same \"special protection .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus , for the Court to adopt Kennedy's approach, it would have to conclude also that the Pickerin g frame- work no longer applies to political speech. But see, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
		"context": "Thus , for the Court to adopt Kennedy's approach, it would have to conclude also that the Pickerin g frame- work no longer applies to political speech. But see, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Kennedy means for religious speech to receive uniquely preferred status , despite decades of prece- dent prohibiting that result , it wouldn't make the 5 See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton 140 S. Ct. 2603; 452 U.S. 640 . 47 standard any more administrable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
		"context": "But see, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv. , 518 U.S. 712. If Kennedy means for religious speech to receive uniquely preferred status , despite decades of prece- dent prohibiting that result , it wouldn't make the 5 See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 452 U.S. 640 . 47 standard any more administrable. Our nation's rich religious pluralism means that virtually any speech might be sincerely religiously motivated for some.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pickering appropriately weighs the competing interests when a government employee engages in religious speech at work.",
		"context": "But see, e.g., O'Hare Truck Serv. , 518 U.S. 712. If Kennedy means for religious speech to receive uniquely preferred status , despite decades of prece- dent prohibiting that result , it wouldn't make the 5 See, e.g., Calvary Chapel Dayton 140 S. Ct. 2603; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 47 standard any more administrable. Our nation's rich religious pluralism means that virtually any speech might be sincerely religiously motivated for some.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners failed to explain their change in position or to consider the significant interests affected",
		"context": ". Petitioners also violated the APA by changing course on DACA for non -discretionary reasons without 40 fulfilling their obligations to \"supply a reasoned analysis for the change,\" State Farm , 463 U.S. at 42; to show \"good reasons for the new policy,\" Fox Television , 556 U.S. at 515; or to consider the \"serious reliance i nterests\" DACA engendered, Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For the first seven -and-a-half months of the current presidential administration, petitioners gave no indication they considered DACA il legal under the reasoning of the Texas decisions. To the contrary, they continued to accept and process requests for DACA relief, and the President explained in April 2017 that his policy was not to deport DACA recipients, whom he advised to \"rest easy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Clinton, supra , at 540 n.173. At the same time, this Court has held that federal courts may enter convictions on lesser -included off enses of those enumerated in § 1153(a), notwithstanding any overlap with tribal authority, in order to equalize the treatment of Indian and non-Indian defendants charged with federal crimes . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alongside the federal government's arrogation of criminal prosecution authority in Indian country to itself stands the constriction of tribal prosecut ion authority , beginning with the creation of the Courts of Indian Offenses, commonly known today as \"CFR courts .\" Originally the \"clan or extended family often served as the primary institutions for the imposition of sanctions for the violation of tribal law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "1279, 1281 (1 994). Creating the Courts of Indian Offenses was \"a valid exercise of the power of the Secretary of the Interior as delegated to him by the Congress which holds plenary power over Indian tribes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Bureau of Indian Affairs's model criminal code , first promulgated in 1935, \"establish[es] or define[s] a complete judici al system \" for these courts, and was the model for early tribal courts, some of which borrowed the federal regulation s as their own tribal criminal code. 342 F.2d 369 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "931 F.2d 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "931 F.2d 636. The Bureau of Indian Affairs's model criminal code , first promulgated in 1935, \"establish[es] or define[s] a complete judici al system \" for these courts, and was the model for early tribal courts, some of which borrowed the federal regulation s as their own tribal criminal code. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These Courts of Indian Offenses thus were a n example of \"ultimate federal control\" over tribal affairs before the establishment of tribal courts. 435 U.S. 313.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 F.2d 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "342 F.2d 369 . These Courts of Indian Offenses thus were a n example of \"ultimate federal control\" over tribal affairs before the establishment of tribal courts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government started to encourage tribal governments to set up their own courts, rather than rely on the Courts of Indian Offenses. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Beginning in the 1950s, the federal government started to encourage tribal governments to set up their own courts, rather than rely on the Courts of Indian Offenses. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Clinton, supra , at 554 (explaining that the federal regulations governing CFR courts \"are designed to encourage tribes to set up their own courts\"). \"These courts are established by the tribes themselves under their own self -governing powers, but are externally limited in their powers by federal regulations relating primarily to the appointment , qualifications, and removal of judges, and the provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "at 554 –55. Once a tribe establishes its own courts, though, the Courts of Indian Offenses are \"entirely displaced\" by the tribal courts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where an individual tribe has not acted to establish its own tribal court system, the CFR courts continue to adjudicate criminal cases . 25 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 F. Supp. 2d 1302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Those acts amount to felonies under Chapter 109A. See 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A), (B); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 410 F.3d 1017; 164 F.3d 1235. The regulations likewise punish statutory rape , which they define as having sexual contact with a person under the age of 16 when the actor is at least four years older than the victim. 25 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "639 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Those acts amount to felonies under Chapter 109A. See 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A), (B); 639 F.3d 1182; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 164 F.3d 1235. The regulations likewise punish statutory rape , which they define as having sexual contact with a person under the age of 16 when the actor is at least four years older than the victim. 25 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 F.3d 1017",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Those acts amount to felonies under Chapter 109A. See 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(A), (B); 639 F.3d 1182; 410 F.3d 1017; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The regulations likewise punish statutory rape , which they define as having sexual contact with a person under the age of 16 when the actor is at least four years older than the victim. 25 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "§ 2243(a). But even though a CFR court may seek to punish the same crimes enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a), cf., e.g., 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 11.450; cf. 684 F.3d 844. Thus the federal government limits the CFR courts' power to such an extent that those prosecutions cannot result in the full extent of punishment available in federal district court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 1024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. When a prosecution in a CFR court is followed by a prosecution in federal district court, the federal government's control over both proceedings establishes that the CFR court prosecution is merely a tool of the federal government",
		"context": "Federal law creates the court; federal law limits the punishment those courts may mete out, even f or crimes listed in the Major Crimes Act ; federal actors play the three important roles in those courts; and federal authorities implement prison terms and collect fines imposed by those courts. Undoubtedly, then, when a defendant is prosecuted in a CFR co urt for a lesser - included offense of a crime later charged in federal district court, the Double Jeopardy Clause should forbid the second prosecution. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "P. 7001 (listing various \"adversary proceed- ings\"), 9014 (governing other \"contested matters\"). Accordingly , \"Congress has long provided that or- ders in bankruptcy cases may be immediately ap-pealed if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.\" Bullard , 135 S. Ct. at 1692 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Section 158 authorizes immediate appeals \"from final judgments, orders, and decrees . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "2 (3d ed. 2019) ; see also Conn . Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] are considered inter-locutory in the ordinary civil context. 2. This Court's decision in Bullard supplies the correct analytical approach for determining finality in bankruptcy cases .",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "2. This Court's decision in Bullard supplies the correct analytical approach for determining finality in bankruptcy cases . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There , Louis Bullard filed a Chapter 13 petition. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re86 F.3d 482; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 F.3d 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re86 F.3d 482; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 F.3d 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re86 F.3d 482; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 F.3d 1539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "86 F.3d 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re86 F.3d 482; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.2d 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re86 F.3d 482; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re725 F.2d 1111. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "§ 1291 ( i.e., when reviewing decisions of district courts exercis- ing original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases) is the same as finality analysis under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (i.e., when re viewing decisions of bankruptcy courts exercising jurisdiction over bank- ruptcy cases) . See, e.g., In re140 F.3d 463; In re119 F.3d 349; Jove Eng'g, 92 F.3d 1539; In re86 F.3d 482; 796 F.2d 553; A.H. Robins 788 F.2d 994; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 He then \"amended it three times over the course of a year.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.2d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Bankruptcy court orders are immediately appealable if they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case .. 14",
		"context": "B ullard sought further review, but the First Circuit dismissed his appeal for lack of jurisdic- tion. Following the majority of circuits, the court con- cluded that an order denying confirmation \"is not a final order so long as the debtor remains free to pro-pose an amended plan.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court affirmed. At the outset , this Court ex- plained that a bankruptcy court order is immediately appeal able when it finally dispose s of a discrete di s- pute within the larger case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. The Question Presented is Critically Important and Properly Presented",
		"context": "Finally, the Court's jurisprudence under a different jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, is instructivehere because the \"Court has held that the requirementof finality is to be given a \"practical, rather than a technical, construction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] citing 337 U.S. 541. Therefore, appealable finality is not limited just tomatters where a judgment or order completelyterminates a case. In Gillespie , this Court decided to hear an appeal because the Court's consideration of the inconvenience, cost and delay that would be involved ifthe appeal were denied all weighed in favor of theCourt hearing the appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. The Question Presented is Critically Important and Properly Presented",
		"context": "Finally, the Court's jurisprudence under a different jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, is instructivehere because the \"Court has held that the requirementof finality is to be given a \"practical, rather than a technical, construction.\" 379 U.S. 148 citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Therefore, appealable finality is not limited just tomatters where a judgment or order completelyterminates a case. In Gillespie , this Court decided to hear an appeal because the Court's consideration of the inconvenience, cost and delay that would be involved ifthe appeal were denied all weighed in favor of theCourt hearing the appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. The Question Presented is Critically Important and Properly Presented",
		"context": "The question will reoccurand likely lead to a deepening of the circuit split if theCourt does not grant Lorenzo's petition. In fact, federaldistrict courts in circuits that have not ruled on theissue raised in this petition have already takenconflicting positions. Compare Lautenberg 2009 WL 2928913[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The conflicts between the circuits and the disparate treatment ofdefendants based on what circuit they happen to be in 12 will only continue and grow more pronounced if the Court does not decide the important question presentedin this petition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F. Supp. 2d 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan",
		"context": "Under this chaotic system, the First Amendment would guard against libel claims from public officials (at least in theory) but would offer no protection for critiques of non -officials, like Petitioner, who orchestrate government 18 corruption or otherwise have an oversize influence on the public sphere.5 4. A decision overruling the public figure standard would also have ramifications outside the libel context because it would imperil other free- speech precedent s. As Justice Scalia wrote in an opinion cited in the Petition, \"[i]t is perhaps our most important constitutional task to ensure freedom of political speech.\" Federal Election Com [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized Sullivan as a cornerstone of the doctrines it developed to fulfil this purpose . 6 Giving Sullivan its narrowest possible 5 Recent history teaches that a rule excluding non -officials from the actual malice standard c ould be abused.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan",
		"context": "6 Giving Sullivan its narrowest possible 5 Recent history teaches that a rule excluding non -officials from the actual malice standard c ould be abused. In the run up to the 2020 election, for example, a series of lawsuits were filed by proxies for government officials seeking to restrain or punish speech critical of the government – which would evade any First Amendment protection under Petitioner's proposal . See 128 N.Y.S.3d 801 (lawsuit alleging television station defamed presidential campaign committee); Donald J. Trump for President, 2020 WL 6608327[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]562 U.S. 443 would undermine the decisions that built upon Sullivan' s right to engage in \"uninhibited, robust and wide -open\" debate on \"the major public issues of our time.\" Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 270-71. The Court should not upend its First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly since there is no concerted pressure from the lower courts calling for it to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No Court Has Ever Called for Petitioner's Narrow and Illogical Interpretation of Sullivan",
		"context": "6 Giving Sullivan its narrowest possible 5 Recent history teaches that a rule excluding non -officials from the actual malice standard c ould be abused. In the run up to the 2020 election, for example, a series of lawsuits were filed by proxies for government officials seeking to restrain or punish speech critical of the government – which would evade any First Amendment protection under Petitioner's proposal . See 128 N.Y.S.3d 801 (lawsuit alleging television station defamed presidential campaign committee); Donald J. Trump for President, 2020 WL 6608327564 U.S. 721[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] would undermine the decisions that built upon Sullivan' s right to engage in \"uninhibited, robust and wide -open\" debate on \"the major public issues of our time.\" Sullivan , 376 U.S. at 270-71. The Court should not upend its First Amendment jurisprudence, particularly since there is no concerted pressure from the lower courts calling for it to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Roe/Casey framework has also made political solutions to religious liberty conflicts harder.",
		"context": "In addition to exacerbating conflicts over religion, the Roe/Casey regime also makes it harder for political actors to \"follow [] the best of our traditions\" and accommodate \"a vari ety of beliefs and creeds.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, while a \"wall -to-wall coalition\" pursued RFRA as an answer to this Court's error in Employment 494 U.S. 872 , RFRA later came under attack in no little part due to the politics and jurisprudence of abortion. At the time RFRA was enacted, the ACLU acknowledged that RFRA would \"permit[ ] religiously sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or contraception services.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Roe/Casey framework has also made political solutions to religious liberty conflicts harder.",
		"context": "In addition to exacerbating conflicts over religion, the Roe/Casey regime also makes it harder for political actors to \"follow [] the best of our traditions\" and accommodate \"a vari ety of beliefs and creeds.\" 343 U.S. 306 . For example, while a \"wall -to-wall coalition\" pursued RFRA as an answer to this Court's error in Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , RFRA later came under attack in no little part due to the politics and jurisprudence of abortion. At the time RFRA was enacted, the ACLU acknowledged that RFRA would \"permit[ ] religiously sponsored hospitals to decline to provide abortion or contraception services.\" Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S enate Comm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Circuits Are Split on What Standard of Review Applies.",
		"context": ", Pet. App. 40 (explaining that whether existing party is inadequate representative of proposed intervenor's interests is an inquiry \"firmly committed to the discretion of the district court\"), with Wal-Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, de novo review is the better approach. Intervention as of right is not subject to a district court's discretion, and the factors that a court must examine to determine whether a proposed intervenor is entitled to intervene as of right require legal determinations, thus necessitating de novo review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Independently, petitioners' interest in enforcing respondents' fiduciary duties supplies the necessary personal stake",
		"context": "Respondents, however, miss that statement's context. As the Tenth Circuit explained in rejecting an identi- cal argument, Russell addressed only Section 1109(a)'s remedy: The Court \"held merely that § 1109(a) did not provide a remedy for individual beneficiaries.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court \"dec isively rejected the claim that 'Congress intended ERIS A's fiduciary standards to protect only the financial integrity of the plan, not individ- ual beneficiaries.'\" Gaither, 394 F.3d at 808 n.6 (quoting Varity , 516 U.S. at 507-515). On the contrary, a fiduciary \"owes fiduciary duties to ea ch individual beneficiary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 F.3d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Independently, petitioners' interest in enforcing respondents' fiduciary duties supplies the necessary personal stake",
		"context": "On the contrary, a fiduciary \"owes fiduciary duties to ea ch individual beneficiary.\" Ibid. Likewise, the fact that relief inures to the plan as a whole—that \"the 'plan'\" is \"the victim,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—does not undercut the principle that fiduciary duties protect participants. The plan holds the assets, but it does so for participants' benefit. So when a fiduciary breach occurs, participants incur harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "41 Petitioners' complaint would force the issue — requ iring the lower courts, and, potentially, this Court, to reach th is question in a future case. Marbury v. Madison recognized the \"general and indisputable rule,\" foundational to our constitutional system, \"that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Bivens, judge -made damages suits against rogue federal officers for consti tutional violations were routinely available . See, e.g. , Woolhandler , supra, at 87–90, 135– 37; see also J AMES E. PFANDER , CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS AND THE WAR ON TERROR 10 (2017) (\"[T]he antebellum model of government accountability extended to a broad range of federal official miscon duct.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "In cases in which Bivens remedies —or an alternative —are available, it follows that the Westfall Act's displacement of state -law tort remedies raises no such constitutional concern. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court has never consi dered whether the Westfall Act raises serious 42 constitutional problems in a case in which the statute's effect is to deny access to any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim. Those constitutional concerns are necessaril y at their zenith in a case like this one , in which the underlying claim is a common law tort (trespass by a rogue federal officer ) that had historically been actionable , and for which no other legal remedy is available today.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "But this Court has never consi dered whether the Westfall Act raises serious 42 constitutional problems in a case in which the statute's effect is to deny access to any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim. Those constitutional concerns are necessaril y at their zenith in a case like this one , in which the underlying claim is a common law tort (trespass by a rogue federal officer ) that had historically been actionable , and for which no other legal remedy is available today. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Bartlett ex rel. 816 F.2d 695 (\"[I]t has become something of a time- honored tradition for the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to find that Congress did not intend to preclude altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious due process concer ns that such preclusion would raise . \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Those constitutional concerns are necessaril y at their zenith in a case like this one , in which the underlying claim is a common law tort (trespass by a rogue federal officer ) that had historically been actionable , and for which no other legal remedy is available today. See 486 U.S. 592; see also Bartlett ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[I]t has become something of a time- honored tradition for the Supreme Court and lower federal courts to find that Congress did not intend to preclude altogether judicial review of constitutional claims in light of the serious due process concer ns that such preclusion would raise . \"). The Constitution's federalist system assumed that state courts would play a central role in holding the federal government to account —including through state tort claims against rogue individual federal officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.2d 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Absent a Bivens Remedy, the Westfall Act's Preemption of State Law Would Raise Serious Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953) (\"In the scheme of the Constitution, [state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\" Often, after all, there' s no need to turn federal courts into common la w courts and imagine a whole new tort jurisprudence under the rubric of § 1983 and the Constitution in order to vindicate fundamental rights when we have state courts ready and willing to vindicate those same rights using a deep and rich common law that 's been battle tested through the centuries . \"). Petitioners plausibly allege—and so this Court must assume —that Respondent violated the Constitution when he shot and killed their 15-year- old son.",
		"citation_value_orig": "787 F.3d 1076",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Louisiana Has a History of Substandard Abortion Providers",
		"context": "Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in the present case noted that Doe 3, the Chief Medical Officer at June Medical Services, LLC, trained other doctors to perform abortions and then hired them, but admitted that he has not performed criminal 15 Available at http://apps.lsbme.la.gov/ disciplinary/DocViewer .aspx?decision=true&fID=2461 . 11 background checks or asked about their previous training. See June Medical Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Three of those doctors are not OB/GYNs, but a radiologist, ophthalmologist and a generalized family medical practitioner. See Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "Instead, Section 101(b) serves to highlight that it is the States' primary responsibility to implement the baseline protections established under the Act in con-cert with their own resource management frame- works. See 03 U.S. 91 correctly acknowledges state sovereignty over the development and use of land and water within each state, this Court has long recognized that federal standards control pollution of navigable waters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such protection is under- mined when the baseline of federal water quality standards is not applied to all water bodies that have significant impacts on the quality of traditional nav i- gable waters. Our nation's waters do not recognize the invisible boundaries between states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "Many of our wa- ters are connected by gravity flow – starting from trib- utaries and associated wetlands and eventually flow- ing to our nation's largest rivers and lake s. 11 Thus, t his Court has long recognized a federal role in controlling water pollution, distinct from water allocation or other resource management decisions that are more properly left to the states. Before the Clean Water Act , abatement of interstate water pollu- tion was addressed by states bringing suit s under the federal common law of nuisance . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New 256 U.S. 296; New 283 U.S. 473; 406 U.S. 91 . As this Court recognized, the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments that created the current regulatory system displaced that common law . See City of 451 U.S. 304 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "200 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "Many of our wa- ters are connected by gravity flow – starting from trib- utaries and associated wetlands and eventually flow- ing to our nation's largest rivers and lake s. 11 Thus, t his Court has long recognized a federal role in controlling water pollution, distinct from water allocation or other resource management decisions that are more properly left to the states. Before the Clean Water Act , abatement of interstate water pollu- tion was addressed by states bringing suit s under the federal common law of nuisance . See 200 U.S. 496; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New 283 U.S. 473; 406 U.S. 91 . As this Court recognized, the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments that created the current regulatory system displaced that common law . See City of 451 U.S. 304 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "Many of our wa- ters are connected by gravity flow – starting from trib- utaries and associated wetlands and eventually flow- ing to our nation's largest rivers and lake s. 11 Thus, t his Court has long recognized a federal role in controlling water pollution, distinct from water allocation or other resource management decisions that are more properly left to the states. Before the Clean Water Act , abatement of interstate water pollu- tion was addressed by states bringing suit s under the federal common law of nuisance . See 200 U.S. 496; New 256 U.S. 296; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 406 U.S. 91 . As this Court recognized, the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments that created the current regulatory system displaced that common law . See City of 451 U.S. 304 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "Many of our wa- ters are connected by gravity flow – starting from trib- utaries and associated wetlands and eventually flow- ing to our nation's largest rivers and lake s. 11 Thus, t his Court has long recognized a federal role in controlling water pollution, distinct from water allocation or other resource management decisions that are more properly left to the states. Before the Clean Water Act , abatement of interstate water pollu- tion was addressed by states bringing suit s under the federal common law of nuisance . See 200 U.S. 496; New 256 U.S. 296; New 283 U.S. 473; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As this Court recognized, the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments that created the current regulatory system displaced that common law . See City of 451 U.S. 304 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Clean Water Act created a framework of cooperative federalism with a robust federal floor of water quality protection.",
		"context": "See 200 U.S. 496; New 256 U.S. 296; New 283 U.S. 473; 406 U.S. 91 . As this Court recognized, the 1972 Clean Water Act amendments that created the current regulatory system displaced that common law . See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In doing so, the Court n oted that \"Congress' intent in enacting the [1972] Amendments was clearly to establish an all -en- compassing program of water pollution regulation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 33 561 U.S. 465 19, 23 572 U.S. 844 40 Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551 39 306 U.S. 451 34 136 S. Ct. 2355, superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light 329 U.S. 90 33 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 19, 23 572 U.S. 844 40 Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551 39 306 U.S. 451 34 136 S. Ct. 2355, superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light 329 U.S. 90 33 561 U.S. 465 19, 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 40 Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551 39 306 U.S. 451 34 136 S. Ct. 2355, superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light 329 U.S. 90 33 561 U.S. 465 19, 23 572 U.S. 844 40 Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 39 306 U.S. 451 34 136 S. Ct. 2355, superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light 329 U.S. 90 33 561 U.S. 465 19, 23 572 U.S. 844 40 Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551 39 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 34 136 S. Ct. 2355, superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "42 CONCLUSION 48 V TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Am. Power & Light 329 U.S. 90 33 561 U.S. 465 19, 23 572 U.S. 844 40 Dep't of 139 S. Ct. 2551 39 306 U.S. 451 34 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "794 F.3d 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "842 F.2d 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "664 F.3d 1084",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 40 None Thompson 484 27 561 U.S. 476 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508 (1988), as recognized in 561 U.S. 358 passim 139 S. Ct. 2484 passim 555 U.S. 1204 22, 23, 35 138 S. Ct. 2392 27 404 U.S. 336 39 794 F.3d 729 27 139 S. Ct. 2319 26 vi TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—continued Page 520 U.S. 259 39 842 F.2d 515 26 664 F.3d 1084 27 553 U.S. 507 40 None Thompson 484 27 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 23 STATUTE 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)(i) 25 RULES Sup. Ct. R. 12.4 18 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "gov/about/facilities-services.html (last vi- sited Sept. 16, 2019) 7 Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Justice Dept. to Weigh Inquiry Into Clinton Foundation, N.Y. Times (Nov. 13, 2017) 46 Ted Sherman & Matt Arco, Kelly Testifies Christie Signed Off on Bridgegate Lane Closures, NJ.com (Oct. 21, 2016) 12 Michael Symons, What Went Wrong for Christie's Presidential Campaign?, USA Today (Feb. 10, 2016) 2 U.S. Census Bureau, City and Town Popula- tion Totals: 2010-2018 (June 27, 2019) 28 U.S. Census Bureau, County Population To- tals and Components Change: 2010-2018 (June 27, 2019) 28 Kate Zernike, Christie Faces Scandal on Traffic Jam Aides Ordered, N.Y. Times (Jan. 8, 2014) 14 INTRODUCTION Just three years ago, this Court reminded prosecu- tors and courts that they may not stretch federal crim- inal \"'statute [s] in a manner that leaves [their] outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Gov- ernment in setting standards' of 'good government for local and state officials.\"' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the gov- ernment in this case did just that when it took two fed- eral property fraud statutes and contorted them in previously unknown ways in a contrived effort to sup- ply a federal prosecutorial response to public outrage over an unseemly episode of state-level political gamesmanship. Consistent with its prior decisions, this Court should correct that overreach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "That theory is wrong. In the context of honest ser- vices fraud, this Court has made clear for decades that the federal fraud statutes do not give federal prosecu- tors broad license to \"seta standards of ... good govern- ment for local and state officials.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More specifically, this Court has expressly 1 The government also charged Baroni and Kelly with depriv- ing stalled motorists of their supposed right to intrastate travel. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "Indeed, in a companion case to Skilling, the government affirmatively conceded that \"[h]onest- services fraud does not embrace allegations that purely political interests may have influenced a public official's performance of his duty.\" Br. for the United States at 45, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The convictions here do more than just run headlong into the reasoning of Skilling and McNally. As a prac- tical matter, if the government's theory is right, Skil- ling and McNally are a dead letter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "2 Given the hyper-partisan tone of our Nation's cur- rent political discourse, where prominent voices on both sides now regularly call for the prosecution of po- litical adversaries, that threat is not one this Court should abide. In any event, it is not one the present state of the law allows. Whatever one may think of the dubious wisdom of laws that would allow the prosecu- tion of a public official who, for no personal benefit, di- rects agency action for a proffered reason that is actu- ally pretext for a political reason—hardly a circum- stance unknown to this Court, see, e.g., Dep't of Com- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—those are not the laws we have; a fact made clear in the honest services fraud cases, and that remains clear no matter what other statutory rocks the government looks un- der. The ordinary money-and-property fraud statutes used here do not by their terms cover such conduct, have never before been used to prosecute such conduct, and core principles of vagueness, lenity, and federal- ism make clear that they may not be expanded by courts or prosecutors to criminalize such conduct. If Congress wants to grant federal prosecutors license to target public officials based on the countless run-of- the-mill acts and decisions that are motivated by some reason other than the publicly-disclosed reason—as a 2 Lin-Manuel Miranda, The Room Where It Happens, on Ham- ilton (Atl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "The Third Circuit's decision affirm- ing in part, reversing in part, and remanding, Pet. App. la, is reported at [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. JURISDICTION The Third Circuit issued its opinion and entered judgment on November 27, 2018; it denied Kelly re- hearing on February 5, 2019. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "909 F.3d 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE GOVERNMENT'S THEORY OF FRAUD CRIMINALIZES A WIDE RANGE OF ORDINARY POLITICAL ACTIVITY",
		"context": "Specifically, Su- preme Court Rule 12.6 provides that \"[a]ll parties to the proceeding in the court whose judgment is sought to be reviewed are deemed parties\" to a case in which the Court grants certiorari and are \"considered re- spondents\" with the right to participate in the case and to receive any relief from the Court's decision in the case, so long as they \"ensure that counsel of record for all parties receive notice\" of their intention. Sup. Ct. R. 12.6; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Baroni provided the requisite notice and, on March 15, 2019, filed a brief—essentially indistinguishable from the petition he otherwise would have filed—in support of Kelly's petition. Following the grant of certiorari in this case, Baroni immediately obtained an order from the district court granting him bail.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Equal Protection Clause",
		"context": "But there, it plays a very different role. In the race context, the predominant intent standard allows a generally prohibited intent —government action based on race — to escape strict scrutiny if that racial intent does not predominate. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, by contrast, the district court would take 49 a generally permissible intent —partisan advantage — and subject it to demanding consideration because it predominated. But that begs the questions why a motivation that is permissible in small doses becomes unconstitutional in larger doses, and what dosage makes partisan intent predominant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Equal Protection Clause",
		"context": "Partisan gerrymandering, however, tends to avoid the concentration of majority -party voters in a small number of districts. See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 51 most feared by litigants who want to know what to expect),\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: a nebulous totality - of-the-circumstances approach. JS.App.214. The district court should not be able to hide its utter failure to identify the circumstances that actually matter by saying the outcome turns on the totality of them .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "1. The prior-construction canon provides that, un- der certain circumstances, Congress is presumed to ratify a \"well-settled\" administrative or judicial 38 construction of a statutory provision when it reenacts the provision or incorporates it into a new law without change. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Helsinn Healthcare 139 S. Ct. 628. But the canon is only a tool for interpreting ambiguous statu- tory provisions. It cannot override text when a stat-ute's meaning is plain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "1. The prior-construction canon provides that, un- der certain circumstances, Congress is presumed to ratify a \"well-settled\" administrative or judicial 38 construction of a statutory provision when it reenacts the provision or incorporates it into a new law without change. See, e.g., 140 S. Ct. 1936; Helsinn Healthcare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the canon is only a tool for interpreting ambiguous statu- tory provisions. It cannot override text when a stat-ute's meaning is plain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 628",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "But the canon is only a tool for interpreting ambiguous statu- tory provisions. It cannot override text when a stat-ute's meaning is plain. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The prior-construction canon is inapplicable here because the statutory text is plain. Indeed, petition- ers do not ask the Court to afford deference under Chevron, U.S.A., 467 U.S. 837 to the interpreta- tion proffered by the go vernment in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "See 513 U.S. 115. The prior-construction canon is inapplicable here because the statutory text is plain. Indeed, petition- ers do not ask the Court to afford deference under Chevron, U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to the interpreta- tion proffered by the go vernment in this case. 5 5 The prior-construction canon is a particularly uncomforta- ble fit when applied to an admi nistrative interpretation for which the government does not seek deference. The Court has long held that an agency is permitted to change its interpreta- tion after the statute is reenacted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "5 5 The prior-construction canon is a particularly uncomforta- ble fit when applied to an admi nistrative interpretation for which the government does not seek deference. The Court has long held that an agency is permitted to change its interpreta- tion after the statute is reenacted. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 308 U.S. 90. Under modern principles of administra-tive law, the most one can infer from reenactment is that Con- gress thought the statute was ambiguous and the agency's inter- pretation was permissible. See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843–844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "5 5 The prior-construction canon is a particularly uncomforta- ble fit when applied to an admi nistrative interpretation for which the government does not seek deference. The Court has long held that an agency is permitted to change its interpreta- tion after the statute is reenacted. See 344 U.S. 344; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under modern principles of administra-tive law, the most one can infer from reenactment is that Con- gress thought the statute was ambiguous and the agency's inter- pretation was permissible. See Chevron , 467 U.S. at 843–844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "308 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "Even if the text were ambiguous, petitioners' invocation of the prior-construction canon would still lack merit. The canon only applies when administra- tive or judicial interpretations have \"settled\" the meaning of a statute. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1947. But nei- ther administrative nor judicial interpretations have settled that all village and regional ANCs automati- cally qualify as \"Indian tribes.\" a. Petitioners assert that Congress ratified their proposed construction when it reenacted ISDA's \"In- dian tribe\" definition in 1988.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "23a. This Court has been re- luctant to apply the prior-construction canon to infor- mal agency interpretations. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that re- luctance is especially pertinent here where the mem-orandum never mentions Interior's promulgated reg-ulations or attempts to reconcile its position with them. Moreover, the informal interpretation never took root in agency practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "See Gardner , 513 U.S. at 121 (reenactment is \"without significance\" when the statutory text and legislative history make \"no reference\" to an agency's interpretation and no evidence exists suggesting Con- gress \"was even aware\" of it). While the Court has in some limited circumstances held that Congress rati- fied an informal interpretation, it has done so only when there was compelling evidence that Congress agreed with the agency's view and intended for it to enjoy the force of law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bragdon , 524 U.S. at 644; 435 U.S. 110. That is not the case here. The drafting history of the 1988 ISDA amendments indicates that the \"reen- actment\" of the definition was a ministerial 6 According to a GAO report, two other anomalies not men- tioned by petitioners arose afte r 1988 for the communities of Val- dez and Seward, where there are no federally recognized tribes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "See Gardner , 513 U.S. at 121 (reenactment is \"without significance\" when the statutory text and legislative history make \"no reference\" to an agency's interpretation and no evidence exists suggesting Con- gress \"was even aware\" of it). While the Court has in some limited circumstances held that Congress rati- fied an informal interpretation, it has done so only when there was compelling evidence that Congress agreed with the agency's view and intended for it to enjoy the force of law. See 535 U.S. 212; Bragdon , 524 U.S. at 644; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is not the case here. The drafting history of the 1988 ISDA amendments indicates that the \"reen- actment\" of the definition was a ministerial 6 According to a GAO report, two other anomalies not men- tioned by petitioners arose afte r 1988 for the communities of Val- dez and Seward, where there are no federally recognized tribes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "31, that version is so \"early\" that it was passed by the House in a previous Congress and then died on the vine. \"Failed legislative proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation.\" Solid Waste [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] was federally recognized. Nor does the accompanying committee report suggest an un- derstanding that all ANCs qualify as tribes; and in any event, \"language in a Committee Report, without additional indication of more widespread congres-sional awareness, is simply not sufficient[.]\" 436 U.S. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "Solid Waste 531 U.S. 159 was federally recognized. Nor does the accompanying committee report suggest an un- derstanding that all ANCs qualify as tribes; and in any event, \"language in a Committee Report, without additional indication of more widespread congres-sional awareness, is simply not sufficient[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A prepared state- ment from CIRI submitted for the record in a four- person hearing adds nothing, see id. Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "29–30 & n.3. But again, there is no evidence Con- gress even considered ANC status; congressional in- action of this sort \"deserve[s] little weight in the in- terpretive process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 c. Petitioners additionally argue that ratification occurred when Congress incorporated the ISDA defi- nition into the CARES Act. Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "In sum, petitioners' administrative ratification ar- gument distills to the position that the CARES Act Congress should be presumed to have incorporated an interpretation advanced in an informal 1976 internal memorandum while simultaneously ignoring the nu- merous statutory and regulatory provisions defining ISDA contracting as the province of federally recog- nized tribes. The contention defeats itself. d. In addition to the 1976 memorandum, petition- ers argue that Congress rati fied the Ninth Circuit's 47 decision in Cook Inlet Native [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], throug h the 1988 reenactment. Gov't Br. 30–32; ANC Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.2d 1471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "13. But as this case reflects, liti- gation involving the ISDA definition or ISDA con- tracting in Alaska can and does arise elsewhere, in- cluding in the District of Columbia and Federal Cir- cuits. See, e.g., Arctic Slope Native Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, Cook Inlet has little force. The case in- volved the unique situation in Anchorage discussed above, and the Ninth Circuit (incorrectly) applied Chevron deference to the administering agencies' challenged decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "699 F.3d 1289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Ratified Petitioners' Interpretation",
		"context": "1543, 1597–1598. The Ninth Circuit has accordingly never applied Cook Inlet in a subsequent case. See Cook Inlet Treaty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There 48 simply is no well-settled judicial precedent treating ANCs as \"Indian tribes,\" because there has been no widespread agency practice in that regard for courts to address. Whether framed in terms of agency prac- tice or judicial precedent, therefore, petitioners' rati- fication argument provides no warrant for departing from the plain text of ISDA and Title V.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Enacted the FCRA's Maximum Possible Accuracy Requirements Precisely Because Inaccurate Information Poses a Material Risk of Harm",
		"context": ". the establishment of all sorts of computerized data banks, the individual is in great danger of having his life and character reduced to impersonal 'blips' and key-punch holes in a stolid and unthinking machine which can literally ruin his reputation without cause, and make him unemployable.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 Given the ubiquity and impact of the credit reporting agencies' information on the daily lives of Americans, even a small rate of inaccuracy was unacceptable to Congress because of the risks any material inaccuracies posed to consumers. Supporters of the bill explained that, because the composition of those whose reports are inaccurate \"is constantly 17 See also Hearing on S. 823 Before the Subcomm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 F.3d 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The President's Refusal to Comply with Unlawful Subpoenas Is Consistent with the Precedent Established by George Washington",
		"context": "In the Establishment Clause context, this Court has observed that the practices of the First Congress are instructive as to what the Establishment Clause means, because many of the members of the first Congress also had voted on the First Amendment itself. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same logic should apply to the actions of the first President, George Washington, who had also presided over the Constitutional Convention, when it comes to the matter of executive power. George Washington once refused to comply with an unlawful subpoena issued by the House, which is exactly the same objection that President Trump is making in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The President's Refusal to Comply with Unlawful Subpoenas Is Consistent with the Precedent Established by George Washington",
		"context": "29 and made public for the whole world to see would involve such a distraction to the President that he might not be able to fulfill the Take Care Clause. This is not about a \"particular President;\" it is about \"the Presidency itself.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, even if the House committees somehow had the power to issue these subpoenas, the breadth of the requests violate the Fourth Amendment. George Washington's basis for rejecting the House's request was that their demand violated the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit Recognized that Section 362(a)(3) Applies to All Property of the Estate, Whether in the Debtor's Possession or Not.",
		"context": "362(a)(3). The Seventh Circuit emphasized the last clause: \"or to exercise control.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is the heart of the matter. Unlike many reasons for filing a Chapter 13, filing to protect a vehicle from a creditor is somewhat unique.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The rationales for tolling supervised release when a defendant is incarcerated in connection with a conviction apply equally to all imprisonment credited toward a prison sentence",
		"context": "3585(b) . By limiting credit to time s erved and time that would otherwise be uncredited, \"Congress made clear that a defendant could not receive doubl e credit for his detention time. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Such \"dou- ble credit\" is similarly unwarranted in the context of a defendant who seeks to count prison time against his term of supervised release. Indeed, t he principle against double counting carries particular force when the penalties are of different types.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The rationales for tolling supervised release when a defendant is incarcerated in connection with a conviction apply equally to all imprisonment credited toward a prison sentence",
		"context": "Indeed, t he principle against double counting carries particular force when the penalties are of different types. This Court has recognized that \"[i]t would be anomalous to interpret § 3585(b) to require sentence credit for time spent confined in a community treatment center,\" because \"Congress generally views such a re- striction on liberty as a part of a sent ence of 'probation' or 'supervised release,' rather than part of a sentence of 'imprisonment.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The mirror -image scenario —allowing a portion of a term of imprisonment for one crime to off- set a d efendant's term of supervised release for another crime —would be equally, if not more, \"anomalous.\" 31 Nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that Con- gress intended that such a period of imprisonment pre- sumptively count as both the sentence for the second crime and part of the supervised -release term for the original crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "But that criticism is misplaced. To start, attorney-fee critics ignore that one purpose of awarding § 1983 attorney fees \"is to encourage litigants to assume the role of a private Attorney General.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"This policy may be served by granting a fee request even where a plaintiff is unable to prove actual damages re sulting from his constitu- tional deprivation.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "698 F.2d 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "Section 1988 requires a party to have \"prevailed on the merits of at least some of his claims,\" the Court explained. Id. at 603 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And while a change in policy that never affected anyone's rights is insufficient to trigger the right to fees, the opposite is true for a plaintiff who alleges that her rights have already been violated: \"an award of nominal damages suffices under this test.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 577 F.3d 169; 401 F.3d 199; 7 F.3d 106; 323 F.3d 616; 421 F.3d 901; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 F.3d 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 401 F.3d 199; 7 F.3d 106; 323 F.3d 616; 421 F.3d 901; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "577 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; 577 F.3d 169; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 7 F.3d 106; 323 F.3d 616; 421 F.3d 901; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 F.3d 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; 577 F.3d 169; 401 F.3d 199; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 323 F.3d 616; 421 F.3d 901; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "7 F.3d 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; 577 F.3d 169; 401 F.3d 199; 7 F.3d 106; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 421 F.3d 901; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 F.3d 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; 577 F.3d 169; 401 F.3d 199; 7 F.3d 106; 323 F.3d 616; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 168 F.3d 1179. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 F.3d 901",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The rule that nominal-damages claims are justiciable has not opened the floodgates to attorney-fee awards.",
		"context": "at 122 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For many decades, lower courts have had no difficulty applying these factors to fashion appro- priate attorney-fee awards. E.g., Boston's Children 395 F.3d 10; 577 F.3d 169; 401 F.3d 199; 7 F.3d 106; 323 F.3d 616; 421 F.3d 901; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no reason to think that bringing the Eleventh Circuit back in line with the rest of the country will cause a glut of unwarranted attorney-fee awards. 50 To ensure the protection of free speech, due process, and other constitutional rights, federal courts must be able to award nominal damages when a plaintiff does not allege or cannot prove compensable harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Courts undertook significant steps to avoid dismissalbased on the assertion of state-secrets privilege",
		"context": ". Recognizing the severity of dismissal, courts at- tempted whenever possible to avoid it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , proves illustrative . There, the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of an Invention Secrecy Act suit seeking recovery for the United States ' alleged use of the plaintiff's patented invention, on which the government had placed a secrecy order. The court re- manded for a possible trial in camera with \"a court reporter and other essential court personnel with the necessary security clearance.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 F.2d 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The BIA's Interpretation Is Unreasonable And Not Entitled To Deference",
		"context": "At the very least, the text, structure and history weigh strongly against the \"reasonableness\" of the BIA's interpretation. See Util. Air Regulatory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is es- pecially true given the \"accepted principle[] of statu- tory construction\" that any \"doubts\" concerning the proper interpretation of the stop-time rule should be \"resolve[d]\" in favor of immigrants. Costello , 376 U.S. at 128.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The BIA's Interpretation Is Unreasonable And Not Entitled To Deference",
		"context": "Indeed, if deference were somehow owed to the BIA's decision in this case, it would raise signifi- cant constitutional questions.10 The Court need not reach those questions, however, because the statute, read correctly, does not contain any ambiguity for the agency to resolve. And if it did, even Chevron 's deferential standard of review does not permit the BIA to use its interpretive authority to protect the executive branch from the consequences of serving notice that does not satisfy the statutory require- ments for a \"notice to appear.\" 10 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]135 S. Ct. 939; see Pet. 22 n.4; Cert. Reply Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "it is thus the role of Congress to address these issues, and it has done so on multiple occasions. 38. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 39. Harper & Row , 471 U.S. 539. 27 were not to be disturbed, the Federal Circuit's reversal on issues of law is nonetheless proper.40 This Court, quoting the legislative history, has also described fair use as an \"equitable rule of reason,\"41 and the Federal Circuit below was correct to conclude that \"[i]f fair use is equitable in nature, it would seem to be a question for the judge, not the jury, to decide, even when there are factual disputes regarding its application.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "38. See 127 S. Ct. 2162 39. Harper & Row , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27 were not to be disturbed, the Federal Circuit's reversal on issues of law is nonetheless proper.40 This Court, quoting the legislative history, has also described fair use as an \"equitable rule of reason,\"41 and the Federal Circuit below was correct to conclude that \"[i]f fair use is equitable in nature, it would seem to be a question for the judge, not the jury, to decide, even when there are factual disputes regarding its application.\" 42 outside the copyright context, this Court has frequently affirmed Circuit Court decisions that set aside jury verdicts on grounds of insufficient evidence or errors of law below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "886 F.3d at 1194. 43. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (denying certiorari where Second Circuit reversed general jury verdict; \"[w]hether the evidence was sufficient or otherwise is a question of law for the court\"). 44. 127 S.Ct. 2162 (affirming reversal of jury verdict; abrogated by statute).",
		"citation_value_orig": "55 S. Ct. 890",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "55 S. Ct. 890 (denying certiorari where Second Circuit reversed general jury verdict; \"[w]hether the evidence was sufficient or otherwise is a question of law for the court\"). 44. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming reversal of jury verdict; abrogated by statute). 45. 130 S.Ct. 1251 (affirming in part reversal of jury verdict).",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 S.Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "127 S.Ct. 2162 (affirming reversal of jury verdict; abrogated by statute). 45. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming in part reversal of jury verdict). 46. 131 S.Ct. 1207 (affirming Fourth Circuit reversal of jury verdict).",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 S.Ct. 1251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT CORRECTLY REVERSED THE JURY AS TO FAIR USE",
		"context": "130 S.Ct. 1251 (affirming in part reversal of jury verdict). 46. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming Fourth Circuit reversal of jury verdict). i n Snyder, a jury imposed liability because the defendant's alleged conduct was \"outrageous,\" but this Court affirmed reversal of that result because \"outrageousness is a 28 Google's own view of the sanctity of jury results in this case is hardly consistent with its own positions below. Below, Google made exactly the argument it opposes here, in an effort to overturn the initial jury verdict of prima facie infringement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "131 S.Ct. 1207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "\"[T]he phrase 'based on' indi- cates a but -for causal relationship.\" Safeco Ins. Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court h as repeatedly concluded, \"based on\" carries the same mean- ing as \"because of.\" University of Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "University of Tex. Sw. Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], applies only where \"age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act,\" i.e., where \"age was [a] 'but -for' cause of the employer's adverse decision.\" Gross , 557 U.S. at 176. 17 Moreover, the \" 'normal definition of discrimination' is 'differential treatment' \" or, more spe cifically, \" 'less favorable' treatment\" of similarly situated individuals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "Gross , 557 U.S. at 176. 17 Moreover, the \" 'normal definition of discrimination' is 'differential treatment' \" or, more spe cifically, \" 'less favorable' treatment\" of similarly situated individuals. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is thus not enough for a federal employer merely to consider age ( e.g., Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "623(a)(1) (emphasis added) . 22 The Court found no \"meaningful textual difference be- tween the text in this statute and the one in Gross ,\" and therefore held that \"Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to retaliate was [a] but-for ca use of the challenged employment action.\" Nassar , 570 U.S. at 352; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 4. This Court's decision in Price 490 U.S. 228, and Congress's subsequent amendment of Title VII's private -sector discrimination provision, confirm that Section 633a(a) should be read to require but -for causation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "Nassar , 570 U.S. at 352; see 571 U.S. 204 . 4. This Court's decision in Price [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Congress's subsequent amendment of Title VII's private -sector discrimination provision, confirm that Section 633a(a) should be read to require but -for causation. a. Title VII's discrimination provision makes it a n \"unlawful employment practice for an employer \" to re- fuse to hire, to discharge, \"or othe rwise to discriminate against any individual with respect \" to the terms and conditions of employment, \" because of \" certain charac- teristics.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "Br. 26 (quot- ing Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In that context, the Court has not neces- sarily required the p laintiff to show that, but for the barrier, she would have obtained the benefit. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "In that context, the Court has not neces- sarily required the p laintiff to show that, but for the barrier, she would have obtained the benefit. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 718 -719 (2 007) ; see also 528 U.S. 18. That is not the type of claim petitioner brings here. Instead, petitioner alleges (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "In that context, the Court has not neces- sarily required the p laintiff to show that, but for the barrier, she would have obtained the benefit. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. 551 U.S. 701, 718 -719 (2 007) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is not the type of claim petitioner brings here. Instead, petitioner alleges (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "at 20 -21 (citing Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That but-for causation require ment comports with \"other areas of constitutional law,\" in which the Court has \"distinguishe[d] between a result caused by a constitutional violation and one not so caused.\" Mt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "Nor does the term \"any\" have that effect . It captures an entire category of conduct —\"discrimination based on age\" —but does not change what that category is, i.e., differential treat- ment because of age. S ee Free [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"governs the decision -making process ,\" not just its \" out- come ,\" places more weight on the word \"ma de\" than it can bear. Petitioner's selected definitions of \"make\" — all of which post -date the ADEA's enactment —do not demonstrate that the \"making\" of a decision must refer to the process as a whole, rather than to the decision itself. In fact, contemporaneous definitions illustrate that the word \"make\" may refer to a p articular point in time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 633a(a)'s text requires but-for causation",
		"context": "Br. 27 (quoting 29 U.S.C. 633a(a) , and citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But that is equally true of the private -sector ADEA provision at issue in Gross , which makes it unlaw- ful to, inter alia , \"discriminate against any individual because of such individua l's age.\" 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "629 F.3d 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Does Not Conflict With Decisions of Other Jurisdictions",
		"context": "Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Morris County Board of Chosen Freeholders v. Freedom From Religion 19 Foundation at 17-20; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, The Presbyterian Church in Morristown v. Freedom From Religion Foundation at 14. On careful examination it is clear that the cases Petitioners cite do not pose a conflict with the New Jer- sey Supreme Court's decision. Both Petitioners point to a conflict between the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling and that of the Vermont Supreme Court in Tay- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taylor involved money the city received from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Develop- ment that could be used for almost any purpose. The Vermont Supreme Court noted, \"funds are possessed and controlled by the Town, and authorizes the Town to use them for a broad array of purposes, with virtu-ally no oversight.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "178 A.3d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Does Not Conflict With Decisions of Other Jurisdictions",
		"context": "App. 6a- 7a. 21 The other case that Petitioner Morris County points to as creating a conflict is American Atheists, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This pre- Trinity Lutheran case obviously does not pose a conflict concerning the meaning of this Court's decision in Trinity Lutheran , which Petitioners and their amici argue is the reason for granting certiorari. Moreover, the facts are quite different from this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 F.3d 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court Does Not Conflict With Decisions of Other Jurisdictions",
		"context": "App. 46a. The only other case that Petitioners point to as creating a conflict is [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Caplan is quite similar to this case in that it involved whether a local government vi- olated the Massachusetts Constitution by giving funds directly to churches for their preservation. The Massa- chusetts Supreme Judicial Court, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, carefully reviewed the history of the state constitutional provision limiting aid to religious entities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 N.E.3d 691",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The argument that overruling Roe will harm the Court's \"institutional credibility\"",
		"context": "(May 22, 2021) , https://wapo.st/2WxCAJn (\"Will the justices unravel decades of precedent to achieve an ideological victory on the most hot -button of issues, or will they preserve the credibility of their institu- tion?\"). 22 to the precedents that they support as a matter of policy . None of these self-appointed priests of the Court's \"insti- tutional credibility \" expressed any angst when the Court overruled 409 U.S. 810, or [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Finally , any analysis of the Court's \"institutional cred- ibility \" must acknowledge the fact that millions of Ameri- cans regard abortion as akin to murder and regard Roe as moral abomination —and many others (like Professor Ely) support legal abortion as matter of policy yet still re- gard Roe as lawless. As a leading constitutional scholar has aptly remarked, \"The Court will face harsh institu- tional consequences no matter how it deals with Roe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Dismissal Of Charges Terminates A Criminal Proceeding In The Accused's Favor",
		"context": "I. To succeed in reading an \"affirmative indica- tions of innocence\" standard into Section 1983's favor- able-termination rule, respondent must show that it was a \"well settled\" common-law principle \"at the time of [Section 1983's] enactment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 512 U.S. 477. Respondent cannot come close. I.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Dismissal Of Charges Terminates A Criminal Proceeding In The Accused's Favor",
		"context": "I. To succeed in reading an \"affirmative indica- tions of innocence\" standard into Section 1983's favor- able-termination rule, respondent must show that it was a \"well settled\" common-law principle \"at the time of [Section 1983's] enactment.\" 139 S. Ct. 1715; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent cannot come close. I.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Establishment Clause protects religious institutions from federal interference",
		"context": "Lette r from James Madison to Bishop Ca rroll, Novem- ber 20, 1806 , reprinted in 20 Records of the American Catholic Historical Society of Phil adelphia at 63 (1909). This episode was reco unted by this Court in its decision in Hosanna -Tabor . Hosanna -Tabor Evangel- ical Lutheran Church and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2012) . The Court did not note, however, that Madison sent along a private letter to accompany the official correspondence , noting that the selection of of- ficials for the New Or leans Churc h and its control by the Archdiocese of Baltimore were subjects that touched on political and foreign policy concerns. Pri- vate letter of James Madison to Bishop Car roll, No- vember 20, 1806 , reprinted in 20 Records of the Amer- ican Catholic Historical Society of Phil adelphia at 65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing a Copyright Owner To Sue for Infringement Once the Copyright Owner Has Complied with the Registration Requirement Comports with the Structure of section 411(a) and the Rest of the Copyright Act",
		"context": "17 U.S.C. § 102(a). And they fail to confront the point – persuasively argued by amici – that Washingtonian Publishing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], estab- lishes a presumption against a doubtful construction that deprives a copyright owne r of its exclusive rights. See NMPA Br. 15-17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Allowing a Copyright Owner To Sue for Infringement Once the Copyright Owner Has Complied with the Registration Requirement Comports with the Structure of section 411(a) and the Rest of the Copyright Act",
		"context": "The government argues (at 16) that Congress could have made the proper result clearer by redrafting the provision. But \"the mere possibility of clearer phrasing cannot defeat the most natural reading of a statute,\" Caraco Pharm. Labs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], es pecially where, as here, the possibility of clearer phrasing cuts both ways. The statute could have said: \"no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until the deposit, application, and fee required for registration have been delivered to the Copyright Office in proper form.\" But the statute could also have said: \"no civil action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work shall be instituted until the Register grants or refuses registration.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Both lower courts correctly found that it was not feasible to distribute the settlement fund in this case",
		"context": "Ibid.12 Petitioners simply disagree with the factual finding of both lower courts that the $5.3 million settlement fund was not feasibly distributable, given the large and indeterminate class. This Court's \"convention\" is to \"not overturn a finding of fact accepted by two lower courts.\" Texas Department of Housing & Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, petitioners do not meaningfully dispute the district court's finding that the identity of class members could not be readily determined: \"This case is somewhat unique in that the size and nature of the class renders it nearly impossible to determine exactly who may qualify as a class member.\" JA98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents' Reasoning Would Put The United States At The Mercy Of Foreign Threats",
		"context": "Imagine a religion that, as a fundamental tenet,demanded the sacrifice of children to \"the gods\" on aregular basis. Suppose this religion, called Molochism, 3 had followers around the world numbering in thebillions, but as yet few in the United States. Eventhough the members of this religion in the U.S. wouldbe (constitutionally) hampered in its exercise byneutral, generally-applicable laws against murder, see Emp't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], they could still advance their religion, and eventually all ofits practices, through the courts and through ourimmigration system—that is, if the tenor ofrespondents' argument became generally accepted, anddomestic civil rights law applied to all immigrationrestrictions challenged by suitably-affected U.S. 3 After the ancient fire god to whom children were sacrificed. Moloch , Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merria m- webster.com/dictionary/Moloch. 26 plaintiffs.4 Specifically, if Congress passed a law barring immigration by, say, those who believe they have an obligation to take innocent human life, it islikely that some members of Congress who voted forthis ban would have made clear, if only in campaignstatements, that it was aimed at Molochians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners' proposed version of the independent state legislature theory would unsettle established election practices",
		"context": "past century, this Court has repeatedly recognized that state constitutions and state checks and balances cons train state legislatures even when state legislatures regulate federal elections. See, e.g , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]576 U.S. 787139 S. Ct. 2484. As a result of that consistent jurisprudence, federa l elections are currently regulated by a combination of federal law, state constitutional law, state statutory law, and state regulatory law, and frequently tempered by state judicial interpretations. And, from July-2022.pdf ; see also Purcell , 549 U.S. at 4 –5 (\"Confidence in the integrity of our electoral proc esses is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners' proposed version of the independent state legislature theory would unsettle established election practices",
		"context": "past century, this Court has repeatedly recognized that state constitutions and state checks and balances cons train state legislatures even when state legislatures regulate federal elections. See, e.g , 241 U.S. 565576 U.S. 787[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result of that consistent jurisprudence, federa l elections are currently regulated by a combination of federal law, state constitutional law, state statutory law, and state regulatory law, and frequently tempered by state judicial interpretations. And, from July-2022.pdf ; see also Purcell , 549 U.S. at 4 –5 (\"Confidence in the integrity of our electoral proc esses is essential to the functioning of our participatory democracy.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is A Circuit Split on Whether Civil Penalties Can Violate the Excessive Fines Clause.",
		"context": "This Court in Austin was clear that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to both civil and criminal law: \"[t]he notion of punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law.\" Austin, 509 U.S. at 610 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). There should therefore be no doubt that a civil action like a tax sale can be a \"fine\" for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause. Yet, despite this clear language by this Court, the Eighth and First Circuits have limited the Excessive Fines Clause to solely apply to cases connected to criminal activity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Price's petition is due to be denied because there is no circuit split",
		"context": "And we con- cluded that \"[a]n alternative drug that its manufacturer or compounding pharmacies refuse to supply for lethal injection 'is no drug at all for Baze purposes.'\" Id. (quoting 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. We likewise rejected Arthur's argu- ment that the ADOC was required to make a good-faith effort to obtain the al- ternative drug. Id.at 1302–03.",
		"citation_value_orig": "742 F.3d 1267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": ". This Court has long held that \"stopping an automo- bile and detaining the driver in order to check his 4 Oklahoma's amicus brief asserts (Okla. Amicus Br. 10) that this Court must resolve any disagreement between the Kansas Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit to avoid a \"legal quagmire\" for courts, relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But LeBlanc addressed confusion that might arise on federal habeas review when a state supreme court has a more restrictive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment than the federal circuit in which it is located. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "at 1727. There can be no similar confusion here, both because Kansas's rule is more rights-protective, and because habeas reli ef is generally unavailable for Fourth Amendment violations. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 driver's license . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": ". [is] unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment,\" except when \"there is at least articula-ble and reasonable suspicion that [the] motorist is un-licensed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On the exceptionally thin facts of the stop be-fore it, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to create an exception to that rule for vehicles registered to sus-pended drivers. In doing so, the court reiterated that reasonable-suspicion determinations must always be based on the \"totality of the circumstances.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "12. The naked observation that some unlicensed drivers sometimes drive is not individualized suspicion, just as a neigh-borhood's top-line crime rate would not justify stop- ping its residents solely on the strength of their \"pres- ence in an area of expected criminal activity.\" Ward- low, 528 U.S. at 124 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 2. Kansas's contrary rule would be tantamount to \"standardless and uncon strained discretion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": ". is not reasonable.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unfortunately, Kansas's rule is just that broad. It sweeps in every vehicle registered to a suspended driver, and therefore every individual who shares those cars.",
		"citation_value_orig": "813 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "Otherwise, law-enforcement officers wo uld have another basis for initiating a stop. Worse yet, over time, Kansas's preferred rule will sweep in ever more innoce nt drivers who are increas- ingly \"at the mercy of advancing technology.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a world where an officer must run each plate manually, offic- ers would be unlikely to hit upon even a small fraction of the vehicles registered to unlicensed drivers. As four Justices noted in United States v. Jones, when it comes to all but the highest-priority offenses, officers have traditionally lacked the resources to \"secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an in- dividual's car for a very long period.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "In a world where an officer must run each plate manually, offic- ers would be unlikely to hit upon even a small fraction of the vehicles registered to unlicensed drivers. As four Justices noted in United States v. Jones, when it comes to all but the highest-priority offenses, officers have traditionally lacked the resources to \"secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an in- dividual's car for a very long period.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] changes the calculus dramatically. As one company brags, its cameras \"can capture up to 1,800 license plates a minute during day or night, across four lanes of traffic and at spee ds of up to 150 miles per hour, alerting officers 'wit hin milliseconds' of suspect plates.\" 7 Given how saturated some cities already are 7 See Kaveh Waddell, How License-Plate Readers Have Helped Police and Lenders Target the Poor , The Atlantic (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "The difference between the two approaches is sig- nificant. Under the rule b elow, officers will exercise their professional judgment about the best way to de-velop reasonable suspicion on the facts of the case—as they routinely do in Kansas and in other jurisdictions. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]135 S. Ct. 1892 (officer first attempted to identify driver); Donis, 905 A.2d at 837 (N.J.) (officer fully identified driver); Ed- monds , 58 A.3d at 963 (officer partially identified driver) (Vt.); Barraza , 2011 WL 3444328 (same). But under the bright-line rule Kansas proposes, offic-ers will be encouraged to think of the right to seize these vehicles as a \"polic e entitlement,\" unmoored from the facts of any individual stop. 556 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 N.E.3d 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Decision Below Was Correct",
		"context": "E.g., 6 N.E.3d 725135 S. Ct. 1892 (officer first attempted to identify driver); Donis, 905 A.2d at 837 (N.J.) (officer fully identified driver); Ed- monds , 58 A.3d at 963 (officer partially identified driver) (Vt.); Barraza , 2011 WL 3444328 (same). But under the bright-line rule Kansas proposes, offic-ers will be encouraged to think of the right to seize these vehicles as a \"polic e entitlement,\" unmoored from the facts of any individual stop. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Common sense and the Con- stitution favor the first approach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress granted the conservator broad powers",
		"context": "Likewise, FHFA's own interests \"reflect the interests of the public\" it serves. Ja- cobs , 908 F.3d at 893; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Act grants the conservator the power and discretion to \"decid[e] whose interests to pursue\" in performing its functions. Saxton , 901 F.3d at 963 (Stras, J., concurring). In contrast, t he Act omits \"shareholders\" from the list of \"best interests \" to be considered .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This case is a poor vehicle because exhaustion would not have been futile.",
		"context": "(While W.B. was discussing the Re- habilitation Act, that statute and the ADA \"impose identical requirements.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) As a result, plaintiffs can—and do—use the record from an IDEA hearing to win summary judgment on ADA claims. Take 2021 WL 4781515.",
		"citation_value_orig": "197 F.3d 611",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Airline employees are a \"class of workers engaged in commerce\" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees",
		"context": ". navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Black's Law Dictionary 220 (2d ed. 1910) . Commerce encompassed \"all the means, instruments, and places by and in which intercourse and traffic are carried on,\" as well as \"the act of carrying them on at these places, and by and with these means.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Airline employees are a \"class of workers engaged in commerce\" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees",
		"context": "13, 22–27 (1920) (setting wages for these employees). That's how this Court used the term. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (setting wages for \"railroad employees,\" which included those who worked in the yard, in the shop, or on the platform). And it's how the term was used in dispute-resolution statutes. \"In 1922, for example, the Railroad Labor Board interpreted the word 'employee' in the Transportation Act of 1920 to refer to anyone 'engaged in the customary work directly contributory to the operation of the railroads.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "203 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Airline employees are a \"class of workers engaged in commerce\" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees",
		"context": "Seamen. Just as railroad employees were those who do the work of the railroad, seamen were those who did \"the ship's work.\" McDermott Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was \"not necessary that a seaman aid in navigation or contribute to the transportation of the vessel\" itself. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Airline employees are a \"class of workers engaged in commerce\" in the same way as seamen and railroad employees",
		"context": "at 355. Nor was it necessary to venture out into foreign waters—or even leave the state. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Ellis, for example, this Court held that a crane operator employed on a dredge in Boston Harbor was a seaman. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's precedent provides some support for abandoning Marks",
		"context": ". This Court recently considered the application of Marks to the fragmented decision of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See 25 S. Ct. 1390. The lone concurring decision in that case was more extreme than Justice Kennedy's concur- rence in Rapanos , but much of the analysis is compa- rable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners Failed to Preserve the \"Compelling Interest\" Issue on Appeal",
		"context": ". Petitioners bear the burden of demonstrating that issues raised on appeal were \"properly presented to the [state] appellate courts[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is only in \"very rare exceptions\" that this Court will review a federal claim \"unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision [it has] been asked to review.\" 520 U.S. 83.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners Failed to Preserve the \"Compelling Interest\" Issue on Appeal",
		"context": "523 U.S. 392. It is only in \"very rare exceptions\" that this Court will review a federal claim \"unless it was either addressed by or properly presented to the state court that rendered the decision [it has] been asked to review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If a federal issue was not presented to the state appellate courts, this Court \"ha[s] no power to consider it.\" 394 U.S. 576.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners Failed to Preserve the \"Compelling Interest\" Issue on Appeal",
		"context": "520 U.S. 83. If a federal issue was not presented to the state appellate courts, this Court \"ha[s] no power to consider it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In their petition for review to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Petitioners suggested only that the government had not met its burden of proof to show there was no less restrictive alternative. They framed the single issue as—\"[d]id Respondents carry their burden under [the Minnesota Constitution] and under RLUIPA to prove that there is no alternative means for adequately disposing of household gray water that is less restrictive on Petitioners' freedom to exercise their religious beliefs?\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioners Failed to Preserve the \"Compelling Interest\" Issue on Appeal",
		"context": "Conn. Mut. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, not only did Petitioners fail to appeal this issue to the Minnesota Supreme Court, they did not properly present it to either the district court or the court of appeals. The assertion that the government's compelling interest must be analyzed \"as to the person\" is raised for the first time in the petition for a writ of certiorari.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The broader legal and practical context confirms that National Forest lands traversed by the Trail remain under the Forest Service's administrative jurisdiction",
		"context": "185(a) , and thus by its terms nei- ther authorizes nor prohibi ts rights -of-way through \"lands in the National Park System ,\" 30 U.S.C. 185(b)(1). See Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress recognized that \"separate authority\" would be needed to grant pipel ine \"rights -of-way through the National Park System\" and that \"such separate authority exists, for example , with regard to the Blue Ridge Parkway.\" S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The broader legal and practical context confirms that National Forest lands traversed by the Trail remain under the Forest Service's administrative jurisdiction",
		"context": "The \"usual rule\" for interpreting statutes is that \"Congress 'does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory sch eme in vague terms or ancillary provi- sions —it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.' \" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That interpretive principle applies with particular force here . Under the court of appeals ' decision, Congress 's modest text that simply direct s that \"a trail\" be \"administered primarily as a footpath by the Secretary of the Interior,\" 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 351– 52. These are \"rules forbidding criminal punishment of certain primary conduct\" and \"rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . They are retroactive \"because they necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an a ct that the law does not make criminal or faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.\" Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 351 –52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "The Court has \"repeatedly emphasized the limited scope of the second Teague exception, explaining that it is clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.\" Beard , 542 U.S. at 417 (cleaned up) . This Court has identified only one procedural rule that \"might fall within this exception\" —the rule of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Id. at 417.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": ". established an affirmative right to counsel in all felony cases.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Gideon rule, \"it is fair to sa y, 'alter[ed] our 27 understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.\"' Beard , 542 U.S. at 418 (quoting Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242).",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Beard , 542 U.S. at 417. This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in 447 U.S. 323 , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "This Court has declined every previous invitation to declare a new procedural rule \"watershed,\" prioritizing States' tremendous interests in the finality of their convictions over prisoners' interests in retroactive application of a new procedural rule that has only a speculative connection with innocence. Schriro , 542 U.S. at 352; see568 U.S. 342 (rejecting retroactivity of 559 U.S. 356 , which held that defense counsel is ineffective for not advising defendant about risk of deportation arising from guilty plea); • Whorton , 549 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of Crawford , 541 U.S. 36, which held that admission of certain hearsay evidence violated the Confrontation Clause); 28 • Summerlin , 542 U.S. at 348 (rejecting retroactivity of 536 U.S. 584 , which held that a jury must determine presence or absence of aggravating factors to impose death penalty); • Beard , 542 U.S. at 406 (rejecting retroactivity of 486 U.S. 367 , which held invalid capital sentencing schemes requiring juries to disregard mitigating factors not found unanimously ); • 533 U.S. 656; • O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 15 1 (r ejecting retroactivity of 512 U.S. 154 , which held that capital defendant must be allowed to inform sentencer that he would be ineligible for parole if prosecution argues future dangerousness); • 508 U.S. 333; 29 • Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 227 (rejecting retroactivity of 472 U.S. 320 , which held that Eighth Amendment barred imposition of death penalty by jury that had been led to believe responsibility for the ultimate decision rested elsewhere) . Contrary to Edwards' suggestion (at 33 –35), this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , does not support applying Ramos retroactively to cases currently pending on collateral review . In Brown , the question before the Court was whether to retroactively apply the holding of Burch v. Louisi ana, 441 U.S. (1979) , which required unanimity for six -person jury verdicts. But, as Edwards acknowledges in passing in a footnote (at 34 n.12), Brown reached this Court on direct review , not habeas .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. New Procedural Rules Are Virtually Never Retroactive Because Of Their \"Speculative Connection To Innocence.\"",
		"context": "Only three Justices believed that Burch should be made fully retroactive under the Court's then- applicable retroactivity standards (which Teague further tightened) . Two other Justices — Justice s Powell and Stevens —joined the plurality's judgment because it was their view that new rules should apply retroactively on direct review. A majority of the Court eventually adopted that view in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If anything, the f act that only a plurality of the Court believed the Burch rule should be fully retroactive even before the Court adopted the Teague framework should count as an argument against finding the new Ramos rule retroactive. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Congressional Practice From The Early Years Of The Nation Confirms That Congress Did Not Think It Was Bound By The Appointments Clause When Dealing With The Territories",
		"context": "8 Second, Congress has required that the President select territorial officials from short lists, even though that practice, according to Aurelius, would violate the Appointments Clause if that clause applied. See Br. of Appellants at 30, Aurelius Investment, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2018 WL 4075970. Again, the Northwest Ordinance, as amended by the First Congress in 1789, required the President, with Senate confirmation, to appoint members of the upper house of the territorial legislature, the territorial legislative council. Specifically, Congress required the President to select these members from lists submitted by the territorial house of representatives: five members from a list of just te n, and, upon a vacancy, one member from a list of just two.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 838",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Other Congressional Practice From The Early Years Of The Nation Confirms That Congress Did Not Think It Was Bound By The Appointments Clause When Dealing With The Territories",
		"context": "2. The selection of inferior officers has been vested in other organs of territorial government as well, and this Court has approved such arrangements even though they do not comport with Article II. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fourth , as noted earlier, Congress has, since 1803, permitted territorial officia ls exercising significant authority in the territories, including territorial governors, to be appointed by the President without the advice and consent of the Senate. See supra 11-15.",
		"citation_value_orig": "85 U.S. 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "To have Article III standing, a plaintif f must show, among other things, that he suffered a \"concrete\" injury. Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A concrete injury is one that is \" 'real,' and not 'abstract.' \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "(brackets and ci- tation omitted). History and congressional judgment are intertwined here because \"ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of trust law.\" Firestone Tire & Rubber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has explained , \"rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.\" Central States, Se.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "As this Court has explained , \"rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and responsibility.\" Central States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Trust law is 7 thus the \"starting point\" for analysis under ERISA. Varity , 516 U.S. at 497.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Section 502(a)(2) of ERISA authorizes a benefi- ciary to bring suit for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of the plan. Courts, including the court of appeals here, agree that even an overfunded plan suffers a cognizable injury when a fiduciary's act reduce s the plan's assets. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,537 U.S. 1106 . So the key question is whether a benefi- ciary may sue in a representative capacity to seek re- dress for that injury .",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 F.3d 901",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Courts, including the court of appeals here, agree that even an overfunded plan suffers a cognizable injury when a fiduciary's act reduce s the plan's assets. E.g., 284 F.3d 901 , cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . So the key question is whether a benefi- ciary may sue in a representative capacity to seek re- dress for that injury . He may.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 1106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 29 U.S.C. 1109 (a). Indeed, s uits to preserve the integrity of the plan are all the more im portant under ERISA than un- der traditional trust law , for not only does the statute \"expand[] the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties,\" 508 U.S. 248, it allows an ERISA fiduciary, u nlike a \"traditional trustee,\" to \"have financial interests adverse to benefi- ciaries ,\" 530 U.S. 211.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "473 U.S. 134; see 29 U.S.C. 1109 (a). Indeed, s uits to preserve the integrity of the plan are all the more im portant under ERISA than un- der traditional trust law , for not only does the statute \"expand[] the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it allows an ERISA fiduciary, u nlike a \"traditional trustee,\" to \"have financial interests adverse to benefi- ciaries ,\" 530 U.S. 211. Analogous derivative suits are common features of other areas of the law , and plaintiffs who satisfy the ap- plicable procedural prerequisites unquestionably have standing to bring those suits . E.g., 59 U.S. 331 (1856 ) (shareholder deriva- 9 tive suit); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage 151 U.S. 368; see Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "473 U.S. 134; see 29 U.S.C. 1109 (a). Indeed, s uits to preserve the integrity of the plan are all the more im portant under ERISA than un- der traditional trust law , for not only does the statute \"expand[] the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties,\" 508 U.S. 248, it allows an ERISA fiduciary, u nlike a \"traditional trustee,\" to \"have financial interests adverse to benefi- ciaries ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Analogous derivative suits are common features of other areas of the law , and plaintiffs who satisfy the ap- plicable procedural prerequisites unquestionably have standing to bring those suits . E.g., 59 U.S. 331 (1856 ) (shareholder deriva- 9 tive suit); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage 151 U.S. 368; see Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Indeed, s uits to preserve the integrity of the plan are all the more im portant under ERISA than un- der traditional trust law , for not only does the statute \"expand[] the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties,\" 508 U.S. 248, it allows an ERISA fiduciary, u nlike a \"traditional trustee,\" to \"have financial interests adverse to benefi- ciaries ,\" 530 U.S. 211. Analogous derivative suits are common features of other areas of the law , and plaintiffs who satisfy the ap- plicable procedural prerequisites unquestionably have standing to bring those suits . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1856 ) (shareholder deriva- 9 tive suit); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage 151 U.S. 368; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, 23.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Indeed, s uits to preserve the integrity of the plan are all the more im portant under ERISA than un- der traditional trust law , for not only does the statute \"expand[] the universe of persons subject to fiduciary duties,\" 508 U.S. 248, it allows an ERISA fiduciary, u nlike a \"traditional trustee,\" to \"have financial interests adverse to benefi- ciaries ,\" 530 U.S. 211. Analogous derivative suits are common features of other areas of the law , and plaintiffs who satisfy the ap- plicable procedural prerequisites unquestionably have standing to bring those suits . E.g., 59 U.S. 331 (1856 ) (shareholder deriva- 9 tive suit); Merchants' Cotton Press & Storage [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.1, 23.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "P. 23.1, 23.2. And ERISA's authorizing benefi- ciaries to sue on behalf of the trust to recover for the trust's injuries is not unlike the assignme nt in qui tam statutes of claims belonging to the United States to pri- vate relators. See Vermont Agency of Natural Res [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both enjoy a \"long tradition\" in the law and thus present \"cases and controversies of the sort tradition- ally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "As in traditional trust law , an ERISA fiduciary owes duties not just to the t rust, but \"to the beneficiaries \" as well. Harris Trust & Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 29 U.S.C. 1104(a) . Ac- cordingly, a breach o f fiduciary duty itself constitutes \"an invasion of a legally protected interest\" belonging to the beneficiary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (citation omitted). And that is true for defined -contribution and defined -benefit plans alike ; indeed, when ERISA was enacted, \"the defined benefit plan was the nor m of American pension practice. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"establishing standards of conduct for fiduciaries\" to further ERISA 's \"policy\"). 10 Historical trust law reinforces the conclusion that a breach of fiduciary duty, standing alone , permits a ben- eficiary to sue irrespective of any monetary loss. For instance, c ourts traditionally have entertained suits by a beneficiary alleging that the trustee violated its duty not to engage in conflicted transactions or disloyal con- duct , with \"no further i nquiry \" into whether the con- flicted conduct caused any harm other than the breach itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Ch. 252 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ma- 235 U.S. 106 . A breach of fiduciary duty —without any additional harm beyond the breach itself —has t hus \"traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in Eng- lish [and] American courts\" by beneficiaries of the trust. Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549; see Aberdeen Ry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "Ch. 252 (N.Y. Ch. 1816)); see, e.g., 254 U.S. 586; Ma- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A breach of fiduciary duty —without any additional harm beyond the breach itself —has t hus \"traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in Eng- lish [and] American courts\" by beneficiaries of the trust. Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549; see Aberdeen Ry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ERISA plan participant or beneficiary has standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty even without a monetary loss",
		"context": "12 That conclusion remains true even if the plan re- mains overfunded. To be sure, beneficiaries of a n over- funded defined -benefit plan are entitled only to their \" 'accrued benefit,' \" not to the \"plan's surplus.\" Hughes Aircraf t [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that means only that a beneficiary has no individual claim to a plan's general asset pool or to residual assets remaining upon the plan's termination . See 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Act 900 Interferes With Nationally Uniform Plan Administration",
		"context": "Without ERISA, multi -state employer -sponsored plans would find it nearly impossible to operate under a variety of conflicting state -based regulations. Restri ctions on MAC pricing interfere with the calculati on and disbursement of benefits. See Fort Halifax Packing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Traditionally, MAC pricing allows plan sponsors to secure lower -cost therapeutic alternatives so that they are able to drive innovation in benefit designs for the ir plan participants. Act 900's stringent regulations on disclosure and implementation of MAC methodology eliminates a cost -containment mechanism and reduces competition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Act 900 Interferes With Nationally Uniform Plan Administration",
		"context": "A failure to upho ld preemption here would subject ERISA self -insured health plans to 50 or more potential state pricing and reporting requirements. \"To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate the adm inistration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits.\" FMC [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has repeatedly struck down laws that provide ERISA plans with myriad conflicting state regulations. Forced compliance with these laws burdens fiduciaries and plan administrators in performing their ERISA mandated functions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Officials often do not obtain valid consent from parents",
		"context": "Schneckloth , 412 U.S. at 222. Officials may not coerce or mislead about invest igations to get it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 While no data shows the number of consent-based investigations that have come from unjust coercion, \"one could reasonably imagine that the number is not insubstantial.\" Coleman, Storming the Castle , 47 W M. & MARY L. REV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. When Congress Provides a Statutory Backstop, the Courts Should Accord Deference to Administrative Agencies' Deregulatory Efforts",
		"context": "As the record reve aled, there is little if any empir- ical basis to measure the effect of the FCC's existing rules on minority ownership. Thus, as Judge Scirica 18 noted in his dissent in the case below, the \"effect the new rules will have on women - and minority - broad- cast owner ship may remain difficult to uncover until the FCC gains experience with the new rules.\" Pro- metheus IV, 939 F.3d at 594 - 95 (Scirica, J. dissent- ing), citing National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting , supra, 436 U.S. at 796 – 97; Council Tree Investors, In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied131 S.Ct. 1784 . Still, the Third Circuit halted the FCC's reform efforts until it produces evidence that meets with the court's sat- isfaction which, if Judge Scirica is correct, may be a v irtually impossible task .",
		"citation_value_orig": "619 F.3d 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. When Congress Provides a Statutory Backstop, the Courts Should Accord Deference to Administrative Agencies' Deregulatory Efforts",
		"context": "Moreover, Section 303 (47 U.S.C. § 303) — the pro- vision in the Co mmunications Act which bestows upon the Commission the authority to regulate broad- casting — remains on the books and continues to pro- vide the Commission with authority to issues rules, if necessary, in the sector (provided, of course, that the Commission pro vides a reasoned explanation for any change in policy. See, e.g., Federal Communications [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Encino Motorcars 136 S.Ct. 2117 ) . Accordingly, as it is axi- omatic that what one Commission can do a subse- quent Commission can und o , there is nothing stopping a future FCC from reinstating in whole or in part any of the rules eliminated by the current FCC's modernization efforts if circum stances require. 1 And, assuming this Court reverses the Third Circuit in this proceeding, then both the Commission and the gen- eral public would have access to real - world data of the effect of the rule change s on women and minority 1 This Court should also note that if Congress wanted to make media ownership rule modernization irrevocable, then it could have used a \"sunset\" clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. When Congress Provides a Statutory Backstop, the Courts Should Accord Deference to Administrative Agencies' Deregulatory Efforts",
		"context": "Moreover, Section 303 (47 U.S.C. § 303) — the pro- vision in the Co mmunications Act which bestows upon the Commission the authority to regulate broad- casting — remains on the books and continues to pro- vide the Commission with authority to issues rules, if necessary, in the sector (provided, of course, that the Commission pro vides a reasoned explanation for any change in policy. See, e.g., Federal Communications 556 U.S. 502; Encino Motorcars [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ) . Accordingly, as it is axi- omatic that what one Commission can do a subse- quent Commission can und o , there is nothing stopping a future FCC from reinstating in whole or in part any of the rules eliminated by the current FCC's modernization efforts if circum stances require. 1 And, assuming this Court reverses the Third Circuit in this proceeding, then both the Commission and the gen- eral public would have access to real - world data of the effect of the rule change s on women and minority 1 This Court should also note that if Congress wanted to make media ownership rule modernization irrevocable, then it could have used a \"sunset\" clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Circuit Split Concerning The Interplay Between The Hobbs Act And Chevron Deference When The \"Validity\" Of An Agency Order Has Not Been Challenged",
		"context": "1. The Sixth Circuit could not have been clearer when it noted the existence of a circuit split on this precise question: There is a circuit split regarding whether to defer to the Commission's explanation of its definition [of the term 'advertisement.'] Sandusky Wellness Ctr., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent next turns a blind eye to a critical distinction: while the cases it relied upon all involved prohibited \"facial challenges\" to the agency order, Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 F.3d 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Circuit Split Concerning The Interplay Between The Hobbs Act And Chevron Deference When The \"Validity\" Of An Agency Order Has Not Been Challenged",
		"context": "788 F.3d 224. In determining if these faxes constituted \"advertisements,\" Sandusky cited the same section of the 2006 FCC Rule at issue here— twice . 788 F.3d at 223 (noting the FCC issued regulations concerning the definition of an \"advertisement ,\" and then \"expound[ed]\" on 6 Schuster, Inc ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Boehringer provides an even more decisive example. After noting the inconsistent manner2 in which the Fourth Circuit treated Sandusky and Boehringer , Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 946",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Circuit Split Concerning The Interplay Between The Hobbs Act And Chevron Deference When The \"Validity\" Of An Agency Order Has Not Been Challenged",
		"context": "Twice in the last five months this Court has reaffirmed that deference to an agency \"is not due unless a 'court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,' is left with an unresolved ambiguity.\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348. This Court should grant certiorari to preserve this doctrine from collateral attack based on an agency's mere inclusion in the Hobbs Act. that definition via the 2006 FCC Rule); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Circuit Split Concerning The Interplay Between The Hobbs Act And Chevron Deference When The \"Validity\" Of An Agency Order Has Not Been Challenged",
		"context": "Twice in the last five months this Court has reaffirmed that deference to an agency \"is not due unless a 'court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction,' is left with an unresolved ambiguity.\" Epic Sys. 138 S. Ct. 1612; SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should grant certiorari to preserve this doctrine from collateral attack based on an agency's mere inclusion in the Hobbs Act. that definition via the 2006 FCC Rule); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "The States have a \"paramount interest\" in fostering safety on their roadways. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 683 P.2d 1276; 471 U.S. 386. One of the ways States promote safety on their roadways is through licensing and registration requirements. Such requirements help ensure that those operating motor vehicles sufficiently understand the rules of the road and are physically capable of operating their vehicle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "The States have a \"paramount interest\" in fostering safety on their roadways. See 136 S. Ct. 2160; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 471 U.S. 386. One of the ways States promote safety on their roadways is through licensing and registration requirements. Such requirements help ensure that those operating motor vehicles sufficiently understand the rules of the road and are physically capable of operating their vehicle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 P.2d 1276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "The States have a \"paramount interest\" in fostering safety on their roadways. See 136 S. Ct. 2160; accord 683 P.2d 1276; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One of the ways States promote safety on their roadways is through licensing and registration requirements. Such requirements help ensure that those operating motor vehicles sufficiently understand the rules of the road and are physically capable of operating their vehicle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "§§ 8-254 & 8-286. Similarly, since the early 1900s, States have issued and relied upon license plates to quickly verify conformance with state licensing and registration obligations of those owning and operating vehicles. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Kansas, for example, issues a license plate to the registered owner of a vehicle and requires it to be attached to the rear of the vehicle to which it is assigned. Kan. Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "Law enforcement officers in Kansas and elsewhere rely on this license plate data to determine compliance with a variety of traffic laws and regulations. In certain situations, the license plate information will show that the vehicle is not properly registered. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]569 U.S. 435. 24 The stop of Glover's vehicle sits at the confluence of several strands of government regulation of vehicles—license plates, registration, and driver's licenses. Deputy Mehrer stopped Glover's vehicle because its license plate revealed a registered owner with revoked driving privileges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Investigative stops promote public safety.",
		"context": "Law enforcement officers in Kansas and elsewhere rely on this license plate data to determine compliance with a variety of traffic laws and regulations. In certain situations, the license plate information will show that the vehicle is not properly registered. See, e.g., 555 U.S. 323[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 The stop of Glover's vehicle sits at the confluence of several strands of government regulation of vehicles—license plates, registration, and driver's licenses. Deputy Mehrer stopped Glover's vehicle because its license plate revealed a registered owner with revoked driving privileges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses",
		"context": "Id. at 114. That defer ence follows from this Court 's traditional deference to state courts' construc- tion of state law, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as well as from the legislature's operat ion against the backdrop of state courts' authority to de- finitively const rue resulting enactments. The legisla- ture therefore should be presumed to craft its statutes in light of established state -law statutory -construction principles. Only whe n a state court sharply deviates from those principles can its decision be said to i nap- propriately \"supplant the legislature,\" in violation of the federal constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses",
		"context": "That deferential rule also follows from this Court's consistent insistence that state courts, not federal courts, are the primary revie wers of state election rules, including for federal elections. See, e.g. , Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2507; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More rigorous review of state courts' appli- cation of t heir own States' constitutions would be dif- ficult to square with th ose decisions, and would threaten to make this Court, not state courts, the pri- mary rev iewer of state election rules. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses",
		"context": "For instance, this Court has repeatedly recognized that state courts may formulate congressiona l redis- tricting plans to remedy state constitutional viola- tions. See, e.g. , Growe , 507 U.S. at 37; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As congressional re- districting is governed by the Elections Clause, see Ar- izona State Leg. , 576 U.S. at 792, th e Clause clearly does not prohibit state- court remedial action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses",
		"context": "§ 726. Just as it had done in elections cases in the past, see, e.g. , League of Wom en Voters, 178 A.3d at 821-824; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court appropriately relied on that broad remedial authority here. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 A.2d 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision is consistent with the Elections and Electors Clauses",
		"context": "23 -24) that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court purported to draw its remedial authority from 25 Pa. S tat. § 3046. To the contrary, the court located 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], provides an instructive contrast. There, the Court was evidently concerned that the Florida Supreme Court claimed sweeping authority to substitute the court's policy judgment for that of the legislature by altering Florida's election laws after Election Day if those laws \"unreasonabl[y]\" restricted vote counting. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Law Is Applicable Only to Fill Gaps in Federal Law",
		"context": "That is fanciful. No one could possibly be confused by the words \"shall not apply,\" and Congress' effort to supply a general choice -of-law rule should not be distorted (in a pro -state -law direction) a body of law applicable to the [OCS],\" namely, \"federal law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 10 by a provision making clear beyond cavil that state law should not apply in one context. Respondent claims that §1333(a)(2)(A) \"states that all the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent state 'are … declared to be the law of the United States.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Law Is Applicable Only to Fill Gaps in Federal Law",
		"context": "In Huson , a personal -injury case, everyone agreed that \"there exists a substantial 'gap' in federal law.\" 404 U.S. at 101 . In Gulf Offshore [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the language respondent cites addresses only the distinct question of which state is \"adjacent.\" Id. at 485- 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Law Is Applicable Only to Fill Gaps in Federal Law",
		"context": "Respondent's other citations are even further afield. See Pac. Operators Offshore, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, respondent claims that \"[n]o decision of this C ourt has required a significant void or gap in federal law before the law of the adjacent state may become applicable.\" Opp.22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The second question presented—asking the Court to graft an atextual exception onto Section 315(b)'s one-year time bar—is unworthy of review",
		"context": "Further review is unwar- ranted. 1. a. This question is properly resolved by \"'the lan- guage of the statute itself'\" ( Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2016)), and Section 315(b)'s text could not be any clearer: An inter partes review may no t be instituted if the pe- tition requesting the proceeding is filed more than 1 year after the date on which the petitioner, real party in interest, or privy of the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infr ingement of the patent . The time limitation set forth in the preceding sentence shall not apply to a request for joinder under subsec-tion (c). 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner has identified no sound basis to reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the first statutory fair-use factor favors respondents",
		"context": "App. 27a; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, petitioner's proposed test often would enmesh courts in issues that judges typically are ill - equipped to decide. T he court of appeals observed that \"it may well have been Goldsmith's subjective intent to portray Prince as a 'vulnerable human being' and War- hol's to strip Prince of that humanity and instead dis- play him as a popular icon.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "188 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner has identified no sound basis to reject the court of appeals' conclusion that the first statutory fair-use factor favors respondents",
		"context": "8—i.e., \"spur[ring] creative expression,\" Google , 141 S. Ct. at 1206— is a worthy federal purpose, and that \"protect[ing] authors ' original expressio n from unre- stricted exploitation \" permissibly furthers that pur- pose , Eldred , 537 U.S. at 221. \"[T]he Framers regarded copyright protection \" as an \" 'engine of free expres- sion. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in copyright law prevents a second autho r from expressing the same idea as her predecess or. \"[E]very idea, theory, and fact in a copyrighted work becomes instantly available for public exploitation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "1001, 1002(3). ERISA \"does not guarantee substantive benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, ERISA mandates certain plan-admin-istration procedures designed to secure the benefits an employer promises to provide. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "Id. 17 \"One of the principal goal s of ERISA [wa]s to enable employers 'to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of stand ard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2 001) (quoting Fort Halifax Packin g 482 U.S. 1). In pursuit of that aim, ERISA preempts \"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.\" 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "Id. 17 \"One of the principal goal s of ERISA [wa]s to enable employers 'to establish a uniform administrative scheme, which provides a set of stand ard procedures to guide processing of claims and disbursement of benefits.'\" 532 U.S. 141 (2 001) (quoting Fort Halifax Packin g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In pursuit of that aim, ERISA preempts \"any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.\" 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "This Court has eschewed \"uncritical literalism\" in interpreting ERISA's preemption clause, recognizing that, if it were read literally, \"pre-emption would never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere.'\" 12 Travelers , 514 U.S. at 655 (alteration omitted) (quoting Henry James, Roderick Hudson xli (World's Classics 1980)); cf. 486 U.S. 825 (holding that many \"lawsuits agai nst ERISA plans for run-of- 12 Several circuits once held that Section 1144's definition of \"State\" as a State or State agency or instrumentality that \"pur- ports to regulate, directly or in directly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans,\" 29 U. S.C. 1144(c)(2), limited ERISA's preemptive scope to \"State laws\" that regulated plans' terms and conditions, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 743 F.2d 1337. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon rejected that argument, reason- ing that Section 1144's seemingly limiting definition of \"State\" merely \"expand[ed]\" preemption to include actions of \"state agencies and instrumentalities.\" 498 U.S. 133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "This Court has eschewed \"uncritical literalism\" in interpreting ERISA's preemption clause, recognizing that, if it were read literally, \"pre-emption would never run its course, for 'really, universally, relations stop nowhere.'\" 12 Travelers , 514 U.S. at 655 (alteration omitted) (quoting Henry James, Roderick Hudson xli (World's Classics 1980)); cf. 486 U.S. 825 (holding that many \"lawsuits agai nst ERISA plans for run-of- 12 Several circuits once held that Section 1144's definition of \"State\" as a State or State agency or instrumentality that \"pur- ports to regulate, directly or in directly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans,\" 29 U. S.C. 1144(c)(2), limited ERISA's preemptive scope to \"State laws\" that regulated plans' terms and conditions, see 749 F.2d 133; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon rejected that argument, reason- ing that Section 1144's seemingly limiting definition of \"State\" merely \"expand[ed]\" preemption to include actions of \"state agencies and instrumentalities.\" 498 U.S. 133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.2d 1337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "486 U.S. 825 (holding that many \"lawsuits agai nst ERISA plans for run-of- 12 Several circuits once held that Section 1144's definition of \"State\" as a State or State agency or instrumentality that \"pur- ports to regulate, directly or in directly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans,\" 29 U. S.C. 1144(c)(2), limited ERISA's preemptive scope to \"State laws\" that regulated plans' terms and conditions, see 749 F.2d 133; 743 F.2d 1337. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon rejected that argument, reason- ing that Section 1144's seemingly limiting definition of \"State\" merely \"expand[ed]\" preemption to include actions of \"state agencies and instrumentalities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet the Court only did so after finding the state law at issue \"ma[de] specific refer-ence to, and indeed is premised on, the existence of a pension plan\" and thus undeniably related to such plans. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Act 900 does not have a prohibited \"connection with\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "Travelers, 514 U.S. at 667 n.6; see also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does this case implic ate plan-administration uni- formity but only \"cost uniformity,\" which \"was almost certainly not an object of pre-emption.\" Travelers , 514 U.S. at 662.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Territoriality is hard to operationalize in cyberspace",
		"context": "The Special Rapporteur notes that U.S. courts have found it diffi- cult to allocate jurisdiction between the several States when it comes to online conduct. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Per- sonal Jurisdiction and the \"Interwebs,\" 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1157-61 (2015) (evaluating traditional per- sonal jurisdictional princip les as applied to cyber- space). This Court has grappled with the same difficulties; as Justice Breyer queried in a recent con- currence, \"[W]hat do those [jurisdictional] standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web site?\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "952 F. Supp. 1119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Territoriality is hard to operationalize in cyberspace",
		"context": "1129, 1157-61 (2015) (evaluating traditional per- sonal jurisdictional princip les as applied to cyber- space). This Court has grappled with the same difficulties; as Justice Breyer queried in a recent con- currence, \"[W]hat do those [jurisdictional] standards mean when a company targets the world by selling products from its Web site?\" J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In view of these consider ations – especially the dif- ficulties that courts have encountered in developing the law of jurisdiction within the United States – the Special Rapporteur urges this Court to exercise the 25 utmost caution in deciding this case. Even though the facts of the case at bar are relatively simple (insofar as only two countries have plausible jurisdictional claims over the data at issue), th e questions of law are as dif- ficult as their answers likely to prove politically sensi- tive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implying Section 1983 Rights In Spending Clause Statutes Violates The Separation Of Powers And Core Principles Of Federalism",
		"context": "Congress, not the Judiciary, is tasked with determining the existence of any alternative private right of action, as well as the scope of availabl e remedies. See , e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Congress, not this Court, creates new causes of action. And with respect to existing implied causes of action, Congress, not this Court, should extend those implied causes of action and expand available remedies.\" (internal citation omitted)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implying Section 1983 Rights In Spending Clause Statutes Violates The Separation Of Powers And Core Principles Of Federalism",
		"context": "Ibid. When federal courts do so, they \"bypass[]\" \"the legislative process with its public scrutiny and participation\" and disrupt \"the normal play of political forces.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Particularly in the Spending Clause context, judicial authorization of private damages lawsuits can undercut Congress's intended federal enforcement scheme and the ability of Congress and designated agencies to effectively manage enforcement. In fact , the risk of liability from third party lawsuits not expressly stated as part of the funding bargain may deter prospective recipients from even accepting federal fu nding in the first place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implying Section 1983 Rights In Spending Clause Statutes Violates The Separation Of Powers And Core Principles Of Federalism",
		"context": "This knowing and voluntary acceptance \"is critical to ensuring that Spending Clause legislation does not undermine the status of the States as independent sovereigns in our federal system.\" Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Permitting private parties to sue under Section 1983 scrambles a state's expectations. In contrast to congressionally designated enforcement schemes, 26 states facing private la wsuits have no way to anticipate—or budget for—poss ible litigation costs or jury awards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THIS COURT HAS NEVER INTERPRETED TITLE VII'S PROHIBITION AGAINST SEX DISCRIMINATION IN A MANNER THAT CONFLICTS WITH THE ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING OF \"SEX\"",
		"context": "Applying the original public meaning of Title VII, the Court consistently has emphasized that Title VII prohibits the disparate treatment of men and women. See, e.g., Meritor , 477 U.S. at 64 (holding that Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination \"evinces a con- gressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women ' in employ- ment\") (quoting City of Los Angeles, Dep't of Water & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]490 U.S. 251 (quoting Manhart , 435 U.S. at 707 n.13) (emphasis",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "The Bad Spaniels parody is the content that VIP is selling, and it matters not that it appears on plastic rather than canvas. The \"Bad Spaniels\" artwork does not function as a trademark or, in dilution terms, a \"designation of source\" merely because it is the appealing ornamental decora tion that distinguishes it from other Silly Squeaker® toys.1 To use the Ninth Circuit's analogy , the Mona Lisa is not a trademark or \"designation of source\" for a t -shirt with the Mona Lisa on it because the depiction distinguishes it from other t -shirts . See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Bad Spaniels parody is different in kind from pun-based marks used to sell the actual nonparodic products for which they are marks. JDPI trots out the 1 VIP made this this point to both lower courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "674 F. App'x 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "In contrast, the only way to parody the Jack Daniel 's bottle is to parody it. \"Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination ….\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What distinguishes the Bad Spaniels toy —what consumers want in buying it—is the speech it embodies. The Bad Spaniels parody \"is not advertising the product; it is the product.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "What distinguishes the Bad Spaniels toy —what consumers want in buying it—is the speech it embodies. The Bad Spaniels parody \"is not advertising the product; it is the product.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the Bad Sp aniels pretend label is artistic expression about a fictional product no one sells, VIP has not registered or even applied to register either \"Bad Spaniels\" or the other label elements as trademarks or trade dress. Nor has it used any trademark symbol —® or ™—on the label to suggest a claim of protectable trademark.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F. 3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "Since 1967, Topps Wacky Package s trading cards and stickers have parodied thousands of iconic brands, from \" Ratz Crackers,\" \"Jolly Mean Giant,\" and \"South Beached Whale Diet\" to \"Blast Blew Ribbon Beer,\" \"Jim Mean Kentucky Sharp Broken Whiskey,\" and \"Old Grand -Mom Whiskey. \" At th e height of their popularity, Wacky Packages outsold Topps baseball cards .2 The one court to address an infringement claim against Wacky Packages rejected it on numerous grounds. Tetley, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (E.D.N.Y. 1 983). As the court 2 Fleer 501 F. Supp. 485658 F.2d 139.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F. Supp. 785",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "Tetley, 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1 983). As the court 2 Fleer [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]658 F.2d 139. See, e.g. , Wacky Packages , WIKIPEDIA , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Wacky_ Packages; Wacky Packages Alphabetized Crosslist , https://wackypacks.com/ stickers/ alphabetical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 F. Supp. 485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "Tetley, 556 F. Supp. 785 (E.D.N.Y. 1 983). As the court 2 Fleer 501 F. Supp. 485[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g. , Wacky Packages , WIKIPEDIA , https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Wacky_ Packages; Wacky Packages Alphabetized Crosslist , https://wackypacks.com/ stickers/ alphabetical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.2d 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. VIP does not use \"Bad Spaniels\" or other elements of its design as a trademark or designation of source.",
		"context": "Id. Parodies borrow, but they don't confuse reasonable consumers . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.3d 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "PROC. LAW § 190.50(5)(a) -(b); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 of limitations has run.9 To guarantee that a Presi- dent, along with individuals and entities connected to him, are not permanently above the law, the grand jury must be permitted to collect evidence and follow leads when memories are fresh and r elevant evidence is available. Nothing in the Constitution requires otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "at 254. A grand jury subpoena, in contrast, is not an \"official pronouncement\" of wrongdoing; it signals only that an investigation is underway. Grand jury investigations are \"necessarily broad,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and while they seek to discover pos- sible criminal conduct, they also serve the \"invaluable function in our society of standing between the ac- cuser and the accused\" and protecting \"the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecu- tion,\" 370 U.S. 375. Thus , it is \"clearly recognized\" that giving evidence as part of a grand jury investigation is a \"public du t[y] which every person within the jurisdiction of the gov- ernment is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.\" 250 U.S. 273.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "at 254. A grand jury subpoena, in contrast, is not an \"official pronouncement\" of wrongdoing; it signals only that an investigation is underway. Grand jury investigations are \"necessarily broad,\" 410 U.S. 1, and while they seek to discover pos- sible criminal conduct, they also serve the \"invaluable function in our society of standing between the ac- cuser and the accused\" and protecting \"the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecu- tion,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus , it is \"clearly recognized\" that giving evidence as part of a grand jury investigation is a \"public du t[y] which every person within the jurisdiction of the gov- ernment is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.\" 250 U.S. 273.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "Grand jury investigations are \"necessarily broad,\" 410 U.S. 1, and while they seek to discover pos- sible criminal conduct, they also serve the \"invaluable function in our society of standing between the ac- cuser and the accused\" and protecting \"the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecu- tion,\" 370 U.S. 375. Thus , it is \"clearly recognized\" that giving evidence as part of a grand jury investigation is a \"public du t[y] which every person within the jurisdiction of the gov- ernment is bound to perform upon being properly summoned.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that notion —that it is every person's civic obligation to participate fully in a gr and jury investi- gation —\"in itself removes any stigma\" from th e par- ticipation. In re658 F.2d 211; see 29 also 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "250 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "250 U.S. 273. And that notion —that it is every person's civic obligation to participate fully in a gr and jury investi- gation —\"in itself removes any stigma\" from th e par- ticipation. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 29 also 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972 ) (\"A [grand jury] subpo ena is served in the same manner as other legal process; it involves no stigma whatever … and it remains at all times under the con- trol and supervision of a court.\") , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.2d 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "250 U.S. 273. And that notion —that it is every person's civic obligation to participate fully in a gr and jury investi- gation —\"in itself removes any stigma\" from th e par- ticipation. In re658 F.2d 211; see 29 also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. 1972 ) (\"A [grand jury] subpo ena is served in the same manner as other legal process; it involves no stigma whatever … and it remains at all times under the con- trol and supervision of a court.\") , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 F.2d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "denied410 U.S. 941 . Second , unlike criminal indictments and prosecu- tions , a core feature of grand jury investigations is se- crecy: \"Since the 17th Century, grand jury proceed- ings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye. \" Douglas Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 356 U.S. 677. Today, federal and state rules guarantee secrecy in grand jury proceedings. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Considerations Asserted To Justify Presidential Immunity From Prosecution Do Not Justify Immunity From Investigation For Unofficial Conduct",
		"context": "denied410 U.S. 941 . Second , unlike criminal indictments and prosecu- tions , a core feature of grand jury investigations is se- crecy: \"Since the 17th Century, grand jury proceed- ings have been closed to the public, and records of such proceedings have been kept from the public eye. \" Douglas Oil 441 U.S. 211; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Today, federal and state rules guarantee secrecy in grand jury proceedings. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because These Class Members Have Timely Individual Claims, They May Maintain Them As A Class Action If They Satisfy The Requirements Of Rule 23",
		"context": "The question in this case is whether the class members, each of whom had timely individual claims, may maintain them as a clas s action. As this Court recently held, \"Rule 23 provides an answer\" to this question: \"It states that '[a] class action may be main- tained' if\" the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b) are satisfied. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 18(a)-(b), 20(a)(1)-(2), 27(a)(1), 30( a)(1); 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because These Class Members Have Timely Individual Claims, They May Maintain Them As A Class Action If They Satisfy The Requirements Of Rule 23",
		"context": ". cannot be reconciled with [ Shady Grove ], which holds that Rule 23 applies to all federal civil suits, even if that prevents achieving some other objective that a court 23 thinks valuable.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the premise \"that every absent class me mber is entitled to American Pipe tolling,\" asserting that American Pipe protects only those who file individual claims. This contention is incorrect and irrelevant. Class tolling benefits \"'all asserted members of the class,'\" Crown, Cork , 462 U.S. at 350 (quoting Ameri- can Pipe , 414 U.S. at 554), not ju st some, as petitioner argues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "642 F.3d 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "22 That relationship reflects the tribes' \"unique status\" in our constitutional order. National Farmers Union Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Upon the founding of the United States, Indian tribes assumed the status of \"domestic dependent nations.\" Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. at 17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 845",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "Cherokee Nation , 30 U.S. at 17. The United States, in turn, as sumed \"the duty ,\" as well as \"the authority ,\" to provide for the tribes' \"protection. \" Board of County [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That duty and authority form the basis of the United States' gen- eral trust relationship with the tribes to this day . But the existence of that general trust relationship does not itself establish judicially enforceable duties on the part of the United States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "But the existence of that general trust relationship does not itself establish judicially enforceable duties on the part of the United States . See Jicarilla , 564 U.S. at 173 (\"The general relationship between the United States and the Indian tribes is not comparable to a pri- vate trust relationship.\") (citation omitted); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, a spe- cific measure adopted by Congress or the Executive as authorized by that general relationship is necessary to establish an enforceable duty. Jicarilla , 564 U.S. at 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 566 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Like a statute or regulation , a treaty can be the basis of a breach - of-trust claim insofar as a tribe can identify a \"specific, applicable, trust -creating [treaty] that the Governme nt violated .\" Jicarilla , 564 U.S. at 177 (citation omitted) ; see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "at 178. 2. This Court has applied the foregoing principles in a series of decisions, beginning with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Mitchell I , the Court considered whether the General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": ", and that the Act therefore did not authorize damages against the United States for the alleged mismanage- ment of the timber resources in question , id. at 546. 25 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that various other statutes and their implementing regulations did impose judi- cially enforceable duties on the United State s with re- spect to those timber resources . Id. at 224.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "The Court held that, \"[g]iven the existence of a trust relationship, it natu- 26 rally follows that the Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary duties. \" Ibid. The Court reached a similar conclusion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That case involved a statute providing that the \"former Fort Apache Military Reservation\" would be \"held by the United States in trust for the White Moun- tain Apache Tribe, subject to the right of the Secretary of the Interior to use any part of the land and improve- ments for administrative or school purposes for as long as they are needed for t he purpose.\" Act of Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "at 493. On remand, \"the Tribe argued that even if its suit could not be maintained on the basis of the IMLA, \" \"a 'network ' of other statutes, treaties, and regulations could provide the basis for its claims. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit agreed, holding \" that the Govern- ment had violated the specific duties create d by those [other] statutes, as well as 'common law trust duties of care, candor, and loyalty ' that arise from the compre- hensive control over tribal coal that is exercised by the Government.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "Un- der the APA, a reviewing court considering a request 33 for mandatory relief under 5 U.S.C. 703 to \"compel agency action unlawfully withheld,\" 5 U.S.C. 706(1) — which is what the Navajo Nation asserts here —may grant such relief \"only where an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is required to take ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this regard, the APA carried forward the \"traditio nal practice prior to its passage,\" under which judicial review could be achieved through use of a writ of mandamus . \"The mandamus remedy was normally limited to enforcement of 'a spe- cific, unequivocal command' \"—i.e., \"the ordering of a precise, definite act about which an official ha d no dis- cretion whatever.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's decisions require that a tribe identify a substantive source of law establishing a specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "Those vague descriptions give little guidance as to what the supposed duty would entail . And the task of measuring the government's compliance would ulti- mately fall on the \"supervising court,\" injecting the Ju- diciary into complex , federal -state -tribal disputes about general water needs, unspecified water rights , and In- dian policy that it \"lack[s] both expertise and infor- mation to resolve .\" SUWA , 542 U.S. at 66 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There thus is no basis for a tr ibe, including the Navajo Nation here, to obtain injunctive or other non -monetary relief with- out identifying a specific trust duty that the government has \"expressly accept[ed].\" Jicarilla , 564 U.S. at 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "1. The FSIA set s forth \"comprehensive rules gov- erning sovereign immunity.\" Verlinden B. V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 Because \"[a]ctions against foreign sover- eigns i n our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States,\" id. at 493, Con- gress deemed it critical to enact \" 'a uniform body of law' concerning the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit in United States courts.\" Firs t Nat'l City 462 U.S. 611.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480.3 Because \"[a]ctions against foreign sover- eigns i n our courts raise sensitive issues concerning the foreign relations of the United States,\" id. at 493, Con- gress deemed it critical to enact \" 'a uniform body of law' concerning the amenability of a foreign sovereign to suit in United States courts.\" Firs t Nat'l City [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FSIA's sovereign -immunity standards and service -of- process requirements thus establish the exclusive 3 The Senate report on the bill that became the FSIA is substan- tially identical to the House Report. See S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 611",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "1606 . Accordingly, once jurisdiction is estab- lished, the FSIA generally functions as a \"pass- through\" to the substantive law that would govern suits between private individuals . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[W]here state law provides a rule of liability governing private indi-viduals, the FSIA requires the application of that rule to foreign states in like circumstances.\" Firs t Nat'l City Bank , 462 U.S. at 622 n.11 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 835",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "1605A, 1605B (provisions enacted in 2008 and 2016 creating federal causes of action for certain terrorism -related claims) . 4 4 Where courts refer to state- law- claims, or to cases where state law provides the rule of liability, they are referring to claims where no federal law provides the rule of decision . See Erie R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Where, as here, the challenged conduct 13 Where Congress wanted to depart from th e equal treat- ment principle, it sai d so explicitly. See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "1603(a). And this case has proceeded un- der an exception to immunity found in \" section 1605,\" 28 U.S.C. 1606, namely the expropriation exception in Section 1605(a)(3) , see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1037 ; Pet. App. C55.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "Petitioner ha s asserted property -law claims for con- version, constructive trust, and possession (also known as replevin) against respondent , treating the painting as stolen property for purposes of those claims, and has sought a declaration of those state -law rights under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. 2201 (2012) . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Compl. 14-15. If the respondent were a p rivate individual, the district court would apply the forum State's (here, California's) choice -of-law rules to select the applicable law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 F. Supp. 2d 1157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "14-15. If the respondent were a p rivate individual, the district court would apply the forum State's (here, California's) choice -of-law rules to select the applicable law. See Klaxon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner con- tend s (Pet. 17; Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 487",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "See Pet. App. B20; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is undisputed at this stage, by contrast, that th e application of federal common -law choice -of-law rules results in the applica- tion of Spanish law , which allowed respondent to ac- quire title to the stolen painting by acquisitive prescrip- tion, making respondent rather than petitioner its law- ful owner . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "862 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "Bar- kanic v. General Admin. of Civ. Aviation of the People 's Republic of China , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see, e.g., Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 841 (explaining that \"t he goal of applying identical substantive laws to foreign states and private individuals cannot be achieved unless a fed- eral court utilizes the same choice of law analysis in FSIA cases as it would apply if all t he parties to the ac- tion were private \") (quoting Barkanic , 923 F.2d at 959 - 960) (brackets and ellips is omitted) . 5 Confirming th at analysis, the Court has previously held that the application of a S tate's choice -of-law rules best effectuates a statutory requirement that another sovereign —the United States —be treated \"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances .\" 369 U.S. 1; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.2d 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "Aviation of the People 's Republic of China , 923 F.2d 957 ; see, e.g., Oveissi , 573 F.3d at 841 (explaining that \"t he goal of applying identical substantive laws to foreign states and private individuals cannot be achieved unless a fed- eral court utilizes the same choice of law analysis in FSIA cases as it would apply if all t he parties to the ac- tion were private \") (quoting Barkanic , 923 F.2d at 959 - 960) (brackets and ellips is omitted) . 5 Confirming th at analysis, the Court has previously held that the application of a S tate's choice -of-law rules best effectuates a statutory requirement that another sovereign —the United States —be treated \"in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 11 -12. In Richards , the Court considered choice of law under the FTCA .",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "The FTCA —unlike the FSIA —specifies that the governing law is \"the law of the place where the 5 To ensure the identity of liability between private individuals and foreign states , federal choice -of-law rules would govern FSI A suits based on substantive federal law, to the extent a choice of law is required —for instance between domestic federal law and foreign law—because federal choice- of-law rules would apply in such cases against private defendants . See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. 16 05(b) (providing an exception to immunity for certain suits to enforce maritime liens); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 act or omission occurred .\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "2674\"). Use of th e FTCA's language incorporat es this C ourt's interpreta- tion of that language to require the application of a State's whole law, including its choi ce-of-law rules . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 3. Section 1606's specif ication that a foreign state should be held liable in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual reflects its judgment that, where state law applies (and unless otherwise specified) , it should generally apply in full, rather than being displaced in whole or in part based solely on the involvement of a foreign government .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "a, at 9 (1971); see id. § 2, at 2; A.I. Trade Fin., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the general Congressional determination in Section 1606 that state law should govern also applies to a State's choice -of-law principles, which reflect a State's \"local policies \" about how to settle competing interests where a case has a significant relationship to more than one jurisdiction . Klaxon , 313 U.S. at 496; see Richards , 369 U.S. at 12 -13 (rejecting an interpretation of the FTCA 18 that would \" prevent the federal courts from implement- ing\" a State's \" policy in choice -of-law rules ,\" including its decision about how \"to take in to account the inter- ests of the State having significant contact with the par- ties to the litigation \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 F.3d 1454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1606 of the FSIA requires the application of state choice-of-law rules in these circumstances",
		"context": "A State's substantive law may , for example, reflect a determination that, quite apart from any limitations under federal law, there are terri- torial limits on the law's application under state law . Cf. Coca -Cola [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Its approach to conflicts of law more broadly warrants comparable treatment .",
		"citation_value_orig": "218 S.W.3d 671",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE ON STARE DECISIS IS UNAVAILING",
		"context": ". Respondents do not quarrel with the well-accepted proposition that resort to stare decisis \"is at its weak- est when [the Court] in terpret[s] the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by con- stitutional amendment or by overruling our prior deci-sions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that and the repeated questioning of Sullivan's initial adoption of the \"act ual malice\" standard or its extension in Curtis Publishing , respondents' reliance on stare decisis to evade review does not carry the day. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE ON STARE DECISIS IS UNAVAILING",
		"context": "It does not. Stare decisis does not insulate from correction decisions un- supportable by the Constitution. The 58-year interval between Sullivan's discovery of the \"actual malice\" standard and the filing of the petition coincidentally 11 corresponds to the time it took the Court to decide [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and overrule 163 U.S. 537. 2. The repeated questioning of the correctness of Sullivan's holding or its reach, as documented in Sec- tion A supra , makes resort to stare decisis a particu- larly weak argument.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. RESPONDENTS' RELIANCE ON STARE DECISIS IS UNAVAILING",
		"context": "It does not. Stare decisis does not insulate from correction decisions un- supportable by the Constitution. The 58-year interval between Sullivan's discovery of the \"actual malice\" standard and the filing of the petition coincidentally 11 corresponds to the time it took the Court to decide 347 U.S. 483 and overrule [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The repeated questioning of the correctness of Sullivan's holding or its reach, as documented in Sec- tion A supra , makes resort to stare decisis a particu- larly weak argument.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "THE PLEADING STANDARD FOR FIDUCIARY BREACH CLAIMS SHOULD NOT PERMIT LITIGATION OVER CHOICES A PRUDENT FIDUCIARY COULD REASONABLY FAVOR",
		"context": "When courts review the decisions of ERISA fidu- ciaries, they evaluate the sufficiency of their process, not the outcomes it achieved . That's the essence of ERISA's prudence standard—and it does not ask judges to make the kinds of judgments vested in fidu-ciaries. As this Court explained in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], courts are not well- situated to second-guess decisions about the appropri- 4 ate price for a basket of services. On the merits, fidu- ciaries who reasonably investigated their decisions are not held liable for breach simply because they could have reasonably exercised their judgment in a different way. Complaints asserting claims of fiduciary breach typically urge an inference of breach from the results achieved by the fiduciaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "The United States cannot enjoin judicial officials simply by sui ng the State. It admits (at 37) that its re- quest to enjoin judges and clerks is \"unusual\" but insists 6 The cases cited by the United States (at 31-32 n.7) for the prop- osition that it is permissible simply to enjoin a State are distinguish- able because (among other reasons) how a State would comply was clearer and they fell within the original jurisdiction of this Court, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or in- volved traditional claims of title, 340 U.S. 900. 24 that it is permissible because lower courts have occasion- ally enjoined courts and such relief is necessary. Both contentions are wrong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "The United States cannot enjoin judicial officials simply by sui ng the State. It admits (at 37) that its re- quest to enjoin judges and clerks is \"unusual\" but insists 6 The cases cited by the United States (at 31-32 n.7) for the prop- osition that it is permissible simply to enjoin a State are distinguish- able because (among other reasons) how a State would comply was clearer and they fell within the original jurisdiction of this Court, see, e.g. , 262 U.S. 55, or in- volved traditional claims of title, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 that it is permissible because lower courts have occasion- ally enjoined courts and such relief is necessary. Both contentions are wrong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "Both contentions are wrong. First , assuming th ese cases were correctly decided, none of them supports broadly enjoining a State's judici- ary from docketing, hearing, and adjudicating a class of tort claims without statutory authorization. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]658 F.2d 420772 F.3d 876 ; 634 F.2d 50 that SB 8 is so unconstitutional that no court would fail to strike it down. If that is the case, there can be no reason to think that a judgment will be entered —making its only author- ity supporting the \"unusual\" remedy of enjoining all ju- dicial personnel entirely inapposite. Second , such an extraordinary remedy —which seeks to set the lower federal courts as hybrid appellate bodies over state tribunals —is not necessary to avert constitu- tional crisis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 F.3d 795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "Both contentions are wrong. First , assuming th ese cases were correctly decided, none of them supports broadly enjoining a State's judici- ary from docketing, hearing, and adjudicating a class of tort claims without statutory authorization. See In re263 F.3d 795[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]772 F.3d 876 ; 634 F.2d 50 that SB 8 is so unconstitutional that no court would fail to strike it down. If that is the case, there can be no reason to think that a judgment will be entered —making its only author- ity supporting the \"unusual\" remedy of enjoining all ju- dicial personnel entirely inapposite. Second , such an extraordinary remedy —which seeks to set the lower federal courts as hybrid appellate bodies over state tribunals —is not necessary to avert constitu- tional crisis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.2d 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "Both contentions are wrong. First , assuming th ese cases were correctly decided, none of them supports broadly enjoining a State's judici- ary from docketing, hearing, and adjudicating a class of tort claims without statutory authorization. See In re263 F.3d 795658 F.2d 420[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 634 F.2d 50 that SB 8 is so unconstitutional that no court would fail to strike it down. If that is the case, there can be no reason to think that a judgment will be entered —making its only author- ity supporting the \"unusual\" remedy of enjoining all ju- dicial personnel entirely inapposite. Second , such an extraordinary remedy —which seeks to set the lower federal courts as hybrid appellate bodies over state tribunals —is not necessary to avert constitu- tional crisis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.3d 876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The district court erred in enjoining Texas's judicial officials",
		"context": "Both contentions are wrong. First , assuming th ese cases were correctly decided, none of them supports broadly enjoining a State's judici- ary from docketing, hearing, and adjudicating a class of tort claims without statutory authorization. See In re263 F.3d 795658 F.2d 420772 F.3d 876 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that SB 8 is so unconstitutional that no court would fail to strike it down. If that is the case, there can be no reason to think that a judgment will be entered —making its only author- ity supporting the \"unusual\" remedy of enjoining all ju- dicial personnel entirely inapposite. Second , such an extraordinary remedy —which seeks to set the lower federal courts as hybrid appellate bodies over state tribunals —is not necessary to avert constitu- tional crisis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.2d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Certiorari Is Unwarranted Because This Issue Is Not Outcome-Determinative.",
		"context": "Oklahoma also waived its concurrent-jurisdiction argument by not raising it until after the OCCA's post- McGirt remand. Under Oklahoma law, \"the State, like defendants, must … preserve errors …, otherwise they are waived.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So whatever the answer to Oklahoma's question presented in general , the decision below reached the correct result. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "1999 OK CR 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 112 of the Patent Act Establishes a Patent Bargain",
		"context": "These requirements ensure that, in exchange for receiving a patent and the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, patentees disclose their invention to the public so that others in the field can make and use the invention defined by the claims, or improve upon it to make new inventions that can benefit the public. This \"carefully crafted bargain\" is at the heart of the U.S. patent system. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141. 5 Section 112(a) strikes a delicate balance between rewarding innovators with patent rights and requiring inventors to fully disclose their invention to the public. The scope of the patent claims and the right to exclude others must be commensurate with the enabling disclosure in the patent specification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 112 of the Patent Act Establishes a Patent Bargain",
		"context": "These requirements ensure that, in exchange for receiving a patent and the right to exclude others from practicing the invention, patentees disclose their invention to the public so that others in the field can make and use the invention defined by the claims, or improve upon it to make new inventions that can benefit the public. This \"carefully crafted bargain\" is at the heart of the U.S. patent system. 525 U.S. 55; Bonito Boats, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 Section 112(a) strikes a delicate balance between rewarding innovators with patent rights and requiring inventors to fully disclose their invention to the public. The scope of the patent claims and the right to exclude others must be commensurate with the enabling disclosure in the patent specification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 112 of the Patent Act Establishes a Patent Bargain",
		"context": "5 Section 112(a) strikes a delicate balance between rewarding innovators with patent rights and requiring inventors to fully disclose their invention to the public. The scope of the patent claims and the right to exclude others must be commensurate with the enabling disclosure in the patent specification. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amgen agrees that patent claims must not \"truly exceed what the patent enables.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 F.2d 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 242 \"Same Offense\" Analysis",
		"context": "§ 242 contai ns the elements of \"under color of law \" and deprivation of a constitutional right (usually drafted in section 242 indictments as deprivations of the right to a trial or the right to be free from unreasonable force). On the other hand, state homicide statutes, incl uding Model Penal Code based statutes, contain the element of killing a human being, and 13 the elements, not the particular manner in how the case was proved. See Dixon , 509 U.S. at 700-704; see also Currier , 138 S. Ct. at 2153 (\"[t]o prevent a second trial on a new charge, th e defendant must show an identity of statutory elemen ts between the two charges against him; it's not enough that 'a substantial overlap [exists] in the proof offered to establish the crimes'\") (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court, although not mentioning Blockburger by name, again relied on Blockburger princi- ples to determine what constitutes a lesser included offense by focusing on the elements of the statutes, as opposed to relying on an amorphous \"inherent rela- tionship approach.\" Id. at 716-717.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 770",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 242 \"Same Offense\" Analysis",
		"context": "Thus, Blockburger is satisfied even without consideration of jurisdictional or mens rea requir ements. Federal courts are split on whether jurisdictional elements can be used to satisfy Blockburger . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]509 U.S. 701. 11 The Schmuck Court held: Since offenses are statutorily defined, that comparison is appropriately conducted by reference to the statutory elements of the offenses in question, and not, as the inherent relationship approach would mandate, 14 there is no basis to modify the Blockburger test in the event dual sovereignty is overruled. Nonetheless, if dual sovereignty is abolished, a new level of cooperative federalis m may be necessary if the federal government still chooses to pursue the sensible policy of federal deference in many police brutality cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "64 F.3d 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 242 \"Same Offense\" Analysis",
		"context": "Section 241 reaches conspiracies involvin g acts under color of law and can also reach certain wholly private conspiracies as well. 13 The double jeopardy clause does not apply where there are two separate convictions for an under- lying substantive crime and a conspiracy to commit that same crime. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, separate conspiracy convictions that concern overlapping but legally distinct conduct do not violate the double jeopardy clause. 450 U.S. 333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 242 \"Same Offense\" Analysis",
		"context": "503 U.S. 378. Similarly, separate conspiracy convictions that concern overlapping but legally distinct conduct do not violate the double jeopardy clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The resolution of this case should not affect those precedents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "Third, any reading of the Tax Injunction Act that reached reporting requirements would violate \"the rule that jurisdictional rules should be clear.\" Id. at 11, 14 (cleaned up; citing, inter alia, Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). A loose, nontechnical definition of the Act's terms would produce \"a vague and obscure boundary that would result in both needless litigation and uncalled -for dismissal, all in the name of a jurisdictional statute meant to protect 20 state resources.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "A loose, nontechnical definition of the Act's terms would produce \"a vague and obscure boundary that would result in both needless litigation and uncalled -for dismissal, all in the name of a jurisdictional statute meant to protect 20 state resources.\" Id. at 14 (cleaned up; citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All of this reasoning from Direct Marketing easily transposes to the Anti-Injunction Act. That's unsur- prising, since Direct Marketing's analysis of the Tax Injunction Act was largely derived from the Anti- Injunction Act itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "That's unsur- prising, since Direct Marketing's analysis of the Tax Injunction Act was largely derived from the Anti- Injunction Act itself. The former was \"modeled on\" the latter, the two statutes use similar language, and the Court assumes their overlapping terms \"are generally used in the same way.\" Direct Mktg., 575 U.S. at 8; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the Anti-Injunction Act omits a few words that appear in the Tax Injunction Act (\"enjoin,\" \"suspend,\" \"levy\"), those minor differences do not alter the core reasoning of Direct Marketing. First, like the Tax Injunction Act, the Anti- Injunction Act is not \"keyed to all activities that may improve\" the government's \"ability to assess and collect taxes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "The Court and the treatise writer are correct. The Anti-Injunc - tion Act \"was written against the background of gen- eral equitable principles disfavoring the issuance of federal injunctions against taxes.\" Bob Jones, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Act of June 30, 1926, ch. 712, 44 Stat. 777 (1926) (codified at 26 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "22 at 742 n.16. One of those principles dictated that \"a suit in equity will not lie to restrain collection on the sole ground that the tax is illegal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Anti-Injunction Act \"is declaratory of [that] prin- ciple\" and \"is to be construed as near as may be in harmony with it and the reasons upon which it rests.\" Standard Nut, 284 U.S. at 509.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "1862 Act §§2-5. Assessors reviewed income tax returns, property, and accounts to determine the specific tax liability for each individual. §§6-9; see Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After assessors publicized lists of who owed what, 1862 Act §§14-15, they addressed taxpayers' objections and made final assessments, §§15-16. Collectors then published information about where and when to pay.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Direct Marketing, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar preenforcement challenges to tax-reporting requirements",
		"context": "Third, like the Tax Injunction Act, a narrower reading of the Anti-Injunction Act \"is consistent with the rule that jurisdictional rules should be clear.\" Direct Mktg., 575 U.S. at 14 (cleaned up). While the Anti-Injunction Act is probably not jurisdictional, see Hobby Lobby Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the government certainly thinks it is , see D.C. Doc. 25-1 at 6. Whatever its precise status, the Anti-Injunction Act is at least a claim -processing rule that, when raised, requires cases to be dismissed for reasons unrelated to their merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.3d 1114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "18-24, supra. By u s- ing that formulation, Congress was able to codify for international organizations the substantive standard s applicabl e to foreign states, without spelling out every nuance of the common law .8 When Congress enacts a statute that adopts a common -law concept, courts must presume that Co n- gress \"adopt[ ed] the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken\" at the time of enactment, absent clear evidence of contrary intent . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has therefore consistently construed statutes adopting common -law concepts by looking to the common law at the time of the statute's enactment. See 561 U.S. 358 ; 570 U.S. 729; 370 U.S. 650, 655 8 Petitioners contend (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "342 U.S. 246. This Court has therefore consistently construed statutes adopting common -law concepts by looking to the common law at the time of the statute's enactment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 570 U.S. 729; 370 U.S. 650, 655 8 Petitioners contend (Br. 24) that Congress could have expres s- ly provided \"the specific level of immunity it thought existed at the time.\" But that is what Congress did.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "342 U.S. 246. This Court has therefore consistently construed statutes adopting common -law concepts by looking to the common law at the time of the statute's enactment. See 561 U.S. 358 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 370 U.S. 650, 655 8 Petitioners contend (Br. 24) that Congress could have expres s- ly provided \"the specific level of immunity it thought existed at the time.\" But that is what Congress did.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "342 U.S. 246. This Court has therefore consistently construed statutes adopting common -law concepts by looking to the common law at the time of the statute's enactment. See 561 U.S. 358 ; 570 U.S. 729; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 655 8 Petitioners contend (Br. 24) that Congress could have expres s- ly provided \"the specific level of immunity it thought existed at the time.\" But that is what Congress did.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "27 (1962) (examining \"the common -law meaning of fo r- gery at the time the 1823 stat ute was enacted\" ); cf. E p- ic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court also looks to the commo n law at the time of enactment when a statute incorporates broader common -law doctrines, including immunity doctrines. For example, the Court has held that 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "For example, the Court has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 incorporates immunities under \"the common law as it existed when Congress passed § 1983 in 1871.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In dete r- mining whether an official sued today under Section 1983 should have immunity, therefore, the Court u n- dertakes \"a considered inquiry into the immunity hi s- torically accorded the relevant official at commo n law and the interests behind it.\" 467 U.S. 914.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "566 U.S. 377. In dete r- mining whether an official sued today under Section 1983 should have immunity, therefore, the Court u n- dertakes \"a considered inquiry into the immunity hi s- torically accorded the relevant official at commo n law and the interests behind it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e Court then decides whether Co n- gress intended that common -law rule to apply, rather than canvassing subsequent evolution in the common law. Filarsky , 566 U.S. at 389.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "Filarsky , 566 U.S. at 389. Similarly, in constr u- ing the scope of \"appropriate equitable relief\" under ERISA, a statute enacted against the backdrop of the law of trusts, the Court examines what relief would have been \"typically available in equity\" at the time of the divided bench —not the relief that would be consi d- ered \"equitable\" and available today . 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Petitioners' examples (Br . 20) are inapposite because they do not codify a principle with a specific common -law meaning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "20) are inapposite because they do not codify a principle with a specific common -law meaning. The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, is \"no more than a de c- laration of what the law would have been without it,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], i.e., a state- 28 This Court's cases have thus proceeded on the \"im- portant assumption \" that the Congress that enacted a particular statute \"w [as] familiar with common -law principles \" at the time, and \"that [it] likely intended these common -law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.\" City of 453 U.S. 247; accord 466 U.S. 522. Because Section 288a(b) adopts the common -law rule governing foreign - state immunity, the scope of the \"same immuni ty from suit .",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, is \"no more than a de c- laration of what the law would have been without it,\" 30 U.S. 457, i.e., a state- 28 This Court's cases have thus proceeded on the \"im- portant assumption \" that the Congress that enacted a particular statute \"w [as] familiar with common -law principles \" at the time, and \"that [it] likely intended these common -law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 466 U.S. 522. Because Section 288a(b) adopts the common -law rule governing foreign - state immunity, the scope of the \"same immuni ty from suit . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "The Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652, is \"no more than a de c- laration of what the law would have been without it,\" 30 U.S. 457, i.e., a state- 28 This Court's cases have thus proceeded on the \"im- portant assumption \" that the Congress that enacted a particular statute \"w [as] familiar with common -law principles \" at the time, and \"that [it] likely intended these common -law principles to obtain, absent specific provisions to the contrary.\" City of 453 U.S. 247; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Section 288a(b) adopts the common -law rule governing foreign - state immunity, the scope of the \"same immuni ty from suit . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "The word \"same\" simply means \"identical\"; it does not indicate whether the quality of \"sameness\" should be measured at the time the statute is applied or at the time the statute was enacted. 10 And the present -tense phase \"is en- ment that federal courts should apply state law when state law applies. Agency Holding [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], simply waives the United States' immunity in certain cases, leaving the United States subject to the same state -law liability rules that apply to private parties. 510 U.S. 471. 10 Petitioners' reliance on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which directs that African Americans receive \"same\" rights as \"white 29 joyed \" could refer either to the time of enactment or the time of application.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "10 And the present -tense phase \"is en- ment that federal courts should apply state law when state law applies. Agency Holding 483 U.S. 143, simply waives the United States' immunity in certain cases, leaving the United States subject to the same state -law liability rules that apply to private parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Petitioners' reliance on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which directs that African Americans receive \"same\" rights as \"white 29 joyed \" could refer either to the time of enactment or the time of application. Precisely because the present tense is susceptible to more than one interpreta tion, this Court has repeatedly held that the statutory co n- text may demonstrate that the present tense refers to a time prior to the time in which the statute is applied.11 See 563 U.S. 816 (\"the citizens,\" ignores the statute's different purpose and context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "510 U.S. 471. 10 Petitioners' reliance on the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which directs that African Americans receive \"same\" rights as \"white 29 joyed \" could refer either to the time of enactment or the time of application. Precisely because the present tense is susceptible to more than one interpreta tion, this Court has repeatedly held that the statutory co n- text may demonstrate that the present tense refers to a time prior to the time in which the statute is applied.11 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"the citizens,\" ignores the statute's different purpose and context. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27; 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "See Pulliam , 466 U.S. at 529. The IOIA is entirely different. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It affords international organizations immun i- ty to further the entirely distinct purpose of that immunity. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "14) are not to the contrary. Two concern statutes that use the past tense. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 423 U.S. 212. 560 U.S. 438, involved the very different question whether a criminal statute applied to conduct committed before the statute was enacted. In Dole Food 538 U.S. 468, the Court construed the FSIA's use of present tense in light of the principle that sovereign status is determined on the facts existing at the time of suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "14) are not to the contrary. Two concern statutes that use the past tense. 503 U.S. 329; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 560 U.S. 438, involved the very different question whether a criminal statute applied to conduct committed before the statute was enacted. In Dole Food 538 U.S. 468, the Court construed the FSIA's use of present tense in light of the principle that sovereign status is determined on the facts existing at the time of suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "Two concern statutes that use the past tense. 503 U.S. 329; 423 U.S. 212. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved the very different question whether a criminal statute applied to conduct committed before the statute was enacted. In Dole Food 538 U.S. 468, the Court construed the FSIA's use of present tense in light of the principle that sovereign status is determined on the facts existing at the time of suit. 30 tense of the verb 'be' is not, considered alone, dispos i- tive\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 288a(b) codifies the federal common-law rule of virtually absolute immunity",
		"context": "503 U.S. 329; 423 U.S. 212. 560 U.S. 438, involved the very different question whether a criminal statute applied to conduct committed before the statute was enacted. In Dole Food [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court construed the FSIA's use of present tense in light of the principle that sovereign status is determined on the facts existing at the time of suit. 30 tense of the verb 'be' is not, considered alone, dispos i- tive\"). Because neither Section 288a(b)'s use of the present tense nor its use of the word \"same\" requires that the statute be read in the manner petitioners propose, pe- titioners invoke the \"reference canon .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "The superior's oversight need not take any particular form, check any \"exclusive criterion,\" id. at 661, or even be \"plenary,\" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Officer may also exercise significant authority \"largely independently\" from the superior. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "Edmond 's straightforward construction of the term \"inferior Officer\" makes perfect sense of the con-stitutional text, structure, and purpose. a. Edmond's construction reflects \"the Constitu- tion's original meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The phrase \"inferior Officer\" has always connoted 21 merely a \"relationship with some higher ranking of- ficer or officers below the President.\" Edmond , 520 U.S. at 662.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": ", Samuel Johnson, Dic- tionary of the English Language (1755) (Inferiour); Thomas Sheridan, A Complete Dictionary of the Eng-lish Language (2d ed. 1789) (Inferiour); Noah Web- ster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (Inferior). \"[I]n other parts of the constitution,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the term \"inferior\" li kewise means subject to some level of supervision. The term \"inferior\" appears three other times in the Constitution, each in refer-ence to the lower courts. See U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "III, § 1 (\"inferior Courts\" (twice)). These uses of the word \"inferior\" \"plainly connote[ ]\" some \"relation-ship of subordination\" to this Court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The first Congress also understood the term \"infe- rior\" to connote a subordinate relationship. See Ed-mond, 520 U.S. at 663–64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "499 (J. Madison)). What differentiates execut ive Officers in this structure is not their fun ctions or any particular su- pervisory mechanism, but thei r relationship to other officials in the Executive Branch hierarchy. For this structure to function properly, inferior Officers must be able to exercise \"significant authority\" even with- out \"complete\" supervision by a superior, Edmond, 23 520 U.S. at 662, 664, and to exercise even the supe- rior's own authority \"under special and temporary conditions\"—without thereby \"transform[ing]\" into a principal Officer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Otherwise, the \"discharge of administra- tive duties would be seriously hindered.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "169 U.S. 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "was deemed to outweigh the benefits of the more cumber- some procedure.\" Ibid. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Edmond's pragmatic distinction between princi- pal and inferior Officers preserves public accountabil- ity for the direct agents of the President in charge of formulating or implementing federal policy in a par-ticular area. It also mainta ins flexibility, as Congress can readily ascertain whether it can select an alter-nate method of appointment for a particular Officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "It also mainta ins flexibility, as Congress can readily ascertain whether it can select an alter-nate method of appointment for a particular Officer. As this case demonstrates, without such a practical line between inferior and principal Officers, there could be \"endless controversies\" as to the proper clas-sification of Officers—precisely what the Appoint- ments Clause aimed to prevent. Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 2. In applying these princ iples, this Court has al- ways recognized that admi nistrative adjudicators are inferior Officers—even in the absence of complete di- rection or control by a superior in particular in- stances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "Nonetheless, this Court held that the military judges were inferior Officers \"by reason of [their] supervision.\" Id. at 666; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the adjudicators in Freytag and Lucia unquestionably were inferior Officers, even though their decisions were not always subject to review within the Executive Branch. Freytag held that spe- cial trial judges of the U.S. Tax Court were inferior Officers—despite their power to \"render the decisions of the Tax Court in [certain] cases.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Inferior Officers Are Directed And Supervised At Some Level By Another Officer",
		"context": "501 U.S. at 882. 25 And Lucia recognized that administrative law judges (ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) were \"near-carbon copies\" of the adjudicators in Freytag . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as special trial judges could \"definitively resolve a case for the Tax Court,\" ibid. , SEC ALJs could, among other things, issue immediately enforceable default orders without any agency review, see In re2013 WL 6173809.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "494 U.S. at 876. That prediction has proven accurate. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cases following Smith that involved Jews, 5 Muslims,6 traditional Christians,7 Quakers,8 Native 5 See, e.g., 743 F. Supp. 1253940 F.2d 661874 P.2d 274753 F. Supp. 1300 (compelling 8 Americans,9 Hmong,10 and the Amish,11 all show that Smith left religious people's practices vulnerable to in- fringement by generally applicable laws. As one study explained, \"the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and immediate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "That prediction has proven accurate. See City of 521 U.S. 507. Cases following Smith that involved Jews, 5 Muslims,6 traditional Christians,7 Quakers,8 Native 5 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]940 F.2d 661874 P.2d 274753 F. Supp. 1300 (compelling 8 Americans,9 Hmong,10 and the Amish,11 all show that Smith left religious people's practices vulnerable to in- fringement by generally applicable laws. As one study explained, \"the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and immediate. \"12 In fact, \"the rate of free exercise cases initiated by religious groups dropped by over 50% immediately after Smith .",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F. Supp. 1253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "That prediction has proven accurate. See City of 521 U.S. 507. Cases following Smith that involved Jews, 5 Muslims,6 traditional Christians,7 Quakers,8 Native 5 See, e.g., 743 F. Supp. 1253[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]874 P.2d 274753 F. Supp. 1300 (compelling 8 Americans,9 Hmong,10 and the Amish,11 all show that Smith left religious people's practices vulnerable to in- fringement by generally applicable laws. As one study explained, \"the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and immediate. \"12 In fact, \"the rate of free exercise cases initiated by religious groups dropped by over 50% immediately after Smith .",
		"citation_value_orig": "940 F.2d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "That prediction has proven accurate. See City of 521 U.S. 507. Cases following Smith that involved Jews, 5 Muslims,6 traditional Christians,7 Quakers,8 Native 5 See, e.g., 743 F. Supp. 1253940 F.2d 661[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]753 F. Supp. 1300 (compelling 8 Americans,9 Hmong,10 and the Amish,11 all show that Smith left religious people's practices vulnerable to in- fringement by generally applicable laws. As one study explained, \"the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and immediate. \"12 In fact, \"the rate of free exercise cases initiated by religious groups dropped by over 50% immediately after Smith .",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 P.2d 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "That prediction has proven accurate. See City of 521 U.S. 507. Cases following Smith that involved Jews, 5 Muslims,6 traditional Christians,7 Quakers,8 Native 5 See, e.g., 743 F. Supp. 1253940 F.2d 661874 P.2d 274[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (compelling 8 Americans,9 Hmong,10 and the Amish,11 all show that Smith left religious people's practices vulnerable to in- fringement by generally applicable laws. As one study explained, \"the consequences of the Smith decision were swift and immediate. \"12 In fact, \"the rate of free exercise cases initiated by religious groups dropped by over 50% immediately after Smith .",
		"citation_value_orig": "753 F. Supp. 1300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": ".\" 14 Quakers to enforce IRS levy against two employee-members who refused, on religious grounds, to pay part of thei r federal taxes). 9 Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]462 N.W.2d 393. 12 Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec, & Roger Finke, Reli- gious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA , 46 J. Church & State 237, 248 (2004).",
		"citation_value_orig": "817 F. Supp. 1319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": ".\" 14 Quakers to enforce IRS levy against two employee-members who refused, on religious grounds, to pay part of thei r federal taxes). 9 Alabama & Coushatta Tribes of 817 F. Supp. 1319[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 Amy Adamczyk, John Wybraniec, & Roger Finke, Reli- gious Regulation and the Courts: Documenting the Effects of Smith and RFRA , 46 J. Church & State 237, 248 (2004).",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 N.W.2d 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's legacy is a diminished Free Exercise Clause that imperils religious minorities the most",
		"context": "17 Twenty-one states have passed their own laws similar to the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Central , BecketLaw.org, https://bit.ly/2ygdumx (last visited April 29, 2020). 18 See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (creating an exception to Smith for generally applicable laws motivated by anti-religious sentiment). 10 See Kennedy , 139 S.Ct. at 637 (Alito, J., statement re- specting denial of certiorari ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Marketplace access.",
		"context": "2022 WL 1528348; accord Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Colorado cannot establish an actual market- access problem for good re ason—its fears are divorced from reality. Many states' public-accommodation laws do not apply to speech like Smith's, yet those states do not report the discri minatory problems that Colorado fears.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "7 County and one other county were ever split in the congressional plans in effect from 1965 to 1992. After the 1990 census, the Alabama Legislature failed to enact a new congressional plan in time to re- ceive preclearance by the Department of Justice be- fore the 1992 elections. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alabama voters filed suit, alleging that the existing plan was malappor- tioned and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F. Supp. 1491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "504 U.S. 902; 507 U.S. 901. 8 When a plaintiff alleges a racial gerrymander, the shape and demographics of districts alone can estab- lish liability. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There can be no clearer case of racial gerry- mandering than one in which the defendant admits that the Legislature perpetuated district lines that were drawn with the admitted purpose of separating voters by race. See North 138 S. Ct. 2548.4 Despite the 2021 plan's obvious status as a racial gerrymander, Secretary Merrill and the other appel- lants repeatedly refer to it as \"race-neutral\" because the Legislature attempted to retain the cores of exist- ing districts and protect incumbents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 1455. There can be no clearer case of racial gerry- mandering than one in which the defendant admits that the Legislature perpetuated district lines that were drawn with the admitted purpose of separating voters by race. See North [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 Despite the 2021 plan's obvious status as a racial gerrymander, Secretary Merrill and the other appel- lants repeatedly refer to it as \"race-neutral\" because the Legislature attempted to retain the cores of exist- ing districts and protect incumbents. Merrill v. Milli- gan, No. 21A375, Reply in Support of Application for a Stay at 17 n.9; Appellants' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "83 at 70. But when the starting point for the Leg- islature's plan is a racial gerrymander, attempting to 4 To be clear, the Singleton plaintiffs have never argued that previous gerrymandered plans \"tainted\" the 2021 plan, turning an otherwise permissible map into a racial gerrymander. See Ab- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Singleton plaintiffs rely only on the district lines that undisput- edly separate White and Black voters in 2021, and direct evi- dence (described below) that the 2021 Legislature relied on an explicit racial target when deciding what plan to adopt. 9 retain the cores of existing districts is inherently not race-neutral.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "The Singleton plaintiffs rely only on the district lines that undisput- edly separate White and Black voters in 2021, and direct evi- dence (described below) that the 2021 Legislature relied on an explicit racial target when deciding what plan to adopt. 9 retain the cores of existing districts is inherently not race-neutral. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (stating that the legitimacy of protecting \"individuals [who] are incum- bents by virtue of their election in an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered district ... is a questionable proposition,\" but noting that the question was not pre- sented in that case). \"[E]fforts to protect incumbents by seeking to preserve the 'cores' of unconstitutional districts … have the potential to embed, rather than remedy, the effects of an unconstitutional racial ger- rymander ….\" 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, aff'd138 S. Ct. 2548.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "532 U.S. 234 (stating that the legitimacy of protecting \"individuals [who] are incum- bents by virtue of their election in an unconstitutional racially gerrymandered district ... is a questionable proposition,\" but noting that the question was not pre- sented in that case). \"[E]fforts to protect incumbents by seeking to preserve the 'cores' of unconstitutional districts … have the potential to embed, rather than remedy, the effects of an unconstitutional racial ger- rymander ….\" 283 F. Supp. 3d 410, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In North Carolina v. Covington , it was undis- puted that the legislature \"instructed its map drawers not to look at race when crafting a remedial map.\" 138 S. Ct. at 2553.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alabama's 2021 Plan Is an Unconstitutional Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "84 at 20–22. 12 such race-based steps.\" Cooper , 137 S. Ct. at 1471; Ab- bott, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In those cases, the majority-minority districts violated the Equal Pro- tection Clause because they could not withstand strict scrutiny. Here, it was undisputed that Alabama's map drawers had not performed a racial polarization anal- ysis before the 2021 plan was enacted, much less a \"meaningful legislative inquiry\" into whether a dis- trict \"created without a focus on race … could lead to §2 liability.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "In deciding that a 2008 amendment to the FSIA could not be the basis for imposing punitive damages on Sudan for conduct a de cade earlier, the D.C. Circuit did not \"disregard[]\" or \"reject[]\" this Court's decision in Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as the Petition co ntends. Pet. 24-26.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Circuit properly considered Altmann and correctly concluded that it did not apply. Instead, the D.C. Circuit applied the controlling precedent of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to prohibit the re troactive imposition of punitive damages because neither the FSIA nor § 1605A's implementing legislation provide the necessary \"clear statement\" to indicate congressional intent for retroactivity. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Subsequently, a number of Courts of Appeals have found that punitive damages statutes are subject to analysis under the Landgraf framework, and indeed have found that those stat utes lack the requisite clear statement to permit the imposition of punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]793 F.3d 147. 2. In Altmann , this Court considered the Landgraf framework and held that the jurisdictional immunity provisions of the FSIA apply to conduct that occurred prior to the FSIA's enactment, notwithstanding the absence of a clear statement to that effect in the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "662 F.3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Subsequently, a number of Courts of Appeals have found that punitive damages statutes are subject to analysis under the Landgraf framework, and indeed have found that those stat utes lack the requisite clear statement to permit the imposition of punitive damages for pre-enactment conduct. See, e.g. , 662 F.3d 1091[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. In Altmann , this Court considered the Landgraf framework and held that the jurisdictional immunity provisions of the FSIA apply to conduct that occurred prior to the FSIA's enactment, notwithstanding the absence of a clear statement to that effect in the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 F.3d 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Id. Faced with analyzing a substantive punitive damages provision of the FSIA, which this Court in Altmann did not do, the D.C. Circuit properly applied the Landgraf framework, in accord with the decisions of other circuits confronted with assessing retroactivity of similar punitive damages provisions (see Ditullio , 662 F.3d at 1100; Gross , 186 F.3d at 1091) as well as this Court's precedent ( see Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the D.C. Circuit explained, that \"jurisdiction under the FSIA applies retroactively .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 848",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Petitioners' extensive reliance upon § 1605A's legislative history (Pet. 32-35) is simply irrelevant to the Landgraf inquiry. See Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 281 (holding that only an \"explicit command\" in the statute can authorize punitive damages for pre- enactment conduct); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, review of the D.C. Circuit's decision in order to examine this history is unwarranted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Consistent With Decisions Of This Court, Including Altmann",
		"context": "Circuit's decision in order to examine this history is unwarranted. Moreover, in light of Landgraf 's \"clear statement\" requirement for retroactivity, a court should not presume, based merely on selective legislative history, that Congress intended retroactive application of the provision 26 without having made that intention express. See Merck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "Lynch , 465 U.S. at 674. And \"references to the Almighty [have] run through our laws, our public rituals, [and] our ceremonies\" since the Founding. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). \"[H]istory is replete with official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance in deliberations and pronouncement of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders.\" Lynch , 465 U.S. at 675.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Public Aff., The Great Seal of the 38 United States 4-5 (2003), https://perma.cc/94WY- 5MMT. Given that legislation \"passed by the first [C]ongress assembled under the [C]onstitution\" is \"contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning,\" these initial enactments suggest the Framers saw no Establishm ent Clause concern with acts endorsing religion or using its symbols. State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled in part by Milwaukee 296 U.S. 268; see also Marsh , 463 U.S. at 790 (Framers' \"actions reveal their intent\"). And, of course, the judiciary joined its coordinate branches in incorporating non-coercive religious expression into its governmental activities: \"Since the days of John Marshall,\" this Court has begun each session requesting that \"God save the United States and this Honorable Court.\" Engel , 370 U.S. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "U.S. Dep't of State Bureau of Public Aff., The Great Seal of the 38 United States 4-5 (2003), https://perma.cc/94WY- 5MMT. Given that legislation \"passed by the first [C]ongress assembled under the [C]onstitution\" is \"contemporaneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning,\" these initial enactments suggest the Framers saw no Establishm ent Clause concern with acts endorsing religion or using its symbols. State of 127 U.S. 265, overruled in part by Milwaukee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Marsh , 463 U.S. at 790 (Framers' \"actions reveal their intent\"). And, of course, the judiciary joined its coordinate branches in incorporating non-coercive religious expression into its governmental activities: \"Since the days of John Marshall,\" this Court has begun each session requesting that \"God save the United States and this Honorable Court.\" Engel , 370 U.S. at 446 (Stewart, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Conduct Of The Framers Confirms That Non-Coercive Actions Did Not Raise Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "Second Inaugural Address, ¶ 3, https://perma.cc/9E4X-RN2L. And many Civil War memorials included crosses and other religious imagery. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Religious symbolism remains no stranger to our public life today, including at the modern Court, which has long featured in its frieze \"a notable and permanent . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "660 F.3d 1091",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
		"context": "A district court's equitable powers to remedy con- stitutional violations are \"'broad.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a constitutional viola- tion is found, a court should \"tailor 'the scope of the remedy' to fit 'the nature and extent of the constitu-tional violation.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
		"context": "25 U.S. 682. A court should accordingly \"for- mulate an effective remedy\" that will \"achieve the greatest possible degree of [relief], taking into account the practicalities of the situation.\" Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 297 (quotation marks omitted); accord Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the scope of a remedial in- junction is entrusted to the district court's discretion, reviewable only for abuse on appeal. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 306.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
		"context": "570 U.S. at 221. Where a statu- tory provision is unconstitutional on its face, an injunc-tion that simply \"prohibit[s] its enforcement is 'prop- er.'\" Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Even viewing this Court's prior decision as a nar- rower as-applied holding, however, the district court entered and the court of appeals affirmed a remedial decree that was tailored to protect the rights of re- spondents themselves. In doing so, the lower courts correctly applied this Court's reasoning to conclude that imposing the Policy Requirement on affiliates closely identified with respondents would infringe on respondents' own speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
		"context": "Funding conditions that restrict the re- cipient's speech within the sco pe of the federally funded program are generally lawful, the Court explained, so long as they leave the recipient \"unfettered in its other activities.\" Id . at 217 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In Rust , for example, the Court upheld a funding condition under Title X of the Public Health Service Act that \"barred [federally funded] projects from advo- cating abortion …, and required grantees to ensure that their [funded] projects were physically and finan- cially separate from their other projects that engaged in the prohibited activities.\" AOSI , 570 U.S. at 216 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Reasoning In AOSI Confirms That Imposing The Policy Requirement On \"Clearly Identified\" Affiliates Violates Respondents' Freedom Of Speech",
		"context": "Similarly, in Regan v. Taxation With Representa- tion of Washington , the Court upheld the U.S. tax code's prohibition on substantial lobbying by charities that are tax-exempt under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By limiting the tax exemption in that way, \"Congress had merely 'chose[n] not to subsidize lobbying.'\" AOSI , 570 U.S. at 215.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because the Jeopardy Opinions Describe the Basis for the Services' Determination, FOIA Requires Their Disclosure",
		"context": ". . arbi trary and capricious,' \" Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But here the public and reg- ulated industry have no means of identifying any in-consistencies, much less holding the Services accountable for them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "This Court has applied the local feeling exception only in cases involving \"arguably prohibited\" conduct—that is, where the conduct challenged in state court might also amount to an unfair labor practice under Section 8. In arguably prohibited cases, there is \"no risk that permitting the state cause of action to proceed would result in state regulation of 32 conduct that Congress intended to protect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In these cases, there may also be a difference between the damages available in state court and the remedies available before the NLRB. The local feeling exception thus sometimes closes that gap by allowing state courts to award damages even where the Board may also provide a remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "And there is no remedial gap in a case like this one. If respondent's conduct is protected, the state court cannot award petitioner any remedy without running afoul of the Supremacy Clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Conversely, if the Board finds respondent's conduct unprotected, petitioner may at that point take advantage of all available state-court remedies. Unsurprisingly, this Court has never applied the local feeling exception to any arguably protected case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "Petitioner's cases are inapposite. Some impose liability for conduct that occurs during a work stoppage but not for the work stoppage itself. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], striking employees not only stopped work but also occupied the employer's factory for nine days, preventing the employer from operating its business and culminating in a \"pitched battle\" with law enforcement. Id. at 248-49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "306 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "Id. at 248-49. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], striking employees not only stopped work but also blocked other employees from entering the employer's plant. Id. at 268-69; see also 356 U.S. 634.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "In 351 U.S. 266, striking employees not only stopped work but also blocked other employees from entering the employer's plant. Id. at 268-69; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, however, petitioner challenges nothing beyond the work stoppage itself. Petitioner's lower-court cases are similarly off- base.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 634",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "Petitioner's other cases are yet further afield, involving no work stoppages at all. See, e.g. , Sears , 436 U.S. at 182-83 (picketing on employer's private property); Farmer , 430 U.S. at 292 (hiring hall discrimination); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner ultimately falls back on a series of cases that reference \"destruction of property\" in dicta. Petr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "23-27. But as this Court has explained, all of those cases involved \"conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order,\" not mere work stoppages. United Mine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 458 U.S. 886. 35 b. Petitioner's argument that state regulation of \"intentional property destruction\" is \"deeply rooted\" fares no better. \"Intentional property destruction\" is not a cause of action under Washington law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "23-27. But as this Court has explained, all of those cases involved \"conduct marked by violence and imminent threats to the public order,\" not mere work stoppages. United Mine 383 U.S. 715; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 35 b. Petitioner's argument that state regulation of \"intentional property destruction\" is \"deeply rooted\" fares no better. \"Intentional property destruction\" is not a cause of action under Washington law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "Neither tort requires a showing of wrongful intent. Conversion, for instance, requires \"neither good nor bad faith, neither care nor negligence, neither knowledge nor ignorance\"; the tort does not depend \"in any way\" on a showing of \"wrongful motives.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pegging the local feeling exception to those torts would thus encompass far more than \"intentional\" property damage. A worker who had absolutely no reason to know that her protected conduct would result in property damage might be liable for conversion or trespass to chattels under Washington law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 P.2d 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The local feeling exception does not apply to arguably protected conduct",
		"context": "The \"venerable\" form of conversion would not have covered respondent's conduct. Trespass to chattels actions, meanwhile, historically required \"direct and immediate force\" or \"intermeddling\" with the affected chattels. William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 14 (1941); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 217 (1965); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, no driver applied any \"force,\" let alone \"direct and immediate force,\" to petitioner's concrete. The \"venerable\" trespass to chattels tort would not cover respondent's conduct, either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": ". That the deterrence or \"chill\" of constitutio nally protected activity constitutes an infringement of con- 5 stitutio nal rights seems we ll established and unc on- troversia l. Whether in the context of spee ch or other rights , making the exer cise of a right costly, risky, or uncertain all serve to deter that exercise and have regularly been found to violate the C onstitution. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 394 U.S. 618 ; 476 U.S. 747561 U.S. 186.2 In the many c ases addressing laws that chill the exercise of constitutional rights , the p rotected activi- ty in quest ion i s not necessarily forbidden outri ght but instead saddled with burdens and risks that cause citizens to steer clear of the lin e and to forego activity that would properly be protected. Such de- terrence, even where not intentionally design ed to suppress protected activity, is nonetheless a violation of the C onstitution and may be challenged before en- forcemen t. Indeed, the very pu rpose of pre - enforcement challenges in numero us contexts is to prevent citizens from having to absorb the serious risks of violating a law in order to challenge it . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": ". That the deterrence or \"chill\" of constitutio nally protected activity constitutes an infringement of con- 5 stitutio nal rights seems we ll established and unc on- troversia l. Whether in the context of spee ch or other rights , making the exer cise of a right costly, risky, or uncertain all serve to deter that exercise and have regularly been found to violate the C onstitution. See, e.g., 390 U.S. 570; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 476 U.S. 747561 U.S. 186.2 In the many c ases addressing laws that chill the exercise of constitutional rights , the p rotected activi- ty in quest ion i s not necessarily forbidden outri ght but instead saddled with burdens and risks that cause citizens to steer clear of the lin e and to forego activity that would properly be protected. Such de- terrence, even where not intentionally design ed to suppress protected activity, is nonetheless a violation of the C onstitution and may be challenged before en- forcemen t. Indeed, the very pu rpose of pre - enforcement challenges in numero us contexts is to prevent citizens from having to absorb the serious risks of violating a law in order to challenge it . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": ". That the deterrence or \"chill\" of constitutio nally protected activity constitutes an infringement of con- 5 stitutio nal rights seems we ll established and unc on- troversia l. Whether in the context of spee ch or other rights , making the exer cise of a right costly, risky, or uncertain all serve to deter that exercise and have regularly been found to violate the C onstitution. See, e.g., 390 U.S. 570; 394 U.S. 618 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]561 U.S. 186.2 In the many c ases addressing laws that chill the exercise of constitutional rights , the p rotected activi- ty in quest ion i s not necessarily forbidden outri ght but instead saddled with burdens and risks that cause citizens to steer clear of the lin e and to forego activity that would properly be protected. Such de- terrence, even where not intentionally design ed to suppress protected activity, is nonetheless a violation of the C onstitution and may be challenged before en- forcemen t. Indeed, the very pu rpose of pre - enforcement challenges in numero us contexts is to prevent citizens from having to absorb the serious risks of violating a law in order to challenge it . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": ". That the deterrence or \"chill\" of constitutio nally protected activity constitutes an infringement of con- 5 stitutio nal rights seems we ll established and unc on- troversia l. Whether in the context of spee ch or other rights , making the exer cise of a right costly, risky, or uncertain all serve to deter that exercise and have regularly been found to violate the C onstitution. See, e.g., 390 U.S. 570; 394 U.S. 618 ; 476 U.S. 747[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 In the many c ases addressing laws that chill the exercise of constitutional rights , the p rotected activi- ty in quest ion i s not necessarily forbidden outri ght but instead saddled with burdens and risks that cause citizens to steer clear of the lin e and to forego activity that would properly be protected. Such de- terrence, even where not intentionally design ed to suppress protected activity, is nonetheless a violation of the C onstitution and may be challenged before en- forcemen t. Indeed, the very pu rpose of pre - enforcement challenges in numero us contexts is to prevent citizens from having to absorb the serious risks of violating a law in order to challenge it . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "Such de- terrence, even where not intentionally design ed to suppress protected activity, is nonetheless a violation of the C onstitution and may be challenged before en- forcemen t. Indeed, the very pu rpose of pre - enforcement challenges in numero us contexts is to prevent citizens from having to absorb the serious risks of violating a law in order to challenge it . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (regarding Due Process: \"'penalizin g those who choose to exer- cise' c onstitutional rights, 'would be patently unconstitution al.' And the very t hreat inherent in the exist ence of such a pu- nitive policy wou ld, with r espect to those sti ll in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.'\") , overrul ed in part by 490 U.S. 794 ; 521 U.S. 844558 U.S. 310 (\"The interpretive process itself would create an in evitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected s peech pending the drawing of fine dis- tinct ions th at, in the end, would themselves be quest ionable.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "415 U.S. 452 (regarding Due Process: \"'penalizin g those who choose to exer- cise' c onstitutional rights, 'would be patently unconstitution al.' And the very t hreat inherent in the exist ence of such a pu- nitive policy wou ld, with r espect to those sti ll in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.'\") , overrul ed in part by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 521 U.S. 844558 U.S. 310 (\"The interpretive process itself would create an in evitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected s peech pending the drawing of fine dis- tinct ions th at, in the end, would themselves be quest ionable.\") . 7 lenge a sta tute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 794",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "415 U.S. 452 (regarding Due Process: \"'penalizin g those who choose to exer- cise' c onstitutional rights, 'would be patently unconstitution al.' And the very t hreat inherent in the exist ence of such a pu- nitive policy wou ld, with r espect to those sti ll in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.'\") , overrul ed in part by 490 U.S. 794 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]558 U.S. 310 (\"The interpretive process itself would create an in evitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected s peech pending the drawing of fine dis- tinct ions th at, in the end, would themselves be quest ionable.\") . 7 lenge a sta tute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "415 U.S. 452 (regarding Due Process: \"'penalizin g those who choose to exer- cise' c onstitutional rights, 'would be patently unconstitution al.' And the very t hreat inherent in the exist ence of such a pu- nitive policy wou ld, with r espect to those sti ll in prison, serve to 'chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights.'\") , overrul ed in part by 490 U.S. 794 ; 521 U.S. 844[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The interpretive process itself would create an in evitable, pervasive, and serious risk of chilling protected s peech pending the drawing of fine dis- tinct ions th at, in the end, would themselves be quest ionable.\") . 7 lenge a sta tute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "If there is state actio n (and hence a state ac tor) once a suit has been filed or re- solved, then there is a state actor to enjoin pre- enforcement. For example, the re should be littl e question that even a pr ivate litigant invokes the power of the State when applying or e nforcing state law in a private lawsuit. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"That the action of state courts and of judicial officers in their official capaci- ties i s to be regarded as act ion of the State within the meaning of the Fo urteenth Amendment, is a proposi- tion which has long been e stablished by decisions of this C ourt. \"; \"These are not cases , as has been sug- gested, in which the States have merely abstained from action, leaving priv ate individuals free to im- pose such discrimin ations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which t he States have made ava il- able to such individuals the full co ercive power of government .",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "\"). 3 3 Cf. New York Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"What a Stat e may not con stitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel. The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama c ourts here may be markedly more inhi biting than the f ear of prosec ution under a crimi nal statute. \" (footnote omitted) ; \"Plainly the Alabama law of civil li- bel is 'a form of regulation that creates hazards t o protected 8 Once the courts are understood as state actors re- gardless whether the plaintiff is a public official or a private person, it is simple to recognize that allow ing the litig ation i tself, not merely its eventual outcome, is the most immediate relevant threat and penalty on those seeking to assert constitutional rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "The fear of damage awards under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama c ourts here may be markedly more inhi biting than the f ear of prosec ution under a crimi nal statute. \" (footnote omitted) ; \"Plainly the Alabama law of civil li- bel is 'a form of regulation that creates hazards t o protected 8 Once the courts are understood as state actors re- gardless whether the plaintiff is a public official or a private person, it is simple to recognize that allow ing the litig ation i tself, not merely its eventual outcome, is the most immediate relevant threat and penalty on those seeking to assert constitutional rights . City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 467 –68 (1 987) (regard- ing Fre e Speech: \"to force the plaintiff who has c om- menced a federal action to suffer the delay of state - court proceedings might itself effect the impermissi- ble ch illing of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect.\") (citation omitted) ; Dom 380 U.S. 479 . (\"Even the prospect of ulti- mate failure of such pros ecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on prot ected expression.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Chilling the Exercise of a Constitutional Right Constitutes Present Infringement for Which There Must Be Present Redress",
		"context": "(footnote omitted) ; \"Plainly the Alabama law of civil li- bel is 'a form of regulation that creates hazards t o protected 8 Once the courts are understood as state actors re- gardless whether the plaintiff is a public official or a private person, it is simple to recognize that allow ing the litig ation i tself, not merely its eventual outcome, is the most immediate relevant threat and penalty on those seeking to assert constitutional rights . City of 482 U.S. 451, 467 –68 (1 987) (regard- ing Fre e Speech: \"to force the plaintiff who has c om- menced a federal action to suffer the delay of state - court proceedings might itself effect the impermissi- ble ch illing of the very constitutional right he seeks to protect.\") (citation omitted) ; Dom [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . (\"Even the prospect of ulti- mate failure of such pros ecutions by no means dispels their chilling effect on prot ected expression.\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 30. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 unlicensed use of material for which a license is readily available. Beyond the context of parody, which was at issue in Campbell , American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc.31 offers the most thorough analysis of lost licensing fees as a form of fourth-factor market harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "688 F.3d 1164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "See Campbell , 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (\"The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop. \"); Harper & Row , 471 31. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as amended , 60 F.3d 913, reh'g denied , 1994 U.S. a pp. le XiS 36735 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 F.3d 881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "See Campbell , 114 S. Ct. at 1178 (\"The market for potential derivative uses includes only those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop. \"); Harper & Row , 471 31. 37 F.3d 881, as amended , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reh'g denied , 1994 U.S. a pp. le XiS 36735 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 1994).",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": ". Similarly, other courts have found that the fourth factor will favor the secondary user when the only possible adverse effect occasioned by the secondary use would be to a potential market or value that the copyright holder has not typically sought to, or reasonably been able to, obtain or capture. See Twin Peaks Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied471 U.S. 1004. 32 The Texaco court went on to conclude that the Copyright Clearance Center provided an efficient mechanism for licensing the precise rights at issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "996 F.2d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "33. \"Though the publishers still have not established a conventional market for the direct sale and distribution of individual 23 Univ. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The profitability of the market at issue is not directly relevant under this formulation. a lso, where a market is \"traditional, reasonable or likely to be developed,\" it is generally found cognizable under the fourth factor even where a particular plaintiff has decided not to participate in it, such as with the television trivia books in Castle Rock Entertainment discussed above.",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F.3d 1290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "Id . at 936–37; see also Princeton Univ. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34. See Castle Rock Entm'nt, 150 F.3d 132; Clean Flicks of 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236; see also 4 F. Supp. 2d 701.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 F.3d 1381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "99 F.3d 1381. 34. See Castle Rock Entm'nt, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Clean Flicks of 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236; see also 4 F. Supp. 2d 701. 24 accordingly held \"[t]hat a ndroid competed directly with Java SE in the market for mobile devices is sufficient to undercut Google's market harm arguments.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Federal Circuit Correctly Weighed the Fourth Factor",
		"context": "99 F.3d 1381. 34. See Castle Rock Entm'nt, 150 F.3d 132; Clean Flicks of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 4 F. Supp. 2d 701. 24 accordingly held \"[t]hat a ndroid competed directly with Java SE in the market for mobile devices is sufficient to undercut Google's market harm arguments.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 F. Supp. 2d 1236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Given a Reasonable Option, Any Statutory Ambiguity Within the APA Should be Resolved in a Manner That Avoids Constitutional Issues",
		"context": ", 508 U.S. at 628–29 (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. , 485 U.S. at 575). Stated differently, \"[w]hen the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners assert that the APA can only be reasonably construed as having established hearing examiners as Officers of the United States. However, they neglect to advance any argument for why a contrary interpretation would be unreasonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans",
		"context": "Harv.Pet.App.194. But Harvard's admissions system is not subject to rational-basis review, where Harvard wins so long as \"'there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts'\" supporting its position. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Strict scrutiny requires Harvard to carry the burden on every question—including whether it penalizes Asian Americans. Fisher, 570 U.S. at 310; 529 U.S. 803.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans",
		"context": "509 U.S. 312. Strict scrutiny requires Harvard to carry the burden on every question—including whether it penalizes Asian Americans. Fisher, 570 U.S. at 310; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The point of strict scrutiny, after all, is to \"'smoke out'\" any \"'racial prejudice or stereotype.'\" Adarand , 515 U.S. at 226.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans",
		"context": "at 819. The \"burden imposed by [the] strict-scrutiny test\" is far too heavy for Harvard to prevail on \"'little more than assertion and conjecture.'\" Republican Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 75 If the district court had applied strict scrutiny, it would have found Harvard liable for penalizing Asian Americans. There is no evidence that Asian-American applicants actually have less desirable personal quali- ties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Harvard penalizes Asian Americans",
		"context": "75 If the district court had applied strict scrutiny, it would have found Harvard liable for penalizing Asian Americans. There is no evidence that Asian-American applicants actually have less desirable personal quali- ties. While Harvard's witnesses \"assert[ed]\" that they \"use[] race in a permissible way,\" Fisher I, 570 U.S. at 313, this self-serving testimony is insufficient to carry Harvard's burden, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Harvard's burden is particularly high here because it penalizes Asian Americans in the most \"subjective\" parts of its process. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 410 U.S. 113; 433 U.S. 350; 497 U.S. 261532 U.S. 67567 U.S. 519. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. 343 U.S. 90; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 433 U.S. 350; 497 U.S. 261532 U.S. 67567 U.S. 519. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. 343 U.S. 90; 410 U.S. 113; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 497 U.S. 261532 U.S. 67567 U.S. 519. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. 343 U.S. 90; 410 U.S. 113; 433 U.S. 350; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]532 U.S. 67567 U.S. 519. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. 343 U.S. 90; 410 U.S. 113; 433 U.S. 350; 497 U.S. 261[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]567 U.S. 519. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Medical Students ChooseTheir Own Oaths , STAT (Sep. 21, 2016), https://goo.gl/YMF3Ls. 7 This Court and its individual justices have repeatedly relied on and cited to the AMA Code of Medical Ethics as guidance. 343 U.S. 90; 410 U.S. 113; 433 U.S. 350; 497 U.S. 261532 U.S. 67[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Ethical Opinions are determinations by the AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the AMA's positions on specificethical issues. They are a part of the AMA Code of Medical Ethics .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Public Health Ass'n, Participation ofHealth Professionals in Capital Punishment, PolicyNumber 200125 (Jan. 2001). The American Society ofAnesthesiologists has taken the position that \"[i]t is afundamental and unwavering principle thatanesthesiologists, consistent with their ethicalmandates, cannot use their art and skill to participatein an execution.\" Brief of amicus curiae American Society of Anesthesiologists Supporting Neither Partyat 10-11, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The American Psychiatric Association has stated in itsPrinciples of Medical Ethics that \"[a] psychiatristshould not be a participant in a legally authorizedexecution.\" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Physicians Are Ethically Prohibited from Participating in Execution by the Historic and Prevailing Standards of the Medical Profession",
		"context": "Ass'n, in WMA Resolution to Reaffirm the WMA's Prohibition ofPhysician Participation in Capital Punishment (Oct.2012). In fact, this Court has itself acknowledged the ethical prohibition on physician participation (andparticipation by other health care professionals) incapital punishment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Requiring Abortion Clinics to Pay for Their Negative Externalities is Constitutional",
		"context": "There is no constitutional right for a business to externalize its costs. \"Insisting that landowners internalize the negative externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against constitutional attack.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Left unregulated, the emitting or upwind State reaps the benefits of the economic activity causing the pollution without bearing all the costs.\" 572 U.S. 489.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Requiring Abortion Clinics to Pay for Their Negative Externalities is Constitutional",
		"context": "570 U.S. 595. \"Left unregulated, the emitting or upwind State reaps the benefits of the economic activity causing the pollution without bearing all the costs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The judicially created right to an abortion is not a right for the abortion industry to shift its full costs of complications onto the public. There is no right to a cheap abortion, an unsafe abortion, or an abortion for which complications are paid by the public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. These ATS Claims Do Not Undermine the Harkin-Engel Protocol",
		"context": "Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21. Courts can also dismiss ATS actions on the basis of forum non conveniens . E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 Respondents do not challenge the legality of th is voluntary Protocol, nor does th is action have anything to do with the Department of Labor's partnerships or actions . Multiple mutually supporting approaches to child slavery in cocoa production are necessary and fully consistent with U.S. policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 F. Supp. 2d 376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE PTAB'S TIME-BAR DETERMINATION IS APPEALABLE",
		"context": ". The Court also should review the Federal Circuit's divided en banc holding, in Wi-Fi One , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that it has jurisdiction to review the PTAB's § 315(b) determination s. The arguments advanced by the Director and CTC do not justify denial. A. The Director agrees with petitioner that the Wi- Fi One decision is erroneous , and persuasively explains why that is so .",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 1364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW WHETHER THE PTAB'S TIME-BAR DETERMINATION IS APPEALABLE",
		"context": "Pet. 18. B. CTC arg ues that Wi-Fi One was correctly decided, relying on SAS Institute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Ignoring the petition's lengthy discussion of the importance of the question (Pet. 16 –21), CTC focuses almost entirely o n SAS Institute as the reason to deny certiorari.4 CTC is wrong for two reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 14(e) prohibits negligent misstatements and omissions of material fact",
		"context": "78n(e) . The first clause of that provision does not contain any requirement that a person act with scienter —\"i.e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud.\" Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 14(e)'s text, history , and purpose make clear that the provision ban s negligent misstatements and omissions of material fact , in addition to fraudulent",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION BELOW AND DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR THE CIRCUIT COURTS",
		"context": ". In its decision the court of appeals both adhered to this Court's precedent and to that of the circuit courts in finding the aiding and abetting allegations were sufficient to displace the presumption against extraterritoriality. Furthermore, review on thi s issue 11 is premature before Respondents are given the chance to clarify allegations against Nestlé USA to comport with this Court's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The public charge rule is valid",
		"context": "This Court did not here grant certiorari on the rule's merits. But recognizing the rule's legality makes the government's \"postcertiorari maneuvers designed to insulate [the] decision from review\" breathtaking. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If th e Court does not step in, t he rule of law enacted in accord with this country's statutes — adopted by the People—will not govern. Instead, two men, the President and a district court judge , will have imposed an unlawful rule on the nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The public charge rule is valid",
		"context": "Instead, two men, the President and a district court judge , will have imposed an unlawful rule on the nation. And they will have defied this Court to do it . If the executive and one district court \" may, at will, annul \" valid rules passed in accordance with federal statute 7 See CASA, 971 F.3d at 263 (finding it \"plain\" that \"the challenged action comports with law\"); City & C ounty of San 944 F.3d 773[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 U.S. 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "Before 1996, defendants in Kansas, consistent with the practice in most other states, could raise an insanity defense under the M'Naghten rule. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Kansas law now pr ovides that \"[m]ental disease or defect\" is \"a defense to a prosecution under any statute\" only to the extent that it shows \"that the defendant . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 P.2d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "2 Consequently, Kansas law permits imprisoning and even executing people based on actions for which they are not morally culpable, even though historically—and in nearly every state today—the same lack of moral culpability has been a defense to criminal responsibility. Kansas's purported \" mens rea approach\" \"eliminate[s] the insanity defense,\" as the State's highest court has recognized. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a practical matter, the critical shortcoming of this approach is that \"[t]he mens rea element of a crime ge nerally assesses only whether persons intended to complete the act performed.\" Elizabeth Bennion, Death Is Different No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense Is Cruel 2 The Kansas legislature tweaked the language of § 22-3220 in a 2011 recodification, but the language of § 21-5209 is substantially identical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 P.3d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": ". will even a legally insane defendant actually lack the requisite mens rea purely because of mental defect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After all, even \"a man who commits murder because he feels compelled by demons still possesses the mens rea required for murder.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "Id. In another Satanic delusion case, State v. Armstrong , the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed Freddie Armstrong's murder conviction because the court found that the evidence of his insanity was so great that \"a rational juror could not have reached a contrary decision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At trial, four out of the five psychological experts who testified concluded that Armstrong's mental illness rendered him inca pable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the offense. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 So. 2d 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "Id. at 313; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cases involving delusions of a command from God: A related (and sometimes overlapping) set of cases involves individuals who acted on a delusional belief that they were following a direct command from God. As the Supreme Court of Colorado has observed, \"the 'deific-decree' delusion\" is important to consider in \"assessing a person's cognitive ability to distin guish right from wrong\" since, \"[i]f a person insane ly believes that 'he has a command from the Almighty to kill, it is difficult to understand how such a man can know that it is wrong for him to do it.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "643 So. 2d 1222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "See Serravo , 823 P.2d at 130. 15 In People v. Skinner , another case involving such a delusion, the Supreme Court of California reversed Jesse Skinner's second-degree murder conviction where the trial court found, \"on clearly sufficient evidence,\" that he \"could not distinguish right and wrong.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result of Skinner's mental illness, the trial court found, he held a delusional belief that he had \"a God- given right to kill\" his wife, and believed his doing so was \"with complete moral and criminal impunity\" and \"not wrongful because it is sanctified by the will and desire of God.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 P.2d 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "at 760. So too in State v. Cameron , the Supreme Court of Washington reversed Gary Cameron's conviction for first-degree murder, holding that the jury had been errone ously prevented from considering Cameron's insani ty defense based on his delusional belief that he was following a command from God. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court 16 found that while Cameron appeared to understand his actions in killing his stepmother, and intended their natural consequences, he could not distinguish between right and wrong at the time of his act due to delusions that the act was ordained by God. The court noted that after the crime, Cameron made no attempt to conceal the victim's body, and was seen downtown \"wearing only a pair of women's stretch pants, a woman's housecoat, a shirt and no shoes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "674 P.2d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "at 303. In State v. Rawland , the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed Frank Rawland's conviction for third-degree murder because Rawland was unable to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the offense. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 Rawland had a long histor y of delusions. Among other things, on multiple occasions he had announced his candidacy for President of the United States by speaking into his AM radio—believing he could \"transmit messages to the world\" by this means—and had then been \"disappointed when he rode his bicycle into down town St. Cloud expecting to be greeted by crowds of well-wishers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "199 N.W.2d 774",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ABOLISHING THE INSANITY DEFENSE, AS KANSAS HAS DONE, ALLOWS PEOPLE WHO LACK MORAL CULPABILITY TO BE IMPRISONED AND EXECUTED",
		"context": "A final example is People v. Horn . In that case, a California appellate court reversed defendant Betty Horn's conviction fo r vehicular manslaughter because the court found th at she was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong at the time of the incident. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Horn had fueled her car at a gas station but lacked the means to pay the attendant, and told the attendant that someone was bringing money to her. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 Cal. App. 3d 1014",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Grievous Injuries Resulting from Forcing Litigants to Endure Ongoing Constitutional Violations from Structurally Unconstitutional Agency Action Before They Are Allowed Access to an Article III Court Are Not Hypothetical",
		"context": "It sought relief from theU.S. District Court in the Northern District of Georgiachallenging, among other things, the FTC'senforcement action as facially unconstitutional andsought an injunction against the FTC proceedings. LabMD, 2014 WL 1908716, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court, however,(erroneously) determined that it lacked jurisdiction torule on the merits of LabMD's constitutional challengesunless and until it had final agency action before it. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "776 F.3d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Grievous Injuries Resulting from Forcing Litigants to Endure Ongoing Constitutional Violations from Structurally Unconstitutional Agency Action Before They Are Allowed Access to an Article III Court Are Not Hypothetical",
		"context": "In a word,no. 9 Instead, the FTC withdrew the Tiversa \"evidence\" upon which its investigation and enforcement actionhad been built, but it refused to dismiss the action. Unable to provide any non-fabricated evidence or non- perjured testimony that the 1718 File had ever beenseen by anyone other than Tiversa or had otherwisespread across the internet, the FTC instead changed its 9 In a separate lawsuit against the specific FTC actors who perpetrated this parade of horribles against LabMD, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], LabMD alleged that the FTC's motivation for its unrelenting pursuit of LabMD wasmotivated by the FTC's desire to retaliate against and silence LabMD's CEO, Mike Daugherty, who published a book, \"The DevilInside the Beltway, the Shocking Expose of the US Government,\" in September 2013 detailing the facts that he had uncovered atthat time about the perversity of the FTC's actions against LabMD. The book was published one month after the FTC filed itscomplaint against LabMD. Unfortunately, this separate lawsuitwas scuttled by the D.C Circuit's (erroneous) ruling that the FTC employees in question enjoyed qualified immunity, allowing themto evade accountability for their actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved",
		"context": "In those courts' views , elementary and secondary schools' \"interests in the educational and social benefits of diversity are similar to those of a law school as articulated in Grutter .\" Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court disagreed. It distinguished Grutter as involving \"considerations unique to institutions of higher education,\" including \"the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 F.3d 1162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved",
		"context": "Grutter contributed to those sensibilities by placing this Court's stamp of approval on racial discrimination in the name of diversity. \"For good or for ill, \" the Court \"teaches the whole people by its example. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The method that many are choosing is to eliminate or undermine gifted -and-talented or honors programs. These programs traditionally provide a challenging education for high -achieving students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved",
		"context": "11 interest would justify the imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary to [this Court's] repeated recognition that '[a] t the heart of the Constitution' s guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the Government must treat citizens as individuals. '\" Id. at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). More, \"antiracist\" adherents , whether in New York , Cambridge , or Chapel Hill, \"rely on the simplistic and often faulty assumption that ' some one particular factor is the key or dominant factor behind differences in outcomes ' and that one should expect ' an even or random distribution of outcomes in the absence of suc h complicating causes as genes or discrimination.'\" 139 S. Ct. 1780.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved",
		"context": "at 730 (plurality opinion) (quoting 515 U.S. 900 ). More, \"antiracist\" adherents , whether in New York , Cambridge , or Chapel Hill, \"rely on the simplistic and often faulty assumption that ' some one particular factor is the key or dominant factor behind differences in outcomes ' and that one should expect ' an even or random distribution of outcomes in the absence of suc h complicating causes as genes or discrimination.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Among other pitfalls, these assumptions tend to collapse the distinction between correlation and causation and shift the analytical focus away from flesh- and-blood human beings to impersonal statistical groups frozen in time. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Grutter encourages evasion of Parents Involved",
		"context": "16 escape judicial notice. E.g., Doe ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. San Francisco's Lowell High School has also tried to eliminate its selective admissions criteria . The school board's resolution , entitled \"In Response to Ongoing, Pervasive Systemic Racism at Lowell High School,\" 27 explained that Lowell \"does not reflect the diversity of SFUSD students and perpetuates segregation and exclusion\" of \"students of color .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "665 F.3d 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Austin's view of facial relief lacks merit",
		"context": "No mat- ter how flawed, most facially invalid statutes will at times blunder into speech or conduct that would not be privi- leged under a differently formulated rule of law. But if in doing so a statute \"operates on a fundamentally mistaken premise,\" the prospect that it may hit upon a stopped- clock right answer \"is little more than fortuitous\" and does not immunize it from facial challenge. Sec'y of State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The federal Stolen Valor Act illustrates the point. Much like Austin's off-premises ordinance, the Stolen Valor Act defined a set of regulated speech without re- gard to its commercial or noncommercial characteristics.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Austin's view of facial relief lacks merit",
		"context": "In Alvarez , however, the Court's plurality did not hold the Act facially valid on the strength of those po- tential applications to misleading commercial speech. Ra- ther, the plurality applied strict scrutiny to the rule of law Congress chose to enact—one blind to any line between commercial and noncommercial speech and by its terms reaching \"false statement[s] made at any time, in any place, to any person.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see567 U.S. 709 (No. 11-210) (\"The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. 704(b) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Austin's view of facial relief lacks merit",
		"context": "In Alvarez , however, the Court's plurality did not hold the Act facially valid on the strength of those po- tential applications to misleading commercial speech. Ra- ther, the plurality applied strict scrutiny to the rule of law Congress chose to enact—one blind to any line between commercial and noncommercial speech and by its terms reaching \"false statement[s] made at any time, in any place, to any person.\" 567 U.S. 709; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 11-210) (\"The question presented is whether 18 U.S.C. 704(b) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "The Court repeatedly has held that \" '[w]hen Con- gress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding ad- ministrative interpretation without pertinent change, the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the inter- pretation is the one intended by Congress.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]434 U.S. 575. In this case, the EEOC, which is the agency pri- marily responsible for admi nistering and enforcing Ti- tle VII, consistently interpreted Title VII as not prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien- tation for at least sixteen years prior to Congress's en- actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See, e.g., 1990 WL 1111074; Viveros v. USPS , 1987 EEOPUB LEXIS 1791, at 2 (1987); EEOC Dec. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "The Court repeatedly has held that \" '[w]hen Con- gress revisits a statute giving rise to a longstanding ad- ministrative interpretation without pertinent change, the congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive evidence that the inter- pretation is the one intended by Congress.' \" 568 U.S. 145[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, the EEOC, which is the agency pri- marily responsible for admi nistering and enforcing Ti- tle VII, consistently interpreted Title VII as not prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orien- tation for at least sixteen years prior to Congress's en- actment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See, e.g., 1990 WL 1111074; Viveros v. USPS , 1987 EEOPUB LEXIS 1791, at 2 (1987); EEOC Dec. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the time Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, every Court of Appe als to consider the issue had concluded that Title VII does not prohibit discrim- ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Williamson 19 The EEOC did not change its position until 2015 in Bald- 2015 WL 4397641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "At the time Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, every Court of Appe als to consider the issue had concluded that Title VII does not prohibit discrim- ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Williamson 19 The EEOC did not change its position until 2015 in Bald- 2015 WL 4397641. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]661 F.2d 1206, the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all former Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to September 30, 1981. Therefore, Blum also represented the law in the Eleventh Circuit. Thus, at the time that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was the law in four circuits that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and a fifth circuit (the Seventh Circuit) had reached the same conclusion, albeit arguably in dicta.",
		"citation_value_orig": "876 F.2d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "At the time Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, every Court of Appe als to consider the issue had concluded that Title VII does not prohibit discrim- ination on the basis of sexual orientation. Williamson 19 The EEOC did not change its position until 2015 in Bald- 2015 WL 4397641. 876 F.2d 69[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all former Fifth Circuit decisions issued prior to September 30, 1981. Therefore, Blum also represented the law in the Eleventh Circuit. Thus, at the time that Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it was the law in four circuits that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and a fifth circuit (the Seventh Circuit) had reached the same conclusion, albeit arguably in dicta.",
		"citation_value_orig": "661 F.2d 1206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs , 135 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (finding ratification based on unani- mous rulings from nine Cou rts of Appeals that Fair Housing Act permitted disparate impact claims); Can- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (finding ratification of conclusion that Title 54 IX permits implied private right of action based on Fifth Circuit decision and several district court deci- sions directly on point, a dozen other federal court de- cisions that \"reached similar conclusions in the same or related contexts,\" and three Supreme Court deci- sions construing \"language si milar to that in Title IX\" in other civil rights statutes); Manhattan Properties, 291 U.S. 320. Bostock argues that Congress did not incorporate these circuit decisions when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because there is no indication that Con-gress was actually aware of these decisions. (Bostock Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. By Enacting The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress Incorporated The Unanimous Decisions Of The EEOC And Several Circuits That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination On The Basis Of Sexual Orientation",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs , 135 S. Ct. at 2519-20 (finding ratification based on unani- mous rulings from nine Cou rts of Appeals that Fair Housing Act permitted disparate impact claims); Can- 441 U.S. 677 (finding ratification of conclusion that Title 54 IX permits implied private right of action based on Fifth Circuit decision and several district court deci- sions directly on point, a dozen other federal court de- cisions that \"reached similar conclusions in the same or related contexts,\" and three Supreme Court deci- sions construing \"language si milar to that in Title IX\" in other civil rights statutes); Manhattan Properties, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bostock argues that Congress did not incorporate these circuit decisions when it enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 because there is no indication that Con-gress was actually aware of these decisions. (Bostock Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. As the Government agrees, this case does not implicate the question presented",
		"context": "And the case presents no serious First Amendment question because, as Petitioners recog- nize, \" neutral legal principles ,\" such as basic incorpo- ration requirements, may be applied to churches without violating the Constitution's Religion Clauses. Reply 3-4; see e.g. , Tony & Susan Alamo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 443 U.S. 595.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. As the Government agrees, this case does not implicate the question presented",
		"context": "And the case presents no serious First Amendment question because, as Petitioners recog- nize, \" neutral legal principles ,\" such as basic incorpo- ration requirements, may be applied to churches without violating the Constitution's Religion Clauses. Reply 3-4; see e.g. , Tony & Susan Alamo 471 U.S. 290; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 595",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS",
		"context": "Only three courts of appeals—the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits—have ever opined on the question presented. See Pet.App. 1–14; Lembach , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mangum , 575 F.3d 935. Of those, only the Third and Ninth Circuits have done so in published opinions. See Pet.App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 F. App'x 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS",
		"context": "Only three courts of appeals—the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits—have ever opined on the question presented. See Pet.App. 1–14; Lembach , 528 F. App'x 297; Mangum , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of those, only the Third and Ninth Circuits have done so in published opinions. See Pet.App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS",
		"context": "Of those, only the Third and Ninth Circuits have done so in published opinions. See Pet.App. 1–14; Mangum , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And only the Third Circuit has engaged with the relevant statutory language. Pet.App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS",
		"context": "528 F. App'x at 299 (\"Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.\"). And the dueling opinions in Mangum suggest that 8 the Ninth Circuit may well reach a different result if it were to consider the issue en banc. The panel majority relied heavily on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Mangum , 575 F.3d at 940–41. Although the majority acknowledged that this Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's application of Norman-Bloodsaw to the Fair Credit Reporting Act in TRW , it believed that TRW had not \"overrule[d]\" Norman-Bloodsaw's \"general approach to the point that [the panel could] now ignore preexisting Ninth Circuit law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 F.3d 1260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SPLIT IS SHALLOW AND TENUOUS",
		"context": "The majority thus considered itself \"required to hold,\" in light of pre- existing circuit precedent, that the discovery rule applies to the FDCPA. Judge O'Scannlain, in a special concurrence, disagreed—though he too relied primarily on circuit precedent. In his view, \"applying the discovery rule in the face of unequivocal statutory language to the contrary\" conflicted with the court's en banc decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mangum , 7 F.3d at 944. \"[T]he majority's contrary conclusion,\" he reasoned, had \"create[d] a stark intracircuit conflict.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": "But there is no reason to believe that federal courts cannot consider such information securely . Congress has expressly provided for in camera ex parte review under FISA , and courts routinely conduct i t. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts use analogous procedures in other sensitive context s, including in criminal cases pursuant to the Classified Information Procedures Act, see 18 U.S.C . App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F.3d 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": "3 § 1 et seq. , see, e.g. , In re 6 Courts have recognized that even in the criminal context, the \"due process exceptions of §§ 1806(g) and 1825(h) limit permiss ible discovery to that which is constitutionally mandated, such as the obligations articulated in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" 228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017 ); see 531 F. Supp. 2d 832 ; and civil habeas proceedings concerning alleged enemy combatants, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": ", In re 6 Courts have recognized that even in the criminal context, the \"due process exceptions of §§ 1806(g) and 1825(h) limit permiss ible discovery to that which is constitutionally mandated, such as the obligations articulated in 373 U.S. 83.\" 228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017 ); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; and civil habeas proceedings concerning alleged enemy combatants, see, e.g. , 532 F.3d 834 . Even before FISA's passage, courts used FISA -like procedures to adjudicate civil litigation involving secret military records, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 F. Supp. 2d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": "228 F. Supp. 3d 363 (M.D. Pa. 2017 ); see 531 F. Supp. 2d 832 ; and civil habeas proceedings concerning alleged enemy combatants, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Even before FISA's passage, courts used FISA -like procedures to adjudicate civil litigation involving secret military records, see, e.g. , 258 F.2d 36 , and sensitive information about electronic surveillance, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 F.3d 834",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": ", 532 F.3d 834 . Even before FISA's passage, courts used FISA -like procedures to adjudicate civil litigation involving secret military records, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and sensitive information about electronic surveillance, see, e.g. , 691 F.2d 272 . The Government's unfounded concerns about in camera review of secret information ignore both Congress's judgment and the federal courts' collective experience.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 F.2d 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": "Even before FISA's passage, courts used FISA -like procedures to adjudicate civil litigation involving secret military records, see, e.g. , 258 F.2d 36 , and sensitive information about electronic surveillance, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Government's unfounded concerns about in camera review of secret information ignore both Congress's judgment and the federal courts' collective experience. The risk of providing the court s below with sensitive information utilizing FISA's ex parte in camera review procedures must also be assessed in light of the information the Government has already submitted to several courts in thi s case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "691 F.2d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE DECISION BELOW IS CORRECT",
		"context": "Moreover, Reynolds itself requires exacting judicial review of the privilege assertion, including of potentially secret information, to satisfy the \"skeptical\" and \"critical\" review the privilege requires. Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 10. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There is little if any additional risk from utilizing FISA's in camera ex parte procedures , given the submissions that have already occurred in this case about a 15-year-old surveillance operation. Finally, whatever rule this Court may eventually establish in other FISA cases, there is absolutely no risk of disclosure against the Government's wishes in this case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F.3d 1190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision",
		"context": "Unlike this case, the cases cited by Petitioner all involved circumstances where the Executive made a voluntary choice to use party affiliation as a criterion in selecting temporary judges, in most cases to fill the remainder of a vacated elected judge's term until the next election, when the voters get to choose. 3 As Delaware is the only State requiring that only Republicans or Democrats be appointed as judges, a decision in this action will not affect anyone out- side the State of Delaware . The issue will not recur 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ku- 848 F.2d 767; 807 F.Supp. 385; 2007 WL 4441226; 2007 WL 1140400; 2006 WL 1049598472 F.3d 504; 510 F.Supp. 816794 F.2d 676. 5 frequently across the coun try or consume substantial judicial resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "986 F.2d 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision",
		"context": "Unlike this case, the cases cited by Petitioner all involved circumstances where the Executive made a voluntary choice to use party affiliation as a criterion in selecting temporary judges, in most cases to fill the remainder of a vacated elected judge's term until the next election, when the voters get to choose. 3 As Delaware is the only State requiring that only Republicans or Democrats be appointed as judges, a decision in this action will not affect anyone out- side the State of Delaware . The issue will not recur 3 986 F.2d 159; Ku- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 807 F.Supp. 385; 2007 WL 4441226; 2007 WL 1140400; 2006 WL 1049598472 F.3d 504; 510 F.Supp. 816794 F.2d 676. 5 frequently across the coun try or consume substantial judicial resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.2d 767",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision",
		"context": "Unlike this case, the cases cited by Petitioner all involved circumstances where the Executive made a voluntary choice to use party affiliation as a criterion in selecting temporary judges, in most cases to fill the remainder of a vacated elected judge's term until the next election, when the voters get to choose. 3 As Delaware is the only State requiring that only Republicans or Democrats be appointed as judges, a decision in this action will not affect anyone out- side the State of Delaware . The issue will not recur 3 986 F.2d 159; Ku- 848 F.2d 767; 807 F.Supp. 385; 2007 WL 4441226; 2007 WL 1140400; 2006 WL 1049598[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 510 F.Supp. 816794 F.2d 676. 5 frequently across the coun try or consume substantial judicial resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 F.3d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision",
		"context": "Unlike this case, the cases cited by Petitioner all involved circumstances where the Executive made a voluntary choice to use party affiliation as a criterion in selecting temporary judges, in most cases to fill the remainder of a vacated elected judge's term until the next election, when the voters get to choose. 3 As Delaware is the only State requiring that only Republicans or Democrats be appointed as judges, a decision in this action will not affect anyone out- side the State of Delaware . The issue will not recur 3 986 F.2d 159; Ku- 848 F.2d 767; 807 F.Supp. 385; 2007 WL 4441226; 2007 WL 1140400; 2006 WL 1049598472 F.3d 504; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]794 F.2d 676. 5 frequently across the coun try or consume substantial judicial resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 F.Supp. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"Major Political Party\" Provision",
		"context": "Unlike this case, the cases cited by Petitioner all involved circumstances where the Executive made a voluntary choice to use party affiliation as a criterion in selecting temporary judges, in most cases to fill the remainder of a vacated elected judge's term until the next election, when the voters get to choose. 3 As Delaware is the only State requiring that only Republicans or Democrats be appointed as judges, a decision in this action will not affect anyone out- side the State of Delaware . The issue will not recur 3 986 F.2d 159; Ku- 848 F.2d 767; 807 F.Supp. 385; 2007 WL 4441226; 2007 WL 1140400; 2006 WL 1049598472 F.3d 504; 510 F.Supp. 816[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 frequently across the coun try or consume substantial judicial resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "794 F.2d 676",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit",
		"context": "§ 501(a) (emphasis added). This Court has instructed that when the legislature is clear as to its intention, courts are bound to honor that intention. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both parties and the Fourth Circuit agree to the meaning of Section 511, and there is no question as to its intent. The plain, unabiguous words in Section 511(a) have only one meaning: the abrogation of state sovereign immunity for copyright infringement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 Wheat. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit",
		"context": "And, \"any state\" means just that; the definition provided by Congress in Section 501(a) gives states no way to escape the coverage of the Copyright Act. Looking at \"the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,\" Congress plainly intended to hold states and state actors responsible for copyright infringement. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 12 U.S. 152 and the design of the Copyright Act do not give rise to any other possible interpretation. The inquiry must end there. The inquiry into applicability of a statute end s \"[if the statute ] clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] and plainly expresses the legislative intent\" and \" the court will enforce the plain meaning without resort to interpretation\" 395 F. Supp. 2d 395 ; see also Connecticut Nat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit",
		"context": "And, \"any state\" means just that; the definition provided by Congress in Section 501(a) gives states no way to escape the coverage of the Copyright Act. Looking at \"the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole,\" Congress plainly intended to hold states and state actors responsible for copyright infringement. 500 U.S. 136; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and the design of the Copyright Act do not give rise to any other possible interpretation. The inquiry must end there. The inquiry into applicability of a statute end s \"[if the statute ] clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] and plainly expresses the legislative intent\" and \" the court will enforce the plain meaning without resort to interpretation\" 395 F. Supp. 2d 395 ; see also Connecticut Nat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit",
		"context": "500 U.S. 136; see also 12 U.S. 152 and the design of the Copyright Act do not give rise to any other possible interpretation. The inquiry must end there. The inquiry into applicability of a statute end s \"[if the statute ] clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] and plainly expresses the legislative intent\" and \" the court will enforce the plain meaning without resort to interpretation\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Connecticut Nat. 503 U.S. 24 (\"We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: the 'judicial inquiry is complete.'\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 F. Supp. 2d 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 511 of the Copyright Act is a clear and unambiguous abrogation of state sovereign immunity and this Court should honor Congressional intent and reverse the Fourth Circuit",
		"context": "The inquiry must end there. The inquiry into applicability of a statute end s \"[if the statute ] clear[ly] and unambiguous[ly] and plainly expresses the legislative intent\" and \" the court will enforce the plain meaning without resort to interpretation\" 395 F. Supp. 2d 395 ; see also Connecticut Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: the 'judicial inquiry is complete.'\"). Because Section 511(a) is unambiguous, this Court should reverse the Fourth Circuit, and hold Section 511 is an unambiguous statute applicable to and enforceab le against states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner identifies no meaningful standard for reviewing the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1",
		"context": "In contending that 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) does not bar review, petitioner principally relies (Br. 21, 46 -47, 50) on this Court's general presumption in favor of judicial re- view , see Mach Mining , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and on the APA 's allowance of review for \"abuse of discretion,\" 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A). But this Court has made clear that the presumption favoring review may be rebutted, including where there exists \"no mean- 49 ingful standard against which to judge the agency's ex- ercise of discretion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner identifies no meaningful standard for reviewing the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1",
		"context": "The question presented was whether the 12 Markle asserts (Br. 40 -44) that this Court should abandon the \"Heckler 'no law to apply' test,\" citing Justice Scalia's dissent in Web- ster. But what Justice Scalia urged —and what this Court subse- quently endorsed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —is that the \"law to apply\" test is not the exclusive basis for determining that agency action is committed to agency discretion. See Webster , 486 U.S. at 607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (\"Our precedents amply show that 'commit[ ment] to agency discretion by law' includes, but is not limited to, situations in which there is 'no law to apply.' \") (brackets in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner identifies no meaningful standard for reviewing the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1",
		"context": "Cf. Central Va. Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, Bennett 's dictum is not necessarily in- consistent with the Service's understanding. Review for \"abuse of discretion\" is available in some cases , including where the Service affirmatively exercises its power un- der Section 4(b)(2) to exclude an area from critical habitat .",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner identifies no meaningful standard for reviewing the Service's decision not to exclude Unit 1",
		"context": "35a. The seco nd sentence of Section 4(b)(2) does not permit a court to compel an exclusion base d simply on disagreements about the threshold weighing of costs and benefits. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is committed to agency discretion, its application of the first sentence is not. As Bennett held , claims that the Service failed to consider the \"economic 53 impact\" or \"other relevant impact[s]\" of its designation , as required by the first sentence, 16 U.S.C. 1533(b)(2), are reviewable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable",
		"context": "10a , and conducted a de novo factual and legal review of the record. So while the Sixth Circuit may have evaluated the same factors the state court did, it did not ask \"the only question that matters under [AEDPA] —whether a state court decision is contrary to, or involved an un-reasonable application of, clearly established federal 18 law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Had it asked that question, the answer would have been clear: whether right or wrong, the Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was reasonable. Most of the Michigan Court of Appeals' analysis focused on the jurors' post -trial testimony.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable",
		"context": "at 36 – 38. Thus, the court's use of juror testimony could not be contrary to Flynn . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Davenport's conclusory responses, Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable",
		"context": "at 45. But noth- ing in AEDPA requires a certain level of detail within a state court's analysis , so long as its decision is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of this Court's precedents . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , did th e Court indicate that the evidence of guilt at trial cannot be considered when determining the harmlessness of a shackling error. Davenport even ap- pears to concede that overwhelming evidence can ren-der a shackling error harmless. See Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Michigan Court of Appeals' decision was not objectively unreasonable",
		"context": "6 J.A. 172– 6 In Michigan, \"the defendant's actions before and after the crime\" \"may be considered to establish premeditation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 73, 290– 97, 303– 05, 525– 27, 590– 94. These facts all supported the prosecution's theory that Davenport committed premeditated murder when he strangled White for at least four minutes and continued to do so after sh e lost consciousness.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 N.W.2d 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Statutory damages, not cy pres settlements, provide incentives to bring low-value claims",
		"context": "103, 114 (2009). Although class members under statutes such as the SCA, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) often sustain minimal actual injuries, statutory damages multiplied by classes numbering in the millions can produce astronomical potential liability. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 623 F.3d 708434 F.3d 948. Cy pres settlements provide a necessary means to compromise risks of this magnitude when other factors—such as little actual injury, weak merits, unsettled law, legal hurdles to class certification— 41 combine to give the claims a low overall value per class member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Statutory damages, not cy pres settlements, provide incentives to bring low-value claims",
		"context": "103, 114 (2009). Although class members under statutes such as the SCA, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) often sustain minimal actual injuries, statutory damages multiplied by classes numbering in the millions can produce astronomical potential liability. See,536 U.S. 915; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]434 F.3d 948. Cy pres settlements provide a necessary means to compromise risks of this magnitude when other factors—such as little actual injury, weak merits, unsettled law, legal hurdles to class certification— 41 combine to give the claims a low overall value per class member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "623 F.3d 708",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Statutory damages, not cy pres settlements, provide incentives to bring low-value claims",
		"context": "103, 114 (2009). Although class members under statutes such as the SCA, the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) often sustain minimal actual injuries, statutory damages multiplied by classes numbering in the millions can produce astronomical potential liability. See,536 U.S. 915; 623 F.3d 708[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cy pres settlements provide a necessary means to compromise risks of this magnitude when other factors—such as little actual injury, weak merits, unsettled law, legal hurdles to class certification— 41 combine to give the claims a low overall value per class member.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 F.3d 948",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Constitutional avoidance",
		"context": "It is well established that, when deciding which of two \"plausible statutory construction s to adopt,\" the Court should choose the one that \"avoid[s] serious constitutional questions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly , when faced with potentially broad and indeterminate federal criminal statutes, this Court has repeatedly adopted narrower interpretations to avoid constitutional vagueness concerns . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Constitutional avoidance",
		"context": "Accordingly , when faced with potentially broad and indeterminate federal criminal statutes, this Court has repeatedly adopted narrower interpretations to avoid constitutional vagueness concerns . See, e.g. , 579 U.S. 550; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The void -for-vagueness doctrine enforces \"two due process essentials.\" Skilling , 561 U.S. at 403.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Constitutional avoidance",
		"context": "See supra at 34. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit's rule would give prosecutors the ability to bring aggravated identity theft charges \"every \" time a defendant commit s predicate offenses such as mail or wire fraud, bank fraud, or healthcare fraud. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Pet. App. 49a (Costa, J. , dissenting) (majority's rule covers \"every single act of provider -payment health care fraud involving a real patient\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Constitutional avoidance",
		"context": "But relying on prosecutorial discretion to curb the reach of Section 1028A is not enough. As this Court has explained time and again, the federal courts \"cannot construe a criminal statute on the assumption that the Government will 'use it responsibly.'\" McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576 (citation omitted) ; see also Van 141 S. Ct. 1648; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] also presents fair notice concerns . Although vagueness often derives from a particular word or phrase, it can also arise from the way different components of a statute relate to each other and are presented to the public . For example, in 40 576 U.S. 591, this Court held that the Armed Career Criminal Act's \"residual clause \"—which covered \"conduct that presents a serious potential risk \" of \"physical injury to another\" —was void for vagueness .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "Two additional reasons render unconvincing Kennedy's claim that a disclaimer would negate any Establishment Clause, operational, or governmental interest concerns present in the second prong of the Pickering analysis. First, the cases cited and relied on related to disclaimers are factually and substantively distinct. This is not a case related to student speech, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Lamb's 508 U.S. 384, or access to an open forum on public school property that is open to other expressive 19 activity, Good News 533 U.S. 98, 454 U.S. 263, or access to other government property that has been opened to the public for speech. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 515 U.S. 753. As Kennedy concedes, this \"long line of this Court's cases\" relates to \"times and places where [the government entity] would permit the speaker to engage in other forms of activity or expression,\" not the case here, and they do not involve speech by teachers and coaches in the presence of students, their younger siblings, and others from the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "Two additional reasons render unconvincing Kennedy's claim that a disclaimer would negate any Establishment Clause, operational, or governmental interest concerns present in the second prong of the Pickering analysis. First, the cases cited and relied on related to disclaimers are factually and substantively distinct. This is not a case related to student speech, 515 U.S. 819, Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or access to an open forum on public school property that is open to other expressive 19 activity, Good News 533 U.S. 98, 454 U.S. 263, or access to other government property that has been opened to the public for speech. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 515 U.S. 753. As Kennedy concedes, this \"long line of this Court's cases\" relates to \"times and places where [the government entity] would permit the speaker to engage in other forms of activity or expression,\" not the case here, and they do not involve speech by teachers and coaches in the presence of students, their younger siblings, and others from the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "Two additional reasons render unconvincing Kennedy's claim that a disclaimer would negate any Establishment Clause, operational, or governmental interest concerns present in the second prong of the Pickering analysis. First, the cases cited and relied on related to disclaimers are factually and substantively distinct. This is not a case related to student speech, 515 U.S. 819, Lamb's 508 U.S. 384, or access to an open forum on public school property that is open to other expressive 19 activity, Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 454 U.S. 263, or access to other government property that has been opened to the public for speech. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 515 U.S. 753. As Kennedy concedes, this \"long line of this Court's cases\" relates to \"times and places where [the government entity] would permit the speaker to engage in other forms of activity or expression,\" not the case here, and they do not involve speech by teachers and coaches in the presence of students, their younger siblings, and others from the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "Two additional reasons render unconvincing Kennedy's claim that a disclaimer would negate any Establishment Clause, operational, or governmental interest concerns present in the second prong of the Pickering analysis. First, the cases cited and relied on related to disclaimers are factually and substantively distinct. This is not a case related to student speech, 515 U.S. 819, Lamb's 508 U.S. 384, or access to an open forum on public school property that is open to other expressive 19 activity, Good News 533 U.S. 98, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or access to other government property that has been opened to the public for speech. Capitol Square Review and Advisory 515 U.S. 753. As Kennedy concedes, this \"long line of this Court's cases\" relates to \"times and places where [the government entity] would permit the speaker to engage in other forms of activity or expression,\" not the case here, and they do not involve speech by teachers and coaches in the presence of students, their younger siblings, and others from the community.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "First, the cases cited and relied on related to disclaimers are factually and substantively distinct. This is not a case related to student speech, 515 U.S. 819, Lamb's 508 U.S. 384, or access to an open forum on public school property that is open to other expressive 19 activity, Good News 533 U.S. 98, 454 U.S. 263, or access to other government property that has been opened to the public for speech. Capitol Square Review and Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Kennedy concedes, this \"long line of this Court's cases\" relates to \"times and places where [the government entity] would permit the speaker to engage in other forms of activity or expression,\" not the case here, and they do not involve speech by teachers and coaches in the presence of students, their younger siblings, and others from the community. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Rule That a Disclaimer by a Public School District Cures any Establishment Clause Concerns Would be Unworkable and Ineffective",
		"context": "Some students in this case felt pressured in relation to their role and status on the team, and undoubtedly students in other circumstances feel pressure to conform to a coach's view of what the coach believes will \"help[] these kids be better people.\" Context matters, and when a teacher or coach speaks or acts on campus or at a school-sponsored activity it carries more weight and impact than when a superintendent or principal issues a disclaimer. This Court has held that a school must retain the authority to refuse \"to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political controversy,\" even in instances of student expression, Hazelwood School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the record in this case does not support the proposition that a disclaimer would have ended the controversy or even altered the very real circumstances the District faced above and beyond the Establishment Clause issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. \"Ancillary\" Relief Does Not Support the FTC's Asserted Power to Obtain Millions of Dollars by Injunction",
		"context": "The parties have briefed why the agency cannot clai m all the powers of a fed- eral court under 13(b), but it is also clear that a claim for past damages is not in any way ancillary to the injunction. The injunction provided in Section 13(b) is wholly forward looking. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not permit the FTC to bring a claim based on long past conduct without some evidence 16 that the defendant 'is' commi tting or 'is about to' com- mit another violation.\") (citation omitted). As the Third Circuit explained, Section 13(b) is wholly un- ambiguous and wholly forward looking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort law does not provide remedies for injured servicemembers",
		"context": "§§ 1110, 1131. However, the amounts disabled servicemembers receive as disability compensation are generally substantially less than the servicemembers would receive in successfully prosecuting tort 12 the federal government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen that arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has explained, these claims are barred because \"they [are] the type of claims if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.\" 473 U.S. 52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort law does not provide remedies for injured servicemembers",
		"context": "340 U.S. 135. As this Court has explained, these claims are barred because \"they [are] the type of claims if generally permitted, would involve the judiciary in sensitive military affairs at the expense of military discipline and effectiveness.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor are there viable claims against other parties who might be responsible for servicemembers' injuries. Take burn pits as an example.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Tort law does not provide remedies for injured servicemembers",
		"context": "See In re893 F.3d 241. Most other suits brought by veterans for compensation have also failed under the political question doctrine or under related doctrines. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. claims. See 38 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.2d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)",
		"context": "31 But even in the choice -of-law context, Petitioners' argument fails. Petitioners do not offer any choice -of- law authority t hat supports the residency rule advo- cated by Petitioners : i.e., that a plaintiff's residence is dispositive of the court's analysis. For example, Peti- tioners cite to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that many states' conflict - of-law rules as of 1962 called for application of \"the law of the place of injury to the substantive rights of the parties.\" (Joint Br. at 31.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. State choice-of-law principles do not evidence Congress' intent regarding who may sue under Section 1964(c)",
		"context": "Petitioners also cite a partial quote in a footnote from a dissenting opinion for the proposition that the situs of the injury still holds sway in choice -of-law de- terminations. (Joint Br. at 31 –32 (quoting J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] But the full quote confirms that the place of injury is not the sole consideration in choice -of-law d eterminations. See McIntyre , 564 U.S. at 904 n.11 ( \"Even as many jurisdictions have modi- fied the traditional rule of lex loci delicti, the location of the injury continues to hold sway in choice -of-law analysis in tort cases.\"). 8 That case, too, thus conf irms that location of the conduct is key to the analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if the Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Are Considered, They Do Not Justify Upholding the Duke Memorandum",
		"context": "See supra Section I.B. Like other discretionary judgments, Secretary Nielsen's \"policy\" ra tionales can at least be re- viewed to determine whether DHS \"exercise[d] its discretion in a reasoned manner.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Each of the new argum ents adduced by Secretary Nielsen is arbitrary and capricious.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if the Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Are Considered, They Do Not Justify Upholding the Duke Memorandum",
		"context": "She thus gave no hi nt that she considered the equitable considerations identified in the DACA Memo- randum, the number of people who had obtained deferred action under DACA, the life-changing signifi- cance of those deferrals, or the derivative impacts of rescission on families, school s, churches, communities, and employers. The administrative record does not even include any information on these subjects. If Secretary Nielsen's discu ssion of costs and reliance suffices here, this Court's instruction that \"'[i]t would be arbitrary and capricious to ignore such matters,'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], will be reduced to a box-check-ing exercise. When a court's remedial order offers only \"minimal reasoning\" and purports to have evaluated only \"unspecified costs,\" this Court lacks \"confidence that [it] adequately grappled with the interests on both sides\" and is unable to perform \"even deferential re-view.\" North 137 S. Ct. 1624.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if the Nielsen Memorandum's Non-Legal Rationales Are Considered, They Do Not Justify Upholding the Duke Memorandum",
		"context": "If Secretary Nielsen's discu ssion of costs and reliance suffices here, this Court's instruction that \"'[i]t would be arbitrary and capricious to ignore such matters,'\" 135 S. Ct. 1199, will be reduced to a box-check-ing exercise. When a court's remedial order offers only \"minimal reasoning\" and purports to have evaluated only \"unspecified costs,\" this Court lacks \"confidence that [it] adequately grappled with the interests on both sides\" and is unable to perform \"even deferential re-view.\" North [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An agency charged with deci- sions of the magnitude at issue here should be held to no less a standard. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Colorado fails to refute numerous alternatives to compelling speech.",
		"context": "Strict scrutiny requires the State to provide more than \"mere say-so.\" 574 U.S. 352; accord Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 The contrast in the parties' positions is stark. Smith's theory follows this Court's precedents and has reasonable limiting principles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' suit against the attorney general and other state-agency officials is also proper under Young",
		"context": "Texas has delegated to private parties the traditional power of the government to ensure compliance with its laws for the transparent purpose of evading federal review. As this Court has recognized, however, \"the choice of how to prioritize and how aggress ively to pursue legal actions against 17 defendants who violate the law\" generally falls within the discretion of the executive branch, not \"within the purview of private plaintiffs (and their attorneys),\" who \"are not accountable to the people.\" TransUnion [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. S.B. 8, on the other hand, delegates to so -called \"private attorneys general\" authority that originates from and is necessarily retained by Texas executive officials, including the actual attorney general.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S. Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When no alternative method is feasible and available, the State is not inflicting \"pain for the sake of pain.\"",
		"context": "Baze , 553 U.S. at 48. It is well settled that t his Court's \"cases mandate inquiry into a prison official' s state of mind .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind .\" Farmer , 511 U.S. at 834.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When no alternative method is feasible and available, the State is not inflicting \"pain for the sake of pain.\"",
		"context": "at 47. To determine what pain is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, Baze recounted that, in Wilkerson , the Court \"cited cases from England in which 'te rror, pain, disgrace were sometimes superadded to the sentence, such as where the condemned was 'emboweled alive, beheaded, and quartered,' or instances of 'public dissection in murder, and burning alive.'\" Baze , 553 U.S. at 48 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Baze also quoted Kimmler 's statements that \"[p]unishments are cr uel when they involve torture or a lingering death,\" and that the word \"cruel\" in the Eighth Amendment \"implies there something inhuman and barbarous .\" Baze , 553 U.S. at 49 (quoting In re136 U.S. 436) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When no alternative method is feasible and available, the State is not inflicting \"pain for the sake of pain.\"",
		"context": "Baze , 553 U.S. at 48 (quoting 99 U.S. 130) . Baze also quoted Kimmler 's statements that \"[p]unishments are cr uel when they involve torture or a lingering death,\" and that the word \"cruel\" in the Eighth Amendment \"implies there something inhuman and barbarous .\" Baze , 553 U.S. at 49 (quoting In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Baze concluded that \"[w]hat each of the forbidden punishments had in common was the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain .\" Baze , 553 U.S. at 48 ; see also Glossip , 135 S. Ct. at 2732 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 U.S. 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Helsinn's position would allow patentees to commercialize their inventions for years, and perhaps indefinitely, before seeking patent protection",
		"context": "Metallizing , 153 F.2d at 519 -20. The Federal Circuit has consistently followed Met- allizing , applying the on -sale bar to sales derived from patented method s whether or not those sales disclose the method , because the sales commercialize the patented process in the same way that sales of a patented machine would . E.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .9 Helsinn's interpret a- tion would reverse th is longstanding prec edent— legitimizing delayed patents on both methods of manufacturing physical items and methods for providing technical services, like cloud co mputing, that can be sold wit hout disclosing how the service works. Inventor s could protect s uch method s as trade secret s for years, perhaps decades, making mi l- lions, before ultimately claiming patent monop olies. c. Helsinn's interpretation would also effectively overturn the longstanding rule that \"commercial o f- fers for sale\" trigger the on -sale bar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "286 F.3d 1326",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Helsinn's position would allow patentees to commercialize their inventions for years, and perhaps indefinitely, before seeking patent protection",
		"context": "Co., 827 F.3d at 1376 -77. An offer itself will virtually never make an invention \"avail a- 9 Accord , e.g. , Plumtree Software, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Scaltech , 269 F.3d at 1328; D.L. Auld 714 F.2d 1144. 49 ble to the public.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 F.3d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Helsinn's position would allow patentees to commercialize their inventions for years, and perhaps indefinitely, before seeking patent protection",
		"context": "An offer itself will virtually never make an invention \"avail a- 9 Accord , e.g. , Plumtree Software, 473 F.3d 1152; Scaltech , 269 F.3d at 1328; D.L. Auld [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 ble to the public.\" Often , an offer would not even di s- close every element to the potential buyer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F.2d 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The question presented warrants review in this case",
		"context": "12133 (ADA ); 42 U.S.C. 18116(a) (ACA ), the private enforce- ment mechanism s play an important role in ensuring that rec ipients of federal financial assistance do not in- tentionally engage in discriminatory conduct —and that they fully compensate their victims when they breach this duty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that \"[t] he award of individual relief to a private litigant\" in some cases is \"necessary to the orderly en forcement of \" Title IX , and noting that \"private suits had become an important and especially flexible part of [the enforce- ment] procedures\" under Title VI). For this reason, too, the court of appeals' flawed decision merits this Court's review. 23",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "U.S. Const. art. I, § 2; U. S. Term Limits , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, states exceed their Article I, § 4 authority to regulate elections if they 8 \"dictate electoral outcomes\" or \"favor or disfavor a class of candidates.\" 531 U.S. 510.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U. S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "I, § 2; U. S. Term Limits , 514 U. S. 779. Accordingly, states exceed their Article I, § 4 authority to regulate elections if they 8 \"dictate electoral outcomes\" or \"favor or disfavor a class of candidates.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellants abridged this mandate by designing districts so as to pres elect the party of each Representative. Second, Article I, § 2 for bids placing disfavored voters into districts so as to minimize the weight of their votes relative to those of favored voters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Appellants abridged this mandate by designing districts so as to pres elect the party of each Representative. Second, Article I, § 2 for bids placing disfavored voters into districts so as to minimize the weight of their votes relative to those of favored voters. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellants abridged this second mandate by cracking and packing po pulations of disfavored voters in pursuit of abrid ging the first mandate. Third, Article I, §§ 2 and 4 imply a duty to design districts consistent with their constitutional purpose—to facilitate effective representation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Third, Article I, §§ 2 and 4 imply a duty to design districts consistent with their constitutional purpose—to facilitate effective representation. Cf. Gralike , 531 U.S. at 524 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellants subordinated this duty to pursue abridging the firs t two Article I mandates. 9 A A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Thus, a state may not assume any degree of the voters' choice here as a spoil of war—to the victorious party of state elections to the General Assembly. The Framers were clear in their concern that the legislatures not intrude upon their voters' right to choose Representatives. See Ariz. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. U.S. Term Limits held that the right to choose in Article I, § 2 was abridg ed by state-imposed term 10 limits on Representatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Rather, Article I, § 4 mandates a duty to enact \"procedure and safeguards necessary to 11 enforce the fundamental right involved.\" Id. at 524 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Thus, a state's authority under Article I, § 4 is limited to that needed to facilitate their citizens' representational rights under Article I, § 2. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Term Limits compels holding that the General Assembly exceeded its Articl e I, § 4 authority. 13 These Article I, §§ 2 and 4 violations cannot have become constitutional by the fact that some degree of gerrymandering may be a longstanding practice. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While this Court can and should readily decide this case based on Gralike and U.S. Term Limits , this case is distinguished by a scope of impacts beyond just North Carolina.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Nothing in Article I or this Court's precedents remotely affords the states such a role—or authorizes them to intrude upon the Article I rights of voters on such a grand scale. Judicial intervention is most imperative when \"a controversy affect[s] the structure of the national government as established by the prov isions of the national Constitution,\" as this case does. Highland Farms [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The cases cited in Highland Farms as such controversies of national significance addressed the separation of powers between the federal political branches. Ramifications to the structure of Congress—posed by this legislature's taking a role in determining the party in control of the House of Representatives— similarly demand this Court's intervention here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "300 U.S. 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Bethune- projected future votes. Thus, within a congressional district, the harm attributable to a First Amendment violation includes this Article I, § 2 abridgment—and conversely, Appellees here incur First Amendment injuries as an element of the overall harm to their representational rights. 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While districts ma y not superficially appear cracked at first glance— compare JA-328 (N.C. districts), with JA-945, Lamone v. Benisek , No. 18- 726 (Md.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "districts)—courts, as here, are capable of finding and analyzing the facts needed to perform this test. See e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reviewing a complex racial gerrymandering case); N.C. State Conf. of 831 F.3d 204. Mere lack of proportionality based on a vote for statewide office, even adjusted to account for densely populated areas greatly fa voring one party, would not be sufficient.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "See e.g. , 137 S. Ct. 1455 (reviewing a complex racial gerrymandering case); N.C. State Conf. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mere lack of proportionality based on a vote for statewide office, even adjusted to account for densely populated areas greatly fa voring one party, would not be sufficient. It coul d be one piece of potentially- relevant evidence, but would have to accompany sufficient direct or circum stantial evidence to prove the intentional arrangement of precincts to accomplish the legislature's purpose—to predetermine the likely el ection outcome.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Article 1, § 2 is abridged when the enacted \"manner\" of election poses any unjustified intrusion upon the selection. Cf. Forsyth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A standard permitting no concerted abridgment is also consistent with this Court's precedents holding that Article I, § 2 precludes any unjustified dilution of congressional districts in the one-person one-vote context, whereas this Court enforces one- person one-vote within state legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause, where a ten percent variance is presumed compliant. This affords states some discretion to pursue legitimate non-discriminatory goals in state districts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "A standard permitting no concerted abridgment is also consistent with this Court's precedents holding that Article I, § 2 precludes any unjustified dilution of congressional districts in the one-person one-vote context, whereas this Court enforces one- person one-vote within state legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause, where a ten percent variance is presumed compliant. This affords states some discretion to pursue legitimate non-discriminatory goals in state districts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Karcher , 462 U.S. at 730–33 (contrasting the Court's precedents); Tennant , 567 U. S. at 764–65 (permitting a 0.79 percent variance to avoid splitting a county—a tradeoff supporting representation); 412 U.S. 783; 377 U.S. 695. Setting an actionable abridgment standard may encourage states to test that line. See Harris , 136 S. Ct. at 1306–07 (noting the ten percent variance standard for enforcing one-person one-vote in state districts, and that a 9.9 percent variance presented was presumed compliant).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "A standard permitting no concerted abridgment is also consistent with this Court's precedents holding that Article I, § 2 precludes any unjustified dilution of congressional districts in the one-person one-vote context, whereas this Court enforces one- person one-vote within state legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause, where a ten percent variance is presumed compliant. This affords states some discretion to pursue legitimate non-discriminatory goals in state districts. See 136 S. Ct. 1301; Karcher , 462 U.S. at 730–33 (contrasting the Court's precedents); Tennant , 567 U. S. at 764–65 (permitting a 0.79 percent variance to avoid splitting a county—a tradeoff supporting representation); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 377 U.S. 695. Setting an actionable abridgment standard may encourage states to test that line. See Harris , 136 S. Ct. at 1306–07 (noting the ten percent variance standard for enforcing one-person one-vote in state districts, and that a 9.9 percent variance presented was presumed compliant).",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "A standard permitting no concerted abridgment is also consistent with this Court's precedents holding that Article I, § 2 precludes any unjustified dilution of congressional districts in the one-person one-vote context, whereas this Court enforces one- person one-vote within state legislative districts under the Equal Protection Clause, where a ten percent variance is presumed compliant. This affords states some discretion to pursue legitimate non-discriminatory goals in state districts. See 136 S. Ct. 1301; Karcher , 462 U.S. at 730–33 (contrasting the Court's precedents); Tennant , 567 U. S. at 764–65 (permitting a 0.79 percent variance to avoid splitting a county—a tradeoff supporting representation); 412 U.S. 783; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Setting an actionable abridgment standard may encourage states to test that line. See Harris , 136 S. Ct. at 1306–07 (noting the ten percent variance standard for enforcing one-person one-vote in state districts, and that a 9.9 percent variance presented was presumed compliant).",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Voters' representational rights should win in a tie. Particularly where there is only marginal evidence of a district being designed to engineer election outcomes, the design features chosen, and their application, are properly within a legislature's \"wide range of judgment calls.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But a lesser presumption of wise discretion is in order where the evidence suggests otherwise. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Cf. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A legislature has a duty to regulate congressional elections so as to facilitate their 21 citizens' representational rights. Smiley , 285 U.S. at 366.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Smiley , 285 U.S. at 366. It follows that representational rights include a right to effective representation, and that states have a duty to design districts to enable and not inhibit that function. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a state designs a district that subordinates its citizens' effective representation to favor the election of the legislature's preferred candidate, that design is particularly averse to Article 1, §§ 2 and 4—as it subordinates a duty mandat ed by these provisions to pursue a purpose these same provisions forbid. The functions of a Repres entative are found in Article I, in the term's definitions, and in historic and current understandings of representation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Research Serv., RL33686, Roles and Duties of a Member of Congress: Brief Overview (Nov. 9, 2012). This Court described the role of a Representative from a presumably non-cracked district as being to give a \"minority of the people in a state [a] voice in the national councils.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States have adopted a range of features in designing districts to support effective representation as just described. See Royce Crocker, Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. North Carolina's Congressional Districts Violate Article I, section 2 & 4",
		"context": "Research Serv., R42831, Congressional Redistricting: An Overview (Nov. 21, 2012) (providing data on state adoption of specific districting features) Many of these adopted features incorporate commonalities, such as geography, that intuitively serve to combine residents likely to share local concerns, economic interests, and political opinions in a manner that supports their joint representation by a single Representative, performing the duties noted above on their behalf. See Crocker, supra , at 9–14; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court should be mind ful of these duties and qualities of Representatives in reviewing the features adopted to determine whether their predominant focus was to facilitate citizens' effective representation or to intrude upon their choosing their Representative. Inexplicably sharp divergences in both geography and partisan preference within a single district may be highly suspect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions",
		"context": "§552(b)(7). As this Court has recog- nized, this structure requires that each exemption be given a \"narrow compass,\" to avoid judicially \"reau-thoriz[ing] the expansive withholding\" that the statu- tory terms are meant to \"halt.\" Milner , 562 U.S. at 571- 72 (citation omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Exemption 5 sits on a list of tightly circumscribed exemptions and should be read accordingly, especially given the absence of any basis for the Services' expansive interpretation in Exemp- tion 5's text. \"[I]nter-agency or intra-agency memoran- dums or letters\" are rarely, if ever, the last step in agencies' decision-making; internal memoranda and letters are the documents by which agencies lay the groundwork for later decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 615",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Services' Interpretation of Exemption 5 Contradicts the Narrow Structure of FOIA's Exemptions",
		"context": "Under the Services' view, an agency could by- pass the restrictions within 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7) by in- voking Exemption 5 for many law-enforcement records preceding the agency's ultimate resolution of an en- forcement proceeding (such as policies relating to sentencing reco mmendations). But see Milner , 562 U.S. at 579-80 (rejecting similarly broad interpreta- tion); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Records describing internal \"prac-tices of an agency\" that guide decision-making could be withheld, even if they did not concern \"personnel,\" 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(2).",
		"citation_value_orig": "591 F.2d 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's assertion that other regulatory requirements sufficiently control groundwater-mediated discharges to surface waters is inaccurate",
		"context": "44). 34 \"RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress intended RCRA \"to re-duce the generation of hazardous waste and to ensure the proper treatment, storage, and disposal of that waste which is nonetheless generated, 'so as to mini-mize the present and future threat to human health and the environment.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's assertion that other regulatory requirements sufficiently control groundwater-mediated discharges to surface waters is inaccurate",
		"context": "Res. Def. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Part C specifically applies to \"well[s],\" meaning \"[a] bore d, drilled, or driven shaft whose depth is greater than the largest surface dimen-sion; or, a dug hole whose depth is greater than the 35 largest surface dimension; or, an improved sinkhole; or, a subsurface fluid distri bution system.\" 40 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.2d 1258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's assertion that other regulatory requirements sufficiently control groundwater-mediated discharges to surface waters is inaccurate",
		"context": "But Congress fundamentally intended CERCL A to serve a very dif- ferent purpose than the Clean Water Act: promoting clean-up efforts for sites already contaminated with hazardous waste. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This con- trasts with the Clean Water Act's broader purpose to not only \"restore\" the Nation's waters, but also to 36 \"maintain\" the waters by preventing future pollution. See 33 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 599",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner's assertion that other regulatory requirements sufficiently control groundwater-mediated discharges to surface waters is inaccurate",
		"context": "Further, sulfate arguably does not meet the \"hazardous substance\" definition under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 40 C.F.R. § 302.4; see also Minn. Stat. §§ 115B.01- 115B.53.",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F. Supp. 1163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the Tie Should Go to Liberty",
		"context": "\"Liberty demands limits on the ability of any one branch to influence basic p olitical decisions,\" and the Constitution's separation of powers imposes those lim-its. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the one consistent, recurring prin-ciple in this Court's nondelegation jurisprudence is that the \"ultimate purpose\" of the doctrine \"is to pro-tect the liberty and security of the governed.\" Metro.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the Tie Should Go to Liberty",
		"context": "Metro. Wash. Airports [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Ass'n of Am. R.R .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Because the Separation of Powers Exists to Protect Liberty, In Close Cases, the Tie Should Go to Liberty",
		"context": "See also Ass'n of Am. R.R . at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring) (the Constitu- tion's separation of powers \"exists to protect liberty\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. During ratification, su pporters of the proposed Constitution often invoked its separation of powers to defend against arguments the new federal government would encroach on individual liberty. For example, Convention delegate Pierce Butler wrote in a letter that \"[p]ains and attention were not spared\" during the Convention to \"preserve to the individual as large a share of natural rights\" by balancing \"the powers of the three Branches, so that no one shoud [ sic] too greatly preponderate.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulations Are Not Under-inclusive",
		"context": "Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, the City had no basis to target on-premises signs, but it did have a reason to target billboards. 6 Similarly, the City of Austin's regulations do not distinguish among viewpoints within those subject-matter categories, \"a 'more blatant' and 'egregious form of content discrimination.'\" Reed , 576 U.S. at 168 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 13 It is commonly understood in the sign industry that off-premises and on-premises signs are categorically different in nature, size, and proximity to highly trafficked areas. Off-pre mises signs typically are billboards of standardized, rectangular dimensions that are erected along the margins of highways and freeways.7 There are two main types of billboards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulations Are Not Under-inclusive",
		"context": "The City of Austin's policy choice to impose technological limits on off-premises signs must be scrutinized against the backdrop of this common- sense understanding of th e differences between off- premises and on-premises signs. Indeed, this Court has recognized that \"[t]he quantum of empirical evidence needed to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny of legislative judg ments will vary up or down 15 with the novelty and plausibility of the justification raised.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Cour t's decisions make clear, the City's legislative judgment in this case is neither novel nor implausible. If the total \"prohibition of offsite advertising\" at issue in Metromedia was \"directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics,\" 453 U.S. at 511, the more limited burden imposed by the City of Austin's restrictions on billboard digitization is narrowly tailored.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulations Are Not Under-inclusive",
		"context": "Unlike off-premises signs, on-premises signs do not impair the City of Austin's asserted interests. A law is underinclusive if \"'it leaves appreciable damage to [the government's] supposedly vital inter- est unprohibited.'\" Reed , 576 U.S. at 172 (quoting Republican Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the record is devoid of any evidence that on-premises signs cause \"appreciable damage\" to the City's aesthetics and public-safety concerns. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black recognized, \"[t]he history of the [Fourteenth A]mendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings\". Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 that human fetuses are human beings from the moment of fertilization. It follows that each human fetus is a human being and person entitled to the right to life and to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.42 In Roe , the Court agreed with this logic.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "[ Roe's attorneys] conceded as much on reargument.\" 410 U.S. at 157. Justice Stevens reemphasized this point in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"[T]here is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures.\" In doing so, the Court confirmed all human beings have constitutional rights, and that if a fetus is a human being, its personhood has been established for purposes of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. 42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "47 Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black has said that \"[t]he history of the [Fourteenth A]mendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless hu-man beings.\" Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 48 Supra at 9-16, e.g., textbooks, articles, interviews, testi- monies, and surveys of biologists all form the consensus on when life begins. 28 20149 of the fact that a human fetus is a biological hu- man being, a member of the species homo sapiens , and a full member of the human family.50 It follows that each human fetus is a human being and person entitled to the right to life51 and to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amend-ment of the U.S. Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "[ Roe's attorneys] conceded as much on reargument.\" 410 U.S. at 157. Justice Stevens reem phasized this point in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"[T]here is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed , if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures.\" In 492 U.S. 490, Justice Blackmun (with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part) said that he could not improve on Stevens' statement, thus confirming that all human beings have constitutional rights, and that abortion rights do not entail the right to kill a human being. Accordingly, if a fetus is a human being, its personhood has been established for pur- poses of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Overwhelming evidence now exists that human fetuses are human beings and therefore protected by the Fourteenth Amendment",
		"context": "410 U.S. at 157. Justice Stevens reem phasized this point in 476 U.S. 747: \"[T]here is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a fetus and a human being; indeed , if there is not such a difference, the permissibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of the state legislatures.\" In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Justice Blackmun (with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined, concurring in part and dissenting in part) said that he could not improve on Stevens' statement, thus confirming that all human beings have constitutional rights, and that abortion rights do not entail the right to kill a human being. Accordingly, if a fetus is a human being, its personhood has been established for pur- poses of protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. This understanding of \"person\" is consistent with the understanding of the Amendment held by 19th century lawmakers 53 and the Court.54 Thus, while some have a philosophical or metaphysical understanding of 53 Supra at 26-27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) applies when a third-party summons is issued \"in aid of the collection of\" a taxpayer's assessed liability",
		"context": "Contrary to petit ioners' submission , that broad phrase simply requires that the summons help the S ervice obtain payment from the relevant taxpayer . 2. Petitioners stake their case on engrafting a legal - interest limitation onto Section 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) , which they derive from the Ninth Circuit's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Relying on its view of the statutory history and purpose, Ip held that Sec- tion 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) \"applies only where the assessed taxpayer has a recognizable legal interest in the records summoned.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "205 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. To The Extent That The TPCA Sweeps Beyond Congress' Laudable Goal Of Stopping Telemarketing And Scam Calls, It Creates An Unconstitutional Morass",
		"context": "L. No. 102-243, § 2(6), 105 Stat. 2394 , 2394 (1991) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as well as \"over -the-phone scam artists\" and \"foreign fraudsters ,\" In re Rules & Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991 , 30 FCC Rcd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Plaintiffs' equal-protection challenge should be rejected",
		"context": "The challenged ICWA provisions readily satisfy that review . By creating a statutory definition and default preferences tha t seek to prevent the unwarranted separation of Indian children from their families and communities , the provisions are \"tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique 9 obligation toward the Indians.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. IV. Texas's nondelegation challenge to 25 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Plaintiffs' equal-protection challenge should be rejected",
		"context": "There is no basis for uprooting those long -settled practices and overturning Congress's j udgment con- cerning how best to protect Indian children, families, and tribes . To the contrary, \"[p]roper respect for a co - ordinate branch of the government requires \" that the Court refrain from invalidating an Act of Congress \"un- less the lack of constitut ional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly demonstrated.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent their 10 claims are justiciable, p laintiffs have not overcome that presumption of constitutionality.3 I. ICWA IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS'S PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS \"The plenary power of Congress to deal with the spe- cial problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and im- plicitly from the Constitution itself.\" 417 U.S. 535.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Plaintiffs' equal-protection challenge should be rejected",
		"context": "106 U.S. 629. To the extent their 10 claims are justiciable, p laintiffs have not overcome that presumption of constitutionality.3 I. ICWA IS A VALID EXERCISE OF CONGRESS'S PLENARY POWER OVER INDIAN AFFAIRS \"The plenary power of Congress to deal with the spe- cial problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and im- plicitly from the Constitution itself.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ICWA falls squarely within that power by establish ing federal standards to protect Indian children and families and \"the continued exist- ence and integrity of Indian tribes .\" 25 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly instructed that all statutory construction begins with the text and goes no further when statutory language is plain. See, e.g., Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Words must be understood according to \"their or- dinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.\" New Prime 139 S.Ct. 532.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 1938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "See, e.g., Puerto 136 S.Ct. 1938. Words must be understood according to \"their or- dinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.\" New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 These principles govern the construction of FOIA's ex- emptions, just like they govern all unambiguous statutory provisions. As the Court put it when considering Exemp- tion 4's neighbor, \"[w]e simply interpret Exemption 5 to mean what it says.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "17 These principles govern the construction of FOIA's ex- emptions, just like they govern all unambiguous statutory provisions. As the Court put it when considering Exemp- tion 4's neighbor, \"[w]e simply interpret Exemption 5 to mean what it says.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 562 U.S. 562136 S.Ct. 383.9 Interpreting Exemption 4 is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation. \"Confidential\" has a well-de- fined ordinary meaning, and Congress did not provide a different definition when it enacted the statute in 1966. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "17 These principles govern the construction of FOIA's ex- emptions, just like they govern all unambiguous statutory provisions. As the Court put it when considering Exemp- tion 4's neighbor, \"[w]e simply interpret Exemption 5 to mean what it says.\" 465 U.S. 792; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S.Ct. 383.9 Interpreting Exemption 4 is a straightforward matter of statutory interpretation. \"Confidential\" has a well-de- fined ordinary meaning, and Congress did not provide a different definition when it enacted the statute in 1966. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (2019) \"Communicated, conveyed, acted on, or practiced in confi- dence : known only to a limited few : not publicly disseminated : private, secret[.]\" This Court already has given \"confidential\" its ordi- nary meaning when used in a FOIA exemption. Congress used that same word in Exemption 7—just a few para- graphs after Exemption 4—and this Court authoritatively applied its common meaning in U.S. Department of Jus- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 In its decisions, this Court has consistently and over the course of many decades described what is \"confidential\" according to that term's plain meaning—private information that is not pub- licly disclosed.11 In Landano,too, the Court did not 10 Exemption 7 permits the Government to withhold information that \"could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source.\" 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(7)(D).",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "Landano's construction of FOIA Exemption 7 rein- forces a plain-text interpretation of \"confidential\" in Ex- emption 4. \"A term appearing in several places in a statu- tory text is generally read the same way each time it ap- pears.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. disclose\" certain information is what ensures the \"confidentiality of data[.]\" 455 U.S. 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "510 U.S. 135. disclose\" certain information is what ensures the \"confidentiality of data[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A \"confiden- tial\" portion of a presentence report was one \"not disclosed to defense counsel.\" 518 U.S. 152.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "455 U.S. 345. A \"confiden- tial\" portion of a presentence report was one \"not disclosed to defense counsel.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Con- versely, the presumption that marital communications are \"confiden- tial may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private.\" 347 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "518 U.S. 152. Con- versely, the presumption that marital communications are \"confiden- tial may be overcome by proof of facts showing that they were not intended to be private.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And when the Court considered the definition of \"personnel\" in Exemption 2, it noted its pre- vious plain-text definition when Exemption 6 used that term: Exemption 6 is \"just a few short paragraphs down from Exemption 2,\" which justified the same definition in both places. Milner,562 U.S. at 570.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "Exemption 4's use of \"confidential\" is \"just a few short paragraphs\" up from Exemption 7's use of that term, and it should be read the same in both places. Notably, before National Parks ,courts that inter- preted Exemption 4 generally reached this same ordi- nary-meaning result and gave \"confidential\" its plain-text definition. Sterling Drug, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, concluded that market shares and sales figures of certain products were \"confi- dential\" under Exemption 4, reasoning that the infor- mation was not customarily released by the submitter and the Government agency indicated it would treat the infor- mation as confidential. See also, e.g., Gen. Servs. 415 F.2d 878.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 F.2d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1.Both in dictionaries and case law, \"confidential\" uniformly means \"private and not publicly disclosed\"",
		"context": "Sterling Drug, 450 F.2d 698, for example, concluded that market shares and sales figures of certain products were \"confi- dential\" under Exemption 4, reasoning that the infor- mation was not customarily released by the submitter and the Government agency indicated it would treat the infor- mation as confidential. See also, e.g., Gen. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These cases were interpreting the same plain text: Congress has not changed Exemption 4's text or reenacted that statutory provision since its ini- tial adoption in 1966. Finally, if all of the above did not settle the question of what \"confidential\" means, ordinary use confirms the breadth of the term—that when Exemption 4 says \"confi- dential\" commercial or financial information obtained from a person, it means all such information that is kept 22 private and not publicly disclosed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.2d 878",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech",
		"context": "See generally Santa Fe Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Good News Club , 533 U.S. at 119 (stating the observer would be \"aware of the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious speech takes place\"). As Judge Ikuta recognized in dissent, any \"concern that Kennedy's religious activities would be attributed to the district is simply not plausible.\" Pet.App.108 (Ikuta, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Establishment Clause cannot be violated by a fear that someone will misperceive private religious speech as the government's speech",
		"context": "of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . He only \"asked his employer to do nothing —simply to tolerate the brief, quiet prayer of one man.\" Pet.App.99 (O'Scannlain, J. , dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mississippi Has a Compelling Interest to Proscribe Pre-Viability Abortions",
		"context": ".In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court created the \"undue burden\" standard to allegedly balance the competing interests at stake in theabortion context. Under that standard, a law violatesthe Constitution \"if its purpose or effect is to place asubstantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking anabortion before the fetus attains viability.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The fact that a defendant is an instrumentality of a foreign state is not relevant to choice of law",
		"context": "The decisions below to apply Spanish law in this case gave undue weight to factors that should have no bearing on choice of law in FSIA cases: (1) the Founda- tion is an instrumentality of the Spanish state, and (2) Spain used public fund s to purchase the Painting for the Respondent. The district court stated: Spain unquestionably has an interest in serv- ing these policy goals and applying its law of adverse possession to the Foundation's claim of ownership, especially given that the Foun- dation is an instrumentality of the Kingdom of Spain and the Painting has been located within its borders for over twenty years. 153 F. Supp. 3d 1148 rev'd and re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals followed, \"In a highly publicized sale, Spain provided TBC public funds to purchase the Collection, including the Painting.\" 862 F.3d 951.",
		"citation_value_orig": "862 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The fact that a defendant is an instrumentality of a foreign state is not relevant to choice of law",
		"context": "153 F. Supp. 3d 1148 rev'd and re-862 F.3d 951. The court of appeals followed, \"In a highly publicized sale, Spain provided TBC public funds to purchase the Collection, including the Painting.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This reasoning destroys the parity between the parties required by Section 1606, the expropriation ex-ception to immunity and the FSIA as a whole. Applying any rule of decision based on who the defendant is 13 discriminates against plaintiffs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "862 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. State does not support Petitioners' approach",
		"context": ". To further justify their position, Petitioners and their amici have previously relied on the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a decision authored by Justice Orr. In their view, Bailey supports the notion that the Attorney General's authority is purely statutory and, therefore, can be given to two legislators. Their reliance on Bailey is misplaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 S.E.2d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "Whether the BIA's reversal is subject to judicial review is a quest ion of considerable practical importance in this case. 1. The government suggests that petitioner's deci- sion not to ask the court of appeals to overturn its ear-lier decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is an obstacle to re- view. See BIO 18-20. It is not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "712 F.3d 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "A litigant need not ask a court of appeals to over- turn its precedent—a task t hat a panel is powerless to accomplish—so as to preserve an argument for re-view. Rather, the Court's \"tra ditional rule\" \"precludes a grant of certiorari only when the question presented was not pressed or passed upon below.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]513 U.S. 374. The lower court certainly \"passed upon\" the ques- tion presented—and the government does not disa- gree. Citing Cole, the court held that it \"lack[ed] juris- diction to review [petitioner's] argument about the likelihood of future harm in Lebanon.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "A litigant need not ask a court of appeals to over- turn its precedent—a task t hat a panel is powerless to accomplish—so as to preserve an argument for re-view. Rather, the Court's \"tra ditional rule\" \"precludes a grant of certiorari only when the question presented was not pressed or passed upon below.\" 504 U.S. 36[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lower court certainly \"passed upon\" the ques- tion presented—and the government does not disa- gree. Citing Cole, the court held that it \"lack[ed] juris- diction to review [petitioner's] argument about the likelihood of future harm in Lebanon.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "But a litigant's effort to 6 argue around circuit precedent—rather than ex- pressly call for its overturning—is appropriate. This strategy \"does not suggest a waiver; it merely reflects counsel's sound assessment that the argument would be futile.\" MedImmune, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When, as here, a court rejects a party's effort to sidestep its precedent, the rule on which the lower court rested it s decision is ripe for this Court's review. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "The government's argument is irrelevant because it addresses an issue subsequent to the question pre- sented. The Court ordinarily does not \"decide in the first instance issues not decided below.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court routinely grants certiorari to re-solve important questions t hat controlled the lower court's decision, notwithstanding a respondent's as- sertion that, on remand, it may prevail for a different reason. See, e.g., Department of 135 S. Ct. 1225.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This is an ideal vehicle",
		"context": "566 U.S. 189. The Court routinely grants certiorari to re-solve important questions t hat controlled the lower court's decision, notwithstanding a respondent's as- sertion that, on remand, it may prevail for a different reason. See, e.g., Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The question here is the scope of judicial review—an im- portant question that has sp lit the circuits and that, as the government repeatedly admits, warrants reso- lution. Whether petitioner ultimately prevails is a matter that the court of appeals will address in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 81- 82; see Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1867, Congress made the writ available to any prisoner —state or federal —\"restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United States.\" Act of Feb. 5, 1867, c h. 28, 14 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "8 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "385. In the first half of the twentieth century, this Court construed the habeas statute s broadly, leading to \"a great increase in the number of applications for habeas corpus filed in the federal courts by state and federal prisoners. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B ecaus e a writ of habeas corpus acts on the pris- oner's jailer , it is filed in the district where the prisoner is confi ned. See 542 U.S. 426.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "342 U.S. 205. B ecaus e a writ of habeas corpus acts on the pris- oner's jailer , it is filed in the district where the prisoner is confi ned. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For federal prisoners, the district of confine- ment is often located \"far from the scene of the facts, the homes of the witnesses and the records of the sen- tencing court .\" Hayman , 342 U.S. at 213 -214.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. 2255 in re- sponse to a Judicial Conference proposal \"to alleviate the burden of habeas corpus petitions filed by federal prisoners in the district of confinement, by providing an equally broad remedy in the more convenient jurisdic-tion of the sentencing court .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 967 -968; see also Hayman , 342 U.S. at 214- 219.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "2. Th at preclusion of habeas relief , however, has al- ways been subject to an exception —a \"saving clause, providing that a writ of habeas corpus would be availa- ble if the alternative process \" established in Section 2255 \" proved inadequate or ineffective.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2008). The saving clause , both originally and now , specifies that a prisoner who could or did seek a remedy by motion is barred from filing a habeas petition \"unless it also appears that the remedy by [Section 2255] motion is inadequate or inef- fective to test the leg ality of his detention. \" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "The \"prescribed standard or measure ,\" Black's 902, for judging the adequacy and ef- ficacy of the Section 2255 remedy is the habeas remedy that the saving clause expressly refers to and that Sec- 17 tion 2255 was adopted to replace . As this Court has re- peatedly recognized, Section 2255's \"intended effect ,\" Webster's Second 1271, was to provide an alternative to habeas that was different in form (primarily, in venue) but \"afford[ed] federal prisoners a remedy identical in scope to federal habeas corpus.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In line with that purpose, t he saving clause ensures that Section 2255 does not disadvantage federa l prisoners as compared to habeas . This Court has understood the saving clause to serve that function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "In line with that purpose, t he saving clause ensures that Section 2255 does not disadvantage federa l prisoners as compared to habeas . This Court has understood the saving clause to serve that function. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court declined to read Sec- tion 2255 to incorporate principles of res judicata, which were inapplicable in habeas. The Court explained that if Section 2255 imposed a res judicata rule, it would fail to provide federal prisoners with \" 'a remedy exactly commensurate with ' habeas .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The saving clause safeguards against leaving federal prisoners with an \"inadequate or ineffective\" substitute for habeas",
		"context": "; see Hayman , 342 U.S. at 209, 223. The Court took a similar approach in rejecting a consti- tutional challenge to an identically worded saving clause in a parallel statute appli cable to the District of Colum- bia. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Boumediene , 553 U.S. at 776. Like Sanders and Hay- man , those dec isions presuppose that the saving clause guarantees that Section 2255 does not deny federal pris- oners the ability to assert claims that would be cogniza-",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Research Shows that Long-Term Underfunding and Outside Financial Pressures, Not Collective Bargaining, Caused Illinois' and Other States' Public Pension Challenges",
		"context": "(quoting reports that appropriations for pension funding were \"below mandatory statutory requirements as expressly provided in the governing law\" and \"grossly insufficient\"). Yet throughout this time, Illinois was fu nding its pensions using an approach that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission characterized as bearing \"no relation to actuarial calculation,\" with the state's insufficient contributions being \"the primary driver\" 4 Notably, these findings do not support the proposition that \"public -sector unions have helped create a situation in which the state's pension funds report a liability of more than $100 billion, at least 50% of it unfunded.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Munnell, supra , at 117 (\"Part of the problem is that Illinois got a late start on funding. Until 1981, employer contributions covered current -year pension benefits, and only employee contributions were set aside for investments.\"). Nor was the concern expressed in Illinois alone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner and IPO Posit a False Dichotomy—Those in the Marketplace Do Not Face a Choice Between Commercialization and Patenting",
		"context": "\"Generally cost defrayal arrangements between collaborators are not deemed to be invalida ting sales, nor are payments for use substantially for test purposes. \" C.R. Bard, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Cont' l Can Co. USA, 948 F.2d 1264. Under the existing on -sale construct, b oth smaller companies like petitioner and larger companies like Intel can enter into cost -defrayal agreements and develo pment partnerships in hopes of commercializ ing an invention in the future . Even if the details of those agreements become public, and even if they are entered into after an invention has been fully developed, a patent may still be granted on the claimed i nvention , provided that the patent application is filed within one year .",
		"citation_value_orig": "157 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner and IPO Posit a False Dichotomy—Those in the Marketplace Do Not Face a Choice Between Commercialization and Patenting",
		"context": "\"Generally cost defrayal arrangements between collaborators are not deemed to be invalida ting sales, nor are payments for use substantially for test purposes. \" C.R. Bard, 157 F.3d 1340; see also Cont' l Can Co. USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the existing on -sale construct, b oth smaller companies like petitioner and larger companies like Intel can enter into cost -defrayal agreements and develo pment partnerships in hopes of commercializ ing an invention in the future . Even if the details of those agreements become public, and even if they are entered into after an invention has been fully developed, a patent may still be granted on the claimed i nvention , provided that the patent application is filed within one year .",
		"citation_value_orig": "948 F.2d 1264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "This Court has rejecte d such a ttempts to transform private action into state action: \"it is not 13 enough that the function serves the public good or the public interest in some way \"; instead, \" the government must have traditionally and exclusively performed the function. \" Manhattan Cmty. Access [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Foster care and the selection of foster parents has never been an exclusive state prerogative. See Pet'rs.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "Respondents rely primarily on cases standing for the unremarkable proposition that government can manage its employees. In Engquist v. Oregon Depart- ment of Agriculture , the Court distinguished the \"'close relationship between the employer and employee '\" from \"'arm's -length' government decisions .'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2008 ). It applied a higher constitutional standard to the latter, particularly when the govern- ment deploys its \"power to regulate or license, as law- maker.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "at 598, 604 . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Philadelphia is acting as sovereign, regulat- ing the foster care system and licensing dozens of pri- vate agencies via arms -length contracts . Those private agencies can only serve children in Philadelphia's fos- ter system by contract ing with Philadelphia .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "Respondents demand a level of deference that ex- ceeds what the government enjoys in national security and prison management. Even in the context of terror- ism, this Court does not defer to the \"Government's reading of the First Amendment,\" but considers care- fully its \"findings\" and \" empirical conclusions\" under strict scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in prison manage- ment, where \"government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society,\" 544 U.S. 709, the Court rejected \"a degree of deference that is tantamount to unques- tioning acceptance .\" Holt, 574 U.S. at 364.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "Even in the context of terror- ism, this Court does not defer to the \"Government's reading of the First Amendment,\" but considers care- fully its \"findings\" and \" empirical conclusions\" under strict scrutiny. 561 U.S. 1. And in prison manage- ment, where \"government exerts a degree of control unparalleled in civilian society,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court rejected \"a degree of deference that is tantamount to unques- tioning acceptance .\" Holt, 574 U.S. at 364. Instead, ap- propriate deference meant \"courts should not blind themselves\" to the setting , and that government s may withdraw accommodation s \"if the claimant abuses the exemption\" to undermine compelling interest s, or is insincerely \"using religious activity to cloak illicit con- duct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "There is no evidence that this stringent standard has made prison management unworkable. 2. Respondents rely heavily on Board of County Com missioner [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which applied the Pickering test to a government contractor. There, the Court analogized the government's power over an \"exclusive\" service provider for the entire ju- risdiction to \"the public services [the county] performs 15 through its employees.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "The condition Philadelphia requires here—asking a church to violate its religious beliefs on marriage as a condition of foster care—is a far cry from the condition in Umbehr , i.e., that a county's exclusive trash hauler refrain from criticizing the relevant government offi- cials. Moreover, since Umbehr , the Court has declined to extend Pickering \"to compelled speech\" of even gov- ernment employees, particularly speech on \"controver- sial subjects such as sexual orientat ion,\" which \"occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Five Justices agreed the outcome would have been dif- ferent had the government \"affirmatively compel[led]\" the religious objectors to perform an action or face con- sequences. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "at 733 (White, J., dissenting). Lyng was about \"publicly owned land\" and distinguished cases where \" individuals [are] coerced by the Govern- ment's action into violating their religious beliefs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, CSS is not trying to control Philadelphia's internal actions or its property ; Philadelphia is attempting to coerce CSS. 16 Respondents ignore the more analogous cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "They don't me ntion Rosenberger. There, the religious student publication was required to \"become a 'Con- tracted Independent Organization'\" to receive funding, and its contract stated it \"should not be misinterpreted as meaning that those organizations are part of or con- trolled by the University.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like Philadelphia, UVA claimed that a ruling for petitioners \" would become a judicial juggernaut, constitutionalizing the ubiquitous content -based deci- sions\" of government entities . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' theory is wrong on the law",
		"context": "at 2257 . Trinity Lutheran held that government cannot exclude religious organizations from grant programs , observing that government s may not discriminate against \"some or all religious beliefs.\" Trinity Lu- theran Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2017 ). And it analogized the church's injury there to the improper exclusion of a government con- tractor . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Congress would have preferred a bipartisan, multi-member commission over a CFPB director who serves at the will of the President",
		"context": "pt. 1041. The 10 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]197 F. Supp. 3d 177. 18 Bureau issued the notice of proposed rulemaking on July 22, 2016. 81 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Congress would have preferred a bipartisan, multi-member commission over a CFPB director who serves at the will of the President",
		"context": "pt. 1041. The 10 See, e.g., 819 F.3d 1179[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 Bureau issued the notice of proposed rulemaking on July 22, 2016. 81 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "197 F. Supp. 3d 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Congress would have preferred a bipartisan, multi-member commission over a CFPB director who serves at the will of the President",
		"context": "The Court, however, is not the legislative scribe for the 111th Congress. See Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the Court cannot rewrite Title X to incorporate a commission-based structure deemed constitutional in other cases, see Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 629, a more considered and nuanced remedy is necessary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE SAME STANDING RULES APPLY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS AND NAMED CLASS MEMBERS",
		"context": "It does not matter that Respondent suffered an Article III injury. Standing \"is not dispensed in gross.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Rule 23 does not change that reality. Federal courts can \"provide relief to claimants, in individual or class actions,\" but only if those claimants \" have suffered, or will imminently suffer, actual harm.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE SAME STANDING RULES APPLY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS AND NAMED CLASS MEMBERS",
		"context": "946 F.3d 762. Because the \"constitutional requirement of standing is equally applicable to class act ions,\" \"each [class] member must have standing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As a result, a class cannot be certified if it includes members who would lack standing to sue individually. In ot her words, \"a named plaintiff cannot represent a class of persons who lack the ability to bring suit themselves.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "718 F.3d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE SAME STANDING RULES APPLY TO ABSENT CLASS MEMBERS AND NAMED CLASS MEMBERS",
		"context": "As a result, a class cannot be certified if it includes members who would lack standing to sue individually. In ot her words, \"a named plaintiff cannot represent a class of persons who lack the ability to bring suit themselves.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Permitting certification of a class including those who suffered no Article III injury raises the same separation -of-powers issues as allowing uninjured plaintiffs to sue individually on their own behalf. In both cases, the President cannot exercise his core power under the Take Care Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "644 F.3d 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. General accrual rules, due process values and purposes, and federalism and fairness all show that Reed's claim did not accrue before the state-court litigation ended.",
		"context": "19; 22 Reply 3 -4, the point here is that a claim like Reed's can accrue no earlier than the denial of rehearing . State courts of last resort can (and sometimes do) modify their reasoning on rehearing , and because claims like Reed's challenge the state courts' authori- tative c onstruction of state law, t hose modifications could change the contours of the claim. Only after de- nial of rehearing do \"no other state avenues for relief remain open ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , meaning that the state's justification for the deprivation , based on its authoritative construction of state law, becomes conclusive. d. Contrary to Goertz's suggestion (Br. 30-31), a rehearing -based accrual rule won't \"harm federal - state relations,\" because it won't alter the authorita- tive effect that state -court decision s have upon issuance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "United States District Court , 407 U.S. at 313. This Court has repeatedly recognized that when otherwise permissible government intrusions occur 13 on the home or curtilage, heightened property and privacy interests require the government to obtain a warrant. Thus, the Court held that a dog sniff on the curti- lage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend- ment, see Jardines , 569 U.S. at 11-12, despite reach- ing the opposite conclusion for dog sniffs of luggage at the airport, United States v.Place , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or vehicles lawfully stopped on the highway, Illinois v.Caballes , 543 U.S. 405. The Court similarly held that use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a container of chemicals in an individual's residence was a Fourth Amendment search, United States v.Karo , 468 U.S. 705, even though such monitoring does not constitute a search when confined to public places, as in United States v.Knotts ,supra . InCalifornia v.Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, this Court was careful to restrict its holding to the claim that there is no reasonable expectation of pri- vacy in \"garbage left for collection outside the curti- lage of a home .",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "United States District Court , 407 U.S. at 313. This Court has repeatedly recognized that when otherwise permissible government intrusions occur 13 on the home or curtilage, heightened property and privacy interests require the government to obtain a warrant. Thus, the Court held that a dog sniff on the curti- lage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend- ment, see Jardines , 569 U.S. at 11-12, despite reach- ing the opposite conclusion for dog sniffs of luggage at the airport, United States v.Place , 462 U.S. 696, or vehicles lawfully stopped on the highway, Illinois v.Caballes , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court similarly held that use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a container of chemicals in an individual's residence was a Fourth Amendment search, United States v.Karo , 468 U.S. 705, even though such monitoring does not constitute a search when confined to public places, as in United States v.Knotts ,supra . InCalifornia v.Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, this Court was careful to restrict its holding to the claim that there is no reasonable expectation of pri- vacy in \"garbage left for collection outside the curti- lage of a home .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly recognized that when otherwise permissible government intrusions occur 13 on the home or curtilage, heightened property and privacy interests require the government to obtain a warrant. Thus, the Court held that a dog sniff on the curti- lage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend- ment, see Jardines , 569 U.S. at 11-12, despite reach- ing the opposite conclusion for dog sniffs of luggage at the airport, United States v.Place , 462 U.S. 696, or vehicles lawfully stopped on the highway, Illinois v.Caballes , 543 U.S. 405. The Court similarly held that use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a container of chemicals in an individual's residence was a Fourth Amendment search, United States v.Karo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], even though such monitoring does not constitute a search when confined to public places, as in United States v.Knotts ,supra . InCalifornia v.Greenwood , 486 U.S. 35, this Court was careful to restrict its holding to the claim that there is no reasonable expectation of pri- vacy in \"garbage left for collection outside the curti- lage of a home . \"Id.at 37 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "Thus, the Court held that a dog sniff on the curti- lage constitutes a search under the Fourth Amend- ment, see Jardines , 569 U.S. at 11-12, despite reach- ing the opposite conclusion for dog sniffs of luggage at the airport, United States v.Place , 462 U.S. 696, or vehicles lawfully stopped on the highway, Illinois v.Caballes , 543 U.S. 405. The Court similarly held that use of a beeper to monitor the movement of a container of chemicals in an individual's residence was a Fourth Amendment search, United States v.Karo , 468 U.S. 705, even though such monitoring does not constitute a search when confined to public places, as in United States v.Knotts ,supra . InCalifornia v.Greenwood , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court was careful to restrict its holding to the claim that there is no reasonable expectation of pri- vacy in \"garbage left for collection outside the curti- lage of a home . \"Id.at 37 (emphasis added). Although the Court has not squarely addressed the question in the vehicle context, it has come close to endorsing the same conclusion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "\"Id.at 37 (emphasis added). Although the Court has not squarely addressed the question in the vehicle context, it has come close to endorsing the same conclusion. Thus, a plurality refused to uphold the warrantless search of a vehicle parked at a home in Coolidge v.New Hampshire , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court in California v.Car- neystated that justifications underlying the automo- bile exception apply \"[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes .\" 471 U.S. 386.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "Thus, a plurality refused to uphold the warrantless search of a vehicle parked at a home in Coolidge v.New Hampshire , 403 U.S. 443. And the Court in California v.Car- neystated that justifications underlying the automo- bile exception apply \"[w]hen a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 As with other intrusions into the home and its surroundings, permitting warrantless searches of vehicles parked at home is fundamentally incompat- ible with the Fourth Amendment's special solicitude for the privacy of the home. Second , the diminution of property and privacy rights would not be limited to the search of the vehi- cle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "Second , the diminution of property and privacy rights would not be limited to the search of the vehi- cle. The plain view doctrine permits officers to seize an item that is in plain view provided that (1) they observe it from a lawful vantage point; (2) they have a right of physical access to it; and (3) it is immedi- ately apparent to him that it is contraband or a fruit, instrumentality, or evidence of a crime. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing officers to enter the curtilage without a warrant radically extends officers' lawful vantage point over the curtilage and expands their right of access to it, thus greatly enabling their ability to seize items of personal property under the plain view doctrine. The right to be secure in one's home would have \"little practical value if the State's agents could stand in a home's porch or side garden and trawl for evidence with impunity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Warrantless searches of vehicles parked on curtilage would seriously erode the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home",
		"context": "Third, there is no logical justification for distin- guishing vehicles from other containers or structures on the curtilage. The Court has explained that \"curti- lage questions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the ar- ea is included within an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the ar- ea from observation by people passing by.\" United States v.Dunn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 A vehicle parked on the curtilage satisfies each of these criteria. It is virtually always proximate to the home—in a driveway or garage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "By prosecutingthis case based upon the rights of its patients, JuneMedical seeks to obtain the benefits of heightenedjudicial scrutiny. The right to practice a profession is not a fundamental right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 634 F.3d 1185. Thus, rational basis reviewapplies to statutes regulati ng professions. 348 U.S. 483.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "By prosecutingthis case based upon the rights of its patients, JuneMedical seeks to obtain the benefits of heightenedjudicial scrutiny. The right to practice a profession is not a fundamental right. 70 F.3d 100; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, rational basis reviewapplies to statutes regulati ng professions. 348 U.S. 483.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 1185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "70 F.3d 100; 634 F.3d 1185. Thus, rational basis reviewapplies to statutes regulati ng professions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under that standard, safety regulations are strongly presumed to be constitutional, and they will not beinvalidated unless there is no reasonably conceivablestate of facts that could provide a rational basis forthem. 508 U.S. 307; Locke , 634 F.3d at 1194.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "348 U.S. 483. Under that standard, safety regulations are strongly presumed to be constitutional, and they will not beinvalidated unless there is no reasonably conceivablestate of facts that could provide a rational basis forthem. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Locke , 634 F.3d at 1194. Statutes 8 regulating professions survive rational basis review even if they seem unwise or their rationale seemstenuous. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "Statutes 8 regulating professions survive rational basis review even if they seem unwise or their rationale seemstenuous. Id. at 1196 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Under familiar principles, the partychallenging a medical safe ty regulation bears the burden of proving the statute lacks a rational basis. Fresenius Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, 704 F.3d 935. June Medical claims that Louisiana's statute violates this Court's holding in WWH , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The WWH standard superimposes a requirement that any burden imposed upon a woman's access toabortions must not be undue, and this considerationmust be balanced against the benefits the law confers. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "But June Medical must prove it has standing to take advantage of this stricter scrutiny,because the WWH standard is premised upon the rights of women seeking abortions. Standing is a consti tutionally-demanded requirement for justiciability. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The Article III judicial powerexists only to redress or otherwise to protect againstinjury to the complaining party, even though the court's judgment may benefit others collaterally.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "Warth , 422 U.S. at 500. The requiremen t that a litigant must have a personal stake in the outcome of the controversybefore the court is necessary \"[t]o ensure that theFederal Judiciary respects the proper—and properlylimited—role of the courts in a democratic society.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The requirement of a concrete injury not only \"confines theJudicial Branch to its proper, limited role in theconstitutional framework of Government,\" it alsoallows the public to know and understand who isinvoking the judicial power, and their reasons for doing so. Lujan , 504 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "Thus, June Medical bears the burden ofdemonstrating the elements of Article III standingbased upon the evidence required in the currentposture of the case. \"[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press.\" DaimlerChrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The standing inquiry requires careful judicial examination of a complaint'sallegations to ascertain whet her the particular plaintiff is entitled to an adjudication of the particular claims asserted.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "at 808, 810. A litigant cannot manufacture a case or controversy by overreacting to anewly-enacted statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 In short, June Medical has failed entirely to demonstrate Article III standing to assert its separate and independent claim based upon the substantive dueprocess rights of its patients . June Medical lacks first- party standing to assert this WWH challenge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F.2d 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": ", 905 F.3d at 808. \"[S]tanding cannot be conferred by a self-inflicted injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (5th Cir. ), cert. denied139 S. Ct. 639.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. June Medical cannot demonstrate Article III standing for the claim before this Court",
		"context": "at 562. The independent choices of third parties who are not before th e court break the requisite chain of causation. ASARCO [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 The hospitals to which applications for admitting privileges must be directed are not before the Court. June Medical did not present any testimony from anyhospital witnesses as to the status of the applicationsfor privileges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Litigants need a uniform rule that clearly identifies when appellate jurisdiction attaches. The final judgment rule provides the best rule: It is clear; it is consistent with Section 1291 and Gelboim; and it still allows the circuits the flexibility to manage their dockets to avoid piecemeal appeals",
		"context": "One who misses a mandatory claims processing dead- line can suffer the same fate as one who misses a jurisdictional deadline and therefore the need for a uniform rule is equally important. 22 A litigant should be able to apply \"a clear test\" to determine how to perfect an appeal. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There should be certainty about the event that triggers the 30-day period for taking an appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 870",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "on Criminal Laws and Procedure of the Se nate Comm. on the Judiciary , 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6808- 6822 (1974) (Justice Department testimony and memorandum advocating a mens rea standard); Unite d [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although Congress ultima tely enacted a different standar d of insanity in 18 U.S.C. 17, Congress recognized that the mens rea approach did not \"suffer[] from constitutional defects\" because it permitted con-sideration of mental illness in determining whether \"mental state requirements\" were satisfied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "2016- 2017) . The jurisdictions also divide on whether the defendant may invoke the insanity defense if he understood his conduct violated the law but be- lieved that his actions were morally justified . Compare, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]534 U.S. 1127659 P.2d 488285 N.W.2d 180. Other jurisdictions use some form of the Amer ican Law Instit ute test, which recognizes an insanity de- fense if the defendant \"lack[ed] substantial capacity ei- ther to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, \" I Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01(1), at 163 (1985) (Model Penal Code) (brackets in original) . See LaFav e § 7.5(b), at 560.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 P.2d 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "2016- 2017) . The jurisdictions also divide on whether the defendant may invoke the insanity defense if he understood his conduct violated the law but be- lieved that his actions were morally justified . Compare, e.g., 704 P.2d 752534 U.S. 1127[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]285 N.W.2d 180. Other jurisdictions use some form of the Amer ican Law Instit ute test, which recognizes an insanity de- fense if the defendant \"lack[ed] substantial capacity ei- ther to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, \" I Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01(1), at 163 (1985) (Model Penal Code) (brackets in original) . See LaFav e § 7.5(b), at 560.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 P.2d 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "2016- 2017) . The jurisdictions also divide on whether the defendant may invoke the insanity defense if he understood his conduct violated the law but be- lieved that his actions were morally justified . Compare, e.g., 704 P.2d 752534 U.S. 1127659 P.2d 488[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other jurisdictions use some form of the Amer ican Law Instit ute test, which recognizes an insanity de- fense if the defendant \"lack[ed] substantial capacity ei- ther to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, \" I Model Penal Code and Commentaries § 4.01(1), at 163 (1985) (Model Penal Code) (brackets in original) . See LaFav e § 7.5(b), at 560.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 N.W.2d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "See LaFav e § 7.5(b), at 560. Those jurisdic- tions , like the M'Naghten jurisdictions, divide on whether the defendant mu st appreciate that his conduct was legally or instead morally wrong, as the \"drafters left to each jurisdiction a choice between the terms 'wrongfulness' and 'criminality.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Still other States have adopted unique insanity standards. See 638 A.2d 783.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 A.2d 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "Rev. Stat. § 161.295(2) (2017) , or mental illnesses caused by long -term substance abuse, even if the defendant is not under the temporary influ- ence of an intoxicating substa nce at the time of the of- fense, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,510 U.S. 1054 . And a number of ju- risdictions follow the Model Penal Code, which provides that the insanity defense cannot be based on \"abnormal- ity manifested only by repeated cr iminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 P.2d 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. American practices likewise permit a mens rea approach to insanity claims",
		"context": "Stat. § 161.295(2) (2017) , or mental illnesses caused by long -term substance abuse, even if the defendant is not under the temporary influ- ence of an intoxicating substa nce at the time of the of- fense, 856 P.2d 811 , cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And a number of ju- risdictions follow the Model Penal Code, which provides that the insanity defense cannot be based on \"abnormal- ity manifested only by repeated cr iminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.\" Model Penal Code § 4.01(2) , at 163; e.g., Ind.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 1054",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The United States is committed, by treaty, to refrain from removal to torture in all cases",
		"context": "CAT protection is so critical to the country's international treaty obligations that the protection afforded is mandatory. The law \"does not permit any discretion or provide for any exceptions\" that would allow removal where torture is likely. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.3d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE CRIMINALIZES COMMON BUSINESS PRACTICES",
		"context": "See generally Petitioner's Brief, Point III (discussing constitutional concerns with right-to- control theory). As the Second Circuit explained in the decision be- low, its \"'right-to-control theory' of wire fraud … al-lows for conviction on 'a showing that the defendant, through the withholding or inaccurate reporting of in- formation that could impact on economic decisions, de- prived some person or entity of potentially valuable economic information.'\" Pet.App.16a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Ac- cording to the Second Circuit, \"[a] 'cognizable harm oc- curs'\" where the defendant deprives the victim of \"'in-formation necessary to make discretionary economic decisions.'\" Pet.App.17a (quoting 804 F.3d 558).",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE CRIMINALIZES COMMON BUSINESS PRACTICES",
		"context": "But it is not hon- est-services fraud, because there is no undisclosed bribe or kickback, as required by Skilling . And it should not be property fraud, because the selling com- pany's money or property ha s not been harmed, as the Seventh Circuit held in reversing a conviction based on these facts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court explained that \"the only ways in which [the defendant] misled anyone concerned … negotiating positions. He led the suc- cessful buyer to believe the seller wanted him to have a piece of the deal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE CRIMINALIZES COMMON BUSINESS PRACTICES",
		"context": "The Eleventh Circuit wisely rejected that theory of guilt, reversed the conviction, and remanded for a new trial. Id . at 1314-16; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But if the right-to-control doctrine were valid, then the defendants in such cases would be guilty based merely on the fact that they had withheld information from the other party in the transaction—and had therefore deprived the counterparty of the right to make \"an informed economic decision about what to do with its money or property.\" 986 F.3d 104 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT-TO-CONTROL DOCTRINE CRIMINALIZES COMMON BUSINESS PRACTICES",
		"context": "Sim ply put, much of that con- duct is not actually fraud. These prosecutions typify how the right-to-control theory's overbroad definition of \"property\" creates a trap for the unwary and places too much \"power in the hands of the prosecutor.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th is Court's decisions in McNally , Cleveland , and Kelly have set clear limits on the scope of the federal property fraud statutes. They are limited to schemes to obtain money or property; they are not all-purpose we apons to enforce \"grandil- oquen[t]\" notions about \"'standards of moral upright-ness, fundamental honesty, fair play and right deal- ing.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Increases the Risk of Over-Disclosure",
		"context": "Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities Regulation , 81 Wash. U. 20 L.Q. 417, 418 (2003); see also Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Thomas L. Hazen, Treatise on the Law of Securities Regulation §1:16 (7th ed. 2017). Section 14(e), enacted in 1968 as part of the Williams Act (amending the Exchange Act), serves this goal as well.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Increases the Risk of Over-Disclosure",
		"context": "The Exchange Act and the Williams Act amendments, of course, do not require disclosure to shareholders of every fact. Rather, the statute and this Court have required disclosure of only material information. See TSC Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the tender offer context, federal courts find \"a misstatement or omission [to be] 'material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding' whether to accept the tender offer.\" Seaboard World 600 F.2d 355357 F.3d 328 cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Negligence Standard for section 14(e) Increases the Risk of Over-Disclosure",
		"context": "See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. 438. In the tender offer context, federal courts find \"a misstatement or omission [to be] 'material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding' whether to accept the tender offer.\" Seaboard World [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]357 F.3d 328 cases. TSC Indus. , 426 U.S. at 448.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 F.2d 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Central Bank Held that There is No Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)",
		"context": "The theory of \"scheme\" liability advanced by the SEC for primary liability is almost indistinguishablefrom aiding and abetting liability, which Central Bank rejected. The circuit courts that have addressedarguments virtually identical to the SEC's argumentshave ruled that a secondary actor like Petitioner whoneither makes a misstatement (or omission in the faceof a duty to disclose) nor employs a manipulative devicemay not be held liable as primary violators underSection 10(b), even if the defendant is alleged to haveparticipated in some manner in a scheme to defraud.See Regents of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 38 (\"'[D]eceptive' conduct involves either a misstatement or a failure to disclose by one who has a duty to disclose.\" (internal quotation marks omitted)) . In Central Bank, this Court held that Section 10(b) prohibits only the making of a material misstatement(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 F.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Central Bank Held that There is No Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)",
		"context": "(internal quotation marks omitted)) . In Central Bank, this Court held that Section 10(b) prohibits only the making of a material misstatement(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd552 U.S. 148 or any subpart of Rule 10b- 5. \"); 77 F.3d 1215. In response to Central Bank 's elimination of aiding and abetting liability in 1995 Congress passed Section20(e) of the Exchange Act as part of the PSLRA.Section 20(e) restored the S EC's ability to bring actions for aiding and abetting against anyone who \"knowinglyor recklessly provides substantial assistance to anotherperson\" in a violation of the federal securities laws.Section 20(e) did not restore the ability of privateplaintiffs to bring aiding and abetting claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 987",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Central Bank Held that There is No Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)",
		"context": "(internal quotation marks omitted)) . In Central Bank, this Court held that Section 10(b) prohibits only the making of a material misstatement(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act. In re443 F.3d 987, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] or any subpart of Rule 10b- 5. \"); 77 F.3d 1215. In response to Central Bank 's elimination of aiding and abetting liability in 1995 Congress passed Section20(e) of the Exchange Act as part of the PSLRA.Section 20(e) restored the S EC's ability to bring actions for aiding and abetting against anyone who \"knowinglyor recklessly provides substantial assistance to anotherperson\" in a violation of the federal securities laws.Section 20(e) did not restore the ability of privateplaintiffs to bring aiding and abetting claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Central Bank Held that There is No Cause of Action for Aiding and Abetting under Section 10(b)",
		"context": "In Central Bank, this Court held that Section 10(b) prohibits only the making of a material misstatement(or omission) or the commission of a manipulative act. In re443 F.3d 987, aff'd552 U.S. 148 or any subpart of Rule 10b- 5. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In response to Central Bank 's elimination of aiding and abetting liability in 1995 Congress passed Section20(e) of the Exchange Act as part of the PSLRA.Section 20(e) restored the S EC's ability to bring actions for aiding and abetting against anyone who \"knowinglyor recklessly provides substantial assistance to anotherperson\" in a violation of the federal securities laws.Section 20(e) did not restore the ability of privateplaintiffs to bring aiding and abetting claims. The D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "77 F.3d 1215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The Act Does Not Advance Any Legitimate State Interest, and So Fails to Meet Any Standard of Constitutional Scrutiny",
		"context": "To survive strict scrutiny, the Government must prove that the compelled speech is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. Arizona Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The state has no legitimate interest in promoting abortion as a method for a pregnant mother to terminate her constitutionally protected relationship with her child. State promotion of a mother giving up her constitutionally protected liberty interest conflicts with the state's duty to protect that interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "An in rem action does not hale an unconsenting state into court, but rather hales the property into court. The judgment in an i n rem suit \"is limited to the property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability on the property owner. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Accordingly , the exercise of in rem jurisdiction \"does not implicate state sovereignty to nearly the same degree as other kinds of jurisdiction .\" Cent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "Cent. Virginia Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has therefore rejected claims of sovereign immunity from in rem actions that do not implicat e the interests underpinning sovereign immunity . In Tennessee Student Assistance 541 U.S. 440 , for example, th e Court held that sovereign immunity does not bar in rem bankruptcy actions seeking to discharge debts owed to a state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "546 U.S. 356 . This Court has therefore rejected claims of sovereign immunity from in rem actions that do not implicat e the interests underpinning sovereign immunity . In Tennessee Student Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for example, th e Court held that sovereign immunity does not bar in rem bankruptcy actions seeking to discharge debts owed to a state. Id. at 450- 51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "Id. at 450- 51 & n.5. Likewise, i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court held tha t sovereign immunity does not bar federal jurisdiction over in rem admiralty actions when the s tate is not in possession of the res, as a judgment in such a case would not require \"property of the sovereign … to be seized .\" Id. at 505, 507-08.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "Just the opposite: The principal purpose of a §717f(h) action is to provide affirmative relief to the property owner in the form of just compensation for a right -of-way for a crossing that FERC has already authorized . That is particularly true of §717f(h) actions since any issue beyond transferring the right - of-way and valuing the property interest is jurisdictionally foreclosed. Far from \"seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , §717f(h) action s aim to augment the state treasur y by paying \"fair market value\" for the property interests being taken, United State 469 U.S. 24 . It is difficult to imagine how state sovereign interests could be offended by an action whose purpose is to make good on the Fifth Amendment's promise of just compensation , especially when the state concedes the federal government's power to authorize the crossing . The fact that §717f(h) act ions provide affirmative relief to the state is enough to defeat any claim that they are \"threatening to state sovereignty .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "43 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "Just the opposite: The principal purpose of a §717f(h) action is to provide affirmative relief to the property owner in the form of just compensation for a right -of-way for a crossing that FERC has already authorized . That is particularly true of §717f(h) actions since any issue beyond transferring the right - of-way and valuing the property interest is jurisdictionally foreclosed. Far from \"seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury,\" 43 U.S. 651 , §717f(h) action s aim to augment the state treasur y by paying \"fair market value\" for the property interests being taken, United State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is difficult to imagine how state sovereign interests could be offended by an action whose purpose is to make good on the Fifth Amendment's promise of just compensation , especially when the state concedes the federal government's power to authorize the crossing . The fact that §717f(h) act ions provide affirmative relief to the state is enough to defeat any claim that they are \"threatening to state sovereignty .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "A state in theory could refuse to appear and retain its right to compensation . See A.W. Duckett & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . An d a §717f(h) action certainly does not require a state \" to defend itself \" against charges of wrongdoing, Fed. Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "An d a §717f(h) action certainly does not require a state \" to defend itself \" against charges of wrongdoing, Fed. Mar. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as such an action \"is merely an inquisition to establish a particular fact,\" i.e., \"the value of the property,\" so that the state can be made whole. 109 U.S. 513 . The conclusion that §717f(h) actions do not impose any sovereign injury distinct from the FERC certificate is reinforced by the immovable -property doctrine , which , as noted , generally provides that a sovereign has no sovereign immunity from a lawsuit 44 concerning real property in the jurisdiction of another sovereign .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The In Rem Nature of section 717f(h) Actions Confirms That They Raise No Distinct Sovereign Immunity Concerns",
		"context": "Mar. 535 U.S. 743 , as such an action \"is merely an inquisition to establish a particular fact,\" i.e., \"the value of the property,\" so that the state can be made whole. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The conclusion that §717f(h) actions do not impose any sovereign injury distinct from the FERC certificate is reinforced by the immovable -property doctrine , which , as noted , generally provides that a sovereign has no sovereign immunity from a lawsuit 44 concerning real property in the jurisdiction of another sovereign . See supra p.32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Government Agrees That The Court Should Grant Plenary Review Of The Constitutional Question, Including The Question Of The Proper Remedy",
		"context": "In addition, and as explained in the petition and by several amici , the Ninth Circuit's bizarre invocation of \"severability\" principles to deny a successful First Amendment litigant any relief by rewriting a statute to abridge more speech is anathema to the First Amendment and is contrary to this Court 's jurisprudence as well as decisions from other courts of appeals . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Pet.17- 22; Br. of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce & Business Round table (\"Chamber.Br.\") 18- 21; Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "18 F.3d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Government Agrees That The Court Should Grant Plenary Review Of The Constitutional Question, Including The Question Of The Proper Remedy",
		"context": "Certiorari is pl ainly warranted here. The government 's brief does little to refute the Ninth Circuit's ruling t hat the TCPA's prohibition on ATDS calls is unconstitutional, and its argument s in 4 its AAPC petition actually undermine the Ninth Circuit's misguided \"severability\" analysis. The government maintains that the statute's \"automated - call restriction\" i s \"content-neutral,\" U. S.Br.8, based on the same distinction between content and purpose that this Court rejected in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the government's view, the ATDS prohibition does not \"depend on the content of the speech at issue\" because the government- debt- collection exception is triggered by \"the call's economic purpose.\" U.S.Br.8 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Decennial Census Count That Excludes Non-Citizens Is Disconsonant with Constitutional and Statutory Mandates",
		"context": "art. I, § 2, cl. 3; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To do otherwise would run afoul of the constitutional mandate 8 that apportionment be based on the \"whole number of persons in each State.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Decennial Census Count That Excludes Non-Citizens Is Disconsonant with Constitutional and Statutory Mandates",
		"context": "But its conclusion (i.e., that undocumented persons should be excluded) does not follow from the premise. The word \"inhabitant\" refers merely to someone's \"usual residence\" or \"usual place of abode\"—or any circumstances where they have an \"enduring tie to a place.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All persons who reside in a state, including those without documented citizenship status, have the requisite \"enduring tie to a place\" to make them \"inhabitants\" with their \"usual residence\" in that state. See Franklin , 505 U.S. at 805; City of San Jose, California , 2020 WL 6253433.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because the scandalous-marks provision is a viewpoint-neutral condition on a government benefit whose availability necessarily turns on the content of an applicant's speech, the court of appeals erred in subjecting that provision to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "As a general matter, when the government restricts speech on the basis of content, such regulation \"may be justified only if the government proves that [it is] nar- rowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court, however, has \"identified numerous situa- tions\" involving \" 'content discrimination' \" in which \"strict scrutiny is unwarranted\" —including situations in which \"the government is acting in a capacity o ther than as regulator.\" 551 U.S. 177 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because the scandalous-marks provision is a viewpoint-neutral condition on a government benefit whose availability necessarily turns on the content of an applicant's speech, the court of appeals erred in subjecting that provision to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2218 . This Court, however, has \"identified numerous situa- tions\" involving \" 'content discrimination' \" in which \"strict scrutiny is unwarranted\" —including situations in which \"the government is acting in a capacity o ther than as regulator.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In this case, t he USPTO's determination that respondent's mark was \"scandalous\" and therefore unregistrable undoubtedly turned on the content of the mark. For three related reasons, however, strict scrutiny is unwarranted here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because the scandalous-marks provision is a viewpoint-neutral condition on a government benefit whose availability necessarily turns on the content of an applicant's speech, the court of appeals erred in subjecting that provision to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "To treat the denial of regi stration as the 20 constitutional equivalent of a ban on speech, and to ap- ply strict scrutiny to content -based criteria for trade- mark registration under the Lanham Act, would funda- mentally disrupt the statutory scheme. Third , \"scan- dalous\" marks are ineligibl e for registration not be- cause the y are thought to convey offensive ideas , but because such marks reflect an offensive \" mode of ex- pressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.\" R. A. V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The scandalous -marks provision thus differs from the dis- paragement provision struck down in Tam , which the Court viewed as targeting the underlying \"ideas\" ex- pressed. 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (Alito, J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Ninth Circuit's decision threatens states' authority under other federal statutes and in waters outside CSU boundaries",
		"context": "26 Making matters worse, the federal government's newly granted management authority also may extend well beyond the geographic scope of waters physically running through federal areas. Under the Ninth Cir-cuit's \"immensely broad\" concept of appurtenance, the government's reserved water right gives it control of not just the portions of the navigable waterway that lie inside CSU boundaries, but also other waters appurte- nant to the reserved federal land. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The potential scope of the government management au- thority over what were previously clearly Alaska's wa- ters now includes \"all the bodies of water on which the United States' reserved rights could at some point be enforced – i.e., those waters that are or may become necessary to fulfill the prima ry purposes of the federal reservation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "720 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Havens Realty's reasoning squarely applies to Reservation Rule testers.",
		"context": "3 Acheson does not contest that Havens Realty 's rea- soning applies generally to Title III, permitting disa- bled testers to bring suit challenging physical barriers they encounter in places of public accommodation. And although Acheson observes that, unlike the FHA , Title III does not specifically grant disabled individu- als \"a private cause of ac tion to vindicate an informa- tional right,\" Petr's Br. 12, Acheson acknowledge s 3 See Suarez 988 F.3d 542 ; 942 F.3d 752 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; C.R. Educ. & Enf' t 867 F.3d 1093 ; Colo. Cross -Disability Coal 765 F.3d 1205 ; 733 F.3d 1323 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Havens Realty's reasoning squarely applies to Reservation Rule testers.",
		"context": "12, Acheson acknowledge s 3 See Suarez 988 F.3d 542 ; 942 F.3d 752 ; 878 F.3d 447; C.R. Educ. & Enf' t [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Colo. Cross -Disability Coal 765 F.3d 1205 ; 733 F.3d 1323 . 25 that the deprivation of information can in some cir- cumstances amount to \"discrimination on the basis of disability\" under Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Havens Realty's reasoning squarely applies to Reservation Rule testers.",
		"context": "12, Acheson acknowledge s 3 See Suarez 988 F.3d 542 ; 942 F.3d 752 ; 878 F.3d 447; C.R. Educ. & Enf' t 867 F.3d 1093 ; Colo. Cross -Disability Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 733 F.3d 1323 . 25 that the deprivation of information can in some cir- cumstances amount to \"discrimination on the basis of disability\" under Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 1205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Havens Realty's reasoning squarely applies to Reservation Rule testers.",
		"context": "12, Acheson acknowledge s 3 See Suarez 988 F.3d 542 ; 942 F.3d 752 ; 878 F.3d 447; C.R. Educ. & Enf' t 867 F.3d 1093 ; Colo. Cross -Disability Coal 765 F.3d 1205 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 25 that the deprivation of information can in some cir- cumstances amount to \"discrimination on the basis of disability\" under Title III, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "733 F.3d 1323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "10 n.3. As this Court has explained, once the named plaintiff establishes Article III injury and membership in the class, the inquiry shifts \"from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to 'fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Spokeo itself recognized that, to bring a class action, Article III requires the \"named plaintiffs [to] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": ". 'show that they personally have been injured, not that [the] injury has -9- been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong.'\" 136 S. Ct. at 1547 n.6 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also, e.g., 424 U.S. 747. And that is all they have to show at the certification stage for the action to be justiciable under Article III, as courts and commentators alike have broadly recognized. See Davis et.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": ". 'show that they personally have been injured, not that [the] injury has -9- been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong.'\" 136 S. Ct. at 1547 n.6 (quoting 426 U.S. 26); see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that is all they have to show at the certification stage for the action to be justiciable under Article III, as courts and commentators alike have broadly recognized. See Davis et.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "Pet. App. 17; see Tyson Foods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that an \"Article III problem would arise only if a court intended to distribute funds to uninjured people\"). The Constitution simply does not require that injury-in-fact be proven at the class-certification stage. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1036",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "Nor does Rule 23's predominance impose such a requirement. As this Court has made clear, Rule 23(b)(3) \"does not require a plaintiff seeking class certification to prove that each elemen[t] of [her] claim [is] susceptible to classwide proof.\" Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And \"it would 'put the cart before the horse,' . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": ". to read Rule 23 to require that a plaintiff demonstrate prior to class certification that each class member is injured.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, all that Rule 23(b)(3) requires is that common questions \"predominate over any questions affecting only individual [class] members.\" Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.3d 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "23(b)(3) (emphasis added). Indeed, \"[t]he entire notion of predominance implies that the plaintiffs ' claims need not be identical.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Amgen, 568 U.S. at 469 (noting that the \" focus of the predominance inquiry\" is on whether the \"proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation\" (cleaned up)). Thus, as this Court has explained, a class can meet the predominance requirement \"even though other important matters will have to be tried separately, such as damages or some affirmative defenses peculiar to some individual class members.\" Tyson Foods , 136 S. Ct. at 1045 (quoting 7AA Wright, Miller, & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1778, pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "2005) ). The fact that -11- \"some class members' claims will fail on the merits if and when damages are decided\" is \"generally irrelevant to the district court's decision on class certification.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ruiz 835 F.3d 1125. So even if there are individualized questions about class members' injuries in a particular case, that matters for certification only if there is \"reason to think that these questions will overwhelm common ones .\" Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "669 F.3d 802",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "2005) ). The fact that -11- \"some class members' claims will fail on the merits if and when damages are decided\" is \"generally irrelevant to the district court's decision on class certification.\" 669 F.3d 802; see also Ruiz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So even if there are individualized questions about class members' injuries in a particular case, that matters for certification only if there is \"reason to think that these questions will overwhelm common ones .\" Halliburton 573 U.S. 258 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 1125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "Whether or not TransUnion is right, the standing question here will be answered on a classwide basis. As Judge Easterbrook has observed, \"Rule 23 allows certification of classes that are fated to lose as well as classes that are sure to win.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 3. In light of the above, \" it is difficult to understand why the presence of uninjured class members at the preliminary stage should defeat class certification. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "618 F.3d 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "But as the amici themselves acknowledge, in many (if not most) cases, it is difficult to determine \"whether the class as defined contains uninjured members.\" Id. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given this , as we explain in Section III below, these practical concerns are better addressed by other mechanisms that courts have developed to deal with this issue after determining liability. In the end, while inclusion of uninjured class members at the certification stage may sometimes be \"inefficient,\" \"this is counterbalanced by the overall efficiency of the class action mechanism.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 F.3d 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Neither Article III nor Rule 23 requires that absent class members submit evidence of personal standing at class certification",
		"context": "In the end, while inclusion of uninjured class members at the certification stage may sometimes be \"inefficient,\" \"this is counterbalanced by the overall efficiency of the class action mechanism.\" Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 ; see also Kleen Prod. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. -13-",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA's Unambiguous Text Requires Immigration Judges to Make Reinstatement Decisions",
		"context": "The same was true when § 1231(a)(5 ) was enacted in 1996. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.10 (1995); Matter of Lok, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 Indeed, immigration judges regularly adjudicate — and are required by § 1229a to adjudicate —other determinations that the INA assigns ultimately to the Attorney General. This includes the cancellation of removal provision, which specifies that \"[t]he Attorney General may cancel removal\" under certain circumstances, 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "18 I. & N. Dec. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The BOOKING.COM Service Mark",
		"context": "§ 1071(b) civil action in the Eastern District of Virginia (the default venue for foreign plaintiff-applicants) for de novo review in order to make additional evidentiary submissions with which to challenge the administrative ruling. Based on those submissions, Booking.Com B.V. prevailed in the civil action on the merits of registrability. Booking.Com [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reh'g denied, No. 172458 (4th Cir. Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any other circuit would have reached the same",
		"context": "9 -10, 13. But Peti- tioner conflates tw o different inquiries. The fact that a danger is \"obvious\" for purposes of the Eighth Amendment merits inquiry un- der [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not make prison officials' behavior \"obviously unconstitutional\" for purposes of the qual ified -immunity inquiry under Hope. 33 Circuit . See Part I V.A, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any other circuit would have reached the same",
		"context": "Petitioner compares ap- ples to oranges by relying on cases from circuits not ad- dressing a similar body of law. See Pet. 16-17, 21-22 (cit- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Weathers v. Loumakis , 742 F. App 'x 332 (9th Cir. 2018) ; Brooks , 800 F.3d at 1298; 264 F.3d 965). In Hope 's terms, t he absence of warning signs , in- cluding the content of the authority binding t he Fifth Circuit , precluded the possibility that the duration of the unsanitary conditions was obvious ly unconstitutional .",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.3d 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any other circuit would have reached the same",
		"context": "See Pet. 16-17, 21-22 (cit- ing 928 F.3d 520 ; Weathers v. Loumakis , 742 F. App 'x 332 (9th Cir. 2018) ; Brooks , 800 F.3d at 1298; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In Hope 's terms, t he absence of warning signs , in- cluding the content of the authority binding t he Fifth Circuit , precluded the possibility that the duration of the unsanitary conditions was obvious ly unconstitutional . That would have been true elsewhere.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 F.3d 965",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implications if the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Were Constitutional",
		"context": "What about products that are themselves scandalous? 49 This is no hypothetical concern. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]723 F.Supp.2d 766. Finally, the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses under- mine trademark owners' established rights. Under Section 15, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.2d 686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implications if the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Were Constitutional",
		"context": "What about products that are themselves scandalous? 49 This is no hypothetical concern. See, e.g., Sambo's Restaurants, 663 F.2d 686[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses under- mine trademark owners' established rights. Under Section 15, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.Supp.2d 766",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Implications if the Immoral/Scandalous Clauses Were Constitutional",
		"context": "Under Section 15, 15 U.S.C. § 1065, allegedly immoral or scandalous marks are always subject to cancellation. Pro-Football, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Brief of Amicus Curiae Pro-Football, Inc. in Tam at 29-35. 11 11 What happens if a mark is registered but becomes scan- dalous because of changing attitudes about, for example, the Confederacy and its leaders, or preferred ethnic names?",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.3d 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. American Pipe Recognized That Statutes of Limitations Are Equitably Tolled During the Pendency of a Class Action for Subsequent Individual Actions",
		"context": "Emps. Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord 535 U.S. 43 . Those cases h old that when a class action is timely filed, the statute of li mitations must be tolled as a matter of equity for absent class members who sub- sequently bring their own individ ual claims (either through new comp laints or intervention in the pen d- ing a ction) that would otherwise be untimely. See Ameri can Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554 ; Crown , Cork , 462 U.S. at 354.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. American Pipe Recognized That Statutes of Limitations Are Equitably Tolled During the Pendency of a Class Action for Subsequent Individual Actions",
		"context": "Emps. Ret. 137 S. Ct. 2042 ; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those cases h old that when a class action is timely filed, the statute of li mitations must be tolled as a matter of equity for absent class members who sub- sequently bring their own individ ual claims (either through new comp laints or intervention in the pen d- ing a ction) that would otherwise be untimely. See Ameri can Pipe, 414 U.S. at 554 ; Crown , Cork , 462 U.S. at 354.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pre-AEDPA habeas principles generally require a prisoner who seeks to present a statutory claim in a second or subsequent collateral attack to show actual innocence",
		"context": "The upshot of those lim its is that pre-AEDPA habeas principles would ordinarily re- quire a prisoner seeking to assert a Davis claim in a sec- ond or subsequent collateral attack to establish his ac- tual innocence. A prisoner who had already raised his claim in an in- itial collateral attack would be subject to the rules gov- erning successive petitions, which require the prisoner to make a \"colorable showing of factual innocence .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That requirement applies even if the pri s- oner 's successive petition relies on an intervening deci- sion of this Court. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pre-AEDPA habeas principles generally require a prisoner who seeks to present a statutory claim in a second or subsequent collateral attack to show actual innocence",
		"context": "at 442- 443. And a prisoner who had not pressed his claim in his initial collateral at- tack would be subject to the rules governing abusive pe- titions, which likewise permit consideration of a previ- ously omitted claim upon a \"colorable showing of factual innocence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A prisoner who failed to present a claim in an initial collateral attack traditionally could also excuse that default by showing \"cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom,\" the same standard that applies to excuse a failure to raise a claim o n direct appeal. McCleskey , 499 U.S. at 494; see Bousley , 523 U.S. at 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pre-AEDPA habeas principles generally require a prisoner who seeks to present a statutory claim in a second or subsequent collateral attack to show actual innocence",
		"context": "at 623 (citation s omitted) . And attorney errors generally cannot constitute cause when they occur on collateral re- view, where no right to counsel attaches. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Martinez v. Ryan , 566 24 That actual -innocence exception to otherwise - applicable procedural bars is deeply rooted in this Court's habeas jurisprudence. See 569 U.S. 383. At the same time, because \"habeas corpus petitions that advance a sub- stantial claim of actual innocence are extreme ly rare,\" an actual -innocence standard respects \"systemic inter- ests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial re- sources.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pre-AEDPA habeas principles generally require a prisoner who seeks to present a statutory claim in a second or subsequent collateral attack to show actual innocence",
		"context": "And attorney errors generally cannot constitute cause when they occur on collateral re- view, where no right to counsel attaches. See 501 U.S. 722; see also Martinez v. Ryan , 566 24 That actual -innocence exception to otherwise - applicable procedural bars is deeply rooted in this Court's habeas jurisprudence. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the same time, because \"habeas corpus petitions that advance a sub- stantial claim of actual innocence are extreme ly rare,\" an actual -innocence standard respects \"systemic inter- ests in finality, comity, and conservation of judicial re- sources.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Intelligible Principle Exception",
		"context": ". In 1892, this Court flatly declared \"That Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is aprinciple universally recognized as vital to theintegrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.\" Marshall Field & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, as government became bigger and the federal budget became larger, there developed pressure oncourts to ignore the original plan and allow the growthof the executive power. As a result, even before thepressures on this Court from President Roosevelt andhis New Deal, this Court — while still payingrhetorical homage to the nondelegation doctrine —crafted a new test that over time has effectivelyeviscerated the doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Non-Delegation Doctrine and the Intelligible Principle Exception",
		"context": "As a result, even before thepressures on this Court from President Roosevelt andhis New Deal, this Court — while still payingrhetorical homage to the nondelegation doctrine —crafted a new test that over time has effectivelyeviscerated the doctrine. \"If Congress shall lay downby legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body author ized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.\" J. W. Hampton, Jr., & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the \"intelligibleprinciple\" standard has the sound of a legal principle,it must be noted that it is neither grounded in theconstitutional text, nor is it a term with a meaning 20 J. Hood at 136-137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief",
		"context": "4 Pomeroy § 1337, at 934; see also 2 Fred F. Lawrence, A Treatise on the Substantive Law of Equity Jurisprudence § 1093, at 1176 (1929) (The \"only purpose\" of a mandatory injunction \"is to prevent the continuance of a condi- tion created by the defendant.\"). This Court has repeatedly affirmed these princi- ples. In Northern Indiana Railroad [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court described an injunction as \"[i]n its na- ture preventative justice.\" Id. at 243.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief",
		"context": "In 6 The \"jurisdiction of equity by way of mandatory injunction is rarely exercised\" and is \"confined to cases where the courts of law are unable to afford adequate redress, or where the injury can not be compensated in damages.\" 1 High § 2, at 3-4. 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it held that an injunction \"afford[s] preventative relief\" and does not \"redress alleged wrongs which have been committed already.\" Id. at 124.",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief",
		"context": "Id. at 124. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that \"[t]he purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations.\" Id. at 633.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief",
		"context": "Id. at 633. And in Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it held that injunctive relief redresses \"a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation,\" not \"past infractions.\" Id. at 109; see also Los Angeles 562 U.S. 29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Injunctions Provide Forward-Looking Relief",
		"context": "And in Steel 523 U.S. 83, it held that injunctive relief redresses \"a continuing violation or the likelihood of a future violation,\" not \"past infractions.\" Id. at 109; see also Los Angeles [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Treatise authors agree. An injunction cannot \"be employed to correct a wrong already done or restore to a party rights of which he has been deprived\" unless \"the injuries are continued.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection",
		"context": "Jones , 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Courts are only now beginning to consider the potential impact of United States v. Jones and Flor- ida v. Jardines on existing Katz -based, Fourth Amend- ment caselaw. A case that considers this potential conflict is [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, Judg e – now Justice – Gorsuch, writing for a panel of the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, considered the impact of Jones on a Katz - based, warrant exception, know n as the private search doctrine. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 1292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Katz-Based Doctrines Should Be Reexamined in Light of United States v. Jones and Florida v. Jardines When Those Doctrines Undermine the Trespass Test's Interpretation of Fourth Amendment Protection",
		"context": "There, Judg e – now Justice – Gorsuch, writing for a panel of the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, considered the impact of Jones on a Katz - based, warrant exception, know n as the private search doctrine. See id. at 1307-08 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The private search doctrine, in essence, stands for the proposition that a warrant is not required when the government searches an item whose contraband or criminal nature was uncovered through a private ac-tor's search and then revealed to the government, and the government, in its later warrantless search, does not exceed the scope of the private actor's search. See Jacobsen , 466 U.S. at 117 (\"Once frustration of the original expectation of privacy occurs, the Fourth 17 Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of the now-nonprivate information .",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Proclamation violates the First Amendment's Religion Clauses",
		"context": "I. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are \"inextricably connected.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . They must be \"read together\" in light of their joint purpose \"to promote and assure the fu llest possible scope of reli- gious liberty and tolerance for all and to nurture the conditions which secure the best hope of attainment of that end.\" Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Proclamation violates the First Amendment's Religion Clauses",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]397 U.S. 664. Lawmakers \"are required to accord to 17 their own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations.\" Larson , 456 U.S. at 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Proclamation violates the First Amendment's Religion Clauses",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., 374 U.S. 203[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lawmakers \"are required to accord to 17 their own religions the very same treatment given to small, new, or unpopular denominations.\" Larson , 456 U.S. at 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Proclamation violates the First Amendment's Religion Clauses",
		"context": "at 540 . And because \" the purpose apparent from govern- ment action can have an impact more significant than the result expressly decreed,\" the question is not what is expressly decreed, but what an \"objective observer\" would perceive. McCreary Cty., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the evidence of discriminatory intent is overwhelming. That evidence is discussed in the 18 Fourth Circuit's opinion and elsewhere , and need not be addressed further here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], further counsels against applying i ssue preclusion here. To begin with, this Court has \"often repeated the general rule that 'one is not bound by a judgment in 18 The limited briefing on this question in the Tenth Circuit also explains—and provides a further reason not to give preclusive effect to—the Tenth Circuit's erroneous resolution of the question as an alternative ground for its decision. 55 personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "To begin with, this Court has \"often repeated the general rule that 'one is not bound by a judgment in 18 The limited briefing on this question in the Tenth Circuit also explains—and provides a further reason not to give preclusive effect to—the Tenth Circuit's erroneous resolution of the question as an alternative ground for its decision. 55 personam in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of process.'\" Taylor , 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Because this rule is \"grounded in due process,\" id. at 901, and the right of a litigant to have \"his own day in court,\" 517 U.S. 793, the Court has emphasized the \"importance of this rule\" and accordingly takes a \"'constrained approach to nonparty preclusion,'\" binding nonparties to prior judgments only in \"exceptional\" circumstances, 564 U.S. 299.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Taylor , 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting 311 U.S. 32). Because this rule is \"grounded in due process,\" id. at 901, and the right of a litigant to have \"his own day in court,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court has emphasized the \"importance of this rule\" and accordingly takes a \"'constrained approach to nonparty preclusion,'\" binding nonparties to prior judgments only in \"exceptional\" circumstances, 564 U.S. 299. There is no dispute in this case that Petitioner was not a party to the Repsis litigation; he was all of ten years old when Mr. Ten Bear and the Crow Tribe filed suit in 1992.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Taylor , 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting 311 U.S. 32). Because this rule is \"grounded in due process,\" id. at 901, and the right of a litigant to have \"his own day in court,\" 517 U.S. 793, the Court has emphasized the \"importance of this rule\" and accordingly takes a \"'constrained approach to nonparty preclusion,'\" binding nonparties to prior judgments only in \"exceptional\" circumstances, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no dispute in this case that Petitioner was not a party to the Repsis litigation; he was all of ten years old when Mr. Ten Bear and the Crow Tribe filed suit in 1992.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "This Court, however, has never addressed the circumstances under which a member of an Indian tribe can be deemed in \"privity\" with his or her tribe. That question has wide-ranging practical consequences, but it also implicates the due process concerns that attend nonparty preclusion, as well as questions of tribal sovereign immunity given Wyoming's attempt to invoke preclusion against a party that it claims is no different from a sovereign tribe. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 56 Next, applying preclusion here would require this Court to approve the use of offensive issue preclusion by a state against a criminal defendant—following a prior civil judgment, no less. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that issue preclusion, which \"first developed\" in civil litigation, has even less purchase in criminal cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly emphasized that issue preclusion, which \"first developed\" in civil litigation, has even less purchase in criminal cases. Bravo-Fernandez, 137 S. Ct. at 358. The Court has called for \"guarded application of preclusion doctrine in criminal cases,\" id., and just last Term, a plurality of this Court declined to \"import\" \"issue preclusion principles in civil cases … into the criminal law,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2018) (plurality op.). These admonishments, moreover, have come in the context of defensive issue preclusion— i.e., a criminal defendant's attempt to preclude the state from invoking an earlier criminal judgment. This Court has taken an even more skeptical view of a state's attempt to employ offensive issue preclusion against a criminal defendant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "These admonishments, moreover, have come in the context of defensive issue preclusion— i.e., a criminal defendant's attempt to preclude the state from invoking an earlier criminal judgment. This Court has taken an even more skeptical view of a state's attempt to employ offensive issue preclusion against a criminal defendant. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the state court had held that petitioner's conviction at an earlier trial had preclusive effect at a subsequent criminal trial on another charge. Id. at 386.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Courts of appeals, furthermore, have explicitly rejected offensive issue preclusion in criminal proceedings. See, e.g. , 150 F.3d 57; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 976 F.2d 633. Even more striking, the foregoing skepticism—and outright repudiation—of offensive preclusion in criminal cases arose in cases involving prior criminal judgments. This case, by contrast, involves a prior civil judgment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 F.3d 881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Courts of appeals, furthermore, have explicitly rejected offensive issue preclusion in criminal proceedings. See, e.g. , 150 F.3d 57; 14 F.3d 881; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even more striking, the foregoing skepticism—and outright repudiation—of offensive preclusion in criminal cases arose in cases involving prior criminal judgments. This case, by contrast, involves a prior civil judgment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "976 F.2d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": ", Gallardo-Mendez , 150 F.3d at 1245-46, the Cour t should not—and need not—do so now, particularly after the state here failed to raise issue preclusion in the first place. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, applying issue preclusion here would not advance the policies underly ing the doctrine. Issue preclusion is intended to reduce the \"expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,\" \"conserv[e] judicial resources,\" and \"minimiz[e] the possibility of inconsistent decisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Applying Issue Preclusion Here Would Needlessly Implicate Unsettled Constitutional Questions",
		"context": "Finally, applying issue preclusion here would not advance the policies underly ing the doctrine. Issue preclusion is intended to reduce the \"expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits,\" \"conserv[e] judicial resources,\" and \"minimiz[e] the possibility of inconsistent decisions.\" Taylor , 553 U.S. at 892; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Petitioner has not brought a separate suit triggering \"expense and vexation\" or taxing \"judicial resources\"; he was criminally prosecuted by the state. And if this Court declined to address the merits of the decision below, the same \"inconsistent decisions\" that 58 presumably led this Court to grant certiorari will remain in place, see Pet.24-27; Reply.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The program has a discriminatory effect",
		"context": "The Court not- ed that \"more than 90% of the children attending nonpublic schools in [the State] [were] enrolled in schools that are controlled by religious organizations 32 or that have the purpose of propagating and promot- ing religious faith.\" 413 U.S. at 830 (citation omitted) (comparing with Lemon v. Kurtzman , \"in which the Court noted that more than 96% of the children at- tending nonpublic schools in [the State] 'attend[ed] church-related schools'\").40 And even setting aside the problematic statistics, the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence of- ten simply asks whether a program has the imper- missible effect of causing \"a symbolic union between government and religion.\" See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, the \"sym- bolic union\" is evident. Taxpayers were effectively told that to qualify for a valuable government bene- fit, they would have to support Christian schools, even if doing so is offensive to the free exercise of their own faith.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause Was Intended To Limit Both Executive and Legislative Power",
		"context": "at 733-34 (citing Chadha , 462 U.S. at 958). See also Freytag , 501 U.S. at 880 (The Appointments Clause \"prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of t he power to appoint. \"); Free Enterprise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 272 U.S. 52 (\"[A]rticle 2 grants to the President the executive power of the government —i.e. , the general administrative control of those executing the law s, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers —a 10 conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause Was Intended To Limit Both Executive and Legislative Power",
		"context": "at 733-34 (citing Chadha , 462 U.S. at 958). See also Freytag , 501 U.S. at 880 (The Appointments Clause \"prevents Congress from dispensing power too freely; it limits the universe of eligible recipients of t he power to appoint. \"); Free Enterprise 561 U.S. 477; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A]rticle 2 grants to the President the executive power of the government —i.e. , the general administrative control of those executing the law s, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers —a 10 conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause Was Intended To Limit Both Executive and Legislative Power",
		"context": "73 , at 494 ( Alexander Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (The Appointments Clause is a 2 As Petitioners note, Congress refers to the SEC's administrative law judges as \"officers.\" See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": ". Relying on Loretto and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Petitioners claim that the Regulation is tantamount to a permanent physical occupation of their property. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "21-22. Such a claim is an exaggerated mischaracteriza-tion of the Access Regulation and those cases. This 33 The Court more recently set out a similar, but not exact, multifactor analysis in Arkansas Game & Fish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court there did not ex- plain whether Arkansas Game's multifactor analysis superseded Penn Central's or should be applied to a specific category of tak-ings cases. Arkansas Game's approach involves factual evalua-tions of the character of the property, the intrusion's frequency, duration, and severity, the owner's investment-backed expecta-tions, and the degree to which the challenged \"invasion\" was the intended or foreseeable result of authorized government action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "Id. at 437. The \"temporary limitations\" found in Pruneyard Shop-ping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Kaiser 444 U.S. 164, and the intermittent flooding cases, on the other hand, \"are subject to a more complex balancing process [un der Penn Cen tral] to determine whether they are a tak- ing.\" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.35 Here, Petitioners point to no facts that describe any- thing resembling a permanent occupation. While they claim they are subject to 120 days of access per year, this in itself is not permanent and continuous, and in practical terms, they have not been subject to more than a few days of access in the past five plus years.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "Id. at 437. The \"temporary limitations\" found in Pruneyard Shop-ping 447 U.S. 74, Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the intermittent flooding cases, on the other hand, \"are subject to a more complex balancing process [un der Penn Cen tral] to determine whether they are a tak- ing.\" Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 n.12.35 Here, Petitioners point to no facts that describe any- thing resembling a permanent occupation. While they claim they are subject to 120 days of access per year, this in itself is not permanent and continuous, and in practical terms, they have not been subject to more than a few days of access in the past five plus years.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "Br. 15, 24-26, even where the Court found \"permanent\" invasions of space based on \"inter- mittent\" government activity, the Court found that there was seri-ous economic loss in addition to that intermittent government ac-tivity. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel 260 U.S. 327. Here, Petitioners have not demonstrated any eco-nomic loss at all from the Access Regulation. 18 to no destruction, limitation, or depreciation of any val- ue in their property because of union organizer access.",
		"citation_value_orig": "243 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "Br. 15, 24-26, even where the Court found \"permanent\" invasions of space based on \"inter- mittent\" government activity, the Court found that there was seri-ous economic loss in addition to that intermittent government ac-tivity. See, e.g., 243 U.S. 316; Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Petitioners have not demonstrated any eco-nomic loss at all from the Access Regulation. 18 to no destruction, limitation, or depreciation of any val- ue in their property because of union organizer access.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "This Court has often recognized that property rights in a physical thing can be described as the right to \"pos-sess, use and dispose of it.\" Id. at 435 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Under the Access Regulation, Petitioners con-tinue to have the right to possess, use, and dispose of the property without limitation. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "In short, the principle of ac-commodation announced in Babcock is limited to labor organization campaigns, and the 'yielding' of property rights it may require is both temporary and limited. Id. (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added). 36 36 In the sixty-plus years since the Babcock & Wilcox decision, this Court has repeatedly affirmed that employers may be com- 19 Petitioners urge that the grant of access to union or- ganizers here should nonetheless be treated like a per- manent physical occupation because it is analogous to the grant of a common law easement. But the Access Regulation does not grant an easement because it al-lows access to the workers—not to particular property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "The access rights here also are not transfer-able, like an easement. If Petitioners choose to sell their land and the new landowner chooses to create a mobile home park or factory, there would be no trans-ferable easement granting anyone access. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, there is no principled distinction between the access rights here and the government's right to conduct inspections on property, which is not treated as an easement. See Prop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "202 Cal. App. 2d 843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "Id. at 832 n.1; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (PruneYard \"underscores the constitutional dis- tinction between a permanent occupation and a tem-porary physical invasion\"). Moreover, this Court has restricted Nollan and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to \"the special context of exactions—land- use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.\" City of 526 U.S. 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Access Regulation does not interfere with Petitioners' use of their property and does not grant an easement",
		"context": "at 832 n.1; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434 (PruneYard \"underscores the constitutional dis- tinction between a permanent occupation and a tem-porary physical invasion\"). Moreover, this Court has restricted Nollan and 512 U.S. 374, to \"the special context of exactions—land- use decisions conditioning approval of development on the dedication of property to public use.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Well-established principles, beyond the constitutional avoidance canon, support narrow construction of criminal statutes",
		"context": "Id. at 2377- 2378. See also Skil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's decisions likewise m ake clear that it is inadequate to rely on prosecutorial restraint to cabin the reach of otherwise overbroad criminal statutes. It is not enough that \"Congress could have intended that th[e] broad range of conduct be made illegal, perhaps with the underst anding that prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid such hard results\"—especially when faced with a \"paucity of material suggesting that Con- gress did so intend.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Well-established principles, beyond the constitutional avoidance canon, support narrow construction of criminal statutes",
		"context": "This Court's decisions likewise m ake clear that it is inadequate to rely on prosecutorial restraint to cabin the reach of otherwise overbroad criminal statutes. It is not enough that \"Congress could have intended that th[e] broad range of conduct be made illegal, perhaps with the underst anding that prosecutors would exercise their discretion to avoid such hard results\"—especially when faced with a \"paucity of material suggesting that Con- gress did so intend.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Although the United State s here urges a more mod- est reading of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i) that would limit its own prosecutorial authority, generally criminal statutes cannot be interpreted broadly \"on the assumption that the Government will 'use [them] re- sponsibly.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Well-established principles, beyond the constitutional avoidance canon, support narrow construction of criminal statutes",
		"context": "\" McDonnell , 579 U.S. at 576. Indeed, as this Court has repeatedly cautioned, construing a criminal statute to cover routine and ordinary conduct \"merely because the G overnment promised to use it responsibly\" would \"leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Mari- 138 S. Ct. 1101142 S. Ct. 2015. Likewise, to the extent there is ambiguity in a crim- inal statute, this Court applies the rule of lenity to con- strain its reach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Well-established principles, beyond the constitutional avoidance canon, support narrow construction of criminal statutes",
		"context": "Indeed, as this Court has repeatedly cautioned, construing a criminal statute to cover routine and ordinary conduct \"merely because the G overnment promised to use it responsibly\" would \"leave us at the mercy of noblesse oblige .\" 559 U.S. 460. See Mari- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]142 S. Ct. 2015. Likewise, to the extent there is ambiguity in a crim- inal statute, this Court applies the rule of lenity to con- strain its reach. See, e.g., 574 U.S. 528; Skilling , 561 U.S. at 410 (noting that \"ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity\") (citations omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. In the Context of a Discretionary Grant Program, There Is No Coherent Distinction between Selecting Grantees who Support the Government's Agenda and \"Imposing\" such Support on Grantees",
		"context": ". The AID I majority ultimately turned on what it saw as the difference between \"the Government's ability toenlist the assistance of those with whom it alreadyagrees\" and \"compelling a grant recipient to adopt aparticular belief as a condition of funding,\" 570 U.S. at218. 3 But this supposed distinction is no more than a [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved a condition imposed on an entire project, not just on the use of funds, but thisCourt held that the condition properly supported the government's desired focus in its funding program. It thus qualified as a legitimate selection criterion. 3That the condition is \"ongoing\" and \"a ground for terminating a grant,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Ninth Circuit's \"Traceability Theory\" Contravenes Legislative History and Usurps Congressional Authority",
		"context": "The Act's silence on groundwater in the context of permitting highlights the lack of Congressional intent for such permitting provisions to cover releases 13 of pollutant via groundwater, particularly in contrast with the express references to groundwater elsewhere in the statute. Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Umatilla court also noted that, of the four categories of water described throughout the Act— navigable waters, groundwater, the contiguous zone, and oceans—the definition of \"discharge of a pollutant\" excludes groundwater while expressly including navigable waters and waters of the contiguous zone and the ocean. 962 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "618 F. Supp. 1103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Ninth Circuit's \"Traceability Theory\" Contravenes Legislative History and Usurps Congressional Authority",
		"context": "§ 1362(12)). As a number of courts have pointed out, the legislative history of the Act supports the plain-language reading that the Act does not regulate groundwater. See Village of Oconomowoc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Umatilla Waterquality , 962 F. Supp. at 1318-19; Kelley , 618 F. Supp. at 1105–06.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F.3d 962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "4 Vazquez, supra , at 531 n.104. If the individual's challenge were successful and the seizure were declared unlawful, the officers would have been required to pay damages for seizing the property. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This outcome would have been driven by the courts' strict observance of the principle that the federal government can only 4 It could be that the act that authorized the seizure was un- constitutional. Or it could be that the act was constitutional, but did not apply to the actions of the officer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "This outcome would have been driven by the courts' strict observance of the principle that the federal government can only 4 It could be that the act that authorized the seizure was un- constitutional. Or it could be that the act was constitutional, but did not apply to the actions of the officer. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 invoke powers enumerated in the Constitution. Kian, supra , at 144 n.39.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "Therefore, if there is no constitu- tional act of the government to authorize the officer's actions—either because he exceeded the valid author-ization or because the authorization itself is unconsti- tutional—then the officer exceeded his authority and must be held personally liable. Kian, supra , at 144. Thus, for example, in Bates v. Clark , the Court up- held a damages verdict against an army captain and his lieutenant for seizing whiskey from merchants on the ground that the merchants we re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The mer-chants brought an action for trespass and the govern- ment officers \"pleaded their official character,\" namely that they acted pursuant to Congressional authoriza-tion and an order from a U.S. Attorney. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "This result might at first seem harsh. As Justice John Marshall admitted in Little v. Barreme , his \"first bias\" in the case was \"in favor of the opinion that though instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But upon further ex- amination, he concluded that authority invalidly given cannot \"change the nature of the transaction, or legal- ize an act which without [su ch authority] would have 14 been a plain trespass.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 U.S. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "Id. To the same point, Justice Story reasoned in The Apollon that \"[t]he Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can only look to the quest ions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were, justice demands that the injured party should re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 After all, \"[a]ll the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.\" 106 U.S. 196. An alterna- tive framework, in which \"courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived [of his rights] by force\" simply because of authority emanating from a higher source would \"sanction[ ] a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regu-lated liberty and the protection of personal rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. For most of this nation's history, individuals could hold federal officers personally liable for violations of constitutional rights",
		"context": "To the same point, Justice Story reasoned in The Apollon that \"[t]he Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this Court can only look to the quest ions, whether the laws have been violated; and if they were, justice demands that the injured party should re22 U.S. 362.5 After all, \"[a]ll the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An alterna- tive framework, in which \"courts cannot give remedy when the citizen has been deprived [of his rights] by force\" simply because of authority emanating from a higher source would \"sanction[ ] a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which has a just claim to well-regu-lated liberty and the protection of personal rights.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "1. a. Statutory interpretation starts with the text ( e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and the text here is unambiguous. On its face, Section 314(d) is expressly limited to the Direc- tor's \"determination\" under Section 314 : \"The determina- tion by the Director whether to institute inter partes re- view under this section shall be final and nonappealable.\" 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "316(e) (setting evidentiary standards in \"an inter partes review instituted under this chapter \") (emphasis added). Congress did not use contra sting terms in adjacent provisions for them to assume the same meaning. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 464 U.S. 16. The fact that Con-gress wrote \"under this chapter \" (not \"under this sec- tion\") in Section 314(b) shows that Congress knows ex- actly how to use that broader language where it so wishes. Yet Congress did not use that language in Section 314(d), despite using it two subsections earlier.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "316(e) (setting evidentiary standards in \"an inter partes review instituted under this chapter \") (emphasis added). Congress did not use contra sting terms in adjacent provisions for them to assume the same meaning. See, e.g., 556 U.S. 418; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that Con-gress wrote \"under this chapter \" (not \"under this sec- tion\") in Section 314(b) shows that Congress knows ex- actly how to use that broader language where it so wishes. Yet Congress did not use that language in Section 314(d), despite using it two subsections earlier.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "Even without the strong presumption favoring ju dicial review, that linguis- tic choice was plainly deliberate. Moreover, any contrary reading of the operative clause (\"under this section\") would impermissibly render it surplusage. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 564 U.S. 162. If Sect ion 314(d) cuts off judicial review over any \"instituti on\" determination made any- where in Chapter 31, then \"under this section\" has no meaning. Section 314(d) would mean exactly the same thing with or without it; in fact, Congress could replace \"section\" with \"chapter\" and it would have the identical effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "Even without the strong presumption favoring ju dicial review, that linguis- tic choice was plainly deliberate. Moreover, any contrary reading of the operative clause (\"under this section\") would impermissibly render it surplusage. See 566 U.S. 93; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Sect ion 314(d) cuts off judicial review over any \"instituti on\" determination made any- where in Chapter 31, then \"under this section\" has no meaning. Section 314(d) would mean exactly the same thing with or without it; in fact, Congress could replace \"section\" with \"chapter\" and it would have the identical effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "35 U.S.C. 314( a) (emphases added). That kind of initial, tentative assessment is often unreviewable either because any prejudice is \"washed clean\" by the fi- nal merits decision, In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 562 U.S. 180, or because the questi on is committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)—making it a com- fortable fit for Section 314(d).",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 314(d)'s plain text establishes that Congress did not bar judicial review over the agency's construction of Section 315(b)",
		"context": "314( a) (emphases added). That kind of initial, tentative assessment is often unreviewable either because any prejudice is \"washed clean\" by the fi- nal merits decision, In re150 F.3d 1362; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or because the questi on is committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2)—making it a com- fortable fit for Section 314(d). See Cuozzo , 136 S. Ct. at 2140 (\"the kind of initial dete rmination at issue here—that there is a 'reasonable likelih ood' that the claims are un- patentable on the grounds asserted—is akin to decisions which, in other contexts, we have held to be unreviewa- ble\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 5 United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439 ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ..... 18 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652503 U.S. 249 ................................................................ 3 Cyan, 138 S. Ct. 1061950 F.3d 458, petition for cert. pending, No. 20- 209 (filed Aug. 17, 2020) ........................................... 2 543 U.S. 335 ................................................................ 5 136 S. Ct. 958 .............. 9, 12 565 U.S. 368 ...... 10 572 U.S. 434 .................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Thryv, 140 S. Ct. 1367 ........................... 5 555 U.S. 415 ........................ 5 United States Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................ 3 Statutes and regulations: Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692 et seq. .................................................................................... 20 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "This case , however, does not turn on any question of subject -verb agreement or the sense of anything . It turns on the precise meaning of a particular statutory phrase . Absent absurdity or \"scrivener's error,\" United States Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a court in construing a statute \"must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says. \" Connecticut Nat'l 503 U.S. 249. And because l egislators \"are pre- sumed to be gr ammatical in their compositions, \" Scali a & Garner 140, \"matter s of syntax are critical \" in deter- mining what a statute says, 140 S. Ct. 1168.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "It turns on the precise meaning of a particular statutory phrase . Absent absurdity or \"scrivener's error,\" United States Nat'l 508 U.S. 439, a court in construing a statute \"must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says. \" Connecticut Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because l egislators \"are pre- sumed to be gr ammatical in their compositions, \" Scali a & Garner 140, \"matter s of syntax are critical \" in deter- mining what a statute says, 140 S. Ct. 1168. 4 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "Br. 20 (citation omitted). Al- though Duguid attempts to minimize that problem, t he Court relied on precisely that distinction in declining to apply the canon in Encino Motorcars , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It should do the same here. 5 Duguid's invocation (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "20 -21) of the last- antecedent rule is similarly unavailing. That rule provides that \"a limiting clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifyi ng only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 572 U.S. 434 ; 555 U.S. 415 . For at least three reason s, the last -antecedent rule does not support Duguid's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) . First, the last -antecedent rule does not apply to a modifier that appears \"at the end of a single, integrated list.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "20 -21) of the last- antecedent rule is similarly unavailing. That rule provides that \"a limiting clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifyi ng only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.\" 136 S. Ct. 958; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 555 U.S. 415 . For at least three reason s, the last -antecedent rule does not support Duguid's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) . First, the last -antecedent rule does not apply to a modifier that appears \"at the end of a single, integrated list.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "20 -21) of the last- antecedent rule is similarly unavailing. That rule provides that \"a limiting clause or phrase should ordinarily be read as modifyi ng only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.\" 136 S. Ct. 958; 572 U.S. 434 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For at least three reason s, the last -antecedent rule does not support Duguid's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) . First, the last -antecedent rule does not apply to a modifier that appears \"at the end of a single, integrated list.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "For at least three reason s, the last -antecedent rule does not support Duguid's reading of Section 227(a)(1)(A) . First, the last -antecedent rule does not apply to a modifier that appears \"at the end of a single, integrated list.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A statute that bars a felon from \"receiv [ing] , possess[ing] , or transport [ing] in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm\" does not prohibit purely intrastate receipt or posses- sion. 404 U.S. 336.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "543 U.S. 335 . A statute that bars a felon from \"receiv [ing] , possess[ing] , or transport [ing] in commerce or affecting commerce any firearm\" does not prohibit purely intrastate receipt or posses- sion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the rule does not ap ply when the modifier is set off by a comma. Inclus ion of a comma at the end of a series before a modifier can \"avoid [any] ambiguity\" about whether the modifier is meant to apply to each term in the series or only to the one that immediately precedes it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Policy concerns provide no sound reason to reject the most natural interpretation of Section 227(a)(1)(A)",
		"context": "17 -18) other \"hypothetical definitions \" with a grammatical structure similar to that of Section 227(a)(1) (A). But e ven if Duguid had accu- rately captured the most \"natural reading\" of each of those hypothetical definition s, that would be so only be- cause \"the mind rebels against reading the [definitions] literally, in line with the logical and canonical principles described\" in our opening brief. Advocate Health Car e [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ver- bal formulation s may exist in which faithful application of ordinary canons of construction produces reading s so substantively unnatural that they can appropriately be rejected. A court should reach that",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court has affirmed that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to habeas relief — even when reviewing for harmlessness",
		"context": "The Sixth Circuit panel majority and the opinions supporting the denial of en banc review glossed over the differences between the Brecht and AEDPA stand- ards, justifying this action by pointing to this Court's precede nts after AEDPA was enacted . But those prec- edents make clear that deference to state court harm- less-error determinations is required , not merely an alternative analysis that can be ignored. This Court first considered AEDPA's edicts in the harmless -error context in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The state court in Esparza had denied a claim of constitutional error, finding that any error was harmless. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court has affirmed that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to habeas relief — even when reviewing for harmlessness",
		"context": "After rejecting t he Sixth Circuit 's conclusion that the error was not the type that could be subject to harmless -error analysis, this Court cited § 2254(d)(1) and Chapman and high- lighted the critical limitation that governed the pris- oner's claim : \"habeas relief is appropriate only if the [state court] applied harmless -error review in an 'ob- jectively unreasonable' manner.\" Id. at 18 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Be- cause this Court could not con clude that the state court's adjudication was objectively unreasonable, it denied habeas relief . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court has affirmed that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to habeas relief — even when reviewing for harmlessness",
		"context": ". . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit interpreted Fry differently. That court held that Fry \"clarified\" that the Brecht standard is the correct test to apply even when a state court had determined that any error was harmless.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.3d 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court has affirmed that AEDPA forms a \"precondition\" to habeas relief — even when reviewing for harmlessness",
		"context": "That court held that Fry \"clarified\" that the Brecht standard is the correct test to apply even when a state court had determined that any error was harmless. 756 F.3d 656. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Ayala, in review- ing the harmlessness of a prosecutor's use of race - based peremptory challenges in jury selection under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , stated that it \"appl [ied] the Brecht test without regard for the state court's harmlessness determination.\" Id. at 674 (quo- tation marks and citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Constitution does not forbid recognition of Christianity's foundational influence upon American history, law, and culture",
		"context": "Laws will not have permanence or power without the sanction of religious sentiment —without a firm belief that there is a Power above us that will reward our virtues and punish our vices. In this age 26 there can be no substitute for Christianity; that, in its general principles, is the great conservative element on which we must rely for the purity and permanence of free institutions. That was the religion of th e founders of the republic, and they expected it to remain the religion of their descendents.33 In Church of the Holy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court concluded that a law which prohibited a church from calling a pastor or priest f rom outside the United States violated the Free Exercise Clause, because it conflicted with Christianity. After explaining at great length the numerous legal and historical evidences of Christianity's influence upon American law, this Court concluded: If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life, as expressed by its laws, its business, its customs, and its society, we find every where a clear recognition of the same truth. Among other matters note the following: The form of oath universally prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of all deliberative bodies and most conventions with prayer; the 33 House Judiciary Committee, Chaplains in Congress and in the Army and Navy , H. R. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "143 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": ". Enlarging Section 111's reach violates a second \"well- established principle\" of statutory construction—that Congress must provide a \"clear statement\" if it wants to alter the \"usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Congress must make its intent \"unmistakably clear in the language 27 of the statute,\" 491 U.S. 58. The Court thus demands even plainer terms when a statute implicates federalism concerns than when Congress delegates major questions. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": ". Enlarging Section 111's reach violates a second \"well- established principle\" of statutory construction—that Congress must provide a \"clear statement\" if it wants to alter the \"usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.\" 572 U.S. 844; Congress must make its intent \"unmistakably clear in the language 27 of the statute,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court thus demands even plainer terms when a statute implicates federalism concerns than when Congress delegates major questions. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "Ark. Elec. Co-op [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "Co-op 461 U.S. 375; see also Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States have \"traditional authority over the need for additional generating capacity, the type of generating facilities to be licensed, land use, ratemaking, and the like.\" Pac.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "Pac. Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They also have wide discretion when modifying existing energy systems or exploring new ones. See 136 S. Ct. 1288.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "461 U.S. 190. They also have wide discretion when modifying existing energy systems or exploring new ones. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The federal government can play a role in this space— within limits. In statutes focused on power and energy needs, for instance, Congress assigned only certain regulatory duties to federal agencies and maintained States' existing authority over many others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "Respect for the traditional assignment of power is even more important here. State regulators have \"the greatest knowledge regarding questions of grid reliability\" in their States, while power-grid-related issues lie outside EPA's expertise. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Nothing in the CAA suggests Congress crossed this time-honored, state-federal line.",
		"citation_value_orig": "829 F.3d 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "§ 7401(a)(3) (emphasis added). This federalism-advancing policy is on full display in Section 111(d): Congress established a structure that, as in other cooperative-federalism statutes, \"allows the States, within limits established by federal minimum standards, to enact and administer their own regulatory programs, structured to meet their own particular needs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States, not EPA, set the performance standards that bind each existing source. Only if States fail to submit \"satisfactory\" plans may EPA step in, and then only with certain procedural safeguards.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "But it is hard to square Congress' statutory choices to preserve States' authority with a construction that allows EPA to trample those same prerogatives. The lower court, at least, could not convincingly do it. In the first case it marshaled Congress had \"unquestionably\" taken \"regulation of [certain] local telecommunications competition away from the States,\" AT&T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; in the second, the Court did not address the federalism canon, see Alaska Dep't of Env't 540 U.S. 461. Nor does federalism fall aside—and with it the unmistakably clear statement requirement—because 29 \"interstate air pollution is not an area of traditional state regulation.\" JA.156.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "But it is hard to square Congress' statutory choices to preserve States' authority with a construction that allows EPA to trample those same prerogatives. The lower court, at least, could not convincingly do it. In the first case it marshaled Congress had \"unquestionably\" taken \"regulation of [certain] local telecommunications competition away from the States,\" AT&T 525 U.S. 366; in the second, the Court did not address the federalism canon, see Alaska Dep't of Env't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does federalism fall aside—and with it the unmistakably clear statement requirement—because 29 \"interstate air pollution is not an area of traditional state regulation.\" JA.156.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Did Not Clearly Delegate to EPA Power to Upend Traditional State and Federal Roles",
		"context": "See, e.g., Nat'l Fed. of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet the CPP's entire purpose was to force grid-wide changes through standards custom-made for that goal— generation shifting was not an incidental effect of the CPP, but the key variable in its \"adjusted CO 2 emission rate.\" JA.1605.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Second Circuit Vitiates The Reasoning Behind The Bright Line Rule Set In Heck And Creates An Unworkable Standard Potentially Shortening The Statute Of Limitations On Section 1983 Claims",
		"context": "Under this rule, the statute of limitations for a §1983 claim begins to run only once the criminal proceedings have terminated in the defendant's favor. See id . In McDonough , however, the Second Circuit held that Heck does not apply to §1983 claims based on fabrication of evidence , incorrectly ruling that fabrication of evidence is analogous to the tort of false arrest , which this Court has held is excepted from the Heck rule, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], since \"the injury for this constitutional violation [fabrication of evidence] occurs at the time the evidenc e is used against the defendant to deprive him of his liberty . . .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"",
		"context": "When interpreting a ny statute, this Cour t's \"inquiry begins with the statutory text.\" Nat'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That principle applies fully in AEDPA cases, as this Court demon- strated in Gonzalez . See 545 U.S. at 528– 29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"",
		"context": "at 532 & n.4 (adjudic ation \"of a claim on the merits\" means \"a dete rmination that there exist or do not exist grounds entitling a petitioner to habeas corpus relief \"). Other 12 cases similarly treat the term \"claim\" broadly . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]545 U.S. 530. A fil ing does not have to be labeled \"application for w rit of habeas corpus\" to qualify . \"Call it a motion for a new trial, arrest of judgment, man- damus, prohibition, coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, certiorari, capias, habeas corpus, ejectment, quare impedit, bill of review, writ of error, or an appl ica- tion for a Get- Out-of-Jail Card; the name makes no dif- ference.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 F.3d 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"",
		"context": "\"Call it a motion for a new trial, arrest of judgment, man- damus, prohibition, coram nobis, coram vobis, audita querela, certiorari, capias, habeas corpus, ejectment, quare impedit, bill of review, writ of error, or an appl ica- tion for a Get- Out-of-Jail Card; the name makes no dif- ference. It is substance that controls.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. AEDPA's text is concerned with a filing's objective, not its label. Second or successive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 F.3d 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. AEDPA broadly circumscribes federal review of habeas \"claims\" presented in an \"application\" that is \"second or successive\" to \"a prior application.\"",
		"context": "§ 2244(b)(3)(A). A district c ourt lacks jurisdiction to even consider a second or successive application absent that authorization . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Whether the court of appeals may grant authoriza- tion t o file a second or successive application depends on whether the claim in that application \"was presented in a prior application .\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Gingles Factors Provide Structure to Section 2's \"Totality of the Circumstances\" Test",
		"context": "Second, the minority group must be \"politically cohesive\" and generally share common beliefs, ideals, and principles such that the group votes as a bloc. Gingles,4 7 8U . S .a t5 1 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, plaintiffs must show that the white majority similarlyvotes\"sufficien tlyasabloctoenableit—in theabsenceofspecialcircumstances...—usuallyto defeat the minority's preferred candidate.\" Gingles, 478U.S.at51.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
		"context": "\"). This Court has repeatedly required proof of a substantial obstacle as part of the undue burden test ever since. See Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 146, 156, 160, 165 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 520 U.S. 968 . Plaintiffs nevertheless a rgue Hellerstedt excised the substantial -obstacle requirement and replaced it with a free -floating balancing of benefits and burdens. Not so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
		"context": "\"). This Court has repeatedly required proof of a substantial obstacle as part of the undue burden test ever since. See Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 146, 156, 160, 165 ; 530 U.S. 914 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Plaintiffs nevertheless a rgue Hellerstedt excised the substantial -obstacle requirement and replaced it with a free -floating balancing of benefits and burdens. Not so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
		"context": "Plaintiffs cite no circuit that has abolis hed a sub- stantial -obstacle requirement after Hellerstedt and Louisiana is aware of none. At least five circuits (in addition to the Fifth) have continued to apply it . Planned Parenthood of Greater [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky ., 896 F.3d at 817; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla ., 864 F.3d at 958; W. Ala. Women 's 900 F.3d 1310 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 908",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
		"context": "Planned Parenthood of Greater 917 F.3d 908 ; Planned Parenthood of Ind. & Ky ., 896 F.3d at 817; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla ., 864 F.3d at 958; W. Ala. Women 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied139 S. Ct. 2606 . The Fifth Circuit restated the test correctly and dutifully follow ed this Court's direction in applying it .",
		"citation_value_orig": "900 F.3d 1310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Hellerstedt affirmed and applied the \"substantial obstacle\" test",
		"context": "& Ky ., 896 F.3d at 817; Planned Parenthood of Ark. & E. Okla ., 864 F.3d at 958; W. Ala. Women 's 900 F.3d 1310 , cert. denied[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Fifth Circuit restated the test correctly and dutifully follow ed this Court's direction in applying it . Plaintiffs , by contrast, are not arguing that th is Court 32 should correct a misstatement or misapplication of Hellerstedt ; they are effectively arguing that Heller- stedt should be overruled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "617 F.2d 854",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.2d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 F.3d 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............ 7 Upjohn 449 U.S. 383 .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "117 F.3d 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ .... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 520 U.S. 154 ...................... 17, 18, 19 Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854 ............................................... 7 511 U.S. 462 ................................ . 19 Department of the 532 U.S. 1 ................................... 13 410 U.S. 73 (197 3) ................................ ... 19, 2 2 505 U.S. 788 ................ 19 576 U.S. 743 ................................ .. 9 562 U.S. 562 ................................................................ 8 Mobil Oil 879 F.2d 698 ................................ 14 421 U.S. 132 ............................................ 3, 6, 7, 15, 19 National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644 ............................................. 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ................................................ 2, 3, 19, 20, 21 Oceana, 920 F.3d 855 .......... 14 Renegotiation 421 U.S. 168 ........................... 3, 4, 7, 10, 15, 16 Swidler & 524 U.S. 399 .................................................................................... 19 Tax 117 F.3d 607 ............ 7 Upjohn [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 19 Statutes and regulations : Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ........... 17 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "The maj ority's approach is deeply flawed. It would make the deliberative process privilege unavailable whenever a draft, pre -decisional document happens to be the last word within an agency about a matter that \"die[s] on the vine, \" National Sec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , even when —as was the case here —the draft document was never adopted by the officials authorized to make deci- sions for the agency . Respondent principally contends that the December 2013 draft biological opinions should be treated as final, rather than pre- decisional, because the drafts allegedly had the \"operative effect\" of causing EPA to revise its draft rule—a claim that neither the court of appeals nor the distr ict court endorsed . Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Respondent's posi- tion is at odds with the record in this case and with the statutory and regulatory context of Secti on 7(a)(2) con- sultations, all of which make clear that the Services ' decisionmakers never actually made a decision about whether the version of the EPA rule under considera- tion in December 2013 would have likely jeopardized ESA -listed species or adversely modified critical habi- tat. Respondent's effects -based approach also has no basis in this Court's precedent , and it would severely 3 undercut the clarity and certainty that are necessary for the deliberative process privilege to fulfill Con- gress's purpose of encouraging \"frank discussion .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but rather discussion drafts recommending a decision that the Services never made, for reasons they never adopted, addressing a version of the EPA rule that never issued. The deliberative process privilege exists to pre- vent such efforts to probe the pre -decisional mental pro- cesses within federal agencies. The Services should be \" judged by what they decided, not for matters they con- sidered bef ore making up their minds. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "The cases invoked by re- spondent (Br. 49) are not to the contrary; those cases addressed documents memorial izing the so -called work- ing law of the agency —legal positions that had been \"adopted, formally or informally, as the agency posi- tion.\" Coastal States Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 868- 869 (requiring disc losure of final opinions explaining the application of \"agency regulations in specific factual sit- uations\"); Tax 117 F.3d 607. No such adoption occurred here in December 2013 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "617 F.2d 854",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "49) are not to the contrary; those cases addressed documents memorial izing the so -called work- ing law of the agency —legal positions that had been \"adopted, formally or informally, as the agency posi- tion.\" Coastal States Gas 617 F.2d 854; see id. at 868- 869 (requiring disc losure of final opinions explaining the application of \"agency regulations in specific factual sit- uations\"); Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such adoption occurred here in December 2013 . And when the Services did make a final decision in May 2014, they released their biological opinion to the public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "117 F.3d 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Resp. Br. 44 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In Milner , this Court rejected an interpreta- tion of FOIA Exemption 2 , 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(2 ), that would have allowed agencies to withhold records con-cerning an agency's rules and practices for its personnel to follow (as opposed to records of personnel practices), in part out of concern that a broader interpretation of Exemption 2 would \"tend to engulf \" other FOIA ex- emptions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "402.14(g)(5). In a case like this one, however, where the consultation concerns the issuance of a regulation, there is no applicant and no general re- quirement that a draft opinion be released outside the government for comment. See National Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the Court need not address the effect of sharing draft biological opinions with a private applicant. Cf. Department of the 532 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "See National Ass'n of Home 551 U.S. 644, and the Court need not address the effect of sharing draft biological opinions with a private applicant. Cf. Department of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lastly, r espondent contends (Br. 54 -55) that the Ser- vices' internal policies reflect that \"drafts belong in the public record .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "See 14 Memorandum from Lois J. Schiffer, Gen . Counsel, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrati on Guidelines for Compil- ing an Agency Administrative Record 10 (Dec. 21, 2012) (stating that certain \"[s]ignificant drafts\" should be included in the administrative record \"but flagged for potential listing, in whole or in part, on the agency's Privilege L og\").2 In any event, an agency that some- times waives the deliberative process privilege and re- leases some pre -decisional drafts does not thereby waive the privilege as to any other documents . See Mobil Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any contrary rule would create perverse incentives, effectively punishing agencies for voluntary disclosures. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.2d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit recently endorsed that position, as advocated by the United States in litigation involving NMFS . See Oceana, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Gov't C.A. Br. at 37 -50, Oceana, supra (filed Aug. 6, 2018) (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 F.3d 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "To the extent that EPA made changes to its draft rule in re- sponse to the preliminary analysis in th e December 2013 draft biological opinions, that is simply how interagency consultation is supposed to work —not a reason to treat the Services' never -adopted, never -signed, and never - circulated drafts as final opinions subject to compelled disclosure under FOIA. b. Respondent errs in s uggesting (Br. 32 -34) that draft biological opinions should be treated as final deci- sions for FOIA purposes under the logic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Bennett , this Court held that a biological opinion constitutes final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "........................................ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................ 1, 2, 3, 9 Cook Inlet Treaty 166 F.3d 986 ........................................................................ 3 Douglas Indian Ass'n v. Juneau Area Dir. , 27 IBIA 292 (1995) .............................................................. 10 476 U.S. 426 ...................................................................................... 9 529 U.S. 362 ............................... 6 Statutes and regulations: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "........................................ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652 ............................................................ 1, 2, 3, 9 Cook Inlet Treaty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................................ 3 Douglas Indian Ass'n v. Juneau Area Dir. , 27 IBIA 292 (1995) .............................................................. 10 476 U.S. 426 ...................................................................................... 9 529 U.S. 362 ............................... 6 Statutes and regulations: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "........................................ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652 ............................................................ 1, 2, 3, 9 Cook Inlet Treaty 166 F.3d 986 ........................................................................ 3 Douglas Indian Ass'n v. Juneau Area Dir. , 27 IBIA 292 (1995) .............................................................. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................................... 9 529 U.S. 362 ............................... 6 Statutes and regulations: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 CARES Act, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "........................................ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652 ............................................................ 1, 2, 3, 9 Cook Inlet Treaty 166 F.3d 986 ........................................................................ 3 Douglas Indian Ass'n v. Juneau Area Dir. , 27 IBIA 292 (1995) .............................................................. 10 476 U.S. 426 ...................................................................................... 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 6 Statutes and regulations: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 CARES Act, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "App. 11a (citation omitted) . That determination squarely con- flicts with both the federal government's longstanding construction of ISDA and the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cook Inlet Native [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —as the D.C. Circuit itself recognized be- low, notwithstanding respondents' claim that no \"legiti- mate circuit conflict \" exists . Confederated Tribes Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.2d 1471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "26- 27. The Ninth Circuit later reconfirmed that the ANC at issue in Cook Inlet Native Association was an Indian tribe for ISDA purposes. See Cook Inlet Treaty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Cook Inlet Native As- sociation squarely conflicts with the reasoning of the decision below, as the D.C. Circuit acknowledged when it \"decline[d] to follow \" the decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 F.3d 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "As explained in the government's petition for a writ of certiorari ( at 24-25), the court of appeals inter- preted the recognition clause to require formal recogni- tion for government -to-government relations. If the recognition clause is understood in that formal sense, then it cannot be applied to ANCs without violating the \"surplusage canon— the presumption that each word Congress uses is there for a reason.\" Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 529 U.S. 362. ANCs are not sovereign political communities but rather busi- ness corporations, established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) , 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "As explained in the government's petition for a writ of certiorari ( at 24-25), the court of appeals inter- preted the recognition clause to require formal recogni- tion for government -to-government relations. If the recognition clause is understood in that formal sense, then it cannot be applied to ANCs without violating the \"surplusage canon— the presumption that each word Congress uses is there for a reason.\" Advocate Health Care 137 S. Ct. 1652; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ANCs are not sovereign political communities but rather busi- ness corporations, established pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) , 43 U.S.C. 1601 et seq .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Pet. 17 -18; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And after 2 The most recent coronavirus relief legislation continues that pattern . In that statute, which the President signed into law on De- cember 27, 2020, Congress defined the eligible grantees for a par- ticular housing assistance program to include Indian tribes as de- fined in 25 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 669",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .. 7 137 S. Ct. 1843 ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "................................ ........ 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Ashcrof 563 U.S. 731 ............................... 3 Ashcrof 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 3, 5 532 U.S. 318 .............. 5 573 U.S. 682 .............................................................. 10 568 U.S. 398 ............ 3 Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 ................................................................. 7 415 U.S. 189 ................................ ... 9 Employment 494 U.S. 872 ................ 10 503 U.S. 60 ............................................................... 11 457 U.S. 800 ........................ 3, 5 574 U.S. 352 ................................ ......... 3 2019 WL 5303288 .......................................................... 6 137 S. Ct. 1285 ............................... 4 563 U.S. 277 ................... 9, 10, 11 483 U.S. 669 ...................... 5 551 U.S. 537 ................................ .. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................ 3, 7 II Constitution, statutes, regulations, and rule: Page U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Pet. 24; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that those concerns are overstated because there has not yet been \"a flood of RFRA damages suits.\" But RFRA was not previously understood to permit damages claims agains t individual federal officers. Armed with the decision be-low, plaintiffs —especially federal prisoners —are likely to bring such claims with increasing frequency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Additionally, t his particular RFRA suit arises in the context of national security . Th is Court has not hesi- tated to grant review of important federal questions im- plicating national -security concerns , even without a cir- cuit conflict . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 568 U.S. 398; 563 U.S. 731; 556 U.S. 662. 4 Here, t he gravamen of the complaint is that federal of- ficials misused the \"No Fly List\" in retaliation for re- spondents' refusal to become informants. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Additionally, t his particular RFRA suit arises in the context of national security . Th is Court has not hesi- tated to grant review of important federal questions im- plicating national -security concerns , even without a cir- cuit conflict . See 137 S. Ct. 1843; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 563 U.S. 731; 556 U.S. 662. 4 Here, t he gravamen of the complaint is that federal of- ficials misused the \"No Fly List\" in retaliation for re- spondents' refusal to become informants. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Additionally, t his particular RFRA suit arises in the context of national security . Th is Court has not hesi- tated to grant review of important federal questions im- plicating national -security concerns , even without a cir- cuit conflict . See 137 S. Ct. 1843; 568 U.S. 398; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 556 U.S. 662. 4 Here, t he gravamen of the complaint is that federal of- ficials misused the \"No Fly List\" in retaliation for re- spondents' refusal to become informants. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Additionally, t his particular RFRA suit arises in the context of national security . Th is Court has not hesi- tated to grant review of important federal questions im- plicating national -security concerns , even without a cir- cuit conflict . See 137 S. Ct. 1843; 568 U.S. 398; 563 U.S. 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 Here, t he gravamen of the complaint is that federal of- ficials misused the \"No Fly List\" in retaliation for re- spondents' refusal to become informants. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "This Court has declined to extend Bivens even in contexts involving subordinate officials . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent s also stress ( e.g., Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "12 -14. \" [T]he availability of a damages action is a question logically distinct from immunity to such an action on the part of particu-lar defendants .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[E]ven where personal liability does not ultimately materialize, the mere 'spec- ter of liability ' may inhibit public officials in the dis- charge of their duties, \" ibid. (citation omitted), \"for even those officers with airtight qualified immunity de-fenses are forced to incur 'the expenses of litigation' and to end ure the 'diversion of their official energy from pressing public issues ,' \" ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "12 -15. Fashioning such a damages remedy is pri- marily a task for elected legislators, who can investigate and weigh the \"substantial costs\" that damages liability imposes on individual defendants and on the admin-istration of federal law . Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1856 ; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Correctional Servs. 534 U.S. 61 . Respondents contend (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "Fashioning such a damages remedy is pri- marily a task for elected legislators, who can investigate and weigh the \"substantial costs\" that damages liability imposes on individual defendants and on the admin-istration of federal law . Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1856 ; see also, e.g., 551 U.S. 537; Correctional Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents contend (Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "See ibid. (permitting suits against officers for acting \"in an official capacity\"); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The APA thus cannot serve as evidence of any established congressional practice regarding damages remedies against individual federal officers .2 The more telling points of comparison are the sta t- utes in which Congress has expressly created a private right of action that permits the plaintiff to recover dam- ages from individual government al officers . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "6395(e)(1). 9 damages, which were \"the traditional form of relief of- fered in the courts of law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other federal statutes are even more express. For example, when Congress authorized civil actions to obtain \" such relief as may be appropriate \" for illegal wiretaps , it specified that \"appropriate relief in- cludes damages. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "2520(a) and (b). Had Congress likewise wished to authorize a damages rem- edy against federal officers sued in their individual ca-pacities under RFRA, it would have said so clearly. That is also the upshot of this Court's decision in Sos- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' con- tention that Sossamon \"bears only a surface -level simi- larity to this case\" (Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "24), b ut rather simply a way of restat- ing that RLUIPA implicates considerations about when a State will be held to have waived its sovereign immun-ity as a condition of receiving federal funds. As ex- plained above, Sossamon rested in part on those consid- erations but also in part on textual and contextual con- sideratio ns that apply equally to RFRA . Respondents also fail to square the decision below with RFRA's history and purpose, which was primarily to restore the substantive status quo for free -exercise claims tha t had prevailed before Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Construing the statute to create a Bivens -like damages remedy against federal officials that was never available before or after Smith would not further that purpose . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below is incorrect",
		"context": "But it does not follow from Congress's limited departures from pre -Smith case law , recognized by this Court in Hobby Lobby , see 573 U.S. at 695 n.3, that Congress also intended to create a previously unknown damages remedy against individual federal officers . 11 2. This Court's decision i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not re- quire a contrary result. See Pet. 20 -23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Senate Factors Sensibly Evaluate Whether a Challenged Practice Exploits Social and Historical Conditions",
		"context": "Petitioners' concerns are belied by the actual outcomes in numerous cases that have upheld the challenged \"commonplace\" voting rules. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , the argument ignores the history of Section 2. The VRA was passed in part to respond to Jim Crow-era restrictions on voting, such as literacy tests and poll taxes, that exploited existing social conditions in a way that caused a disparate impact on Black and other minority voters' ability to participate in the political process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Enacted RFRA To Safeguard Religious Liberty And Adequately Compensate Victims",
		"context": ". RFRA was Congress's direct response to the majority holding in Employment Div [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That case concerned a state government's decision to deny unemployment benefits to Native Americans terminated by their employer for 5 using peyote for sacramental purposes. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Enacted RFRA To Safeguard Religious Liberty And Adequately Compensate Victims",
		"context": "Congress's res ponse was unambiguous : the right to free exercise is so fundamental that any government action —even neutral action —that burdens a person's exercise of religion must be subject to strict scrutiny review. In addition to restoring the pre -Smith standard of review, Congress expanded free exercise protections in two more ways. First, Congress designed RFRA to \"provide very broad protection for religious liberty,\" 573 U.S. 682 , \"ensur[ ing] its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter ,\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second , Congress explicitly included a private right of action, designed to ensure that courts will fashion \"appropriate relief\" sufficie nt to remedy every RFRA injury. 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Nevada v. Hall arose from a collision in which Cali- fornia residents were injured by a car owned by the State of Nevada, which was being driven by an employee of the University of Nevada on official state business. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The California residents filed suit in California against the State of Nevada and the university, as well as the driver's estate. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Id. at 431. Justice Blackmun also pointed to the swift adoption of the Eleventh Amendment after [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which had held that citizens of one State could sue another State in federal court without the defendant State's consent. \"If the Framers were indeed concerned lest the States be haled before the federal courts,\" he obse rved, \"how much more must they have reprehended the notion of a State's being haled before the courts of a sister State.\" 440 U.S. at 431 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "\"The tacit pos-tulates yielded by that ordering,\" Justice Rehnquist wrote, \"are as much engraine d in the fabric of the doc- ument as its express provisions, because without them the Constitution is denied force and often meaning.\" Id. He found support for that view in no less founda- tional a precedent than [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Court recog-nized the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity notwithstanding the absence of any express provision creating it. 17 Justice Rehnquist explained that the majority's de- cision \"work[ed] a fundamental readjustment of inter- state relationships which is impossible to reconcile … with express holdings of this Court and the logic of the constitutional plan itself.\" 440 U.S. at 432-433 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "First, the Court has rejected Hall's view that any protection for interstate sovereign immunity must be explicitly located in the constitutional text. To th e contrary, the Court has re- peatedly recognized that States continue to enjoy the immunity they possessed before the ratification of the Constitution, unless the Constitution abrogated that immunity, and thus that the scope of States' immunity must be discerned not just by the constitutional text but by the historical record and the intent of the Fram-ers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the Court has emphasized the importance of state sov-ereign immunity in safeguarding the dignity and self-government interests of the States—interests neither recognized nor accounted for in Hall. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Second, the Court has emphasized the importance of state sov-ereign immunity in safeguarding the dignity and self-government interests of the States—interests neither recognized nor accounted for in Hall. Id. at 714-715; Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 A. Hall Ignored The Framing-Era Understanding Of Interstate Sovereign Immunity In Hall, as discussed above, the Court refused to \"infer[] from the structure of our Constitution\" any protection for sovereign immunity beyond the limits on federal-court jurisdiction exp licitly set forth in Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "First , whereas Hall reasoned that neither Article III nor the Eleventh Amendment expressly codified interstate sovereign immunity, 440 U.S. at 421—and refused to \"infer[]\" such a doctrine \"from the structure of our Constitution,\" id. at 426—this Court's decisions have since made clear that \"the scope of the States' immunity from suit is demarcated not by the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment alone but by fundamental pos-tulates implicit in the constitutional design,\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 729. In Tennessee Student Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court ob- served that \"the States' sovereign immunity is not lim-ited to the literal terms of the Eleventh Amendment.\" Id. at 446.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Id. at 446. In Federal Maritime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court described the Eleventh Amendment as just \"one particular exemplification of [States' sovereign] immunity.\" Id. at 753.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Id. at 753. And in Virginia Office for Pro- tection & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court observed that the Eleventh Amendment merely \"confirm[s] the structural understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity in- 19 tact.\" Id. at 253; see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54; 501 U.S. 775.3 It is necessary to look beyond the constitutional text, the Court has explained, because neither the orig- inal Constitution nor the Eleventh Amendment \"explic-itly memorializ[es] the fu ll breadth of the sovereign immunity retained by the States when the Constitution was ratified.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "And in Virginia Office for Pro- tection & 563 U.S. 247, the Court observed that the Eleventh Amendment merely \"confirm[s] the structural understanding that States entered the Union with their sovereign immunity in- 19 tact.\" Id. at 253; see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 It is necessary to look beyond the constitutional text, the Court has explained, because neither the orig- inal Constitution nor the Eleventh Amendment \"explic-itly memorializ[es] the fu ll breadth of the sovereign immunity retained by the States when the Constitution was ratified.\" Federal Mar. Comm'n , 535 U.S. at 753.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Comm'n , 535 U.S. at 753. Indeed, \"[t]he Constitution never would have been rati- fied if the States … were to be stripped of their sover-eign authority except as expressly provided by the Constitution itself.\" Atascadero State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, and relatedly, the Court's post-Hall deci- sions recognize that the way to determine the princi-ples of state sovereign immunity implicit in the consti-tutional structure is to ex amine \"'history and experi- ence, and the established order of things,'\" which \"re-veal the original understanding of the States' constitu- tional immunity from suit.\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 726-727 (quoting 134 U.S. 1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234. Second, and relatedly, the Court's post-Hall deci- sions recognize that the way to determine the princi-ples of state sovereign immunity implicit in the consti-tutional structure is to ex amine \"'history and experi- ence, and the established order of things,'\" which \"re-veal the original understanding of the States' constitu- tional immunity from suit.\" Alden , 527 U.S. at 726-727 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Whereas Hall placed the burden on the State to show that its sovereign immunity was affirmatively and ex-plicitly incorporated into the Constitution, see 440 U.S. at 421, the Court has since taken the opposite approach. It has recognized that \"the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 3 Even decisions before Hall—most notably 134 U.S. 1—recognized that the constitutional princi- ple of state sovereign immunity is not limited to the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment and is inherent in the federal nature of the Union.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "Alden , 527 U.S. at 726-727 (quoting 134 U.S. 1). Whereas Hall placed the burden on the State to show that its sovereign immunity was affirmatively and ex-plicitly incorporated into the Constitution, see 440 U.S. at 421, the Court has since taken the opposite approach. It has recognized that \"the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 3 Even decisions before Hall—most notably [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—recognized that the constitutional princi- ple of state sovereign immunity is not limited to the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment and is inherent in the federal nature of the Union. See id. at 13-15; see also 292 U.S. 313.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STATES ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMMUNE FROM SUIT IN EACH OTHER'S COURTS",
		"context": "It has recognized that \"the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 3 Even decisions before Hall—most notably 134 U.S. 1—recognized that the constitutional princi- ple of state sovereign immunity is not limited to the express terms of the Eleventh Amendment and is inherent in the federal nature of the Union. See id. at 13-15; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hall limited its discussion of Hans and Monaco to brief citations in footnotes. 440 U.S. at 420 nn.18, 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "292 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Plaintiffs proved specific intent",
		"context": "This precinct was moved outof the Sixth District in 2011.5 Data like this, reflecting voter history in small batches of citizens, is self-evidently sufficient to sup- port a First Amendment retaliation claim. Indeed, courts often adjudicate allegations that the State has intentionally targeted groups of citizens rather than specific individuals, as they do in all racial gerry- mandering cases. See, e.g.,Cooper , 137 S. Ct. at 1466; Bush v.Vera , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The fact that the State moved Republican voters out of the Sixth District based on precinct-level data, and did not examine each voter's history\" individually before taking \"punitive action does not make its action less culpable under the First Amendment.\" J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 952",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Plaintiffs proved specific intent",
		"context": "Inquiry into legislative intent is \"common\" and \"makes up the daily fare of every appellate court in the country.\" McCreary Cty. v.ACLU , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It \"is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine,\" as with respect to Establishment Clause (ibid.) and Ex Post Facto Clause cases ( Smith v.Doe, 538 U.S. 84).",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Plaintiffs proved specific intent",
		"context": "v.ACLU , 545 U.S. 844. It \"is a key element of a good deal of constitutional doctrine,\" as with respect to Establishment Clause (ibid.) and Ex Post Facto Clause cases ( Smith v.Doe, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). So, too, is it a key element in racial gerrymander- ing cases. As the Court just recently confirmed in 5Vote-history data is at elections.state.md.us/elections/2010/- election_data/index.html and archived at perma.cc/W3VP- BRXZ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Plaintiffs proved specific intent",
		"context": "See also NAACP Amicus Br. 15-17. The Court's decision in United States v.O'Brien , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which is not a First Amendment retaliation case, does not suggest otherwise. Indeed, the Court there reaffirmed that laws with \"inevitable unconstitutional effect[s],\" such as \"the redrawing of municipal boundaries\" to disenfranchise voters \"for no reason other than\" their race, are properly subject to challenge. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The ACE Rule's \"To and At the Source\" Interpretation Is Not Necessary to Ensure Appropriate Limitations on EPA's Regulatory Authority.",
		"context": "8; Westmoreland Br. 14) that EPA may regulate based on hidden, pretextual reasons outside of its statutory authority —e.g., to shut down an industry rather than to reduce emissions. See Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Petitioners also err in assuming that the decision below endorsed the Clean Power Plan in its entirety and the measures that it adopted to reduce power -plant 37 CO 2, the court considered only whether the Rule's particular interpretation of \"best system of emission reduction\" —the sole basis for the Rule 's repeal of the Plan —was compelled by the statute (J.A.102).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Properly Balanced Public Policy Considerations When It Authorized The Discretionary Award Of Full Costs Under section 505",
		"context": "In Fogerty , this Court enumerated the following non-exclusive factors that \"may be used to guide courts' discretion\": \"frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence .\" 510 U.S. at 534 n .1 9 (internal quotation marks omitted) . In 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court further recognized \"the broad leeway § 505 gives to district courts\" while also recognizing that Fogerty \"established several principles and criteria to guide their decisions .\" The trial court should afford substantial weight to the objective reasonableness of the parties' positions in the determination of whether to award attorney's fees under § 505. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "24 (conceding that the Ninth Circuit \"ultimately con - cluded\" that the extra terri toriality principle is not con - fined \"to only price -control and price- affirmation cases \" and that it had \"recog nized a broader under standing\"). Petitioners' assertion of a conflict with this Court's deci - sions requires petitioners to rewrite Ninth Circuit prece- dent. The Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in Sam Francis Foun [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,577 U.S. 1062 —never men - tioned in the petition —places the issue beyond dispute. Christies did not involve a price -control or price -affirm - ation statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "784 F.3d 1320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "The Ninth Cir cuit held that the statute vio lated the dor mant Commerce Clause as ap plied to out-of-state sales by in -state res idents be - cause it purported to \"regulat[e] a com mercial tran - 10 saction that 'takes place wholly outside of the State's bor - ders. '\" Id. at 1323 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The court distinguished prior cases that, like this one, in volved \"state laws that regulated in - state conduct with allegedly sig nificant out- of-state practical effects.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "Christies makes clear that the Ninth Circuit has not, as peti tioners claim, limited the extraterritoriality doctrine to price-con trol or price - affirm ation statutes.3 Petitioners present no contrary argument. They sim - ply pretend Christies and cases like it do not exist. Sug - gesting the pos sibility of an i ntra -circuit conflict within the Ninth Cir cuit, petitioners invoke language from As- sociation des Eleveurs de Can ards et d'Oies du [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. 26.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 937",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "26. Ele veurs , however, predates the en banc deci sion in Christies , which controls to the extent of any conflict. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Christies, moreover, distin - guished cases like Eleveurs as \"con cern[ing] state laws that regulated in -state con duct with allegedly significant out-of-state practical effects\" ra ther than \"regulation of 3 Other Ninth Circuit cases (cited by the decision below, Pet .App. 10a) resolve extra territoriality challenges to statutes having nothing to do with price -control or price -affirmation without simply holding that the extraterritoriality doctrine is limited to such restrictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 F.3d 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "Christies, moreover, distin - guished cases like Eleveurs as \"con cern[ing] state laws that regulated in -state con duct with allegedly significant out-of-state practical effects\" ra ther than \"regulation of 3 Other Ninth Circuit cases (cited by the decision below, Pet .App. 10a) resolve extra territoriality challenges to statutes having nothing to do with price -control or price -affirmation without simply holding that the extraterritoriality doctrine is limited to such restrictions. See Ward , 986 F.3d at 1240- 1241 ( statute regulating employee wage statements) ; Rosen 940 F.3d 439[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 whol ly out of state conduct.\" 784 F.3d at 1324.",
		"citation_value_orig": "794 F.3d 1136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Presents No Question Regarding Limits on Baldwin's Scope",
		"context": "Eleveurs , 729 F.3d at 952. Regardless, even if an intra -circuit conflict existed, \"[i]t is primarily the task of a Court of Appeals to recon cile its internal difficulties\" —not an ob ligation of this Court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners thus lost below even though the Ninth Circuit accepts their view of the question they purport to presen t for review. They nowhere explain how a decision of this Court that likewise agrees with them on th at legal question could change the outcome.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 901",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Government Must Prove Each Fact Material to Showing Clear and Present Danger Before Punishing Speech",
		"context": "\"Any variation from\" the \"opinion\" people hold \"may inspire fear. Any word spoken\" that \"deviates from the views of another person may start an argu-ment or cause a disturbance.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"But our Constitut ion says we must take this risk,\" and \"our history sa ys that it is this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of openness—that is the basis of our national strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, society.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "18 U.S.C. 3663A (b)(4). 3 3 See, e.g., 844 F.3d 1024[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (attorney's fees 24 a. When GE Capital discovered that petitioner had engaged in a complex conspiracy to fraudulently obtai n tens of millions of dollars , it acted immediately \"to investi gate the extent of the fraud.\" J .A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "577 F.3d 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "18 . The elec- tronic data (including emails) preserved and analyzed by GE Capital's investigators helped the government incurred in \"discovering and investigating\" defendant's fraud in an attempt to recover lost funds); Hosking , 567 F.3d at 332 (7th Cir.) (bank's internal investigation costs); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]477 F.3d 215. 25 establish the factual basis for charging petitioner with a conspiracy count. See C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 F.3d 927",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "18 . The elec- tronic data (including emails) preserved and analyzed by GE Capital's investigators helped the government incurred in \"discovering and investigating\" defendant's fraud in an attempt to recover lost funds); Hosking , 567 F.3d at 332 (7th Cir.) (bank's internal investigation costs); 557 F.3d 927[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 establish the factual basis for charging petitioner with a conspiracy count. See C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 F.3d 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit decision on which petitioner relies took that premise as a given, because neither party contested it in that case. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the text of Section 3663A(b)(4) does not say \"the government's investigati on,\" and petitioner presents no sound reason to infer that extratextual limitation . The definition of \"investigation\" is broad and not lim- ited to the government's work.",
		"citation_value_orig": "639 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "See id. at 750. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the victim's internal investigation detected that the defendant's insuranc e claims were fraudulent. The magistrate judge found that, without the victim's investigation expenses, \"the complexities of the fraud engaged in by Defendant might never have 28 been fully resolved, nor would Defendant's prosecution have been as effective. \" 2009 WL 10677000.4 Congress in Section 3663A(b)(4) accordingly ad- dressed expenses incurred in both the \"prosecution of the offense,\" which only the government can initiate, and in \"the investigation of the offense,\" which naturally could either involve the government or not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "3771(a)(3) and (4). 4 See also, e.g. , 778 F.3d 83; Amato , 540 F.3d at 162 (law firm \"assisted [the victim] in completing its internal investigation of the fraud and then reporting the fraud to the government\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[t]he fruits of [the victim's] investigation were turned over to the F.B.I. and the U.S. Attorney' s Office, enabling the government to prose- cute [defendant] without conducting a significant investigation \"), cert. denied,553 U.S. 1043.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": ", 778 F.3d 83; Amato , 540 F.3d at 162 (law firm \"assisted [the victim] in completing its internal investigation of the fraud and then reporting the fraud to the government\"); 534 F.3d 635 (\"[t]he fruits of [the victim's] investigation were turned over to the F.B.I. and the U.S. Attorney' s Office, enabling the government to prose- cute [defendant] without conducting a significant investigation \"), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 Petitioner's narrow reading of \"the investigation of the offense\" would produce anomalous results. See Dolan, 560 U.S. at 620 ( the MVRA should not be read to \"create[ ] a serious statutory anomaly\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "But e ven if \" the investigation \" did mean \"t he gov- ernment's investigation,\" restitution under 18 U.S.C. 3663A(b)(4) still would not require that the victim's investigation expenses be requested or required by the government. \"Participate\" is a \"term[ ] and concept[ ] of breadth,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It commonly means \"to take part in\" something —not to have sole or even \"primary\" responsibility for it . 507 U.S. 170.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "\"Participate\" is a \"term[ ] and concept[ ] of breadth,\" 464 U.S. 16. It commonly means \"to take part in\" something —not to have sole or even \"primary\" responsibility for it . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under that standard definition, a victim can , for exam- ple, \"take part in\" t he investigation of a criminal offense by preserving evidence and unco vering the defendant's conduct even before the victim starts actively cooperat-ing with law enforcement. 5 5 The D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "3663A(b)(4). But as th is Court has recently recognized in rejecting a similar preposition -focused argument, even within the context of a single statute, \"there is no 'canon of interpretation that forb ids interpreting differ- ent words used in different [provisions] to mean roughly the same thing.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g., Hosking , 567 F.3d at 331 n.2 (the provisions are \"functionally identical\"); United States v. Juvenile Female , 296 F ed. Appx.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "2008) (the provisions are \"substantially the same\") . Moreover, petitioner's suggestion that the MVRA allows less restitution for victims' investigative ex- penses than did the VWPA is a t odds with the MVRA 's overarching objective \"to expand, rather than limit, the restitution remedy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . On petitioner's view, Congress identified offenses sufficiently important to warrant mandatory r estitution, yet withdrew a form of restitu- tion that courts could previously have ordered for those offenses as a matter of discretion (and can still order for offense s not covered by the MVRA ). The \"MVRA's clear purpose,\" however, \"was to increase the frequency of restitution, not reduce it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "On petitioner's view, Congress identified offenses sufficiently important to warrant mandatory r estitution, yet withdrew a form of restitu- tion that courts could previously have ordered for those offenses as a matter of discretion (and can still order for offense s not covered by the MVRA ). The \"MVRA's clear purpose,\" however, \"was to increase the frequency of restitution, not reduce it.\" Federal Criminal Resti- tution § 5:4, at 148; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that a victim's expenses are not \"necessary\" when they are not re- quested or required by the government. That conten- tion yet again assumes petitioner's initial premise that the provision is limited to government in vestigations. And it would be flawed even if that premise were cor- rect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 F.3d 1188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. GE Capital incurred recoverable expenses when it participated in the investigation of petitioner's fraud",
		"context": "3771(a)(3) —could not receive restitution for transporta- tion or child -care costs unless the government spec ifi- cally requested the victim to attend . The modifier \"necessary\" in Section 3663A(b)(4) requires only that the victim's costs be \"appropriate \" under the circumstances and \"reasonably useful\" to the investigation or prosecution of the defendant's offense or to attendance at related proceedings. Black's Law Dictionary 1029; Eyraud , 809 F.3d at 467- 468 (expe nses under Section 3663A(b)(4) must be \" reasonably neces- sary to aid in the investigation or prosecution of the de- fendant\") (citation omitted) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has explained that a \"necessary\" expense in federal law can mean \"an expense that is merely helpfu l and appropriate,\" and the Court has ac- cordingly interpreted a statutory reference to \"reason- ably necessary\" services to call for \"a determination by 34 the district court, in the exercise of its discretion,\" as to whether the services were \"sufficiently imp ortant.\" 2018 WL 1402425 's \"necessary\" requirement does, of course, preclude restitution for expenses that \"served no investigatory purpose,\" even if they were caused by the defendant's offense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.3d 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus",
		"context": "Real Estate Law, supra , § 6:21. Further- more, after cancellation, the purchaser has no right to recover amounts paid over to the vendor, no matter how large the payments made nor how small the actual damages incurred by the vendor due to the breach. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 231 N.W. 826; Olson , 148 N.W. at 69. A related body of law stretching back to the 19th century expresses the reluctance of courts to hold non-breaching parties liable to breaching 19 parties for the value of partial performance and con- tinues to safeguard the freedom of sophisticated par- ties to include large nonrefundable deposits in real estate contracts today.",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 N.W.2d 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus",
		"context": "at 69. Then, as now in Minnesota, con- tract purchasers who had not waived specific perfor- mance remedies were equitable owners. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; State ex rel. 109 N.W.2d 44. Neverthe less, forfeitures were swift and did not involve re turn of payments to the would-be seller or even a sh owing by the seller that his 20 damages exceeded the value of his property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "196 N.W.2d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. In Minnesota, outside the mortgage context, the equity of redemption does not protect a defaulting equitable owner's surplus",
		"context": "Then, as now in Minnesota, con- tract purchasers who had not waived specific perfor- mance remedies were equitable owners. See, e.g., 196 N.W.2d 465; State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neverthe less, forfeitures were swift and did not involve re turn of payments to the would-be seller or even a sh owing by the seller that his 20 damages exceeded the value of his property. See Olson , 148 N.W.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 N.W.2d 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Delaware's partisan balance requirements promote public confidence in judicial integrity by discouraging the politicization of judicial appointments",
		"context": "See Williams-Yulee , 575 U.S. at 447. But even if judges can \"suppress their awareness\" of these pressures, \"the public's confidence in the judiciary could be undermined simply by the possibility that judges would be unable 23 to do so.\" Republican Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Research suggests that these concerns are not unwarranted. For example, while causality is difficult to establish with precision, there is substantial evidence that job security pressures affect judicial decisionmaking, including in states that appoint judges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test would produce results at odds with the Act's purposes",
		"context": ". Petitioner's reading of Section 102(b) would also thwart the Act's purposes by disincentivizing invest- 10 ment in innovative technology to the detriment of con- sumers and businesses alike. As this Court has rep eat- edly explained, the Copyright Act is \"intended to moti- vate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward,\" Sony Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], thereby \"promot[ing] the Progre ss of Science and the useful Arts.\" U.S. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test would produce results at odds with the Act's purposes",
		"context": "1, §8, cl. 8; see also Twentieth Cent. Music [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet peti- tioner's theory would upset this careful \"balance,\" Sony Corp ., 464 U.S. at 429, undermining the incentive to create original works that serve a practical function. Nowhere would petitioner's approach prove more disruptiv e than in the field of computer science, where original works are by their very nature functional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test would produce results at odds with the Act's purposes",
		"context": "It would also discourage companies from 11 sharing their code with third -party developers, thereby harming interop erability. Taken together, these consequences would deprive consumers of inno- vative, interoperable products from which they would otherwise benefit. Given the Act's well -established goal of incentiviz- ing creativity, it is \"difficult to believe, absent so me in- dication in the statute itself or the legislative history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that pur- pose,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by withholding copyright protection from any work that serves a practical function. See also 454 U.S. 201.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 642",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test would produce results at odds with the Act's purposes",
		"context": "Taken together, these consequences would deprive consumers of inno- vative, interoperable products from which they would otherwise benefit. Given the Act's well -established goal of incentiviz- ing creativity, it is \"difficult to believe, absent so me in- dication in the statute itself or the legislative history, that Congress would have undercut sharply that pur- pose,\" 455 U.S. 642, by withholding copyright protection from any work that serves a practical function. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court Must Preserve the Agencies' Ability to Exclude Waste Treatment Systems from CWA Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Yet, as with groundwater, plaintiff 's groups have frequently attacked the legality of the waste treatment system exclusion. See , e.g., Ohio Valley Envtl. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Agencies' existing exclusion for waste treatment systems covers a wide array of water features relied on by clean water agencies that are designed to enhance surface water quality, reduce environmental impacts, and promote water susta inability. These features vary by facility, but can include constructed wetlands and other green infrastructure, wastewater collection bins, basins and channels, cooling ponds, stormwater sedimentation ponds, low volume waste ponds, and wastewater and treated water conveyances, such as pipes and channels.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.3d 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "1987). As a necessary corollary to these powers, \"[e]very sov- ereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign state.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sovereign independence is limited, however, by international humanitarian and human rights law. All nations, for example, are bound by jus cogens norms \" 'from which no derogation is per- mitted.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "All nations, for example, are bound by jus cogens norms \" 'from which no derogation is per- mitted.' \" Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nations may also con-sent to be bound by additio nal limitations by entering into treaties with one another. Vienna Convention, art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "859 F.2d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard is widely viewed as among the most privacy-protective standards in the world for authorizing a search. This Court has described \"the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police\" as being \"basic to a free society.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled on other grounds by 367 U.S. 643. Even outside of government searches, constitutional protections for personal pri-vacy have become a key element of this Court's juris- prudence, dating back to the seminal article by Warren and Brandeis and appearing in landmark opinions ever since. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy , 4 Harv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment's probable cause standard is widely viewed as among the most privacy-protective standards in the world for authorizing a search. This Court has described \"the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police\" as being \"basic to a free society.\" See 338 U.S. 25, overruled on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even outside of government searches, constitutional protections for personal pri-vacy have become a key element of this Court's juris- prudence, dating back to the seminal article by Warren and Brandeis and appearing in landmark opinions ever since. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy , 4 Harv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy , 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Numerous other 15 countries have likewise adopted strong domestic con- stitutional protections for the right to privacy.4 Domestic constitutions and international human rights instruments both tend to articulate the right to privacy at a high level of generalization. It is the role of ordinary domestic law to operationalize those general principles into specif ic protections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Sovereign nations have a duty to implement privacy protections and, in so doing, may afford stronger protections than the floor established by international human rights law",
		"context": "It is the role of ordinary domestic law to operationalize those general principles into specif ic protections. Some such protections are derived from judicial interpretation of overarching principles. See Riley , 134 S. Ct. at 2488- 91; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Others are created via the legislative process. For example, in the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING ACCESS WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS COUNSELS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION",
		"context": "But the general difficulty of distinguishing between these two concepts counsels in favor of interpreting them in the same basic way. As the lower courts have properly held, access \"without authorization\" is limited to cir- cumventing technological access restrictions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pulte Homes, 648 F.3d 295. The court should interpret \"exceeds authorized access\" as impos-ing the same bar but at a different stage. Here's how the two prongs should work together.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE DIFFICULTY OF DISTINGUISHING ACCESS WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM EXCEEDING AUTHORIZED ACCESS COUNSELS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION",
		"context": "But the general difficulty of distinguishing between these two concepts counsels in favor of interpreting them in the same basic way. As the lower courts have properly held, access \"without authorization\" is limited to cir- cumventing technological access restrictions. See 928 F.2d 504; Pulte Homes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court should interpret \"exceeds authorized access\" as impos-ing the same bar but at a different stage. Here's how the two prongs should work together.",
		"citation_value_orig": "648 F.3d 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "All the Denial Order resolved was the litigation forum. Instead of applying the Bullard standard as the Court articulated it, Jackson and its amici focus primarily on the particular \"proceeding\" resolved by the order, specifically whether the proceeding may be said to constitute a \"discrete dispute[] within the larger case.\" Bullard , 135 S. Ct. at 1692 (quoting Howard Delivery Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). For example, Jackson argues that \"the relevant 'proceeding' is the discrete process of resolving a motion for relief from the automatic stay, which terminates when relief is granted or conclusively denied.\" Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": ". should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this rule, the phrase \"under section 157\" modifies the language \"referred to the bankruptcy judges\" and not \"proceedings.\" Accordingly, the phrase points to the general referral language of section 157, not the list of core proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "Other core proceedings are resolved through non- final motions. For example, motions to transfer venue are core proceedings under section 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). See, e.g., Storage Equities, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, orders granting or denying venue-transfer motions are not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Stewart Org.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 B.R. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "Yet, orders granting or denying venue-transfer motions are not immediately appealable. See, e.g., Stewart Org. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But whether such an order is final depends on whether the relief is granted or denied. See, e.g., 60 F.3d 724.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": ", 487 U.S. 22. But whether such an order is final depends on whether the relief is granted or denied. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Jackson and its amici also tout the importance of \"prejudice,\" with Jackson implying incorrectly that the Denial Order in this case was entered \"with prejudice.\" Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "The presumption in bankruptcy practice is that a stay-relief motion may be renewed at any time during the course of the bankruptcy as circumstances change. See, e.g. , Pinpoint IT Servs., LLC v. Rivera (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is especially true where, as here, the motion is premised on evidence of the debtor's lack of good faith. As explained Other examples of \"core proceedings\" often adjudicated by interlocutory, as opposed to final, orders include: orders under section 157(b)(2)(M) \"approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral,\" see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "761 F.3d 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "That is especially true where, as here, the motion is premised on evidence of the debtor's lack of good faith. As explained Other examples of \"core proceedings\" often adjudicated by interlocutory, as opposed to final, orders include: orders under section 157(b)(2)(M) \"approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral,\" see, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] regarding \"determinations of the validity, extent or priority of liens,\" see, e.g. , In re893 F.2d 264293 B.R. 764. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 B.R. 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "As explained Other examples of \"core proceedings\" often adjudicated by interlocutory, as opposed to final, orders include: orders under section 157(b)(2)(M) \"approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral,\" see, e.g. , In re434 B.R. 716 regarding \"determinations of the validity, extent or priority of liens,\" see, e.g. , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]293 B.R. 764. See, e.g. , 528 B.R. 874.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.2d 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Jackson and Its Amici Misconstrue the Bullard Finality Standard",
		"context": "As explained Other examples of \"core proceedings\" often adjudicated by interlocutory, as opposed to final, orders include: orders under section 157(b)(2)(M) \"approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash collateral,\" see, e.g. , In re434 B.R. 716 regarding \"determinations of the validity, extent or priority of liens,\" see, e.g. , In re893 F.2d 264[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g. , 528 B.R. 874.",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 B.R. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "Trademarks represent prominent brands and institutions. That makes them ripe targets for satire , parody, criticism, and commentary . And just as the people possess the \"prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good taste, on all public institution s,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , they likewise have the privilege to speak their mind on public brands. The First Amendment thus requires breathing room for using another's mark for political, social, and artistic expression —even if the use is intended to make money. Va. State Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "The First Amendment thus requires breathing room for using another's mark for political, social, and artistic expression —even if the use is intended to make money. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither Hustler magazine nor 2 Live Crew lost constitutional protection just because they sold their infamous parodies . Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ; 510 U.S. 569 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "of 425 U.S. 748. Neither Hustler magazine nor 2 Live Crew lost constitutional protection just because they sold their infamous parodies . Hustler Mag., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 510 U.S. 569 . 6 The freedom to use another's mark for legitimate expression must cover traditional mediums like publications , websites, and music . But it also must extend to useable product s. Indeed , political , social, and artistic expression incorporating another's trademark often takes the form of a t-shirt, 6 or here, a humorous dog toy.7 Those useable form s enhance a speaker's ability to reach others .",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "of 425 U.S. 748. Neither Hustler magazine nor 2 Live Crew lost constitutional protection just because they sold their infamous parodies . Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 6 The freedom to use another's mark for legitimate expression must cover traditional mediums like publications , websites, and music . But it also must extend to useable product s. Indeed , political , social, and artistic expression incorporating another's trademark often takes the form of a t-shirt, 6 or here, a humorous dog toy.7 Those useable form s enhance a speaker's ability to reach others .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "Imagine $10 t-shirt s that use a university logo to express opposition to university policy or satirize the school's losing football team. Those shirts are just like \"the sandwich boards that union pickets sometimes wear,\" and thus \"are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than given away. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Nike, 6 F.3d 1225 ; Black Dog Tavern 823 F. Supp. 48 . 7 VIP Prod s. 953 F.3d at 1172 ; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier 507 F.3d 252. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 F.3d 1010",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "Imagine $10 t-shirt s that use a university logo to express opposition to university policy or satirize the school's losing football team. Those shirts are just like \"the sandwich boards that union pickets sometimes wear,\" and thus \"are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than given away. \" 125 F.3d 1010 ; see also Nike, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Black Dog Tavern 823 F. Supp. 48 . 7 VIP Prod s. 953 F.3d at 1172 ; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier 507 F.3d 252. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 F.3d 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "Imagine $10 t-shirt s that use a university logo to express opposition to university policy or satirize the school's losing football team. Those shirts are just like \"the sandwich boards that union pickets sometimes wear,\" and thus \"are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than given away. \" 125 F.3d 1010 ; see also Nike, 6 F.3d 1225 ; Black Dog Tavern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 7 VIP Prod s. 953 F.3d at 1172 ; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier 507 F.3d 252. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "823 F. Supp. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Robust protection for political, social, and artistic expression requires latitude to draw on trademarks, even in the commercial context",
		"context": "Those shirts are just like \"the sandwich boards that union pickets sometimes wear,\" and thus \"are a medium of expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection by being sold rather than given away. \" 125 F.3d 1010 ; see also Nike, 6 F.3d 1225 ; Black Dog Tavern 823 F. Supp. 48 . 7 VIP Prod s. 953 F.3d at 1172 ; see also Louis Vuitton Malletier [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "19, at 25. And even if the invalidation of the other four claims were to call into question the sustainability of the lost - profits award, there is no indication that petitioner 's re- quest fo r lost profits would be \"so implausible that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent also argues (Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This case is a suitable vehicle for resolving the question presented",
		"context": "But even if the Court 's decision not to grant plenary review at that time on the lost -profits question is properly viewed as a denial of a writ of certiorari, \"a prior denial of certiorari does 'not establish the law of the case or amount to res judicata on the points raised. ' \" Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 84 (10th ed. 2013) (quoting Hughes Tool [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Petitioner therefore is not precluded from rais- ing the issue again. 23",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jurors' Misunderstanding of the Availability of Parole Has a Major Impact on Jurors' Concerns about the Defendant's Future Dangerousness",
		"context": ". \"A crucial assumption underlying [the] system [of trial by jury] is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Writing for the plurality of the Court in Simmons , Justice Blackmun observed that \"[i]t can hardly be questioned that most juries lack accurate information about the precise meaning of 'life imprisonment'….\" Simmons , 512 U.S. at 169.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Adopting West Virginia's Incorrect Interpretation Of 4 U.S.C. section 111 And Davis Would Cause Serious Hardship For 2.6 Million Federal Annuitants",
		"context": "Under this strategy, as long as states steered clear of so -called \"blanket\" tax exemptions for all state retirees, they could cater to powerful interest groups by doling out favorable treatment to specific sub-classes of state retirees while denying the same treatment to similarly situated federal retirees, who typically lack the same political influence with state legislatures. Some states have held that s uch schemes are unlawful under Davis . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the lower court's decision is left standing, however, states would be given a green light to implement this strateg y for favoring state retirees —precisely the sort of discriminatory treatment that this Court prohibited in Davis. The potential impact of the decision below is far from narrow.",
		"citation_value_orig": "771 S.W.2d 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The District Court's Effect Prong Is Limited and Precise",
		"context": "To prevail, she must also establish that the total population deviation between the entire plan's most and least populous districts exceeds ten percent (in a state-legislative suit). See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, a racial vote-dilution plaintiff is not done after showing that she has been cracked or packed—or even that she could have been placed in \"an additional majority-minority district.\" LULAC , 548 U.S. at 495 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 835",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History Supports Schools' Authority",
		"context": "Respondents (at 29 n.24) ultimately dismiss pre- Tinker cases for \"not address[ing] a speech claim\" and mostly pre-dating the incorporation of the First Amend- ment. But States had First Amendment analogues, and \"[i]f students in public school s were originally understood as having free-speech rights , one would have expected 19th-century public schools to have respected those rights and courts to have enforced them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] argue that schools' jurisdiction has always ended when students leave school custody or cease transit. Bu t respondents (at 24-28) insist that schools constitutionally can regulate off-campus speech (bullying, harassment, \"and the like\") even when students engage in that off-campus speech under parental custody. They never explain how or when the meaning of the First Amendment changed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Aiding and Abetting Slavery and Forced Labor Are the Type of Violations Implicating U.S. Responsibility that the Founders Sought to Remedy under the ATS",
		"context": "International norms prohibiting aiding and abetting slavery and forced labor indisputably meet the Sosa standard , and fall squarely within the ATS' remedial purpose , nor do Petitioner or the 5 This is precisely wh at the lower courts had done, as Sosa noted with approval. Id. at 732 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 13 Government dispute this .6 Indisputably, these norms apply to entities as well as natural persons. See §II (A)-(C), infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.2d 876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Limiting cost awards under Section 505 to costs that are taxable under Section 1920 reflects sound copyright policy",
		"context": "The Court has accordingly adopted rules regarding the shifting of litigation expenses under 17 U.S.C. 505 that eschew \"unconstrained discretion\" in favor of predicta- ble \" 'limits .' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Fogerty , the Court held that the same standards that govern a district court's decision to award attor- ney's fees to a copyright plaintiff should apply as well to a successful defendant. 510 U.S. at 534.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1979",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Limiting cost awards under Section 505 to costs that are taxable under Section 1920 reflects sound copyright policy",
		"context": "The Court also observed that an objective -reasonableness test would address th e \"oft- stated concern that an a pplication for attorney' s fees 'should not result in a second major litigation. ' \" Id. at 30 1988 (quoting Independent Fed'n of Flight [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 2. Construing 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Limiting cost awards under Section 505 to costs that are taxable under Section 1920 reflects sound copyright policy",
		"context": "And there is no ap- parent policy r eason that cost awards should be gov- erned by different rules in copyright suits than in pa- tent and trademark cases. See 15 U.S.C. 1117(a) (allow- ing prevailing trademark plaintiff s to rec eive \"the costs of the action\"); see also , e.g., Summit Tech., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] The Ninth Circuit's approach , by contrast, creates an un defined —and hence unknowable —universe of nontaxable costs that may be award ed to the prevailing party at the conclusion of a copyright suit . In this case , for example, the district court awarded approximately $12 million in nontaxable costs, which included compen- sation \"for expert witness fees, additional e -discovery 31 fees not included under 28 U.S.C. § 1920, contract attor- ney services, jury consulting, and other non -taxable costs.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.3d 1371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Limiting cost awards under Section 505 to costs that are taxable under Section 1920 reflects sound copyright policy",
		"context": "i, 1, 13, 16, 23. \"Without governing standards or principles ,\" however, the Ninth Circuit's rule \"threaten[s] to condone judicial 'whim' or predilection.\" Kirtsaeng , 136 S. Ct. at 1986 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This Court should reject an interpre- tation that would turn 17 U.S.C. 505 into \"an open - ended\" authority for shifting \"all expenses incurred by prevailing\" copyright litigants, possibly including, for example, \"travel and lodging expenses or lost wages due to time taken off from work.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran",
		"context": "But Respondents miss the point. T he funds in Taylor were used for \" painting three exterior sides\" of a church and \"examining window sills for structural damage .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, Morris County provides construction funding for a building 's exterior and mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems only. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "178 A.3d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran",
		"context": "But they never explain the constitutional significance of the varying amounts . Nor did the court below make a de minimis exception : all church- es are excluded regardless of amount . Respondents next argue that American Atheists, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is \"quite different ,\" primarily because it predated Trinity Lutheran . Opp. 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 F.3d 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran",
		"context": "This fails for at least two reasons. First, a government program need not be \"restriction -free\" to constitute a \"generally availa- ble public benefit program .\" Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, the program in Trinity Lutheran was itself limited to \"public and private schools, nonprofit daycare centers, and other nonprofit entities\" that met the qualifying purposes of the grant , with funds ultimately distributed \"on a competit ive basis \" to an even smaller group. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below conflicts with Trinity Lutheran",
		"context": "The potential oversight in both cases is the same: an accounting of how funds are spent and building s maintained . This Court has long re- jected that supervision of public aid alone creates an excessive entanglement, even where much more in- tricate oversight—such as monitoring \"to prevent or 10 to detect inculcation of religion by public employ- ees\"—is involved . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The merger doctrine only applies where there are limited ways to express an idea",
		"context": "The merger doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the expression of an idea may be copyrighted even while the idea itself may not. Where there are only a limited number of ways to express an idea, the idea and the expression \"merge\" to prevent the author from getting copyright protection for the idea. See, e.g., Gates Rubber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Altai , 982 F.2d at 707- 08; Herbert Rosenthal Jewe lry 446 F.2d 738; see also 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[B][3]. Baker itself was essentially decided on merger grounds—to have extended copyright protection to the ruled lines, columns, and headings of the accounting forms would have been akin to copyrighting the accounting system itself. See 101 U.S. at 104-05.",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 F.3d 823",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The merger doctrine only applies where there are limited ways to express an idea",
		"context": "The merger doctrine is an exception to the general rule that the expression of an idea may be copyrighted even while the idea itself may not. Where there are only a limited number of ways to express an idea, the idea and the expression \"merge\" to prevent the author from getting copyright protection for the idea. See, e.g., Gates Rubber 9 F.3d 823; Altai , 982 F.2d at 707- 08; Herbert Rosenthal Jewe lry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 4 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.03[B][3]. Baker itself was essentially decided on merger grounds—to have extended copyright protection to the ruled lines, columns, and headings of the accounting forms would have been akin to copyrighting the accounting system itself. See 101 U.S. at 104-05.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 F.2d 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The merger doctrine only applies where there are limited ways to express an idea",
		"context": "By way of example from Mr. Oman's experience, historically the Copyright Office refused to register copyrights for typeface designs. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1977); Eltra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 198 8, the Copyright Office promulgated a regulation that barred protection for computer programs that generate typefonts, on the basis of merger. See 53 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.2d 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The merger doctrine only applies where there are limited ways to express an idea",
		"context": "As the Federal Circuit recognized in this case, this analysis focuses on the choice of expression available to the author of a work at the time of creation, not on the choices available to a subsequent user of the work. See, e.g. , Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Apple Comput., Inc. , 725 F.2d at 524; see also Pet. App. 151a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 F.3d 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles",
		"context": "But for support, the United States relies on cases involving general state-law causes of action for contribution, untethered to any statutory scheme or particular kind of injury. By contrast, \"[t]here is no general federal right to contribution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, Congress has authorized only limited contribution rights within specific statutory regimes. See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles",
		"context": "572 U.S. 434. Instead, Congress has authorized only limited contribution rights within specific statutory regimes. See Texas Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that context, the harm is necessarily defined by the statutory violation. See Lexmark Int'l, 572 U.S. 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles",
		"context": "See Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630. In that context, the harm is necessarily defined by the statutory violation. See Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Extinguishing common liability for the \"same harm,\" therefore, requires extinguishing common liability for the same statutory violation. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles",
		"context": "Extinguishing common liability for the \"same harm,\" therefore, requires extinguishing common liability for the same statutory violation. See, e.g. , Northwest Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Tellingly, the United States never identifies the \"same harm\" here, alluding only in general terms (at 30) to \"the dump's contaminated condition.\" That is because, even if violations occur at the same location, the CWA and CERCLA \"harms\"—the respective statutory violations—are distinct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The United States' Interpretation Upsets Traditional Contribution Principles",
		"context": "Pet. App. 139a, 141a; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2 004) (federal consent decree is limited to the pleadings). By contrast, the harm addressed by CERCLA is the \"release\" of a \"hazardous substance.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "There is no daylight between the rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment and the rights enforceable under Section 1983 . The clear purpose of that provision w as \"the enforcement of t he Constitution to the extent of the rights guarantied by the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute thus extends \"as broad [ly] as the protection that the Fourteenth Amendment affords ,\" but \"'no further.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": ", men- tioned in Count III, J.A. 104 –06, merely \"enlarge[s] the range of rem- edies availab le\" with respect to an independent cause of action. Skelly Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "See Baker , 443 U.S. at 146 (\"Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitu- tion.\"). Section 1983 provi des a remedy only \" for uncon- stitutional state action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"deprivation\" means something short of a violation only in \"the unique context of the [Just Compensation] Clause ,\" and t hat State subdivisions (but not natural \"person[s],\" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) can be held liable under Section 1983 for takings of property for public use that do not violate the Const itu- tion. But it is \"dangerous\" to ascribe a different meaning to statutory language in its different applications , 543 U.S. 371, and it is no less dan- gerous to interpret Section 1983 to match the Solicitor General's \"perceive d 'purpose' of a constitutional provi- sion,\" rather than the \"actual constitutional right[]\" that it confers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "491 U.S. 58 that \"deprivation\" means something short of a violation only in \"the unique context of the [Just Compensation] Clause ,\" and t hat State subdivisions (but not natural \"person[s],\" 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ) can be held liable under Section 1983 for takings of property for public use that do not violate the Const itu- tion. But it is \"dangerous\" to ascribe a different meaning to statutory language in its different applications , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it is no less dan- gerous to interpret Section 1983 to match the Solicitor General's \"perceive d 'purpose' of a constitutional provi- sion,\" rather than the \"actual constitutional right[]\" that it confers. 538 U.S. 760. For her part, petitioner ignores the statutory text completely and fails to observe the \"strict\" distinction be- tween \"a simple suit for just compensation ,\" which does not allege a violation of the Constitution , and a Section 1983 suit, which seeks \"damages for the unconstitutional denial of such compensation .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "§ 1983 ) can be held liable under Section 1983 for takings of property for public use that do not violate the Const itu- tion. But it is \"dangerous\" to ascribe a different meaning to statutory language in its different applications , 543 U.S. 371, and it is no less dan- gerous to interpret Section 1983 to match the Solicitor General's \"perceive d 'purpose' of a constitutional provi- sion,\" rather than the \"actual constitutional right[]\" that it confers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For her part, petitioner ignores the statutory text completely and fails to observe the \"strict\" distinction be- tween \"a simple suit for just compensation ,\" which does not allege a violation of the Constitution , and a Section 1983 suit, which seeks \"damages for the unconstitutional denial of such compensation .\" Del Monte Dunes , 526 U.S. at 710.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 760",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "V. A deprivation of property is perfectly constitutional if effected through due process. In some cases, \"due pr ocess of law\" is a state -law postdeprivation suit against the government official who deprived a person of property . E.g., Hudson , 468 U.S. at 533; Parratt , 451 U.S. at 543 –44; Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such cases, a Section 19 83 action is not \"an alternative remedy \" that itself effects due process, Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "38, but rather a n action for damages for want of due process. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting the similar relationships of the Due Process and Just Compen sation Clauses to Section 1983). The same is true of any constitutional right the in- fringement of which turns on unavailability of a n adequate postdeprivation remedy. See, e.g., 536 U.S. 403; Carter v. nation suit filed by the government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "Expense 527 U.S. 627 (noting the similar relationships of the Due Process and Just Compen sation Clauses to Section 1983). The same is true of any constitutional right the in- fringement of which turns on unavailability of a n adequate postdeprivation remedy. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Carter v. nation suit filed by the government. See, e.g., 26 Pa. C.S. ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "5 (apply- ing special public -notice and in tervention rules to both types of suits). Those concepts are foreign to a tort suit filed under Section 1983. 33 Greenhow , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cf. 494 U.S. 259.",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 U.S. 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "33 Greenhow , 114 U.S. 317. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A violation of such a right is not \"complete \" if adequate postdeprivation reme- dies are available. Williamson County , 473 U.S. at 195.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "§ 1983. Petitioner's position rests on \"a generally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unencumbered oppor- tunity to litigate that right in a federal district court.\" Al- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1980). See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "13. 34 Lastly, p etitioner invokes (Br. 27) the teaching of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that \"ex- haustion of administrative remedies in § 1983 actions should not be judicially imposed.\" Id. at 502.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "XIV, § 1, the plaintiff could seek relief immediately under Sec- tion 1983. Petitioner, by contrast, has not been denied any right under the Just Compensation Clause and therefore cannot state a claim under Section 1983. Williamson County \"d[id] not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather den[ied] the existence of a cause of action,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , because \"the governmental action [was] not unconstitu- tional.\" 474 U.S. 121. Section 1983 means what it says .",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A plaintiff invoking Section 1983 must allege a violation of the Constitution",
		"context": "Petitioner, by contrast, has not been denied any right under the Just Compensation Clause and therefore cannot state a claim under Section 1983. Williamson County \"d[id] not engraft an exhaustion requirement upon § 1983, but rather den[ied] the existence of a cause of action,\" 512 U.S. 477 , because \"the governmental action [was] not unconstitu- tional.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1983 means what it says . A plaintiff must al- lege \"the deprivation of\" a constitutional \"right\" in order to state a claim .",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, nothing in the Elections Clause prohibited the North Carolina General Assembly from authorizing judicial review of its congressional districting maps",
		"context": "§ 12 0- 2.4(a1). As the North Carolina Supreme Court has explained, those statutes \"allow the General Assembly to exercise its proper responsibilities, \" \"decrease the risk that the courts will encroach upon the responsibilities of the leg- islative branch,\" and \"set out a workable framework for judicial review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 117 -120. Congressional elections in North Carolina are thus proceeding in precisely the \"Manner\" that was \"pre- scribed by the Legislature,\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "595 S.E.2d 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rescission Of DACA Was Not Adequately Explained",
		"context": "Chenery I , 318 U.S. at 94 . The basis for agency action must be \"set forth with such clarity as to be under-standable.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Judulang , 565 U.S. at 64. Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the agency \"must examine the relevant data and articu- late a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.\" Motor Vehicle Mfrs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rescission Of DACA Was Not Adequately Explained",
		"context": "Under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the agency \"must examine the relevant data and articu- late a satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.\" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An agency may choose to reverse an existing policy but must first \"provide a reasoned explanation for the change, show that there are good reasons for the new policy,\" and \"be cognizant that longstanding policies may have 'engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.'\" Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct. 2117 ( 2016) (citation omit- ted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rescission Of DACA Was Not Adequately Explained",
		"context": "Ass'n of U.S., 463 U.S. 29. An agency may choose to reverse an existing policy but must first \"provide a reasoned explanation for the change, show that there are good reasons for the new policy,\" and \"be cognizant that longstanding policies may have 'engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account.'\" Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2016) (citation omit- ted). The rescission of DACA fails to meet these require- ments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. PROTECTABLE MARKS",
		"context": "Courts in terpreting the Act have identified four main categories of terms that correspond with eligibility fo r trademark protection. In order of most protectable to not protectable at all, these categories are: (1) fanciful or arbitrary; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; and (4) generic. See Abercrombie & Fitch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Descriptive marks—which mainly describe an applicant's goods or services—are not registrable unless the mark has acquir ed secondary meaning. See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F.2d 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. PROTECTABLE MARKS",
		"context": "See Abercrombie & Fitch 537 F.2d 4. Descriptive marks—which mainly describe an applicant's goods or services—are not registrable unless the mark has acquir ed secondary meaning. See Park 'N Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To acquire secondary meaning, the term must \"become sufficiently distinctive to establish mental association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark an d a single source of the 8 product.\" Retail Servs., 364 F.3d 535; see also 15 U.S.C § 1052; Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. PROTECTABLE MARKS",
		"context": "See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189. To acquire secondary meaning, the term must \"become sufficiently distinctive to establish mental association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark an d a single source of the 8 product.\" Retail Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 15 U.S.C § 1052; Two Pesos, 505 U.S. 763. The applicant can demonstrate secondary meaning through, among other things, the length and manner of use of the mark, volume of sales, manner of advertising, consumer-survey evidence, and direct consumer testimony. See Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 F.3d 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. PROTECTABLE MARKS",
		"context": "See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189. To acquire secondary meaning, the term must \"become sufficiently distinctive to establish mental association in buyers' minds between the alleged mark an d a single source of the 8 product.\" Retail Servs., 364 F.3d 535; see also 15 U.S.C § 1052; Two Pesos, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The applicant can demonstrate secondary meaning through, among other things, the length and manner of use of the mark, volume of sales, manner of advertising, consumer-survey evidence, and direct consumer testimony. See Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. PROTECTABLE MARKS",
		"context": "of Supervisors for Louisiana State Univ. Agri c. & Mech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Examples of descriptive marks that have acquired secondary meaning include \"SHARP\" for televisions or \"DIGITAL\" for computers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Establishment Clause was meant to encourage diverse religious exercise",
		"context": ". As this Court recently stated, the Establishment Clause \"must be interpreted by reference to historical practices and understandings.\" Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit's ruling, however, ig nores the historic understanding that the Establishment Clause requires the government to accommodat e a broad array of religions, so long as the government does not 5 use its power to coerc e citizens to abide by a particular religious belief or observance. Both before and after the ratification of the Constitution, the disestablishment of religion was not understood to require strict separation between the state and any encouragement or recognition of religious belief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nominal-damages claims do not need to be paired with compensatory-damages claims to be justiciable.",
		"context": "This de prives plaintiffs of the freedom to make litigation ch oices, forces plaintiffs to prove compensatory-damages claims in situations where such proof may involve sensitive, private matters, and needlessly pr olongs and complicates litigation. For example, to avoid the possibility of the government mooting their lawsuit without acknowl- edging its past constitution al violations, the Eleventh Circuit's rule would have required the students in Brown v. Board of Education to claim and prove compensatory damages for th e \"feeling of inferiority\" resulting from facing segregated public schools. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would have obligated the students in Safford Unified School District No. 557 U.S. 364, to plead and show the monetary cost for the \"embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating\" effects of a middle- school-student strip search.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nominal-damages claims do not need to be paired with compensatory-damages claims to be justiciable.",
		"context": "347 U.S. 483. It would have obligated the students in Safford Unified School District No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to plead and show the monetary cost for the \"embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating\" effects of a middle- school-student strip search. Even in Flanigan's itself, the plaintiff would have had to testify and undergo cross-examination on activi ties involving intimate conduct. As these cases il lustrate, plaintiffs of all kinds have incentive to \"waive[ ] all right to more than nominal damages,\" a choice that was \"self-evident\" at common law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nominal-damages claims do not need to be paired with compensatory-damages claims to be justiciable.",
		"context": "But a $1 compensatory-damages claim ( e.g., a fraction of a tank of gas needed to driv e to campus to share one's faith, a confiscated piece of sidewalk chalk) would remain justiciable. So the result would be litigants creatively repackaging their nominal-damages claim as a compensatory one—until the Eleventh Circuit tries to extend its rule to \"trivial\" compensatory- damages claims, which also would conflict with this Court's rulings. See Sprint Commc'ns Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If courts can decide th e constitutionality of a changed policy based solely on a compensatory- damages claim, it does not se rve judicial restraint, or modesty, or any other policy to prohibit the same decision in the context of a nominal-damages claim. Quite the opposite, requiring citizens to vindicate their constitutional rights by presenting courts with undesired or illusory compensatory-damages claims will require courts to resolve additional questions in which no party has a real and vital interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "In the resulting rule's \"concise gen-eral statement,\" 5 U.S.C. § 553(c), the agency cannot \"leave vital questions, raised by comments which are of cogent materiality, completely unanswered.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the agency has a duty to provide a reasoned explanation of its decision by ad-dressing the \"major issues\" raised by the public's com-ments. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 F.2d 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "Id. (quoting Auto. Parts & Accessories [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The FCC has made it especially easy for the public to submit comments and petitions through the agency's elec-tronic docketing system. See Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 F.2d 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "That means that any person who par-ticipated in the agency proceedings could reasonably track one case challenging a rule in order to ensure that their interests are represented during the judicial review process. Indeed, consumer groups frequently participate as amici curiae in Hobbs Act challenges to FCC orders. See, e.g., ACA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Public interest groups often petition the agency for modification of orders that do not adequately pro-tect consumers. Business groups have similarly stepped in to participate in such proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "28 https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/60001008332.pdf. 13 2014).29 When companies petitioned for review of the order, EPIC and twelve other consumer groups sub-mitted briefs as amici curiae. See Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC and Six Consumer Privacy Organizations in Support of Respondents, ACA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Con-sumer Law Ctr., Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates Consumers Union, AARP, Consumer Fed'n of Amer-ica, and MFY Legal Serv. 's, ACA 885 F.3d 687. Another example is the dispute over whether telecommunications companies had to obtain \"opt-in\" consent to disclose \"customer proprietary network in-formation\" (\"CPNI\") to third parties that culminated in National Cable & Telecommunications 555 F.3d 996.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "13 2014).29 When companies petitioned for review of the order, EPIC and twelve other consumer groups sub-mitted briefs as amici curiae. See Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC and Six Consumer Privacy Organizations in Support of Respondents, ACA 885 F.3d 687; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Con-sumer Law Ctr., Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates Consumers Union, AARP, Consumer Fed'n of Amer-ica, and MFY Legal Serv. 's, ACA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Another example is the dispute over whether telecommunications companies had to obtain \"opt-in\" consent to disclose \"customer proprietary network in-formation\" (\"CPNI\") to third parties that culminated in National Cable & Telecommunications 555 F.3d 996. When the FCC first promulgated an opt-in rule following passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, U.S. West filed a successful Hobbs Act challenge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "See Brief of Amici Curiae EPIC and Six Consumer Privacy Organizations in Support of Respondents, ACA 885 F.3d 687; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat'l Con-sumer Law Ctr., Nat'l Ass'n of Consumer Advocates Consumers Union, AARP, Consumer Fed'n of Amer-ica, and MFY Legal Serv. 's, ACA 885 F.3d 687. Another example is the dispute over whether telecommunications companies had to obtain \"opt-in\" consent to disclose \"customer proprietary network in-formation\" (\"CPNI\") to third parties that culminated in National Cable & Telecommunications [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the FCC first promulgated an opt-in rule following passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, U.S. West filed a successful Hobbs Act challenge. U.S. 182 F.3d 1224, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "Another example is the dispute over whether telecommunications companies had to obtain \"opt-in\" consent to disclose \"customer proprietary network in-formation\" (\"CPNI\") to third parties that culminated in National Cable & Telecommunications 555 F.3d 996. When the FCC first promulgated an opt-in rule following passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, U.S. West filed a successful Hobbs Act challenge. U.S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,530 U.S. 1213. The court of appeals held that the agency rec-ord did not adequately support the opt-in rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 F.3d 1224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "6927 (2007). The National Cable and Telecommunica-tions Association (\"NCTA\") sought judicial review of the new CPNI rule under the Hobbs Act. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. EPIC and other consumer groups sub-mitted an amicus curiae brief to defend the FCC order. Brief of Amici Curiae Privacy and Consumer 30 https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6518153274.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "Brief of Amici Curiae Privacy and Consumer 30 https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6518153274.pdf. 31 https://ecfsapi.fcc.gov/file/6518334730.pdf. 15 Organizations, Technical Experts and Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents Urging the Court to Deny the Petition for Review of the FCC's 2007 Order, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the D.C. Circuit ultimately upheld the order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd. 7961, 7971, 7977–78 (2015), set aside in part, ACA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After the FCC issued the 2015 Order, the same groups that had argued for a nar-rower autodialer definition in the 2008 rulemaking filed a Hobbs Act challenge in the D.C. Circuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "After the FCC issued the 2015 Order, the same groups that had argued for a nar-rower autodialer definition in the 2008 rulemaking filed a Hobbs Act challenge in the D.C. Circuit. As a result of the petitioners' challenge, the court of appeals set aside the FCC order in part in ACA International, et [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, the court found that the expanded definition adopted in the 2015 Order was \"incompatible\" with the statute be-cause the law could not \"reasonably be read to render every smartphone an ATDS subject to the Act's re-strictions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The rulemaking process enables the public to meaningfully participate in federal agency decision-making",
		"context": "21 334 F. Supp. 3d 1262; see also 326 F. Supp. 3d 578; 345 F. Supp. 3d 1064; 312 F. Supp. 3d 1308; Abante Rooter & Plumbing, 2018 WL 3707283; 2018 WL 2327037; 2018 WL 2316452. Other courts have disagreed and held that earlier orders can be invalidated as a result of the ACA International de-cision. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sessions v. Barclays Bank Delaware, 317 F. Supp. 3d. 1208, 1212 (N.D. Ga. 2018); 319 F. Supp. 3d 924; 342 F. Supp. 3d 563; 2018 WL 4217065.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority",
		"context": ". The Services' account of the above-described rec- ord as one of ruminative give-and-take, rather than de- cisive cause-and-effect, hinges upon two errors. First, the Services incorrectly characterize their jeopardy de- cision as an indeterminate suggestion, akin to a recom- mendation by lower-level agency staff with a \"total lack of decisional authority,\" Renegotiation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Brief 8-9. Second, the Services describe their Jeopardy Opinions as only relevant to \"a policy which an agency has rejected,\" because EPA altered its In- take-Structures Rule, Brief 24-25, 37—even though this alteration was caused by the jeopardy determina- tion whose basis the Opinions supply.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority",
		"context": "6 Bennett rejects the proposition that this technical 6 A final biological opinion likewise does not prevent the Ser- vices from changing their minds, subject to the constraints of rea- soned decision-making. See Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 possibility deprives the Services' conclusions of legal impact and meaningful effect. Given the ESA's un- yielding prohibitions and the Services' wildlife-related expertise, the Services' conclusions have practical and legal consequences such that action agencies cannot \"in reality\" defy them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Services' Account of the Record Mistakes the Nature of Their ESA Authority",
		"context": "The Services contend that whenever an action agency abandons or modifie s its action following the Services' jeopardy determination, the opinion explain- ing that determination is just a deliberative rumina- tion that has \"died on the vine.\" Brief 39 (quoting Nat'l Sec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That contention makes prohibitory authority disappear, simply because it is prohibitory. When EPA refuses to approve a permit submitted to it, that re- fusal does not die on the vine if the applicant abandons or amends its proposed activi ties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Prior Administrative Adjudication Is Not Typically an Element of a Criminal Offense",
		"context": "Even in other contexts, the results of immigration proceedings may be chal- lenged. For example, in United States v. Ortiz-Lopez , a criminal defendant was permitted to litigate the question of alienage, tho ugh an IJ had previously determined that he was not a United States citizen. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court emphasized 3The state courts generally apply the same rule. See generally, e.g.,Ex parte369 S.W. 205; 116 Md. App. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F.3d 53",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Prior Administrative Adjudication Is Not Typically an Element of a Criminal Offense",
		"context": "24 F.3d 53. The court emphasized 3The state courts generally apply the same rule. See generally, e.g.,Ex parte369 S.W. 205; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 the \"difference in burdens of proof between criminal trials and civil proceedings,\" and explained that \"al- lowing deportation orders to establish the element of alienage in a later criminal trial would eviscerate the element altogether.\" Id.a t5 6 ; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 Md. App. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Prior Administrative Adjudication Is Not Typically an Element of a Criminal Offense",
		"context": ",Sec. & Exch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One of the only other circumstances in which an administrative judgment routinely serves as a pre- 11 condition for a criminal prosecution is in the context of tax fraud and tax evasion. See 264 F.3d 535.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.2d 1368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A Prior Administrative Adjudication Is Not Typically an Element of a Criminal Offense",
		"context": "628 F.2d 1368. One of the only other circumstances in which an administrative judgment routinely serves as a pre- 11 condition for a criminal prosecution is in the context of tax fraud and tax evasion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in that con- text, robust procedural protections allow an individ- ual to challenge any finding of deficiency before it becomes final. Before issuing a formal notice of defi- ciency, the I.R.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 F.3d 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "The First Amendment fully protects both commissioned and non-commissioned art. This is trueeven when art is conceptualized in collaboration witha customer or created with a profit motive. Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Speakers do not forfeit First Amendment protection by collaborating with other speakers. See Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569 (\"[A] private speaker does not forfeitconstitutional protection simply by combiningmultifarious voices\" (citing Miami Herald Publ'g 418 U.S. 241 ( 1974))); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S. Ct. at 1744 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (\"Nor does it matter that the couple also communicatesthrough the cake.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569; 487 U.S. 781. Speakers do not forfeit First Amendment protection by collaborating with other speakers. See Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569 (\"[A] private speaker does not forfeitconstitutional protection simply by combiningmultifarious voices\" (citing Miami Herald Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1974))); see also Masterpiece Cakeshop , 138 S. Ct. at 1744 n.3 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (\"Nor does it matter that the couple also communicatesthrough the cake. More than one person can be 12 engaged in protected speech at the same time.\"). As the Ninth Circuit recognized, when a client commissionsart from an artist, both c lient and artists are \"engaged in expressive activity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "More than one person can be 12 engaged in protected speech at the same time.\"). As the Ninth Circuit recognized, when a client commissionsart from an artist, both c lient and artists are \"engaged in expressive activity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While both parties \"contribute to the creative process,\" in which\"the customer has ultimate control over which designshe wants,\" and the artist \"provide[s] a service,\" theresult is no less an expre ssion by the creator \"because there is no dispute that the [commissioned artist]applies [her] creative talents as well.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "621 F.3d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "Riley , 487 U.S. at 801. Art—such as the websites produced by Ms. Smithand the custom cakes created by the Kleins—does notreceive a diminished degree of First Amendmentprotection \"merely because\" it is \"sold rather thangiven away.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If it were not so, vast swaths of expressive art would be excluded from theprotection of the First Amendment, from Leonardo daVinci's Last Supper painting commissioned by the Duke of Milan 5 to the Human Rights Campaign's blue 5 Alicja Zelazko, Last Supper , ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE , https://bit.ly/3zaHk8O (last accessed May 27, 2022). The First Amendment's protection of free sp eech assuredly protects religious speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "If it were not so, vast swaths of expressive art would be excluded from theprotection of the First Amendment, from Leonardo daVinci's Last Supper painting commissioned by the Duke of Milan 5 to the Human Rights Campaign's blue 5 Alicja Zelazko, Last Supper , ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE , https://bit.ly/3zaHk8O (last accessed May 27, 2022). The First Amendment's protection of free sp eech assuredly protects religious speech. Capital Square Review and Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 and yellow \"equal\" logo commissioned from artist Robert Stone.6 Artists must engage in self-expression to create both commissioned and non-commissioned original artwork.As the Tenth Circuit correctly held, the \"speech\" ofartists like Ms. Smith is \"implicated even where [their]services are requested by a third-party.\" 303 Creative, 6 F.4th at 1177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "See, e.g., Klein, 410 P.3d at 1072 (\"[T]o the extent that the cakes are expressive,they do not reflect only the Kleins' expression. Rather,they are products of a collaborative process in whichMelissa's artistic execution is subservient to acustomer's wishes and preferences. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]441 P.3d 1203309 P.3d 68. 14 First Amendment fully protects both commissioned and non-commissioned art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 P.3d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Original, Expressive Art Is Pure Speech, Regardless of Whether the Art is Commissioned or Non-Commissioned",
		"context": "See, e.g., Klein, 410 P.3d at 1072 (\"[T]o the extent that the cakes are expressive,they do not reflect only the Kleins' expression. Rather,they are products of a collaborative process in whichMelissa's artistic execution is subservient to acustomer's wishes and preferences. \"); 370 P.3d 272[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]309 P.3d 68. 14 First Amendment fully protects both commissioned and non-commissioned art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 P.3d 1203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The purpose of section 2676 does not support applying the judgment bar to dismiss additional claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.",
		"context": "The FTCA is one such statut e. Id. Traditio nal principles of res judicata, or claim preclusion, \"prevent [] partie s from raising issues that could have been raised and deci ded in a prior action —even if they were not actua lly litigated. \" Lucky Brand Dungare es, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc ., 140 S. C t. 1589, 1594 (2020) ; see also 8 Comm 'r of Internal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Historically, federal law applied preclu - sion princ iples (including both claim and issue preclusion) to claims ra ised in subs equent litigation only when the parties to the second actio n were also the parties to the first acti on or were in privity w ith those parties . \"Un der thi s mutu ality do ctrine, neither party could use a prior jud gment as an estoppel ag ainst the oth er unless both parties were bound by t he judgment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The purpose of section 2676 does not support applying the judgment bar to dismiss additional claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.",
		"context": "Parklane Hosiery C 439 U.S. 3. In 1946, when Congres s enacted the FTCA , the federal courts generally enforced a strict requirement of mutu ality of the parties in order to apply claim preclusion principles. See Un ited S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1942 ); 225 U.S. 111 (19 12); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 93 (1 942) ( non-party or privy to prior action \"not bound by or entitled to c laim the bene fits o f an adjudication upon any matter decided in the action\"). An exception to the mutuality r equireme nt at the time of the FTCA 's enactment , how ever, allowed an employer t o asser t clai m preclusi on in a subsequent suit where its employee had prevailed in an earlier suit regarding the same co nduct . See Restatem ent (Firs t) of Judgments § 96(1)(a) & cmts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The purpose of section 2676 does not support applying the judgment bar to dismiss additional claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.",
		"context": "Parklane Hosiery C 439 U.S. 3. In 1946, when Congres s enacted the FTCA , the federal courts generally enforced a strict requirement of mutu ality of the parties in order to apply claim preclusion principles. See Un ited S 315 U.S. 203 (1942 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (19 12); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 93 (1 942) ( non-party or privy to prior action \"not bound by or entitled to c laim the bene fits o f an adjudication upon any matter decided in the action\"). An exception to the mutuality r equireme nt at the time of the FTCA 's enactment , how ever, allowed an employer t o asser t clai m preclusi on in a subsequent suit where its employee had prevailed in an earlier suit regarding the same co nduct . See Restatem ent (Firs t) of Judgments § 96(1)(a) & cmts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "225 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The purpose of section 2676 does not support applying the judgment bar to dismiss additional claims brought in the same action as an FTCA claim.",
		"context": "Thus, the FTCA 's judgment bar extends the res judic ata e ffect of a prior judgme nt against the U nited Stat es to a n action against a federal employee for the same cond uct. \"The doctrin e of c laim preclusion , or r es judicata, operates to bar a 'second suit ' after fina l judgm ent involving the same parties and causes of action . Howev er, it cannot be invoked t o bar claims brought in the same sui t.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (stating that an adjudic ation of \"fewer tha n all the c laims \" in an action \"does not end the action as to any of the claims … and may be revised at any time before the entry of a judgment adjudic ating all the claims \"). \"The rules of res judicata are applic able only when a final judgment is ren dered ,\" Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13; they address \"when a judgment in one action is to be carried over to a secon d action and given a concl usive e ffect there .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "789 F.3d 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
		"context": "28. But that argument fails in its essential pre mise , because Rule 4 (a)(4)' s tim ing rules are not conditioned on whether a filing was \" proper. \" 20 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court distinguishe d between state habeas applications that are \"filed\" (i.e., \"delive red to, and accepted by, the appro priat e court officer\") and those th at are \" proper- ly filed\" ( i.e., file d \"in com pliance with the applicable laws and rules governing fili ngs\"). Id. at 8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Conflict Between Applying Rule 4(a)'s Plain Text And AEDPA",
		"context": "4( a)(4)(A) (iv) (motion must seek \"to 21 alter or amend the judgm ent\"). Once again, r e- spondent admits (at 44) that petitioner filed \" a 'true' Rule 59(e) motion \" seeking precis ely this relief. That concession also und ermines r espondent 's reliance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1926 ). There, the peti tioner filed a motion for a new trial, and then—after that motion was denied —\"presen ted a moti on for leave to file a motion to r econsider and grant a new trial.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision fails to recognize that temporary physical invasions are subject to a different and far more stringent level of review than regulatory actions that merely restrict an owner's use of property",
		"context": ". The court below began its takings analysis by stating that there are \"three categories\" of govern-ment action in this Court's takings jurisprudence. Cedar Point [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to the court, those three categories are (1) \"permanent physical invasions,\" (2) \"regulations that completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of her property,\" and (3) \"the remainder of regulatory actions, which are gov- erned by the standards set forth in Penn Central [.]\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision fails to recognize that temporary physical invasions are subject to a different and far more stringent level of review than regulatory actions that merely restrict an owner's use of property",
		"context": "This Co urt has held that \"[w]hen the government physically takes possession of an in-terest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner even though that use is temporary .\" Tahoe- Sierra Pres. Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, the fact that physical invasions are distinct from regulations does not mean that every temporary physical invasion is a taking. This \"Court [has] said that \"temporary limitations are sub- ject to a more complex balancing process to deter- mine whether they are a taking.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Ninth Circuit's decision fails to recognize that temporary physical invasions are subject to a different and far more stringent level of review than regulatory actions that merely restrict an owner's use of property",
		"context": "To be sure, the fact that physical invasions are distinct from regulations does not mean that every temporary physical invasion is a taking. This \"Court [has] said that \"temporary limitations are sub- ject to a more complex balancing process to deter- mine whether they are a taking.'\" Arkansas Game & Fish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Crucially, however, the \"balancing process\" for temporary occupations is not the same as the def- erential review that courts apply in regulatory tak-ings cases. Quite the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Analogous Tort At Common Law Provides The Proper Limitations Rule",
		"context": "42-22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983); seeMonroe v.Pape , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sec- tion 1983 \"creates a species of tort liability\" for the violation of constitutional rights. Heck , 512 U.S. at 483.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Analogous Tort At Common Law Provides The Proper Limitations Rule",
		"context": "§ 1988(a). One of those respects is the length of the 21 statute of limitations governing a Section 1983 claim. See Wallace , 549 U.S. at 387; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. McDonough's suit is accordingly governed by New York's three-year limitations period for personal injury torts. SeeN.Y.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Analogous Tort At Common Law Provides The Proper Limitations Rule",
		"context": "But the standard rule does not always govern. This Court has \"recognized that statutes of limitations do not inexorably commence upon accrual.\" Heimeshoff , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A cause of action may \"accrue[ ] at one time for the purpose of calculating when the statute of limita- tions begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit.\" Reiter v.Cooper , 507 U.S. 258; see also Wallace , 549 U.S. at 390 n.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Analogous Tort At Common Law Provides The Proper Limitations Rule",
		"context": "Heimeshoff , 571 U.S. 99. A cause of action may \"accrue[ ] at one time for the purpose of calculating when the statute of limita- tions begins to run, but at another time for the purpose of bringing suit.\" Reiter v.Cooper , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Wallace , 549 U.S. at 390 n.3. In other words, even if the elements of a claim have 22 been satisfied and the plaintiff can bring suit, the statute of limitations may not begin to run. One area where the Court has not always followed the \"standard\" limitations rule is Section 1983 suits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Abood's standard is workable",
		"context": ". Petitioner cannot show that the standard outlined in Abood is \"unworkable,\" Payne , 501 U.S. at 827 , or that it has \"'defied consistent application by the lower courts,'\" Pearson , 555 U.S. at 235 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 829 –30). Following Abood , the Court has addressed the line between chargeable and no n- chargeable expenses in the public sector twice , in Lehnert , 500 U.S. at 522 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Lehnert was 8 -1 as to several chal- 55 lenged expend itures and Locke was 9 -0. Although the Court's division over the scope of chargeable expenses in Lehnert confirmed that line-drawing will be diffi- cult in some cases, as Abood predicted, 431 U.S. 236 – 37, that is not nearly enough to label a legal doctrine unwork able.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Abood's standard is workable",
		"context": "Following Abood , the Court has addressed the line between chargeable and no n- chargeable expenses in the public sector twice , in Lehnert , 500 U.S. at 522 , and 555 U.S. 207 . Lehnert was 8 -1 as to several chal- 55 lenged expend itures and Locke was 9 -0. Although the Court's division over the scope of chargeable expenses in Lehnert confirmed that line-drawing will be diffi- cult in some cases, as Abood predicted, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] – 37, that is not nearly enough to label a legal doctrine unwork able. Petitioner complains that Lehnert and Locke are \"subjective\" and \"vague,\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Abood's standard is workable",
		"context": "Br. 26, but on the rare occasions when the Court has invoked vagueness to find a doctrine unworkab le in the past, it has pointed to the \"experience of the federal courts\" a nd the \"inability of later opinions to impart the predictabi lity that the earlier opinion forecast.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner does not offer any examples of such unpredic tability. Simila rly, petitioner's argumen t that the lower courts have \"struggled repeatedly\" with class ifying union expen ditures in the years following Abood is unsup- ported.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Abood's standard is workable",
		"context": ". to draw guidance from [ Abood's] model have proved it both impracticable and doctrinally barren.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And even i f courts had difficulty applying the line drawn in Lehnert , the solution would be to clarify that line in an appropr iate case, not to oblit erate it altogether and jettison decades of precedent uphold- 56 ing agency fees for representational activ ities. See supra I.D.8",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The History of Diversity Jurisdiction and Adoption of the FSIA Supports Application of State Choice of Law Rules",
		"context": "between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects .\" The Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470 –71, provided: \"the circuit courts of the United States shall have 6 Accordingly, when Congress moved the provision granting subject matter jurisdiction over claims against foreign sovereigns out of Section 1332 as part of FSIA's comprehensive codification of actions against foreign state defendants, which had as its princi pal goal the adoption of the \"restrictive theory\" of sovereign immunity, Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is no reason to believe Congress intended to alter the continuous practice since at least 1875 of addressing such cases under the rules for diversity jurisdiction. The statutory history of the FSIA fully supports this understanding. There is no indication that Congress intended the specialized FSIA jurisdictional grant of Section 1330 to alter the ancient understanding t hat diversity jurisdiction applies to sovereign parties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The History of Diversity Jurisdiction and Adoption of the FSIA Supports Application of State Choice of Law Rules",
		"context": "Since jurisdiction in actions against foreign states is comprehensively treated by the new section 1330, a s imilar jurisdictional basis under section 1332 becomes superfluous . 4 See, e.g. , Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"); Republic of 195 F.2d 230 . In other words, Congress viewed Section 1330 as establishing \"a similar jurisdictional basis\" to diversity juris diction under Section 1332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "350 F.2d 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The History of Diversity Jurisdiction and Adoption of the FSIA Supports Application of State Choice of Law Rules",
		"context": "4 See, e.g. , Republic of 350 F.2d 645. \"); Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In other words, Congress viewed Section 1330 as establishing \"a similar jurisdictional basis\" to diversity juris diction under Section 1332. Since diversity jurisdiction encompassed actions involving foreign states from at least 1875 (and under the FSIA continue s to do so in cases where foreign states are plaintiffs), the statutory history confirms that Section 1330 incorporates \"similar\" choice of law principles as Section 1332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 F.2d 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Dismissal decisions rested on Totten's government-contracting rule rather than Reynolds's evidentiary-privilege rule",
		"context": "After Reynolds , Totten continued to determine the outcome in several cases. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As courts recognized , how- ever, those cases are \"inapposite\" in the evidentiary - 17 privilege context because they \"were contract actions which the Court of Claims held could not be main- tained because the contracts contained covenants of secrecy as in Totten .\" 464 F. Supp. 510 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 F. Supp. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Dismissal decisions rested on Totten's government-contracting rule rather than Reynolds's evidentiary-privilege rule",
		"context": ", 118 F. Supp. 371 . As courts recognized , how- ever, those cases are \"inapposite\" in the evidentiary - 17 privilege context because they \"were contract actions which the Court of Claims held could not be main- tained because the contracts contained covenants of secrecy as in Totten .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F. Supp. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the patent system's role in encouraging innovation. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The balance between the interest in motivating innovation and enlightenment by rewarding invention with patent protection on the one hand, and the interest in avoi ding monopolies that unnec- essarily stifle competition on the other, has been a feature of the federal patent laws since their inception.\"). Genus claims are no different in this respect from any other pa- tent claims. The bargained-for disclosure in the form of genus claims both promotes the progress of science and human health and also provid es the public with a head start to future discoveries that build upon the genus claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "Indeed, downstream parties may obtain patent protection for non-obvi ous improvements to past discoveries, including for spec ies with unexpected proper- ties that fall within the genus claims of a preexisting pa-tent. See, e.g. , Abbvie [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 can be non-obvious and patent eligible despite a patent on its genus. \").6 Thus, a pioneer can hold patent rights over an entire genus, and, at the same time , an improver can hold patent rights to species that provid e unexpected benefits within that genus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "While the pioneer and the improver could potentially exclude each other from commercializing the improved species in such a scenario, 7 there are strong incent ives against their doing so. If an improved inventio n is better than other known species in the genus, it co uld command greater market de- mand— e.g., by providing greater benefit to patients. Reaching an agreement, the innovator and improver could offset their significant investments and split the eco- nomic recovery commensurate with their respective con- tributions and expenditures.8 The parties therefore have 6 See also Prometheus Labs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Iron Grip Barbell 392 F.3d 1317; Eli Lilly & 334 F.3d 1264; In re301 F.2d 676. 7 Each would have the right to ex clude the other by virtue of their concurrent patent rights over the species. See generally 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "805 F.3d 1092",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "While the pioneer and the improver could potentially exclude each other from commercializing the improved species in such a scenario, 7 there are strong incent ives against their doing so. If an improved inventio n is better than other known species in the genus, it co uld command greater market de- mand— e.g., by providing greater benefit to patients. Reaching an agreement, the innovator and improver could offset their significant investments and split the eco- nomic recovery commensurate with their respective con- tributions and expenditures.8 The parties therefore have 6 See also Prometheus Labs., 805 F.3d 1092; Iron Grip Barbell [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Eli Lilly & 334 F.3d 1264; In re301 F.2d 676. 7 Each would have the right to ex clude the other by virtue of their concurrent patent rights over the species. See generally 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.3d 1317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "While the pioneer and the improver could potentially exclude each other from commercializing the improved species in such a scenario, 7 there are strong incent ives against their doing so. If an improved inventio n is better than other known species in the genus, it co uld command greater market de- mand— e.g., by providing greater benefit to patients. Reaching an agreement, the innovator and improver could offset their significant investments and split the eco- nomic recovery commensurate with their respective con- tributions and expenditures.8 The parties therefore have 6 See also Prometheus Labs., 805 F.3d 1092; Iron Grip Barbell 392 F.3d 1317; Eli Lilly & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re301 F.2d 676. 7 Each would have the right to ex clude the other by virtue of their concurrent patent rights over the species. See generally 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 F.3d 1264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "While the pioneer and the improver could potentially exclude each other from commercializing the improved species in such a scenario, 7 there are strong incent ives against their doing so. If an improved inventio n is better than other known species in the genus, it co uld command greater market de- mand— e.g., by providing greater benefit to patients. Reaching an agreement, the innovator and improver could offset their significant investments and split the eco- nomic recovery commensurate with their respective con- tributions and expenditures.8 The parties therefore have 6 See also Prometheus Labs., 805 F.3d 1092; Iron Grip Barbell 392 F.3d 1317; Eli Lilly & 334 F.3d 1264; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Each would have the right to ex clude the other by virtue of their concurrent patent rights over the species. See generally 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 F.2d 676",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "9 Reputational and legal protections also encourage li- censing. Attempting to enjoin the commercialization of an important medicine could be untenable from a public re- lations perspective—and courts are generally unwilling to enjoin health-related products, such as medicines and an- tibodies, in which there is a strong public interest. See eBay [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Accordingly, the parties have incentives to nego- tiate an agreement to bring the improved product to 9 Id. at 1052 (\"Improvers have an incentive to invest in research even in the shadow of an original invention, since they can obtain a patent on their improvement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "§ 271(e)(1). As this Court has explained, \"the statutory text makes clear that it provides a wide berth for the use of patented drugs in activities re- lated to the federal regulatory process\" and the safe har-bor \"necessarily includes,\" for example, \"preclinical studies of patented compound s that are appropriate for concern for the greater public good , particularly in the realm of vascular surgery and other potentia lly life saving technologies. \"); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 submission to the FDA in the regulatory process.\" Merck 545 U.S. 193.",
		"citation_value_orig": "712 F. Supp. 2d 1285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Genus Claims Do Not Preempt The Progress Of Science And The Useful Arts – They Encourage Downstream Innovation.",
		"context": "\"); Johnson & Johnson Vision Care, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1285. 12 submission to the FDA in the regulatory process.\" Merck [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, downstream researchers can conduct re- search to advance the progress of science by operating within the \"wide berth\" of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor. Similarly, downstream researchers can avail them- selves of regulatory data excl usivity, which protects data submitted for regulatory approval for certain periods of time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court need not address circumstances beyond a state court's exercise of general jurisdiction based on registration",
		"context": "It presents no occasion to decide whether States may adopt special statutes, whether la- beled \"consent\" or otherwise, that enable state courts to hear claims that are tied to the State but go beyond this Court's specific -jurisdiction doctrine . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that a ruling against him would call into doubt the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. 2334(e) (Supp. I 2019) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner Cites No Authority that Actually Supports His Novel Proposal",
		"context": "As one contemporary scholar quoted in the Petition notes, early nineteenth - century libel cases show that \"judicial action imposing liability for speech is covered by constitutional free- expression provisions, regardless of whether the plaintiff himself was actin g for the state.\" Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original Freedom of Elec. Comm'n , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2.a. The other authorities Petitioner cite s also do not support his argument and often contradict it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Prosecutors Rely On The Elastic Doctrine When There Is Deceit But They Cannot Prove Contemplated Economic Harm",
		"context": "Dunn and Perez show that, taken to its logical conclusion, this short-cut can be used to turn into a federal offense any misrepresentation in an employment application, or any misuse of workplace information, in either the public or private sector. Charging Undisclosed Self-Dealing as Property Fraud. Both 850 F.3d 94, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied135 S. Ct. 1698, involved employees who failed to disclose kickbacks that gave them a financial interest in transactions they authorized on behalf of their employers. In both cases, the transactions that generated the kickbacks did not harm the employer, which got the goods or services it paid for.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 F. App'x 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Prosecutors Rely On The Elastic Doctrine When There Is Deceit But They Cannot Prove Contemplated Economic Harm",
		"context": "Dunn and Perez show that, taken to its logical conclusion, this short-cut can be used to turn into a federal offense any misrepresentation in an employment application, or any misuse of workplace information, in either the public or private sector. Charging Undisclosed Self-Dealing as Property Fraud. Both 850 F.3d 94, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied135 S. Ct. 1698, involved employees who failed to disclose kickbacks that gave them a financial interest in transactions they authorized on behalf of their employers. In both cases, the transactions that generated the kickbacks did not harm the employer, which got the goods or services it paid for.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 F. App'x 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The penalty imposed by Notice 2016-66 is a regulatory tax and not a tax that the AIA intends to protect.",
		"context": "In Korte v. Sebelius , the Seventh Circuit was asked to determine, in part, whether th e AIA barred plaintiffs ' challenge of the contraception mandate, and concluded \"no.\" The court held, \"[t]he contraception mandate is not itself a tax provision \" and therefore the AIA did not preclude the lawsuit. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The c ourt acknowledged that if plaintiffs were successful they would also avoid any potential tax liability, but emphasized that the AIA \"does not reach 'all disputes tangentially related to taxes. '\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.3d 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The penalty imposed by Notice 2016-66 is a regulatory tax and not a tax that the AIA intends to protect.",
		"context": "Id. The distinction between a regulatory/punitive tax and a revenue generating tax was essential to the AIA analysis. The Tenth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Hobby Lobby Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd sub nom. 573 U.S. 682. Plaintiffs there also challenged the contraception m andate and the government argued that the AIA barred judicial review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.3d 1114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The penalty imposed by Notice 2016-66 is a regulatory tax and not a tax that the AIA intends to protect.",
		"context": "Id. at 1127 (quoting Nat'l Fed 'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The statutory scheme makes clear that the tax at issue here is no more than a penalty for violating regulations related to health care and employer -provi ded insurance, see, e.g. , 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The penalty imposed by Notice 2016-66 is a regulatory tax and not a tax that the AIA intends to protect.",
		"context": ", 42 U.S.C. § 300gg -22(b)(2)(C)(i) (calculating the maximum 'penalty ' that the Secretary of HHS can impose on non - compliant insurers in the same way that 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1) calculates the 'tax' for non -compliant employers, name ly '$100 for each day for each individual with respect to which such a failure occurs '), and the AIA does not apply to 'the exaction of a purely regulatory tax, ' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hobby Lobby Stores , 723 F.3 d at 1127 –28. As explained above, Notice 2016 -66 is not a revenue generating provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.2d 1126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Claims Like Amgen's Harm Innovation",
		"context": "But this Court has a doctrine to address that risk . Under the doctrine of equivalents , \"a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is 'equivalence ' between the elements of the accused 46 product or process and the claimed elements of the patented in vention. \" Warner -Jenkinson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, in this context, the science itself protects against the risk Amgen invokes, because making a few seemingly minor substitutions in the amino -acid sequence can radically change the blocking and binding characteristics of an antibody. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.",
		"context": "§ 373. This intent requirement was no accident; Congress was aware of First Amendment problems that could arise with respect to a solicitation statute and deliberately sought to avoid them.5 Aiding and abetting similarly requires that the defendant specifically inten d that the crime she is assisting be carried out . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The encouragement provision lacks this intent requirement . The only mens rea requirement in the statute addresses the speaker's knowledge or reckless 5 In the Senate Report on 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.",
		"context": "But it did not; indeed, in 1986, when it adopted the current version of the statute, Congress deleted a \"willfully or knowingly\" requirement as a modifier for \"encourage\" or \"induce .\" This provide s \"some indication of congressional intent, express or implied,\" to dispense with a requirement that the defendant act \"knowingly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the fact that Congress added a knowing or reckless disregard requirement only to the fact of a noncitizen's status precludes this Court adding an intent requirement to the verbs \"encourage\" or \"induce\" —even if Congress had not already specifically deleted those requirements. In Holder v. Humanitarian L aw Project, the Court declined to read in a requirement of intent to further an organization's illegal activities where the statutory language specified that the defendant need only have knowledge about an organization's connection to terrorism .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Encouragement Provision Does Not Include the Elements Required in a Solicitation or Aiding and Abetting Statute.",
		"context": "Moreover, the fact that Congress added a knowing or reckless disregard requirement only to the fact of a noncitizen's status precludes this Court adding an intent requirement to the verbs \"encourage\" or \"induce\" —even if Congress had not already specifically deleted those requirements. In Holder v. Humanitarian L aw Project, the Court declined to read in a requirement of intent to further an organization's illegal activities where the statutory language specified that the defendant need only have knowledge about an organization's connection to terrorism . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Similarly, here, Congress spoke to mens rea and required only knowledge or reckless disregard of the listener's immigration status , and neither knowing n or intentional encouragement . And the plain meaning of 31 the words \"encourage\" or \"induce\" includes speech that has the effect of encouraging someone to act, regardless of the speaker's int ent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "3 So-called \"rotten boroughs\" are a different type of political manipulation that does not requir e bizarre shapes or geographic inflation but simply differential populations between districts. This problem is solved by vigoro us enforcement of the one person - one vote principle. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 5 American political folklore in 1812, courtesy of Massa - chusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry. Governor Gerry signed into law a redistricting of Essex County which strung a series of towns together in a contorted manner. Gilb ert Stuart (better known for his portraiture) was en gaged in a conversation with the editor of the Boston Weekly Messenger over the map of the district.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "As is clear from the history of the first gerry - mander, originally there were two critical components, a bizarre geographic configuration and the linking of disparate communities into a single district. This original definition would ha ve been easily recognized by the founders. They en visioned districts which embraced communities with all of their countervailing interests and pressures as a check and balance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 377 U.S. 533. 4 Another irony is that Gerry's other accomplishments are often overshadowed by his gerrymander. He was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, twice elected to Cong ress, and elected Vice President of the United States with James Madison in 1812.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "As is clear from the history of the first gerry - mander, originally there were two critical components, a bizarre geographic configuration and the linking of disparate communities into a single district. This original definition would ha ve been easily recognized by the founders. They en visioned districts which embraced communities with all of their countervailing interests and pressures as a check and balance on 376 U.S. 1 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 Another irony is that Gerry's other accomplishments are often overshadowed by his gerrymander. He was a signer of the Declaration of Independence, delegate to the Constitutional Convention, twice elected to Cong ress, and elected Vice President of the United States with James Madison in 1812.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "As the founders recognized in such districts, represent - atives will be more inclined to be attentive to the indi - vidual concerns of their local community and less inclined to march in lockstep to the agenda of any particular political faction. The original gerrymander was seen as an attempt to subvert those countervailin g interests and pressures. In the years before [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the legislative failure to redistrict at all, resulting in increasing malapportionment of legislative districts, was called the \"silent gerrymander.\" See, Baker, Gerry - mandering : Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970 S 122 (N. Polsby, ed. 1971).",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. NOT ALL DISTRICTING IS PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING",
		"context": "\"It equally covers squig - gles, multimember distri cting, or simple non -action, when the result is racial or political misrepresenta - tion.\" Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Democratic Representation : Reapportionment In Law and Politics 460 (1968). As applied to the case before the court, and all the partisan gerrymandering cases since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], pl aintiffs have sought to overlay some version of a proportional partisan result requirement on a system of community repre - sentation. What has gone generally unrecognized in the popular discussion is that these two concepts are, more often than not, at odds with each other. 7 Community based representation may result in proportional representation, but it is actually unlikely t o h a v e t h a t r e s u l t .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "The purpose of copyright is \"to create incentives for creative effort.\" Sony Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But because \"all intellectual creative activity is in part derivative,\" Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard , 103 Harv. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "at 348. Thus, cour ts recognized that a work could be quoted or excerpted for purposes of criticism or parody, as long as the secondary use had \"neither the intent nor the effect of fulfilling the demand for the original,\" and did not copy more of the original than was necessary. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 220 F. 359; Bloom & 125 F. 977. Similarly, newspapers and magazines could quote other original works for purposes of reporting or commentary, where the use of the copyrighted material had a different purpose from the original and was therefore unlikely to undermine its value. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 F.2d 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "Similarly, newspapers and magazines could quote other original works for purposes of reporting or commentary, where the use of the copyrighted material had a different purpose from the original and was therefore unlikely to undermine its value. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Broadway Music 31 F. Supp. 817. By contrast, copying another news article for \"the same evident purpose of attractively and effectively serving [the original words] to the reading public\" does not qualify as fair use. See Chicago Record-Herald 275 F. 797.",
		"citation_value_orig": "39 F. Supp. 836",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "Similarly, newspapers and magazines could quote other original works for purposes of reporting or commentary, where the use of the copyrighted material had a different purpose from the original and was therefore unlikely to undermine its value. See, e.g. , 39 F. Supp. 836; Broadway Music [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, copying another news article for \"the same evident purpose of attractively and effectively serving [the original words] to the reading public\" does not qualify as fair use. See Chicago Record-Herald 275 F. 797.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 F. Supp. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "§ 107. These factors must be examined with reference to copyright's underlying purpose. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the longstanding view that \"supersed[ing]\" uses are not fair prevails, because allowing others simply to \"free-ride\" on the creative works of others would hinder copyright's purpose. See Leval , supra , at 1116, 1125.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The fair use doctrine does not protect works that merely seek to supersede the original",
		"context": "Print 1961), https ://www.copyright.gov/history/ 1961_registers_report.pdf. 28 courts will not find fair use. See Campbell , 510 U.S. at 578-79 (citation omitted); Harper & Row Publishers, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, where the use is likely to cause harm to the market for the original work, there can be no fair use. Campbell , 510 U.S. at 590; Harper & Row , 471 U.S. at 566-67.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If No Criminal Conviction is Required, then a Conviction Under 18 U.S.C. section 2383 Cannot Possibly be Required",
		"context": "See Amici Curiae Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, et. al ., at 24 (making this claim). Yet, before 2383 was passed or Section 3 was ratified, the Confiscation Act of 1862 (\"the Second Confiscation Act\") had already provided that any person who \"incite[s] … or engage[s} in any rebellion of insurrection … shall be forever incapable and disqualified to hold office under the United States,\" and it was § 2 of the Second Confiscation Act that was the true precursor to 2383.15 Thus, if 2383 temporally 15 The most extensive discussion of the provision appears in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , an 1863 case presided over by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Field. Applying the Second Confiscation Act, th e Court convicted the defendants for preparing an armed vessel and setting sail to attack United States ships in the Pacific on the Confederacy's behalf, despite never actually carrying out an attack. For a more detailed discussion of the history and text of 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS",
		"context": ". As this Court has recognized, the ATS' text excludes no category of defendants. Argentine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text does not distinguish between natural persons and entities in providing tort remedies for law-of-nations violations suffered by foreign citizens . Moreover , entity liability for law-of- nations violations was well-established in the Founding era .",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS",
		"context": "This purpose is undermined by immunizing U.S. corporations . The text, history, and purpose of the ATS have led lower courts, with the exception of the Second Circuit, to find corporate liability under the ATS. 22 22 Every circ uit court to address corporate liability under the ATS, except [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], has found that corporate liability is available. See 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 201 1); 654 F.3d 11; 671 F.3d 37 Whether the issue is one of federal common law or international law, there is corporate liability for these ATS claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "621 F. 3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS",
		"context": "The text, history, and purpose of the ATS have led lower courts, with the exception of the Second Circuit, to find corporate liability under the ATS. 22 22 Every circ uit court to address corporate liability under the ATS, except 621 F. 3d 111, has found that corporate liability is available. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir. 201 1); 654 F.3d 11; 671 F.3d 37 Whether the issue is one of federal common law or international law, there is corporate liability for these ATS claims. The international norms prohibiting child slavery and forced labor apply directly to private parties, including corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "643 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS",
		"context": "22 22 Every circ uit court to address corporate liability under the ATS, except 621 F. 3d 111, has found that corporate liability is available. See 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 201 1); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 671 F.3d 37 Whether the issue is one of federal common law or international law, there is corporate liability for these ATS claims. The international norms prohibiting child slavery and forced labor apply directly to private parties, including corporations. This case does not require a decision about whether other ATS claims may be made against corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 F.3d 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ATS' TEXT, HISTORY, AND PURPOSE SUPPORT LIABILITY FOR U.S. CORPORATIONS",
		"context": "22 22 Every circ uit court to address corporate liability under the ATS, except 621 F. 3d 111, has found that corporate liability is available. See 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 201 1); 654 F.3d 11; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Whether the issue is one of federal common law or international law, there is corporate liability for these ATS claims. The international norms prohibiting child slavery and forced labor apply directly to private parties, including corporations. This case does not require a decision about whether other ATS claims may be made against corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.3d 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. The Plain Language Of Section Three Confirms That Congress Alone Has The Power To Determine If A Person Is Disqualified From Holding Office Under Section Three",
		"context": "what it says.\" Hartford Underwriters Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In turn, a court's \"sole function\" is to read those words and enforce them according to their plain terms. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. The Plain Language Of Section Three Confirms That Congress Alone Has The Power To Determine If A Person Is Disqualified From Holding Office Under Section Three",
		"context": "There is no similar power granted in Article I of the Constitution that would permit Congress to remove any of the other requirements for the presidency such as age, residency, 10 or status as a natural born citizen. Accordingly, there is no similar political question for those \"neutral candidacy qualification[s].\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But here, the second sentence of Section Three places this particular qualification for the presidency squarely (and exclusively) within the purview of Congress. Further, as Justice Samour described in his dissent, \"the most concerning misstep\" by the majority was finding that S ection Three is self-executing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "131 F.3d 843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. The Plain Language Of Section Three Confirms That Congress Alone Has The Power To Determine If A Person Is Disqualified From Holding Office Under Section Three",
		"context": "Anderson , 2023 WL 8770111, at 56 ¶ 278 (Samour, J., dissenting). As a Reconstruction Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed as an expansion of federal power, not an expansion of state power. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By ignoring the historical context, the majority's interpretation collides with the framers' intent of empowering Congress to make Section Three determinations to safeguard attempts to undermine the United States government. A state court or state official cannot bypass clear constitutional delineation of power even, as the majority puts it, \"when presented with a proper vehicle (like section 1-1-113).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 US 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. The Plain Language Of Section Three Confirms That Congress Alone Has The Power To Determine If A Person Is Disqualified From Holding Office Under Section Three",
		"context": "Anderson , 2023 WL 8770111, at 19 ¶ 88 (Samour, J., dissenting). Thus, without federal enforcement legislation, there is no private right of action or remedy provided by Section Three. See Cale [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By making its own determination that former President Trump engaged in insurrection and then going so far as to strike his name from the state primary ballot, the Colorado State Court has usurped Congress's constitutionally-mandated power. If the decision is left untouched, Congress will have been stripped of its power to \"remove [any] disability\" that may block former President Trump from becoming president again, because Colorado has already determined that his name will not appear on the ballot.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.2d 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S RULE IS PRACTICAL AND EFFICIENT",
		"context": ". . be available on demand,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and thus parties within the Seventh Circuit \"cooperate\" to \"allow information underlying an expert's testimony to be considered,\" Gov't Br. 54 (quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding this requirement, processing times for benefits applicants within the 25 Seventh Circuit fall well wit hin the national average, and indeed seven hearing offices within the Seventh Circuit are in the top half of offices nationwide in processing time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Ejusdem Generis Does Not Make the Statutory Text Unclear",
		"context": "Ejusdem generis does not support excluding tribes from the concluding phrase \"other foreign or domestic government.\" \"[T]he rule of ejusdem generis , while firmly estab- lished, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To make the canon work, the Band must deploy it in support of a textually and contextually plausible interpretation of \"domestic government\" that excludes tribes. As the Band has none, ejusdem generis cannot help it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Ejusdem Generis Does Not Make the Statutory Text Unclear",
		"context": "22 The test for domesticity cannot be \"traceability\" to the United States or its Constitution, as the Band also appears to suggest (at 37). The 13 original States do not trace their origins to either; they \"'existed before the Constitution.'\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under Section 365(a) and (g), the Chapter 11 trustee may decline to undertake the debtor's future performance obligations under an executory contract",
		"context": "at 1915. And a contract is \"executory\" if \"performance remains due to some extent o n both sides.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The trustee accordingly \"assume s\" a contract under which the debtor has remaining performance obliga- tions when the trustee agrees to take upon itself the debtor's remaining obligations and thus performs them . The trustee \"reject s\" such a contract when the trustee instead refuses to take on the debtor's obligations and accordingly does not perform them .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under Section 365(a) and (g), the Chapter 11 trustee may decline to undertake the debtor's future performance obligations under an executory contract",
		"context": "365(g). 17 Section 365 makes clear that the trustee can elect not to complete the debtor's remaining contractual perfor- mance obligations , if performance has become uneco- nomical and thus would be harmful to the estate and other creditors. See Enterprise Energy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] thus establish that a trustee's choice not to take on the debtor's future performance obligations constitutes a breach of the con- tract, even though the trustee was not origin ally a party to the contract and thus may not have \"breached\" it un- der ordinary contract principles. \"[B]y classifying re- jection as breach,\" Section 365(g) thus protects counter- parties by establishing that \"in bankruptcy, as outside of it, the other party's rights remain in place.\" Sun- beam Products , 686 F.3d at 377.",
		"citation_value_orig": "50 F.3d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under Section 365(a) and (g), the Chapter 11 trustee may decline to undertake the debtor's future performance obligations under an executory contract",
		"context": "Nothing in Section 365 , however, empowers a trustee to revoke the grant of a trademark license that the debtor already granted and could not revoke under the terms of the parties' original agreement . \"Rejec- tion\" does not \"render[] void the contract and requir[e] 18 that the parties be put back in the positions they occu- pied before the contract was formed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11th Cir.) , cert. denied,552 U.S. 1022 ; see 981 F.2d 1450.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 F.3d 1294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Under Section 365(a) and (g), the Chapter 11 trustee may decline to undertake the debtor's future performance obligations under an executory contract",
		"context": "476 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.) , cert. denied,552 U.S. 1022 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rejection is thus different from rescission , which typically allows a cou nterparty to halt its own performance and terminate a contract in response to a repudiation or material breach by the other party. See 26 Samuel Williston & Richard A. Lord, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 68.2, at 37 -42 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 F.2d 1450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Alzheimer's Disease",
		"context": "27Seeid.at 1295–96. 28See Novartis Pharm. 48 F. Supp. 3d 733[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 on credibility\" rather than scientific reasoning.29The Federal Circuit's own ambivalence about that result is perhaps reflected in the court's designation of its opinion as nonprecedential.30 That hesitancy contrasts starkly with the appeals court's confidence in the scientific accuracy of the inter partes review decision. There, the Federal Circuit praised the Board for citing \"[a]mple record evidence from scholarly sources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "611 F. App'x 988",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Defamation",
		"context": "On top of the traditional requirements for slander or libel ( e.g., a false statement made to a third party that damages one's reputation), the First Amendment imposes additional safeguard s. Public figures must prove the speaker acted \"with knowledge that [the statement] was false or wi th reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.\" N.Y. Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hustler , 485 U.S. at 56 (requiring same for intentional infliction of emo- tional distress). Even for private figures, states may not \"impose liability without fault,\" Gertz , 418 U.S. at 347, or \"permit recovery of presumed or punitive dam- ages\" without \"a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth,\" id. at 349–50.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "2008) ; see House Br. 22 -23; cf. Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, respondents ' standing and merits theories both depend on the same flawed statutory interpret ation. And e ven if the Court assumed that Section 5000A were a command for purposes of analyzing standing, respondents certainly cannot demonstrate any \" realis- tic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "Here, respondents ' standing and merits theories both depend on the same flawed statutory interpret ation. And e ven if the Court assumed that Section 5000A were a command for purposes of analyzing standing, respondents certainly cannot demonstrate any \" realis- tic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute's operation or enforcement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The purpose and effect of the TCJA was to ren- der Section 5000A inoperative . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "26. But their cit ations are to summar- ies of arguments made by losing advocates , not to any opinion of the Court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 40 U.S. 449. 2 This Court's actual precedents require plaintif fs to establish that the challenged stat- ute either presently harms them or creates a \"threat-ened injury [that] is certainly impendin g\"—not \"speculative\" or \"hypothetical.\" 568 U.S. 398 ; see Dellinger Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "26. But their cit ations are to summar- ies of arguments made by losing advocates , not to any opinion of the Court. See 3 U.S. 199; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 This Court's actual precedents require plaintif fs to establish that the challenged stat- ute either presently harms them or creates a \"threat-ened injury [that] is certainly impendin g\"—not \"speculative\" or \"hypothetical.\" 568 U.S. 398 ; see Dellinger Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "40 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "See 3 U.S. 199; 40 U.S. 449. 2 This Court's actual precedents require plaintif fs to establish that the challenged stat- ute either presently harms them or creates a \"threat-ened injury [that] is certainly impendin g\"—not \"speculative\" or \"hypothetical.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Dellinger Br. 12 -16. The individual respondents assert that Clapper is \"inapposite\" because they have in fact purchased insurance based on their belief that Section 5000A is a command.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The individual respondents are not subject to a command and face no threat of enforcement",
		"context": "But t he plaintiffs in Clap- per also claimed \"ongoing injuries,\" arising from 1 The lack of any possibility of enforcement means the result would be the same if the issue were analyzed as a question of statutory jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act. See Bray Br. 2 -5; Skelly Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Other sources provide a more reliable indication of early views on this subject. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
		"context": ". Section 2 also requires courts to consider whether a \"State's justification for its electoral system\" is legitimate and the challenged practice is tailored to that end. Houston Lawyers' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, results -based \"liability mandates the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers, not the displacement of valid governmental policies.\" Inclusive Communities , 576 U.S. at 540 (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
		"context": "See, e.g., Veasey, 830 F.3d at 237 ( considering all-white primaries, secret ballot provisions, poll taxes, re - registration requirements, and voter registration purges). Indeed, only two weeks ago, such rationales disconnected from evidence were used to disrupt the 10 Moreover, partisan motivation s for a challenged law are per se tenuous under Section 2, given that \"'[f]encing out' from the franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitutionally impermissible.\" Dunn , 405 U.S. at 355; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 See, e.g. , Dunn , 405 U.S. at 346; 380 U.S. 528; 525 U.S. 182.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
		"context": "Dunn , 405 U.S. at 355; see also 553 U.S. 181. 11 See, e.g. , Dunn , 405 U.S. at 346; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 525 U.S. 182. 33 orderly transition of political power and incite a violent uprising at the seat of the Nation's government. Thus, w hether an anti-fraud justification is legitimate or \"seems to have been contrived\" is an important part of the Section 2 analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
		"context": "Dunn , 405 U.S. at 355; see also 553 U.S. 181. 11 See, e.g. , Dunn , 405 U.S. at 346; 380 U.S. 528; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 orderly transition of political power and incite a violent uprising at the seat of the Nation's government. Thus, w hether an anti-fraud justification is legitimate or \"seems to have been contrived\" is an important part of the Section 2 analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 2 Offers Due Regard to the State's Legitimate Interests",
		"context": "33 orderly transition of political power and incite a violent uprising at the seat of the Nation's government. Thus, w hether an anti-fraud justification is legitimate or \"seems to have been contrived\" is an important part of the Section 2 analysis. See Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit's evidence- based analysis strikes the appropriate balance between respecting the need for orderly election s and protecting racial equality in access to the ballot. The court properly maintained the precinct- based voting system , while restricting Arizona from discarding valid votes in appropriate races without justification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 111(d) Does Not Clearly Authorize The Clean Power Plan",
		"context": "Nothing in the panel majority's decision below articulates any persuasive challenge to this analysis . The panel majority concluded that the major questions doctrine did not invalidate the Clean Power 49 Plan because \"there is no question that the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by power plants across the Nation falls squarely within the EPA's wheelhouse .\" J.A.137 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But Massachusetts v. EPA does not suggest that EPA can enact any and all regulations, no matter how transformative , as this Court's decision in UARG makes clear . 573 U.S. at 316–19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CHOICE PROGRAMS ALLEVIATE, NOT EXACERBATE, RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS",
		"context": "16 -273) (vacated) . 3 Many books repeatedly challenged in public libraries, including school libraries, are challenged over content some consider to be immoral. Of the Top 11 books on the most recent an nual Ameri- can Library Association list of most frequently challenged books, nine were challenged at least in part for sexual material some felt 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 400 F. Supp. 2d 707 ; see also Austin Ruse, \"Horrific Sex Ed Cur- riculum Is Taking Over in This Virginia County, and Objectors Are Getting Steamrolled,\" Daily Signal , Feb. 15, 2018, https://dailysign.al/2IrSVpQ ; Joan Frawley Desmond, \"Sex Education in California Sparks Cul- ture Clash,\" Nat'l Catholic Register , Apr. 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/2X2MehW . The effect of this dynamic within public schooling is to force people into political conflict over w hich val- ues will be imposed on all students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CHOICE PROGRAMS ALLEVIATE, NOT EXACERBATE, RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS",
		"context": "16 -273) (vacated) . 3 Many books repeatedly challenged in public libraries, including school libraries, are challenged over content some consider to be immoral. Of the Top 11 books on the most recent an nual Ameri- can Library Association list of most frequently challenged books, nine were challenged at least in part for sexual material some felt 14 482 U.S. 578 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Austin Ruse, \"Horrific Sex Ed Cur- riculum Is Taking Over in This Virginia County, and Objectors Are Getting Steamrolled,\" Daily Signal , Feb. 15, 2018, https://dailysign.al/2IrSVpQ ; Joan Frawley Desmond, \"Sex Education in California Sparks Cul- ture Clash,\" Nat'l Catholic Register , Apr. 28, 2017, https://bit.ly/2X2MehW . The effect of this dynamic within public schooling is to force people into political conflict over w hich val- ues will be imposed on all students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 F. Supp. 2d 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody",
		"context": "In loco parentis rested on a theory of delegation. The idea was that parents delegate their parental au-thority to the school; so when the school disciplines the child, it is acting as \"the parent, not the State.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As Blackstone put it, a father would \"del- egate part of his parental authority … to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco parentis.\" 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 441 (1765) (Blackstone); accord 19 N.C. 365 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody",
		"context": "§1382) . The same rule remains in for ce today, see 24 Pa. Stat. §13- 1317; §5 - 510, and it bans Pennsylvania schools from acting in loco parentis when students are no longer under their supervision, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; J.S. ex rel. 650 F.3d 915 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 A.2d 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Under the common law, schools had no authority to act in loco parentis when students were under their parent's custody",
		"context": "§13- 1317; §5 - 510, and it bans Pennsylvania schools from acting in loco parentis when students are no longer under their supervision, see 868 A.2d 28 ; J.S. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, under the regime of in loco parentis, \"[t]he schoolmaster generally had no right to punish a pupil for conduct that occurred after the class was dis-missed.\" Dupre, Should Students Have Constitutional Rights?",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "\"Consu mers surveys have become almost de rigueur in litigation over genericness.\" McCarthy, su- pra, § 12:14; Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d at 965 (\"[C]onsumer surveys may be a preferred method of prov- ing genericness. \"); Berner Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"most judicially accepted format for testing for generic- ness\" is the Teflon survey, which teaches survey respond- ents the difference between generic terms and brands, then asks respondents to identify terms as generic or as likely brands. McCarthy, supra , § 12:16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "987 F. 2d 975",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "Infra pp. 35 -36. The government (at 36, 41) also cites Abercrombie & Fitch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the pro position that no amount of evidence of consumer perceptions can make generic terms non -ge- neric. But the Abercrombie line of cases involves whether a mark that has already become generic can be resur- rected with evidence of secondary meaning, i.e. , a second- ary association with a brand in consumers' eyes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F.2d 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 F.3d 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.2d 1556",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.2d 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "605 F.2d 990",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 F.2d 845",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "But no judicial deci- sion previously deemed B OOKING .COM generic. Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Tech. Publ'g 729 F.2d 1136; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "892 F.3d 1358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Primary-Significance Inquiry Properly Considers Survey Evidence",
		"context": "Nor, as the district court found, was B OOKING .COM commonly used or understood as a generic term before res pondent 10 Most of the government's cases (at 41 -43) similarly hold that con- sumer perceptions cannot salvage phrases that were generic before specific enterprises used them. See Hunt Masters, 240 F.3d 251164 F.3d 806777 F.2d 1556655 F.2d 5605 F.2d 990290 F.2d 845892 F.3d 1358; Tech. Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Canfield , 808 F.2d at 297. 33 popularized it. Pet.App.10a -11a, 16a -17a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.2d 1136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THIS CASE IS A CLEAN VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "Neither the Seventh Circuit's decision, nor those of the bankruptcy courts in the four cases consolidat-ed below, cited any of the conduct respondents allege as a basis for holding the City violated §362(a)(3). Rather, they simply held th at the City's failure to turn over the cars immedi ately upon respondents' bankruptcy filings violated §362(a)(3). Those rulings were based on the circuit's precedent in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that \"passively holding onto an asset … violates sect ion 362(a)(3),\" thus \"re- quir[ing] that a creditor immediately return a seized asset … upon … [the debtor's] filing of … bankrupt- cy.\" Id. at 700, 703.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THIS CASE IS A CLEAN VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "While the automatic stay prohibits creditors from collecting their claims outside the bankruptcy process, 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(6), the law is clear that creditors may negotiate with debtors over how their claims will be paid in the 8 bankruptcy process. Creditors thus do not violate the stay by filing (or amending) proofs of claim, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or requesting other re-lief within the bankruptcy proceeding, Inslaw , 932 F.2d at 1474. The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that creditors and debtors may seek to negotiate a consensual treatment of a cr editor's claim, including treatment that creditors wo uld \"accept\" in a plan or as \"adequate protection\" of their interests in property the debtor seeks to use. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 F.3d 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THIS CASE IS A CLEAN VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE QUESTION PRESENTED",
		"context": "R. Bankr. Proc. 4001(d); In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the City asserted that it was entitled to re- tain possession of the cars (even under Thompson ) absent a turnover proceeding, including because courts had held at the time that the City could retain possession of impounded cars under the automatic- stay's exception in §362(b)(3). Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 F.3d 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "at 2304 -09. Under due process, \"[i]n no event … can issue preclusion be invoked against one who did not participate in the prior adjudication. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hellerstedt itself acknowledged the weakness 13 of stare decisis for holdings reached by a party 's waiver of an issue. 136 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "S. Cent. Bell Tel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 Quite simply, \"cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt with. \" 511 U.S. 661 . The courts here must contend with the evidence that Louisiana proffers to support its laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "Bell Tel. 526 U.S. 160.4 Quite simply, \"cases cannot be read as foreclosing an argument that they never dealt with. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The courts here must contend with the evidence that Louisiana proffers to support its laws. Under these various strands of due-process authority, prior parties ' litigation mistakes do not bind future litigants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "The courts here must contend with the evidence that Louisiana proffers to support its laws. Under these various strands of due-process authority, prior parties ' litigation mistakes do not bind future litigants. Former judges and Department of Justice officials make the histrionic analogy – and borderline ad hominem attack – that question ing Roe-Casey rights is as extreme as seeking to undo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and – presumably – to revert instead to separate -but-equal under 163 U.S. 537. See Amicus Br. of Former Judges et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "The courts here must contend with the evidence that Louisiana proffers to support its laws. Under these various strands of due-process authority, prior parties ' litigation mistakes do not bind future litigants. Former judges and Department of Justice officials make the histrionic analogy – and borderline ad hominem attack – that question ing Roe-Casey rights is as extreme as seeking to undo 347 U.S. 483, and – presumably – to revert instead to separate -but-equal under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Amicus Br. of Former Judges et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "Again, that conf uses the holding with the result. Brown does not guarantee that all future equal -protection cases will resolve as Brown did. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]532 U.S. 59539 U. S. 244 with 539 U.S. 306. As the divergent results in the two Michigan cases demonstrate, facts matter. Even under the same holding as to the law, different facts can yield different results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "Again, that conf uses the holding with the result. Brown does not guarantee that all future equal -protection cases will resolve as Brown did. See, e.g., 422 U.S. 490[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]539 U. S. 244 with 539 U.S. 306. As the divergent results in the two Michigan cases demonstrate, facts matter. Even under the same holding as to the law, different facts can yield different results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "Again, that conf uses the holding with the result. Brown does not guarantee that all future equal -protection cases will resolve as Brown did. See, e.g., 422 U.S. 490532 U.S. 59[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with 539 U.S. 306. As the divergent results in the two Michigan cases demonstrate, facts matter. Even under the same holding as to the law, different facts can yield different results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U. S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Stare decisis does not trump due process",
		"context": "Again, that conf uses the holding with the result. Brown does not guarantee that all future equal -protection cases will resolve as Brown did. See, e.g., 422 U.S. 490532 U.S. 59539 U. S. 244 with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the divergent results in the two Michigan cases demonstrate, facts matter. Even under the same holding as to the law, different facts can yield different results.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": ". . punishment,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What the SEC calls dis-gorgement is a penalty for the reasons this Court gave unanimously in 137 S. Ct. 1635. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "Id. at 1643-44 (cita- tion omitted). The SEC responds (at 34) that \"equita-ble remedies often have a deterrent effect,\" quoting Hecht [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as saying that \"'[t]he historic injunctive process was designed to deter.'\" But the SEC leaves out half the Court's sentence: \"The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "1 E v e n a s t o d e t e r r e n c e , Hecht likely meant deterrence of future violations by those enjoined. Cf. Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That specific-deterrence rationale is not the general deterrence Kokesh describes. 4 To reach that conclusion, Kokesh applied the same test this Court has traditionally used to distinguish equitable remedies from penalties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "4 To reach that conclusion, Kokesh applied the same test this Court has traditionally used to distinguish equitable remedies from penalties. Equitable reme-dies \"restor[e] the status quo,\" such as by \"ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs\" to the plaintiff. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 481 U.S. 412. A remedy not \"limited to restoration of the status quo,\" Tull, 481 U.S. at 424, is not equitable. That mirrors this Court's reasoning that SEC disgorgement \"does not simply restore the status quo,\" but \"leaves the defendant worse off.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "4 To reach that conclusion, Kokesh applied the same test this Court has traditionally used to distinguish equitable remedies from penalties. Equitable reme-dies \"restor[e] the status quo,\" such as by \"ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs\" to the plaintiff. 328 U.S. 395; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A remedy not \"limited to restoration of the status quo,\" Tull, 481 U.S. at 424, is not equitable. That mirrors this Court's reasoning that SEC disgorgement \"does not simply restore the status quo,\" but \"leaves the defendant worse off.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "paid to victims\" as opposed to those \"dispersed to the United States Treasury,\" 137 S. Ct. at 1644; and cited Porter 's distinction between \"restitution paid to an aggrieved party and penalties paid to the Government,\" id. Restitution, whether legal or equitable, is not compensatory damages, see Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but is compensatory in the relevant sense that it goes to an aggrieved private party. The SEC does not dispute that disgorged funds often do not go to harmed investors or that petitioners were ordered to pay the Treasury. But it insists (at 36) that it \"aims to return disgorged funds to injured investors where possible,\" citing its 2019 annual report.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Kokesh establishes that the SEC's disgorgement remedy is a penalty",
		"context": "to undertake to punish him by obliging him to pay more than a fair compensation to the person wronged.'\" Dowagiac Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Treasury is not the \"person wronged\" here, and SEC disgorgement goes beyond \"fair compensation.\" Accordingly, SEC disgorge- ment is punishment, not equitable relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 50 (1993). \"Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act protects consumers by pr o- tecting competition. \"It rests on the premise that the 21 unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highe st quality and the grea t- est material progress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "N. Pac. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Competition advances consumer welfare by promoting allocative efficiency and lowering prices for products to level s \"approx i- mating [their] marginal co st.\" 476 U.S. 447. Section 1's consumer -welfare focus bars courts from assessing a restraint's \" reasonableness\" in the abstract divorced from competitive conditions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "Ry. 356 U.S. 1. Competition advances consumer welfare by promoting allocative efficiency and lowering prices for products to level s \"approx i- mating [their] marginal co st.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1's consumer -welfare focus bars courts from assessing a restraint's \" reasonableness\" in the abstract divorced from competitive conditions. Bork, supra , at 426 -29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "Bork, supra , at 426 -29. Even when, for examp le, lawyers refused to represent indigent criminal defendants in order to promote better legal representation, the a n- titrust laws did not consider that restraint's \"social utility .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A restraint's reason a- bleness also does not turn on the \" process \" that a party receives ; \"the absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust analysis.\" Nw.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "A restraint's reason a- bleness also does not turn on the \" process \" that a party receives ; \"the absence of procedural safeguards can in no sense determine the antitrust analysis.\" Nw. Wholesale [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1985 ). Nor is the Sherman Act a tort law. \"Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, wit h- out more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "\"Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not, wit h- out more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws.\" Brooke Grp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead of undertaking an amorphous reason a- bleness inquiry, courts must \"focus[] directly on the challenged restraint's impact on competitive cond i- tions .\" Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs , 435 U.S. at 688.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "A restraint is unreasonable only if antic ompetitive , and reasonable if procompetitive . Atl. Richfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And these terms have special meaning in this context ; they distinguish restraint s that are \"harmful to the consumer\" from restraints that are in the \"consu m- er's best interest.\" Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "Richfield 495 U.S. 328. And these terms have special meaning in this context ; they distinguish restraint s that are \"harmful to the consumer\" from restraints that are in the \"consu m- er's best interest.\" Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . An ant i- competitive restrain t \"obstructs the achievement of competition's basic goals —lower prices, better pro d- ucts, and more efficient produ ction methods.\" Town of 915 F.2d 17 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 . An ant i- competitive restrain t \"obstructs the achievement of competition's basic goals —lower prices, better pro d- ucts, and more efficient produ ction methods.\" Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A comparison of naked horizontal restraints with pure ly vertical ones shows th is consumer -welfare d i- vide. The Court has viewed with skepticism naked horizontal restraint s—i.e., restraints between firms at the same market level ( like competing manufa c- turers) that seek only to restrict interbrand compet i- tion (competition among different brands of similar products ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.2d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "The Court has viewed with skepticism naked horizontal restraint s—i.e., restraints between firms at the same market level ( like competing manufa c- turers) that seek only to restrict interbrand compet i- tion (competition among different brands of similar products ). A cartel's \"[r]estrictions on price and ou t- put are the parad igmatic examples of restraints of trade that the Sherman Act was intended to prohi b- it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those restraints represent the \"core case for antitrust regulation\" because they generate an \"externality\" harm ing consumers. Dou g- las Ginsburg, Rationalizing Antitrust , 35 Antitrust Bull.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "2001 ). Thus, \"the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition\" and prevent these consumer losses. State Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court requires greater analysis for pure ver- tical restraints —i.e., restraints between firms at di f- ferent market levels (such as a manufacturer and r e- tailers) that seek only to limit intrabrand compet i- tion (competition among firms selling the same brand ). These restraints —like an agreement b e- tween a manufacturer and a retailer about the price that the retailer may charge for the manufacturer's goods —can be anticompetitive if they facilitate a car- tel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1 protects the competition that promotes consumer welfare",
		"context": "at 901 -02 (citation omi t- ted). Resale price maintenance, for example, may fix a \"free rider\" problem. Rothery Storage & Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If \"discounting retailers\" who do not furnish the services undercut the service providers, it could eliminat e the services that the manufacturer seeks . Leegin , 551 U.S. at 890 -91.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.2d 210",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Stare Decisis Warrants Following This Court's Analysis in Patterson",
		"context": ". Stare decisis thereby avoids the instability and unfairness that accompany 25 disruption of settled legal expectations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability, predicta-bility, and respect for judicia l authority,\" this Court has emphasized that it \"will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.\" 502 U.S. 197.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Stare Decisis Warrants Following This Court's Analysis in Patterson",
		"context": "548 U.S. 230. Because \"[a]dherence to precedent promotes stability, predicta-bility, and respect for judicia l authority,\" this Court has emphasized that it \"will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justification.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the doctrine of stare decisis applies with \"enhanced force\" because Patterson involved interpre- tation of a statute. Kimble , 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (\" [S]tare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision .",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Stare Decisis Warrants Following This Court's Analysis in Patterson",
		"context": "in- terprets a statute. Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mis- take it sees. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"enhanced force\" of stare decisis applies re- gardless of whether the McDonnell Douglas /Burdine holding of Patterson was based on the text or the poli- cies and purposes of the law. Kimble , 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (\"Indeed, we apply statutory stare decisis even when a decision has announced a 'judicially created doctrine' designed to implement a federal statute.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. Even if the alleged search terms could have been linked to the named plaintiffs, disclosure of those terms could not inflict harm or create a sufficient risk of harm",
		"context": "17 But divorces are matters of public record, including in Italiano's home state of Florida. As the Florida Supreme Court observed long ago, Florida maintains \"well-kept public records covering vital statistics, such as divorces\"; \"the State Bureau of Vital Statistics is the custodian of records that reflect the granting of divorces in every county in Florida.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also http://www.floridahealth.gov/ certificates/certificates/index.html. The subjects of most of Italiano's other searches are also matters of public record, including addresses (Fla. Stat. §§ 695.22, 695.26), foreclosures ( id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 So.2d 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. INVESTMENT FIRMS ARE UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF DATA THEFT BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS",
		"context": "Most notable of these cases is United States v. Aleynikov, which concerned a former Goldman Sachs computer programmer who was accused of misappropriating source code for the firm's high-frequency trading system. 12 The Aleynikov case is particularly notable for present purposes as, prior to trial, the District Court dismissed the CFAA charge against the defendant, reasoning t hat the \"phrases 'accesses a computer without authorization' and 'exceeds authorized access' cannot be read to encompass an individual's misuse or misappropriation of information to which the individual was permit-ted access.\" 13 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 726 F.3d 235. 17",
		"citation_value_orig": "676 F.3d 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. INVESTMENT FIRMS ARE UNDER CONSTANT THREAT OF DATA THEFT BY FAITHLESS INSIDERS",
		"context": "12 The Aleynikov case is particularly notable for present purposes as, prior to trial, the District Court dismissed the CFAA charge against the defendant, reasoning t hat the \"phrases 'accesses a computer without authorization' and 'exceeds authorized access' cannot be read to encompass an individual's misuse or misappropriation of information to which the individual was permit-ted access.\" 13 12 676 F.3d 71. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17",
		"citation_value_orig": "726 F.3d 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "\"[T]he touchstone for any decision about remedy is legislative intent, for a court cannot 'use its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord NFIB, 567 U.S. at 586 ( plural- ity opinion) . Courts must \"refrain from invalidating more of [a] statute than is necessary.\" 468 U.S. 641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "546 U.S. 320; accord NFIB, 567 U.S. at 586 ( plural- ity opinion) . Courts must \"refrain from invalidating more of [a] statute than is necessary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If a court holds a statutory provision unconstitutional, it must ask whether \"the legislature [would] have preferred what is left of its statute to no statute at all.\" Ayotte , 546 U.S. at 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "In assessing congressional intent on the ques- tion of severability, the best way to \"determine[ ] what Congress would have done\" is \" by examining what it did.\" Legal Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Examining the statutory scheme that Congress created when it amended the ACA makes this a straightforward case. The TCJA reduced to zero the amount of the alterna- tive tax imposed by Section 5000A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "J.A. 481 ( King , J., dissent- ing). It manifests \"Congress' intent that\" the balance of the ACA \"should survive in the absence\" of an enforceable minimum coverage provision, Alaska Air-lines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because that is precisely the way Congress arranged things. Indeed, if Congress had viewed the minimum coverage provision \"as so essential to the rest of the ACA that it intended the entire statute to rise and fall\" with that provision, it is \"inconceivable that Congress would have\" made the minimum coverage provision unen- forceable while leaving the rest of the Act in place . J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "Under any of those formulations , the balance of the Affordab le Care Act must stand following the TCJA. Most recently, the Court framed the severabi lity inquiry as whether it is \" 'evident that Congress would not have enacted those provisions which are within its 38 power, independently of those which are not. '\" Mur- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As just discussed, here it is abundantly clear that Congress wanted to keep the hundreds of other ACA provisions that are within its power without an enforceable minimum coverage provision , because that is the scheme Congress created. The Court also noted in Murphy that \"we ask whether the law remains 'fully operative' without the invalid provisions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "The Court also noted in Murphy that \"we ask whether the law remains 'fully operative' without the invalid provisions.\" M urphy , 138 S. Ct. at 1482 (quoting Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). In the years since the TCJA rendered Section 5000A(a) toothless, the remaining provisions of the ACA have continue d to operat e as Congre ss intended , as petitioners and numerous amici from across the healthcare sector can attest . Elsewhere, the Court has asked whether the remainder of a statute \"will function in a manner consistent with the intent of Congress,\" explaining that \"the unco nstitutional provision must be severed unless the statute created in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress plainly intended that the rest of the ACA would remain in place even without the minimum coverage provision",
		"context": "Here, the statutory scheme that would be created in the absence of an enforceable Section 5000A (a) is functionally the same as the one that Congress did enact when it adopted the TCJA. In other cases, the Court has described the severa- bility inquiry as a three -part inquiry under which it \"must retain those portions of the Act that are ( 1) con- stitutionally valid, (2) capable of functioning independently, an d (3) consistent with Congress' basic objectives in enacting the statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is unconstitutional. As noted, the balance of the ACA is already functioning independently. And leaving the remaining provisions in pla ce was the evident intent of the TCJA—which harmonizes with the ACA's basic objectives of \"increas[ing] the number of Americans covered by health insurance and decre as[ing] the cost of health care. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No clear criteria exist for awarding non-taxable costs",
		"context": "The standards for determining costs vary across courts that allow for non-taxable costs. Some courts have authorized non- taxable costs that were \"reasonable\" or \"reasonably incurred.\" See Ronaldo Designer Jewelry, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133121 ; Compass Homes, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101338 ; see also InvesSys, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir. 6 The word \"full\" sheds no light on the breadth of the word \"costs,\" which is the crux of the dispute. The word does no more than clarify that, whatever \"costs\" are found permissible , they must be paid in \"full.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 F.3d 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No clear criteria exist for awarding non-taxable costs",
		"context": "6 The word \"full\" sheds no light on the breadth of the word \"costs,\" which is the crux of the dispute. The word does no more than clarify that, whatever \"costs\" are found permissible , they must be paid in \"full.\" The en banc Federal Circuit in a patent case used a similar analysis for the phrase \"all expenses\" in NantKwest, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 2004) (allowing non-taxable costs under § 505 as part of \"reasonable attorneys' fees\"). Other courts have required non-taxable costs awards to be \"necessary\" to the case, in addition to being reasonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "898 F.3d 1177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Neither PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins nor NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. supports granting union organizers physical access to petitioners' private property",
		"context": "This case does not require examining that fact pat- tern. Since Babcock was decided, the Court has stated 18 that its dictum there potentially applies \"only where 'the location of a plant and the living quarters of the employees place the employees beyond the reach of reasonable union efforts to communicate with them.'\" Lechmere, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, petitioners' employees do not live on petitioners' property. Nor are they cut off from modern means of communication.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Second Circuit's Decision Is Correct",
		"context": "Halliburton II allowed defendants a chance to present evidence disproving price impact only because the Court believed that \"[p]rice impact is different\" than materiality. Id. at 283; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The price- impact defense Halliburton II allows, in contrast, requires defendants to produce \"direct, more salient 19 evidence\" to show that the predicted price impact did not, in fact, occur. 573 U.S. at 282.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 F.3d 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
		"context": "81 Section 1983 \"has, as its provenance, Reconstruction -era policies aiming to secure to former slaves federal rights and to ward off state and local incursion on those rights.\" 82 The legislative history of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, which gave rise to Section 1983, demonstrates that 79 Laskar , 972 F.3d at 1293 (emphasis added). 80 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 81 See, e.g. , McDonough , 139 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
		"context": "81 See, e.g. , McDonough , 139 S.Ct. at 2156 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 82 140 S.Ct. 735. 28 Congress was aware of state actors' complicity in racial violence, and was concerned not only that state actors would fail to protect the rights of BIPOC, but \"might, in fact, be antipathetic to the vindication of those rights.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
		"context": "84 Under the Eleventh Circuit's standard, a person who has been found guilty of a charge, or accepted guilt for that charge, could still not asse rt a successful Section 1983 claim. At the same time , the Eleventh Circuit's approach does not bar those with dismissed criminal charges from bringing potentially meritorious Section 1983 claims before a neutral factfinder. Judicial review of claims arising from dismissed false criminal charges is necessary because the criminal 83 Mitchum , 407 U.S. at 242 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 449 U.S. 90. 84 McDonough , 139 S.Ct. at 2156 –57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
		"context": "84 Under the Eleventh Circuit's standard, a person who has been found guilty of a charge, or accepted guilt for that charge, could still not asse rt a successful Section 1983 claim. At the same time , the Eleventh Circuit's approach does not bar those with dismissed criminal charges from bringing potentially meritorious Section 1983 claims before a neutral factfinder. Judicial review of claims arising from dismissed false criminal charges is necessary because the criminal 83 Mitchum , 407 U.S. at 242 ; see also 457 U.S. 496 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 84 McDonough , 139 S.Ct. at 2156 –57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT'S FINALITY-BASED STANDARD IS ESSENTIAL TO FULFILL THE PURPOSE OF SECTION 1983 AND ADEQUATELY ADDRESS AND DETER THE RACIALIZED PRACTICE OF PURSUING FALSE CHARGES AGAINST BIPOC",
		"context": "It is part of a larger syst em of racial subordination, in which the criminal legal sy stem and policing play a substantial part. Indeed, \"[a]s long as police misconduct has existed in this country, its victims have primarily 99 Id. 100 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 34 been people of color.\" 101 The prevailing indications - of-innocence standard illustrates that existing legal structures are inadequate to ensure police account - ability, and highlights the need for judicial oversight and civil remedies to deter racialized police misconduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Affirming the D.C. Circuit Would Erase the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Liability",
		"context": "Thestatutory substantial assistance requirementtells us that a difference between primaryliability and aiding and abetting must exist, andit must be meaningful and substantial. (LawProfessors Amici Br. 8) Not only does a low threshold for primary liability undermine Congress's determination that \"substantial assistance\" is required for aiding and abetting liabilityit also conflicts with this Court's decisions in Central Bank of Denver, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Janus , and Stoneridge . Those decisions show that primary liability under Rule 10b-5 must be closely linked to a misstatement or misconductthat deceived a securities offeree, buyer, or seller.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "1. 10 on the shoals of long-settled precedent upholding disclosure requirements outside the election context. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Several circuit courts have followed this Court's lead and applied the exacting scrutiny standard outside the election context. The D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "Several circuit courts have followed this Court's lead and applied the exacting scrutiny standard outside the election context. The D.C. Circuit upheld a statute requiring registered lobbyists to disclose any donor organizations that met a monetary contribution statutory threshold, concluding that the disclosure requirement survived the same level of scrutiny applied \"in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]], McConnell, and Buckley [v. Valeo].\" Nat'l Ass'n of 582 F.3d 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "Circuit upheld a statute requiring registered lobbyists to disclose any donor organizations that met a monetary contribution statutory threshold, concluding that the disclosure requirement survived the same level of scrutiny applied \"in 554 U.S. 724], McConnell, and Buckley [v. Valeo].\" Nat'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Tenth Circuit applied exacting scrutiny in upholding the constitutionality of Colorado's Fair Campaign Practice Act, which imposed disclosure requirements on, among other things, some forms of \"genuine issue advocacy\" unconnected to a political campa ign or advocacy for a particular candidate. Independence Inst 812 F.3d 787.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "Nat'l Ass'n of 582 F.3d 1. The Tenth Circuit applied exacting scrutiny in upholding the constitutionality of Colorado's Fair Campaign Practice Act, which imposed disclosure requirements on, among other things, some forms of \"genuine issue advocacy\" unconnected to a political campa ign or advocacy for a particular candidate. Independence Inst [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Citizens United \"made clear that the wooden distinction between express advocacy and issue discussion does not apply in the disclosure context\" and upheld, under exacting scrutiny, a disclosure requirement applied to independent issue advocacy groups. Ctr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "812 F.3d 787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "Similarly, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Citizens United \"made clear that the wooden distinction between express advocacy and issue discussion does not apply in the disclosure context\" and upheld, under exacting scrutiny, a disclosure requirement applied to independent issue advocacy groups. Ctr. for Individual [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The First Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. See Nat'l Org.",
		"citation_value_orig": "697 F.3d 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "The First Circuit has reached a similar conclusion. See Nat'l Org. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 Of course, exacting scrutiny does not always require disclosure, for private persons may be able to point to legitimate harms arising from disclosure in a particular case. Outside the election context, just as within it, a showing of \"a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure of .",
		"citation_value_orig": "649 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": ". contributors' names will subject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties\" may chill association to a degree sufficient to justify exceptions to disclosure. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (invalidating order to disclose NAACP's membership lists to Alabama based on \"an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility\"). But these effects on association must be \"serious\" and may not be \"speculative.\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The exacting scrutiny described in the Court's election cases applies in the same way to non-election cases",
		"context": "As Justice Scalia wrote, \"Requiring people to stand up in public for their political acts fosters civic courage, without which democracy is doomed.\" John Doe No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added) . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court confirmed that § 1983 provides a right of action for violations of federal statutory rights , as well as constitutional ones. In Thiboutot , the plaintif fs sued under § 1983 to recover public assistance benefits to which they were entitled under provisions of the Social Security Act enacted pursuant to Congress's Spending Clause au thority . 448 U.S. at 2–3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.",
		"context": "\"Given that Congress attached no modifiers to the phrase, the plain language of the statute undoubtedly embraces respondents ' claim that petitioners violated the Social Security Act.\" Id. ; see also Golden State Transit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since Thiboutot , the Court has refused to carve out categories of laws or rights from the scope of the § 1983 right of action . For example, the Court ha s \"refused to limit the phrase 'and laws' in § 1983 to civil rights or equal protection laws. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.",
		"context": "Since Thiboutot , the Court has refused to carve out categories of laws or rights from the scope of the § 1983 right of action . For example, the Court ha s \"refused to limit the phrase 'and laws' in § 1983 to civil rights or equal protection laws. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1991 ). It likewise has \"rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional rights that are encompassed within the phrase 'rights, privileges, or immunities.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.",
		"context": "For example, it h as \"refused to limit the phrase to 'personal' rights as opposed to 'property' rights.'\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Instead , the Court \" give[s] full effect to [§ 1983's] broad language, recognizing that § 1983 provides a remedy, to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Spending Clause laws are federal \"laws\" within the scope of the section 1983 right of action.",
		"context": "Dennis , 498 U.S. at 445 (internal footnote omitted) . Accordingly, the Court does \"'not lightly concl ude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on § 1983 as a remedy' for the 5 deprivation of a federally secured right ,\" and does so only when the text and structure of a statute require such a reading. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Board's interpretation is inconsistent with the purposes behind the relevant statutory provisions.",
		"context": "In Pereira, for example , after servi ng notice lacking time-and-place inform ation on Mr. Pereira , the government mailed the subseq uent hearing no- tice to th e wrong a ddress. 138 S. C t. at 2107 . Simi- larly, in Yi Di Wa [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], (7th Cir. 201 4), the go vernment repeatedly failed to properl y serve the hearing notice over th e cou rse of more than ten years. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "759 F.3d 670",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous",
		"context": ". Section 2 of the FAA is the statute's \"primary substantive provision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It makes covered arbitration agreements as \"valid, irrevocable, and enforceable\" as any other type of agreement would be under state law. 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous",
		"context": "§ 2 ; cf. New Prime , 139 S.Ct. at 537 -38 (explaining that Section 2, and the FAA as a whole, do not apply to all written arbitration agreements) ; Rent-A-Center, West, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In turn, Section 3 provides that if a \"suit or pro - ceeding\" is brought in a co urt \"upon any is sue referable to arbitration,\" then \"the co urt in which such suit is pending . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous",
		"context": "If, when adding Section 16 into the FAA, Congress had intended to alter or supplement Section 3's express condition for mandat ory stays, then Congress would have altered or supplemented Section 3's unambiguous Satisfaction Clause : the FAA's only existing, mandatory \"stay\" language. See Gross , 557 U.S. at 175 (\"When Congre ss amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.\") (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Congress chose not to alter or supplement Section 3's unambiguous Satisfaction Clause when adding Section 16 into the statute. See Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous",
		"context": "; ibid. at 94 (\"To supply om issions transcends the judicial function.\") (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Furthermore, absent any textual amendment or supplement to Section 3's text, it would defeat the purpose of the Satisfaction Clause to read any auto - matic stay into Section 16. The Satisfaction Clause's crystal-clear purpose is to impose a stay only \"upon\" a judicial determination of arbitrability, not merely \"upon\" one party's assertions of arbitrability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 3's Satisfaction Clause Remains Unambiguous",
		"context": "Put differently, if a party's pending \"application\" alone cannot \"stay\" a \"suit,\" then obvi - ously, a party's rejected \"application\" alone cannot \"stay\" a \"suit.\" Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress was silent about mandatory stays in Section 16, only because it had already been clear and conspicuous about mandatory stays in Section 3. A judicial finding of arbitrability has always been expressly required before Congress would require indefinite, perhaps consecutive stays in a great many contract-related cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Is Responsibly Exercising Its Legislative Powers with Respect to Internet Taxation",
		"context": ". Congress is currently deeply engaged in legislative debate, fact finding, hear ings, and committee consid- eration of the issues raised by State efforts to require 15 Direct Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1147–48 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied137 S. Ct. 591.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.3d 1129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Step One\" of the Ninth Circuit's results test requires elections officials to predict voter behavior with near-perfect precision",
		"context": "Elections officials are not alone in their confusion about § 2's results test. \"[N]umerous courts and commentators have noted that applying Section 2's 'results test' to vote-denial claims is challenging, and a clear standard for its application has not been conclusively established.\" Ohio Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet elections officials alone face liability for fa iling it. And \"step one\" of the Ninth Circuit's results test ensures that elections officials will face liability for race-neutral standards, practices, and procedures that do not result in near-perfect outcomes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Step One\" of the Ninth Circuit's results test requires elections officials to predict voter behavior with near-perfect precision",
		"context": "6 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added). As this Court has explained, \"Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the 'results test,' applied\" in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 478 U.S. 30 . Consistent with White , Congress did not intend \"that any deviations from absolute equality, however small, must be justified to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Step One\" of the Ninth Circuit's results test requires elections officials to predict voter behavior with near-perfect precision",
		"context": "§ 10301(b) (emphasis added). As this Court has explained, \"Congress substantially revised § 2 to make clear that a violation could be proved by showing discriminatory effect alone and to establish as the relevant legal standard the 'results test,' applied\" in 412 U.S. 755. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Consistent with White , Congress did not intend \"that any deviations from absolute equality, however small, must be justified to the satisfaction of the judiciary to avoid invalidation.\" See 412 U.S. at 763–64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress Replaced \"Known,\" A Word Used To Define Prior Art In Patent Acts Since 1790, With \"Available To The Public\" To Provide A More Apt and Internationalized \"Prior Art\" Standard",
		"context": "18 \"Section 102(a) establishes that a person cannot patent what was already known to others. … Accordingly, in order to invali-date a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use must have been available to the public.\" Woodland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. - 14 - art. \"19 Outside the United States, the term \"available to the public\" has long been interpreted to preclude sub-ject matter that remains confidential or otherwise se-cret from constituting prior art and being used to in- validate a patent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "148 F.3d 1368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Step One, Prong One: When May a Wetland Be Treated as a \"Water\"?",
		"context": ". a continuing highway over which commerce is or may be carried on\"). 3 The Sacketts use the phrase \"traditional navigable waters\" to denote those waters that are, or have been, or with reasonable improvement would become navigable-in-fact, see SWANCC , 531 U.S. at 172, and that either by themselves or by linking to other waters could serve as channels of interstate commerce, see In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The difference between such waters and \"the waters of the United States\" is that the latter, although including all traditional navigable waters, also comprise those waters that can serve as channels of interstate commerce only through links with non-aquatic modes of transport. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Step One, Prong One: When May a Wetland Be Treated as a \"Water\"?",
		"context": "For one, EPA's water-quality concerns are overblown: even ungenerously interpreted, the plurality's test would still cover over 50 million acres of wetlands. See Amicus Brief of Outdoor Recreation & Conservation Organizations 7. Further, discharges of pollutants into wetlands that are nearby other regulated waters but which are not covered by the plurality's test will likely still be regulated if, pursuant to the indirect discharge theory, see County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Rapanos , 547 U.S. at 743-44, those pollutants find their way to regulated waters. But most significantly, EPA's critique rests on the highly contested proposition that broad federal regulation necessarily 12 results in a better environment, see Amicus Brief of Property & Environment Research Center (PERC) 10- 20; Amicus Brief of West Virginia 26, a proposition that even the agency's own amici reject, see Amicus Brief of National Association of Clean Water Agencies 18 (\"Exclusions for [green infrastructure] from the WOTUS definition support critical public policy aims acknowledged by Congress and both state and federal agencies.\"). Indeed, as the regulatory history confirms, the states are fully competent to protect their waters and wetlands in the absence of federal regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Step One, Prong One: When May a Wetland Be Treated as a \"Water\"?",
		"context": "33-35. Obviously the Act is a water-quality statute; but the means that Congress selected to protect water quality—directly regulating only \"waters\" and leaving other water- 13 quality regulation to the states—must also be respected. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For clear evidence that Congress has not chosen every \"means\" possible to remedy water pollution, one need look no further than how the Act treats nonpoint sources. Although pollution from such sources \"constitutes a substantial portion of all water pollution,\"5 Congress chose to leave its regulation to the states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Analysis Of A Transformative Purpose And Character Cannot Rely On Subjective Assessments.",
		"context": "Further, the assessment cannot rely merely on the taste and discernment of the judge. As this Court has observed, it \"would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, a court must consider what a reasonable person would determine the purpose and character of the new work to be. See Campbell , 510 U.S. at 582 (\"The threshold question when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be perceived .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "188 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Allowing discriminatory admissions was premised largely on enriching schools academically by admitting students with different viewpoints",
		"context": "This Court previously upheld the use of race in admissions based substantially on the hope that a more racially diverse student body would offer a more diverse range of viewpoints, and thereby enrich education. That is, the Court accepted that more racially diverse populations would create more diversity of opinion. Citing Justice Powell's analysis in Regents of University of California v. Bakke , Justice O'Conner's majority opinion in Grutter rationalized diversity admissions as a way for universities to choose students who would \"contribute the most to the 'robust exchange of ideas'…\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 Essentially, the Court adopted Justice 5. There was no majority opinion in Bakke , but Justice Powell's vote was the pivot around which the Court's holding turned when it ordered the medical school to admit Bakke. Justice Powell rejected racial quotas as violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but argued that the use of race was permissible as one of several admission criteria.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Allowing discriminatory admissions was premised largely on enriching schools academically by admitting students with different viewpoints",
		"context": "See Hall at 569. 6 the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this nation of many peoples.\" Grutter , 539 U.S. at 324 (quoting Bakke , 438 U.S. at 313 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). Robust dialogue was not the Court's only rationale for upholding diversity admissions as serving a \"compelling interest.\" Breaking down stereotypes by getting to know people from different backgrounds was another.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Allowing discriminatory admissions was premised largely on enriching schools academically by admitting students with different viewpoints",
		"context": "The academic mission of a university is \"a special concern of the First Amendment.\" [Bakke , 438 U.S.] at 312. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].8 8. When the Fisher case returned to the Court three years later, the Court identified and approved the respondent's objectives: On the first page of its 2004 \"Proposal to Consider Race and Ethnicity in Admissions,\" the University identifies the educational values it seeks to realize through its admissions process: the destruction of stereotypes, the \" 'promot[ion of] cross-racial understanding,' \" the preparation of a student body \" 'for an increasingly diverse workforce and society,' \" and the \" 'cultivat[ion 7 \"[P]reparing students for work and citizenship\" is another rationale advanced by the Court. Grutter , 539 U.S. at 331.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Allowing discriminatory admissions was premised largely on enriching schools academically by admitting students with different viewpoints",
		"context": "Grutter , 539 U.S. at 331. Education \"'sustain[s] our political and cultural heritage' with a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of society… This Court has long recognized that \"education… is the very foundation of good citizenship.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Grutter , 539 U.S. at 331 ( citation omitted ). Grutter also offered an argument more particular to law schools as the training ground for future political and other leaders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress and the Executive Branch have relied on this Court's longstanding interpretation",
		"context": "And for the same reason, Executive Branch officials may faithfully implement Congress's directives without fear that they will later be held t o have violated the Fifth Amendment. That assurance is vital because of \"the nearly inf inite variety of ways in which government actions or regula- tions can affect property interests.\" Arkansas Game & Fish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has recognized that, under its modern tak- ings doctrine, \"no magic formula enables a court to judge, in every case, whether a given government in ter- ference with property is a taking. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit's opinion runs afoul of this Court's unconstitutional conditions cases",
		"context": ". The Third Circuit allowed Philadelphia to exclude agencies that will not speak a government message in home studies. This splits with th e Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Departmen t of Texas, Veterans of For- eign [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents do not dis- pute this split. Instead, Philadelphia erroneously claims th at \"CSS does not allege a circuit split on this question .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit's opinion runs afoul of this Court's unconstitutional conditions cases",
		"context": "Further, the Third Circuit's decision departs from this Court's decision in Agency for Int'l Dev. v. AOSI, which held that the government may not condition participation in a government program on spe ech out- side that program. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, Philadelphia admits that it has \"nothing to do\" with home studies . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit's opinion runs afoul of this Court's unconstitutional conditions cases",
		"context": "But even if foster care were a public functi on (it is not), there is nothing talismanic about th is. Education, public health, sanitation, and solemnization of mar- riages could all fall into Responde nts' nebulous cate- gory, yet the First Amendment still applies. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Co lumbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Board of Cty. 10 518 U.S. 668; Obergefell , 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2602, 2607. Philadelphia frets over \"mayhem in governmen t contracting\" if CSS prevails.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Third Circuit's opinion runs afoul of this Court's unconstitutional conditions cases",
		"context": "Education, public health, sanitation, and solemnization of mar- riages could all fall into Responde nts' nebulous cate- gory, yet the First Amendment still applies. See, e.g., Trinity Lutheran Church of Co lumbia, 137 S. Ct. 2012 ; Board of Cty. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Obergefell , 135 S. Ct. at 2594, 2602, 2607. Philadelphia frets over \"mayhem in governmen t contracting\" if CSS prevails. Phila .",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "Cf. Harrison Redev. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After all, the New Jersey Constitution says that blight elimination is a public use, and a valid redevelopment determination says that blight exists. Just like a valid FERC certificate authorizes the use of eminent domain, a valid redevelopment determination in New Jersey does the same.",
		"citation_value_orig": "942 A.2d 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "Nonetheless, New Jersey courts still recognize that a property owner who is barred from challenging the validity of a redevelopment determination remains free to challenge the condemnation on any other grounds. A New Jersey court, for example, will reject a condemnation of property in a valid redevelopment zone if the condemnation is not \"reasonably necessary\" to an actual redevelopment project. See Borough of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too in other states. State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows.",
		"citation_value_orig": "200 A.3d 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]586 S.E.2d 853552 N.W.2d 578203 A.3d 939939 A.2d 331283 S.E.2d 455506 N.E.2d 1152. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 P.3d 900",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of 332 P.3d 900[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]552 N.W.2d 578203 A.3d 939939 A.2d 331283 S.E.2d 455506 N.E.2d 1152. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 S.E.2d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of 332 P.3d 900586 S.E.2d 853[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]203 A.3d 939939 A.2d 331283 S.E.2d 455506 N.E.2d 1152. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 N.W.2d 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of 332 P.3d 900586 S.E.2d 853552 N.W.2d 578203 A.3d 939[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]283 S.E.2d 455506 N.E.2d 1152. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "939 A.2d 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of 332 P.3d 900586 S.E.2d 853552 N.W.2d 578203 A.3d 939939 A.2d 331[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]506 N.E.2d 1152. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 S.E.2d 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The government's argument disregards the Act's command that district courts follow the \"practice and procedure\" of state courts hearing condemnation cases",
		"context": "State courts across the country routinely reject condemnations without 10 invalidating (or even questioning) the order or statute from which a condemnor's legal authority flows. Sometimes, these decisions rest on the fact that the condemnor, though authorized to take land generally, has not established that it needs the subject property anytime soon. 2 Other times, courts reject takings because the record shows the timing or placement of an otherwise lawful \"public use\" was meant to serve some illegitimate purpose like stymying an unwanted development project.3 2 See, e.g., Utah Dep't of 332 P.3d 900586 S.E.2d 853552 N.W.2d 578203 A.3d 939939 A.2d 331283 S.E.2d 455[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 These cases establish that state courts hearing condemnations can and do evaluate the lawfulness of the specific taking before them without invalidating or even evaluating the underlying delegation of the eminent domain power. Read in tandem, §§ 717f(h) and 717r(b) suggest that federal district courts can do the same thing in Natural Gas Act condemnations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 N.E.2d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Registration jurisdiction is unfair.",
		"context": "Mal- lory says all this is just ified by a corporation's in- state presence and operatio ns, but this Court has rec- ognized since International Shoe that in-state opera- tions justify claims based on those in-state operations . Pennsylvania's scheme subverts that principle. C. Mallory relies heavily on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], upholding general \"tag\" jurisdiction over individuals. But tag jurisdiction was 9 upheld—despite its obvious unfairness—because of its unquestioned acceptance, both historically and to- day. Mallory cannot make a similar showing for gen- eral registration-jurisdiction, so Burnham is inapt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.",
		"context": "It makes perfect sense to hold that an alien must be charged with inadmissibility in order to face an additional consequence: application of the stop-time rule. History. Petitioner's interpretation is consistent with Matter of Ching , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that the phrase \"is deportable\" meant that the alien was found to be deportable. Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 I. & N. Dec. 710",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The purpose and history of the stop-time rule reinforce that Petitioner's position is correct.",
		"context": "This discrepancy is not remotely \"similar\" to the discrepancies that \"plagued the earlier law,\" (Gov't Br. 20), where \"by its terms, § 212(c) did not apply when an alien was being deported.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "1. It is true that emotional-distress damages are not available for a breach of an \"ordinary commercial contract,\" where \"[p]ecuniary interests are paramount.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Yet not all contracts are purely commercial in their nature. Some involve rights we cherish, dignities we respect, emotions recognized by all as both sacred and personal.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "84 N.W.2d 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "Id. ; see also Richard A. Lord, 24 Williston on Contracts § 64:11 (2021) (noting that \"[n]umerous cases allowing the recovery of emotional distress damages for breach of contract exist\"). Indeed, while some courts and commentators have called the more fine-grained rule that applies in 34 cases like this an \"exception,\" Stewart, 84 N.W.2d at 824, others have explained that \"there is no general rule barring [emotional-distress damages] in actions for breach of contract\" at all, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is all a question of the subject matter and background of the contract.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 N.E.2d 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "The Court had good reason to eschew any such inquiry. In all sorts of contexts, courts rely on the venerable principle that \"[e]very citizen is presumed to know the law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 378 U.S. 347. Yet no defendant may evade punishment on the ground that the statutory provision under which he was charged is an obscure or rarely invoked one, or an exception to some more general rule. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "The Court had good reason to eschew any such inquiry. In all sorts of contexts, courts rely on the venerable principle that \"[e]very citizen is presumed to know the law.\" 140 S. Ct. 1498; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet no defendant may evade punishment on the ground that the statutory provision under which he was charged is an obscure or rarely invoked one, or an exception to some more general rule. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "§ 922(g) (criminalizing exceptions to the general rule that persons may lawfully possess firearms). Nor can any individual defeat criminal charges by saying the general populace is unaware of pertinent wrinkles in applicable common law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 532 U.S. 451. 37 Any other approach would be wholly unmanageable. Here, for example, courts would have no dependable way to determine what tens of thousands of federal funding recipients actually know about traditional contract remedies or when they \"think that they might be liable\" for a breach, Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "§ 922(g) (criminalizing exceptions to the general rule that persons may lawfully possess firearms). Nor can any individual defeat criminal charges by saying the general populace is unaware of pertinent wrinkles in applicable common law. See, e.g., 139 S. Ct. 544; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 37 Any other approach would be wholly unmanageable. Here, for example, courts would have no dependable way to determine what tens of thousands of federal funding recipients actually know about traditional contract remedies or when they \"think that they might be liable\" for a breach, Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "at 151; see also Ark. La. Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no reason why someone would have such selective knowledge of an interlocking set of principles, all based on the same overall concept of foreseeability. On the contrary, private businesses and governmental entities that enter into multi-million-dollar contracts with the federal government are sophisticated parties that are deeply familiar with contract law, as well as with the common-sense reality that intentional discrimination is likely to cause mental anguish.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "See Pet. App. at 100a-01a, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Denying recovery for emotional distress would have left those victims—and many others—with \"no remedy\" under federal anti-discrimination law to redress their injuries. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "If, as in this case, the refusal forces the victim to seek treatment elsewhere, it inflicts frustration and humiliation from the discriminatory exclusion—but typically no pecuniary loss. More acute psychological trauma can result when an emergency compels a patient to accept treatment despite a medical provider's refusal to accommodate her disability. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a deaf patient who needed emer-gency gallbladder surgery did not understand what was happening to her for more than a day because the hospital refused to provide an ASL interpreter. Id. at 338-41; see, e.g., 582 F.3d 268.",
		"citation_value_orig": "701 F.3d 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fifth Circuit had no warrant to brush aside the traditional rule",
		"context": "For example, in 701 F.3d 334, a deaf patient who needed emer-gency gallbladder surgery did not understand what was happening to her for more than a day because the hospital refused to provide an ASL interpreter. Id. at 338-41; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These harassment and failure-to-accommodate cases are paradigmatic violations of Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation Act. Congress has deliberately and repeatedly conferred a private right of action to deter intentional violations of those statutes and to allow victims to recover compensation for the resulting harms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.3d 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause field and conflict preempts the state law provisions on which the state court relied.",
		"context": "Federal law can preempt state law in three over- lapping ways: (1) express preemption ; (2) implied or field preemption ; and (3) conflict preemption. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Elections Clause preempts state law under fi eld and 7 conflict preemption. Indeed, under the circumstances here, the Tenth Amendment cuts against state law: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states , are reserved to the states respectively, o r to the people.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause field and conflict preempts the state law provisions on which the state court relied.",
		"context": "English , 496 U.S. at 79 n.5. For state courts to impose substantive criteria for federal elections —especially if they do so via vague and malleable terms —\"upsets the balance \" that the Elections Clause struck. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The River Master appropriately entertained New Mexico's request for delivery credit",
		"context": "If so, they would not be subject to forfeiture. But in setting forth those time limitations, the text of the amended decree \"does not speak in jurisdictional terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, it speaks in the language of a claim -processing rule, prescribing when \"[t]he River Master shall perfor m [certain] duties.\" 485 U.S. at 391.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Liability for dilution by tarnishment should not be stretched to the unconstitutional extremes proposed by JDPI.",
		"context": "§ 1125(c)(3)(A). Those exclusions provide the \"narrow specificity\" of government regulation and the \"breathing space\" that First Amendment freedoms need to survive. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit held that dilution by tarnishment did not apply to Bad Spaniels because of the noncommercial -use exclusion. This Court may affirm based on that exclusion or, alternatively, the fair-use exclusion for parodies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions",
		"context": "Aurelius maintains (Br. 63) that this Court has \"not hesitated to grant … vastly disruptive relief\" in the past, but Aurelius cites no case where this Court has ever provided a remedy for improperly appointed officers that is even remotely as harmful as what is requested here. Aurelius cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court ruled that a one- house veto of executive action was unconstitutional because it authorized \"essen tially legislative\" action without bicameral approval and presentment to the President. Id. at 952-59.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions",
		"context": "57-58) and UTIE R (Br. 82) also rely on Northern Pipeline Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but this Court plainly considered the practical consequences of its holding—that Congress had unconstitutionally vested Article III functions in non-Article III bankruptcy courts— and shaped its disposition accordingly. It held that the decision \"shall apply only prospectively\" because \"retroactive application would not further the opera- tion of our holding, and would surely visit substantial injustice and hardship upon those litigants who relied upon the Act's vesting of jurisdiction in the bankruptcy courts.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Aurelius Fails To Demonstrate That This Court Should Disregard The Practical Consequences Of Invalidating The Board's Prior Actions",
		"context": "30 no explanation for why the outcome of Northern Pipeline—barring application for anyone but the sin- gularly affected respondent there—makes sense under their restrictive view of the de facto officer doctrine. Finally, Aurelius notes (Br. 59) that 600 NLRB cases were at issue in New Process Steel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but this Cou rt did not decide whether these cases would be vacated. Id. at 688 (not address- ing remedy, but rather simp ly reversing and remanding for further proceedings).",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 674",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ready mobility does not justify a warrantless search in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "Within the home and curtilage, however, ready mobility do es not excuse the need for a warrant. 21 Drugs, for example, are \"easily removed, hidden, or destroyed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Despite acknowledging the risk of evidence being destroyed, the Court has refused to permit warrantless searches of the home for drugs. Absent true exigent circumstances, there is no mobility -based exception within the home for searches.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ready mobility does not justify a warrantless search in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "Absent true exigent circumstances, there is no mobility -based exception within the home for searches. Id. at 35 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"there must almost always be a strong possibility that confederates of the arrested man will in the meanwhile remove the items for whic h the police have probable cause to search\") ; Riley , 134 S. Ct. at 2486, 2491 ( requiring a warrant for post - arrest search es of cell phones, which contain \" many sensitive records previously found in the home,\" despite threats of evidence destruction). The same is true when searching for people, who \"are inherently mobile.\" Steagald , 451 U.S. at 221.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ready mobility does not justify a warrantless search in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "at 221, an officer's \"judicially untested determinations\" of probable cause do n ot justify an entry to search for people or objections in the absence of genuine exigent circumstances. Id. at 213; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But \"if the police may, without a warrant, seize and search an unoccupied vehicle parked on the owner's private property, not being used for any illegal purpose, then it is hard to see why they need a warrant to seize and search a suitcase, a trunk, a shopping bag, or any other portable container in a house, garage , or back yard.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief",
		"context": "This Court in Liu v. SEC identified the SEC cases that led to its unrestrained \"disgorgement\" power. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1940– 41 and 1952–53 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (2020). Jus-tice Thomas noted, \"It is telling that, when the SEC began seeking [disgorgement] it did so without any statutory authority.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief",
		"context": "Id. at 1952. That case was [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,404 U.S. 19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 F. Supp. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief",
		"context": "Id. at 1952. That case was 312 F. Supp. 77, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,404 U.S. 19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 F.2d 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief",
		"context": "That case was 312 F. Supp. 77, aff'd446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That case drew on the Porter/Mitchell line of cases. The Seventh Circuit opinion below starkly laid out how this mistaken line of cases led it astray.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FTC Followed the SEC's Lead to Grab Powers Not Granted to It by Congress and to Avoid the Procedures Congress Provided for Awards of Equitable Relief",
		"context": "Mr. FitzGerald noted that, like the SEC, the FTC first proceeded by consent orders before bringing its claims of broad equitable powers to the courts. Id. at 10 (\"Be- fore the court ruled, the parties reached a settlement 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 under which the payments were placed in escrow, and […respondents] agreed to a Commission consent or- der that required them to forgo future payments un- der the contracts and pay redress to consumers.\") (cit- ing Australian Land Title, Ltd. , 92 F.T.C. 362).",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Harvard has workable race-neutral alternatives",
		"context": "Overruling precedent is serious, \"[b]ut stare decisis is not an inexorable command.\" Franchise Tax Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court considers overruling a prece - dent virtually every Term, many of this Court's \"most notable and consequential decisions\" overruled prece - dent, and almost \"every current Member of this Court\" voted to overrule \"multiple constitutional pre-cedents\" in \"just the last few Terms.\" Ramos, 140 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Harvard has workable race-neutral alternatives",
		"context": "at 1411 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in p art) (collecting cases). Stare decisis \"'is at its weakest when [this Court] interpret[s] the Constitution,'\" as it did in Grutter . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 50 When deciding whether to overrule a precedent, this Court considers \"a number of factors.\" Hyatt, 139 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": "§ 363(m) (emphasis added). 8 Because avoidance claims belong to the estate, Sears was the proper party to do so. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] two years after the date of the transfer sought to be a voided ; or (2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.\" ).9 In this instance, t he transfer occurred on October 4, 2019 . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.3d 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": "Pub. Emps Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 costs the transferee has made or incurred , including the payment of taxes .10 Whe re, as here, the statutory scheme prescribes (and limits ) the remedy with carefully crafted restrictions and protections , there is no occasion to create some unlimited, common -law alternative. See, e.g., 285 U.S. 467 ; see952 F.2d 82 ; accord City of 451 U.S. 304 .11 10 For example, Transform has continued to pay rent and taxes , and MOAC has demanded that Transform make repairs to the property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 2042. 30 costs the transferee has made or incurred , including the payment of taxes .10 Whe re, as here, the statutory scheme prescribes (and limits ) the remedy with carefully crafted restrictions and protections , there is no occasion to create some unlimited, common -law alternative. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see952 F.2d 82 ; accord City of 451 U.S. 304 .11 10 For example, Transform has continued to pay rent and taxes , and MOAC has demanded that Transform make repairs to the property. Section 550(e) would permit Transfor m to be made whole on these expenses; automatic return would leave Transform empty -handed in contravention of the Code's protections . 11 Likewise unavailing is Rule 60(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 2042. 30 costs the transferee has made or incurred , including the payment of taxes .10 Whe re, as here, the statutory scheme prescribes (and limits ) the remedy with carefully crafted restrictions and protections , there is no occasion to create some unlimited, common -law alternative. See, e.g., 285 U.S. 467 ; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord City of 451 U.S. 304 .11 10 For example, Transform has continued to pay rent and taxes , and MOAC has demanded that Transform make repairs to the property. Section 550(e) would permit Transfor m to be made whole on these expenses; automatic return would leave Transform empty -handed in contravention of the Code's protections . 11 Likewise unavailing is Rule 60(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "952 F.2d 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 2042. 30 costs the transferee has made or incurred , including the payment of taxes .10 Whe re, as here, the statutory scheme prescribes (and limits ) the remedy with carefully crafted restrictions and protections , there is no occasion to create some unlimited, common -law alternative. See, e.g., 285 U.S. 467 ; see952 F.2d 82 ; accord City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .11 10 For example, Transform has continued to pay rent and taxes , and MOAC has demanded that Transform make repairs to the property. Section 550(e) would permit Transfor m to be made whole on these expenses; automatic return would leave Transform empty -handed in contravention of the Code's protections . 11 Likewise unavailing is Rule 60(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Transfer Is Not Avoidable",
		"context": ". simply because it is or may have been erroneous'\" ; it is void \"only in the rare instance where a judgment is premis ed either on a certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard .\" United Student Aid Funds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"a court may continue to issue relief that invalidates some transfers of property outside the estate [.]\" U.S. Br. 24.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Stripping Slaves of Legal Privileges, Including the Right to Testify",
		"context": "462 § 6. 68 Finkelman , supra note 13, at 127. 69 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court upheld a state statute that required parental notification before a minor has an abortion , but that provided a judicial bypass of the notification requirement if the minor could convince a court that notification would not be in her best interests. Of course, even in this 27 Once again, the fetus is treated exactly as a slave, as property , as a thing .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Stripping Slaves of Legal Privileges, Including the Right to Testify",
		"context": "In 1850, Congress amended the Fugitive Slave Law and set up a federal judicial and 57 Slavery was, thus, \"super protected\" property under the Constitution. Similarly, but this time without benefit of any specific text in the Constitution, this Court has made abortion a \"super protected\" right. See Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[W]hile Roe isn't super -precedent, it did spawn a body of jurisprudence that has made abortion the only true 'super -right' protected by the federal courts today. The purported right to an abortion before viability is the only one that may not be infringed even for the very best reason. For an unenumerated right judicially created just 45 years ago, that is astounding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "888 F.3d 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Stripping Slaves of Legal Privileges, Including the Right to Testify",
		"context": "The purported right to an abortion before viability is the only one that may not be infringed even for the very best reason. For an unenumerated right judicially created just 45 years ago, that is astounding. \"); see also Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 25 bureaucratic app aratus to assist masters in recovering their slaves who fled to free states.60 The revised law also took direct aim at the substance of the \"personal privilege laws\" by stripping blacks of normal due process rights and privileges and immunities. Federal j udges and newly created commissioners would hear these cases, without right of appeal to any court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Conclusion: The Due Process Clause Does Not Protect the Right to an Abortion",
		"context": "With this analysis in mind, Justice Scalia was correct when he said that a right to an abortion cannot \"be logically deduced fro m the text of the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]497 U.S. 520; see also 521 U.S. 720. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe, The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong 11 indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Conclusion: The Due Process Clause Does Not Protect the Right to an Abortion",
		"context": "With this analysis in mind, Justice Scalia was correct when he said that a right to an abortion cannot \"be logically deduced fro m the text of the Constitution.\" 497 U.S. 502497 U.S. 520; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe, The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong 11 indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Conclusion: The Due Process Clause Does Not Protect the Right to an Abortion",
		"context": "As Justice Rehnquist noted in his dissent in Roe, The fact that a majority of the States reflecting, after all, the majority sentiment in those States, have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong 11 indication, it seems to me, that the asserted right to an abortion is not so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental. Roe, 410 U.S. at 174 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Justice White agreed, stating , \"I find nothing in the language or history of the Constitution to suppor t the Court's judgments.... [I]n my view its judgment is an improvident and extravagant exercise of the power of judicial review....\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Roe has no basis in the text of the Constitution or in our nation's history and traditions. It was a bare power grab by judges who read their own philosophies of liberty into the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. RYDER CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE DE FACTO OFFICER DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO STRUCTURAL CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "But that says little about what role the doctrine sh ould play when a structural provision of the U.S. Constitution 6 is violated. Faced with that precise scenario, this Court correctly held that the de facto officer doctrine should play no role. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A submission presented under Rule 59(e) is subject to AEDPA's limitations on second or successive habeas applications",
		"context": "Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) does not allow a state prisoner to prolong his postconviction proceed- ings by relitigating in the district court the merits of federal habeas corpus claims that the district court has already rejected . The federal civil rules apply to habeas applications \"only 'to the extent that [they are] not in- consistent with ' applicable federal statutory provisions and rules \" governing habeas cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Ha- beas Rule 12 . AEDPA, in turn, restricts the rights of habeas applican ts in a variety of ways, such as by limit ing appeals and —as particularly relevant here —generally precluding a prisoner from repetitively challenging his final s tate conviction , see 28 U.S.C. 2244(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts",
		"context": "9 Emma Green, A New Jersey Mosque Wins in a Religious- Discrimination Lawsuit—Over Parking Lots , THE ATLANTIC (May 30, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ politics/archive/2017/05/bernards- township-mosque-case-settled/528492/. 10 In prisons, the harm frequently comes from grooming requirements. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court considered a prisoner's challenge to the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy that prohibited inmates from wearing \"facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the lip.\" 135 S. Ct. 853. The Department's po licy made no exception for religious objections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts",
		"context": "10 In prisons, the harm frequently comes from grooming requirements. In 135 S. Ct. 853, this Court considered a prisoner's challenge to the Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming policy that prohibited inmates from wearing \"facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the lip.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Department's po licy made no exception for religious objections. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts",
		"context": "Holt did not allege financial injury but indisputably suffered harm from being forced to violate his religious beliefs or face disciplinary action. A similar prison policy prevented Albert Kuperman from growing a beard—a practice important to his Orthodox Jewish faith—while serving his sentence in a New Hampshire state prison. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like Holt, Kuperman did not allege financial injury when he sued the prison officials, seeking injunctive relief as well as nominal and punitive damages. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "645 F.3d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Minority faiths frequently experience unquantifiable burdens on religious exercise in the zoning and prison contexts",
		"context": "This is particularly important in prison cases for at least two overlapping reasons. To begin with, this Court has limited the relief available to prisoners under RLUIPA to non- monetary remedies, making it easier for prisons to moot RLUIPA claims by simply changing their practices or transferring prisoners. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A constitutional claim for money damages may be the only way for a prisoner to vindicate his or her religious freedoms. On top of that, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (\"PLRA\") provides that compensatory damages are not available for emotional harm absent physical 10 Xerxes Wilson, Women sue Delaware ov er workplace hijab prohibition; federal lawsuit claims discrimination , USA TODAY (Aug. 14, 2020), https://www.us atoday.com/story/news/nation/2020/08/14/ba rred-wearing-hijabs-former-delaware-workers-sue-state/3373522001/.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Context and structure confirm that Section 1231(a), not Section 1226, governs respondents' detention",
		"context": "a. This Court has explained that \"Congress's struc- tural choices\"— for instance, a \" 'decision to locate a provision in one subsection rather than another' \"—is a guide to statutory meaning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] — rather than in Section 1226 or in a standalone section . Congress also chose to place the provision addressing statutory withholding, 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), in Section 1231— again, not in Section 1226, nor in its own section.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "This case involves a defined contribution plan in which participants direct their own investments. Such participant-directed plans are \"designed to offer participants meaningful choices about how to invest their retirement savings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Participants in such plans are in the driver's seat, and the fiduciary's pr imary obligation in this context is ensuring that participants have the tools \"to make their own choices.\" 658 F.3d 667.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.3d 314",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "671 F.3d 314. Participants in such plans are in the driver's seat, and the fiduciary's pr imary obligation in this context is ensuring that participants have the tools \"to make their own choices.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That means providing participants with a \"variety of investment options\" that ca rry diverse \"risk profiles, investment strategies, and associated fees,\" Renfro , 671 F.3d at 327, along with the information necessary to understand and choose among those options, see Loomis , 658 F.3d at 671; see also Employee Benefits Sec. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan 25-26 (Sept. 2020).",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "ERISA's unique treatment of participant-directed plans is underscored by the affirmative defense provided in Section 1104(c). As Judge Wood explained for the Seventh Circuit, Section 1104(c) explicitly \"modifies\" the ordinary role of the plan fiduciary when, as here, the plan \"provide[s] for individual accounts and allow[s] a participant or beneficiary 'to exercise control over the assets in his account.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (encouraging fiduciaries to give individual account holders \"a broad range of 5 https://www.dol.gov/sites/do lgov/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our- activities/resource-center/publications/what-you-should-know- about-your-retirement-plan.pdf. 21 investment alternatives\"). In that instance, the participant, not the fiduciary, is responsible for the \"results [of the] participant's or beneficiary's exercise of control.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.3d 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "Tibble , 575 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 ( 1959). This Court has made clear, however, that \"trust law informs but does not control the interpretation of ERISA,\" especially when plan participants are \"not similarly situated to the beneficiaries of a private trust.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Varity 516 U.S. 489. In defending their paternalistic duty of prudence, petitioners and the government rely on trust law principles governing the classic trust relationship—in which the trustee has the power to make investment decisions and \"is not subject to the control of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1615",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "Tibble , 575 U.S. at 528 (citation omitted); see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 174 ( 1959). This Court has made clear, however, that \"trust law informs but does not control the interpretation of ERISA,\" especially when plan participants are \"not similarly situated to the beneficiaries of a private trust.\" 140 S. Ct. 1615; see also Varity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In defending their paternalistic duty of prudence, petitioners and the government rely on trust law principles governing the classic trust relationship—in which the trustee has the power to make investment decisions and \"is not subject to the control of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 5 cmt. e, at 52 (2003); see, e.g. , North Carolina Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that context, it may make sense to require a more rigorous analysis of each individual investment in isolation, including as to cost. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 227 cmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "But Northwestern's Plans are defined contribution plans that give participants responsibility for selecting their own investments from a menu of options. \"The trust-law analogy\" used by petitioners and the government \"therefore does not fit\" this context. Thole, 140 S. Ct. at 1620; see In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If anything, the closest analog in trust law would be \"a beneficiary who in advance approves an investment[] or the retention or change of an investment\"—and in that circumstance, 23 the beneficiary \"cannot thereafter complain of the trustee's action,\" even if the investment might \"otherwise be nonlegal.\" Amy M. Hess, George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees § 941 (3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 F.3d 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "dicta in a prior case in which the point now at issue was not fully debated.\" Central Va. Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 low-cost funds they desired and deemed prudent, respondents are liable for breach of duty because \"numerous additional funds were offered as well.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. PETITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT MISCHARACTERIZE THE NATURE OF THE DUTY OF PRUDENCE UNDER ERISA FOR PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED PLANS",
		"context": "Hecker , 556 F.3d at 589. Fiduciaries of participant-directed plans are, of course, still subject to suit for claims of mismanagement, such as conflicts of interest. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a fiduciary may be subject to a breach-of-duty claim for offering \" only retail class shares\"—and no lower cost institutional shares from which to choose. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "588 F.3d 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Shares of most corporations are not traded on public markets, and finding buyers for such shares is difficult or impossible",
		"context": "19 See Del. Code Ann. Title 8, § 151(b) (West 201 7) (every Del- aware corporation must have at least one class of non -redeema- ble common stock); 84 A.3d 954; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 13 tax returns.20 Only about 4,000 corporations are listed on a U.S. stock exchange —less than 0.1% of cor- porations that filed tax returns.21 Of the rest, s ome are owned by a single shareholder, but many are ben- eficially owned by dispersed minority owners. Most publicly traded companies are bigger, on average, than companies that lack active public markets for their shares.",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 A.2d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "Sosna , 419 U.S. at 404. The Constitution confers upon Congress \"not all governmental powers, but only dis- crete, enumerated ones.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"[e]very law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.\" Morrison , 529 U.S. at 607.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "And \"tribe\" referred to a \"distinct body of the people,\" not the individual peo- 7 Individual Petitioners' standing to press their Article I claims was unquestioned at the certiorari stage. \"[I]ndivid- ual[s]\" may \"challenge a law as enacted in contravention of con- stitutional principles of federalism.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In any event, Texas indisputably has Article III standing to bring this claim, and the \"presence of one party with standing is sufficient to s atisfy Article III's case -or- controversy requirement.\" 547 U.S. 47 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "564 U.S. 211 . In any event, Texas indisputably has Article III standing to bring this claim, and the \"presence of one party with standing is sufficient to s atisfy Article III's case -or- controversy requirement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 48 ple themselves . 2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the Eng- lish Language at 980 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "2 S. Johnson, A Dictionary of the Eng- lish Language at 980 . The Constitution's grant of au- thority to regulate commerce with Indian \" Tribes\" is thus , along with \"States\" and \"f oreign Nations,\" a ref- erence to trade with three distinct \"classes\" of govern- mental bodies. Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (18 31). The Articles of Confederation and its influence on the Constitution's drafting confirm that the Indian Commerce Clause cannot be understood to grant Con- gress unlimited authority over any matter that in-volves an Indian . Under the Articles, the Continental Congress had the \"sole and exclusive right and power of .",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "They regulate the adoption of children, not commerce; they govern rela-tions between individual \"Indian c hildren\" (including non-tribal members) and prospective adoptive par- ents, not tribes; and they operate in state -court pro- ceedings outside of reservations. First , ICWA's child -placement system does not regulate trade, the exchange of commodities, or \"com-mercial intercourse .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[G]oods are the subject of com- merce, \" but \" persons are not.\" M ayor, Alderman & 50 Commonalty of City of 36 U.S. 102 ; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "22 U.S. 1 . \"[G]oods are the subject of com- merce, \" but \" persons are not.\" M ayor, Alderman & 50 Commonalty of City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. U.S. Const. amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 U.S. 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "That \"lack of historical prece- dent\" is a \"telling indication\" of the \"severe constitu- tional problem\" here. Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. This Court 's Interstate Commerce Clause prec- edents confirm that ICWA's placement preferences exceed the limits of Congress's enumerated powers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "I, § 8. And this Court has held only that the Interstate Commerce and Indian Commerce Clauses have different \"applications.\" Cotton Petro- leum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The power to regulate commerce with t ribes is \"exclu- sive\" to the federal government, while the power to regulate commerce among States is a \"concurrent\" power. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "88a (Dennis, J.) (quot- ing Cotton Petroleum , 490 U.S. at 192). Congress's power under the Indian Commerce Clause may be \"plenary\" —as is its interstate -com- merce power, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —but it \"is not absolute ,\" 329 U.S. 40 , in- cluding the structural restriction that Congress pos- sesses only limited, enumerated powers, while the States retain the rest. This Court has accordingly warned that Congress would go too far if it used its Indian Commerce Clause power to interfere with the power or authority of States. When the Court upheld a federal law affirm- ing a tribe's authority to criminally prosecute a non - tribal member for \"events that occur upon the tribe's own land,\" it relied in particular on the fact that the 54 law \"involve[d] no interference with the power or au- thority of any State. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "88a (Dennis, J.) (quot- ing Cotton Petroleum , 490 U.S. at 192). Congress's power under the Indian Commerce Clause may be \"plenary\" —as is its interstate -com- merce power, 312 U.S. 100 —but it \"is not absolute ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , in- cluding the structural restriction that Congress pos- sesses only limited, enumerated powers, while the States retain the rest. This Court has accordingly warned that Congress would go too far if it used its Indian Commerce Clause power to interfere with the power or authority of States. When the Court upheld a federal law affirm- ing a tribe's authority to criminally prosecute a non - tribal member for \"events that occur upon the tribe's own land,\" it relied in particular on the fact that the 54 law \"involve[d] no interference with the power or au- thority of any State. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "This Court has accordingly warned that Congress would go too far if it used its Indian Commerce Clause power to interfere with the power or authority of States. When the Court upheld a federal law affirm- ing a tribe's authority to criminally prosecute a non - tribal member for \"events that occur upon the tribe's own land,\" it relied in particular on the fact that the 54 law \"involve[d] no interference with the power or au- thority of any State. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the Tenth Amend- ment's reservation of powers to the States provides \"explicit language\" setting a limitation on Congress's authority. Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "parent and child[ ],\" which \" be- longs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.\" Burrus , 136 U.S. at 593– 94. So deeply embedded is this principle that federal courts recognize a \"domestic relations\" exception to diversity jurisdiction, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and exclude child -custody decisions from federal habeas challenges because of the \"special so- licitude for state interests in the field,\" 458 U.S. 502 (declining to identify \"a Supreme Court decision blessing a statute that operates just like ICWA or a Founding -era federal law that reg u- lates Indian children and applies within state child welfare proceedings\"). Far from a well -established practice with a rich historical pedigree, see Lara , 541 U.S. at 203 –04, the imposition of federal standards on family matters \"long . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "parent and child[ ],\" which \" be- longs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States.\" Burrus , 136 U.S. at 593– 94. So deeply embedded is this principle that federal courts recognize a \"domestic relations\" exception to diversity jurisdiction, 504 U.S. 689, and exclude child -custody decisions from federal habeas challenges because of the \"special so- licitude for state interests in the field,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (declining to identify \"a Supreme Court decision blessing a statute that operates just like ICWA or a Founding -era federal law that reg u- lates Indian children and applies within state child welfare proceedings\"). Far from a well -established practice with a rich historical pedigree, see Lara , 541 U.S. at 203 –04, the imposition of federal standards on family matters \"long . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "Holyfield , 490 U.S. at 45 n.17. They do not apply on \"land that is Indian country,\" where 55 federal and tribal law have \"primary jurisdiction .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Rather , they apply to arms of the state government s in state jurisdictions . Nor would holding that ICWA's placement prefer- ences exceed Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause call into question any of this Court's prior precedents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ICWA EXCEEDS CONGRESS'S ENUMERATED POWERS",
		"context": "Nor would holding that ICWA's placement prefer- ences exceed Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause call into question any of this Court's prior precedents. Many of this Court's cases on which the en banc court relied regulate commerce directly. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Others reference the In- dian Commerce Clause in up holding Congress's power \"to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions on tribal sovereign author- ity,\" including the authority to prosecute criminal vi-olations. Lara , 541 U.S. at 202.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The plain meaning of \"render,\" \"the alien,\" and \"inadmissible\" support Petitioner's interpretation",
		"context": "Second, the stop-time rule uses the phrase \"the alien.\" Its use of the definite article demonstrates that it refers to the actual alien seeking cancellation of removal, not some hypothetical alien. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, the stop-time rule uses the word \"inadmissible.\" \"Inadmissible\" is a term of art in immigration law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stolt-Nielsen v. Animal Feeds Requires A \"Contractual Basis\" Authorizing Class Arbitration, Which Cannot Be Found In The Parties' Basic Agreement To Arbitrate Their Disputes",
		"context": "24a (emphasis added). See also id . at 28a.3 In Stolt-Nielsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], th is Court held that \"a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.\" Id., 559 U.S. at 684 (emphasis added and in original). This means that when, as here, two parties have \"simply agree[d] to submit their disputes to an arbitrator ,\" Stolt-Nielsen , 559 U.S. at 685 , they have not also implicitly agreed to arbitrate their disputes on a classwide basis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": ". Qualified immunity \"ensure[s] that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their con-duct is unlawful.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus the \"salient question\" in determining whether law is clearly established \"is whether the state of the law at the time of an incident provided 'fair warning' to the defendants 'that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.'\" 134 S. Ct. 1861.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "533 U.S. 194. Thus the \"salient question\" in determining whether law is clearly established \"is whether the state of the law at the time of an incident provided 'fair warning' to the defendants 'that their alleged [conduct] was unconstitutional.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's prece- dent unambiguously holds that defendants may have such \"fair warning\" without an existing case present-ing an identical \"factual scenario.\" App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1861",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "1. Every officer has, and had at the time of Re- spondents' actions, fair warning that it is unconstitu-tional to substantially burden the free exercise of reli- gion without some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 490 U.S. 680; 406 U.S. 205. Even in the prison context, where constraints on liberty are at their peak, it is clearly established that government officials cannot substantially burden an incarcerated person's right to religious exercise—including by preventing prayer—unless \"it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests.\" 482 U.S. 342.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "1. Every officer has, and had at the time of Re- spondents' actions, fair warning that it is unconstitu-tional to substantially burden the free exercise of reli- gion without some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 406 U.S. 205. Even in the prison context, where constraints on liberty are at their peak, it is clearly established that government officials cannot substantially burden an incarcerated person's right to religious exercise—including by preventing prayer—unless \"it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests.\" 482 U.S. 342.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "1. Every officer has, and had at the time of Re- spondents' actions, fair warning that it is unconstitu-tional to substantially burden the free exercise of reli- gion without some legitimate government interest. See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520; 490 U.S. 680; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even in the prison context, where constraints on liberty are at their peak, it is clearly established that government officials cannot substantially burden an incarcerated person's right to religious exercise—including by preventing prayer—unless \"it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests.\" 482 U.S. 342.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "See, e.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520; 490 U.S. 680; 406 U.S. 205. Even in the prison context, where constraints on liberty are at their peak, it is clearly established that government officials cannot substantially burden an incarcerated person's right to religious exercise—including by preventing prayer—unless \"it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also 866 F.2d 567. Here, Ms. Sause was not even under arrest, much less incarcerated, when her First Amendment rights were violated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "Even in the prison context, where constraints on liberty are at their peak, it is clearly established that government officials cannot substantially burden an incarcerated person's right to religious exercise—including by preventing prayer—unless \"it is reasonably related to legitimate penolog-ical interests.\" 482 U.S. 342. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Ms. Sause was not even under arrest, much less incarcerated, when her First Amendment rights were violated. In fact, she was in the \"protected pri-vacy\" of her home.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.2d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "Here, Ms. Sause was not even under arrest, much less incarcerated, when her First Amendment rights were violated. In fact, she was in the \"protected pri-vacy\" of her home. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet the officers ordered her to stop praying, despite the absence of any legitimate government pur-pose. That unlawful conduct violated Ms. Sause's clearly established rights under the First Amend-ment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": ". ., a burden upon religion exists.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has long recognized that engaging in prayer is a core reli- gious exercise. 370 U.S. 421366 F.3d 1214357 F.3d 197 (holding that inmate stated free ex-ercise claim when he alleged he would be \"disciplined for failing to obey an order expressly given to him by a corrections officer who knew that completion of the task would require plaintiff to abandon religious pray-ers in which he was then engaged\"); 813 F.3d 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "450 U.S. 707. This Court has long recognized that engaging in prayer is a core reli- gious exercise. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]366 F.3d 1214357 F.3d 197 (holding that inmate stated free ex-ercise claim when he alleged he would be \"disciplined for failing to obey an order expressly given to him by a corrections officer who knew that completion of the task would require plaintiff to abandon religious pray-ers in which he was then engaged\"); 813 F.3d 76. It has been understood si nce colonial days that preventing a citizen from praying in her own home substantially infringes on her free exercise of religion. As an example of religious persecution under colonial rule, Thomas Jefferson described acts of the Virginia Assembly that targeted Quakers by prohibiting \"all persons from suffering their meetings in or near their houses.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "450 U.S. 707. This Court has long recognized that engaging in prayer is a core reli- gious exercise. 370 U.S. 421[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]357 F.3d 197 (holding that inmate stated free ex-ercise claim when he alleged he would be \"disciplined for failing to obey an order expressly given to him by a corrections officer who knew that completion of the task would require plaintiff to abandon religious pray-ers in which he was then engaged\"); 813 F.3d 76. It has been understood si nce colonial days that preventing a citizen from praying in her own home substantially infringes on her free exercise of religion. As an example of religious persecution under colonial rule, Thomas Jefferson described acts of the Virginia Assembly that targeted Quakers by prohibiting \"all persons from suffering their meetings in or near their houses.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, \"[c]ertain actions so obviously run afoul of the law\" as to overcome qualified immunity even under factual circumstances not yet recorded by a court. Hope , 536 U.S. at 753–54.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "To be sure, the court of appeals briefly acknowledged that a factually similar case 7 may not be required if defendants' conduct is \"obvi- ously egregious.\" App. 9a (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But that stand-ard, too, conflicts with Hope . Under Hope , qualified immunity does not rise and fall with whether the facts were \"obviously egregious\" in the eyes of the court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 F.3d 1147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "Hope , 536 U.S. at 741. Respondents (at Opp. 16) also analogize this case to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Mul- 136 S. Ct. 305, but both of those cases involved the reasonab leness of searches under the Fourth Amendment. As the Court explained, be-cause the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions are \"cast at a high level of generality\" and officers must make difficult judgments about whether a search or seizure is reasonable in widely varying situations, Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 199, \"specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context\" for overcoming qual-ified immunity, Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court of Appeals Defied this Court's Precedent When It Concluded that Officers Lacked Fair Warning that the First Amendment Bars Imposing a Substantial Burden on Religion Without Any Legitimate Government Interest",
		"context": "Hope , 536 U.S. at 741. Respondents (at Opp. 16) also analogize this case to 543 U.S. 194, and Mul- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but both of those cases involved the reasonab leness of searches under the Fourth Amendment. As the Court explained, be-cause the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions are \"cast at a high level of generality\" and officers must make difficult judgments about whether a search or seizure is reasonable in widely varying situations, Brosseau , 543 U.S. at 199, \"specificity is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context\" for overcoming qual-ified immunity, Mullenix , 136 S. Ct. at 308. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE VACATED MR. GREER'S CONVICTION",
		"context": "This Court should resolve that question in Mr. Greer's favor and allow the Eleventh Circuit to determine in the first instance whe ther Mr. Gre er is 7 Even if the government's reading of Neder were correct , the Neder Court addre ssed only the omission of a jury instruction under the Sixth Amend ment, not whether h armless -error review is completely without constitutional limitations. 19 entitled to plain -error relief un der the proper analy- sis. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That said, the government's ar- gument that Mr. Greer cannot satisfy plain -error re- view is fla wed in at leas t four ways. First, the government 's att empt to rely excl usively on the trial evidence ignores that Mr. Greer indisput- ably satisfied the first two prongs of plain -error re- view —that the district court com mitted error and the error is plain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE VACATED MR. GREER'S CONVICTION",
		"context": "This undercuts the govern- ment's attempt to now argue the trial evidence is suf- ficient at prongs three and four . Indeed, a s at least one c ourt has expla ined, \"a successful sufficiency challenge almost always mee ts the first three factors of plain error and will generally meet the fourth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second, the governm ent ar gues that the Old Chief stipulation alone supports Mr. Greer's conviction be-cause a jury could infer knowledge of status from a stipulation. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "821 F.3d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE VACATED MR. GREER'S CONVICTION",
		"context": "at 60 (reflecting that Officer Anthony testified that so me- one had st olen the gun). The gover nment's belief that this circumstantial evidence s hows Mr. Greer knew his status is mere conjecture and guesswork, and that 21 type of speculation cannot support a verdict. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally , the government resorts to the e vidence in the sentencing record. B ut as explained throughout both Mr. Greer's initial brief and this brief, an appel- late court cannot review evidence outside the trial record when reviewing a trial error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's \"professional speech\" holding is in clear conflict with this Court's cases",
		"context": ". Although the so-called \"professional speech\" doc- trine has different origins than the commercial speech doctrine, it, too, is rooted in the notion that a speaker's interest in obtaining money from a listener can poten- tially justify higher levels of regulation. Lower courts have traced the doctrine back to a concurring opinion 29 in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which Justice Jackson articulated the justification for profes- sional-licensing schemes as being based on \"[t]he mod-ern state['s] duty to pr otect the public from those who seek for one purpose or another to obtain its money .\" Id. at 545 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's \"professional speech\" holding is in clear conflict with this Court's cases",
		"context": "Id. at 422, 431. In so holding, the Primus Court distinguished the case from another decided the same day, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Court upheld disciplinary action against an attor- ney for solicitation. The di stinguishing factor: unlike in Ohralik , the solicitation in Primus was not \"for pe- cuniary gain.\" Primus , 436 U.S. at 422; see also Eu- gene Volokh, The Trouble with \"Public Discourse\" as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights , 97 Va. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "According to the panel, \"this Nation, unlike others,maintains a clearly defined wall between church andstate that 'must be kept high and impregnable.'\" Id. at 207-208 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This statement proves too much. \"[T]heEstablishment Clause does not compel the governmentto purge from the public sp here all that in any way partakes of the religious.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "This statement proves too much. \"[T]heEstablishment Clause does not compel the governmentto purge from the public sp here all that in any way partakes of the religious.\" Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"Such absolutism is not only inconsistent with ournational traditions, but would also tend to promote thekind of social conflict the Establishment Clause seeksto avoid.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": ".\" Id. (quoting Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.Nyquist , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And critically, \"the Constitution [does not] require complete separation ofchurch and state; it affirmatively mandatesaccommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,and forbids hostility toward any.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "And critically, \"the Constitution [does not] require complete separation ofchurch and state; it affirmatively mandatesaccommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions,and forbids hostility toward any.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Illinois ex rel. 333 U.S. 203). \"Anything less would require the 'callousindifference' we have said was never intended by theEstablishment Clause.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "Id. (citing 343 U.S. 306; Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"Anything less would require the 'callousindifference' we have said was never intended by theEstablishment Clause.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "\"Anything less would require the 'callousindifference' we have said was never intended by theEstablishment Clause.\" Id. (citing Zorach , 343 U.S. at 314); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accommodation and tolerance are recognizable aspects of this Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly , a case that determined that a crèche put up by the city ofPawtucket as part of a Christmas display wasconstitutionally permissible when viewed in the context 19 of the Christmas season. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "that not 'every law that confers an indirect,remote, or incidental benefit upon religion is, for thatreason alone, constitutionally invalid.'\" Id. (quoting Nyquis t, 413 U.S. at 771; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"Rather than requiring governmentto avoid any action that acknowledges or aids religion,the Establishment Clause permits government somelatitude in recognizing and accommodating the centralrole religion plays in our society.\" Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Lynch , 465 U.S. at 678; Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "Humanist Ass'n , 874 F.3d at 215-216 (Gregory, C.J., dissenting) (quotingSchempp, 374 U.S. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring));see Salazar v. Buono , 559 U.S. at 726 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)(noting that demolition of a World War I monument inthe shape of the Latin cross would \"have beeninterpreted by some as an arresting symbol of aGovernment that is not neutral but hostile on mattersof religion and is bent on eliminating from all publicplaces and symbols any trace of our country's religiousheritage.\") (citing Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring)). If tolerance truly \"presupposes somemutuality of obligation,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is not demo nstrated by the attempt to remove long standing memorials, to erase history, andto banish all symbols with religious significance fromthe public sphere. Because \"[t]he First Amendmentstands as a bulwark against official religious prejudiceand embodies our Nation's deep commitment toreligious plurality and tolerance,\" 201 L. Ed. 2d 775, the Fourth Circuit's decision must bereversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT'S OPINION EXHIBITS IMPERMISSIBLE HOSTILITY TOWARD RELIGION",
		"context": "(citing Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring)). If tolerance truly \"presupposes somemutuality of obligation,\" 505 U.S. 577, it is not demo nstrated by the attempt to remove long standing memorials, to erase history, andto banish all symbols with religious significance fromthe public sphere. Because \"[t]he First Amendmentstands as a bulwark against official religious prejudiceand embodies our Nation's deep commitment toreligious plurality and tolerance,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fourth Circuit's decision must bereversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "201 L. Ed. 2d 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Case is a Poor Vehicle to Address the Federal Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "And the pro- posed findings by a special master in a different case involving different parties cannot be used to 14 collaterally attack the factual predi cates of the decision below. This Court has long recognized that it \"do[es] not grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific facts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This is precisely what Petitioner seeks here. And that is not the only vehicle defect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Case is a Poor Vehicle to Address the Federal Constitutional Claims",
		"context": "It was also fully consistent with the legislative intent behind Act 77 , which favored the exercise of the fundamental right to vote .12 Appx. 25a-26a, (citing In re290 A.2d 108 ); Appx.47a (citing League of Women Voters , 178 A.3d at 322 ); see also 25 Pa.C.S. § 3511 (military and overseas ballots counted if received within seven days of Election Day); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 Petitioner errs in claiming that the General Assembly's intent is reflected by its implicit consideration and rejection of the need to move the received -by date for ballots when the legislature en- acted Act 12 in March. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Physical Violence",
		"context": "8 See also Seth Hemmelgarn, Prop 8 Fight Gets Ugly on Both Sides , Bay Area Reporter (Oct. 16 , 2008), https://www.ebar.com/ index.php?ch=news&sc=&sc3=&id=239406&pf=1; and Prop. 8 Supporter Allegedly Attacked in Modesto , KCRA TV (Oct. 15, 2008), https://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/politics/Prop_8_Supp orter_Allegedly_Attacked_In_Modesto.html. 15 Ronald Prentice in Support of Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for a Protective Order at 4, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In another incident, an elderly woman was spit at while protestors knocked out of her hands and stomped on a cross she carried. The Price of Prop 8 , supra , at 10 & nn.80-83.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Physical Violence",
		"context": "See also , Question 1 Backers Receive Death Threats, Fo rmer Homosexual Leader Says They Should Not Live in Fear , Catholic News Agency (Nov. 14, 2009), https://www.catholicne wsagency.com/news/question_1 _backers_should_not_live_in_fear_after_death_threats_former_ homosexual_leader_says (reporti ng same death threat with slightly different wording and also reporting second death threat). 15 stitches after being punched in the face by an attacker attempting to take and destroy the signs.15 Supporters holding signs and distributing materials were \"victims of ph ysical assaults such as being spat upon and having hot coffee thrown on them by passengers in passing automobiles.\" Declaration of Ronald Prentice in Support of Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for a Protective Order at 4, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In another incident, an elderly woman was spit at while protestors knocked out of her hands and stomped on a cross she carried. Messner, supra note 9, at 10 & nn.80-83.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Harvard Considers Race Flexibly As One Factor Among Many",
		"context": "SFFA's contrary arguments were thoroughly rejected by the courts below, which found emphatically that Harvard does not discriminate against Asian-American applicants and uses race only as this Court's precedents permit. While SFFA tries to relitigate those claims a third time—badly distorting the facts in the process—SFFA does not identify any error, much less \"'a very obvious and exceptional showing of error,'\" that could justify overturning those \"'concurrent findings.'\" Exx- on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should affirm. 3 3 Harvard reiterates its jurisdictional argument that SFFA lacks Article III standing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "Those circum- stances are exacerbated by the myriad varied, modi- fied, and divergent tests now extant in the circuits to evaluate the Act's possible extraterritorial reach. The Second Circuit's three-factor Vanity Fair test is based on Steele , most closely follows the factors outlined by the Court in Steele , and is the most widely adopted test among the circuit courts of appeals. See Vanity Fair Mills, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The three factors of the Vanity Fair test are whether: (1) the defendant's conduct had a sub- stantial effect on United States com-merce; (2) the defendant was a United States citizen and the United States has a broad power to regulate the con-duct of its citizens in foreign countries; and (3) there was no conflict with trade-mark rights established under the foreign law …. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 F.2d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "However, the Fourth and Fifth circuits both have modified the first factor of that test. Specifically, and rather than a \"substantial effect,\" the Fourth Cir-cuit requires conduct to have a \"significant effect\" on United States commerce. See Nintendo of Am., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . IPO considers the substantial effect requirement in the 8 Vanity Fair test and the Fourth Circuit's significant effect requirement to be equivalent. In contrast, the Fifth Circuit only requires \"some effect\" on United States commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F.3d 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "In contrast, the Fifth Circuit only requires \"some effect\" on United States commerce. See Am. Rice, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit also adopted a \"some effect\" test in antitrust litiga- tion, Timberlane Lumber 549 F.2d 597, which it has applied to the Lanham Act in Wells Fargo & 556 F.2d 406, Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d 552, and Trader Joe's 835 F.3d 960. The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "701 F.2d 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "See Am. Rice, 701 F.2d 408. The Ninth Circuit also adopted a \"some effect\" test in antitrust litiga- tion, Timberlane Lumber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which it has applied to the Lanham Act in Wells Fargo & 556 F.2d 406, Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d 552, and Trader Joe's 835 F.3d 960. The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\" Trader Joe's , 835 F.3d at 969.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 F.2d 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "See Am. Rice, 701 F.2d 408. The Ninth Circuit also adopted a \"some effect\" test in antitrust litiga- tion, Timberlane Lumber 549 F.2d 597, which it has applied to the Lanham Act in Wells Fargo & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d 552, and Trader Joe's 835 F.3d 960. The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\" Trader Joe's , 835 F.3d at 969.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.2d 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "See Am. Rice, 701 F.2d 408. The Ninth Circuit also adopted a \"some effect\" test in antitrust litiga- tion, Timberlane Lumber 549 F.2d 597, which it has applied to the Lanham Act in Wells Fargo & 556 F.2d 406, Reebok Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Trader Joe's 835 F.3d 960. The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\" Trader Joe's , 835 F.3d at 969.",
		"citation_value_orig": "970 F.2d 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "See Am. Rice, 701 F.2d 408. The Ninth Circuit also adopted a \"some effect\" test in antitrust litiga- tion, Timberlane Lumber 549 F.2d 597, which it has applied to the Lanham Act in Wells Fargo & 556 F.2d 406, Reebok Int'l, 970 F.2d 552, and Trader Joe's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\" Trader Joe's , 835 F.3d at 969.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit's Timberlane multi-fac- tor test requires showings that: (1) the conduct \"cre- ate some effect on American foreign commerce\"; (2) the effect is \"sufficiently great to present a cog-nizable injury to the plaintiff[]\" under the Lanham Act; and (3) \"the interests of and links to American foreign commerce [are] sufficiently strong in relation to those of other nations to justify an assertion of ex- traterritorial authority.\" Trader Joe's , 835 F.3d at 969. 4 In further contrast, the First Circuit has re- jected the Vanity Fair and the Timberlane tests in fa- vor of one articulated in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That test offers a complex frame- work and separate factors, requirements, and analy- sis depending upon whether the defendant is a United States citizen. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.3d 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "417 F.3d at 121. IPO acknowledges that the First Circuit's approach has some support in Hartford Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but that approach appears inconsistent with the Court's later disap-proval of prudential concerns in Lexmark Interna- tional, 572 U.S. 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Court Should Resolve the Conflict Among the Federal Courts of Appeals and Adopt the Second Circuit's Test for Extraterritoriality in Vanity Fair",
		"context": "417 F.3d at 121. IPO acknowledges that the First Circuit's approach has some support in Hartford Fire Ins. 509 U.S. 764, but that approach appears inconsistent with the Court's later disap-proval of prudential concerns in Lexmark Interna- tional, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 202(h)'s Text Confirms that the Public Interest Is Paramount",
		"context": "25-27. Quite the contrary, that \"asserted limitation is found nowhere in the statute.\" Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plus, the D.C. Circuit has explicitly rejected Industry Petitioners' argument (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' arguments about \"communities of interest\" and compactness cannot justify their race-based illustrative maps.",
		"context": "Rucho , 139 S. Ct. at 2500. Thus, it cannot be that Plaintiffs' illustrative plans \"maintain[] com- munities of interest,\" LULAC , 548 U.S. at 433, by trading one for another. Similarly, though \"preserving the cores of prior districts\" is a \"legitimate objective[],\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the district court dis- carded it because taking that principle into account would purportedly \"immuniz[e] states from liability under Section Two so long as they have a longstanding, well-established map, even in the face of a significant demographic shift.\" MSA182. But the court identified no \"significant demographic shift\" that would result in a springing §2 violation in which Alabama's longstanding districting scheme suddenly became unlawful.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Licensed centers' claims are not subject to informed-consent principles",
		"context": ". Informed-consent principles, like those discussed in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], do not justify the Abortion Referral. A doctor's obligation to obtain informed consent arises within an existing patient-clinician relationship when the patient seeks to undergo a medical intervention. The doctor's duty to inform the patient is limited to disclosing \"information about the nature of the procedure\" under consideration and its risks, consequences, and alternatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The district court failed to assess race as part of a holistic analysis of each district as a whole",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has never affirmed a predominance finding, or even remanded for a determination of predominance , \"without evidence that some district lines deviated from traditional principles. \" Ibid . (citing Alabama , 135 S. Ct. at 1265- 1266; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Vera , 517 U.S. at 966, 974 (plurality opinion); Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905- 906; Miller , 515 U.S. at 917; Shaw I , 509 U.S. at 635- 636). b. In its original opinion, the district court mist ak- enly assessed only those district lines that conflicted with traditional districting criteria.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Broad Forfeiture Rules Force Defendants Into a Hobson's Choice Between Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "Broad forfeiture rule s also ha ve the effect of put- ting defendants to a Hobson's choice between funda- mental constitutional rights. A s discussed above, a defendant who might forfeit his right to confront wit- nesses against him may well choose to avoid present- ing certain testimony or taking the stand himself, thereby forgoing his right to present a complete 10 defense. See Holmes , 547 U.S. at 324; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Vines , 251 P.3d at 966–67, the defendant sought to introduce part of a statement by his co -de- fendant that suggest ed a third party had played a key role in the crime . The trial court ruled that , if the defendant introduced a portion of the statement, he would open the door to the prosecution's use of other, more incriminating portions , even though the co-defendant had invoked his Fifth Amendment right not to testify .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Broad Forfeiture Rules Force Defendants Into a Hobson's Choice Between Constitutional Rights",
		"context": "Id. at 302. The Confrontation Clause, whose \"very mission\" is \"to ad- vance 'the accuracy of the truth -determining process in criminal trials,'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], guarantees one such right . \"We want defense attorneys to be able to cross -ex- amine and test the evidence that the state is putting forward,\" says Coleman. \"If we're not permitted to do that, not only are we ineffective, but you also have the situation of this trial right being violated .",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "Even if the district court's order fell within section 1252(f)(1), that provision would not have limited the lower courts' jurisdiction to hear respondents' claim s— only the available remedies for those claims . The con- tours of this distinction can be blurry , cf. Fort Bend [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but sec- tion 1252(f)(1) is best understood as limiting lower courts' remedial powers . After all, this Court has described section 1252(f)(1) as a remedial limitation . \"By its plain terms, and even by its title, [ section 1252(f)(1)] is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "After all, this Court has described section 1252(f)(1) as a remedial limitation . \"By its plain terms, and even by its title, [ section 1252(f)(1)] is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] unambiguously restricted the lower cou rts' ju- risdiction, this Court would have said so. Only section 1252(f)(1)'s imprecise use of the term \"jurisdiction\" suggests otherwise. \" Jurisdictional re- quirements mark the bounds of a court's adjudicatory authority .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "A n on-jurisdictional requirement does not become jurisdictional merely because the term jurisdiction appears in close proximity. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1252(f)(1) does not unambiguously speak in jurisdictional terms. \"[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that when Congr ess employs a term of art , it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached \" to that term.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "\"[I]t is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that when Congr ess employs a term of art , it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached \" to that term. Air Wis . Airlines [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress's use of the term \"jurisdiction\" here tracks twentieth -century us- ages of the term as concerning when a court may grant relief —not when it has the power to adjudicate a case. E.g., Steel Co 523 U.S. 83 ; Glidd en 370 U.S. 530 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "Airlines 571 U.S. 237. Congress's use of the term \"jurisdiction\" here tracks twentieth -century us- ages of the term as concerning when a court may grant relief —not when it has the power to adjudicate a case. E.g., Steel Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Glidd en 370 U.S. 530 . Congress used the term \"jurisdiction\" in section 1252(f)(1) consistent with this traditional understanding , making it \"nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.\" AADC , 525 U.S. at 481.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "Airlines 571 U.S. 237. Congress's use of the term \"jurisdiction\" here tracks twentieth -century us- ages of the term as concerning when a court may grant relief —not when it has the power to adjudicate a case. E.g., Steel Co 523 U.S. 83 ; Glidd en [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress used the term \"jurisdiction\" in section 1252(f)(1) consistent with this traditional understanding , making it \"nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief.\" AADC , 525 U.S. at 481.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "AADC , 525 U.S. at 481. Congress used \"jurisdic- tion\" and \"authority\" as synonyms in defining what courts may \"enjoin and restrain.\" See generally Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]556 U.S. 431. The subsection title places a \"[l]imit on injunctive relief.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1252(f)(1) limits the lower courts' equitable remedies, not their jurisdiction",
		"context": "2. Such an ex- pansion of this Court's original jurisdiction would violate Article III . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because interpreting section 1252(f)(1) as a reme- dial limitation both pre serves judicial review and \"avoids placing its constitutionality in doubt ,\" that is the inter- pretation required by well -established canons of con- struction. S CALIA & GARNER , supra at 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "Over the years, state courts have violated liti- gants' due process rights in several ways. For instance, they have failed \"to provide the essential in- gredients of a fair hearing\" and altered individual rights \"without providing adequate notice and oppor- tunity to defend .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . State courts have also interpreted state laws in ways that \"result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "State courts have also interpreted state laws in ways that \"result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.\" Id. at 17; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (200 1); 378 U.S. 347. Those due process violations typically ripen only after a state high court authoritatively speaks. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673, is a good example.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "State courts have also interpreted state laws in ways that \"result in the denial of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.\" Id. at 17; see also 532 U.S. 451 (200 1); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those due process violations typically ripen only after a state high court authoritatively speaks. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673, is a good example.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "at 17; see also 532 U.S. 451 (200 1); 378 U.S. 347. Those due process violations typically ripen only after a state high court authoritatively speaks. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is a good example. The Court held that the Missouri Supreme Court violated due process b ecause its authoritative construction of a state law stripped the plaintiff of a remedy for its equal protection claim without giving the plaintiff \"an opportunity to present its case and be heard.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "Litigants cannot challenge unenacted bills. After all, Article III's case-or-controvers y requirement bars interfere nce \"with legislative and executive functions which have not yet proceeded so far as to affect indi- vidual interests adversely.\" Communist Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, \"state legislation that has been 35 proposed but not yet enacted\" doesn't count as author- ity. 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "Communist Party of 367 U.S. 1. Similarly, \"state legislation that has been 35 proposed but not yet enacted\" doesn't count as author- ity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Brinkerhoff -Faris observed, an authoritative judicial construction of state law is like legislation. 281 U.S. at 679 -80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "§ 2342. For \"agency action to be 'final,'\" it must (among other things) \"mark the 'consummation ' of the agency 's decisionmaking process .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Same idea here. A § 1983 plaintiff can challenge the authoritative construction of state law only after the state court of last resort has spoken.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "Same idea here. A § 1983 plaintiff can challenge the authoritative construction of state law only after the state court of last resort has spoken. c. To the extent c ommon -law torts, although \"imperfect\" analogues, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see supra p. 25, serve as an additional \"guide,\" McDonough , 139 S. Ct. at 2156 , they \"con- firm[]\" Reed's \"conclusion,\" 139 S. Ct. 1715 . Take m alicious prosecutio n. Like Reed' s due pro- cess claim, malicious prosecution is process -oriented . The tort \"accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintif f's favor ,\" even tho ugh the plaintiff must also show \" that a de- fendant instigated a criminal proceeding with improper purpose and without probable cause .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Analogous claims show that Reed's claim accrued at the end of the state-court litigation.",
		"context": "Same idea here. A § 1983 plaintiff can challenge the authoritative construction of state law only after the state court of last resort has spoken. c. To the extent c ommon -law torts, although \"imperfect\" analogues, 471 U.S. 261; see supra p. 25, serve as an additional \"guide,\" McDonough , 139 S. Ct. at 2156 , they \"con- firm[]\" Reed's \"conclusion,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Take m alicious prosecutio n. Like Reed' s due pro- cess claim, malicious prosecution is process -oriented . The tort \"accrues only once the underlying criminal proceedings have resolved in the plaintif f's favor ,\" even tho ugh the plaintiff must also show \" that a de- fendant instigated a criminal proceeding with improper purpose and without probable cause .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "The question, rather, is how a statute governing st ate regulation of Indian gaming should be read when it draws a prohibitory/ regulatory distinction by requiring tribes to comply with state laws \"prohibit[ing]\" gaming activities while denying the state \"regulatory jurisdiction.\" This Court's precedents supply the answer: \"When the words of the Court are us ed in a later statute gov- erning the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-gress and of the Court's own processes to give the words the same meaning in the absence of specific di- rection to the contrary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 139 S. Ct. 544; Cottage Sav. 499 U.S. 554. 1 1 Texas argues that its readin g is supported by section 107(a)'s provision that violations are subject to Texas's civil as well as criminal penalties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "The question, rather, is how a statute governing st ate regulation of Indian gaming should be read when it draws a prohibitory/ regulatory distinction by requiring tribes to comply with state laws \"prohibit[ing]\" gaming activities while denying the state \"regulatory jurisdiction.\" This Court's precedents supply the answer: \"When the words of the Court are us ed in a later statute gov- erning the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-gress and of the Court's own processes to give the words the same meaning in the absence of specific di- rection to the contrary.\" 529 U.S. 420; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cottage Sav. 499 U.S. 554. 1 1 Texas argues that its readin g is supported by section 107(a)'s provision that violations are subject to Texas's civil as well as criminal penalties.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "This Court's precedents supply the answer: \"When the words of the Court are us ed in a later statute gov- erning the same subject matter, it is respectful of Con-gress and of the Court's own processes to give the words the same meaning in the absence of specific di- rection to the contrary.\" 529 U.S. 420; accord 139 S. Ct. 544; Cottage Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1 1 Texas argues that its readin g is supported by section 107(a)'s provision that violations are subject to Texas's civil as well as criminal penalties. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "22–23. It simply means that if Texas imposes civil 4 Third, and relatedly, section 107(a)'s use of \"pro- hibited\" cannot be read in isolation. See, e.g., Star Athletica, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] incorporates Cabazon 's terminology and its limits on state regulatory author- ity. Section 107(b), entitled \"NO STATE REGULA- TORY JURISDICTION,\" states categorically that \"Nothing in this section\"—including section 107(a)— \"shall be construed as a grant of civil or criminal regu- latory jurisdiction to the State of Texas.\" That textual connection between section 107(a) and (b)—essentially ignored by Texas—is significant both because it clearly embraces the distinction Cabazon drew between pro- hibitory and regulatory gaming laws and because it makes clear that Texas may not \"regulat[e],\" i.e., deter- mine the rules governing, gaming conducted on tribal lands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "40. These statutes are \"cogent proof that Congress knew w ell how to express its in- tent directly when that intent was to subject reserva- tion Indians to the full sweep of state [gaming] laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Texas responds that the Restoration Act is differ- ent because it federalizes state law, rather than apply- ing it directly, Br. 40, but this misses the point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "44– 45) and the United States (Br. 29) explained, \"[f ]ew principles of statutory cons truction are more compel- ling than the proposition that Congress does not in- tend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 11 accord 540 U.S. 614; 507 U.S. 197. Against all this, Texas identifies no language in the pre- Cabazon Resolution supporting Texas's read- ing that the Act applies all Texas gaming laws and regulations to the Tribe. Like the Fifth Circuit before it, Texas simply assumes with out analysis that this is the import of the Tribe' s proposed ban on all gam- ing \"as defined by\" Texas law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "44– 45) and the United States (Br. 29) explained, \"[f ]ew principles of statutory cons truction are more compel- ling than the proposition that Congress does not in- tend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.\" 480 U.S. 421; 11 accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 507 U.S. 197. Against all this, Texas identifies no language in the pre- Cabazon Resolution supporting Texas's read- ing that the Act applies all Texas gaming laws and regulations to the Tribe. Like the Fifth Circuit before it, Texas simply assumes with out analysis that this is the import of the Tribe' s proposed ban on all gam- ing \"as defined by\" Texas law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE ACT'S PLAIN TEXT SUPPORTS THE PUEBLO'S READING, NOT TEXAS'S",
		"context": "44– 45) and the United States (Br. 29) explained, \"[f ]ew principles of statutory cons truction are more compel- ling than the proposition that Congress does not in- tend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has earlier discarded in favor of other language.\" 480 U.S. 421; 11 accord 540 U.S. 614; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Against all this, Texas identifies no language in the pre- Cabazon Resolution supporting Texas's read- ing that the Act applies all Texas gaming laws and regulations to the Tribe. Like the Fifth Circuit before it, Texas simply assumes with out analysis that this is the import of the Tribe' s proposed ban on all gam- ing \"as defined by\" Texas law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 9 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 4 Alcaraz 727 Fed. Appx. 260 , petition for cert. pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "589 F.3d 1040",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.3d 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "594 F.3d 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 F.3d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.3d 762",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "651 F.3d 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.3d 885",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.3d 1243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "652 F.3d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .. 8, 12 364 F.3d 1134 ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "pending, No. 19- 1156 (filed Mar. 20, 2020) ......................................... 5 Alvarez 927 F.3d 236 ...................................................................... 11 Anaya 594 F.3d 673 ........................................................................ 5 Castañeda 488 F.3d 17 ...................................................................... 11 659 F.3d 762 ......................... 5 Department of Homeland 2020 WL 3454 ................. 10 651 F.3d 824 .......................... 9 392 F.3d 241 ...................................................................... 11 Gonaz 882 F.3d 885 ........................................................................ 5 Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243 ...................................................................... 9 652 F.3d 1011 ..................... 3, 4 537 U.S. 12 ................................ .. 8, 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 3 Kaur v. Holder , 478 F ed. Appx . 439 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 F.3d 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "App x. 207 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir. 2007 ) ............................ 9 217 F.3d 646 .......................... 3 675 F.3d 1182 ............... 5 753 F.3d 826 ...................... 5 650 F.3d 968 ................................................ 11 Statutes : Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "207 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 5 505 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007 ) ............................ 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................... 3 675 F.3d 1182 ............... 5 753 F.3d 826 ...................... 5 650 F.3d 968 ................................................ 11 Statutes : Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "217 F.3d 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "207 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 5 505 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007 ) ............................ 9 217 F.3d 646 .......................... 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............... 5 753 F.3d 826 ...................... 5 650 F.3d 968 ................................................ 11 Statutes : Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "675 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "207 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 5 505 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007 ) ............................ 9 217 F.3d 646 .......................... 3 675 F.3d 1182 ............... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 5 650 F.3d 968 ................................................ 11 Statutes : Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "753 F.3d 826",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "207 (9th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................ 5 505 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2007 ) ............................ 9 217 F.3d 646 .......................... 3 675 F.3d 1182 ............... 5 753 F.3d 826 ...................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................ 11 Statutes : Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq. ...................................................................................... 6 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "App. 14a; 3 see id. at 13a-14a (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 364 F.3d 1134; 217 F.3d 646). Although the panel major- ity cited th ose cases fo r what it called a presumption of credibility, they all hold that u nless the Board ma kes \"an explicit adverse credibility finding, we assume that the facts in [the alien's testimony] are true .\" Hu, 652 F.3d at 1013 n.1 (emphasis added); see Kalubi , 364 F.3d at 1137 (\"Testimony must be accepted as true in the ab- sence of an explicit adverse cred ibility finding.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "652 F.3d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "App. 14a; 3 see id. at 13a-14a (discussing 652 F.3d 1011; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 217 F.3d 646). Although the panel major- ity cited th ose cases fo r what it called a presumption of credibility, they all hold that u nless the Board ma kes \"an explicit adverse credibility finding, we assume that the facts in [the alien's testimony] are true .\" Hu, 652 F.3d at 1013 n.1 (emphasis added); see Kalubi , 364 F.3d at 1137 (\"Testimony must be accepted as true in the ab- sence of an explicit adverse cred ibility finding.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 F.3d 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "App. 14a; 3 see id. at 13a-14a (discussing 652 F.3d 1011; 364 F.3d 1134; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Although the panel major- ity cited th ose cases fo r what it called a presumption of credibility, they all hold that u nless the Board ma kes \"an explicit adverse credibility finding, we assume that the facts in [the alien's testimony] are true .\" Hu, 652 F.3d at 1013 n.1 (emphasis added); see Kalubi , 364 F.3d at 1137 (\"Testimony must be accepted as true in the ab- sence of an explicit adverse cred ibility finding.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "217 F.3d 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Respondent suggests (Br. in O pp. 16) that the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions in 589 F.3d 5, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], would have precluded the panel majority from applying a presumption of truthfulness. But the Ninth Circuit has applied a presumption of truthfulness repeatedly — apparently disregarding or fi nding inapplicable the lan- guage to which respondents point in Aden and Singh , which arose in different circumstances . See, e.g., Gonz 882 F.3d 885594 F.3d 673.",
		"citation_value_orig": "753 F.3d 826",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "16) that the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions in 589 F.3d 5, and 753 F.3d 826, would have precluded the panel majority from applying a presumption of truthfulness. But the Ninth Circuit has applied a presumption of truthfulness repeatedly — apparently disregarding or fi nding inapplicable the lan- guage to which respondents point in Aden and Singh , which arose in different circumstances . See, e.g., Gonz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]594 F.3d 673. And here, the panel majority did the same thing in two steps: after holding that re- spondent's testimony must be deemed credible because the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility find- ing, it further held that the Board could not rely on as- pects of respondent's testimony that it found not to be truthful in finding his testimony insufficiently persua-sive to carry his burden of proof. The court of appeals could have course -corrected in en banc proceedings below —and the dissenters urged it to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.3d 885",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "16) that the Ninth Circuit's prior decisions in 589 F.3d 5, and 753 F.3d 826, would have precluded the panel majority from applying a presumption of truthfulness. But the Ninth Circuit has applied a presumption of truthfulness repeatedly — apparently disregarding or fi nding inapplicable the lan- guage to which respondents point in Aden and Singh , which arose in different circumstances . See, e.g., Gonz 882 F.3d 885[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And here, the panel majority did the same thing in two steps: after holding that re- spondent's testimony must be deemed credible because the IJ did not make an explicit adverse credibility find- ing, it further held that the Board could not rely on as- pects of respondent's testimony that it found not to be truthful in finding his testimony insufficiently persua-sive to carry his burden of proof. The court of appeals could have course -corrected in en banc proceedings below —and the dissenters urged it to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "594 F.3d 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "1252(b)(4)(B). Instead, the panel majority applied a presumption of credibility — and then of truthfulness —to responden t's testimony, declared that the Board's contrary determinations had to give way to the court's rigid framework, and as a re- sult refused to \"remand to the agency for additional in- vestigation or explanation .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 B. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Warrants This Court's Review 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Respondent concedes (Br. in Opp. 18 -19) that the Eighth Circuit, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rejected a ny presumption that \"testimony must be ac- cepted as true\" absent an express adverse credibility finding, id. at 830. Respondent likewise concedes (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "651 F.3d 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Respondent likewise concedes (Br. in Opp. 19) that the Tenth Circuit rejected a presump- tion of truthfulness in Gutierrez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too with the First Circuit in 505 F.3d 50 (2007 ). See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.3d 1243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "in Opp. 19) that the Tenth Circuit rejected a presump- tion of truthfulness in Gutierrez 810 F.3d 1243. So too with the First Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2007 ). See Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "in Opp. 31 -33) confirm, rather than refute, that it is generally inappro- priate for courts to overrule the agency's treatment of 11 an alien's testimony without remanding to let the agency consider the record afresh . Indeed, in Casta ñeda- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the en banc First Circuit corrected a panel decision that had erred in the same way as the panel here by definitively resolv- ing a disputed record question rather than remanding to the Board for a \"fresh look.\" Id. at 25; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 F.3d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's decision warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Id. at 243. Likewise, in Alvarez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the \"unchallenged,\" \"undisputed record evidence compel [led] the conclusion\" t hat there was a nexus between the alien's persecution and protected status , and the government conceded that the Board's contrary",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.3d 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "The government (at BIO 8 -13) and some courts of ap- peals have embraced two arguments against judicial review. They maintain that \"any final decis ion\" under sec- tion 355(f) refers only to final decisions described in section 355(c), i.e., initial benefits determinations and em- ployer status determinations. Further, relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], they contend that because decision s refusing to reopen Social Security ben- efits determinations are unreviewable, the same must be true of decisions denying reopening of railroad benefits. Neither argument has merit . Congress Did Not Insulate All Board Decisions Outside Section 355(c) f rom Judicial Scrutiny The government's reading rests on the premise that everyone on section 355(f)'s list of litigants who can seek 30 judicial review —\"[a]ny claimant, or any railway labor or- ganization … of which claimant is a member, or any base - year empl oyer of the claimant, or any other party ag- grieved by a final decision under [s ection 355 (c)]\"—must be \"aggrieved by a final decision under [s ection 355 (c)].\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "And, the theory goes, if only litigants aggrieved by final decisions under section 355(c) can su e, then such decisions must be the only ones that Congress permitted these liti- gants to challenge in court. So , in the government's view, section 355(f)'s authorization of judicial review of \"any fi- nal decision of the Board\" must mean \"any final decision of the Board under section 355(c).\" See BIO 10; accord , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 346 F.3d 346 ; 198 F.3d 139 ; 708 F.2d 250 . In other words, the government reads the provision as follows: Any claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any railway labor organiza- tion …, of which claimant is a member [agg rieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any base -year employer of the claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any other party aggrieved by a final decision under s ubsec- tion (c) of this section may obtain a review of a ny final decision of the Board [under subsection (c)]. That interpretation is flawed from start to finish.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "And, the theory goes, if only litigants aggrieved by final decisions under section 355(c) can su e, then such decisions must be the only ones that Congress permitted these liti- gants to challenge in court. So , in the government's view, section 355(f)'s authorization of judicial review of \"any fi- nal decision of the Board\" must mean \"any final decision of the Board under section 355(c).\" See BIO 10; accord , e.g., 392 F.3d 567 ; 346 F.3d 346 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 708 F.2d 250 . In other words, the government reads the provision as follows: Any claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any railway labor organiza- tion …, of which claimant is a member [agg rieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any base -year employer of the claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any other party aggrieved by a final decision under s ubsec- tion (c) of this section may obtain a review of a ny final decision of the Board [under subsection (c)]. That interpretation is flawed from start to finish.",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 F.3d 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "And, the theory goes, if only litigants aggrieved by final decisions under section 355(c) can su e, then such decisions must be the only ones that Congress permitted these liti- gants to challenge in court. So , in the government's view, section 355(f)'s authorization of judicial review of \"any fi- nal decision of the Board\" must mean \"any final decision of the Board under section 355(c).\" See BIO 10; accord , e.g., 392 F.3d 567 ; 346 F.3d 346 ; 198 F.3d 139 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In other words, the government reads the provision as follows: Any claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any railway labor organiza- tion …, of which claimant is a member [agg rieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any base -year employer of the claimant [aggrieved by a final decision under subsection (c)], or any other party aggrieved by a final decision under s ubsec- tion (c) of this section may obtain a review of a ny final decision of the Board [under subsection (c)]. That interpretation is flawed from start to finish.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.2d 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "See Stovic , 826 F.3d at 503 (internal quotation marks omitted) . Section 355(f)'s list of potential litigants resembles countless other statutes that \"list … terms or phrases fol- lowed by a limiting clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Confronted with such lists, courts generally interpret the limiting clause —here, \"ag- grieved by a final decision under [section 355 ](c)\" —by applying the \"last -antecedent rule .\" Under that rule, \"'a limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately fol- lows.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "Under that rule, \"'a limiting clause or phrase … should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately fol- lows.'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 152 (2012). Thus, in Lockhart , this Court h eld that e ach crime in the list of \"aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abu- sive sexual conduct involving a minor\" need not \"involv[e] a minor\"; only the offense of \"abusive sexual conduct in- volving a minor\" does. 136 S. Ct. at 962-63 (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "The gov- ernment's argument just illustrates the implausibility of its reading. Further, h ad Congress intended to limit judicial re- view under section 355(f) so lely to decisions mentioned in section 355(c) , Congress could have easily said \"any final decision under section 355(c) \" when providing for judicial review. See Stovic , 826 F.3d at 503; see generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is what Congress did when limiting the \"any other party\" category of litigants entitled to sue under section 355(f) to those \"aggrieved by a final de cision under [section 34 355(c)].\" Congress also used similar language in section 355(c) to refer specif ically to final decisions under that provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§§ 220.180, 220.185, 220.186, 260.1(a)(4). And courts have uniformly treated decisions terminating annuities as reviewable. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 706 F.2d 99 . Yet, under the government's view, these de terminations —which are just as significant as the initial grant or denial of benefits — would be unreviewable simply because section 355(c) does not list them expressly. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.2d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§§ 220.180, 220.185, 220.186, 260.1(a)(4). And courts have uniformly treated decisions terminating annuities as reviewable. E.g., 925 F.2d 1374 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Yet, under the government's view, these de terminations —which are just as significant as the initial grant or denial of benefits — would be unreviewable simply because section 355(c) does not list them expressly. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "706 F.2d 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "But d ecisions about whether to grant or deny credit can dramatically affect what benefits claimants re- ceive . Courts routinely review grants or denials of such credit. E.g., Weyerhaeuser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 88 F.3d 886 . The government's position would upend that understanding. Similarly, Board orders requiring beneficiaries to re- pay erroneous payments do not fall wit hin section 355(c) or section 355(g).",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 F.3d 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "But d ecisions about whether to grant or deny credit can dramatically affect what benefits claimants re- ceive . Courts routinely review grants or denials of such credit. E.g., Weyerhaeuser 503 F.3d 596 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government's position would upend that understanding. Similarly, Board orders requiring beneficiaries to re- pay erroneous payments do not fall wit hin section 355(c) or section 355(g).",
		"citation_value_orig": "88 F.3d 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "The benefi- ciary has the right to request that the Board waive recovery at its discretion, if the beneficiary was not at fault and recovery would be inequitable. Id. § 255.10; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions do not fall within section 355(c) , be- cause overpayment recovery involve s developments after the initial grant of benefits, and may not affect a claim- ant's ultimate entitl ement to benefits . Nor are these decisions covered by section 355(g), since they concern \"recovery\" of already -paid benefits, not a claim for bene- fits or a contribution refund .",
		"citation_value_orig": "631 F.3d 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "The upshot of the government's position is that, be- cause Congress delegated to the Board the authority to establish these types of decisions instead of listing them in section 355(c), Congress freed the Board from any ju- dicial checks on the Board's exercise of that authority . Aggravating the problem, Congress cabined Executive Branch supervision, which could otherwise provide a check on arbitrary agency action. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ordinarily, the Presi- dent shapes agency decision -making by installing his choice of principal officers t o run the agency. See, e .g., Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "Ordinarily, the Presi- dent shapes agency decision -making by installing his choice of principal officers t o run the agency. See, e .g., Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But here, Congress re- quires the President to choose two of the Board's three members from lists supplied by labor and industry, and limits the President's choice of chairman to individuals un- related to employers or labor organizations . See 45 U.S .C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "The Federalist No. 51, at 317 -18 (J. Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003) ; see Free Enter . 40 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But if litigants aggrieved by Board decisions cannot turn to the judiciar y, there are few other checks in sight. The Board would be a law unto itself, empowered to invent its own procedures and then apply them however it pleased to hundreds of thousands of claimants for w hom Board -administered benefits may be the only source of in- come —not to mention employers and others with significant stakes in the adjudicatory process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "But if litigants aggrieved by Board decisions cannot turn to the judiciar y, there are few other checks in sight. The Board would be a law unto itself, empowered to invent its own procedures and then apply them however it pleased to hundreds of thousands of claimants for w hom Board -administered benefits may be the only source of in- come —not to mention employers and others with significant stakes in the adjudicatory process. Califano v. Sanders Does Not Justify Cutting Off Judicial Review Under the RRA and RUIA This C ourt in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that denials of requests to reopen benefits determi- nations under the Social Security Act are unreviewable. Id. at 107 -09.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§ 405(g)). Thus, only final Social Security decisions \"made after a hearing\" are reviewable. 3 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cun- 392 F.3d 567; 198 F.3d 139; 346 F.3d 139; 63 F.3d 972. 41 Sanders held that because the Social Security Admin- istration can deny petitions for reopen ing \"without a hearing,\" such denials are not reviewable final decisions \"made after a hearing.\" 430 U.S. at 108 ; see Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1775 & n.12 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.2d 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§ 405(g)). Thus, only final Social Security decisions \"made after a hearing\" are reviewable. 3 See 708 F.2d 250; Cun- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 198 F.3d 139; 346 F.3d 139; 63 F.3d 972. 41 Sanders held that because the Social Security Admin- istration can deny petitions for reopen ing \"without a hearing,\" such denials are not reviewable final decisions \"made after a hearing.\" 430 U.S. at 108 ; see Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1775 & n.12 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§ 405(g)). Thus, only final Social Security decisions \"made after a hearing\" are reviewable. 3 See 708 F.2d 250; Cun- 392 F.3d 567; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 346 F.3d 139; 63 F.3d 972. 41 Sanders held that because the Social Security Admin- istration can deny petitions for reopen ing \"without a hearing,\" such denials are not reviewable final decisions \"made after a hearing.\" 430 U.S. at 108 ; see Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1775 & n.12 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 F.3d 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§ 405(g)). Thus, only final Social Security decisions \"made after a hearing\" are reviewable. 3 See 708 F.2d 250; Cun- 392 F.3d 567; 198 F.3d 139; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 63 F.3d 972. 41 Sanders held that because the Social Security Admin- istration can deny petitions for reopen ing \"without a hearing,\" such denials are not reviewable final decisions \"made after a hearing.\" 430 U.S. at 108 ; see Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1775 & n.12 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 F.3d 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Arguments Against Reviewability Are Meritless",
		"context": "§ 405(g)). Thus, only final Social Security decisions \"made after a hearing\" are reviewable. 3 See 708 F.2d 250; Cun- 392 F.3d 567; 198 F.3d 139; 346 F.3d 139; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 Sanders held that because the Social Security Admin- istration can deny petitions for reopen ing \"without a hearing,\" such denials are not reviewable final decisions \"made after a hearing.\" 430 U.S. at 108 ; see Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1775 & n.12 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "63 F.3d 972",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs were personally invited to participate by the police chief",
		"context": "Even receipt of the general OPD letter, Dkt.54-17, would be enough for standing. See Am. Humanist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "859 F.3d 1243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
		"context": "PCMA is correct that e ssentiality does not require exclusivity. But it does require essentiality, and the cases on which PCMA relies show why essentiality is lacking here. PCMA first relies on District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the District required employers to provide employees the same health benefits in their ERISA- 50 exempt workers' compensation plans that they pro- vided in their ERISA-covered health plans. Id. at 130-31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Act 900 does not refer to ERISA plans",
		"context": "But ERISA plans were absolutely essential to its operation because they provided the benefits by which its regulation of other plans was measured. No ERISA plans; no regulation. PCMA next relies on Ingersoll-Rand [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court addressed a bespoke wrongful-termination cause of action against employers who terminated employees to avoid contrib-uting to their ERISA pension plans. That cause of action did not directly regulate ERISA plans. It regulated employers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Circuit erroneously found that Congress could rely on a \"bundle\" of powers to pass ICWA",
		"context": "26a (Dennis, J.). This mode of analysis makes a mockery of the axiom that the federal governm ent is one of enumerated pow- ers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any powers that were not specifically granted to it are reserved to the States. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Fifth Circuit erroneously found that Congress could rely on a \"bundle\" of powers to pass ICWA",
		"context": "This approach is particularly troubling where, as here, the Fifth Circuit did not even attempt to articu- late a limiting principle of when Congress may rely on a conglomeration of powers to create a new authority that it does not otherwise possess. This Court has granted cert iorari in cases presenting such core constitutional concerns without regard to whether th e lower courts divided on that question . E.g., New York , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should do so here to address this long -claimed but never -supported aggrega- tion of power to Congress to reach into the heartland of a State's sovereign authority over domestic relations .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The clash between political correctness and Christianity",
		"context": "Over the past decade , there have been many lawsuits in which the government has attempted Christians to speak or act contrary to their religious convictions . See, e.g. , Masterpiece [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (attempting to punish a Christian baker for not celebrating a same -sex wedding); 922 F.3d 140441 P.3d 1203. The list could go on, but the point is that there is a strong and terrible movement in the United States to punish Christians and religious Americans who dissent from the new orthodoxy of political correctness .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The clash between political correctness and Christianity",
		"context": "Over the past decade , there have been many lawsuits in which the government has attempted Christians to speak or act contrary to their religious convictions . See, e.g. , Masterpiece 138 S.Ct. 1719 (attempting to punish a Christian baker for not celebrating a same -sex wedding); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]441 P.3d 1203. The list could go on, but the point is that there is a strong and terrible movement in the United States to punish Christians and religious Americans who dissent from the new orthodoxy of political correctness .",
		"citation_value_orig": "922 F.3d 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The clash between political correctness and Christianity",
		"context": "Over the past decade , there have been many lawsuits in which the government has attempted Christians to speak or act contrary to their religious convictions . See, e.g. , Masterpiece 138 S.Ct. 1719 (attempting to punish a Christian baker for not celebrating a same -sex wedding); 922 F.3d 140[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The list could go on, but the point is that there is a strong and terrible movement in the United States to punish Christians and religious Americans who dissent from the new orthodoxy of political correctness .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 P.3d 1203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "Id. 2 Justice Thurgood Marshall also noted this distinction. Concurring in Pacific Gas & Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], he explained that the \"degree of intrusiveness\" in PruneYard is different than in other Takings Clause cases because the owner \"voluntarily encouraged\" others to enter the property; by contrast, the plaintiff in Pacific Gas had \"not abandoned its right to exclude others\" and had not invited the general public to us e its property. Id. at 22 - 23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "at 22 - 23. This Court 's subsequent decisions have made similar distinctions. Most recently, in Horne, the 2 Even this circumscribed view of Pruneyard is in tension with the Court 's holding in Lloyd Corp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that property does not \"lose its private character merely because the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.\" Id. at 569; s ee also Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech, supra , 38-40.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "Similarly, in Nollan , the Court explained that PruneYard did not apply, because there, \"the owner had already opened his property to the general public.\" Nollan , 483 U.S. at n.1. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court distinguished the shopping center in PruneYard which \"attracted more than 25,000 daily patrons \" from the \"permanent recreational easement\" the City of Tigard sought to impose on a landowner. Id. at 394.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "Taken together, those decisions limit PruneYard to its facts. The lower court s have similarly recognized PruneYard 's limited application . For example, in Central Illinois Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Seventh Circuit declined to apply PruneYard to a utility company that had \"maintain[ed] the right to exclude others from their property.\" Id. at 1174.",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 1169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "at 1174 (quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. , 475 U.S. at 22 (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)). The D.C. Cir cuit also refused to extend PruneYard beyond its facts. In Waremart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a stand -alone private grocery store successfully argued that nonemployee union representatives could not, under 15 California law, handbill customers in the store 's parking lot. Id. at 876 -77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 F.3d 870",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "The court explained that the store was not a traditional public forum like PruneYard 's shopping center, since people visited \"solely to shop\" and the \"property owners invited members of the public for that purpose alone, not ' to meet friends, to eat, to rest, to congregate, or to be entertained at its premises. '\" Id. at 876 (citing Albertson 's, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). \"In contrast to Pruneyard , ... [stand -alone stores] contain [] no plazas, walkways or central courtyard where patrons may congregate and spend time together.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "107 Cal. App. 4th 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "\"In contrast to Pruneyard , ... [stand -alone stores] contain [] no plazas, walkways or central courtyard where patrons may congregate and spend time together.\" Id. (quoting Trader Joe 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). State courts too—including those \"interpreting state constitutional provisions similar in wording to California 's free speech provision[,] have declined to follow [ PruneYard v. ] Robins . Indeed, some of these courts have been less than kind in their criticism o f [PruneYard v. ] Robins .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 Cal. App. 4th 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, the Court should not extend PruneYard any further",
		"context": "State courts too—including those \"interpreting state constitutional provisions similar in wording to California 's free speech provision[,] have declined to follow [ PruneYard v. ] Robins . Indeed, some of these courts have been less than kind in their criticism o f [PruneYard v. ] Robins .\" Golden Gateway [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State courts that \"have considered this issue overwhelmingly have chosen not to interpret their state constitutions as requi ring private property owners, such as those who own large shopping malls, to permit certain types of speech, even political speech, on their premises.\" United Food & Com .",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 Cal. 4th 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' prosecutions are not conflict preempted",
		"context": "567 U.S. at 403. But Kansas's decision to punish the use of another's personal identifying information does not relate to \"the same activity\" as IRCA, namely employment authorization. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. When Congress did address preemption in IRCA it adopted an express preemption provision that deliberately limits IRCA's preemptive scope to \"any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions (other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who employ, or recruit or refer for a fee for employment, unauthorized aliens.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' prosecutions are not conflict preempted",
		"context": "After all, conflict preemption analysis \"does not justify a 'freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives'; such an endeavor 'would undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law.'\" Whiting , 563 U.S. at 607 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5. The flaws in Respondents' conflict preemption claim are on full display in the irrational results it would produce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondents' prosecutions are not conflict preempted",
		"context": "Yet unauthorized aliens would enjoy a favored status, with immunity from state prosecution for violating criminal statutes that apply to everyone else. \"No such design can be attributed to a rational Congress.\" Dan's City Used Cars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Bucklew failed to identify any known and available \"method\" or \"procedure\" for lethal nitrogen",
		"context": "Matsushita Elec . Indus . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": ". No school may advance religion as part of its mission. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 472 U.S. 38. This principle leads many government school officials to conclude that any student religious speech is inherently inconsistent with the school's educational mission and, therefore, belongs elsewhere. As a result, even school officials not openly hostile to religious speech are often hesitant to tolerate student religious expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": ". No school may advance religion as part of its mission. See, e.g., 482 U.S. 578; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This principle leads many government school officials to conclude that any student religious speech is inherently inconsistent with the school's educational mission and, therefore, belongs elsewhere. As a result, even school officials not openly hostile to religious speech are often hesitant to tolerate student religious expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "Government schools may convey messages diametrically opposed to many students' faiths but cannot convey their religious counterparts, and this reality defines the landscape in which student religious expression occurs. Thus, government school officials naturally tend to be wary of religious speech as a matter of course, which tends to prejudice officials toward a censorious instinct whether they are intentionally hostile to faith or not. 5 Even though no Establishment Clause concern arises from student religious expression, see, e.g., Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], many government school officials will take advantage of whatever leeway the Court provides to engage in discrimination against student religious speech, especially when that speech contradicts popular social values. These concerns are not hypothetical. Amicus knows from experience that if the Court permits government school officials to censure a student for speech made off campus and outside of the physical control of the government school officials, such officials will take the opportunity to censor religious speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "Amicus knows from experience that if the Court permits government school officials to censure a student for speech made off campus and outside of the physical control of the government school officials, such officials will take the opportunity to censor religious speech. For decades, many schools have sought persistently to suppress student religious speech in violation of the Court's decisions. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bd. of 496 U.S. 226; 454 U.S. 263. A litany of cases in every circuit enforces these decisions against resistant government schools.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "For decades, many schools have sought persistently to suppress student religious speech in violation of the Court's decisions. See,533 U.S. 98; Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 454 U.S. 263. A litany of cases in every circuit enforces these decisions against resistant government schools. Amicus has handled a legion of matters where schools ban student religious speech in a manner that can only be stopped by Tinker .",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "For decades, many schools have sought persistently to suppress student religious speech in violation of the Court's decisions. See,533 U.S. 98; Bd. of 496 U.S. 226; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A litany of cases in every circuit enforces these decisions against resistant government schools. Amicus has handled a legion of matters where schools ban student religious speech in a manner that can only be stopped by Tinker .",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "A litany of cases in every circuit enforces these decisions against resistant government schools. Amicus has handled a legion of matters where schools ban student religious speech in a manner that can only be stopped by Tinker . Some of those cases include: 484 S.W.3d 416; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Schultz v. Medina Valley Independent School District , No. 11-50486, at 1-2 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011) (unpublished) (dissolving temporary restraining order protecting high school valedictorian who was prohibited from praying during her graduation speech)3; Michael Vasquez, Broward schools' Runcie says Bible controversy \"should've been handled differently ,\" Miami Herald (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/a rticle1964003.html (student prohibited from reading his Bible during free reading time).",
		"citation_value_orig": "730 F.Supp.2d 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Government Schools Are Hostile to Student Religious Speech that Disagrees with Contemporary Elite Views on Social Issues",
		"context": "11-50486, at 1-2 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011) (unpublished) (dissolving temporary restraining order protecting high school valedictorian who was prohibited from praying during her graduation speech)3; Michael Vasquez, Broward schools' Runcie says Bible controversy \"should've been handled differently ,\" Miami Herald (Sept. 12, 2014), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/education/a rticle1964003.html (student prohibited from reading his Bible during free reading time). Counsel for Amicus also participated extensively in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given the natural hostility to student religious expression in government schools, the Court should not abandon Tinker or extend it beyond the school environment. 3 Available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX- 0001-0005.pdf; see also 2011 WL 13234770.",
		"citation_value_orig": "976 F. Supp. 659",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "It has long been established that, because con- tempt is such a serious sanction, a person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order unless it is clear that the order applies to his conduct. This Court stated that principle in California Arti- ficial Stone Paving [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That case concerned whether a person could be held in contempt for violating an injunction not to infringe a competitor's patents for concrete pavement, when the alleged infringer had \"varied his mode of making the pavement\" and so it was unclear whether the in- junction barred his conduct. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "Id. at 612-613. The Court explained that, because contempt is a \"severe remedy,\" it \"should not be resorted to where there is 6 See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of 86 F.3d 464; Project B.A.S.I.C. , 947 F.2d at 16. 21 fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the de- fendant's conduct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 F.3d 1531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "Id. at 612-613. The Court explained that, because contempt is a \"severe remedy,\" it \"should not be resorted to where there is 6 See also, e.g., 114 F.3d 1531; Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Project B.A.S.I.C. , 947 F.2d at 16. 21 fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the de- fendant's conduct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "86 F.3d 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "The Court remanded the case, stating that, \"if the judges [on the court of appeals] disagree\" as to whether the injunction ap- plies, \"there can be no judgment of contempt.\" Ibid. The Court applied the same principle in Interna- tional Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The is- sue there was whether a labor union could be held in contempt for violating a court order that did not spec- ify the acts prohibited. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "Contempt is re- served for \"a violation of a court order by one who fully understands its meaning but chooses to ignore its mandate.\" Ibid. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The courts of appeals all recognize that a person cannot be held in contempt for violating a court order unless the order clearly applies to his conduct. Most circuits articulate the principle as a requirement that an order be \"clear and unambiguous\" (or \"specific and definite\") before it can serve as a basis for contempt.7 7 See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "The courts of appeals all recognize that a person cannot be held in contempt for violating a court order unless the order clearly applies to his conduct. Most circuits articulate the principle as a requirement that an order be \"clear and unambiguous\" (or \"specific and definite\") before it can serve as a basis for contempt.7 7 See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C. , 947 F.2d at 16 (civil contempt is appropriate \"only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous\"); In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]219 F.3d 793. See Tivo 646 F.3d 869. And the Second Circuit asks whether there is a \"fair ground of doubt\" about whether the order applies, which depends in part on whether the order was \"clear and unambiguous.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 F.3d 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "The courts of appeals all recognize that a person cannot be held in contempt for violating a court order unless the order clearly applies to his conduct. Most circuits articulate the principle as a requirement that an order be \"clear and unambiguous\" (or \"specific and definite\") before it can serve as a basis for contempt.7 7 See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C. , 947 F.2d at 16 (civil contempt is appropriate \"only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous\"); In re61 F.3d 256[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Tivo 646 F.3d 869. And the Second Circuit asks whether there is a \"fair ground of doubt\" about whether the order applies, which depends in part on whether the order was \"clear and unambiguous.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 F.3d 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "Most circuits articulate the principle as a requirement that an order be \"clear and unambiguous\" (or \"specific and definite\") before it can serve as a basis for contempt.7 7 See, e.g., Project B.A.S.I.C. , 947 F.2d at 16 (civil contempt is appropriate \"only if the putative contemnor has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous\"); In re61 F.3d 256219 F.3d 793. See Tivo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Second Circuit asks whether there is a \"fair ground of doubt\" about whether the order applies, which depends in part on whether the order was \"clear and unambiguous.\" 65 F.3d 1051.",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "See Tivo 646 F.3d 869. And the Second Circuit asks whether there is a \"fair ground of doubt\" about whether the order applies, which depends in part on whether the order was \"clear and unambiguous.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In applying those rules, courts construe ambi- guities in favor of the alleged contemnor. See , e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "65 F.3d 1051",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "In applying those rules, courts construe ambi- guities in favor of the alleged contemnor. See , e.g. , Axia NetMedia [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gascho , 875 F.3d at 800; 514 F.3d 280; Grace , 72 F.3d at 1241. Despite the variations in language, the principle is the same: A person cannot be held in contempt for violating an ambiguous order. This rule rests on basic notions of notice and fairness.",
		"citation_value_orig": "889 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "See Schmidt , 414 U.S. at 476 (\"[B]asic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is out- lawed. \"); Gascho , 875 F.3d at 800 (\"[I]t would be un- fair for courts to hold a party in contempt unless that party was disobeying a clear and unequivocal court Corr. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]484 F.3d 1288754 F.2d 120. If there is a reasonable basis to believe that the order does not apply, then the putative contemnor lacks the necessary notice, and he cannot be said to have deliberately disregarded the court's command. International Longshoremen's Ass'n , 389 U.S. at 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.2d 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "See Schmidt , 414 U.S. at 476 (\"[B]asic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is out- lawed. \"); Gascho , 875 F.3d at 800 (\"[I]t would be un- fair for courts to hold a party in contempt unless that party was disobeying a clear and unequivocal court Corr. , 869 F.2d 461[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]754 F.2d 120. If there is a reasonable basis to believe that the order does not apply, then the putative contemnor lacks the necessary notice, and he cannot be said to have deliberately disregarded the court's command. International Longshoremen's Ass'n , 389 U.S. at 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 F.3d 1288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. A person should not be held in contempt for violating a court order if he has good reason to believe the order does not apply to his conduct",
		"context": "See Schmidt , 414 U.S. at 476 (\"[B]asic fairness requires that those enjoined receive explicit notice of precisely what conduct is out- lawed. \"); Gascho , 875 F.3d at 800 (\"[I]t would be un- fair for courts to hold a party in contempt unless that party was disobeying a clear and unequivocal court Corr. , 869 F.2d 461484 F.3d 1288[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If there is a reasonable basis to believe that the order does not apply, then the putative contemnor lacks the necessary notice, and he cannot be said to have deliberately disregarded the court's command. International Longshoremen's Ass'n , 389 U.S. at 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "754 F.2d 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The plaintiffs' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction",
		"context": "Burger King , 471 U.S. at 473. In- deed, the Court has already gone a long way toward ac- commodating that interest. A corporation was once amenable to suit only in its State of incorporation, see Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; later, in any State where it had a substantial and continuing presence, see International Harvester Co. of 234 U.S. 579; later still, in any State where it exercised the privilege of con- ducting activities, see International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 319; and now, in any State at which it directs even a sin- gle act, if that act creates a substantial connection with the State, see McGee , 355 U.S. at 223. The main limit on specific jurisdiction today is the requirement that the claim arise out of or relate to the corporation's contacts with the forum. That limit still allows a plaintiff to bring a product -liability claim in the State where the defendant (or, in certain circumstances, a distributor) sold the product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The plaintiffs' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction",
		"context": "Burger King , 471 U.S. at 473. In- deed, the Court has already gone a long way toward ac- commodating that interest. A corporation was once amenable to suit only in its State of incorporation, see Bank of 38 U.S. 519; later, in any State where it had a substantial and continuing presence, see International Harvester Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; later still, in any State where it exercised the privilege of con- ducting activities, see International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 319; and now, in any State at which it directs even a sin- gle act, if that act creates a substantial connection with the State, see McGee , 355 U.S. at 223. The main limit on specific jurisdiction today is the requirement that the claim arise out of or relate to the corporation's contacts with the forum. That limit still allows a plaintiff to bring a product -liability claim in the State where the defendant (or, in certain circumstances, a distributor) sold the product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The plaintiffs' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction",
		"context": "Plaintiffs 27 commonly buy and use products in their home States; in those cases, assuming purposeful availment by the man- ufacturer , the plaintiffs could sue the manufacturer in those States. When a manufacturer in one State ships a product to a plaintiff in another State, the plainti ff could similarly bring the suit in the State to which the goods are delivered. See Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And when plaintiffs go to other States to buy products, it ordinarily is fair to ask them to go back to those States to bring claims about those products. Moreover, \"it will be feasible to de- termine the place of sale of most products involved in products -liability cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The plaintiffs' interests do not justify the state courts' exercise of jurisdiction",
		"context": "41. Further, general jurisdiction in the corporation's place of incor- poration or principal place of business operates as a \"safety valve that sometimes allows plaintiffs access to a reasonable forum in cases when specific jurisdiction would de ny it.\" Daimler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Given that the main purpose of the rules of jurisdiction is to protect the de- fendant, and given that those rules already give plain- tiffs access to a range of forums, plaintiff s' interests in suing in an even wider range of forums cannot justify the theory of jurisdiction adopted by the courts below . 29 That is particularly so because it is not obvious that allowing suit in the place of injury would produce a meaningful improvement for plaintiffs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Summers, 555 U.S. at 493. Plaintiffs seeking forward-looking relief thus must demonstrate a \"real and immediate threat\" the challenged conduct will recur. City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the district court found it \"absolutely clear that the allegedly unlawful activity cannot be reason-ably expected to recur.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "\" Lexmark , 134 S. Ct. at 1388. That presumption \"app lies unless it is expressly negated.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress did nothing to negate that presumption here. ERISA expressly states Congress's purpose to protect \"the interests of participants in employee benefits plans.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "23 n.5 (quoting 523 U.S. at 101). As this Court ha s repeatedly held (including in Steel Co. itself ), \"statutory standing\" is a threshold issue that \"may properly be treated before Article III jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 544 U.S. 1; Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 97 n.2. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Stat ic Control Components, Inc. , on which Plaintiffs previously relied, confir med only that \"statutory stand- ing\" is not jurisdictional . 134 S. Ct. 1377.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 815",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "23 n.5 (quoting 523 U.S. at 101). As this Court ha s repeatedly held (including in Steel Co. itself ), \"statutory standing\" is a threshold issue that \"may properly be treated before Article III jurisdiction.\" 527 U.S. 815; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 97 n.2. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Stat ic Control Components, Inc. , on which Plaintiffs previously relied, confir med only that \"statutory stand- ing\" is not jurisdictional . 134 S. Ct. 1377.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "527 U.S. 815; see, e.g., 544 U.S. 1; Steel Co. , 523 U.S. at 97 n.2. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Stat ic Control Components, Inc. , on which Plaintiffs previously relied, confir med only that \"statutory stand- ing\" is not jurisdictional . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An issue need not be jurisdictional to be a \"threshold ground[ ] for denying audience to a case on the merits\" because the plaintiff or forum is inappropriate. Sinochem Int'l 549 U.S. 422.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "134 S. Ct. 1377. An issue need not be jurisdictional to be a \"threshold ground[ ] for denying audience to a case on the merits\" because the plaintiff or forum is inappropriate. Sinochem Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 60 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(2), (a)(3).",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "As this Court has held, a requirement that relief be \"appropriate\" restricts the class of plaintiffs who may invoke a cause of action. In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee , this Court confronted a provision authorizing the \"national committee of any political party\" to \"institute such actions as may be appro- priate to implement\" the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court held this provision did not confer standing on the Democratic National Committee in suits against private parties , explaining that a con- trary conclusion would \"ignore the word 'appropriate.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Supra pp. 24-27; cf. CIGNA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that \"appropriate\" unambiguously limits remedies but not parties. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Seek Non-Monetary Relief",
		"context": "47. In these circumstances, the \"canon of constitutional avoidance\" comes into play: \"when a 62 serious doubt is raised about the constitutionality of an Act of Congress, this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] are suscep- tible to constructions that would eliminate that consti- tutional concern, they should be so construed. Gollust , 501 U.S. at 125; see John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing , 42 D UKE L.J. 1219, 1227 (1993) (\"[B]road statutor y grant[s] should be con- strued in a manner consis tent with constitutional limitations, including the Article III limitation that only those who suffer actual injury have standing to sue.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Legal Rule Preempts Respondents' Claims Here",
		"context": "And that determination, in turn, makes plain that the FDA would not have suddenly turned around and approved a resubmitted warning about the same risk, based on the same data—whether Merck sought permission (under the PAS process) or forgiveness (under the CBE process). Indulging in Respondents' contrary speculation would make it impossible ever to prove impossibility preemption. See PLIVA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "11 -13. a. Raiders does not address many of the relevant decisions. It is silent on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Union Fish 248 U.S. 308, which explain that maritime law has historically been \"uniform throughout the Union,\" and not \"limited in its extent, or controlled in its exerc ise, by the laws of the several states.\" Watts , 115 U.S. at 362; see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "115 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "11 -13. a. Raiders does not address many of the relevant decisions. It is silent on 115 U.S. 353, and Union Fish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which explain that maritime law has historically been \"uniform throughout the Union,\" and not \"limited in its extent, or controlled in its exerc ise, by the laws of the several states.\" Watts , 115 U.S. at 362; see Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "17. Raiders dismisses (at 21) several other decisions because of their \"inclusion in a string - cite\" —an obvious non -response. Raiders also omits any mention of Southern Pacific [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that maritime con- tracts are governed by a uniform \"general maritime law.\" Raiders's own amici admit that Jensen cemented the role of federal common law in maritime -contract disputes. States Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "244 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "See, e.g., Watts , 115 U.S. at 362. Jensen also has given rise 7 this Court's Jensen decision in 1917, federal common law governed maritime contracts. Raiders at least addresses London [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and The Kensington , 183 U.S. 263, but it misses the point of those decisions. Before Wil- burn Boat , parties sometimes agreed on choice -of-law clauses selecting a particular country's law, and U.S. courts generally enforced those clauses unless con- trary to federal public policy. Raiders contends (at 21-22) that these cases are irrelevant because they did not involve a choice \"between the law of two states.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "167 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "See, e.g., Watts , 115 U.S. at 362. Jensen also has given rise 7 this Court's Jensen decision in 1917, federal common law governed maritime contracts. Raiders at least addresses London 167 U.S. 149, and The Kensington , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but it misses the point of those decisions. Before Wil- burn Boat , parties sometimes agreed on choice -of-law clauses selecting a particular country's law, and U.S. courts generally enforced those clauses unless con- trary to federal public policy. Raiders contends (at 21-22) that these cases are irrelevant because they did not involve a choice \"between the law of two states.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "That historical assessment is both dubious and irrelevant. The majority in Wilburn Boat did not address Watts or even Jensen . Instead, it relied primarily on decisions like [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 183 U.S. 553, which had \"approve[d] provisions of state law that require agents and companies to take out licenses and conform to various conditions prelimi- nary to doing business.\" Wilburn Boat , 348 U.S. at 328 (Reed, J., dissenting). Allowing States to have gener- ally applicable business regulations is a far cry from to a century's worth of federal case law, see Schoenbaum § 4:4, mak- ing the States' request all the more remarkable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "That historical assessment is both dubious and irrelevant. The majority in Wilburn Boat did not address Watts or even Jensen . Instead, it relied primarily on decisions like 155 U.S. 648, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which had \"approve[d] provisions of state law that require agents and companies to take out licenses and conform to various conditions prelimi- nary to doing business.\" Wilburn Boat , 348 U.S. at 328 (Reed, J., dissenting). Allowing States to have gener- ally applicable business regulations is a far cry from to a century's worth of federal case law, see Schoenbaum § 4:4, mak- ing the States' request all the more remarkable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 U.S. 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Before Wilburn Boat, federal law governed the enforceability of maritime choice-of-law clauses",
		"context": "b. Raiders cites just three pre -Wilburn Boat cases, all of which are irrelevant or unreasoned. Raiders pri- marily relies (at 23 -24) on E. Gerli & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to Raiders (at 23), E. Gerli shows that there was no federal pre- sumption of enforceability because the Second Circuit supposedly \"held that t he enforceability of the choice - of-law clause should be determined based on the policy of the jurisdiction where the contract was 'drawn and delivered': Italy.\" That is not what the Second Circuit held.",
		"citation_value_orig": "48 F.2d 115",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's ADA action seeks \"relief\" not available under the IDEA",
		"context": "The Court in Fry there- fore repeatedly use d \"remedy\" and \"remedies\" as syn- onyms for the term \"relief. \"3 That equivalency is confirmed by the principle that \"identical words and phrases within the same statute should normally be given the same meaning .\" Powerex [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1415 repeatedly uses \"relief \" in its legal sense as a synonym for a claim's remedy or remedies. Congress , for instance, directed that the court in an IDEA action shall \"grant such relief as the court deter- mines is appropriate .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's ADA action seeks \"relief\" not available under the IDEA",
		"context": "18 and includes —\"as an available remedy \"—an order di- recting the \"retroactive reimbursement\" of past educa- tional expen ses. School Comm. of the Town of Burling- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s text in 1986 , it also generally barred parents who reject a school's settlement offer from recovering attorneys' fees for later work if \"the re- lief finally obtained by the parents is not more favora- ble\" than the offer. 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(D) (i)(III) (em- phasis added) .4 That prohibition clearly uses \"relief \" in its legal sense and require s a comparison of the reme- dies awarded on an IDEA claim to those offered in the settlement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's ADA action seeks \"relief\" not available under the IDEA",
		"context": "11. Those types of consequential damages are forms of \"relief \" unavailable under the IDEA, which does \"not al low for damages .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see p. 4, supra . That conclusion does not turn solely on the fact that the IDEA does not authorize \"damages\" awards. The criteria for triggering Section 1415 (l )'s exhaustion re- quirement \"consider substance, not surface\" and, for that reason, the \"particular labels and terms \" used in the complaint are \"not what matters .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. FURTHER PERCOLATION IN THE LOWER COURTS IS UNNECESSARY",
		"context": "In other words, he acknowledged that the circuit courts have convalesced around one 19 outcome —federal courts lack jurisdiction to consider challenges like Axon 's. But just because the courts of appeals have reached the same conclusion does not mean that they have reached the right conclusion. \"All 12 Courts of Appeals with criminal jurisdiction agreed that a defendant need not know he is a felon to be guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm \" until \"[t] his Court came to the opposite conclusion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sometimes courts of appeals engage in groupthink where they all apply flawed reasoning that this Court eventually rejects . This is one such area where all the courts of appeals have gone astray.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "1. It is well established that \"a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by rep-resentatives of the State, \" violates the Due Process 14 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 386 U.S. 1294 U.S. 103 (due pro- cess \"cannot be deemed to be satisfied if a State has contrived a conviction through a deliberate de- ception of court and jury\"). Although p etitioner does not allege that he was con- victed on the basis of fabricated evidence —he was in fact acquitted of the charges , see p. 3 , supra —the courts of a ppeals have generally held that the knowing use of fabricated evidence may violate due process even absent a conviction , where the defendant can show that she was \"deprive[d] of her liberty in some [other] way.\" 682 F.3d 567 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "360 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "1. It is well established that \"a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by rep-resentatives of the State, \" violates the Due Process 14 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 360 U.S. 264; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]294 U.S. 103 (due pro- cess \"cannot be deemed to be satisfied if a State has contrived a conviction through a deliberate de- ception of court and jury\"). Although p etitioner does not allege that he was con- victed on the basis of fabricated evidence —he was in fact acquitted of the charges , see p. 3 , supra —the courts of a ppeals have generally held that the knowing use of fabricated evidence may violate due process even absent a conviction , where the defendant can show that she was \"deprive[d] of her liberty in some [other] way.\" 682 F.3d 567 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "1. It is well established that \"a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by rep-resentatives of the State, \" violates the Due Process 14 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 360 U.S. 264; see 386 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (due pro- cess \"cannot be deemed to be satisfied if a State has contrived a conviction through a deliberate de- ception of court and jury\"). Although p etitioner does not allege that he was con- victed on the basis of fabricated evidence —he was in fact acquitted of the charges , see p. 3 , supra —the courts of a ppeals have generally held that the knowing use of fabricated evidence may violate due process even absent a conviction , where the defendant can show that she was \"deprive[d] of her liberty in some [other] way.\" 682 F.3d 567 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "360 U.S. 264; see 386 U.S. 1294 U.S. 103 (due pro- cess \"cannot be deemed to be satisfied if a State has contrived a conviction through a deliberate de- ception of court and jury\"). Although p etitioner does not allege that he was con- victed on the basis of fabricated evidence —he was in fact acquitted of the charges , see p. 3 , supra —the courts of a ppeals have generally held that the knowing use of fabricated evidence may violate due process even absent a conviction , where the defendant can show that she was \"deprive[d] of her liberty in some [other] way.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,568 U.S. 1143 ; see 835 F.3d 358 (\"[ A]n acquitted criminal defendant may have a stand -alone fabricated evidence claim against state ac- tors under the du e process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, ab- sent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged.\") , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F.3d 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "Although p etitioner does not allege that he was con- victed on the basis of fabricated evidence —he was in fact acquitted of the charges , see p. 3 , supra —the courts of a ppeals have generally held that the knowing use of fabricated evidence may violate due process even absent a conviction , where the defendant can show that she was \"deprive[d] of her liberty in some [other] way.\" 682 F.3d 567 , cert. denied,568 U.S. 1143 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[ A]n acquitted criminal defendant may have a stand -alone fabricated evidence claim against state ac- tors under the du e process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if there is a reasonable likelihood that, ab- sent that fabricated evidence, the defendant would not have been criminally charged.\") , cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 2093 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment is an unlikely home for petitioner's as- serted constitutional right. The \"Fourth Amendment does not speak of unreasonable 'prosecutions,' and in- stead refers only to unreasonable 'searches and sei- zures. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Although t his Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment \"establishes the minimum constitu- tional 'standards and procedures' not just for arrest but also for ensuing 'detention, ' \" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 917 (citation omitted), being subjected to the judicial pro- cess is not naturally considered a \"seizure \" within the 16 meaning of the Fourth Amendment . See 489 U.S. 593.1 As to the Sixth Amendment, petitioner states that the \"Second Circuit has suggested that fabrication of evidence could arise under the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a fair trial before an impartial jury.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "196 F.3d 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "\" 196 F.3d 24 . Although t his Court has recognized that the Fourth Amendment \"establishes the minimum constitu- tional 'standards and procedures' not just for arrest but also for ensuing 'detention, ' \" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 917 (citation omitted), being subjected to the judicial pro- cess is not naturally considered a \"seizure \" within the 16 meaning of the Fourth Amendment . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].1 As to the Sixth Amendment, petitioner states that the \"Second Circuit has suggested that fabrication of evidence could arise under the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a fair trial before an impartial jury.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "Amend. VI. The suggestion, however, that it also protects the right not to be subject to cri minal prosecution based on fabricated evidence seems to stem from mistaken dicta in a Second Circuit decision interpreting the Due Process Clause.2 The 1 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court declined to recognize a freestanding substantive due- process right \"to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause,\" but \"ex- press[ed] no view\" as to whether the plaintiff might have a Fourth Amendment claim. Id. at 268, 275 (pl urality opinion).",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "\" 804 F.3d at 547 n.7 (citation and brackets omitted). But the decisions it cited were both grounded in due process. See Zahrey , 221 F.3d at 348; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. Malicious Prosecution Is The Most Analogous Common - Law Tort To Petitioner's Constitutional Claim Having identified the constitutional right at issue , the Court next \"must determine the elements of, and rules associated with, an action seeking damages for its violation.\" Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920.",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 F.3d 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "Manuel , 137 S. Ct. at 920. The Court has looked to common -law torts for valuable guidance in making that determination . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388- 389; Heck , 512 U.S. at 483 -484; Carey , 435 U.S. at 257- 258. And w hile identifying the closest analogy to particular constitutional claims can sometimes present a difficult question, that is not so here. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioner's Section 1983 claim asserts a constitutional right to be free from criminal prosecution on the basis of fabricated evidence claim",
		"context": "Petitioner likewise seeks to re- cover for those same kinds of harms stemming from the 3 Whether all such damages are compensable in a Section 1983 action of this sort is a separate question not presented here. See Carey , 435 U.S. at 258- 259 (\"[T]he rules governing compensation for injuries caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights should be tailored to the interests protected by the particular right in ques- tion. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 same sort of violation . The court of appeals' focus on those harms therefore only underscores that m alicious prosecution is plainly the most analogous common -law claim for a Section 1983 plaintiff who seeks damages for the use of fabricated evidence to initiate criminal pro- ceedings against h im.4 That conclusion is only rein- forced by the court of appeals' failure to identify any other analogous common -law claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The vocational expert's hearing testimony in this case constitutes substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factfinding",
		"context": "It is much more than a \"mere scintilla,\" ibid., and it is far removed from the kind of evidentiary material lacking any \"rational probative force\" that would be in sufficient to constitute \"substan- tial evidence,\" Perales , 402 U.S. at 407 (quoting Consol- idated Edison , 305 U.S. at 230). There is no contrary evidence in the record, much less anything \"so compel- 42 ling\" that \"a reasonable factfinder would have to con- clude\" that O'Callaghan's expert testimony was incor- rect. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A reasonable factfinder confronted with s uch an evidentiary record could rationally find that bench as- sembler and sorter positions exist in roughly the num- bers that O'Callaghan described , and in any event could determine that jobs suitable for petitioner existed in significant numbers in the nati onal economy. In short, the ALJ's factfinding is \"supported by substantial evi- dence\" and therefore \"conclusive\" on judicial review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Arizona Juries Regularly Find Non-Causally Connected Mitigation Sufficiently Substantial to Call for Leniency",
		"context": "RT 11/19/15. As in Styers, the crime for which Lambright was convicted involved some planning and was not recognized by the court as impulsive. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, w hen Arizona capital defendants have the opportunity to present their non- causally conn ected mitigation in the trial court, jurors are 24 more often than not persu aded to reject a death sentence. The Arizona Supreme Court's stubborn adherence to a paradigm that assigns de minimi s weight to non- casually connected mitigation is both unconstitutional and prejudicial to Arizona's capital defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "673 P.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Trial Court Properly Balanced Petitioners' Need for Discovery Against the Harm That Would Result from Disclosure of Execution Participants",
		"context": ". hate mail and messages \" and eventually demanded that \"the Texas Department of Criminal Justice return a supply of compounded pentobarbital sold for use in executions.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Another supplier was sued and \"elected to discontinue providing drugs to the State rather than endure the expense and burdens of litigation.\" 783 F.3d 1089 , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.3d 888",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Trial Court Properly Balanced Petitioners' Need for Discovery Against the Harm That Would Result from Disclosure of Execution Participants",
		"context": "In re741 F.3d 888 . Another supplier was sued and \"elected to discontinue providing drugs to the State rather than endure the expense and burdens of litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied135 S. Ct. 2941, and make clear that they will stop supplying lethal injection drugs if their identities are disclosed, see In re Mo. Dep't of Corr., 839 F.3d at 736 (Missouri's supplier had confirmed that it would \"cease to provide pentobarbital to anyone .",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 1089",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Trial Court Properly Balanced Petitioners' Need for Discovery Against the Harm That Would Result from Disclosure of Execution Participants",
		"context": "to resolve.\" Bucklew , 587 U.S. at __ (slip op., at 29). Given that the constitutionality of capital punishment is \"settled,\" Glossip , 135 S. Ct. at 2732, Tennessee and other States that continue to administer the death penalty have a \"s ignificant interest in enforcing\" death sentences that have been imposed and affirmed on direct and collateral review, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and in doing so \"in a timely manner,\" Baze , 553 U.S. at 61. See also Bucklew , 587 U.S. at __ (slip op., at 29). Requiring States to identif y their drug suppliers or other participants in the execution process would unduly burden this sovereign interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983",
		"context": "at 24, 27 -34. 1. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court elaborated on the features of a statutory enforcement scheme that preclude individual enforcement under § 1983. Relying on Middlesex County Sewerage 453 U.S. 1 ; 468 U.S. 992; and City of Rancho Palos 544 U.S. 113, the Court explained that \"unusually elaborate\" and \"carefully tailored\" \"enforcement provisions,\" such as \"detailed and restrictive administrative and judicial remedies, \" beyond simply \"the withdrawal of federal funding,\" indicate Congress 's intent not to allow an individual remedy under § 1983. Fitzgerald , 555 U.S. at 253 -255.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983",
		"context": "1. In 555 U.S. 246, the Court elaborated on the features of a statutory enforcement scheme that preclude individual enforcement under § 1983. Relying on Middlesex County Sewerage [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 468 U.S. 992; and City of Rancho Palos 544 U.S. 113, the Court explained that \"unusually elaborate\" and \"carefully tailored\" \"enforcement provisions,\" such as \"detailed and restrictive administrative and judicial remedies, \" beyond simply \"the withdrawal of federal funding,\" indicate Congress 's intent not to allow an individual remedy under § 1983. Fitzgerald , 555 U.S. at 253 -255. As the Government agrees , Congress provided just such a \"comprehensive system of enforcement 16 mechanisms in FNHRA itself.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983",
		"context": "1. In 555 U.S. 246, the Court elaborated on the features of a statutory enforcement scheme that preclude individual enforcement under § 1983. Relying on Middlesex County Sewerage 453 U.S. 1 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and City of Rancho Palos 544 U.S. 113, the Court explained that \"unusually elaborate\" and \"carefully tailored\" \"enforcement provisions,\" such as \"detailed and restrictive administrative and judicial remedies, \" beyond simply \"the withdrawal of federal funding,\" indicate Congress 's intent not to allow an individual remedy under § 1983. Fitzgerald , 555 U.S. at 253 -255. As the Government agrees , Congress provided just such a \"comprehensive system of enforcement 16 mechanisms in FNHRA itself.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 992",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FNHRA's Comprehensive Enforcement Scheme Is Incompatible With Individual Enforcement Under section 1983",
		"context": "1. In 555 U.S. 246, the Court elaborated on the features of a statutory enforcement scheme that preclude individual enforcement under § 1983. Relying on Middlesex County Sewerage 453 U.S. 1 ; 468 U.S. 992; and City of Rancho Palos [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that \"unusually elaborate\" and \"carefully tailored\" \"enforcement provisions,\" such as \"detailed and restrictive administrative and judicial remedies, \" beyond simply \"the withdrawal of federal funding,\" indicate Congress 's intent not to allow an individual remedy under § 1983. Fitzgerald , 555 U.S. at 253 -255. As the Government agrees , Congress provided just such a \"comprehensive system of enforcement 16 mechanisms in FNHRA itself.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. States' Surrender of Sovereign Policymaking Power Does Not Equate to a Surrender of Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "5 But that logic was expressly rejected in Seminole : \"Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authorit y over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.\" 517 U.S. at 72. And the Court reaffirmed that principle in Federal Maritime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which involved maritime law: \"'[T]he background principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to di ssipate when the subject of the suit is an area … th at is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.'\" Id. at 767 (second alteration in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. States' Surrender of Sovereign Policymaking Power Does Not Equate to a Surrender of Sovereign Immunity",
		"context": "at 767 (second alteration in original). Subsequent cases have followed suit. For example, the Court has held that the Indian Commerce Clause gives Congress \"plenary and exclusive\" power to legislate regarding the Indian tribes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the Court has held that the very same Indian Commerce Clause does not provide Congress with the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity, see Seminole , 517 U.S. at 57–66. Similarly, the Patent Clause has been interpreted as providing Congress with exclusive power over 5 See, e.g. , Jeffrey M. Hirsch, War Powers Abrogation , 89 G EO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Because Perez could not have invoked a futility exception had he sued under the IDEA, he also cannot invoke a futility exception here.",
		"context": "A.F. ex rel. Christine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "801 F.3d 1245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Executive Branch Has For Decades Interpreted \"Person\" To Include The Government And Has A Longstanding Practice Of Pursuing Post-Issuance Patent Review",
		"context": "For decades, the Executive B ranch has understood the term \"person\" to encompass government agencies when it appears in statutes closely analogous to and preceding § 18(a)(1)(B). Prior to the AIA, several other statutes established administrative processes that allowed the Patent Off ice to reconsider its decision to grant a patent application. See, e.g., Oil States Energy Services, 138 S. Ct. at 1370– 1371; Cuozzo Speed Technologies, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These predecessor proceedings —ex parte reexamination and in ter partes reexamination —could be sought by \"[a]ny person at any time.\" 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Executive Branch Has For Decades Interpreted \"Person\" To Include The Government And Has A Longstanding Practice Of Pursuing Post-Issuance Patent Review",
		"context": "§ 311(a); id. § 321(a). Congress was presumably aware of the Executive Branch's interpretation of the word \"person\" in these predecessor statutes, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and yet Congress chose to use precisely the same term, making no attempt to exclude federal agencies from the new provisions' scope. This congressional re- enactment is a signal of the Legislative Branch's approval of the Executive Branch's existing practice of petitioning for patent review.5 See, e.g., 209 U.S. 337. Not surprisingly, given Congress's continued use of \"person\" in the AIA, the Executive Branch's practice of asking the Patent Office to review potentially invalid as the document titled \"Reexam – Final Rejection,\" and dated August 2, 2010.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Executive Branch Has For Decades Interpreted \"Person\" To Include The Government And Has A Longstanding Practice Of Pursuing Post-Issuance Patent Review",
		"context": "§ 321(a). Congress was presumably aware of the Executive Branch's interpretation of the word \"person\" in these predecessor statutes, see 434 U.S. 575, and yet Congress chose to use precisely the same term, making no attempt to exclude federal agencies from the new provisions' scope. This congressional re- enactment is a signal of the Legislative Branch's approval of the Executive Branch's existing practice of petitioning for patent review.5 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Not surprisingly, given Congress's continued use of \"person\" in the AIA, the Executive Branch's practice of asking the Patent Office to review potentially invalid as the document titled \"Reexam – Final Rejection,\" and dated August 2, 2010. 5 Indeed, Congress has not enacted, or even given serious consideration to, any bill to push back against the E xecutive Branch's longstanding interpretation, whether before or after passing the AIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": ". If the Court does not believe that demonstrable error alone is enough to warrant overturning precedent, then it should look to the factors it articulated recently in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those factors are: (1) the quality of the precedent's reasoning, (2) the workability of the precedent in question, (3) whether legal or factual developments have eroded the decision's underpinnings and left it as an outlier, and (4) reliance interests. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "at 946-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). A fractured Court attempted to apply Gingles again in League of United Latin Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in a vote line t hat was hardly easy to follow. LULAC , 548 U.S. at 408. As of 2009, the Court appeared to fall into three camps as to how to apply Gingles .",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "LULAC , 548 U.S. at 408. As of 2009, the Court appeared to fall into three camps as to how to apply Gingles . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, as the Chief Justice noted in his application -stage dissent, Gingles makes the voter - 18 dilution doctrine as \" 'an area of the law notorious for its many unsolved puzzles[.] '\" Merrill , 142 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "862, 871 (2021)). That is not to say that every case in which Gingles arose was subject to such a fractured decision. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 507 U.S. 146. However, when the Court decides the harder cases applying Gingles , the reasoning tends to be more fractured. With three or four different approaches in the harder cases, the voter -dilution doctrine wobbles along like a shopping cart with wheels that do not cooperate with each other.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "862, 871 (2021)). That is not to say that every case in which Gingles arose was subject to such a fractured decision. See, e.g., 507 U.S. 25; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, when the Court decides the harder cases applying Gingles , the reasoning tends to be more fractured. With three or four different approaches in the harder cases, the voter -dilution doctrine wobbles along like a shopping cart with wheels that do not cooperate with each other.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "With three or four different approaches in the harder cases, the voter -dilution doctrine wobbles along like a shopping cart with wheels that do not cooperate with each other. Furthermore , as the Chief Justice o bserved in his dissent at the application stage, perhaps the biggest problem with Gingles's workability is that it defeats the purpose for which the Voting Rights Act was enacted . Merrill , 142 U.S. at 883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whatever factors go into workability, if a precedent defeats the primary purpose of the law that it is supposed to interpret, then the precedent does not work. 8 Consequently, the 8 In fairness to the Gingles Court, as the Chief Just ice noted, the language of Section 2 (b) has been described as \"'famously elliptical[.]'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 997",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "8 Consequently, the 8 In fairness to the Gingles Court, as the Chief Just ice noted, the language of Section 2 (b) has been described as \"'famously elliptical[.]'\" Merrill , 142 S.Ct. at 883 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is constrained by 19 workability factor suggests that it should be revisited. 3. Whether Gingles's Underpinnings Have Been Eroded and Left It as an Outlier Third, a decision is an outlier if further developments in the law have eroded the decision's under pinnings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 F.3d 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "Two types of erosion are worth noting here. First, this Court recently held that political gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question because the judiciary lacks manageable standards to assess those cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, it is time for the Court to look again at Justice Thomas's criticism that voter -dilution claims necessarily require the Court to engage in political theory. The Court held in Rucho that it was not proper for a Court to do that.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The South has largely turned from its former ways that necessitated the Voting Rights Act in the f irst place. Thus, major factual and legal changes have eroded Gingles 's underpinnings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "It often insists that districts be created precisely because of race.'\" Stay App. 33 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). When a statute that was designed to end racial discrimination is interpreted to require racial discrimination, then something is very wrong. Gingles and its progeny stand as an o utlier to the demands of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, as well as the Voting Rights Act itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Janus Factors Favor Overruling Gingles",
		"context": "Indeed, one of the State's centra l claims in this application is that construing the Voting Rights Act to require such racial gerrymandering is unconstitutional. As this Court observed recently, attempting to follow Gingles and its progeny automatically triggers strict scrutiny, but it is presumed that the State has a compelling interest in following the Voting Rights Act. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So, in every case, the State has to walk the narrowly -tailored line. It is a fine line to walk between violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Congress always legislates against traditional \"weights and bounds in the scales of justice.\" Moris- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some- times these principles are grounded in the common law, see, e.g., id. at 262-63, and sometimes they are rooted in longstanding notions of equity, see, e.g., Hol- 560 U.S. 631 ( 2010).",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Moris- 342 U.S. 246. Some- times these principles are grounded in the common law, see, e.g., id. at 262-63, and sometimes they are rooted in longstanding notions of equity, see, e.g., Hol- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2010). Regardless, this Court does not deem Congress to have departed from such principles abs ent the \"clearest command\" to the contrary. 530 U.S. 327.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 631",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "at 262-63, and sometimes they are rooted in longstanding notions of equity, see, e.g., Hol- 560 U.S. 631 ( 2010). Regardless, this Court does not deem Congress to have departed from such principles abs ent the \"clearest command\" to the contrary. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, the Court \"presum[es] that Congress did not intend [to enact statutes] which raise[] serious constitutional doubts.\" 543 U.S. 371.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "530 U.S. 327. In addition, the Court \"presum[es] that Congress did not intend [to enact statutes] which raise[] serious constitutional doubts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, a stat ute \"must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.\" 241 U.S. 394.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "543 U.S. 371. Indeed, a stat ute \"must be construed, if fairly possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying this principle, this Court has repeatedly \"read significant limitations\" into im- migration-related and other statutes \"in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation.\" 533 U.S. 678; accord Martinez , 543 U.S. at 381; 533 U.S. 289; 353 U.S. 194.",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "241 U.S. 394. Applying this principle, this Court has repeatedly \"read significant limitations\" into im- migration-related and other statutes \"in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Martinez , 543 U.S. at 381; 533 U.S. 289; 353 U.S. 194. 15 The Government's interpretation of Section 1326 would contravene traditional equitable considera- tions and raise grave constitutional concerns. In par- ticular, this Court has repeatedly noted the profound due process and separation of powers problems that would result from a scheme that permits the results of an administrative proceeding to conclusively estab- lish a criminal offense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "241 U.S. 394. Applying this principle, this Court has repeatedly \"read significant limitations\" into im- migration-related and other statutes \"in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation.\" 533 U.S. 678; accord Martinez , 543 U.S. at 381; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 353 U.S. 194. 15 The Government's interpretation of Section 1326 would contravene traditional equitable considera- tions and raise grave constitutional concerns. In par- ticular, this Court has repeatedly noted the profound due process and separation of powers problems that would result from a scheme that permits the results of an administrative proceeding to conclusively estab- lish a criminal offense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "241 U.S. 394. Applying this principle, this Court has repeatedly \"read significant limitations\" into im- migration-related and other statutes \"in order to avoid their constitutional invalidation.\" 533 U.S. 678; accord Martinez , 543 U.S. at 381; 533 U.S. 289; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 The Government's interpretation of Section 1326 would contravene traditional equitable considera- tions and raise grave constitutional concerns. In par- ticular, this Court has repeatedly noted the profound due process and separation of powers problems that would result from a scheme that permits the results of an administrative proceeding to conclusively estab- lish a criminal offense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Th ose concerns are height- ened when, as here, the agency never had the author-ity to issue the order in the first instance. 1. The last time this Court addressed the crime of unlawful reentry was in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, the defend- ants argued that they could not be convicted of the crime because their underlying removal orders suf- fered from procedural flaws. The Court ruled that alt- hough the statute did not it self envision a challenge of that type, the Constitution nonetheless precluded prosecution for unlawful reentry where the defendant has not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to seek review of the prior removal order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "See id. at 833 n.7. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the statute at issue criminalized will- ful failure to leave the country despite an outstanding deportation order but did \"not permit the court which tries him for this crime to pass on\" the validity of that order. Id. at 177 (Jackson, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Under the Government's view of Section 1326, a federal court is required to impose criminal liability based on a re- moval order even when the court recognizes that the order should never have been issued in the first place. \"To sustain such a view … would make the ju- dicial function a rubber stamp in criminal cases for administrative or executive action\"—and substan-tively invalid action at that. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This at- tempt to use the courts and \"criminal sanctions to give effect to an invalid administrative order\" impinges on \"the unique responsibility of the judiciary to assure itself that constitutional limits on government power have been maintained.\" Gerald L. Neuman , The Con- stitutional Requirement of \"Some Evidence\" , 25 San Diego L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "327 U.S. 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Gerald L. Neuman , The Con- stitutional Requirement of \"Some Evidence\" , 25 San Diego L. Rev. 631, 698 (1988) (discussing Mendoza- Lopez ). Dissenting in the World War II case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Justice Rutledge recognized this constitutional concern. The statute there precluded a court presiding over a criminal en-forcement action even from considering a purely legal defect that rendered an administrative \"order invalid on its face.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "34 n.4. But the majority limited its holding to the war-time exigencies that dr ove that case's result. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]600 F.2d 904. Had Yakus re- solved the constitutional question here, there would have been no need for the Court to explicitly reserve the issue in its subsequent decisions in Spector and Mendoza-Lopez . As a leading treatise currently puts it, \"[i]t is doubtful, in light of current doctrines of due process, that Congress could deny a criminal defendant the right to raise the invalidity of a statute or regulation in his defense, absent extreme exigencies.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "34 n.4. But the majority limited its holding to the war-time exigencies that dr ove that case's result. See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking 434 U.S. 275[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Had Yakus re- solved the constitutional question here, there would have been no need for the Court to explicitly reserve the issue in its subsequent decisions in Spector and Mendoza-Lopez . As a leading treatise currently puts it, \"[i]t is doubtful, in light of current doctrines of due process, that Congress could deny a criminal defendant the right to raise the invalidity of a statute or regulation in his defense, absent extreme exigencies.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 F.2d 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "a. Where an administrative agency or other gov- ernment actor purports to exercise authority it does not have, the resulting action is ultra vires and void ab initio . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (where magistrate issued warrant in violation of statutory geographic limitation, such warrant \"was treated as no warrant at all—as ultra vires and void ab initio to use some of the law's favorite Latin phrases—as null and void without regard to potential questions of 20 'harmlessness'\"); see also 906 F.3d 1109; 883 F.3d 204; 863 F.3d 1041. Like other non-Article III bodies, IJs derive their authority from Congress. The INA authorizes IJs to conduct removal proceedings and prescribes the stat- utory minimum of the form of such removal proceed- ings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.3d 1109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "a. Where an administrative agency or other gov- ernment actor purports to exercise authority it does not have, the resulting action is ultra vires and void ab initio . See 809 F.3d 1109 (where magistrate issued warrant in violation of statutory geographic limitation, such warrant \"was treated as no warrant at all—as ultra vires and void ab initio to use some of the law's favorite Latin phrases—as null and void without regard to potential questions of 20 'harmlessness'\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 883 F.3d 204; 863 F.3d 1041. Like other non-Article III bodies, IJs derive their authority from Congress. The INA authorizes IJs to conduct removal proceedings and prescribes the stat- utory minimum of the form of such removal proceed- ings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "906 F.3d 1109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "a. Where an administrative agency or other gov- ernment actor purports to exercise authority it does not have, the resulting action is ultra vires and void ab initio . See 809 F.3d 1109 (where magistrate issued warrant in violation of statutory geographic limitation, such warrant \"was treated as no warrant at all—as ultra vires and void ab initio to use some of the law's favorite Latin phrases—as null and void without regard to potential questions of 20 'harmlessness'\"); see also 906 F.3d 1109; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 863 F.3d 1041. Like other non-Article III bodies, IJs derive their authority from Congress. The INA authorizes IJs to conduct removal proceedings and prescribes the stat- utory minimum of the form of such removal proceed- ings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "a. Where an administrative agency or other gov- ernment actor purports to exercise authority it does not have, the resulting action is ultra vires and void ab initio . See 809 F.3d 1109 (where magistrate issued warrant in violation of statutory geographic limitation, such warrant \"was treated as no warrant at all—as ultra vires and void ab initio to use some of the law's favorite Latin phrases—as null and void without regard to potential questions of 20 'harmlessness'\"); see also 906 F.3d 1109; 883 F.3d 204; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like other non-Article III bodies, IJs derive their authority from Congress. The INA authorizes IJs to conduct removal proceedings and prescribes the stat- utory minimum of the form of such removal proceed- ings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "863 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (\"No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.\"). Thus, for example, where the BIA enters a re- moval order without statutory authority to do so, its \"lack of authority to enter [the noncitizen's] removal order renders that component of his proceedings 'in essence, a legal nullity.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Mejia 897 F.3d 894464 F.3d 505. b. Here, Palomar-Santiago's removal order was ultra vires and void ab initio .",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 F.3d 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (\"No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.\"). Thus, for example, where the BIA enters a re- moval order without statutory authority to do so, its \"lack of authority to enter [the noncitizen's] removal order renders that component of his proceedings 'in essence, a legal nullity.'\" 335 F.3d 874; see also Mejia [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]464 F.3d 505. b. Here, Palomar-Santiago's removal order was ultra vires and void ab initio .",
		"citation_value_orig": "897 F.3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "§ 1229a(c)(3)(A) (\"No decision on deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.\"). Thus, for example, where the BIA enters a re- moval order without statutory authority to do so, its \"lack of authority to enter [the noncitizen's] removal order renders that component of his proceedings 'in essence, a legal nullity.'\" 335 F.3d 874; see also Mejia 897 F.3d 894[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Here, Palomar-Santiago's removal order was ultra vires and void ab initio .",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.3d 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "See Gov't Br. 7. And all agree that this was incorrect un-der [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that such state DUI convictions do not constitute \"crime[s] of violence,\" 18 U.S. C. § 16, qualifying as ag- gravated felonies under the INA. See Gov't Br. 8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Crucially, Palomar-Santiago's deportation order did not just become invalid at some later date; it was void from the time it was en tered. It is well-settled that this sort of \"judicial construction of a statute is an authoritative statement of what the statute meant before as well as after the decision of the case giving rise to that construction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, courts have appropriately referred to \"pre- Leocal \" removals based on prior DUI convictions—the precise issue here—as \"invalid.\" Aguilera-Rios , 769 F.3d at 632; see 418 F.3d 1104.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "511 U.S. 298. Accordingly, courts have appropriately referred to \"pre- Leocal \" removals based on prior DUI convictions—the precise issue here—as \"invalid.\" Aguilera-Rios , 769 F.3d at 632; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such orde rs were without legal au- thority and therefore are void ab initio . c. This Court's collateral-review jurisprudence re- inforces this analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "c. This Court's collateral-review jurisprudence re- inforces this analysis. The Court has repeatedly rec-ognized that new interpretations of a criminal statute that show a defendant was convicted of \"an act that the law does not make criminal\" are necessarily ret-roactive. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike new procedural rules, which merely call the reliability of the prior proceeding into doubt, substantive interpretations of a statute leave no \"possibility of a valid result\" where they \"elimi-nate[] a State's power to proscribe the defendant's conduct.\" 136 S. Ct. 718.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "523 U.S. 614. Unlike new procedural rules, which merely call the reliability of the prior proceeding into doubt, substantive interpretations of a statute leave no \"possibility of a valid result\" where they \"elimi-nate[] a State's power to proscribe the defendant's conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \"a convicti on or sentence imposed in violation of a substantive rule is not just erroneous but contrary to law and, as a result, void.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "at 731. Alternatively stated, \"a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to convict or punish a criminal de- fendant in the first place\" makes its \"judgments or sentences ... void ab initio .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, any punishment for an act that a subsequent court decision makes clear did not violate a criminal statute, as properly inter- preted, contravenes \"the Federal Due Process Clause.\" 531 U.S. 225, is not to the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "457 U.S. 537. Indeed, any punishment for an act that a subsequent court decision makes clear did not violate a criminal statute, as properly inter- preted, contravenes \"the Federal Due Process Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary. Lewis held that a federal court may use a state-court conviction as a predicate for a felon-in-pos- session charge even if that conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. 445 U.S. at 65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Expressly — And Correctly — Warned Against Using An Indisputably Erroneous Removal Order As The Basis For A Section 1326 Prosecution.",
		"context": "Neither did the other two cases the Government cites (Gov't Br. 34) to argue that a prior criminal conviction may not be collaterally attacked when used as the basis of a second conviction or enhanced sentence. See Daniels [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A felon-in-possession case truly comparable to the situation here would be one in which the Government attempted to prosecute someone for the offense after precedent established that the predicate conviction never should have issued in the first place. The Gov- ernment has not cited, and this Court has never con-sidered, any such case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment provides that \"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized,\" U.S. Const. amend IV, and it applies to the FTC. Knoll Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 This Court has held that the warrant itself—not merely supporting documents—must state with particularity the things to be seized such that the description is available for inspection by the person whose premises is to be searched. 540 U.S. 551.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 F.2d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Knoll Assocs., 397 F.2d 530. 23 This Court has held that the warrant itself—not merely supporting documents—must state with particularity the things to be seized such that the description is available for inspection by the person whose premises is to be searched. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any \"warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.\" 468 U.S. 981.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The FTC Uses Section 13(b) to Circumvent the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "540 U.S. 551. Any \"warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has never allowed the Fourth Amendment to be nullified or circumvented simply by appointing a receiver to seize the premises before a general search is conducted. The evils of general warrants go to the heart of the Founding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 981",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Deference to Agency Interpretation of Statutory Texts Allows the Executive to Exercise Judicial Power",
		"context": "In order to keep the political branches in check, the courts may not surrender their power to interpret the law to either of the political branches . Each branch of govern ment must support and defend the Constitution and thus must interpret the Constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Courts may not, however, cede their judicial power to interpret the laws to the Executive. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Deference to Agency Interpretation of Statutory Texts Allows the Executive to Exercise Judicial Power",
		"context": "Instead, the court now treats the existence of an \"ambiguity\" as meaning that Congress intended the agency, and only the agency, to interpret the statute. So long as the agency interpretation is 9 \"reasonable,\" Chevron requires the courts to cede their judicial power to the executive and approve the agency interpretation. This Court took this line of argument to its logical extreme in National Cable & Telecommunications As- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, th is Court ruled that Chevron defer- ence applied to th e FCCs decision that cable internet providers did not provide \"telecommunications ser- vice\" as defined by the Communications Act, and thus were exempt from common carrier regulation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Systems that autodialed stored lists of numbers were pervasive in 1991, and Congress chose to exclude them.",
		"context": "Civ. Code §§ 1788 to 1788.33. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Unlike the automated telemarketing devices prevalent in the early 1990s, which dialed a random or sequen- tial block of numbers, predictive dialers generally automatically dialed a list of numbers that had been preprogrammed and stored in the dialer, or were downloaded from a computer data- base. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Systems that autodialed stored lists of numbers were pervasive in 1991, and Congress chose to exclude them.",
		"context": ". That is exactly the sort of reasoning [the Supreme] Court has long rejected.\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). 21 TCPA predates the use of predictive dialers,\" Duran , 955 F.3d at 288, they—like the FCC—needed \"to de- termine whether the TCPA applied to this new tech- nology,\" Marks , 904 F.3d at 1045. The fatal problem with this reasoning is that predictive dialing is not a \"new technology.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The judgments of the courts below should be affirmed",
		"context": "App. 73a-77a). 21 See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]138 S. Ct. 443; Regents D.Ct. Dkt. 79 at 8; Batalla Vidal D.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 1200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The judgments of the courts below should be affirmed",
		"context": "App. 73a-77a). 21 See In re875 F.3d 1200[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Regents D.Ct. Dkt. 79 at 8; Batalla Vidal D.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "a. As originally understood, the Establishment Clause protects religious liberty by \"forestall[ing] com- pulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Town of Greece , 572 U.S. at 586 (plurality opinion) (\"It is an elemental First Amendment principle that government may not coerce its citizens 'to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.' \") (citation omitted). That is the threat at which the Establishment Clause is aimed, because it is the threat with which the Framers were well familiar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "Town of Greece , 572 U.S. at 608 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 16 judgment ); see Establishment 2144 -2146, 2152- 2159. \"[O]nly clergy of the official church could lawfully per- form sacraments; and dissenters, if tolerated, faced an array of civil disabilities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An establish- ment of religion at the time of the Founding was thus marked by some element of compelled religious belief or adherence, whether by requiring religious ob- servance or support, sanctioning nonadherence, or con- trolling the inner wor kings of the church. Establish- ment 2131.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "\"In 1785, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia considered a 'tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion.' \" Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Memorial and Re- monstrance), \"at once the most concise and the most ac- curate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what i s 'an establishment of reli- gion, ' \" 330 U.S. 1. \"In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison ob- jected to the proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious devotion in violation of conscience.\" Arizona C hristian , 563 U.S. at 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "\"In 1785, the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia considered a 'tax levy to support teachers of the Christian religion.' \" Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition 563 U.S. 125 (Memorial and Re- monstrance), \"at once the most concise and the most ac- curate statement of the views of the First Amendment's author concerning what i s 'an establishment of reli- gion, ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In the Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison ob- jected to the proposed assessment on the ground that it would coerce a form of religious devotion in violation of conscience.\" Arizona C hristian , 563 U.S. at 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "Id. at 300 (¶ 3) . The proposed assessment \"ultimately died in com- mittee,\" Arizona Christian , 563 U.S. at 141, and \"in its place Madison succeeded in securing the enactment of 'A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,' first intro- duced in the Virginia General Assembly seven years earlier by Thomas Jefferson,\" Valley Forge Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In condemning religious establishments, Jef- ferson's bill shared Madison's focus on coercion. As en- acted, the bill guaranteed \"[t]hat no man shall be com- pelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, re- strained, molested, or burthened in his body or goods, 18 nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "33 n.9. Madison went on to become \"the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.\" Hosanna - Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1789, he proposed in the House of Representatives the following language for those Clauses: \"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or wor- ship, nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.\" 1 Annals of Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "A committee consisting of Madison and others subsequently revised the language to read: \"no religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed.\" Id. at 729; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the House debated the revised language, Mad- ison explained that \"he apprehended the mean ing of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a reli-gion, and enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any manner contrary to their conscience.\" 1 Annals of Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "To the founding generation, the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses stood in harmony, serving the fundamental purpose o f \"secur[ing] religious lib- erty ,\" Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Di [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by both protecting against coercive governmental activity and ensuring the free- dom to worship according to the dictates of conscience, see Wallace , 472 U.S. at 50. b. History makes clear not only that the Establish- ment Clause forbids coercion, but what types of actions are (or are not) coercive. See Marsh , 463 U.S. at 790 (explaining that \"historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Es tablishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied\" to contemporaneous practices).",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "The same will generally be true of passive displays acknowledging the role of reli- gion in the Nation's history and the lives of its people . In no meaningful sense are o bservers being made to es- pouse religious belief , to engage in religious obser - vance, or to provide financial support targeted to any particular religion . c. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that the Establishment Clause did not permit a 22 school distric t's practice of reciting an official prayer in its public schools. Id . at 424.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The history of the Establishment Clause distinguishes the coercion of religious belief or adherence from the acknowledgement of religion in public life",
		"context": "In Schempp , the Court summarized Engel as holdin g that a violation of the Establishment Clause need not be \"predicated on coercion.\" 374 U.S. at 223. And in Com- mittee for Pub lic Education & Religious [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court relied on Schempp in turn for its statement that \"proof of coer- cion\" is \"not a necessary element of any claim under the Establishment Clause.\" Id. at 786.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Slipshod Way Courts Have Approached the Second Amendment Has Left a Jurisprudence of Doubt",
		"context": "Drake, 724 F.3d at 440 (Hardiman , J., dissenting). And while our Founders designed our system to allow for a diverse level of practices develop, it is unlikely that they intended the Second Amendment to turn on judicial vagaries. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court presumably hoped that the lower courts would help define the scope of the Second Amendment . In response, however, these courts have developed a slipshod way of handling cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "836 F.3d 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Slipshod Way Courts Have Approached the Second Amendment Has Left a Jurisprudence of Doubt",
		"context": "In response, however, these courts have developed a slipshod way of handling cases. The only thing that they have in common is their need for additional guidance. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Masciandaro , 638 F.3d at 475 (\"This case underscores the dilemma faced by lower courts in the post -Heller world . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.3d 659",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "And al - though this Court's cases provide that the \"liberty\" protected by the Due Process Clause may sometimes embrace certain unenumerated privacy interests, those interests would need grounding in history and tradition —wh ich a right to abortion lacks. See Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 723- 24 (the substantive -due- process question is not whether an interest is \"con-sistent with this Court's substantive -due-process line of cases,\" but whether it is supported by \"this Nation's histor y and practice\"). Consistent with these points, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on which Roe relied and which applied the most expan- sive approach to the right of privacy among pre -Roe cases, finds grounding in text and tradition. In inval-idating a state law regulating the use of contracep- tives, Griswold vindicated the textually and histori- cally grounded Fourth Amendment protection against government invasion of the home—which would likely have been necessary to prosecute under the 16 statute. E.g., id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Beyond all of these points is another that funda- mentally distinguishes abortion from any privacy or liberty interest that this Court has ever recognized. None of the privacy or liberty interests embraced in this Court's cases involves, as abortion does, \"the pur- poseful termination of a potential life.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Abortion is thus \"dif-ferent in kind from\" other interests \"that the Court has protected under the rubric of personal o r family 17 privacy and autonomy.\" 476 U.S. 747.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "448 U.S. 297. Abortion is thus \"dif-ferent in kind from\" other interests \"that the Court has protected under the rubric of personal o r family 17 privacy and autonomy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Roe itself acknowl- edged that \"[t]he pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy.\" 410 U.S. at 159.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Cf. Obergefell , 576 U.S. at 679 (\"[T]hese cases involve only the rights of two consenting adults whose marriages would pose no risk of harm to themselves or third parties. \"); Law- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So Roe's departure from the Constitution and past cases —and Casey 's stare -decisis- focused adherence to that departure, see 505 U.S. at 853; infra Part I -B— fail to accou nt for the material difference between a right to abortion and interests recognized in other cases. These features —that a right to abortion has no ba- sis in constitutional text, structure, history, or tradi-tion, and that such a right is fundamentally differ ent from any right recognized by this Court —show that Roe and Casey were \"poorly reasoned.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "So Roe's departure from the Constitution and past cases —and Casey 's stare -decisis- focused adherence to that departure, see 505 U.S. at 853; infra Part I -B— fail to accou nt for the material difference between a right to abortion and interests recognized in other cases. These features —that a right to abortion has no ba- sis in constitutional text, structure, history, or tradi-tion, and that such a right is fundamentally differ ent from any right recognized by this Court —show that Roe and Casey were \"poorly reasoned.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Abortion re- strictions should be subject only to the rational -basis review that applies to every law. Some have attempted to defend a right to abortion under equal -protection principles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Abortion re- strictions should be subject only to the rational -basis review that applies to every law. Some have attempted to defend a right to abortion under equal -protection principles. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, the \"fact that the justification\" for Roe \"continues to evolve\" itself \"undermin[es] the force of s tare decisis.\" Knick , 139 S. Ct. at 2178.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "And this reconstruction of Roe lacks merit. This Court's cases \"establish conclu- sively\" that \"the disfavoring of abortion ... is not ipso facto sex discrimination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Abortion restrictions like the one here do not \"treat anyone dif-ferently from anyone else or draw any distinction be- tween persons.\" 521 U.S. 793.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "506 U.S. 263. Abortion restrictions like the one here do not \"treat anyone dif-ferently from anyone else or draw any distinction be- tween persons.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And far from evincing an inherently discriminatory purpose, \"there are com-mon and respectable reasons for opposing [abortion], other than hatred of, or condescension toward (or in- deed any view at all concerning), women as a class — as is evident from the fact that men and women are on both sides of the issue.\" Bray , 506 U.S. at 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. This Court's Abortion Precedents Are Egregiously Wrong",
		"context": "Attempts to re -ground Roe on equal -protec- tion footing fail. Roe and Casey are, in sum, irreconcilable with con- stitutional text and \"historical meaning\" —which pro- vides compelling grounds to overrule them. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. \"Indirect enforcement\" does not create standing or avoid sovereign immunity",
		"context": "Clapper , 568 U.S. at 409 . \"[T]he mere existence of enforcement power does not create a justiciable controversy under Article III with enforce- ment officials.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, because the \"threatened injury must be certainly impending ,\" Clapper , 568 U.S. at 409, they must show some threat that the named defendants will use t hat power. Susan B. Anthony List , 573 U.S. at 158.",
		"citation_value_orig": "695 F.2d 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. \"Indirect enforcement\" does not create standing or avoid sovereign immunity",
		"context": "10 WWH.ROA.71. And even if the WWH petitioners have standing based on their indirect enforcement theory, that would at most allow them to challenge the constitu-tionality of indirect enforcement proceedings. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The executive officials cannot be sued under Ex parte Young for much the same reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. \"Indirect enforcement\" does not create standing or avoid sovereign immunity",
		"context": "And \"[t]he doctrine is limi ted to that pre- cise situation.\" Va. Office for Prot. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since these executive offic- ers cannot \"indirectly enfor ce\" SB 8, they have immunity from any request to enjoin them from indirectly enforc-ing SB 8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent's interpretation would protect the government's interests and conserve public resources",
		"context": "A relator and his counsel cannot know, in advance, whether the government will intervene, and that uncertainty may deter relators from coming forward. But even assuming that the government would intervene in every meritorious case, that merely highlights another problem with petitioners' interpretation: it would force the government to expend its own resources on cases it could otherwise leave to relators, lest the recoveries be lost altogether. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-49, Universal Health Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 15-7) (explaining that the government would feel \"pressured\" to intervene if it \"believed that courts woul d draw . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "§ 1064(3) . It should reject a rule that a domain name comprising a generic term or terms, when taken as a whole, for particular goods or services, is per se generic and therefore cannot be registered as a trademark or service mark . Both the Fourth and Federal Circuits have adopted the \"primary significance\" test to determine if a mark is generic in registration proceedings.8 See, e.g., Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3 d at 180 n.6 ; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; In re Reed Elsevier Props. , 482 F .3d 1376 , 1378 (Fed. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.3d 1359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "For the sake of conciseness and for the convenience of the Court, this brief incorporates by reference those cites. 7 Circuit has also recognized that \"the legal test of genericness is 'primary significance.'\" Ty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This test is flexible and requires evidence showing that \" the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer .\" Kellogg , 305 U.S. at 118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "This test is flexible and requires evidence showing that \" the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer .\" Kellogg , 305 U.S. at 118. The USPTO contends that , under Goodyear's India Rubber Glove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , a generic SLD plus a TLD necessarily result s in a generic composite as a matter of law . But as the Fourth Circuit found, \"[n]o circuit has adopted the bright line rule for which the USPTO advocates.\" Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 184.",
		"citation_value_orig": "128 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "There is no reason to adopt a bright line rule for domain names . As the Federal Circuit has recognized, in rare instances, \" the addition of a TLD indicato r to a descriptive term operate [s] to create a distinctive mark \" that may be eligible for trademark protection. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Adopting a bright line rule would condemn those marks to generic ness as a matter of law and deprive them forever of any trademark or service mark protection regardless of any evidence concerning their source -identifying significance. 8 In addition , \"[c] ertain terms may connote more than the sum of their parts ,\" and courts should \" take care to decide the genericness of these terms by looking to the whole.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 F.3d 1293",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "Adopting a bright line rule would condemn those marks to generic ness as a matter of law and deprive them forever of any trademark or service mark protection regardless of any evidence concerning their source -identifying significance. 8 In addition , \"[c] ertain terms may connote more than the sum of their parts ,\" and courts should \" take care to decide the genericness of these terms by looking to the whole.\" Liquid Controls [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That applies equally to domain na mes. \"Because the evaluation of a mark proposed for registration requires consideration of the mark as a whole, the distinctiveness derived from a connection to the Internet, as indicated by the TLD indicator, is a part of the calculus for registration. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 F.2d 934",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "But genericness is a question of fact. See, e.g. , Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 181; Advertise.com, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; In re573 F.3d 1300 ; Door Sys., 83 F.3d 169 . \"More precisely, the question of genericness is one of linguistic usage, and can be approached by a variety of routes. \" Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 171.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 974",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "But genericness is a question of fact. See, e.g. , Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 181; Advertise.com, 616 F.3d 974 ; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Door Sys., 83 F.3d 169 . \"More precisely, the question of genericness is one of linguistic usage, and can be approached by a variety of routes. \" Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 171.",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 1300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "But genericness is a question of fact. See, e.g. , Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 181; Advertise.com, 616 F.3d 974 ; In re573 F.3d 1300 ; Door Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"More precisely, the question of genericness is one of linguistic usage, and can be approached by a variety of routes. \" Door Sys., 83 F.3d at 171.",
		"citation_value_orig": "83 F.3d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": "One commonly accepted route is consumer surveys. See, e.g. , Princeton Vanguard , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also MCCARTHY , supra , § 12:14, at 12 -58 (\"Consumer s urveys have become almost de ri gueur in litigation over genericness.\"). Fourth Circuit precedent provides that \"the district court, as the trier of fact, is accorded great deference\" on factual findings. Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 181 (citing Swatch 739 F.3d 150 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Whether A Term Is Generic Should Be Determined By The Fact-Specific \"Primary Significance\" Test",
		"context": ", Princeton Vanguard , 786 F.3d 960; see also MCCARTHY , supra , § 12:14, at 12 -58 (\"Consumer s urveys have become almost de ri gueur in litigation over genericness.\"). Fourth Circuit precedent provides that \"the district court, as the trier of fact, is accorded great deference\" on factual findings. Booking.com B.V. , 915 F.3d at 181 (citing Swatch [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The district court's factual finding that B OOKING.COM is descriptive based on the record evidence should thus be accorded great deference. Although \"there is no need for a survey if other evidence overwhelmingly proves that the disputed designation is a generic name,\" several judges are \"used to su rvey evidence and often expect to receive evidentiary assistance by surveys in resolving generic disputes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "739 F.3d 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure",
		"context": "As an initial matter, Nance's complaint is time- barred. A challenge to a state's method of execution brought under § 1983 is subject to the statute of limi- tations governing personal injury actions in the state where the challenge was filed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (III) (B) (11th Cir. 2017). Nance's § 1983 complaint was filed in Georgia, so Georgia's two -year statute of limitations period for personal injury actions applies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure",
		"context": "Id. For as -applied § 1983 challenge s, the statute of limitations begins to run when the facts which would support the cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nance admits in his complaint that he started using the drug gabapentin in April 2016, which was over three years before he filed his complaint in Janu ary 2020. Pet.App.53a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure",
		"context": "Pet.App.53a. Therefore, the statute of limitations would have accrued in April 2016, and the two-year § 1983 statute of limitations would have expired by the time the complaint was filed. See, e.g., 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As for the claims concerning Nance's compromised veins, Nance's first habeas petition, filed in May 2014, demon strate s that Nance knew of his allegedly compro- mised veins. Res.App .16a, 19a .",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure",
		"context": "On top of everything else, Nance's complaint would also fail, regardless of whether this Court granted review, because it simply repeats substan- tive argu ment s rejected by this Court in Glossip and Bucklew . To prevail on an Eighth Amend ment as- applied execution challenge , a petitioner must show that a feasible, readily imple ment ed alternative method of execution will significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain, which the State has refused to adopt without a legitimate penological reason. See Bucklew , 139 S. Ct. at 1125, 1129 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, regardless of whether Nance's claim was raised in a § 1983 complaint or a § 2254 17 habeas petition, Nance's firing squad alter native fails. The State of Georgia has legitimate penological reasons for rejecting death by firing squad in lieu of lethal injection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Petition Presents a Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Whether section 1983 or Habeas Is the Appropriate Procedure",
		"context": "Here, regardless of whether Nance's claim was raised in a § 1983 complaint or a § 2254 17 habeas petition, Nance's firing squad alter native fails. The State of Georgia has legitimate penological reasons for rejecting death by firing squad in lieu of lethal injection. For exam ple, Georgia has never execu ted a prisoner by firing squad, see Bucklew , 139 S. Ct. at 1129-30, and lethal injec tion has been univer sally accepted as the most humane method of execution, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, Nance's claim is virtually in distinguish able from the claim rejected by this Court in Bucklew .",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text And Context Support An Actual-Agreement Requirement",
		"context": ". with the text of the treat y and the context in which the written words are used.\" Air [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Abbott, 560 U.S. at 10 (same). Here, al though \"habitual residence\" is not defined in the Hague Convention or in the treaty's im- plementing legislation, the Convention's text and con- text demonstrate that an infant's residence in a coun- try cannot be \"habitual\" unless both parents share an 30 intent—and thus are in ac tual agreement—that she remain there. A \"habitual residence\" requires regular physical presence in a country with an intention of remaining there for at least some time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text And Context Support An Actual-Agreement Requirement",
		"context": "Mozes , 239 F.3d at 1076. As the courts of appeals requiring actual agreement have 32 recognized, the parents' joint view on where they in- tend to raise the child provides the settled purpose and continuity that the in fant herself is unable to manifest. See, e.g., Gitter , 396 F.3d at 133 (asking \"where the parents mutually intended the child's ha-bitual residence to be\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In holding that the habitual residence of an infant can be established in the absence of the parents' mu-tual intent, the Sixth Circuit rendered the word \"ha- bitual\" meaningless. Where no meeting of the minds is required, there is no reliable means for ensuring that an infant's mere physical presence in a country has a sufficiently settled qua lity to be deemed \"habit- ual.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text And Context Support An Actual-Agreement Requirement",
		"context": "Dist. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case exposes the deficiencies of the Sixth Cir- cuit's approach to habitual residence. The Sixth Cir-cuit reasoned \"[t]hat an 'infant will normally be a ha-bitual resident of the country where the matrimonial home exists.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Harassment in the Workplace",
		"context": ". received hundreds of threatening emails and phone calls.\" Declaration of Frank Schubert in Support of Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for a Protective Order at 6, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, a woman who had managed her popular, family-owned restaurant for 26 years was forced to resign after it was made public that she gave $100 to Prop 8, because \"throngs of [angry] protesters\" repeatedly arri ved at the restaurant and \"shout[ed] 'shame on you' at customers.\" Steve Lopez, Prop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Harassment in the Workplace",
		"context": ". received hundreds of threatening emails and phone calls.\" Declaration of Frank Schubert in Support of Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for a Protective Order at 6, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, a woman who managed her popular, family-owned restaurant for 26 years was forced to resign after it was made public that she gave $100 to Prop 8, because \"throngs of [angry] protesters\" repeatedly arrived at the restaurant and \"shout[ed] 'shame on you' at customers.\" 23 The police even had to \"arriv[e] in riot gear one ni ght to quell the angry mob\" at the restaurant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Many territorial officers would meet the First Circuit's test",
		"context": "82-447, 66 Stat. 327 (1952). 2 See, e.g., Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, like the Board Members, the Governor of Puerto Rico serves in a continuing office; he exercises significant discretion in carrying out important func- tions; and his powers trace their authority directly and exclusively to federal law. See, e.g., Sanchez-Valle , 136 S. Ct. at 1875 (\"Put simply, Congress conferred the au- thority to create the Puerto Rico Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Many territorial officers would meet the First Circuit's test",
		"context": "V, § 3 (Chief Justice and four Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico). Under the logic of the First Circuit, not only would all of these officers be subject to the Appoint- ments Clause, all the actions they have taken would potentially be open to question. See, e.g., Noel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff 'd by Nat'l Labor Relations 573 U.S. 513. Besides Puerto Rico, the First Circuit's reasoning also threatens the self-gov ernment of two other unin- corporated territories—Guam and the U.S. Virgin Is- lands. 3 Unlike Puerto Rico, these two territories have never passed a local constitution to provide a basis for 3 These concerns could also be raised about American Samoa.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Many territorial officers would meet the First Circuit's test",
		"context": "3 Unlike Puerto Rico, these two territories have never passed a local constitution to provide a basis for 3 These concerns could also be raised about American Samoa. The Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands specifically reserved the right of local self-government when it entered the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States. See, e.g., Com- monwealth of the Northern Mariana [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 territorial government4—instead, they draw their power exclusively from two Organic Acts passed by Congress. See 48 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 F.3d 1057",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review",
		"context": "Mach Min- ing, 575 U.S. 480. Where, as here, Congress limits an agency's authority, Congress does not nor- mally give the agency the sole power to police those limits, thereby issuing a \"blank check[] drawn to the credit of some administrative officer. \" Bowen , 476 U.S. at 671 (citation omitted); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —one that can be met only by \"clear and convincing evidence,\" 509 U.S. 43; see, e.g., PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. 2051, and more generally through- out Section 1395 l, Congress distinguished between de- terminations that should be left to the agency and those subject to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. 1395l (t)(12), (t)(21)(E); see also , e.g., 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 U.S. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review",
		"context": "Mach Min- ing, 575 U.S. 480. Where, as here, Congress limits an agency's authority, Congress does not nor- mally give the agency the sole power to police those limits, thereby issuing a \"blank check[] drawn to the credit of some administrative officer. \" Bowen , 476 U.S. at 671 (citation omitted); see 34 U.S. 8 —one that can be met only by \"clear and convincing evidence,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., PDR Network, 139 S. Ct. 2051, and more generally through- out Section 1395 l, Congress distinguished between de- terminations that should be left to the agency and those subject to judicial review. See 42 U.S.C. 1395l (t)(12), (t)(21)(E); see also , e.g., 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review",
		"context": "18 That is the beginning and end of the inquiry. Es- pecially where Congress has made such particularized judgments about reviewability , one can hardly say that Congress unambiguously foreclosed judicial re- view of the agency 's actions under paragraph (14) simply by remaining silent on the matter. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike many Medicare rate -setting provisions, paragraph (14) tightly cabins rate -setting discretion for outpatient drugs. Subparagraph (14)(D) sets forth detailed, multi- step requirements for agency collection of rigorous survey data on hospitals' drug acquisition costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government Cannot Overcome The Strong Presumption Favoring Judicial Review",
		"context": "of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. CountryMark requires an SRE in some years even though it has been able to comply with its RVO obligations without an SRE in other years",
		"context": "This changed in 2017 when another panel in the Tenth Circuit invalidated EPA's methodology. Sinclair Wyoming Ref. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Based on that decision, EPA granted CountryMark SREs for the 2017 and 2018 compliance years (which were accounted for in 2018 and 2019), recognizing that CountryMark experienced dispropor- tionate economic impact. With the exemptions, the RFS costs returned to manageable levels in 2018 and 2019.",
		"citation_value_orig": "887 F.3d 986",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "The Court has made it clear that this clause i s a delega- tion of authority to adopt only procedural regulations for congressional elections; it does not permit states to favor or to di sadvantage particular candidates. See U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. States are not permitted to dictate electoral outcomes based on candidates ' political positions because such action would constitute an illegitimate purpose and would be incon- sistent with the constitutional norm against government action solely in support of partisan advantage. See 531 U.S. 510; Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833 –34 (\"[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regula- tions, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779. States are not permitted to dictate electoral outcomes based on candidates ' political positions because such action would constitute an illegitimate purpose and would be incon- sistent with the constitutional norm against government action solely in support of partisan advantage. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833 –34 (\"[T]he Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regula- tions, and not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints. \"). In Cook , the Court overturned a Missouri consti- tutional amendment requiring each candidate 's position on congressional term limits to be printed on the ballot because the amendment had the purpose of favoring cer- 21 tain candidates over others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "Id. at 526 (quoting Thornton , 514 U.S. at 833–34); see id. at 524–27; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, courts have emphasized the illegitimacy of government election administration with a partisan purpose in striking down voter identification laws and early voting restrictions on nonracial bias grounds. In Obama for America v. Husted , the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court 's injunction against an Ohio law limiting early voting because the law discriminated between clas- ses of voters.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court's Elections Clause decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "The court in Husted drew upon this Court 's holding in Bush v. Gore that \"the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person 's vote over that of another. \" Id. at 910 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Consistent with the constitutional norm estab- lished in these cases, the pane l below in Common Cause held that redistricting of congressional districts for parti- san a dvantage violates the Elections Clause. See Com- mon Cause , 318 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Administrative Agencies Increasingly Attempt to Stand in Congress's Shoes",
		"context": "See BST Holdings, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 33698. 9 If so, any effort by EPA to save the statute by proposing a limiting constru ction or promising to behave responsibly should be rejected out of hand. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 These are but two examples of a broader trend in recent years of federal agencies wresting from the People's elected representatives the power to make major policy choices among competing societal visions in poli tically divisive contexts. This is far from constitutionally healthy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "114, 28 Stat. 335, 335 -37. While this Court struck down other parts of the Act, see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it upheld the jury discrimination pro- visions, 100 U.S. 303 ; Ex Parte100 U.S. 339. Guaranteeing meaningful Black jury service was critical for several overlapping reasons. An in- tegrated jury affirmed the citizenship of those called to serve: Black newspapers would often publish the names of prominent community leaders empaneled as jurors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "114, 28 Stat. 335, 335 -37. While this Court struck down other parts of the Act, see109 U.S. 3 , it upheld the jury discrimination pro- visions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ex Parte100 U.S. 339. Guaranteeing meaningful Black jury service was critical for several overlapping reasons. An in- tegrated jury affirmed the citizenship of those called to serve: Black newspapers would often publish the names of prominent community leaders empaneled as jurors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "114, 28 Stat. 335, 335 -37. While this Court struck down other parts of the Act, see109 U.S. 3 , it upheld the jury discrimination pro- visions, 100 U.S. 303 ; Ex Parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Guaranteeing meaningful Black jury service was critical for several overlapping reasons. An in- tegrated jury affirmed the citizenship of those called to serve: Black newspapers would often publish the names of prominent community leaders empaneled as jurors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "And it protected Black defendants. In early cases like Strauder , the Court \"understood that allowing the defendant an opportunity to secure representation of 26 the defendant's race on the jury may help to over- come racial bias and provide the defendant with a better chance of having a fair trial.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Black jury participation declined after Recon- struction, but, owing to the traditional requirement of unanimity, even limited Black participation posed a problem for many whites. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "28 feature of Louisiana justice ever since. Throughout most of the twentieth century, Black citizens were simply left out of juror pools ; reviewing courts blessed the massive underrepresentation of Black jurors on lis ts so long as state officials pointed to vague qualifications —e.g., \"sound judgment and fair character\" —to account for large racial disparities in jury pools and venires. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord 3 So.2d 895 (La. 1941 ); 172 So. 412 . The Court's fair -cross -section jurisprudence has lim- ited such overt exclusionary practices.",
		"citation_value_orig": "162 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "1941 ); 172 So. 412 . The Court's fair -cross -section jurisprudence has lim- ited such overt exclusionary practices. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But fair -cross -sec- tion challenges remain notoriously difficult to prove, Nina W. Chernoff, Wrong About the Right: How Courts Undermine the Fair Cross -Section Guarantee by Confusing it with Equal Protection , 64 Hastings L. Rev. 141 (2012) , and Black jurors remain substan- tially underrepresented in Louisiana venires today, Gordon Russell, Tilting the scales: In Louisiana, is it truly a 'jury of one's peers' when race matters?",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "See Alan Blinder, Glitch Kept Thousands of Young People Off Jury Rolls in Louisiana , N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 2019 , at A24 (\"Since 2011, more than 150,000 people —including 29 The challenge -for-cause process exacerbates these di sparities, which defendants are powerless to contest through fair -cross -section claims. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As in decades past, Louisiana prosecutors remain far more likely to re- move Black potential jurors than white potential ju- rors for lacking the required objectivity —formerly \"sound judgment and fair character \"—to serve. Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethink ing Ra- cial Exclusion and the Jury , 118 Mich. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unanimity Has Always Implicated Fundamental Fairness",
		"context": "There is a broad scholarly c onsensus that Batson has not meaning- fully curtailed racial bias in the exercise of peremp- thousands born after June 2, 1993 —may have been inadvert- ently left off the jury rolls, potentially starving young defend- ants of jurors who were roughly their age.\"). 30 tory strikes, both in Louisiana and across the coun- try. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The end result is a system that functioned —all the way until its abolition in 2018 —precisely as it was originally designed : Black jurors like Ms. Tay- lor, when they did manage to serve, often found that their service is \"meaningless.\" Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1493 (citation and internal quotation marks omit- ted); see also State v. Maxie , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "This analysis is flawed. First, \"[a] delegation of authority to determine the potential criminal exposure of half a million people cannot be deemed narrow.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second, the Second Circuit 's approach confuses the need for meaningful statutory guidance with the 44 question of how many people a delegation affects. Congress cannot cede its lawmaking power to another branch just because that power concerns a discrete group.",
		"citation_value_orig": "627 F.3d 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "On that question, the Second Circuit and other courts of appeals have suggested that the mere existence of a detailed statutory regime to govern post - Act offenders supplies an in telligible principle for deciding whether SORNA should apply to pre -Act offenders. See J.A. 108; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 561 F.3d 1202 . This is wrong b ecause the Attorney General was given plenary authority to decide whether SORNA's requirements even apply to pre -Act offenders. And if 45 the Attorney General decides to compel pre -Act offenders to register, there is no statutory directive that she apply the same terms to pre -Act offenders as to post-Act offenders (or even apply the same terms to all pre -Act offenders).",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "On that question, the Second Circuit and other courts of appeals have suggested that the mere existence of a detailed statutory regime to govern post - Act offenders supplies an in telligible principle for deciding whether SORNA should apply to pre -Act offenders. See J.A. 108; see also 750 F.3d 263 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This is wrong b ecause the Attorney General was given plenary authority to decide whether SORNA's requirements even apply to pre -Act offenders. And if 45 the Attorney General decides to compel pre -Act offenders to register, there is no statutory directive that she apply the same terms to pre -Act offenders as to post-Act offenders (or even apply the same terms to all pre -Act offenders).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 F.3d 1202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "This is wrong b ecause the Attorney General was given plenary authority to decide whether SORNA's requirements even apply to pre -Act offenders. And if 45 the Attorney General decides to compel pre -Act offenders to register, there is no statutory directive that she apply the same terms to pre -Act offenders as to post-Act offenders (or even apply the same terms to all pre -Act offenders). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, rather than cabining the Attorney General's discretion, Congress's explicit guidance for post -Act offenders starkly exposes the Attorney General's wholly unchecked power to devise a pre -Act regime and prosecut e anyone who violates it. See United States v. Nichols , 784 F .3d 666, 675 (10th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "§ 20901. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rev'd on other grounds, 136 S. Ct. 1113 ; Ambert , 561 F.3d at 1213- 14. According to these courts, this declaration of purpose shows that Congress meant to \"provide the broadest possible protection to the public\" and that the Attorney General was therefore instructed to require the registration of pre -Act offenders \"to the extent that he determines it would contribute to the protection of the public and the comprehensiveness of a national sex offender registry.\" Ambert , 561 F.3d at 1214.",
		"citation_value_orig": "775 F.3d 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "§ 20901. See, e.g. , 775 F.3d 1225 , rev'd on other grounds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ambert , 561 F.3d at 1213- 14. According to these courts, this declaration of purpose shows that Congress meant to \"provide the broadest possible protection to the public\" and that the Attorney General was therefore instructed to require the registration of pre -Act offenders \"to the extent that he determines it would contribute to the protection of the public and the comprehensiveness of a national sex offender registry.\" Ambert , 561 F.3d at 1214.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "These provisions comprise the \"comprehensive national system\" contemp lated by Congress ; it is not clear how Congress felt about the registration of pre -Act offenders merely because it sought to establish a more comprehensive overall system for future registration. This Court has also repeatedly and consistently rejected the contention that SORNA 's general, overall purpose necessarily means that Congress intended the statute to cover as many offenders as possible in every situation (or otherwise controls the meaning of later 48 specific provisions) . See Nichols, 136 S. Ct. at 1118- 19 (rejecting Government's argument t hat SORNA's purpose means it must be interpreted to cover offenders who move abroad); Reynolds , 565 U.S. at 442 (rejecting Government's argument that SOR NA's purpose means the statute must be construed t o cover pre-Act offenders of its own force); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions affirm that SORNA's general declaration of purpose does not control the interpretation of its particular statutory provisions. In the same way, it does not provide a discernable restriction o n the Attorney General's p ower.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The courts of appeals have not persuasively identified an intelligible principle in Section 20913(d)",
		"context": "But Congress did not offer any guidance as to how the Att orney General should balance this potential desire for expansive coverage against other important policy concerns, such as the burden retroactivity imposes on states. As the Court recognized when it construed the Comprehensive Criminal Control Act of 1984, \"no legislation pu rsues its purposes at all costs\" : \"Deciding what competing values will or will not be sacrificed to the achievement of a particular objective is the very essence of legislative choice—and it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent simplistica lly to assume that whatever furthers the statute's primary objective must be the law. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. SORNA is replete with examples of compromises with respect to the registration of post -Act offenders, including the exemption of certain offenders and 8 For instance, to be \"comprehensive,\" does SORNA require a tier II offender released in 1980 to register for another 25 years after SORNA's 2006 enactment, as one Attorney General decided? Or is SORNA still \"comprehensive\" if that offender is freed from SO RNA's registration requirements altogether, as a different Attorney General later decided?",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
		"context": "\"Whether a law passed by Congress is a 'law of the United States' depends on the meaning given to that phrase by its context. A law for the District of Colum- bia, though enacted by Congress, was held to be not a 'law of the United States' within the meaning of [fed- eral law].\" Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Likewise, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
		"context": "The Court has also made this distinction in other instances. For example, when determining the author-ity of judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, whether Congress created the court un- der Article III or Article IV (or in other instances Arti-cle I) is controlling in any case regarding the salary, tenure, and constitutional authority of that judge. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is demonstrated by comparing the federal courts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. While Puerto Rico has had an Article III court since 1966, 14 \"[t]he District Court of the Virgin Islands derives its jurisdiction from Article IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate the territories of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
		"context": "This is demonstrated by comparing the federal courts of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. While Puerto Rico has had an Article III court since 1966, 14 \"[t]he District Court of the Virgin Islands derives its jurisdiction from Article IV, § 3 of the United States Constitution, which authorizes Congress to regulate the territories of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Vooys , 901 F.3d at 180–81 (\"[T]he District Court of the Virgin Islands [is] an Article IV court. \"); 48 U.S.C. § 1614(a) (\"The President shall, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, appoint two judges for the District Court of the Virgin Islands, who shall hold office for terms of ten years and until their successo rs are chosen and quali- fied, unless sooner remove d by the President for cause.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "738 F.3d 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
		"context": "17 \"Whether a law passed by Congress is a 'law of the United States' depends on the meaning given to that phrase by its context. A law for the District of Colum- bia, though enacted by Congress, was held to be not a 'law of the United States' within the meaning of [fed- eral law].\" Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Likewise, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A \"law of the United States\" is not exempt from constitutional scrutiny simply because it applies to a territory",
		"context": "The Court has also made this distinction in other instances. For example, when determining the author-ity of judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, whether Congress created the court un- der Article III or Article IV (or in other instances Arti-cle I) is controlling in any case regarding the salary, tenure, and constitutional authority of that judge. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So while the Territory Clause, as interpreted in the Insular Cases , may permit Congress to enact a law of a territory that would otherwise violate a right granted by the Constitution, even on their own terms the Insular Cases do not grant Congress any authority to enact a law of the United States—such as the Social Security Act—in violation of those rights. 18",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The problem of proof",
		"context": "If recklessness rather than intent were a defense, how could the defendant's claim be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt? It is no longer permitted to presume that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his acts, even if the presumption is rebuttable. See Sand- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No one but the defendant knows whether his act was inten- tional or reckless, but his act demonstrates it was one or the other. 12 889 A. 2d 312, is a real- life example of evidence that is ambiguous as to which of the three mental states it proves even though it clearly proves that one of them is true.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U. S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The problem of proof",
		"context": "See Sand- 442 U. S. 510. No one but the defendant knows whether his act was inten- tional or reckless, but his act demonstrates it was one or the other. 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is a real- life example of evidence that is ambiguous as to which of the three mental states it proves even though it clearly proves that one of them is true. Erskine admit- ted giving the victim a bloody nose and \"holding his hand over her mouth until she stopped yelling.\" Id., at 316, ¶ 11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "889 A. 2d 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The problem of proof",
		"context": "See ibid. The trial judge instructed the jury on the intentional, knowing, and depraved indifference mental states but did not require them to agree on one of the alternatives. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, see id., at 316, ¶ 13, relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In law school hypotheticals, and sometimes appellate opinions, facts are often crisply defined as if we were omniscient. In the real world, facts are often messy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U. S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "1605(a)(3). Congress did not fur- ther define those terms, but this Court has previously 15 looked to t he \"most recent restatement of foreign rela- tions law at the time of the FSIA's enactment\" to dis- cern the contemporary meaning of one of the statute's provisions. Permanent Mission of India to the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Baker Botts L. L. 576 U.S. 121 defined a \"taking\" as \"[c]onduct attributable to a state that is intended to, and does , effectively deprive an alien of substantially all the benefit of his interest in property.\" Id. § 192, at 572 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "b. That conclusion is reinforced by \"settled princi- ples of statu tory of construction\" under which particu- lar words or phrases should be given \"a consistent meaning\" across statutes that \"pertain to the same sub- ject.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Twelve years b efore Congress enacted the FSIA, it enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, which created an exception to the act of state doctrine — the doctrine that generally bars U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of the acts of a foreign state undertaken within it s own jurisdiction, 168 U.S. 250 . The Second Hickenlooper Amend- ment was a response to this Court's decision in Sab- batino , 376 U.S. at 428, which held that the act of state doctrine bar s U.S. courts from adju dicating claims in- volving the taking of property by a foreign sovereign within its own territory .",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "That conclusion is reinforced by \"settled princi- ples of statu tory of construction\" under which particu- lar words or phrases should be given \"a consistent meaning\" across statutes that \"pertain to the same sub- ject.\" 409 U.S. 239. Twelve years b efore Congress enacted the FSIA, it enacted the Second Hickenlooper Amendment, which created an exception to the act of state doctrine — the doctrine that generally bars U.S. courts from sitting in judgment of the acts of a foreign state undertaken within it s own jurisdiction, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Second Hickenlooper Amend- ment was a response to this Court's decision in Sab- batino , 376 U.S. at 428, which held that the act of state doctrine bar s U.S. courts from adju dicating claims in- volving the taking of property by a foreign sovereign within its own territory . In the wake of Sabbatino , Con- gress sought to ensure that the act of state doctrine would not prevent courts from adjudicating certain ex- propriation claims, such as those arising from the Cas- tro government's expropriation of American -owned businesses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "The Second Hickenlooper Amend- ment was a response to this Court's decision in Sab- batino , 376 U.S. at 428, which held that the act of state doctrine bar s U.S. courts from adju dicating claims in- volving the taking of property by a foreign sovereign within its own territory . In the wake of Sabbatino , Con- gress sought to ensure that the act of state doctrine would not prevent courts from adjudicating certain ex- propriation claims, such as those arising from the Cas- tro government's expropriation of American -owned businesses. See Banco Nacional de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]383 F.2d 166, cert. d enied, 390 U.S. 956. The text of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment specifie s that the exception to the act of state doctrine applies in cases involving a \"confiscation or other taking by an act of state in violation of the princ iples of international law .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "243 F. Supp. 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "The Second Hickenlooper Amend- ment was a response to this Court's decision in Sab- batino , 376 U.S. at 428, which held that the act of state doctrine bar s U.S. courts from adju dicating claims in- volving the taking of property by a foreign sovereign within its own territory . In the wake of Sabbatino , Con- gress sought to ensure that the act of state doctrine would not prevent courts from adjudicating certain ex- propriation claims, such as those arising from the Cas- tro government's expropriation of American -owned businesses. See Banco Nacional de 243 F. Supp. 957[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. d enied, 390 U.S. 956. The text of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment specifie s that the exception to the act of state doctrine applies in cases involving a \"confiscation or other taking by an act of state in violation of the princ iples of international law .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 F.2d 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "2370 (e)(2) (emphasis added). N ine years before the FSIA was enacted, a 17 court interpreted the quoted language to prevent the application of the exception in cases involving \"confisca- tions by a state of the property o f its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether compen- sation has been provided.\" F. Palicio y Compania, S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]375 F.2d 1011; see 891 F.3d 1311; Bank 723 F. Supp. 516 ; 539 F. Supp. 209. The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 F. Supp. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "2370 (e)(2) (emphasis added). N ine years before the FSIA was enacted, a 17 court interpreted the quoted language to prevent the application of the exception in cases involving \"confisca- tions by a state of the property o f its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether compen- sation has been provided.\" F. Palicio y Compania, S. 256 F. Supp. 481[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 891 F.3d 1311; Bank 723 F. Supp. 516 ; 539 F. Supp. 209. The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.2d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "2370 (e)(2) (emphasis added). N ine years before the FSIA was enacted, a 17 court interpreted the quoted language to prevent the application of the exception in cases involving \"confisca- tions by a state of the property o f its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether compen- sation has been provided.\" F. Palicio y Compania, S. 256 F. Supp. 481375 F.2d 1011; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bank 723 F. Supp. 516 ; 539 F. Supp. 209. The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "2370 (e)(2) (emphasis added). N ine years before the FSIA was enacted, a 17 court interpreted the quoted language to prevent the application of the exception in cases involving \"confisca- tions by a state of the property o f its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether compen- sation has been provided.\" F. Palicio y Compania, S. 256 F. Supp. 481375 F.2d 1011; see 891 F.3d 1311; Bank [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 539 F. Supp. 209. The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F. Supp. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "2370 (e)(2) (emphasis added). N ine years before the FSIA was enacted, a 17 court interpreted the quoted language to prevent the application of the exception in cases involving \"confisca- tions by a state of the property o f its own nationals, no matter how flagrant and regardless of whether compen- sation has been provided.\" F. Palicio y Compania, S. 256 F. Supp. 481375 F.2d 1011; see 891 F.3d 1311; Bank 723 F. Supp. 516 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 F. Supp. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "The expropriation exception's reference to \" rights in property taken in violation of international law\" closely tracks the Second Hickenlooper Amendment's refer- ence to \"takings in violation of pri nciples of inter- national law.\" Because the two statutes also \"pertain to the same subject\" —the facilitati on of judicial review of claims involving takings by a foreign state —they should be interpreted in the same way. Erlenbaugh , 409 U.S. at 243; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, like the Sec- ond Hickenlooper Amendment, the expropriation ex- ception excludes any cases involving domestic taking s, \"no matter how flagrant .\" Palicio , 256 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "See p. 15, supra. And no court of appeals espoused the view that the expropriation exception may be understood to cover takings that occur as part of a genocide until 2012— almost 40 years after the FSIA's enactment and more than 60 years after the 1948 Genoc ide Convention. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This dearth of contemporary support for the court of appeals' position cannot be excused by analogy to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) , 28 U.S.C. 1350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text excludes property taken from a sovereign's own nationals",
		"context": "Hungary I, 812 F.3d 145 . But there is no reason to assume that Con- gress intended for the expropriation exception to be in-terpreted in accordance with the ATS, a statute that employs different statutory language, was drafted in a different context, was enacted almost two centuries ear- lier, and was not con sidered in the context of human - 19 rights law until after the FSIA was enacted . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As noted, the text of the Second Hickenlooper Amendment provides the far more obvious statutory pr ecursor for the expropriation exception. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Navajo Nation's breach-of-trust claim fails to allege the violation of any specific trust duty that the government has expressly accepted",
		"context": "The United States has a general trust relation- ship with Indian tribes. But the existence of that gen- eral relat ionship does not itself establish any judicially enforceable duties against the United States. In a series of decisions culminating in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court has made clear that a tribe may sue to enforce only those trust responsibilit ies that the United States has \"ex- pressly accept[ed].\" Id. at 177.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Significance of Obergefell",
		"context": "l In Obergefell v. Hodges, this Court found in the Constitution a right of personal identity for all citizens. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he Justices in the majority held that: \" The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Significance of Obergefell",
		"context": "Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. Certainly, government ought to protect , not impede , the free exercise of religious conscience. See, e.g., 18 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]565 U.S. 171. State actions must uphold constitutionally - protected freedoms, not grant special protections for some, while coercing others to engage i n conduct or expression contrary to their religious identity and conscience . Contrary to Obergefell 's holding, Smith eviscerate s the constitutional right to one 's religious identity and free exercise, enabling States to subjectively deem infringement on religious conscience as neutral and generally applicable (as it always does when it imposes special SOGI preferences).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Significance of Obergefell",
		"context": "Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1731. Certainly, government ought to protect , not impede , the free exercise of religious conscience. See, e.g., 18 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, 137 S. Ct. 2012[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. State actions must uphold constitutionally - protected freedoms, not grant special protections for some, while coercing others to engage i n conduct or expression contrary to their religious identity and conscience . Contrary to Obergefell 's holding, Smith eviscerate s the constitutional right to one 's religious identity and free exercise, enabling States to subjectively deem infringement on religious conscience as neutral and generally applicable (as it always does when it imposes special SOGI preferences).",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Significance of Obergefell",
		"context": "Fulton , 141 S. Ct. at 1881; Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2016 ; Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 546. \" Under that stringent standard, only a state interest ' of the highest order ' can justify the government's discriminatory policy. \" Trinity Lutheran, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 ( citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Fulton , 141 S. Ct. at 1881. And a s Masterpiece Cakeshop recognized , \"these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, \" and without subjecting persons living a gay lifestyle to indignities \"when they seek goods and services in an open market. \" 138 S. Ct. at 1732.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes FELA judgments from taxation",
		"context": "Schleier , 515 U.S. at 329–30; Liepelt , 444 U.S. at 496. Since such awards are not income taxable, they also are not subject to FICA taxes or withholding. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 87 F.3d 682 ... are not wages for FICA and income tax withholding purposes.\" Memorandum from the Office of Chief Counsel at 8 (October 22, 2008)(non-precedential);6 see also Lawsuits, Awards, and Settlements Audit Techniques Guide at 14 (5/2011)(\"There is general agreement that to the extent damages are excludable from gross income, they are not subject to employment taxes.\"). 7 The IRS has not stated otherwise for purposes of \"income\" or \"compensation\" under the RRTA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 1015",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. IRC section 104(a)(2) excludes FELA judgments from taxation",
		"context": "Schleier , 515 U.S. at 329–30; Liepelt , 444 U.S. at 496. Since such awards are not income taxable, they also are not subject to FICA taxes or withholding. 164 F.3d 1015; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ... are not wages for FICA and income tax withholding purposes.\" Memorandum from the Office of Chief Counsel at 8 (October 22, 2008)(non-precedential);6 see also Lawsuits, Awards, and Settlements Audit Techniques Guide at 14 (5/2011)(\"There is general agreement that to the extent damages are excludable from gross income, they are not subject to employment taxes.\"). 7 The IRS has not stated otherwise for purposes of \"income\" or \"compensation\" under the RRTA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 F.3d 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The SEC's disgorgement remedy is not an injunction",
		"context": "§§ 77t(b)(1), 78u(d)(1). Injunctions are a form of equi- table relief. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]937 F.3d 764. Cases such as Porter v. Warner Holding Co. , on which the SEC has relied, are not to the contrary. The statute in Porter authorized not only injunctive relief, but also any \"other order.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The SEC's disgorgement remedy is not an injunction",
		"context": "(emphases added). The money did not go to the Treasury. 16 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], also cited by the SEC, similarly affirmed a remedy \"restor[ing] wage losses to employees discharged in violation of\" the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. 361 U.S. at 296 (emphases added). Moreover, Mitchell gave no indication that the statutory scheme it was construing was th e sort of \"carefully crafted\" (Mertens , 508 U.S. at 254) framewor k that triggers a presump- tion against implying additional remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Overview of parties' positions",
		"context": "Supra , at 5 n.2. Petitioner's 1996 convictions occurred before IIRIRA's effective date, so section 1101(a)(13)(C)(v) does not apply to those convictions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 As explained below, the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, which the government endorses in this Court, is incorrect. Although the BIA has rejected Petitioner's interpretation, it s reasoning is so weak that Chevron deference is unwarranted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "The \"public function\" test considers whether a private entity is performing a function traditionally and exclusively performed by government. See Jack- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 457 U.S. 830; Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 158-60. This Court has cautioned that the \"public function\" in-quiry, by design, has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" because, \"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State .'\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 159, 163 (emphasis added) (examining prior \"public function\" cases and noting that \"their scope is carefully defined\" and that what those cases \"have in common [is] the feature of exclusivity,\" such as \"edu cation, fire and police pro- tection, and tax collection\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "The \"public function\" test considers whether a private entity is performing a function traditionally and exclusively performed by government. See Jack- 419 U.S. 345; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 158-60. This Court has cautioned that the \"public function\" in-quiry, by design, has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" because, \"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State .'\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 159, 163 (emphasis added) (examining prior \"public function\" cases and noting that \"their scope is carefully defined\" and that what those cases \"have in common [is] the feature of exclusivity,\" such as \"edu cation, fire and police pro- tection, and tax collection\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "This Court has cautioned that the \"public function\" in-quiry, by design, has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" because, \"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State .'\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 159, 163 (emphasis added) (examining prior \"public function\" cases and noting that \"their scope is carefully defined\" and that what those cases \"have in common [is] the feature of exclusivity,\" such as \"edu cation, fire and police pro- tection, and tax collection\"). The few functions this Court has found to meet the narrow application of the \"public function\" test include an election run by a private political party, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], operating a public park, 382 U.S. 296, and the exercise of peremptory challenges, which assists the govern-ment in the selection of juries, the \"quintessential governmental body\" ( Edmonson , 500 U.S. at 624; 505 U.S. 42). 42 Recognizing the narrow confines of this inquiry, this Court has consistently rejected attempts to find state action under the public function test where the stringent criteria—performing a traditional and ex- clusive government function —are not met. For ex- ample, in Jackson , this Court held that Metropolitan Edison Co., a private corp oration authorized to pro- vide utilities by the state's award of a certificate of public convenience, was not a state actor for purpos- es of constitutional claims arising out of an alleged wrongful termination of utility services.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "This Court has cautioned that the \"public function\" in-quiry, by design, has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" because, \"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State .'\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 159, 163 (emphasis added) (examining prior \"public function\" cases and noting that \"their scope is carefully defined\" and that what those cases \"have in common [is] the feature of exclusivity,\" such as \"edu cation, fire and police pro- tection, and tax collection\"). The few functions this Court has found to meet the narrow application of the \"public function\" test include an election run by a private political party, 345 U.S. 461, operating a public park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the exercise of peremptory challenges, which assists the govern-ment in the selection of juries, the \"quintessential governmental body\" ( Edmonson , 500 U.S. at 624; 505 U.S. 42). 42 Recognizing the narrow confines of this inquiry, this Court has consistently rejected attempts to find state action under the public function test where the stringent criteria—performing a traditional and ex- clusive government function —are not met. For ex- ample, in Jackson , this Court held that Metropolitan Edison Co., a private corp oration authorized to pro- vide utilities by the state's award of a certificate of public convenience, was not a state actor for purpos- es of constitutional claims arising out of an alleged wrongful termination of utility services.",
		"citation_value_orig": "382 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "This Court has cautioned that the \"public function\" in-quiry, by design, has \"carefully confined bound[aries]\" because, \"[w]hile many functions have been traditionally performed by governments, very few have been 'exclusively reserved to the State .'\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 159, 163 (emphasis added) (examining prior \"public function\" cases and noting that \"their scope is carefully defined\" and that what those cases \"have in common [is] the feature of exclusivity,\" such as \"edu cation, fire and police pro- tection, and tax collection\"). The few functions this Court has found to meet the narrow application of the \"public function\" test include an election run by a private political party, 345 U.S. 461, operating a public park, 382 U.S. 296, and the exercise of peremptory challenges, which assists the govern-ment in the selection of juries, the \"quintessential governmental body\" ( Edmonson , 500 U.S. at 624; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 42 Recognizing the narrow confines of this inquiry, this Court has consistently rejected attempts to find state action under the public function test where the stringent criteria—performing a traditional and ex- clusive government function —are not met. For ex- ample, in Jackson , this Court held that Metropolitan Edison Co., a private corp oration authorized to pro- vide utilities by the state's award of a certificate of public convenience, was not a state actor for purpos- es of constitutional claims arising out of an alleged wrongful termination of utility services.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "The Court found the \"public function\" test was not met because providing education for students who could not be served by traditional public schools was not a task exclusive and traditional to government. Id. at 842; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Blum , 457 U.S. at 1011-12 (provision of long-term nursing care not \"'traditionally the exclusive prerog-ative of the State'\") (quoting Jackson , 419 U.S. at 353); Polk 454 U.S. 312. The allegations here fall far short of plausibly sat- isfying this demanding standard. The provision of cable television generally—or public access channels in particular—is not a function traditionally provid- ed by government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "The Court found the \"public function\" test was not met because providing education for students who could not be served by traditional public schools was not a task exclusive and traditional to government. Id. at 842; see also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522; Blum , 457 U.S. at 1011-12 (provision of long-term nursing care not \"'traditionally the exclusive prerog-ative of the State'\") (quoting Jackson , 419 U.S. at 353); Polk [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The allegations here fall far short of plausibly sat- isfying this demanding standard. The provision of cable television generally—or public access channels in particular—is not a function traditionally provid- ed by government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "First, the City has not delegated to MNN a mu- nicipal obligation such that MNN's actions can be considered state action. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, under the appli- cable regulations, control of the public access chan-nels in Manhattan has never resided with the City. Pursuant to the New York state regulations, if the 45 municipality fails to designate a private nonprofit entity to operate the local public access channel, the operation of such channel does not fall to the City—it defaults to the cable franchisee .",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. MNN Does not Perform a Traditional and Exclusive Government Function, so it is not a State Actor Under the \"Public Function\" Test",
		"context": "Mfrs. Mut. In s. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jackson , 419 U.S. at 353 (observing that statutory scheme governing provision of utility service never required the state to provide such ser- vice in the first instance, such that state could not have delegated government function to private utili- ty operator). Moreover, this Court has only ever applied the \"public function\" analysis by looking at the specific function being performed by the private entity and considering whether that specific function is \"an ex- clusive prerogative of the sovereign.\" Flagg Bros. , 436 U.S. at 160 (warehouse sale of private property pursuant to New York Uniform Commercial Code); see also Jackson , 419 U.S. at 351-53 (provision of utility services); Rendell-Baker , 457 U.S. at 842 (edu- cation of maladjusted students); San Francisco Arts & Athletics , 483 U.S. at 544-45 (coordination of Olympics competition); Blum , 457 U.S. at 1011-12 (provision of long-term nursing care); Terry , 345 U.S. at 468-70 (administering an election); Evans , 382 U.S. at 302 (operation of a public park); Edmonson , 500 U.S. at 624-25 (use of peremptory challenges to create a jury); Brentwood , 531 U.S. at 309-10 (Thom- as, J., dissenting) (organiz ation of interscholastic sports).",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fourth Amendment standing traditionally was tied to property rights",
		"context": "Historically, Fourth Amendment standing was tied to property rights. Pre- Rakas cases either explicitly or implicitly looked to property rights to determine whether a defendant had Fourth Amendment standing. For instance, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court found an individual who claimed ownership of contraband had standing to challenge an unlawful search and exclude the illegal fruits flowing it. See342 U.S. 48; see also 187 F.2d. 498 . That was because an individual \"who claims ownership in or right to possession of the premises searched or property se ized\" has standing to challenge an unlawful search or seizure.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fourth Amendment standing traditionally was tied to property rights",
		"context": "Pre- Rakas cases either explicitly or implicitly looked to property rights to determine whether a defendant had Fourth Amendment standing. For instance, in 342 U.S. 48, the Court found an individual who claimed ownership of contraband had standing to challenge an unlawful search and exclude the illegal fruits flowing it. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 187 F.2d. 498 . That was because an individual \"who claims ownership in or right to possession of the premises searched or property se ized\" has standing to challenge an unlawful search or seizure. Jeffers, 187 F.2d.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fourth Amendment standing traditionally was tied to property rights",
		"context": "Pre- Rakas cases either explicitly or implicitly looked to property rights to determine whether a defendant had Fourth Amendment standing. For instance, in 342 U.S. 48, the Court found an individual who claimed ownership of contraband had standing to challenge an unlawful search and exclude the illegal fruits flowing it. See342 U.S. 48; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That was because an individual \"who claims ownership in or right to possession of the premises searched or property se ized\" has standing to challenge an unlawful search or seizure. Jeffers, 187 F.2d.",
		"citation_value_orig": "187 F.2d. 498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Fourth Amendment standing traditionally was tied to property rights",
		"context": "That was because an individual \"who claims ownership in or right to possession of the premises searched or property se ized\" has standing to challenge an unlawful search or seizure. Jeffers, 187 F.2d. at 501 (emphasis added); affrm'd by Jeffers , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court affirmed that Fourth Amendment standing traditionally had been linked to property rights. A range of property interests, like \"ownership in or right to possession of the premises, 14 the interest of a lessee or licensee, or of one with dominion,\" were the bases for standing. Jones , 362 U.S. at 266 (quoting Jeffers, 187 F.2d.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Silence Here Would Ensure the Continued Misapplication of the Insular Cases, With Serious Consequences",
		"context": "n that both proponents and some opponents of the First Circuit 's ruling are now arguing that the Insular Cases should have no bearing he re, the Court may be tempted to simply remain silent on the territorial incorporation doctrine . That would be a mistake . The Supreme Court —as the creator of th is doctrine —has a special duty to limit and reverse its negative impact s. See, e.g., Igart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 9 Overruling the Insular Cases for purposes of the domestic territorial application of the Constitution should have no effect on the analytically distinct question of the Constitution's extra - territorial application internationally . 18 (Torruella, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Silence now risks continued extension of the troubl ing view of the Insular Cases advanced by Unsecured Creditors here and by the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Even If Claims Of \"Malicious Prosecution\" And \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Are Cognizable Under section 1983, Those Claims Are Barred In This Case",
		"context": "And it is why the lower courts treated them differently— dismissing Count I, the \"fabrication of evidence\" claim, because it is time-barred, and Count II, the \"malicious prosecution\" claim, on grounds of absolute immunity. Specifically, a § 1983 \"malicious prosecution\" claim, according to the Second Circu it, requires the plaintiff to show a lack of probable cause to institute a proceeding and a favorable termination of the proceeding. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 598 F.3d 50; Ricciuti , 124 F.3d at 130. The courts below accordingly 17 ruled that the \"malicious prosecution\" claim did not accrue until Petitioner was acquitted. But whether that ruling was right or wrong—an issue we address below— the courts below dismissed th e \"malicious prosecution\" claim on grounds of absolute immunity, and Petitioner does not challenge that holding in this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "841 F.3d 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Even If Claims Of \"Malicious Prosecution\" And \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Are Cognizable Under section 1983, Those Claims Are Barred In This Case",
		"context": "And it is why the lower courts treated them differently— dismissing Count I, the \"fabrication of evidence\" claim, because it is time-barred, and Count II, the \"malicious prosecution\" claim, on grounds of absolute immunity. Specifically, a § 1983 \"malicious prosecution\" claim, according to the Second Circu it, requires the plaintiff to show a lack of probable cause to institute a proceeding and a favorable termination of the proceeding. See, e.g., 841 F.3d 72; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ricciuti , 124 F.3d at 130. The courts below accordingly 17 ruled that the \"malicious prosecution\" claim did not accrue until Petitioner was acquitted. But whether that ruling was right or wrong—an issue we address below— the courts below dismissed th e \"malicious prosecution\" claim on grounds of absolute immunity, and Petitioner does not challenge that holding in this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "598 F.3d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Even If Claims Of \"Malicious Prosecution\" And \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Are Cognizable Under section 1983, Those Claims Are Barred In This Case",
		"context": "Under the Second Circuit's decisions, a \"fabrication of evidence\" claim, by contrast with a \"malicious prosecution\" claim, can be brought even if there was probable cause. The Second Circuit has been clear on this point. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Second Circuit flatly stated that in a § 1983 action for fabrication of evidence, \"[p]robable cause is not a defense.\" See also 838 F.3d 265, the court—after holding that there was probable cause for an arrest—explicitly rejected, in emphatic terms, the argument that \"as there was probable cause for [the] arrest—independent of the allegedly fabricated evidence—the fabrication of evidence is legally irrelevant.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 F. App'x 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Even If Claims Of \"Malicious Prosecution\" And \"Fabrication Of Evidence\" Are Cognizable Under section 1983, Those Claims Are Barred In This Case",
		"context": "As we will show below, this claim is best seen as a substantive due process claim—that government conduct that shocks the conscience violates the Due Process Clause for that reason alone. Second Circuit cases do refer to the \"fabrication of evidence\" claim as a due process claim. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ricciuti , 124 F.3d at 130.2 But whatever the soundness of the Second Circuit's view, a \"fabrication of evidence\" claim does not, and cannot, require a favorable termination of the proceedings. That is because a valid \"fabrication\" claim 2 Similarly, some of the Second Circuit's opinions addressing the \"fabrication of evidence\" claim refer to a deprivation of liberty as an element of that claim. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F.3d 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Statutory Structure and Early Cases Support Reading the AIA as Broadly Protecting the System of Assessments and Collections",
		"context": "Congress folded into that judicial remedy, how- ever, the requirement that taxpayers first seek non-judicial administrative remedies. Thus §19 referenced a system of remedies, not a single one. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One year later, Congress amended §19 in the Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 472, 475 to add this language at the end: \"And no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of tax shall be maintained in any court.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Statutory Structure and Early Cases Support Reading the AIA as Broadly Protecting the System of Assessments and Collections",
		"context": "The AIA was enacted to preclude such interference. See Bryan 5 Camp, Jesus and the Anti-Injunction Act , 136 Tax Notes 1335 (Sept. 10, 2012). The fact that the original AIA was linked to the remedies in §19 of the 1866 Act was important to this Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the first case where this Court interpreted the AIA. There, the taxpayer asserted that an excise tax on tobacco as- sessed against him was illegal. The taxpayer argued that the suit was not to restrain \"taxes\" within the meaning of the AIA because the AIA's text meant only legal taxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "If this Court nonetheless reaches out to catch the question neglected below, it should conclude that shareholders of companies ta rgeted by a tender offer do have a private right of action under Section 14(e). The text, structure, history and purpose of the Williams Act prove as much, especially when the \"circumstances of its enactment,\" Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], are duly considered. 1. When deciding whether to imply a private right in a federal statute, this Court's mission is to infer what Congress intended when it enacted the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "1. When deciding whether to imply a private right in a federal statute, this Court's mission is to infer what Congress intended when it enacted the statute. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So th e \"initial focus must be on the state of the law at the time the legislation was enacted.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": ". and that it expected its enactment to be interpreted in conformity with them.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. To be sure, such historical \"context shorn of text\" is not dispositive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698. The broad language of Se ction 14(e) contains the affirmative textual support needed to create a private right of action. A comparison with Touche Ross & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is illuminative. There, the Court held that Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a), did not create a private right because it \"proscribes no conduct as unlawful,\" 442 U.S. at 576, and \"[b]y its terms,\" was \"forward-looking, not retrospective,\" seeking to promote good conduct and \"forestall insolvency, not to provid e recompense after it has occurred.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "Borak and its implications for implied private rights were mentioned twice in written statements to Congress. See S. 510 Hearings, at 67 (written statement of Professor Carlos L. Israels) (\"Presumably we may assume that the Commission will be able to enforce the provisions of this Bill, if it is enacted, and of its rules thereunder by proceedings for injunction in the Federal courts; and that under J. I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1964) a private litigant could seek similar relief before or after the significant fact such as the acceptance of his tender of securities. \"); id. at 140 (written statement of Professor William H. Painter) (discussing the Williams Act's use of the term \"unlawful\" and stating, \"such language is being judicially construed to allow not only injunctive relief by the Commission and criminal penalties for willful violations but also private remedies to injured investors ( J. I.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "\"); id. at 140 (written statement of Professor William H. Painter) (discussing the Williams Act's use of the term \"unlawful\" and stating, \"such language is being judicially construed to allow not only injunctive relief by the Commission and criminal penalties for willful violations but also private remedies to injured investors ( J. I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])\"). Congress's subsequent amendments to the Williams Act, moreover, reflected acquiescence in judicial interpretations of the Act as conferring a private right of action. When Congress amended the 25 Williams Act in 1970, it was aware that private lawsuits had already been brought under the Act— yet did not seek to foreclose them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Based on this Court's Precedent, Congress Reasonably Would Have Expected Its Enactment of Section 14(e) to Confer a Private Remedy",
		"context": "The dissent made explicit what was implicit within the majority's reasoning, \"Section 14(e) was patterned after § 14(a), which regulates proxy contests. It is clear that a shareholder may recover in a suit under § 14(a) even though he was not 7 Congress amended the Willia ms Act a second time in 1977, and again did not tamp down on the implied private rights. See Fla. Commercial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 himself deceived by the misrepresentations.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.2d 1513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Donor privacy is built on venerable precedents protecting anonymous advocacy",
		"context": ". The founding generation had deep regard for anonymous advocacy. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In England and the American Colonies, authorit ies used press licensing laws to expose the names of writers, printers, and distributors to \"lessen the circulation of literature critical of the government.\" 362 U.S. 60.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Donor privacy is built on venerable precedents protecting anonymous advocacy",
		"context": "514 U.S. 334. In England and the American Colonies, authorit ies used press licensing laws to expose the names of writers, printers, and distributors to \"lessen the circulation of literature critical of the government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before the American Revolution, \"colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by English-controlled courts.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Donor privacy is built on venerable precedents protecting anonymous advocacy",
		"context": "Talley , 362 U.S. at 62 n.3. And his enormously influential work Common Sense was originally published anonymously. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federalist Papers were also published under pseudonyms. Talley , 362 U.S. at 65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.3d 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Donor privacy is built on venerable precedents protecting anonymous advocacy",
		"context": "This modern innovation \"chills speech by exposing anonymous donors to harassment and threats of reprisal.\" Del. Strong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Even if the Court Considers and Accepts One of Respondents' Alternative Theories, It Should Remand, not Affirm",
		"context": "42; U.S. Br. 31. Like the right to share fish recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], any such analysis should pr oceed \"on a river-by-river, run-by- run basis,\" not based on allegations about the effect of culverts regionwide. And if the Court bases this right on common-law principles, it should incorporate common law limitations on relief. See infra pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Even Officers in Quasi-Judicial Roles Like ALJs Must Be Removable by the President",
		"context": ". except judges of the courts of the United States\" by the president as allowing the president to remove territorial judges. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The quasi - judicial character of the office did not change the president's power to remove such executive officers. When considering Congress's removal of the Comptroller General, the Court stated that \"[i]nterpreting a law ena cted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate\" and \"exercis[ing] judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act\" are \"[d]ecisions of that kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 U.S. 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Even Officers in Quasi-Judicial Roles Like ALJs Must Be Removable by the President",
		"context": "The quasi - judicial character of the office did not change the president's power to remove such executive officers. When considering Congress's removal of the Comptroller General, the Court stated that \"[i]nterpreting a law ena cted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate\" and \"exercis[ing] judgment concerning facts that affect the application of the Act\" are \"[d]ecisions of that kind are typically made by officers charged with executing a statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The D.C. Circuit, in Kuretski v. C.I.R , also considered the presidential removal of tax judges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Even Officers in Quasi-Judicial Roles Like ALJs Must Be Removable by the President",
		"context": "In that case, the court held: \"A tribunal may be considered a 'Court of Law' for purposes of the Appointments Clause notwithstanding that its officers may be removed by the President. The Freytag Court's treatment of territorial courts confirms the point.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied , 135 S. C t. 2309 (2015) . These examples include executive officers who exercis e quasi -judicial functions as well as Article I judges that preside over a \"court of law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews",
		"context": ". . does not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or an- cillary provisions,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it certainly does not do so through silence. As the dissenting opinion below made clear, the \"irregular assumption\" that Congress gave the government \"two bites at the apple,\" \"with no hint of support in the statute or legislative history, cannot be countenanced.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews",
		"context": "unless and until Congress confers power upon it,\" Louisiana Pub. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court must \"tak[e] seriously, and apply[] rigorously\" the \"statutory limits on agencies' authority\" established under the AIA. City of Arling- 569 U.S. 290. Put simply, in a case \"defining the proper scope of the federal power,\" the Court must \"be certai n that Congress has con- ferred authority on the agency\" in question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews",
		"context": "Serv. 476 U.S. 355, this Court must \"tak[e] seriously, and apply[] rigorously\" the \"statutory limits on agencies' authority\" established under the AIA. City of Arling- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put simply, in a case \"defining the proper scope of the federal power,\" the Court must \"be certai n that Congress has con- ferred authority on the agency\" in question. New 535 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews",
		"context": "City of Arling- 569 U.S. 290. Put simply, in a case \"defining the proper scope of the federal power,\" the Court must \"be certai n that Congress has con- ferred authority on the agency\" in question. New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The AIA review pro- visions provide no such certainty here. Because reading \"person\" in the AIA's review pro- visions to include the government would be not only \"decidedly awkward,\" Int'l Primate Prot.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reading \"Person\" to Include the Government Would Allow It to Pursue Duplicative Patent Challenges, Contrary to the Structure and Purpose of AIA Reviews",
		"context": "The AIA review pro- visions provide no such certainty here. Because reading \"person\" in the AIA's review pro- visions to include the government would be not only \"decidedly awkward,\" Int'l Primate Prot. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but fundamentally at odds with the structure 40 and purpose of the AIA, such an interpretation should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": ". If any doubts remain, this Court should resolve them in favor of CIC, as the IRS's contrary interpre- tation \"would raise serious constitutional problems.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to the IRS, litigants have no right to raise preenforcement claims when the IRS's policies are en- forced by tax penalties—not \"even constitutional 19 claims. \"5 IRS-Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "And while it notes that the Act normally satisfies due process, it admits that the Act can violate due process when re- fund suits are not \"'adequate .'\" IRS-Br. 44-45 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The IRS does not deny that refund suits are inadequate when filing one requires the plaintiff to commit a federal crime. The IRS instead denies th e premise that CIC must commit a crime to bring a refund suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "Section 7203 5 Although CIC does not raise constitutional claims, its APA claims have a constitutional dimension. Congress can \"'create a vast and varied bureaucracy,'\" this Court has held, if that bu- reaucracy remains sufficiently \"accountable to the people.\" Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[F]ramed against a background of rapid expansion\" of the administrative state, the APA is a vital judicial \"check\" that helps ensure agen- cies remain within constitutional bounds. 338 U.S. 632.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "Seila Law 140 S. Ct. 2183. \"[F]ramed against a background of rapid expansion\" of the administrative state, the APA is a vital judicial \"check\" that helps ensure agen- cies remain within constitutional bounds. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 criminalizes only \"willful[]\" violations of reporting re- quirements, the IRS notes, and a violation is not will- ful if it is \"based on a 'good -faith belief' that the report- ing requirement does not apply.\" IRS-Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 632",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "20 criminalizes only \"willful[]\" violations of reporting re- quirements, the IRS notes, and a violation is not will- ful if it is \"based on a 'good -faith belief' that the report- ing requirement does not apply.\" IRS-Br. 46 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Government promises it would never prosecute some- one who \"failed to comply with a reporting require- ment based on a good-faith belief that the require- ment did not apply.\" IRS-Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "46, is thus irrelevant. A uni- lateral promise not to prosecute (in an appellate brief) could not resolve the constitutional problem created by the Government's interpretation anyway. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 559 U.S. 460; Abbott 387 U.S. 136. But even if it could, the Government does not promise that it will not prosecute individuals who de-liberately disobey reporting requirements because they believe those requirements violate the APA (and want to litigate that claim in a refund suit). The Gov- ernment refused to make that concession below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "46, is thus irrelevant. A uni- lateral promise not to prosecute (in an appellate brief) could not resolve the constitutional problem created by the Government's interpretation anyway. See 138 S. Ct. 1101; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Abbott 387 U.S. 136. But even if it could, the Government does not promise that it will not prosecute individuals who de-liberately disobey reporting requirements because they believe those requirements violate the APA (and want to litigate that claim in a refund suit). The Gov- ernment refused to make that concession below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "46, is thus irrelevant. A uni- lateral promise not to prosecute (in an appellate brief) could not resolve the constitutional problem created by the Government's interpretation anyway. See 138 S. Ct. 1101; 559 U.S. 460; Abbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even if it could, the Government does not promise that it will not prosecute individuals who de-liberately disobey reporting requirements because they believe those requirements violate the APA (and want to litigate that claim in a refund suit). The Gov- ernment refused to make that concession below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "But even if CIC could bring a refund suit without violating §7203, it could not bring a refund suit with- out violating some federal law. CIC must, at the very least, violate a statutory reporting requirement. That violation could entail a penalty of $50,000 per unre- ported transaction, §6707(b)—penalties that CIC must be able to pay in full before it can sue, Flora , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CIC also faces risks to its members' licenses and livelihoods. As accountants and attorneys, CIC's members and employees have ethical obligations that prevent them from deliberately violating federal tax law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Constitutional avoidance favors CIC",
		"context": "6; Chamber-Amicus-Br. 6-9. Separate from this constitutional problem, CIC's inability to bring a refund suit without violating fed- eral law squarely implicates the exception from South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under that decision, the Anti-Injunction Act does not apply when a plaintiff has no \"alternative legal way\" to challenge the provision. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Automatic Stays Make Messes Out of Multi-Party Cases",
		"context": ". Federal courts determine their own jurisdiction, not on a case -by-case basis, but on a claim -by-claim basis. See, e.g., Santiago [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And of course, a district court loses jurisdiction only over those \"aspects of the case involved in\" a pending appeal. Griggs , 459 U.S. at 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Sixth Circuit's decision is correct",
		"context": ". The government's merits argument (at 12-14) rests almost entirely on the notion that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that the IDEA contains a futility requirement, which Congress ratified. Re-spondents (at 30-34) and the Sixth Circuit (Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Sixth Circuit's decision is correct",
		"context": "Whatever dicta Honig may contain about exhaustion, § 1415( l) con- tained no futility exception when it was written, and it didn't pick one up throug h ratification just because Congress did \"[n]othing.\" SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktie- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Sixth Circuit got it right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "§ 1350, pr ovides jurisdiction over 22 violations of \"the law of nations.\" This Court has explained that the statute thus directs courts considering its scope to look elsewhere, to \"the general common law,\" and specifically \"torts in violation of the law of nations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], refers courts assessing whether a particular power falls within the statute's grant of authority to the body of law regarding what writs could be issued and under what circumstances. See 342 U.S. 205; 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (designating the \"laws of the several states\" as the rules of decision for civil actions in federal courts sitting in diversity); 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "This Court has explained that the statute thus directs courts considering its scope to look elsewhere, to \"the general common law,\" and specifically \"torts in violation of the law of nations.\" 138 S. Ct. 1386, refers courts assessing whether a particular power falls within the statute's grant of authority to the body of law regarding what writs could be issued and under what circumstances. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (designating the \"laws of the several states\" as the rules of decision for civil actions in federal courts sitting in diversity); 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (extending tort liability to the United States in accordance with \"the law of the place where the act or omission occurred\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "Rather, the Court must construe statutes by their terms and then, in an appropriate case where the question is presented, determine whether the statute so interpreted is constitutional. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 This Court's decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., is instructive in this regard. Hobby Lobby addressed, among other things, the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (\"RFRA\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "Hobby Lobby addressed, among other things, the interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (\"RFRA\"). 573 U.S. 682 . RFRA was a clear-cut legislative response to a constitutional holding, namely this Court's more restrictive interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. at 4 Because there is no Suspension Clause issue properly presented in this case, the Court is not called on to decide what the Clause protects, but only what the statute means. Notably, however, a decision from this Court construing \"questions of law\" narrowly—reaching, for example, only \"pure\" legal questions—would likely engender numerous as-applied Suspension Clause challenges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 306, 307 n.29 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 332 U.S. 388; 326 U.S. 135; 307 U.S. 22; 264 U.S. 32). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See 320 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "239 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 306, 307 n.29 (citing 239 U.S. 3; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 326 U.S. 135; 307 U.S. 22; 264 U.S. 32). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See 320 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 306, 307 n.29 (citing 239 U.S. 3; 332 U.S. 388; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 307 U.S. 22; 264 U.S. 32). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See 320 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 306, 307 n.29 (citing 239 U.S. 3; 332 U.S. 388; 326 U.S. 135; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 264 U.S. 32). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See 320 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "See, e.g. , id. at 306, 307 n.29 (citing 239 U.S. 3; 332 U.S. 388; 326 U.S. 135; 307 U.S. 22; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See 320 F.3d 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "at 306, 307 n.29 (citing 239 U.S. 3; 332 U.S. 388; 326 U.S. 135; 307 U.S. 22; 264 U.S. 32). That St. Cyr understood habeas review to cover mixed questions was confirmed by uniform circuit cases reading the decision in that way. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 These cases, along with St. Cyr itself, formed the legal landscape against which Congress enacted the savings clause. 6 5 That this was the proper reading of St. Cyr was also confirmed by this Court, albeit after the savings clause was enacted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F.3d 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "Pet. for Writ of Cert. at 11, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2000 WL 33979531 (addressing \"non-constitutional legal claims (such as pure questions of statutory interpretation)\") (emphasis omitted). 28 Cyr, that decision's historical analysis was correct. There is a long tradition of habeas courts considering the application of law to und isputed facts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "533 U.S. at 306. Those questions of law routinely in cluded \"mixed\" questions, i.e., the application of law to undisputed facts. See, e.g., 355 U.S. 115; Delgadillo , 332 U.S. at 388; Bridges , 326 U.S. at 135; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mahler , 264 U.S. at 32. Any suggestion that habeas courts reviewed only claims that were not \"fact-intensive,\" Ovalles BIO 7, would be untenable. In Hansen , for example, a noncitizen was accused of having violated a statute barring entry \"for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE STATUTE DOES NOT REQUIRE COURTS TO CONSULT THE HISTORY OF HABEAS LAW TO DETERMINE IF A CLAIM IS REVIEWABLE",
		"context": "If Congress had required courts to decide, for each legal question or category of legal questions, whether habeas courts had historically reviewed the same issue or some analogous question, the result would have been a complex and difficult-to-administer jurisdictional statute. Cf. Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before 30 courts could reach the merits of any legal issue, they would need to undertake a difficult and uncertain exploration of historical habeas caselaw, digging through the often scattered, incomplete, and partial materials that have survived the centuries. As St. Cyr explained, such an inquiry will often be \"difficult\" given \"ambiguities\" in the historical record when it comes to particular issu es.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Unless a party to a judgment is named or otherwise described in a timely notice of appeal, a court of appeals cannot exercise jurisdiction over their appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315. These requirements are \"'mandatory and jurisdictional,'\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 138 S. Ct. 13. And by implementing these statutory limitations, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 create \"a single jurisdictional threshold\" for a party to a judgment seeking to contest that judgment on appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 ; accord Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 147.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Unless a party to a judgment is named or otherwise described in a timely notice of appeal, a court of appeals cannot exercise jurisdiction over their appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315. These requirements are \"'mandatory and jurisdictional,'\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (quoting 459 U.S. 56); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And by implementing these statutory limitations, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 create \"a single jurisdictional threshold\" for a party to a judgment seeking to contest that judgment on appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 ; accord Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 147.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "And by implementing these statutory limitations, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 create \"a single jurisdictional threshold\" for a party to a judgment seeking to contest that judgment on appeal. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 ; accord Gonzales, 565 U.S. at 147. Respondents did not raise this argument previously, but because the Attorney General's failure to appeal the final judgment \"is one of jurisdictional magnitude,\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 , it may be raised by any party or the Court itself at any stage in the litigation, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Courts have \"no authority to create equitable exceptions to [these] jurisdictional requirements.\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 ; accord 495 U.S. 33.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Respondents did not raise this argument previously, but because the Attorney General's failure to appeal the final judgment \"is one of jurisdictional magnitude,\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 , it may be raised by any party or the Court itself at any stage in the litigation, see, e.g., 546 U.S. 500. 15 Courts have \"no authority to create equitable exceptions to [these] jurisdictional requirements.\" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 ; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed parties after the time for filing a notice of appeal has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal. Because the Rules do not grant courts the latter power, we hold that the Rules likewise withhold the former.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "JA 29-30. The Attorney General, like any other \"person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others[,] is bound in accordance with the terms of his agreement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 As a party bound by final judgment, the Attorney General was obligated to file a timely appeal if he wished to contest that judgment. See 815 F.3d 645 (holding party bound by judgment was subject to thirty -day deadline for filing notice of appeal even though it was dismissed as named party and \"not actively participating in the case at the time it would have needed to file its appeal\" because \"the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that federal courts cannot 'create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements'\"). Yet the Attorney General did not file an appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "The Attorney General, like any other \"person who agrees to be bound by the determination of issues in an action between others[,] is bound in accordance with the terms of his agreement.\" 553 U.S. 880.2 As a party bound by final judgment, the Attorney General was obligated to file a timely appeal if he wished to contest that judgment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding party bound by judgment was subject to thirty -day deadline for filing notice of appeal even though it was dismissed as named party and \"not actively participating in the case at the time it would have needed to file its appeal\" because \"the Supreme Court has made abundantly clear that federal courts cannot 'create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional requirements'\"). Yet the Attorney General did not file an appeal. The Secretary's timely filing of an appeal does not relieve the Attorney General of the consequences of this jurisdictional defect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "815 F.3d 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "P. 3 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendments (explaining amended rule will sustain appeal from unnamed party only if \"it is objectively clear [from notice of appeal] that a party intended to appeal\"). And \"this Court recognizes no 2 \"[A] government official, sued in his representative capacity, cannot freely repudiate stipulations entered into by his predecessor in office during an earlier stage of the same litigation.\" Morales [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 18A Fed. Prac. & Proc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Civ. § 2956 (3d ed. 2021) ; City of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 general equitable doctrine . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "167 U. S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": ". which countenances an exception to the finality of a party's failure to appeal merely because his rights are 'closely interwoven' with those of another party.\" Federated Dep't Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does the Attorney General's voluntary dismissal as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 excuse his failure to appeal. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Nor does the Attorney General's voluntary dismissal as a defendant under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 excuse his failure to appeal. Cf. Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has explained, \"[t]he label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context,\" and this Court \"never [] restricted the right to appeal to named parties to the litigation.\" 536 U.S. 1; see also id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Microsoft 137 S. Ct. 1702. As this Court has explained, \"[t]he label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context,\" and this Court \"never [] restricted the right to appeal to named parties to the litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. at 7-11; 738 F.3d 58361 F.3d 1305. 3 Those who have the right to appeal 3 The Attorney General's agreement to be bound by the final judgment thus differentiates this case from those where a nonnamed party is not so bound, but is merely in privity with a 18 must exercise that right within the jurisdictional limits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "As this Court has explained, \"[t]he label 'party' does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context,\" and this Court \"never [] restricted the right to appeal to named parties to the litigation.\" 536 U.S. 1; see also id. at 7-11; 738 F.3d 58[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 Those who have the right to appeal 3 The Attorney General's agreement to be bound by the final judgment thus differentiates this case from those where a nonnamed party is not so bound, but is merely in privity with a 18 must exercise that right within the jurisdictional limits. To permit the Attorney General to intervene in an appeal that he could have but did not pursue would be \"equivalent to permitting courts to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 F.3d 1305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 . In short, \"a court's subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties' litigation conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When a party decides to forego taking action in a lawsuit in the expectation that another party will protect its interests, it does so at its peril.\" N.Y. Petroleum 757 F.2d 288; see also 889 F.3d 648, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "540 U.S. 443. \"When a party decides to forego taking action in a lawsuit in the expectation that another party will protect its interests, it does so at its peril.\" N.Y. Petroleum 757 F.2d 288; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,139 S. Ct. 1373. By the terms of his dismissal, the Attorney General was bound by the final judgment, and had thirty days to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "889 F.3d 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Attorney General's Failure to Appeal a Judgment to Which He Was Bound Deprived the Court Below of Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 ; Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 . named party or has an interest in the subject matter of the case. See Marin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 235 (2021) ; AAL High Yield Bond Fund , 361 F.3d at 1310 (\"[T]he point of Devlin .",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Internal Revenue Service does not seek to control charities' speech and its donor-disclosure rule is readily distinguishable from the Attorney General's",
		"context": "As to context, the IRS's disclosure mandate is connected to a government tax-benefit program. Federal law gives 501(c)(3) organizations, like the Law Center, two valuable advantages: (1) an exemption from income taxes and (2) tax-deductibility of donations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The IRS defines tax-exempt charities, requires them to make tax filings, and oversees a disclosure regime that concerns tax benefits. In contrast, the Attorney General's Office is not a tax authority and oversees no tax benefits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Internal Revenue Service does not seek to control charities' speech and its donor-disclosure rule is readily distinguishable from the Attorney General's",
		"context": "Madigan , 538 U.S. at 610. California lacks the power to keep \"foreign\" charities from \"associat[ing] for the collective advocacy of ideas.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the First Amendment, the Law Center and its donors have the right to \"express their views, by words and lawful conduct, on . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Internal Revenue Service does not seek to control charities' speech and its donor-disclosure rule is readily distinguishable from the Attorney General's",
		"context": "Federal tax law does not prohibit any group's speech, nor could it. Id. at 545–46; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 297 U.S. 233. It simply requires charities to accept related conditions, like donor disclosure, to obtain financial benefits. Regan , 461 U.S. at 546.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Internal Revenue Service does not seek to control charities' speech and its donor-disclosure rule is readily distinguishable from the Attorney General's",
		"context": "Federal tax law does not prohibit any group's speech, nor could it. Id. at 545–46; accord 468 U.S. 364; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It simply requires charities to accept related conditions, like donor disclosure, to obtain financial benefits. Regan , 461 U.S. at 546.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "a. A state court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a defendant that \"purpo sefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A state court also may exercise specific jurisdiction over a de- fendant who \" 'purposefully direct[s] ' his activities\" at the State. Burger King 471 U.S. 462326 U.S. 310, in which this Court has upheld a state court's exercise of specific jurisdiction, the claims brought by the plaintiff have arisen, at least in part, out of the activ ities that tied the defendant to the forum State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "357 U.S. 235. A state court also may exercise specific jurisdiction over a de- fendant who \" 'purposefully direct[s] ' his activities\" at the State. Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]326 U.S. 310, in which this Court has upheld a state court's exercise of specific jurisdiction, the claims brought by the plaintiff have arisen, at least in part, out of the activ ities that tied the defendant to the forum State. For example, in International Shoe itself, an out-of-state company sent its salesmen to a State, 9 thereby enabling the state court to hear a suit to collect employment taxes due for \"those very activities.\" 326 U. S. at 320.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "357 U.S. 235. A state court also may exercise specific jurisdiction over a de- fendant who \" 'purposefully direct[s] ' his activities\" at the State. Burger King 471 U.S. 462[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which this Court has upheld a state court's exercise of specific jurisdiction, the claims brought by the plaintiff have arisen, at least in part, out of the activ ities that tied the defendant to the forum State. For example, in International Shoe itself, an out-of-state company sent its salesmen to a State, 9 thereby enabling the state court to hear a suit to collect employment taxes due for \"those very activities.\" 326 U. S. at 320.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "For example, in International Shoe itself, an out-of-state company sent its salesmen to a State, 9 thereby enabling the state court to hear a suit to collect employment taxes due for \"those very activities.\" 326 U. S. at 320. Likewise, in Travelers Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an out -of-state insurer's illegal solicitations in a State allowed a state court to hear a suit to stop those solicitations. Id. at 648.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "Id. at 648. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Burger King , out-of-state defendants entered into contracts that had substantial ties to the forum States, allowing courts in those States to hear claims \"based on\" those contracts. McGee , 355 U.S. at 223; see Burge r King , 471 U.S. at 479 -480. And in 465 U.S. 770, and 465 U.S. 783, out -of-state defendants published magazine articles that were circu- lated in or aimed at the forum States, allowing state courts to hear claims for libel based on those articles.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "In 355 U.S. 220, and Burger King , out-of-state defendants entered into contracts that had substantial ties to the forum States, allowing courts in those States to hear claims \"based on\" those contracts. McGee , 355 U.S. at 223; see Burge r King , 471 U.S. at 479 -480. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 465 U.S. 783, out -of-state defendants published magazine articles that were circu- lated in or aimed at the forum States, allowing state courts to hear claims for libel based on those articles. Keeton , 465 U.S. at 773 -777; Calder , 465 U.S. at 788 -789. b. As relevant here, t his Court's cases establish that a manufacturer purposefully avails itself of the forum State by directly selling its g oods there.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 770",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "In 355 U.S. 220, and Burger King , out-of-state defendants entered into contracts that had substantial ties to the forum States, allowing courts in those States to hear claims \"based on\" those contracts. McGee , 355 U.S. at 223; see Burge r King , 471 U.S. at 479 -480. And in 465 U.S. 770, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], out -of-state defendants published magazine articles that were circu- lated in or aimed at the forum States, allowing state courts to hear claims for libel based on those articles. Keeton , 465 U.S. at 773 -777; Calder , 465 U.S. at 788 -789. b. As relevant here, t his Court's cases establish that a manufacturer purposefully avails itself of the forum State by directly selling its g oods there.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "See Interna- tional Shoe , 326 U.S. at 320. In addition, a manufac- turer (at a minimum) purposefully directs its goods at the State if it places its goods in the \"stream of com- merce\" while also engaging in conduct that \"indicate[s] an intent or pur pose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the mar- ket in the forum State, advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.\" Asahi Metal Industry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In those cir- cumstances, a plaintiff 's claim about a product ulti- mately sold in the forum State arises out of or relates to the purposeful conduct in or directed at the State. At the same time, this Court's cases establish that, when a product is ultimately sold outside the forum State , a claim about that product does not \"relate \" to the manufacturer's contacts with the forum State merely because of the fortuity that the same type of product also is sold within that State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "In those cir- cumstances, a plaintiff 's claim about a product ulti- mately sold in the forum State arises out of or relates to the purposeful conduct in or directed at the State. At the same time, this Court's cases establish that, when a product is ultimately sold outside the forum State , a claim about that product does not \"relate \" to the manufacturer's contacts with the forum State merely because of the fortuity that the same type of product also is sold within that State. For example, in International Shoe , the Court thrice cited its previous decision in Old Wayne Mutual Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to illustrate the line be- tween claims that \"arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state\" and claims that are \"unre- lated to\" or \"unconnected with\" those activities. Inter- national Shoe , 326 U.S. at 317 -319. In Old Wa yne, an insurer from Indiana sold an insurance policy in Indiana to insure the life of a citizen of Pennsylvania.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "Id. at 23. More recently, in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Opera- tions , S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , a tire com- pany sold tires in France that caused a bus accident in France, killing two boys visiting from North Carolina. Id. at 918.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Specific jurisdiction requires contacts related to the claim, not just general connections to the forum",
		"context": "Nicastro , 564 U.S. at 880 (plurality opinion). An in -state defendant enjoys the \"rights and privileges incident to domicile\" even when it \"sojourns without the state\"; the home State, in turn, enjoys the reciprocal power to require its citizens and corporations to answer for ac ts in other States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specific jurisdiction, by contrast, rests on the principle that each State has a limited power to resolve claims against out - of-state defendants, \"to the extent that power is exer- cised in c onnection with the defendant's activities touching on the State.\" Nicastro , 564 U.S. at 881 (plu- rality opinion) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "As discussed above, that premise is flatly contradicted by Knauff , which con- firm s that the President's authority to exclude aliens \"stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.\" 338 U.S. at 542. Accordingly, the court was wrong to conclude that the President's authority here is 14 As further support for its \"[c]onstitutional [a]voidance\" holding, the court of appeals cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 353 U.S. 194. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "As discussed above, that premise is flatly contradicted by Knauff , which con- firm s that the President's authority to exclude aliens \"stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation.\" 338 U.S. at 542. Accordingly, the court was wrong to conclude that the President's authority here is 14 As further support for its \"[c]onstitutional [a]voidance\" holding, the court of appeals cited 381 U.S. 1, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "39a-42a. But both cases are inapposite because they concerned reg- ulation of citizens or aliens already present in this country, not al- iens abroad. So too did [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 357 U.S. 116189 U.S. 86 , cited in IRAP , slip op. 98 -99 (Gregory, J., concurring). None of those cases creates any doubt about Section 1182(f )'s constitutionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "39a-42a. But both cases are inapposite because they concerned reg- ulation of citizens or aliens already present in this country, not al- iens abroad. So too did 533 U.S. 678, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]189 U.S. 86 , cited in IRAP , slip op. 98 -99 (Gregory, J., concurring). None of those cases creates any doubt about Section 1182(f )'s constitutionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "39a-42a. But both cases are inapposite because they concerned reg- ulation of citizens or aliens already present in this country, not al- iens abroad. So too did 533 U.S. 678, 357 U.S. 116[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cited in IRAP , slip op. 98 -99 (Gregory, J., concurring). None of those cases creates any doubt about Section 1182(f )'s constitutionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The court of appeals' narrow view of the President's constitutional authority is incorrect",
		"context": "Pet. App. 54a (quotin g Youngstown Sheet & Tube [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Quite to the contrary, the Proclamation is a quintessential exercise of the Presi- dent's power at its peak. See Youngstown , 343 U.S. at 635- 637.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Second Circuit: 9/11 cross memorial constitutional",
		"context": ". The Second Circuit's rejection of an atheist organization's challenge to the Cross at Ground Zero illustrates how the lack of an objective test invites Establishment Clause challenges even when there are no religious undertones in a passive government display. American [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Port Authority, even the atheist petitioners agreed that \"The Cross at Ground Zero is a genuine historic artifact of recovery and healing efforts after the September 11 attacks.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "760 F.3d 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, being required to admit government inspectors onto private property is frequently a reasonable condition of a government-issued license",
		"context": "20 Naturally, there can be hard cases in between. But the common sense of this doctrine is that the govern- ment may not \"forc[e] some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. The germaneness requirement of the unconsti- tutional conditions doctrine is easily satisfied where the relevant benefit is a government-issued license to sell products or services.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, being required to admit government inspectors onto private property is frequently a reasonable condition of a government-issued license",
		"context": "§ 374(a)(1) (authorizing FDA to inspect \"any factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices, tobacco products, or cos- metics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held, for introduction into interstate commerce or after such introduction\"). The Food Drug & Cosmetic Act's inspection provisions reflect the reality that as \"gov- ernmental regulation of business enterprise\" \"mush- room[s],\" so too does \"the need for effective investiga- tive techniques to achieve the aims of such regulation.\" See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and government access to inspect the licensed drugs (the condition) is directly and reasonably related to that regulatory objective. The same is true of inspections conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety Inspec- tion Service (FSIS), which enforces a host of \"health 21 and safety constraints on the meat processing indus- try.\" Windy City Meat 926 F.2d 672.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, being required to admit government inspectors onto private property is frequently a reasonable condition of a government-issued license",
		"context": "See387 U.S. 541, and government access to inspect the licensed drugs (the condition) is directly and reasonably related to that regulatory objective. The same is true of inspections conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety Inspec- tion Service (FSIS), which enforces a host of \"health 21 and safety constraints on the meat processing indus- try.\" Windy City Meat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In adopting the Federal Meat Inspection Act, for example, Congress required FSIS to inspect \"all meat food products pre- pared for commerce in any slaughtering, meat-can- ning, salting, packing, rendering, or similar establish- ment.\" 21 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.2d 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, being required to admit government inspectors onto private property is frequently a reasonable condition of a government-issued license",
		"context": "§ 136a(a). Compliance inspections of power plants such as those conducted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis- sion (NRC) and Federal Energy Regulatory Commis- sion (FERC) provide other ready examples of lawful government entry onto private property. The NRC, for instance, is authorized to conduct \"inspections\" \"to assure a [nuclear power] licensee's compliance with 22 the Atomic Energy Act and with Commission regula- tions necessary for retention of the license\" ( Missis- sippi Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For similar rea- sons, Congress has charged FERC with licensing, and assessing the safe operation of, liquid natural gas ter- minals and private hydroelectric projects, making vi- olations punishable by civil and other penalties. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "601 F.2d 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din",
		"context": "1. a. Respondents' Establishment Clause challenge is governed by Mandel , which this Court recently de- scribed as providing for \"minimal scrutiny (rational - basis review).\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Man del, the Attorney General (through his delegee) denied admission to a Belgian journalist, Ernest Mandel, who wished to speak about communism. 408 U.S. at 756 -759.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din",
		"context": "It also reflects that aliens outside the United States seeking a visa or initial admission have no constitutional rights at all regarding entry into the country. I n this context, Mandel 's limited requirement of \"a facially legitimate and bona fide reason\" for exclusion, 408 U.S. at 770, accords the necessary respect for the Nation's sovereign authority to protect its borders, even if a fur- ther assessment might be called for in purely domestic contexts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mandel 's approach has particular force here for three reasons. First, courts are generally \"ill equipped to determine the[ ] authenticity and utterly unable to as- sess the[ ] adequacy\" of the Executive's \"reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din",
		"context": "See United States R.R. Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit's approach is also irreconcilable with Mandel 's central holding that the exclusion of al- iens abroad calls for especially deferential judicial re- view. 408 U.S. at 769- 770.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din",
		"context": "44 -53, is particularly misguided in this context. The \"unrea-soned assumption that courts should simply plop Estab- lishment Clause cases from the domestic context\" — involving religious displays, subsidies for religious schools, and the like —\"over to the foreign affairs con- text ignores the realities of our world.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ii. Nor does Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Din support the Fourth Circuit's ruling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "858 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Proclamation is constitutional under Mandel and Din",
		"context": "at 2141. The Din concurrence's reference to \"bad faith\" did not propose an enormous loophole in Mandel or ap- prove a wide -ranging search for pretext in reviewing a consular officer's visa -refusal decision. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir.) ( Din \"left things as Mandel had left them ,\" and \"Mandel tells us not to go behind a facially legitimate and bona fide explana- tion\"), cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 380.",
		"citation_value_orig": "851 F.3d 710",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Respondents and their amici begin by resisting the first part of our syllogism—that seizures of per- sons under the Fourth Amendment equate with com- mon-law arrests. This Court has already held, however, that the common law of arrest \"defines the limits of a seizure of the person\" under the Fourth Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; OB17-18. Our opening brief explains why Hodari D . is right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "This definition of seizures of persons was not a \"technical meaning\" unmoored from the \"normal and ordinary\" meaning \"understood by the voters.\" NACo Br. 7 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). General-purpose dictionaries like Web- ster's explained that a seizure of a person is an arrest, which can be effectuated by \"touching the body.\" 1 Webster, supra , at 13; 2 Webster, supra , at 67; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Court did not think so, offering the sentence, \"She seized the purse-snatcher, but he broke out of her grasp,\" as ev- idence that the \"[t]he word 'seizure' readily bears the meaning of a laying on of hands or application of phys- ical force to restrain movement, even when it is ulti- mately unsuccessful.\" 499 U.S. at 626; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, the original understanding controls. And speakers at the time of the Founding knew that the term seizure of the person included \"the mere touching of a person.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Payton v. New York , on which Respondents (RB38, 45) and their amici rely (NACo Br. 19), con- firms that, at common law, the question whether an arrest had occurred \"typically arose in civil damages actions for trespass or false arrest.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even Respondents' amici acknowledge that courts articulated the common-law rule that an arrest occurs without submission in a range of cases beyond the debtors' context, including cases involving false imprisonment claims. NACo Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Union Pac. Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, the Founding generation and their descendants were fa- miliar with the notion that civil damages actions, in- cluding for unjustified arrests and trespasses on the body, would lie against officers who touch individuals without justification. See CAC Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The common law of arrest defines the limits of seizure of the person in the Fourth Amendment.",
		"context": "Rep. 193, 194 (false arrest case explaining that a man is arrested when another \"gently laid his hands in order to arrest\"); 5 Del. 487. 9 seizures as it was endorsed by the Framers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- terpreting the term \"seizure\" of the person to mean a common-law arrest, the way the Framers would have, does not mean that every consequence of a common- law arrest must flow from a seizure, just as interpret- ing the term \"search\" as the Founders would have does not mean police officers face all the consequences of a common-law trespass. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Notion of a Constitutional Right to Late-Term Abortions Is in Grave Tension with the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": "The Eighth Amendment bars \"cruel and unusual punishment.\" Abortion at and after 15 weeks typicallyemploys extremely cruel and barbaric methods to slaythe child in the womb. As this Court recognized, in thesecond trimester (after 12 weeks of gestation), \"[t]hemost commonly used procedure is called 'dilation and evacuation' (D&E),\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Kennedy explained ingreater detail, As described by Dr. Carhart, the D&E procedure requires the abortionist to use instruments tograsp a portion (such as a foot or hand) of adeveloped and living fetus and drag the graspedportion out of the uterus into the vagina. Dr.Carhart uses the traction created by the openingbetween the uterus and vagina to dismember thefetus, tearing the grasped portion away from theremainder of the body.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 914",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Notion of a Constitutional Right to Late-Term Abortions Is in Grave Tension with the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": ". [I]tis safe to affirm that punishments of torture, suchas those mentioned by the commentator referredto, and all others in the same line of unnecessarycruelty, are forbidden by th[e Eighth] amendmentto the Constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]471 U.S. 1080, in explaining the obvious unconstitutionality of such ancient practices as disemboweling whilealive, drawing and quartering, [and] publicdissection, . . ., the Court has emphasized that theEighth Amendment forbids \"inhuman and barbarous\" methods of execution that go at allbeyond \"the mere extinguishment of life\" and cause\"torture or a lingering death.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Notion of a Constitutional Right to Late-Term Abortions Is in Grave Tension with the Eighth Amendment",
		"context": ". [I]tis safe to affirm that punishments of torture, suchas those mentioned by the commentator referredto, and all others in the same line of unnecessarycruelty, are forbidden by th[e Eighth] amendmentto the Constitution. 99 U.S. 130[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in explaining the obvious unconstitutionality of such ancient practices as disemboweling whilealive, drawing and quartering, [and] publicdissection, . . ., the Court has emphasized that theEighth Amendment forbids \"inhuman and barbarous\" methods of execution that go at allbeyond \"the mere extinguishment of life\" and cause\"torture or a lingering death.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 1080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "A second line of cases contributed to the Miller holding. In addition to prohibiting mandatorymaximum punishments, the Court has categoricallyexcluded certain offenses (nonhomicide crimes) andcertain offenders (juveniles and the mentally impaired)from capital punishment. Miller , at 469-70, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 543 U.S. 551; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "A second line of cases contributed to the Miller holding. In addition to prohibiting mandatorymaximum punishments, the Court has categoricallyexcluded certain offenses (nonhomicide crimes) andcertain offenders (juveniles and the mentally impaired)from capital punishment. Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "A second line of cases contributed to the Miller holding. In addition to prohibiting mandatorymaximum punishments, the Court has categoricallyexcluded certain offenses (nonhomicide crimes) andcertain offenders (juveniles and the mentally impaired)from capital punishment. Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; 543 U.S. 551; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; 543 U.S. 551; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence. Miller had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component. Prescriptively, the Court forbade statesfrom deeming youth \"irrelevant\" to a LWOP decision,and thus required them to \"take into account howchildren are different, and how those differencescounsel against irrevocably sentencing them to alifetime in prison.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; 543 U.S. 551; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence. Miller had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component. Prescriptively, the Court forbade statesfrom deeming youth \"irrelevant\" to a LWOP decision,and thus required them to \"take into account howchildren are different, and how those differencescounsel against irrevocably sentencing them to alifetime in prison.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; 543 U.S. 551; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Solem, 463 U.S. 277), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence. Miller had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component. Prescriptively, the Court forbade statesfrom deeming youth \"irrelevant\" to a LWOP decision,and thus required them to \"take into account howchildren are different, and how those differencescounsel against irrevocably sentencing them to alifetime in prison.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "Miller , at 469-70, citing 554 U.S. 407; 543 U.S. 551; 536 U.S. 304. Miller moved further, diverging from the principle that \"death is different.\" Whereas priorcases had applied special scrutiny when the penaltywas death ( Lockett, 438 U.S. 586; Woodson , 428 U.S. 280), or when the punishment imposed an irrevocableforfeiture through LWOP though the crime did notinflict the irrevocable forfeiture of death ( Graham, 560 11 U.S. 48; Solem, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), Miller applied that scrutiny for a capital crime punished with a noncapital sentence. Miller had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component. Prescriptively, the Court forbade statesfrom deeming youth \"irrelevant\" to a LWOP decision,and thus required them to \"take into account howchildren are different, and how those differencescounsel against irrevocably sentencing them to alifetime in prison.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Miller v. Alabama had a prescriptive, predictive, and descriptive component",
		"context": "prospect\" of reform. Miller , at 472. Petitioner contends Miller established a rule that courts must find a defendant's \"permanent incorrigibility,\" \"irreparable corruption,\" or\"irretrievable depravity\" (or as the California Court ofAppeal described it in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"irreparablecorruption resulting in permanent incorrigibility\")before sentencing him to LWOP. No such requirementexists.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 Cal.Rptr.3d 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SECURING DEFENDANT AUTONOMY NOTWITHSTANDING APPEAL WAIVERS IS ESPECIALLY CRUCIAL IN LIGHT OF THE INCREASING PREVALENCE OF PLEA BARGAINING",
		"context": "857, 859 (2000) (observing that plea bargain- ing \"has swept across the penal landscape and driven our vanquished jury into small pockets of resistance\"). The Framers understood that \"the jury right [may] be lost not only by gross denial, but by erosion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That erosion is nearly complete, as plea bargains now comprise all but a tiny fraction of convictions. See La fler, 566 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Traditional Principles of Self-Defense Support the Constitutionality of New York's Law",
		"context": "As Respondents explain —and as many Courts of Appeals have concluded—public -carry licensing schemes (like the New York law challenged here) rest firmly on centuries of tradition . See Resp 'ts' Br. 3-6, 21-36; see also 992 F.3d 765 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That understanding is supported by a related Anglo -American tradition: the common law of self -de- fense. As Heller observed, self -defense is \"the central component\" and \"core lawful purpose\" of the Second Amendment right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.3d 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nothing in the Twentieth Amendment's text or history prohibits states from removing disqualified insurrectionist candidates from their ballots.",
		"context": "1. \"The Constitution vests states with \"far -reaching authority\" over presidential elections, including the means of appointing presidential electors. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; U.S. Const. art. 5 II, § 1 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nothing in the Twentieth Amendment's text or history prohibits states from removing disqualified insurrectionist candidates from their ballots.",
		"context": "art. 5 II, § 1 . And in exercising that authority , states are given broad discretion to \"provide for standards as to the contents of the official ballots ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as necessary to \"protect the integrity of [the] political process.\" 405 U.S. 134 . That \"legitimate interest in protecting the integ- rity and practical functioning of the political process\" gives states the power \"to exclude from the ballot candi- dates who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nothing in the Twentieth Amendment's text or history prohibits states from removing disqualified insurrectionist candidates from their ballots.",
		"context": "5 II, § 1 . And in exercising that authority , states are given broad discretion to \"provide for standards as to the contents of the official ballots ,\" 424 U.S. 1 , as necessary to \"protect the integrity of [the] political process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That \"legitimate interest in protecting the integ- rity and practical functioning of the political process\" gives states the power \"to exclude from the ballot candi- dates who are constitutionally prohibited from assuming office .\" Hassan v. Colorado, 495 F .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech",
		"context": "9-10; 15; see also International Bhd. of Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].6 The government treats the encouragement provi- sion as though Congress used other locutions, including \"incentivizing,\" \"procuring,\" (Pet. 7), \"facilitating,\" \"so-liciting,\" \"aiding and abetting,\" (Pet. 9), and \"active as-sistance\" (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech",
		"context": "32a (emphasis added). Moreover, § 1324 already includes an aiding-and- abetting provision, which makes it a crime to aid or abet § 1324(a)'s bringing, transporting, and harboring 6 See also, e.g. , Global-Tech Appliances, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (to \"induce\" means \"[t]o bring on or about, to affect, cause, to influence to an act or course of conduct, lead by persuasion or reasoning, incite by motives, prevail on\"). 20 offenses. See 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech",
		"context": "§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(II) (\"Any per- son who … aids or abets th e commission of any of the preceding acts [in § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i-iv)] shall be pun- ished[.]\"). Adopting the government's proposed inter- pretation of the encouragement provision would thus \"[be] at odds with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions , so that no part will be in- operative or superfluous.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] supposedly does not cover \"facilitation of an alien's primary con-duct in violation of the immigration laws.\" Pet. 23.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech",
		"context": "16-17. But courts may not ac-tually '\" rewrite a … law to conform it to constitutional requirements.\"' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pet. App. 11a, 27a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Interpreted The Encouragement Provision To Cover A Wide Array Of Protected Speech",
		"context": "For two of them, the government relies on shorthand phrases in the opinions, rather than actual statutory terms. The statutes at issu e did not use the words \"en- courage\" or \"induce,\" but were more narrowly tailored. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These opinions show at most that context mat-ters. Indeed, Williams expressly distinguished the statute at issue there from a problematic criminaliza- tion of the statement \"I encourage you to obtain child pornography.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result",
		"context": "231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091. 27 Glass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such intent was expressed in sect ion 3231, which merely con- solidated the redundant \"all crimes and offences\" to \"all offenses\" and swapped \"cognizable under the authority of\" for \"against the laws of.\" The current section 3231 is otherwise identical to the 1789 Act's original grant of criminal jurisdiction ov er \"all … offences.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result",
		"context": "\"Congress' awareness of the need to make a clear statement … is amply demonstrated by the numerous occasions on which it has.\" See Arabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U.S. at 258; see generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most glaring is the FSIA, which provides a sweeping statement of foreign sovere ign immunity and comprehen- sively addresses the amenab ility to suit of foreign sovereigns and their instrument alities. That Act grants jurisdiction in \"nonjury civil action[s] against … foreign states,\" including state-owned corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result",
		"context": "That is no t to say that sovereigns were fair game in the civil context. Common-law immunity of- tentimes still protected so vereigns from suit. See Republic of Aust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in civil cases where cour ts did not recognize immun- ity, see infra p. 35, civil jurisdiction existed under express congressional authorization. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code reaches foreign states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result",
		"context": "U.S. Br. Add. 26, SerVaas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The United States responded with alarm: \"no criminal proceedings can be started against sovereign states.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "661 F. App'x 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Nothing Since 1789 Counsels a Different Result",
		"context": "22 (quoting McCulloch , 372 U.S. at 21). Some nations sp ecifically \"base their sover- eign immunity decisions on reciprocity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Especially given America's underdog status in 1789 and its sensitivity to its perceived role alongside other na- tions, supra pp. 16-17, the First Congress would have been loath to open the door to reciprocal prosecution by foreign states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.2d 835",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA",
		"context": "\"The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the 14 human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \"mere omission from [a statute] of any mention of intent will not be construed as eliminating that elemen t from the crimes denounced.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA",
		"context": "\"Engrained in our concept of due process is the requirement of notice. Notice is sometimes essential so that the citizen has the chance to defend charges.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If a pe rson is not aware that his conduct is forbidden, and has no ability to learn so, due process bars \"the imposition of heavy criminal penalties.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Due Process Forbids Criminalizing Good Faith Efforts To Comply With the CSA",
		"context": "225 N.Y. 25). Thus, in a case where a regulatory offense also came with the possibility of a penalty of up to three years' imprisonment, this Court refused to expose \"a good -faith error of judgment\" to criminal punishment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Otherwise, the \"criminal sanctions would be used, not to punish conscious and calculated wrongdoing at odds with statutory proscriptions, but instead simply to regulate business practices regardless of t he intent with which they were undertaken.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and held that Cheryl Perich was a \"minister\" covered by the ministerial exception. Id. at 192.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "at 190-192. After Hosanna-Tabor , the lower courts – including the Ninth Circuit – have been consistent in 2 their interpretation of the ministerial exception. See, e.g., 700 F.3d 169[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] recognized there is not a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister; instead, courts should analyze all of the circumstances of employment. See, Biel v. St. James School , 911 F.3d at 607-609; Puri v. Khalsa , 844 F.3d at 1159-1162. And, yet, despite this unity among the various circuit courts as to the approach for determining whether an employee is a \"minister\" under the ministerial exception, Petitioner requests this Court overrule Hosanna-Tabor and adopt – in essence – a \"function-only\" test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "Morrissey-Berru appealed. B. The Ninth Circuit proceedings and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] On appeal, Our Lady of Guadalupe School argued that functional consensus is the legal standard for analyzing whether an employee has the legal status of a \"minister.\" Answering Br. 30-32, ECF No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "30-32, ECF No. 17. In response, Morrissey-Berru argued that the Ninth Circuit should follow this Court's ruling in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and conduct a complete factual examination of Morrissey-Berru's 7 employment with Our Lady of Guadalupe School. Reply Br. 11, 13, ECF No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "11, 13, ECF No. 23. After the close of briefing in this matter, the Ninth Circuit issued a 2-to-1 decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the majority opinion held that in \"assessing the totality of Biel's role at St. James, the ministerial exception does not foreclose her claim.\" Id. at 605.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "App. 2a-3a. Relying on both Hosanna- Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 911 F.3d 603, the Court concluded that, on balance, Morrissey-Berru was not a \"minister\" for purposes of the ministerial exception, and therefore, the ministerial exception did not bar her ADEA claim. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "App. 2a-3a. Relying on both Hosanna- Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 565 U.S. 171 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court concluded that, on balance, Morrissey-Berru was not a \"minister\" for purposes of the ministerial exception, and therefore, the ministerial exception did not bar her ADEA claim. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "3a. On June 25, 2019, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc in Biel v. St. James School. See, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION Petitioner fails to show a conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and those of this Court or any of the other federal circuit or state courts. I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 565 U.S. 171 In 2012, this Court considered for the first time \"whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 1238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "See, 926 F.3d 1238. 9 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION Petitioner fails to show a conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and those of this Court or any of the other federal circuit or state courts. I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] In 2012, this Court considered for the first time \"whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.\" Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 565 U.S. 171. In Hosanna-Tabor , this Court examined Cheryl Perich's employment as a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School to determine whether she was qualified as a \"minister\" for purposes of the exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. E.E.O.C., 565 U.S. 171 (2012)",
		"context": "9 REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION Petitioner fails to show a conflict between the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and those of this Court or any of the other federal circuit or state courts. I. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and 565 U.S. 171 In 2012, this Court considered for the first time \"whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment.\" Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Hosanna-Tabor , this Court examined Cheryl Perich's employment as a teacher at the Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran School to determine whether she was qualified as a \"minister\" for purposes of the exception. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The CWA's structure and history do not support the County's and EPA's limiting constructions",
		"context": "25 (quoting Or. Nat. Desert [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), to support its view that the Act com- pletely exempts pollution from point sources that reaches navigable waters indirectly. EPA rejects the County's view \"that any spatial gap between a point 36 source and jurisdictional surface waters renders the NPDES program inapplicable,\" U.S. Br. 8, but posits a special exception for point-source discharges that reach navigable waters through groundwater, be- cause of what EPA sees as the Act's \"purpose not to regulate groundwater.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 778",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "The statute's \"very pur- pose,\" as the Tenth Circuit said, is to \"[e]liminat[e] [certain] ideas\" about ma rriage in favor of others, Pet.App.24a, and it authorizes the government to take sides in an importan t cultural, political, and religious discussion—all in the name of \"produc[ing] a society free of … biases,\" Hurley , 515 U.S. at 578. It is \"a bedrock\" First Amendment principle \"that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because\" the government disagrees with them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 31 consideration, and adherence.\" Turner Broad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "\"At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, 31 consideration, and adherence.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, this Court has held that the government's disagreement with a speaker's opinion \"is a reason for according it constitutional protection.'\" Hustler Mag.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "576 U.S. 155. A law that discriminates based on viewpoint is an even more \"blatant\" First Amendment violation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government may not regulate \"speech based on 'the specific mo tivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker.'\" Reed , 576 U.S. at 168 (quoting Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 829).",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "A law is content based if it \"applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or … message expressed.\" Reed , 576 U.S. at 163. A viewpoint-based law regulates speech becaus e of the \"particular views taken by speakers on a subject,\" Rosenberger , 515 U.S. at 829, or \"reflects the Government's disapproval of a subset of messages it finds offensive,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CADA compels speech based not only on content but also viewpoint. The content of a message determines whether CADA applies, and the viewpoint of the speaker determines the legality of the message.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "Tornillo , 418 U.S. at 256. So CADA is a \"[g]overnment-enforced right of access [that] inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.'\" Tornillo , 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting N.Y. Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added). Because Smith must \"opt to change [her] message\" or \"refrain from speaking altogether,\" the St ate has silenced her voice. See Ariz. Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "Because Smith must \"opt to change [her] message\" or \"refrain from speaking altogether,\" the St ate has silenced her voice. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club 's Freedom Club [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Smith is not alone. Like others across the country, she has refrained from expressing her views of marriage to avoid speaking a contrary one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "That stigmatizes her viewpoint as unwelcome, drives it from the public square, and removes it from public consciousness. CADA \"restrict[s] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others,\" something \"wholly foreign to the First Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 Third, the Clause awards access to Smith's websites \"only to those who disagree[ ] with [her] views\" on marriage. PG&E , 475 U.S. at 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "A statement saying, \"I create wedding we bsites\" is permissible; one saying \"I create only opposite-sex wedding websites\" is not. This \"is about as content-based as it gets.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Colorado insists it can ban Smith's statement for the sole reason that it is speech incidental to illegal conduct. Opp.Br.31–33.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "Opp.Br.31–33. But this doctrine covers speech \"intended to induce or commence illegal activities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It prohibits employers from posting signs saying \"white applicants only\" and restaurants from stating \"gay couples not serv ed here.\" Those signs are \"incidental to a valid limitation\" on the \"illegal,\" non- expressive activity of di scriminatory conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Publication Clause restricts artists' speech based on content and viewpoint.",
		"context": "It prohibits employers from posting signs saying \"white applicants only\" and restaurants from stating \"gay couples not serv ed here.\" Those signs are \"incidental to a valid limitation\" on the \"illegal,\" non- expressive activity of di scriminatory conduct. Pittsburgh Press [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, Smith's statement is not incidental to a valid limit on non-expressive, illegal conduct. It is incidental to an invalid restriction on constitutionally protected speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Roe errantly evaluated a state's interest in \"potential\" life instead of \"actual\" life",
		"context": "15 This unfamiliarity with the significance of conception as the beginni ng of a new human life persisted. For instance, Justice Stevens, who joined the Court after Roe, argued that \"a State has no greater secular interest in protecting the potential life of an embryo\" than it has \"in protecting the potential life of a sperm or an unfertilized ovum.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is because he was \"not aware of any secular basis for differentiat ing\" between destroying an individual sperm cell before conception and a human zygote after conception. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Provision Threatens Other Forms of Protected Speech",
		"context": "But the provision threatens other forms of protected speech as well, due to the indefiniteness of the term \"political ,\" and the discretion which polling officials have to 27 define and apply that term. More than 30 years ago, this Court suggested that sayings like \"Jesus Saves,\" \"Abortion is Murder,\" and \"Right to Choose,\" are non- political speech. Members of City Council of City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, it is hardly a stretch to believe that many would see such speech as \"political\" today . A shirt that says \"Life Begins at Birth\" or \"Family Research Council\" and which a person wears as a religious statement could be perceived as \"political\" by a polling official and banned under Section 211B.11(1) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare decisis counsels against overruling Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "One consideration this Court has identified in weigh- ing whether to overrule a precedent is whether Con- gress \"remains free to alter\" the prior decision through legislation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those considerations weigh against overruling Seminole Rock deference . 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare decisis counsels against overruling Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "Petitioner further contends (Br. 48 -50) that Semi- nole Rock deference is a \"procedural\" rule entitled to less respect as precedent. That contention is at odds with petitioner's own view s. Stare decisis concerns are less significant for \"procedural and evidentiary rules,\" Payne , 501 U.S. at 828, because those rules \"do not gov- ern primary conduct ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Seminole Rock deference too affects the lawfulness of primary conduct by regulated parties , since, where applicable, it 37 governs the meaning of regulations that regulate pri- mary conduct . The doctrine is thus unlike the prece- dent this C ourt overruled in 555 U.S. 223, which governed only the sequence in which a reviewing court was required to address two legal questions bearing on claims of qualified immunity, see id. at 232— not whether to grant such immunity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare decisis counsels against overruling Seminole Rock deference",
		"context": "48 -50) that Semi- nole Rock deference is a \"procedural\" rule entitled to less respect as precedent. That contention is at odds with petitioner's own view s. Stare decisis concerns are less significant for \"procedural and evidentiary rules,\" Payne , 501 U.S. at 828, because those rules \"do not gov- ern primary conduct ,\" 570 U.S. 99, Seminole Rock deference too affects the lawfulness of primary conduct by regulated parties , since, where applicable, it 37 governs the meaning of regulations that regulate pri- mary conduct . The doctrine is thus unlike the prece- dent this C ourt overruled in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which governed only the sequence in which a reviewing court was required to address two legal questions bearing on claims of qualified immunity, see id. at 232— not whether to grant such immunity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Director Exercises Sufficient Control Over Inter Partes Review To Render APJs Inferior Officers",
		"context": "The court below then explained that \"whether one is an inferior officer depends on whether he has a superior, and inferior of- ficers are officers whose work is directed and super- vised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination wi th the advice and consent of the Senate.\" U.S. App. at 9a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (internal marks removed). The Federal Circuit condensed this Court's caselaw into what one Judge called at oral argument \"three buckets.\" See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16",
		"context": "Id . § 10301(b). This totality of circumstances inquiry is far - reaching and \"springs from the demonstrated ingenuity of state and local governments in hobbling 3 Prior to 1982, this statute was interpreted by this Court in City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to require a showing of discriminatory intent. The 1982 amendments explicitly added the results test. Thus, although proof of intent is not required under Section 2, plaintiffs can still sustain a Section 2 challenge by proving racially discriminatory intent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16",
		"context": "at 44– 45. See, e.g., Veasey , 830 F.3d at 244; LWV , 769 F.3d at 240; Mich . State A. Philip Randolph [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 677 F.3d 383. The Senate Factors are \"useful in examining both elements of the two-part test, especially the causal linkage between disparate impacts and conditions of discrimination.\" Veasey , 830 F.3d at 245 n.34 (citing LWV , 769 F.3d at 240, 245).",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F.3d 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16",
		"context": "at 44– 45. See, e.g., Veasey , 830 F.3d at 244; LWV , 769 F.3d at 240; Mich . State A. Philip Randolph 833 F.3d 656; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Senate Factors are \"useful in examining both elements of the two-part test, especially the causal linkage between disparate impacts and conditions of discrimination.\" Veasey , 830 F.3d at 245 n.34 (citing LWV , 769 F.3d at 240, 245).",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 F.3d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16",
		"context": "Although Section 2 does not require intentional discrimination by state actors, many of the Senate Factors are probative of such discrimination. Indeed, the Senate Factors are derived from those circumstances that this Court has found relevant to identifying unconstitutional discrimination. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 485 F.2d 1297. This, in part, reflects the fact that there is rarely a clean line between \"official\" and \"private\" discrimination that interacts with a specific voting practice to burden access to the franchise based on race. In the Jim Crow -Era, for example, only widesprea d private discrimination in housing and employment could ensure the effectiveness of \"gainful employment or property\" requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. This Court Has Interpreted the Plain Text of Section 2 to Broadly Prohibit Election Laws That Interact with Social and Historical Conditions to Deny the Right to Vote. 16",
		"context": "Although Section 2 does not require intentional discrimination by state actors, many of the Senate Factors are probative of such discrimination. Indeed, the Senate Factors are derived from those circumstances that this Court has found relevant to identifying unconstitutional discrimination. See 412 U.S. 755; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This, in part, reflects the fact that there is rarely a clean line between \"official\" and \"private\" discrimination that interacts with a specific voting practice to burden access to the franchise based on race. In the Jim Crow -Era, for example, only widesprea d private discrimination in housing and employment could ensure the effectiveness of \"gainful employment or property\" requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 F.2d 1297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………………………19 68 F.3d 525 …………………………...26 134 S. Ct. 2751 ………………………….36 430 U.S. 199 …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed 513 U.S. 179 ……………………………………19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …………………………...26 134 S. Ct. 2751 ………………………….36 430 U.S. 199 …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed 513 U.S. 179 ……………………………………19 68 F.3d 525 …………………………...26 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………………….36 430 U.S. 199 …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed 513 U.S. 179 ……………………………………19 68 F.3d 525 …………………………...26 134 S. Ct. 2751 ………………………….36 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed 513 U.S. 179 ……………………………………19 68 F.3d 525 …………………………...26 134 S. Ct. 2751 ………………………….36 430 U.S. 199 …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "…………………………………………...24 CONCLUSION………………………………………..36 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 318 F. Supp. 3d 1293 ……………..30 Asgrow Seed 513 U.S. 179 ……………………………………19 68 F.3d 525 …………………………...26 134 S. Ct. 2751 ………………………….36 430 U.S. 199 …………………………………….. 9 City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
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		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
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		"context": "of Water and 435 U.S. 702 ………………………………...7, 21 566 U.S. 30 ………………………………………5 556 U.S. 303 ……………………………………16 494 U.S. 26 ……………………………………..17 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d 53 ……………………………...34 iv 411 U.S. 677 ……………………………... passim 447 F.3d 1187 ………………………..26 General Electric 429 U.S. 125 ……………………………………..5 137 A.D.3d 30 …….34 510 U.S. 17 ……………………………………..12 853 F.3d 339 …………………… passim 416 U.S. 351 ……………………………………..7 767 F.3d 216 …………………………..33 289 Or. App. 507 ………………………………35 539 U.S. 558 ……………………………………13 v Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 ……………………..34, 35 Michael 450 U.S. 464 ……………………………………..6 Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept. of Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401 ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren 547 U.S. 370 ……………………………………17 441 P.3d 1203 ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 420 U.S. 636 ………………………………….7, 8 883 F.3d 100 ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C.",
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		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
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	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
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		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
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	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "of Family & Life 138 S. Ct. 2361 ………………………………...33 135 S. Ct. 2584 ( 2015) ………………………………...13 523 U.S. 75 ………………………………………7 Pennsylvania Dept. of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren 547 U.S. 370 ……………………………………17 441 P.3d 1203 ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 420 U.S. 636 ………………………………….7, 8 883 F.3d 100 ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2………………………………...3, 18 Rule 37 Supreme Court Rules ………………………...1 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C.",
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		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401 ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………………………17 441 P.3d 1203 ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 420 U.S. 636 ………………………………….7, 8 883 F.3d 100 ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2………………………………...3, 18 Rule 37 Supreme Court Rules ………………………...1 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13701, et seq ………………………………16 OTHER MATERIALS Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Texas Evangelical Groups Are Suing for the Right to Discriminate Against LGBTQ Workers , VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17961620/te xas-evangelical -lgbtq -discrimination -lawsuit …….31 vii American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 28 (2009), available at https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/g ender -identity -report.pdf ………………………….4, 13 American Psychological Association, Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation 2 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lbgc/publications/thera peutic -resp.html ………………………………………19 Amy Littlefield, Meet the Trans L aw Student Suing His Doctor for Canceling His Gender Affirming Surgery , REWIRE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/03/meet - trans -law-student -suing -doctor -canceling - gender -affirmation -surgery/ ……………………31, 32 Bradford Richardson, Transgende r teacher wins $60k settlement for co -workers' improper gender pronouns , WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 6/may/25/transgender -teacher -awarded -60k- improper -pronouns/ …………………………………..29 Brianna Heldt, Indiana Teacher Forced to Resign Over Refusal to Use Transgender Pronouns , TOWNHALL (June 6, 2018), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/briannaheldt/2 viii 018/06/06/indiana -teacher -forced -to-resign - over-refusal -to-use-transgender -pronouns - n2487919 ………………………………………………29 Claudi Buck & Sammy Caiola, Transgender Patient Sues Dignity Health for Discrimination over Hysterectomy Denial , SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 370",
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		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401 ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren 547 U.S. 370 ……………………………………17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 420 U.S. 636 ………………………………….7, 8 883 F.3d 100 ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2………………………………...3, 18 Rule 37 Supreme Court Rules ………………………...1 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13701, et seq ………………………………16 OTHER MATERIALS Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Texas Evangelical Groups Are Suing for the Right to Discriminate Against LGBTQ Workers , VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17961620/te xas-evangelical -lgbtq -discrimination -lawsuit …….31 vii American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 28 (2009), available at https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/g ender -identity -report.pdf ………………………….4, 13 American Psychological Association, Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation 2 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lbgc/publications/thera peutic -resp.html ………………………………………19 Amy Littlefield, Meet the Trans L aw Student Suing His Doctor for Canceling His Gender Affirming Surgery , REWIRE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/03/meet - trans -law-student -suing -doctor -canceling - gender -affirmation -surgery/ ……………………31, 32 Bradford Richardson, Transgende r teacher wins $60k settlement for co -workers' improper gender pronouns , WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 6/may/25/transgender -teacher -awarded -60k- improper -pronouns/ …………………………………..29 Brianna Heldt, Indiana Teacher Forced to Resign Over Refusal to Use Transgender Pronouns , TOWNHALL (June 6, 2018), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/briannaheldt/2 viii 018/06/06/indiana -teacher -forced -to-resign - over-refusal -to-use-transgender -pronouns - n2487919 ………………………………………………29 Claudi Buck & Sammy Caiola, Transgender Patient Sues Dignity Health for Discrimination over Hysterectomy Denial , SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 P.3d 1203",
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	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401 ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren 547 U.S. 370 ……………………………………17 441 P.3d 1203 ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………………………….7, 8 883 F.3d 100 ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2………………………………...3, 18 Rule 37 Supreme Court Rules ………………………...1 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13701, et seq ………………………………16 OTHER MATERIALS Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Texas Evangelical Groups Are Suing for the Right to Discriminate Against LGBTQ Workers , VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17961620/te xas-evangelical -lgbtq -discrimination -lawsuit …….31 vii American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 28 (2009), available at https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/g ender -identity -report.pdf ………………………….4, 13 American Psychological Association, Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation 2 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lbgc/publications/thera peutic -resp.html ………………………………………19 Amy Littlefield, Meet the Trans L aw Student Suing His Doctor for Canceling His Gender Affirming Surgery , REWIRE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/03/meet - trans -law-student -suing -doctor -canceling - gender -affirmation -surgery/ ……………………31, 32 Bradford Richardson, Transgende r teacher wins $60k settlement for co -workers' improper gender pronouns , WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 6/may/25/transgender -teacher -awarded -60k- improper -pronouns/ …………………………………..29 Brianna Heldt, Indiana Teacher Forced to Resign Over Refusal to Use Transgender Pronouns , TOWNHALL (June 6, 2018), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/briannaheldt/2 viii 018/06/06/indiana -teacher -forced -to-resign - over-refusal -to-use-transgender -pronouns - n2487919 ………………………………………………29 Claudi Buck & Sammy Caiola, Transgender Patient Sues Dignity Health for Discrimination over Hysterectomy Denial , SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 636",
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	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "of Public 495 U.S. 552 ……………………………………16 Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2014) ………………………...33 Price 490 U.S. 228 …………………….………4, 21, 22 566 U.S. 93 ……………………………………..19 Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401 ……………………………………19 vi S.D. Warren 547 U.S. 370 ……………………………………17 441 P.3d 1203 ………………………….34 Telescope Media 271 F. Supp. 3d 1090 ………………34 420 U.S. 636 ………………………………….7, 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ………………….… passim STATUTES 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2………………………………...3, 18 Rule 37 Supreme Court Rules ………………………...1 Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. §13701, et seq ………………………………16 OTHER MATERIALS Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Texas Evangelical Groups Are Suing for the Right to Discriminate Against LGBTQ Workers , VOX (Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17961620/te xas-evangelical -lgbtq -discrimination -lawsuit …….31 vii American Psychological Association, Report of the Task Force on Gender Identity and Gender Variance 28 (2009), available at https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/g ender -identity -report.pdf ………………………….4, 13 American Psychological Association, Report of the American Psychological Association Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation 2 (2009), available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lbgc/publications/thera peutic -resp.html ………………………………………19 Amy Littlefield, Meet the Trans L aw Student Suing His Doctor for Canceling His Gender Affirming Surgery , REWIRE (Jan. 3, 2018), https://rewire.news/article/2018/01/03/meet - trans -law-student -suing -doctor -canceling - gender -affirmation -surgery/ ……………………31, 32 Bradford Richardson, Transgende r teacher wins $60k settlement for co -workers' improper gender pronouns , WASH. POST (May 25, 2016), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 6/may/25/transgender -teacher -awarded -60k- improper -pronouns/ …………………………………..29 Brianna Heldt, Indiana Teacher Forced to Resign Over Refusal to Use Transgender Pronouns , TOWNHALL (June 6, 2018), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/briannaheldt/2 viii 018/06/06/indiana -teacher -forced -to-resign - over-refusal -to-use-transgender -pronouns - n2487919 ………………………………………………29 Claudi Buck & Sammy Caiola, Transgender Patient Sues Dignity Health for Discrimination over Hysterectomy Denial , SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "As a result , this Court should conclude that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination does not include a prohibition against discrimination based on sexual orientation. This Court has explained that \"[w]e need not leave our common sense at the doorstep when we interpret a statute.\" Price [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Common sense dictates that the word \"sex\" is not syno nymous with \"sexual orientation .\" That understanding comports with dictionary definitions, medical professionals, and this Court's precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": ". .\" Michael [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]429 U.S. 125. The different reproductive capacities between men and women are, in part , what has led this Cour t to characterize \"sex\" as an immutable characteristic that falls into one of two, separately -identifiable groups. In 411 U.S. 677, this Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute that prevented a female member of the uniformed services from claiming her husband as a dependent for the purpose of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical benefits without proving her husband was actually dependent on her income .",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": ". .\" Michael 450 U.S. 464[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The different reproductive capacities between men and women are, in part , what has led this Cour t to characterize \"sex\" as an immutable characteristic that falls into one of two, separately -identifiable groups. In 411 U.S. 677, this Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute that prevented a female member of the uniformed services from claiming her husband as a dependent for the purpose of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical benefits without proving her husband was actually dependent on her income .",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Michael 450 U.S. 464429 U.S. 125. The different reproductive capacities between men and women are, in part , what has led this Cour t to characterize \"sex\" as an immutable characteristic that falls into one of two, separately -identifiable groups. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court declared unconstitutional a federal statute that prevented a female member of the uniformed services from claiming her husband as a dependent for the purpose of obtaining increased quarters allowances and medical benefits without proving her husband was actually dependent on her income . The statute , however, 6 permitted a male member of the uniformed services to claim his wife as a dependent without offering such proof of financial dependency. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "In striking down the federal statute, this Court recognized that \"sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic \" that \"frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.\" Id. at 686 (emphasis added) ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, \"statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of inv idiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Myths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's ability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or for paying them less. City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The common -sense reality is that men and women are biologically distinct. That reality led to overt and pervasive discrimination against women as a cla ss, which eventually resulted in legal protections for women in employment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "That reality led to overt and pervasive discrimination against women as a cla ss, which eventually resulted in legal protections for women in employment. After Title VII's implementation, t o comply with equal protection guarantees, this Court held that Title VII protects both men and women from sex discrimination in the employment c ontext, regardless of whether the employer is in the same class (male or female) as the employee. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At its core, Title VII is designed to prevent discrimination against men, as a class , and women, as a class , based on notions of how men, as a class , or women, as a class , should look or act. A few of this Court 's sex discrimination cases from the 1970s highlight the pervasive discrimination women faced in the workplace that were premised on certain roles for men and women.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "A few of this Court 's sex discrimination cases from the 1970s highlight the pervasive discrimination women faced in the workplace that were premised on certain roles for men and women. In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , this Court confronted 8 the question of whether a federal statute violated the equal protection secured by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendme nt because it afforded benefits to male wage earners that were not provided to female wage earners. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, death benefits of male wage earners were payable to the widow and the couple's minor children while death benefits o f female wage earners were payable only to the minor children. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 636",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Frontiero , 411 U.S. at 686 -87 (emphasis added) . In a strikingly similar case, this Court struck down a provision in the Federal Old -Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits program because survivors' benefits were pa yable to the husband of a deceased wife only if he could prove he was receiving at least one -half of his support from his deceased wife, whereas a surviving wife did not have to satisfy the support requirement. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1977 ). Relying on Frontiero , this Court explained that the statutory support requirement \"operates to deprive women of protection for their families which men receive as a result of their employment . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Although a person's sexual orientation is related to his or her sex, insofar as it is part of identifying whether a person is sexually attracted to someone of the same or opposite sex, \"sexual orientation\" and \"sex\" are not the same and should not be collapsed into a catch -all category of \"sex\" discrimination. Yet, that is exactly what Zarda's representatives and Bostock argue -- that because one's biological sex is \"necessarily a factor in sexual orientation,\" sexual orientation is a \"subset of sex discrimination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Br. for Respondents Zarda, et al. at 25 (\"[T]he notion that men should be attracted only to women and women should only be attract ed to men is a normative sex - based stereotype\"); Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": ". .'\" Zarda , 883 F.3d at 113 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on this Court's statement that Title VII is a \"'broad rule of work place equality' [that] 'strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment' based on protected characteristics.\" Zarda , 883 F.3d at 111 (quoting 510 U.S. 17 and L.A. Dep't of Water & 435 U.S. 7).",
		"citation_value_orig": "853 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Zarda , 883 F.3d at 113 (quoting 853 F.3d 339. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on this Court's statement that Title VII is a \"'broad rule of work place equality' [that] 'strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment' based on protected characteristics.\" Zarda , 883 F.3d at 111 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and L.A. Dep't of Water & 435 U.S. 7). The dissent in Zarda properly points out, however, that Title VII is not a broad, catch -all statute that seeks to eradicate all workplace discrimination. Rather, it \"singles out for prohibition discrimination based on particular categories and classifications that have been used to perpetuate injustice – but not all such categories and classifications.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Zarda , 883 F.3d at 113 (quoting 853 F.3d 339. In reaching its conclusion, the Second Circuit relied on this Court's statement that Title VII is a \"'broad rule of work place equality' [that] 'strikes at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment' based on protected characteristics.\" Zarda , 883 F.3d at 111 (quoting 510 U.S. 17 and L.A. Dep't of Water & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The dissent in Zarda properly points out, however, that Title VII is not a broad, catch -all statute that seeks to eradicate all workplace discrimination. Rather, it \"singles out for prohibition discrimination based on particular categories and classifications that have been used to perpetuate injustice – but not all such categories and classifications.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "; see also American Psychological Association, Report of the Tas k Force on Gender 13 Identity and Gender Variance 28 (2009), available at https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/policy/gender - identity -report.pdf (last visited August 19, 2019) (sexual orientation refers to \"the tendency to be sexually attracted to persons of the same sex, the opposite sex, both sexes, or neither sex\"). This Court also has recognized that one's sexual orientation concerns matters of sexuality, not biological sex. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court explained that Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom for same -sex couples to enj oy intimate association, recognizing that \"when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.\" 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added) (quoting 539 U.S. 558). This Court did not strike the Texas law down because it discriminated based on one's \"sex,\" but, rather, because it discriminated based on one's intimate sexual choices – one's sexuality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "This Court also has recognized that one's sexual orientation concerns matters of sexuality, not biological sex. In 135 S. Ct. 2584, this Court explained that Lawrence confirmed a dimension of freedom for same -sex couples to enj oy intimate association, recognizing that \"when sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.\" 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (emphasis added) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court did not strike the Texas law down because it discriminated based on one's \"sex,\" but, rather, because it discriminated based on one's intimate sexual choices – one's sexuality. \"Sexuality\" is different than \" sex.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Recognizing the limitations on devising Congressional intent, there are nevertheless several reasons to conclude that Congress did not intend for \"sex\" to include sexual orientation or gender identity. First, the fact that Congress has added sexual orientation as an additional protected categor y in other statutes is evidence t hat Congress understands that the words have different 16 meanings.2 \"[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons\" is that \"'a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If sexual orientation discrimination is itself sex discrimination, as is argued in this case, then it would render sexual orientation superfluous in those statutes. 2 Sexual orientation is protected as a separate categor y under the Violence Against Women Act , 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": ".\" S.D. Warren [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that Cong ress has chosen in other statutes to include \"sexual orientation\" alongside \"sex\" reflects its understanding that the terms are distinct , even if related in some way .3 In fact, 3 The gradual changes to President Nixon's original execu tive order concerning equal employment in the federal government shows that the Executive Branch understands the terms are distinct. In 1969, the Executive Order discussed the language in Title VII, explaining that employment discrimination in the federal government would prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Except for religion, all of the categories listed in section 2000e - 2 are based on immutable characteristics. 42 U.S.C. §2000e -2(a)(1 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Sexual orientation , however, is not an immutable characteristic in the same way that one's race, national origin, or biological sex are . \"Same -sex sexual attractions and behavior occur in the context of a variety of sexual orientations and sexual orientation identities, and for some, sexual orientation identity ( i.e., individual or group membership and affiliation, self -labeling) is fluid or substituting it with \"sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Second, the ordina ry meaning of \"sex\" does not subsume within it \"sexual orientation. \" When interpreting a statute, the Court looks \"'first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Schindler Elevator 563 U.S. 401. Here, \"sex\" is not defined in Tit le VII. However, as discussed above, the common sense, ordinary meaning of \"sex\" refers to the immutable, biological characteristics of a man or woman , frequently tied to their distinct reproductive capabilities .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Second, the ordina ry meaning of \"sex\" does not subsume within it \"sexual orientation. \" When interpreting a statute, the Court looks \"'first to its language, giving the words used their ordinary meaning.'\" 566 U.S. 93; see also Schindler Elevator [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, \"sex\" is not defined in Tit le VII. However, as discussed above, the common sense, ordinary meaning of \"sex\" refers to the immutable, biological characteristics of a man or woman , frequently tied to their distinct reproductive capabilities .",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Dist. , 427 F3d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 2005), amended by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27 people have legitimate, conflicting opinions. In addition, when schools are introd ucing young, elementary -aged, students to these materials, parents might not be prepared to have their child exposed to some of these issues at such an early age.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 F.3d 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "Pickup v. Brown , 740 F3d 1208, 1238 (9th Cir. 2014) (after concluding that speech by medical professionals is exem pt from First Amendment protection, upholding a ban prohibiting counseling to individuals who would like to align their gender identity with their biological sex), abrogated by Nat'l Inst. of Family & Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The controversies surrounding business owners forced to accommodate a person's perceived gender identity mirror the legal issues that have arisen in the context of businesses forced to comply with sexual orientation nondiscrimination policies. When faced w ith public accommodations laws that 34 prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, flower -shop owners, bakers, photographers, and wedding -venue providers, asserting that their sincerely -held religious beliefs prevent them from providing the service, have received court decisions , often involving sizeable monetary penalties, holding that they engaged in unlawful discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "The controversies surrounding business owners forced to accommodate a person's perceived gender identity mirror the legal issues that have arisen in the context of businesses forced to comply with sexual orientation nondiscrimination policies. When faced w ith public accommodations laws that 34 prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, flower -shop owners, bakers, photographers, and wedding -venue providers, asserting that their sincerely -held religious beliefs prevent them from providing the service, have received court decisions , often involving sizeable monetary penalties, holding that they engaged in unlawful discrimination. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]309 P.3d 53. At least one business owner has been subjected to litigation involving claims that he engaged in discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. O n the same day that Jack Phillips of Maste rpiece Cakeshop obtained a favorable ruling from this Court for refusing to bake a custom cake for a same -sex wedding ceremony , he had a complaint filed against him at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for refusing to bake a cake celebrating a person's gender transition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 P.3d 1203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "At least one business owner has been subjected to litigation involving claims that he engaged in discrimination based on gender identity and sexual orientation. O n the same day that Jack Phillips of Maste rpiece Cakeshop obtained a favorable ruling from this Court for refusing to bake a custom cake for a same -sex wedding ceremony , he had a complaint filed against him at the Colorado Civil Rights Commission for refusing to bake a cake celebrating a person's gender transition. Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Scott Shackford, Can a Baker Be Forced to Make a Transgender Celebration Cake? , REASON .COM (Aug. 15, 2018), https://reason.com/blog/2018/08/15/can -a- baker -be-forced -to-make -a-transgen . In Masterpiece , this Court reversed the decisions below, which held that Phillips engag ed in 35 sexual orientation discrimination when he refused to bake a custom cake for a same -sex wedding reception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Interpreting \"Sex\" To Include \"Sexual Orientation\" Or \"Gender Identity\" Would Threaten First Amendment Rights",
		"context": "When businesses are compelled to refer to a person by his or her gender identity rather than biological sex, or based on choices concerning sexuality, it infringes the free speech rights of the business. Similarly, forci ng business owners to make business decisions that conflict with the sincerely - held religious beliefs of the owners of the entity raises free exercise of religion issues. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] mandate required closely held corporations to provide health -insurance coverage for methods of contraception contrary to the sincerely held religious beliefs of the companies' 36 owners is unconstitutional u nder the Religious Freedom Restoration Act). CONCLUSION This case presents an opportunity for this Court to clarify for lower courts that sexual orientation is not subsumed within Title VII's prohibition against sex discrimination. That",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": "18a) (emphasis added).3 The TVA Act contains no provision that grants immunity to or limits the liability of the TVA for discretionary decisions. Thus, \"[b]y permitting [the TVA] to sue and be sued, Congress effected a 'broad' waiver\" of any governmental immunity that the TVA might have otherwise enjoyed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has elsewhere put these same points thus: By launching \"the [TVA] into the commercial world,\" and inclu ding a sue - and-be-sued clause in its charter, Congress has cast off the [TVA]'s \"cloak of sovereignty\" and given it the \"status of a private commercial enterprise.\" [Library of 478 U.S. 310].",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": "510 U.S. 471. This Court has elsewhere put these same points thus: By launching \"the [TVA] into the commercial world,\" and inclu ding a sue - and-be-sued clause in its charter, Congress has cast off the [TVA]'s \"cloak of sovereignty\" and given it the \"status of a private commercial enterprise.\" [Library of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]]. It follows that Congress is p resumed to have waived any otherwise existing immunity of the [TVA] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": ". 3 No limitation on the TVA's sue -and-be-sued clause, arising from the TVA Act, is involved in this case. 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress \"intend[ed] that [the TVA] shall have much of the essential freedom and elasticity of a private business corporation.\" N.C. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": "Congress \"intend[ed] that [the TVA] shall have much of the essential freedom and elasticity of a private business corporation.\" N.C. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The TVA may be the preeminent example of a governmentally created entity that, over time, has grown into a distinct commercial corporation.4 Indeed, t he TVA \"operates in much th e same way as an ordinary business corporation, under the control of its directors in Tennessee, and not under that of a cabinet officer or independent agency headquartered in Washington.\" Natural Resources Defense Council, 459 F.2d 255; accord, e.g., North Carolina ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.3d 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": "515 F.3d 344. The TVA may be the preeminent example of a governmentally created entity that, over time, has grown into a distinct commercial corporation.4 Indeed, t he TVA \"operates in much th e same way as an ordinary business corporation, under the control of its directors in Tennessee, and not under that of a cabinet officer or independent agency headquartered in Washington.\" Natural Resources Defense Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. 439 F. Supp. 2d 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 F.2d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Largely Commercial TVA Is \"Broadly\" Amenable to Suit",
		"context": "The TVA may be the preeminent example of a governmentally created entity that, over time, has grown into a distinct commercial corporation.4 Indeed, t he TVA \"operates in much th e same way as an ordinary business corporation, under the control of its directors in Tennessee, and not under that of a cabinet officer or independent agency headquartered in Washington.\" Natural Resources Defense Council, 459 F.2d 255; accord, e.g., North Carolina ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 F. Supp. 2d 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The States' Significant Finality Interests Remain Unimpaired.",
		"context": "Evidence decays or is destroyed in storms like Hurricane Katrina.46 Moreover, the jurisdictions that accepted non - unanimous jury verdicts had especially powerful reliance interests because they expressly relied on this Court's holding in Apodaca that such verdicts were constitutional. And \"reliance upon a square, unabandoned holding of the Supreme Court is always justifiable reliance[.]\" Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court in Allen found this to be a highly pertinent consideration in the retroactivity analysis: B ecause \"prosecutors, trial judges, and appellate courts throughout our state and federal systems justifiably have relied on the standard of [previous precedent] ,\" the Court found the \"reliance interest of law enforcement officials\" to be a \"compelling \" rea son why the new Batson rule \"should not be retroactive.\" 478 U.S. at 260.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CONGRESS DID NOT RATIFY THE SEC'S DISGORGEMENT REMEDY",
		"context": "The SEC says (at 13) that this Court need not deter- mine whether [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which first gave the agency a disgorgement remedy, was \"correctly decided,\" con-ceding that Texas Gulf Sulphur reflects an outdated \"understanding of courts' re medial authority.\" True enough, but Texas Gulf Sulphur also relied on the incorrect premise that the SEC was not seeking \"a penalty assessment\" – even though the inside-tipper defendant was ordered to pay so-called \"restitution\" of \"profits derived by his tippees ,\" not by him personally. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 F.2d 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. CONGRESS DID NOT RATIFY THE SEC'S DISGORGEMENT REMEDY",
		"context": ". . as an expression of congressional intent,\" Central Bank of Denver, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], thus apply with particular force. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": ". \"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit, \" without regard to any perceived 6 The lack of APA -INA review would not necessarily preclude constitutional review, 486 U.S. 592; Fong Yue 149 U.S. 698, but plaintiffs here cannot establish any constitutional violations. 15 unfairness, inefficiency, or inequity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "\"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued. \" 312 U.S. 584. \"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit, \" without regard to any perceived 6 The lack of APA -INA review would not necessarily preclude constitutional review, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fong Yue 149 U.S. 698, but plaintiffs here cannot establish any constitutional violations. 15 unfairness, inefficiency, or inequity. Dep't of 525 U.S. 255.7 Moreover, such waivers are strictly construed, in terms of their scope, in favor of the sovereign.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "\"The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued. \" 312 U.S. 584. \"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit, \" without regard to any perceived 6 The lack of APA -INA review would not necessarily preclude constitutional review, 486 U.S. 592; Fong Yue [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but plaintiffs here cannot establish any constitutional violations. 15 unfairness, inefficiency, or inequity. Dep't of 525 U.S. 255.7 Moreover, such waivers are strictly construed, in terms of their scope, in favor of the sovereign.",
		"citation_value_orig": "149 U.S. 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "\"Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit, \" without regard to any perceived 6 The lack of APA -INA review would not necessarily preclude constitutional review, 486 U.S. 592; Fong Yue 149 U.S. 698, but plaintiffs here cannot establish any constitutional violations. 15 unfairness, inefficiency, or inequity. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].7 Moreover, such waivers are strictly construed, in terms of their scope, in favor of the sovereign. 518 U.S. 187. In the 1976 amendments to 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "15 unfairness, inefficiency, or inequity. Dep't of 525 U.S. 255.7 Moreover, such waivers are strictly construed, in terms of their scope, in favor of the sovereign. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the 1976 amendments to 5 U.S.C. §702, Congress \"eliminat[ed] the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official capacity. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "In the 1976 amendments to 5 U.S.C. §702, Congress \"eliminat[ed] the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official capacity. \" Sea-Land Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that waiver has restrictions . Specifically, the APA waiver neither \"affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground, \" nor \"confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "659 F.2d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "§702(1) - (2); accord id. at §701(a)(1) (no review \"to the extent that … statutes preclude judicial review \"). In addition to restrictions on review in the organic INA itself, see Section I.C, supra (discussing doctrine of consular nonreviewability) , review is also precluded \"to the extent that … agency action is committed to agency 7 The officer -suit exception in Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], offers a limited exception to sovereign immunity, but only with ongoing violations of federal law. 474 U.S. 64. Here, there is no ongoing violation of law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "at §701(a)(1) (no review \"to the extent that … statutes preclude judicial review \"). In addition to restrictions on review in the organic INA itself, see Section I.C, supra (discussing doctrine of consular nonreviewability) , review is also precluded \"to the extent that … agency action is committed to agency 7 The officer -suit exception in Ex parte209 U.S. 123, offers a limited exception to sovereign immunity, but only with ongoing violations of federal law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is no ongoing violation of law. 16 discretion by law. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "§702(2). One sign that Congress has committed an issue to executive officers ' discretion is when a reviewing court would have \"no law to appl y\" in reviewing the agency action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled on other grounds by 430 U.S. 99. Here, Congress has not given a reviewing court the \"law to apply \" – much less access to the required classified information – needed to evaluate plaintiffs ' claims. Specifically, §1182(f) authorizes the President \"by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, [to] suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "§702(2). One sign that Congress has committed an issue to executive officers ' discretion is when a reviewing court would have \"no law to appl y\" in reviewing the agency action. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, overruled on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, Congress has not given a reviewing court the \"law to apply \" – much less access to the required classified information – needed to evaluate plaintiffs ' claims. Specifically, §1182(f) authorizes the President \"by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, [to] suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Sovereign immunity bars relief",
		"context": "App. 26a. But indefinite periods are not unknown in immigration law, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and the Proclamation – §4(a), Pet. App. 142a – provides for periodic review.8 At bottom, §1182(f) authorizes the President to do what \"he may deem to be appropriate \" for \"such period as he shall deem necessary ,\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 647",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The application of restraining physical force can effect a temporary seizure even if the subject does not yield",
		"context": "While \"encounters between citizens and police offic- ers are incredibly rich in diversity,\" a Fourth Amend- ment seizure can occur in only one of two ways: by a \"show of authority,\" such as a command to halt , or \"by means of physical force .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To effect a seizure by physical force, a law-enforcement officer must intentionally apply phys- ical force to a subject in a manner objectively designed to restrain him. Unlike a sh ow-of-authority seizure, however, a physical -force seizure does not necessarily require that the officer succeed in stopping the subject ; a subject 's failure to yield shortens the seizure, but does not negate it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Broader Statutory Context Confirms Congress Did Not Intend Litigation To Proceed During Arbitrability Appeals",
		"context": "Unlike Section 2339B, Section 3731 contains neither detailed instructions on the appellate process, nor an express stay provision. In this circumstance, courts have readily concluded that Congress relied on Griggs . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result, when Congress drafted Section 16, Con- gress relied on standard divestiture principles to stay district court proceedings during the arbitrability ap- peal. Third , Suski notes that preliminary-injunction ap- peals do not produce an automatic stay, meaning that district courts proceed to evaluate the merits while courts of appeals simultaneously evaluate the likeli- hood of success on the same merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "236 F.3d 812",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Broader Statutory Context Confirms Congress Did Not Intend Litigation To Proceed During Arbitrability Appeals",
		"context": "A trial court's authority to continue ad- judicating the same issue that is on appeal is separate 18 from a court's residual authority to stay the legal ef- fect of a judgment during that appeal. An appeal sim- ultaneously \"suspends further proceedings\" in the trial court, \"generally\" \"operates as a supersedeas of execution,\" and also provides the court \"discretionary power\" to suspend the decree's legal effect where \"the decree itself, without further proceedings, may have an intrinsic effect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case involves only the applica- tion of the first principle: How and when district courts may proceed during an appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Did Not \"Expressly Prescribe[]\" that the 2006 Amendment to Article 43(a) Applies Retroactively",
		"context": "When it comes to the temporal a pplication of statutes, \"prospectivity remains the appropriate default rule,\" and retroactive application remains the exception. Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 272; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress, of course, can overcome the \"presumption against retroactivity,\" Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 272, but only if it has \"expressly prescribed the statute's proper reach,\" id. at 280, or if \"normal rules of construction\" unambiguously reveal the same intent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Did Not \"Expressly Prescribe[]\" that the 2006 Amendment to Article 43(a) Applies Retroactively",
		"context": "9a. As importantly , it does not even specify an effective date. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mindful of both the presumption in favor of repose and the presumption against retroactivity , Congress uses unambiguous language when it intends to apply amendments to criminal limitations provisions to prior cases —including with respect to Article 43 itself . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Did Not \"Expressly Prescribe[]\" that the 2006 Amendment to Article 43(a) Applies Retroactively",
		"context": "E.g., FY2006 NDAA §§ 514(d), 516(d), 609(c), 664(c), 715(b), 743(b), 921(b), 119 Stat. at 3233, 3237, 3290, 3316, 3345, 3360, 3411 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 and 50 U.S.C.) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress's silence as to the retroactive applicability of Article 43, then, is conclusive: as the CAAF held below , the 2006 amendment did not \"expressly prescribe []\" retroactive application . Briggs Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Purported Split of Authority Is Insubstantial and Does Not Merit Certiorari Review.",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit's decision is consistent with a nearly unbroken line of circuit precedent construing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) as barring appellate review of remand orders. Those decisions were unanimous from the enactment of Section 1447(d) in 1949 until the Seventh Circuit 's 2015 outlier decision in Lu Junhong , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including after 2011, when Congress added federal -officer jurisdiction to civil- rights jurisdiction as the sole carve -outs from Section 1447(d) in the Re moval Clarification A ct of 2011, Pub L. No. 112- 51, 125 Stat. 545 (2011) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.3d 805",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This step is justified because religious liberty is the first and foremost right guaranteed by the Constitution",
		"context": "10 Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions , 85 Geo L.J. 1945 (1996-97). See Edward J. DeBartolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.\" 20 The foundational document of the American nation, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the \"laws of nature and of nature's God\" and says the rights of human beings are \"unalienable\" because they are \"endowed by their Creator.\" Justice Douglas wrote i n 343 U.S. 306 that \"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,\" and in 366 U.S. 420 he wrote in dissent, The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This step is justified because religious liberty is the first and foremost right guaranteed by the Constitution",
		"context": "See Edward J. DeBartolo 485 U.S. 568: \"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.\" 20 The foundational document of the American nation, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the \"laws of nature and of nature's God\" and says the rights of human beings are \"unalienable\" because they are \"endowed by their Creator.\" Justice Douglas wrote i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,\" and in 366 U.S. 420 he wrote in dissent, The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression were not given to us by the government through the First Amendment; they are, as the Declaration of Independence says, \"endowed by [the] Creator.\" Government through the Constitution only \"secures\" the rights that God has already granted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This step is justified because religious liberty is the first and foremost right guaranteed by the Constitution",
		"context": "See Edward J. DeBartolo 485 U.S. 568: \"where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.\" 20 The foundational document of the American nation, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the \"laws of nature and of nature's God\" and says the rights of human beings are \"unalienable\" because they are \"endowed by their Creator.\" Justice Douglas wrote i n 343 U.S. 306 that \"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,\" and in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] he wrote in dissent, The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression were not given to us by the government through the First Amendment; they are, as the Declaration of Independence says, \"endowed by [the] Creator.\" Government through the Constitution only \"secures\" the rights that God has already granted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. A religious speech carve-out to Garcetti would require allowing all religious speech, no matter how inconsistent with the district's curriculum",
		"context": "If this Court creates a religious- speech carve -out to Garcetti for public employees, public school districts will have to permit almost all religious speech —regardless of how antithetical it is to the school's curriculum or poli- cies. After all, the government cannot \"prefer one reli- gion over another.\" See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Schools would undoubtedly face additional litigation costs and dif ficulties if they permit some religious expressions and not others. But some religious speech is, at the very least, seri- ously in tension with, if not directly contrary to, the school's educational mission .",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. A religious speech carve-out to Garcetti would require allowing all religious speech, no matter how inconsistent with the district's curriculum",
		"context": "Indeed, t hroughout history, many religio ns have advocated for the persecution of or violence towards those who refuse to subscribe. Many religions may advocate other positions —such as the use of psychedelic drugs, or even the worship of evil —that are directly antithetical to a school district's mission, pol-icies, and curriculum . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With respect to at least one such example , this Court has concluded that sc hools may penalize a stu- dent's speech \"promoting illegal drug use ,\" notwith- standing a potential religious association. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (upholding punishment for student who displayed banner reading \"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Special Master Correctly Found That Georgia's Use Of ACF Waters Is Reasonable",
		"context": "ARG UMENT To obtain an equitable apportionment, Florida must prove two things: (1) it has suffered a serious injury caused by Georgia's consumptive use, id. at 2514; and (2) \"the benefits of the [apportionment] substantially outweigh the harm that might resul t,\" id. at 2527 (alteration in original) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Colorado II, 467 U.S. at 316-17; Colorado I, 459 U.S. at 187 & n.13; 320 U.S. 383. Those requirements serve important purposes. The heightened burden of proof reflects the \"sovereign status and 'equal dignity' of States\" and the fact that the Court must tread carefully before \" 'exercis[ing] its extraordinary power under the Constitution to control the conduct of one State at the suit of another. '\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS WILL CONTINUE TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE PROTECTION UNDER THE CATEGORICAL RULE, AS THEY HAVE IN CALIFORNIA",
		"context": "In 1989, the California Court of Appeal, Second District, held that police officers acted lawfully when they sought to follow a misdemeanant into his home without a warrant while in hot pursuit. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court rejected the defendant's Fourth Amendment challenge and stated, \"[T]he fact that the offenses justifying the ini- tial detention or arrest we re misdemeanors is of no significance in determining the validity of the entry without a warrant.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "216 Cal.App.3d 1425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amicus DRI Is Categorically Wrong in Its Characterization of State Judges as Being Biased Due to Their Elections Being Dominated by Contributions from the Plaintiffs' Bar",
		"context": "While s tate courts certainly have a strong interest in providing a forum for their citizens, this does not suggest a bias or lack of fairness. Rather, it suggests the proper role of state courts , which has been repeatedly acknowledged by this Court. See San Remo Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 531 U.S. 438 ; Doran v. Salem Inn,",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amicus DRI Is Categorically Wrong in Its Characterization of State Judges as Being Biased Due to Their Elections Being Dominated by Contributions from the Plaintiffs' Bar",
		"context": "While s tate courts certainly have a strong interest in providing a forum for their citizens, this does not suggest a bias or lack of fairness. Rather, it suggests the proper role of state courts , which has been repeatedly acknowledged by this Court. See San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. 323 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Doran v. Salem Inn,",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Gregory v. Ashcroft confirms the States' broad constitutional authority to structure their governments and set party affiliation requirements for state judges",
		"context": "The 35 Third Circuit's \"least restrictive means\" analysis can- not be reconciled with Delaware's authority \"to deter- mine the qualifications of [its] most important govern- ment officials\"—including its \"judges\"—an authority that \"lies at \"'the heart of representative government'\" and is \"reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment and [Article IV],\" which \"guarantee[s] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Gov- ernment.\" Id. at 463 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and U.S. Const. Art. IV, § 4).",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Severance Would Not Resolve The Remedial Questions In Pending Enforcement Actions Filed By The CFPB",
		"context": "What good is it for a party to prevail on a constitutional ground if doing so does not change the outcome of the court's judgment on the challenged action being reviewed? If Congress and ex- ecutive agencies are permitted to violate the separa- 23 tion of powers with impunity, litigants will be de- prived of any \"incentives to raise\" these challenges in the first place. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And if unconstitutional agencies are per- mitted to avoid the award of any meaningful relief for the party at bar, no \"rational litigant\" will bring struc-tural constitutional challenges going forward. Kent Barnett, To the Victor Goes the Toil —Remedies for Regulated Parties in Separation -of-Powers Litigation , 92 N.C. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent",
		"context": "A plurality of the Court specifically noted the importance of such sex stereotyping evidence in disparate treatment cases saying \"[W[e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group\" and that \"'Congress intended strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.\"' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], quoting 444 F. 2d 1194.\" In the years afterward, however, advocates fought to expand the meaning of the plurality's language into 17 a new and freestanding \"sex stereotyping\" theory of sex discrimination. But close examination shows that the plurality merely reaffirmed the definite relevance of sex­ stereotyping evidence in disparate treatment cases, against its concern that Price Waterhouse's counsel was waffling too much.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent",
		"context": "A plurality of the Court specifically noted the importance of such sex stereotyping evidence in disparate treatment cases saying \"[W[e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group\" and that \"'Congress intended strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes.\"' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251, citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water and 435 U.S. 702, quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" In the years afterward, however, advocates fought to expand the meaning of the plurality's language into 17 a new and freestanding \"sex stereotyping\" theory of sex discrimination. But close examination shows that the plurality merely reaffirmed the definite relevance of sex­ stereotyping evidence in disparate treatment cases, against its concern that Price Waterhouse's counsel was waffling too much.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F. 2d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent",
		"context": "Justice O'Conner (who did not join the plurality) specifically asked whether Price Waterhouse's counsel viewed such comments as relevant both generally and to disparate treatment cases (given that they require intent). Justice Marshall also asked questions apparently to confirm the relevance of sex stereotyping evidence, irrespective of intent. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], (\"PWTranscript\") at 16; 21-23; 38. 7 Price Waterhouse's counsel tactically chose to minimize the significance of the stereotyping comments and to suggest such evidence was most appropriate in disparate impact cases. But some members of the Court viewed this trial tactic as waffling on a key issue.8 This background tells us that the Price Waterhouse plurality meant to affirm strongly that 7 The Official Transcript does not identify the questioners by name.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent",
		"context": "at 21-23; counsel eventually 19 decisions cannot be based on sex stereotypes, even if there is no subjective intent to harm. However, it did not intend to create a free-standing theory. Further support for this reading is indicated by the plurality's Manhart citation, which properly noted that Manhart was quoting a 1971 case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,404 U.S. 991. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F. 2d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Price Waterhouse Plurality Opinion Does Not Support the EEOC's Interpretation or the View that Stereotyping Theory is Distinct from Title VII; Manhart and Prior Cases Affirm the Strong Value of Stereotyping Evidence, Irrespective of Intent",
		"context": "at 23 (\"It's relevant, but ... \"). See also Pet. Reply Br., Price [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS, 1250, at 21 ·23. 20 employer relied upon it in taking negative employment action. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "That conclusion remains true even if the plan re- mains overfunded. To be sure, beneficiaries of a n over- funded defined -benefit plan are entitled only to their \" 'accrued benefit,' \" not to the \"plan's surplus.\" Hughes Aircraf t [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that means only that a beneficiary has no individual claim to a plan's general asset pool or to residual assets remaining upon the plan's termination . See 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "a. That right derives from \"the rule that a trustee owes th e same fiduciary duty to a contingent beneficiary as to one with a vested interest in so far as necessary for the protection of the contingent benefi- ciary's rights in the trust property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, even if an individual's interest is \"contingent and may not vest in possession,\" he is \"entitled to maintain [an] action in equity in order to secure relief reasonably necessary to protect and preserve\" the trust. Burr 125 N.E.2d 484.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 N.E.2d 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "91 N.E.2d 81. Accordingly, even if an individual's interest is \"contingent and may not vest in possession,\" he is \"entitled to maintain [an] action in equity in order to secure relief reasonably necessary to protect and preserve\" the trust. Burr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That rule applies with equal force to defined -benefit plan beneficiaries, who hold vested benefit s that rely on the plan's health and solvency. Even when a plan is over- funded , those beneficiaries retain a n interest in an undi- vided share of the plan's assets because all of those as- sets are held in trust for , and must be used \"for the ex- clusive benefit of,\" the beneficiaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 N.E.2d 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "That marginal difference cannot affect standing ; if the risk is sufficiently non -speculative in the one case, it is equally non -speculative in the other . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Statutory funding status and minimum funding requirements are based on actuarial tables, inflation, interest rates , and other economic factors and predictions . See 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "That suffices t o allege a materially increased risk of future nonpayment or underpayment. That said, a plaintiff 's standing \"must be supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the district court dismissed the case as moot under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), see Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "II. BENEFICIARIES OF OVE RFUNDED ERISA DEFINE D- BENEFIT PLANS WHO AL LEGE BREACH OF FIDUC I- ARY DUTY MAY SUE UND ER SECTION 502( a)(2) In add ition to establishing Article III standing, a plaintiff bringing a statutory claim must demonstrate what is sometimes called statutory standing , i.e., that he \"has a cause of action under the statute.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 128 n.4. That is \"a straight- forward question of statutory interpretation\" about \"whether [the plaintiff ] falls within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "(citation omitted). The government agrees th at one of ERISA's \"cen- tral purposes\" is \"to prevent the 'great personal trag- edy' suffered by employees whose vested benefits are not paid when pension plans are terminated.\" Nachman [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But given limited resources , the Secretary of Labor cannot monitor every plan in the country. Congress thus reasonably determined that the best means of protecting individual pension r ights was to authorize beneficiaries to sue fiduciaries who breach their duties , notwithstanding resulting litigation costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A material increase in the risk of monetary loss is a cognizable injury",
		"context": "29 U.S.C. 1001(b); see Pilot Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Identifying the interests protected by\" a statute \" re- quires no guesswork\" when there is a \"detailed state- ment of the statute's purposes.\" Lexmark , 572 U.S. at 131.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Court Should Not Have a Role in the Initial Selection of Cy Pres Recipients; Its Role Should Be the Close, Independent Scrutiny of Proposed Recipients",
		"context": "While there is a strong impetus for courts to select cy pres recipients, doing so is problematic because even when the motives underlying the selection are proper, it nevertheless creates the appearance of impropriety. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.2011) (providing money to a legal aid foundation that though normally a proper choice for cy pres was heavily criticized, because the judge's husband sat on the board); 2012 WL 2839788. Therefore, CJRI believes that it is best if the court does not involve itself in the initial process of selecting cy pres recipients. \"The specter of judges and outside entities dealing in the distribution and solicitation of settlement money may create the appearance of impro- priety.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.3d 1034",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "When this case first reached this Court, it was not about the scope of Bivens. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that raised the Bivens issue when it granted certiorari in Hernández I . See 137 S. Ct. 291 .1 From that point on, the Westfall Act has figured prominently in Petitioners' analysis of the availability of a damages remedy under Bivens. That is because the Westfall Act displ aces the Texas tort remed ies to which Petitioners could otherwise have resorted .",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "§ 71.031( a) (Vernon 2016) ). And the availability of alternative remedies has long been a central feature of this Court's Bivens analysis. See, e.g., Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1858; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If no Bivens remedy is available, then the Westfall Act has the effect of depriving Petitioners of the only remaining judicial remedy to vindicate their constitutional rights. To that end, Petitioners' opening merits brief in Hernández I specifically explained that the Westfall Act is the reason why \"the Hernández family [cannot] hold Agent Mesa accountable in state court,\" Brief for the Petitioners at 41, Hern 137 S. Ct. 2003 (per curiam) ; that a refusal to recognize a Bivens remedy \"would break new ground in allowing constitutional harms to go unredressed,\" id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "See, e.g., Abbasi , 137 S. Ct. at 1858; 565 U.S. 118. If no Bivens remedy is available, then the Westfall Act has the effect of depriving Petitioners of the only remaining judicial remedy to vindicate their constitutional rights. To that end, Petitioners' opening merits brief in Hernández I specifically explained that the Westfall Act is the reason why \"the Hernández family [cannot] hold Agent Mesa accountable in state court,\" Brief for the Petitioners at 41, Hern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (per curiam) ; that a refusal to recognize a Bivens remedy \"would break new ground in allowing constitutional harms to go unredressed,\" id . at 48 ; and 1. The three -judge Fifth Circuit panel in Hernández I had initially recognized a Bivens remedy for Petitioners' Fifth Amendment claim, at least in part because of the Westfall Act 's preclusion of alternative remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "at 48 ; and 1. The three -judge Fifth Circuit panel in Hernández I had initially recognized a Bivens remedy for Petitioners' Fifth Amendment claim, at least in part because of the Westfall Act 's preclusion of alternative remedies. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals declined to consider the Bivens question. Hernandez , 785 F.3d at 121 n.1 (Jones, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "757 F.3d 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": ", Corr. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in denying a Bivens remedy to the plaintiffs in Abbasi , the Court carefully noted that it was \"of 5 central importance . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "It is the Westfall Act, not any of these other barriers, that precludes Petitioners from asserting their constitutional claims in a state -law tort suit—the very remedy that, in Bivens , the Solicitor General had argued rendered it unnecessary to recognize a federal judge - made remedy. See Pet. 25 n.8 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 301), 1970 WL 116900). In any event, a statute can unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of a remedy even where other statutes (or judicial decisions) have also contri buted to the un availability of alternatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Westfall Act Has Been Part of This Case Since This Court Added the Bivens Question in Hernández I",
		"context": "In any event, a statute can unconstitutionally deprive plaintiffs of a remedy even where other statutes (or judicial decisions) have also contri buted to the un availability of alternatives. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 6 question could also potentially factor into whether this Court allows Petitioners to proceed under Bivens. To nevertheless ask this Court to hold that Petitioners have no Bivens remedy without even considering the constitutional implications of such a holding not only ignore s the role that the Westfall Act has already played in this li tigation to date, but ask s this Court to resolve this case with one arm tied behind its back (and in the government's favor) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The CCA's Ruling Relies On Lay Stereotypes, Conflicts With Medical Standards, And Is Inconsistent With This Court's Prior Decision",
		"context": "First , as a threshold matter, the Attorney Ge n- eral simply ignores a glari ng, funda mental flaw at the heart of the CCA's decision: its relianc e on lay stereotypes of people with intellectual disabilities . 3 In this Court's previous deci sion in this case, the Court made clear that \"lay perceptions of intellectual disability\" may not info rm the intellectual -disability inquiry, explaining that \"the medical profession has endeavored to counter lay stereotypes of the intelle c- tually disabled.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Despite the clarity of this Court' s holding, the CCA resurrected the very same stere o- types that it had previously relied on and that this Court explicitly rejected —such as the fact that Moore once had a girl friend; that he had an u nskilled job at a res taurant; and that he survived on the streets and played pool. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1039",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The CCA's Ruling Relies On Lay Stereotypes, Conflicts With Medical Standards, And Is Inconsistent With This Court's Prior Decision",
		"context": "Id. Separately, w ithout expressly mentioning Briseno , she also placed particular significance on the \"beha v- ior that surround[ed]\" Moore 's commission of the crime and that it purportedly showed \"a level of planning and forethought,\" JA 147 —an emphasis identical to that called for by the seventh Briseno fac- tor. See Ex Parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here , too, t he Attorney General simply ignores that testimony. There can be no question that the repudiated Briseno frame work was, in the expert's own words, \" one piece of the pie\" —i.e., an e l- ement —of her analysis .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.W.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Should Use A Scalpel, Not A Bulldozer",
		"context": "Fund , 561 U.S. at 508 45 (citation omitted). This Court has thus developed a \"decisive preference for surgical severance, rather than wholesale destruction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it has refused to let a challenger \"ride a discrete constitu- tional flaw . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Should Use A Scalpel, Not A Bulldozer",
		"context": "to take down [a] whole, otherwise con-stitutional\" system. Id. at 2351 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Arthrex cannot identify a single Appointments Clause case where this Court has engaged in the type of wholesale destruction that Arthrex now requests. The Court's recent separation of powers cases have opted to cure the constitutional defect not by blowing up the entire statutory regi me, but by severing only the particular provisions creating constitutional prob- lems.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court Should Use A Scalpel, Not A Bulldozer",
		"context": "Indeed, none of the cases on which Arthrex relies supports its extraordinary request to \"break first, fix later.\" Even where severance has not been possible, this Court's precedents have favored staying the judg- ment for a sufficient time to \"afford Congress an op-portunity\" to take any necessary action without im- pairing the agency's ongoing functions. Buckley , 424 U.S. at 143 (staying judgment for 30 days so as not to \"affect[ ] the authority of the [agency] to exercise the duties and powers granted it under the Act\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; N. Pipeline , 458 U.S. at 88 (staying judgment for 98 days to \"afford Congress an opportunity to reconstitute the bankruptcy courts or 47 to adopt other valid means of adjudication\"). The Court is not required to take down the IPR system.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "227(a)(1), within the meaning of the TCPA. When a modifying phrase appears \" at the end of a single, integrate d list ,\" it is most natural ly read to modify each antecedent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see An- tonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The In- terpretation of Legal Texts 147 (2012) ( \"When there is a strai ghtforward, parallel construction that involves all nouns or verbs in a series, a postpositive modifier normally applies to the entire series . \"). So, for example, \"the natural construction\" of a statutory provision es- tablishing a punishment for a felon \"who receives, pos- sesses, or transports in commerce or affecting com- merce\" is that the phrase \"in commerce or affecting commerce\" modifies not just \" transport ,\" but also \"re- ceives\" and \"possesses.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "\"). So, for example, \"the natural construction\" of a statutory provision es- tablishing a punishment for a felon \"who receives, pos- sesses, or transports in commerce or affecting com- merce\" is that the phrase \"in commerce or affecting commerce\" modifies not just \" transport ,\" but also \"re- ceives\" and \"possesses.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the same way, the phrase \"using a random or sequential number genera- tor\" in the clause \" to store or produce telephone num- bers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator,\" 47 U.S.C. 227(a)(1) (A), is best read to modify both \"produce\" and \"store.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "N o court of ap- peals has adopted that interpretation; Duguid has not endorsed it; and nothing in the record below suggests that the device petitioner used to sen d the offending texts had the capacity to use a random or sequential generator to make the calls at issue here. 18 2. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. dismissed,139 S. Ct. 1289, the court of appeals conclud ed that the phrase \"using a random or sequential number generator\" mod- ifies only \"produce ,\" and not \"store.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "21 the alternative interpretation. \"Sometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redun- dancy.\" Rimini St., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has previously recognized that Congress sometimes uses redundant language in an effort to comprehensively regulate a technical field. See, e.g., 566 U.S. 624 ; see Fort Stewart 495 U.S. 641 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "Rimini St., 139 S. Ct. 873 . This Court has previously recognized that Congress sometimes uses redundant language in an effort to comprehensively regulate a technical field. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Fort Stewart 495 U.S. 641 . b. As to the structure of the TCPA, the court of ap- peals placed significant weight on the exception s to the automated -call restriction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "Rimini St., 139 S. Ct. 873 . This Court has previously recognized that Congress sometimes uses redundant language in an effort to comprehensively regulate a technical field. See, e.g., 566 U.S. 624 ; see Fort Stewart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . b. As to the structure of the TCPA, the court of ap- peals placed significant weight on the exception s to the automated -call restriction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The text of Section 227(a)(1)(A) is best read as limited to devices that have the capacity to use a random or sequential number generator",
		"context": "III § 301, 129 Stat. 588. Last Ter m, the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , declared that provision unconstitutional . See p. 9 n. 2, supra . In the court of appeals' view, \"t his debt collection exception demonstrates that equipment tha t dials from a list of individuals who owe a debt to the United States is still an [autodialer] but is exempted from the TCPA's strictures.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Modern Classifications of Service Department Employees",
		"context": "Fletcher Jones, 300 N.L.R.B. 875, subsequent decision 340 N.L.R.B. No. 9 (2003), review denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This makes sense because of the skill sets involved and the higher wages of me- chanics. In addition to highly-trained mechanics, there are likely to be lesser skilled technicians known as lu- bricators, lube technicians, express techs, or lube and oil technicians.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 F. App'x 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Modern Classifications of Service Department Employees",
		"context": "Although mechanics are generally required to keep their own work areas clean, most dealerships either employ janitorial staff or contract with an outside agency to provide on-going cleaning services. The janitor is usually placed within the service depart- ment even if her duties extend into the sales areas. See330 N.L.R.B. 328, review denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This job is hourly and non-exempt. In some dealerships, the individual performing this work may be called a maintenance employee, and the job may also include facilities or equipment maintenance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "229 F.3d 1184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court Has Declined to Apply Price Waterhouse -Burden Shifting Outside the Title VII Context in Which It Arose",
		"context": "And the Court has never held that Price Waterhouse -burden shifting applies to anti-discrimination statutes other than TitleVII. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly cautioned thatcourts \"must be careful not to apply rules applicableunder one statute to a different statute without careful and critical examination.\" Federal Express [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At issue in Gross was whether the burden of persuasion ever shifts to the party defending an allegedmixed-motive claim under the Age Discrimination inEmployment Act. The Court held that it does not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The establishment of a National Forest, in and of itself, does not render the lands occupied within the meaning of the 1868 Treaty",
		"context": "pdf (providing a cooperative framework for the exercise of treaty - based hunting rights by the Lake Superior Chipp ewa Indians on National F orest lands). 15 This is not to say that the Forest Service would be barred from administer ing a particular tract of Na- tional F orest land in such a way that rendered it occu- pied within the meaning of the treaty . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Tenth Circuit in Repsis concluded that the establish- ment of the Bighorn National Forest, by itself , ren- dered the land occupied, without considering the uses to which the Forest Service had put any particular tract. 73 F.3d at 993.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 P.2d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. No requirement of actual or intended financial harm",
		"context": "The Court instead endorsed Judge Learned Hand's obser- vation that \" 'a man is nonetheless cheated out of his property, when he is induced to part with it by fraud,' even if 'he gets a quid pro quo of equal value.' \" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d 22 Cir.) (Hand, J. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.2d 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. No requirement of actual or intended financial harm",
		"context": "A student who ob- tains scholarship funds by materially misrepresenting his qualifications commits fraud even though the gran- tor pays no more than it would have if the scholarship had gone to someone else . And a cont ractor commits fraud if it obtains a lucrative contract by materially mis- representing its qualifications, whether or not the client can prove that she could have secured better or cheaper work had the fraud not occurred. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In these examples, whether or not the victim s got fair value in a pocketbook sense, they have been cheated out of a fundamental as- pect of what they sought to acquire.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.3d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "2 Elliot's Debates 348-49. This Court, also, has long recognized the im- portance of the principle that Congress alone, and not the Executive Branch, may authorize the withdrawal and use of particular public funds. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This limitation, established by the Appropriations Clause, \"was intended as a restriction upon the dis-bursing authority of the Exec utive department.\" Cin- cinnati Soap 301 U.S. 308.",
		"citation_value_orig": "98 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "See , e.g., 98 U.S. 104. This limitation, established by the Appropriations Clause, \"was intended as a restriction upon the dis-bursing authority of the Exec utive department.\" Cin- cinnati Soap [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Joseph Story explained, to preserve \"in full vigor the constitutional barrier between each depart- ment,\" the Constitution grants Congress \"a control-ling influence over t he executive power, since it holds at its own command all the resources by which a chief magistrate could make himself formidable.\" Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 531, at 372 (1833).",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "The Framers knew firsthand how crucial it was to separate the power to appropriate funds from the power to execute the law against individuals. \"The Framers placed the power of the purse in the Congress in large part because the British experience taught that the appropriations power was a tool with which 19 the legislature could resist\" executive power. Noel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,573 U.S. 513. The delegates to the Con- stitutional Convention gave Congress the sole power to provide \"the supplies requisite for the support of government\" because they saw how \"that powerful in- strument,\" in the hands of Parliament, had overcome the \"overgrown prerogatives\" of the British monarch. The Federalist Papers, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "; see Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws 119 (1748) (Thomas Nugent t rans., 1793) (\"Were the exec utive power to determine the raising of public money other- wise than by giving its consent, liberty would be at an end … because the executive power would be no longer dependent.\"). Thus, as then- Judge Kavanaugh recognized, the legislature's \"exclusive power over the federal purse\" stands as \"one of the most important authorities allo- cated to Congress\" in the Constitution. U.S. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Hart 's 16 Ct. Cl. 459 . The Appropriations Clause acts as a \"bulwark of the Constitution's separation of powers\" that is \"particularly important as a restraint on Executive Branch officers.\" Dep't of Navy , 665 F.3d at 1347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "665 F.3d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "Dep't of Navy , 665 F.3d at 1347. It \"assure[ s] that public funds will be spent according to the letter of the difficult judgments reached by Con-gress as to the common good and not according to the individual favor of Government agents.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Any other course 20 would give to the fiscal officers a most dangerous dis- cretion.\" Reeside , 52 U.S. at 291.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "PHH, 881 F.3d at 165 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). Congress's relinquishment of its budget authority over the CFPB is an unconstitutional \"delegat[ion of] legislative power to the agency.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 21 Nor is it sufficient that Congress retains the power to amend Title X's funding provisions . All stat- utes are subject to repeal; that does not change their unconstitutionality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Severance Of The Removal Restriction Would Not Solve The Constitutional Defects Stemming From The CFPB's Funding Outside Of The Congressional Appropriations Process",
		"context": "This Court, however, need not define the precise extent to which , and circumstances in which , agencies can be funded outside the appropriations process. It is enough to hold that this agency —which is protected not merely by one but two layers of budget ary inde- pendence , with additional self-funding via civil penal- ties to boot —is too much for the Constitution to bear. Just like the dual -insulation from the President's re- moval power that this Court confronted in Free Enter- prise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the CFPB funds itself by requisitioning over hundreds of mil- lions of dollars from the Federal Reserve's budget, which itself is independently funded by fees assessed upon the Federal Reserve banks. 12 U.S.C. § 243.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's \"Meaning-or-Message\" Test Has No Substantive Support in The Law or the Legislative History of Section 107",
		"context": "More over, the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 (\"1976 Act\") does not require it. In particular, in the mid-1950s, leading up to passage of the 1976 Act, the Copyright Office commissioned a series of thirty-four ( 34) studies relating to copyright law. Mills Music, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These studies became part of the legislative history, together with reports issued by the Copyright Office and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "The House Has Standing To Appeal. The House plainly has standing to pursue this appeal, for it has a lways had a \"personal stake in the outcome\" of this case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, the House suffers its own distinct injuries in the redis tricting context and is a proper party to represen t the broader interests of the State under state law. Either way, the House has standing to defend the map the House drew and to appeal an adverse decision that requires the House to operate with unlawful districts and face election under different court -drawn maps.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "Yet now, after years of sitting on the sidelines, Virginia's attorney general suddenly claims that the House's independent interest has evaporated, and that he alone has a monopoly over whether to appeal a decision that injures the House but appears to benefi t the attorney general's political party. The attorney general's claim not only reflects (or at a bare minimum invites) gamesmanship of the worst sort, but is squarely refuted by this Court's precedent. While a state attorney general is \"typically\" the actor who appeals \" to defend the constitutionality\" of 25 a state statute, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the attorney general is c ertainly not the only one with standing to do so. It is well established that an intervenor may \"keep the case alive\" on appeal if the intervenor \"independently\" has standing. 476 U.S. 54 (1986 ); see also 136 S. Ct. 1732 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "While a state attorney general is \"typically\" the actor who appeals \" to defend the constitutionality\" of 25 a state statute, 570 U.S. 693 , the attorney general is c ertainly not the only one with standing to do so. It is well established that an intervenor may \"keep the case alive\" on appeal if the intervenor \"independently\" has standing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1986 ); see also 136 S. Ct. 1732 . The House plainly has independent standing here. This Court concluded nearly 50 years ago that a legislative chamber whose districts have been invalidated and ordered reconstituted has standing to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "While a state attorney general is \"typically\" the actor who appeals \" to defend the constitutionality\" of 25 a state statute, 570 U.S. 693 , the attorney general is c ertainly not the only one with standing to do so. It is well established that an intervenor may \"keep the case alive\" on appeal if the intervenor \"independently\" has standing. 476 U.S. 54 (1986 ); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The House plainly has independent standing here. This Court concluded nearly 50 years ago that a legislative chamber whose districts have been invalidated and ordered reconstituted has standing to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1732",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "The House plainly has independent standing here. This Court concluded nearly 50 years ago that a legislative chamber whose districts have been invalidated and ordered reconstituted has standing to appeal. In Sixty -Seventh Minnesota State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Minnesota State Senate intervened as a defendant in reapportionment litigation and filed a direct appeal to this Court after a three -judge district court issued orders reducing the number of state senate districts, thus requiring wholesale redistricting. Id. at 187- 94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "at 189- 90, 192 . The prospect that judicial proceedings over House maps in the case of a political impasse would take place without the one party most \"directly affected by the District Court's orders\" underscores the House's distinct injury and the deep flaws in the attorney general's position. The decision below also \"poses a serious and immediate threat,\" ASARCO [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , to the House's institutional interest in fulfilling its constitutional obliga tion to redistrict. This Court has repeatedly em phasized that redistricting is \" the task of local legislatures, \" Gaffney , 412 U.S. at 751, and that remains the case in Virginia, see Va. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "1. 27 debating, and ultimately enacting the 2011 plan. The decision below not only \"completely nullified\" those actions, Ariz. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 307 U.S. 433 , but transfers that authority to a court and a special master. In this regard, the inv alidation of redistricting legislation imposes a distinct injury on the legislature not present with other kinds of legislation. Given the commands of the Constitution, there must be some map for the upcoming election.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "1. 27 debating, and ultimately enacting the 2011 plan. The decision below not only \"completely nullified\" those actions, Ariz. State 135 S. Ct. 2652 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but transfers that authority to a court and a special master. In this regard, the inv alidation of redistricting legislation imposes a distinct injury on the legislature not present with other kinds of legislation. Given the commands of the Constitution, there must be some map for the upcoming election.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "But Article III does not require an exclusive injury; only a particulari zed injury. And this Court has already recognized that each branch of the legislature is a distinct institution with distinct interests that can give rise to standing. See Beens, 406 U.S. at 194; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the House is the only chamber that suffers the distinct injury of having to proceed with unlawful districts and divided constituencies, and is the natural and logical party to 28 vindicate the General Assembly's injury in having its redistricting authority usurped by federal courts. The House's distinct interests make this case nothing like the cases in which this Court has rejected intervenors' efforts to defend the constitutionality of state laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "Id. at 709- 10; see also JA2973. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is instructive. There, the Court concluded that New Jersey's General Assembly Speaker and Senate 29 President could defend the constitutionality of a state statute \"in both the District Court and the Court of Appeals\" after the state attorney general declined to do so. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The House Has Standing To Appeal",
		"context": "Here, too, Virginia's courts have permitted the House an d its Speaker to intervene in lawsuits challenging the validity of state laws. In fact, they have done so in lawsuits challenging the same districting map at issue here. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the House and its Speaker have always participated in this litigation in their official capacities, thereby avoiding the flaw that ultimately doomed the legislators in Karcher, who could not continue their challenge in this Court because they were \"no longer hold[ing] th[e] offices\" of Speaker and President. 484 U.S. at 81.",
		"citation_value_orig": "813 S.E.2d 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": "This li tigation exper ience further supports recognizing that Title VII 's ban on discrim i- nation based on sex prohibits discrimination on the b a- sis of transgender status and sexual orientation, b e- cause it shows that attempts to limit the holding of Price Waterhouse to somehow exclude these forms of discrim ination leads to \"illogical\" doctrinal distinctions and \"untenable results.\" Zarda, 883 F.3d at 122 (cita- tions omitted) . As summarized by the panel decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for years, l ower \"courts [applying Title VII] in the Construction of Gender Ide ntity, 33 Readings For Diversity and Social Justice , 213- 19 (2001) (same). 20 have been haphazardly, and with limited success, tr y- ing to figure out how to draw the line between\" sex - stereotyping claims, on the one hand, and transgender- status or sexual -orientati on claims, on the other . Such courts generally used two different approaches, but neither is consistent with the statute or this Court's prece dent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "830 F.3d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": "What about a male employee who is taunted both for being gay and for being \"effem inate\"?38 There are no good answers 37 Compa re, 2017 WL 2423794, B 2017 WL 2731284, and 2008 WL 4948664. 38 Compare, e.g., Kay, 142 F. App'x. at 51 (holding that because coworkers' taunts that t he plaintiff was \"not a real ma n\" were mixed with homophobic remarks, the plaintiff's claim was impro p- erly \"based upon discrim ination that is motivated by perceived sexual orientation\" ), and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming the dismi s- sal of a complaint alle ging death threats, physical assault, and mockery from coworkers \"u sing high -pitched voices or gesturing in a stereotypical way\" be cause the plaintiff had used evidence that co-workers mocked his \"sup posedly effeminate chara cteristics . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": ". . only as an example of discrimination because of sexual orient a- tion\") , with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( sustaining Title VII claim at summary jud g- 22 because these are not good ques tions. Rather, as courts faced with such inquiries have reco gnized, t he overall \"lesson imparted by th[is] body of Title VII lit i- gation \" is \"that no coherent line can be drawn b etween these … sorts of claims.\" 167 F. Supp. 3 ; see also 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": "only as an example of discrimination because of sexual orient a- tion\") , with 579 F.3d 285 ( sustaining Title VII claim at summary jud g- 22 because these are not good ques tions. Rather, as courts faced with such inquiries have reco gnized, t he overall \"lesson imparted by th[is] body of Title VII lit i- gation \" is \"that no coherent line can be drawn b etween these … sorts of claims.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 150 F. Supp. 3d 1151 . Asking courts to draw such lines invites arb i- trary and unfair results. Second , faced with the impossible task of disti n- guishing between these overlapping legal theories , some courts have just given up, \"throw[ing] out the b a- by with the bathwater\" by r ejecting Ti tle VII claims anytime there is a hint t hat discrimination was mot i- vated by transgender status or sexual orient ation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "167 F. Supp. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": "Second , faced with the impossible task of disti n- guishing between these overlapping legal theories , some courts have just given up, \"throw[ing] out the b a- by with the bathwater\" by r ejecting Ti tle VII claims anytime there is a hint t hat discrimination was mot i- vated by transgender status or sexual orient ation. See Hively , 830 F.3d at 706– 08 (collecting cases). For e x- ample, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], th e plaintiff alleged that \"he was discriminated against because his harassers objected to 'those aspects of h omosexual behavior in which a male participant assumes what Appellees perceive as a tra-ditio nally female -or less mascu line-role,'\" id. at 763. Yet despite the plaintiff's \"detailed\" alleg ations that the defendants had \"question[ed] his masc ulinity,\" the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the co mplaint on the theory that \"recognition of [plaintiff's] claim would have the effect of de facto amending T itle VII to en- compass sexual orientation as a prohibited basis for discrimination. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 F.3d 757",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Attempts To Distinguish Between Sex Stereotyping And Transgender Status Or Sexual Orientation Discrimination Lead To Absurd Results",
		"context": "23 maintained the di stinction between sexual -orientation and sex-stereotyping cl aims, the court admitted that the distinction was ar tificial. See id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (affirming grant of summary judgment against plaintiff who had alleged discrimination for \"not conform[ing] to gender norms in that she does not meet stereotyped expectations of fem ininity and may be perceived as more mascu line than a stereotyp ical woman, \" because she had \"co nflat[ed]\" sexual - orientation and sex-stereotyping claims) . But this second approach to the problem is co m- pletely u nprincipled. There is no legal justification for holding that ind ividuals lose the protections afforded by Title VII against adverse employment actions based on gender merely because, in their case, the particular stereotype can be given another l abel—i.e.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 F.3d 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate",
		"context": "The proportion of Delaware's population that is ex- clude d from judicial office is growing: Among new vot- ers registered between 2010 and 2018, unaffiliated and minor -party voters outnumbered Republicans by approximately 2.5 to 1, and unaffiliated voters will outnumber Republicans statewide within twenty -five years if this trend continues.3 Even then, however, Democrats and Republicans will retain their monop- oly on judicial office because unaffiliated citizens are, by definition , not members of a major party . The major -party requirement forces those who as- pire to judicial office and who are independents or members of third parties to choose between exercising their constitutionally protected right not to associate with a major political party or seeking a state judge- ship. But t he government \"may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , including the right to associate (or not) with a political party . See 497 U.S. 62 (\"The government 'may not enact a regulation providing that no –––––––––––––––––––––––– 2 These percentages are based on the Delaware Department of Elections' tabulation of registered voters by party . See State of Del., Party Tabulation of Registered Voters, https:// elections.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate",
		"context": "The major -party requirement forces those who as- pire to judicial office and who are independents or members of third parties to choose between exercising their constitutionally protected right not to associate with a major political party or seeking a state judge- ship. But t he government \"may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests ,\" 408 U.S. 593 , including the right to associate (or not) with a political party . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The government 'may not enact a regulation providing that no –––––––––––––––––––––––– 2 These percentages are based on the Delaware Department of Elections' tabulation of registered voters by party . See State of Del., Party Tabulation of Registered Voters, https:// elections. del- aware.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate",
		"context": "10 Republican … shall be appointed to federal office.'\" (quoting United Pub. Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])) ; 385 U.S. 589. And b ecause freedom of association \"plainly presupposes a freedom not to associa te,\" Roberts , 468 U.S. at 623, it is no so- lution to say that one who wants to be considered for a judgeship in Delaware can affiliate with whichever of the two major parties more closely reflects his or her views, even if the fit is not perfect. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate",
		"context": "10 Republican … shall be appointed to federal office.'\" (quoting United Pub. Workers of 330 U.S. 75)) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And b ecause freedom of association \"plainly presupposes a freedom not to associa te,\" Roberts , 468 U.S. at 623, it is no so- lution to say that one who wants to be considered for a judgeship in Delaware can affiliate with whichever of the two major parties more closely reflects his or her views, even if the fit is not perfect. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The major-party requirement imposes a severe burden on the right to associate",
		"context": "And b ecause freedom of association \"plainly presupposes a freedom not to associa te,\" Roberts , 468 U.S. at 623, it is no so- lution to say that one who wants to be considered for a judgeship in Delaware can affiliate with whichever of the two major parties more closely reflects his or her views, even if the fit is not perfect. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has long recognized that provisions that grant a \"complete monopoly\" on publi c office to the two major political parties are subject to strict scrutiny because they severely burden the associa- tional rights of citizens who are not members of those parties. Rhodes , 393 U.S. at 32; see also Storer , 415 U.S. at 729 (explaining that the restrictions in Rhodes , which effectively barred independents and members of third parties from running for office, \"severely bur- dened the right to associate for political purposes\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
		"context": "\"Although section headings cannot limit the plain meaning of a statutory text, they supply cues as to what Congress intended.\" Merit Mgmt. Grp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As one court of appeals has aptly noted, these \"cues\" are especially salient in this context, as \"we look to the headings within § 841 not to interpret that Section itself, but rather to inform us as to Congress's understanding of that Section when it later enacted the First Step Act.\" 954 F.3d 446.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
		"context": "This argument does vio- lence to the text of the First Step Act. \"A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inop- erative or superfluous, void or insignificant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of the First Step Act. That is, rather than reading the statute as it is written to define a \"covered offense\" as \"a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,\" First Step Act § 404(a) (em- phasis added), the government would read the First Step Act as defining a \"covered offense\" as \"a violation of a Federal criminal statute which was modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act.\" That, quite simply, is not what the First Step Act says.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
		"context": "Such a reading also defies common sense: Sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act modified only stat- utory penalties, not the substantive contours of a fed- eral crime. See Fair Sentencing Act § 2 (reducing the quantity of crack cocaine triggering certain criminal penalties, while leaving intact the prohibition against producing, distributing, or possessing with intent to distribute any quantity of crack cocaine); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]], which provide the penalties for violations of section 841(a) involving crack cocaine, as being the 'statute' to which the penalties clause refers, especially because doing so requires concluding that the Fair Sentencing 12 Act modified the penalties that apply to these 'stat- utes' by modifying the provisions themselves.\" 962 F.3d 1290. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
		"context": "3. Other arguments the government has made for treating § 841(a), in combination with § 841(b)(1)(C), as the \"Federal criminal statute\" named in Section 404(a) of the First Step Act are similarly divorced from the First Step Act's text. As an initial matter, the gov- ernment's reliance on this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is inapt. In Al- leyne, this Court held as a matter of constitutional law that any fact that increases a mandatory minimum, such as the drug quantities delineated in § 841(b), is an \"element\" of a crime that must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 570 U.S. at 102, 108.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Phrase \"Federal Criminal Statute\" Refers to section 841(a) in this Case",
		"context": "See First Step Act § 404(a). This Court \"as- sume[s] that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, if anything, the language of the First Step Act evinces an effort by Congress to avoid the limitations that an expansive reading of Al- leyne might impose upon relief under its legislation. Accord Smith , 954 F.3d at 450 (\"We see no reason to believe that Congress would have thought the holding 13 in Alleyne concerning criminal procedure and the ele- ments of a crime informed the meaning of the phrase 'Federal criminal statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The funding injuries are self-inflicted and speculative",
		"context": "On balance, the states would be better off financiall y. To the extent that they choose to cover healthcare that they need not cover, the injury would be a self-inflicted one, which would not suffice for standing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While Plaintiffs may —or may not —be out some money, their alleged injury is not cognizable. 16",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The limitation on the President's ability to remove the Director of the CFPB is not severable from the remainder of Title X",
		"context": "Alaska Airlines , 480 U.S. at 685. The Court has lo ng avoided giving a statute \"an effect altogether different from that sought by the measure viewed as a whole, \" which \"can be a more ex- treme exercise of the judicial power than striking the whole statute.\" National Federation of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is not severable from the remainder of Title X. Rendering the Director removable by the President at will would radically re- shape the CFPB and create an agency that the Congress that enacted the Dodd-Frank Act would surely not have wanted. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The limitation on the President's ability to remove the Director of the CFPB is not severable from the remainder of Title X",
		"context": "5302. As the Court has explained, severabi lity \"rarely turn[s] on the presence or absence of such a clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To be sure, a sev- erability clause creates a presumption that Congress would prefer the statute with out the invalid provision to no statute at all. See Alaska Airlines , 480 U.S. at 686.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "a. \"At all stages of litigation, a plaintiff must main- tain a personal interest in the dispute.\" 141 S. Ct. 792 ; see Match -E- Be-Nash -She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy those re- quirements as to any provision , let alone the third - ranked preferences. i.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "i. The Brackeens failed to establish standing as of the time they filed the operative complaint in March 2018. See Rockwell Int 'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At that time, they had already \"successfully petitioned to adopt\" A.L.M ., so they faced no injury traceable to ICWA's ap- plication in any ongoing proceedings. J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "post -dated the fil- ing of the operative complaint, and they did not notify the district court of those proceedings until after the court entered final j udgment. D. Ct. Doc. 17 1 (Oct. 10, 2018) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, when the Brackeens filed the operative com-plaint, their only basis for standing was their allegation that they \"intend[ed] to provide foster care for, and pos- 51 sibly adopt, additional children.\" J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "100 . \"Such 'some day' intentions —without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be —do not support a finding of the 'actual or imminent' injury that [this Court's] cases require.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pet. App. 357a (Wiener, J.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "5 0a (Dennis, J.). Moreover, the \"exception to the mootness doctrine for a controversy that is capable of repetition, yet evading review\" is inapplicable here. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., In re2019 WL 6698079. Sec- ond, their asserted intentions \"to foster and adopt chil- dren \" in the future , 21-380 Cert. Reply Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "18) that it is enough to demonstrate injury traceable to the \"placement preferences as a whole. \" But \"[s]tand - ing is not dispensed in gross.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. E ven if the individual plaintiffs could demonstrate injury traceable to some other placement preference, that would not give them any basis to challenge the third -ranked preferences. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The individual plaintiffs cannot satisfy Article III's case or controversy requirement",
		"context": "The individual plaintiffs' asserted injur ies therefore could arise only from ICWA's application in state court. A state court, however, is not bound by a federal district court's decision that a statutory or reg- ulatory provision is unconstitutional. See Arizonans for Official [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because the federal defendants would not be par- ties to any state child -custody proceedings, neither de- claratory nor injunctive relief against the federal de- fendants would have any effect in such proceedings . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": "See 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, 1344; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Construing the disjunctive language as a unit ary w hole, the Court has applied the \"common understanding\" of \"the words 'to defraud,' \" as referring \" 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signif y[ing ] the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.' \" 483 U.S. 350161 U.S. 306.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": ", 527 U.S. 1. Construing the disjunctive language as a unit ary w hole, the Court has applied the \"common understanding\" of \"the words 'to defraud,' \" as referring \" 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signif y[ing ] the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]161 U.S. 306. The Court has explained that \"materiality of false- hood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes,\" but that \" 'justifiable reliance' and 'damages' \"—which \"plainly have no place\" in those statutes —are not. Neder , 527 U.S. at 24- 25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": ", 527 U.S. 1. Construing the disjunctive language as a unit ary w hole, the Court has applied the \"common understanding\" of \"the words 'to defraud,' \" as referring \" 'to wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes,' and 'usually signif y[ing ] the deprivation of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.' \" 483 U.S. 350[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has explained that \"materiality of false- hood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes,\" but that \" 'justifiable reliance' and 'damages' \"—which \"plainly have no place\" in those statutes —are not. Neder , 527 U.S. at 24- 25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "161 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": "1951)). It en- compasses both \"tangible\" and \"intangible\" \"property rights. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It thus includes, for example, \"confidential busi-ness information,\" ibid. , and \" [t]he right to be paid money,\" Pasquantino , 544 U.S. at 356.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": "It thus includes, for example, \"confidential busi-ness information,\" ibid. , and \" [t]he right to be paid money,\" Pasquantino , 544 U.S. at 356. The term \"prop- erty\" does not, however, include the mere right to an employee's loyal \"honest services, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 399- 402 (2010 ), although a separate statutory provision proscribes \"bribery and kickback schemes,\" id. at 412 (citing 18 U.S.C. 1346).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory definition of fraud is satisfied by proof that the defendant obtained property by means of a material falsehood",
		"context": "For exam- ple, the Court has \"held that a State's interest in an unissued video poker license was not 'property,' be- cause the interest in choosing particular licensees ,\" un- accompanied by any allegation of lost revenue or the 28 like, \"was 'purely regulatory ,' \" without private ana- logue. Id. at 357 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But a government' s \"eco- nomic\" interests —including economic interests that have a regulatory source, like \"entitlement to ta x revenue\" — are \"property\" for purposes of the fraud statutes. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities",
		"context": "2000bb -1(c). As this Court has recognized, \"the word ' appropriate' is inhe rently context dependent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Interpreted in light of all rel- evant context —including the broader statutory lan- guage, history, separation -of-powers concerns, and precedent —the phrase \"appropriate relief \" in RFRA does not encompass a damages remedy against federal employees in their personal capacities, for four reasons. First , placed within the broader statutory context, relief is \"appropriate\" only if it runs \"against a govern- 14 ment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities",
		"context": "Properly understood, RFRA permits relief against feder al officials only in their offi- cial capacities. Second , \"appropriate relief \" must be read against the backdrop of the preexisting rule that damages were generally unavailable against individual federal em-ployees . Before RFRA , the only possible avenue f or ob- taining such relief would have been through an implied cause of action under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but this Court's extant precedents did not rec- ognize such an action under the Free Exe rcise Clause. Congress enacted RFRA in response to this Court's de- cision in Employment 494 U.S. 872 —which changed the prevailing substantive standard under the Free Exercise Clause —and there is no indication in the statute or its legislative history that Congress's mere reversion to the prior substantive standard was also intended to work an avulsive change in the law of remedies by authorizing a novel damages remedy against federal employees in their personal ca- pacities . Accordi ngly, the statutory phrase \"appropriate relief \" should not be read to encompass such a remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities",
		"context": "Second , \"appropriate relief \" must be read against the backdrop of the preexisting rule that damages were generally unavailable against individual federal em-ployees . Before RFRA , the only possible avenue f or ob- taining such relief would have been through an implied cause of action under 403 U.S. 388 , but this Court's extant precedents did not rec- ognize such an action under the Free Exe rcise Clause. Congress enacted RFRA in response to this Court's de- cision in Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —which changed the prevailing substantive standard under the Free Exercise Clause —and there is no indication in the statute or its legislative history that Congress's mere reversion to the prior substantive standard was also intended to work an avulsive change in the law of remedies by authorizing a novel damages remedy against federal employees in their personal ca- pacities . Accordi ngly, the statutory phrase \"appropriate relief \" should not be read to encompass such a remedy. Third , this Court should decline to infer from the vague term \"appropriate relief \" the existence of a personal -capacity damages remedy against federal em- ployees , in the absence of a clear statement of congres- sional intent to that effect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities",
		"context": "Third , this Court should decline to infer from the vague term \"appropriate relief \" the existence of a personal -capacity damages remedy against federal em- ployees , in the absence of a clear statement of congres- sional intent to that effect. Congress speaks clearly when authorizing s uch a remedy , which imposes heavy 15 burdens on a coequal Branch ; Congress, not the Judici- ary, is best situated to assess those burdens and deter- mine whether a damages remedy is in the public inter- est. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. T he phrase \"appropriate re- lief,\" however, does not \"clearly identify[] money dam-ages.\" Sossamon , 563 U.S. at 286.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "RFRA does not authorize damages awards against federal officials in their personal capacities",
		"context": "App. 24a -26a. But the case upon which it relied for that proposition, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , has no application here. Franklin addressed an implied cause of action , and the statutory text was thus necessarily silent on the question of remedies. A d- verting to a general presumption that damages are available is inappropriate (and unnecessary) where the statute includes an express cause of act ion and an ex- press remedies provision .",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RLUIPA's Protections Are Broad",
		"context": "§ 2000cc–5(7)(A). Significantly, it is individuals who determi ne which exercises of a given religion are meaningful. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also JAMES M ADISON , Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785) (\"The Religion then of every man must be left to the conviction and conscience of every man; and it is the right of every man to exercise it as these may dictate. \"), in 2 T HE W RITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 184 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1901), quoted in Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion , 103 H ARV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The agencies lacked \"good cause\" to bypass notice-and-comment procedures",
		"context": "553(b)(B). The agencies have not put forward evidence to satisfy this \"meticulous and demanding\" standard. Sorenson Commc'ns [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a. Pending litigation, or any uncertainty it causes, is not good cause to circ umvent the APA's ordinary procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The agencies lacked \"good cause\" to bypass notice-and-comment procedures",
		"context": "51,095-96. Good cause is a fact- specific inquiry. See Mack Trucks, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither circumstance is analo- gous to the argument made in support of the agencies' argument for good cause here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F.3d 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Industry data demonstrates that excessive fee lawsuits have become excessive",
		"context": "33, Issue 1. 3 See Jacklyn Wille, Spike in 401(k) Lawsuits Scrambles Fiduciary Insurance Market , Bloomberg Law (Oct. 18, 2021), 7 cases proceed into discovery.4 It is now routine \"in nu- merous other lawsuits\" for \"a plaintiff 's attorney, seek- ing a large fee,\" to \"target a plan that holds abundant assets,\" in the hope of a large settlement. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, plaintiffs have increasingly attacked smaller plans with less than $100 million in assets and fewer than 1,000 participants, 5 and have also shifted their focus to universities, filing a dozen copycat law-suits against large universities. 6 This, in turn, has made it harder for plans and fiduciaries to obtain the insurance coverage necessary to operate in today's liti-gious environment, threatening the availability of re- tirement benefits and services to employees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "Petrs . Br. 1–2, 5, 36– 38; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . According to Missis- sippi , \"nothing\" in constitutional text or tradition supports any individual right —ever—to obtain an abortion. Petrs .",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "As the Court has explained , \"[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty,'\" —and liberty includes \"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 884; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 497 U.S. 261 ; 405 U.S. 438 ; 342 U.S. 165 ; 197 U.S. 11 . Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "As the Court has explained , \"[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty,'\" —and liberty includes \"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 884; see also, e.g. , 504 U.S. 127 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 405 U.S. 438 ; 342 U.S. 165 ; 197 U.S. 11 . Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "As the Court has explained , \"[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty,'\" —and liberty includes \"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 884; see also, e.g. , 504 U.S. 127 ; 497 U.S. 261 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 342 U.S. 165 ; 197 U.S. 11 . Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "As the Court has explained , \"[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty,'\" —and liberty includes \"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 884; see also, e.g. , 504 U.S. 127 ; 497 U.S. 261 ; 405 U.S. 438 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 197 U.S. 11 . Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "As the Court has explained , \"[t]he controlling word in the cases before us is 'liberty,'\" —and liberty includes \"the right to make family decisions and the right to physical autonomy.\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 884; see also, e.g. , 504 U.S. 127 ; 497 U.S. 261 ; 405 U.S. 438 ; 342 U.S. 165 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "197 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "Thus, for example, the Court has rec- ognized that the right to liberty protec ts against state -forced intrusions into the body, Rochin, 342 U.S. at 1 72–73, as well as the ability to decide whether to accept medical treatment , Riggins , 504 U.S. at 135; Cruzan , 479 U.S. at 279. Similarly, the Court has held that liberty includes the individual's right to use contraception. See Eisenstadt , 405 U.S. at 453; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In recent years, multiple decisions have rein- forced the principle that \"physical autonomy\" and \"bodily integrity\" are integral components of liberty. Casey , 505 U.S. at 857, 884; see 539 U.S. 166 ; 532 U.S. 67 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "See Eisenstadt , 405 U.S. at 453; 431 U.S. 678 . In recent years, multiple decisions have rein- forced the principle that \"physical autonomy\" and \"bodily integrity\" are integral components of liberty. Casey , 505 U.S. at 857, 884; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 532 U.S. 67 . The Court has also extended Casey 's analysis of \"consti- tutional protection [for] personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela- tionships, child rearing, and education.\" 539 U.S. 558 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "See Eisenstadt , 405 U.S. at 453; 431 U.S. 678 . In recent years, multiple decisions have rein- forced the principle that \"physical autonomy\" and \"bodily integrity\" are integral components of liberty. Casey , 505 U.S. at 857, 884; see 539 U.S. 166 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court has also extended Casey 's analysis of \"consti- tutional protection [for] personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela- tionships, child rearing, and education.\" 539 U.S. 558 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "Casey , 505 U.S. at 857, 884; see 539 U.S. 166 ; 532 U.S. 67 . The Court has also extended Casey 's analysis of \"consti- tutional protection [for] personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family rela- tionships, child rearing, and education.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In light of these precedents, t hat the specific words \"pregnancy\" or \"abortion\" do not appear in the Constitution's text is of no moment. T he constitu- tional question here is whether general principles 19 grounded in the Cons titution apply to the specific sit- uation at hand.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "Br. 13. If that were a basis for overruling precedent, then [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , would have to go , for the same Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also segregated the D.C. public school system . So would 372 U.S. 335 , and 388 U.S. 1 . Some believe Heller similarly lacks any historical foundation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "13. If that were a basis for overruling precedent, then 347 U.S. 483 , would have to go , for the same Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also segregated the D.C. public school system . So would [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 388 U.S. 1 . Some believe Heller similarly lacks any historical foundation. See 554 U.S. at 683–87 (Breyer , J., dissenting) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "13. If that were a basis for overruling precedent, then 347 U.S. 483 , would have to go , for the same Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment also segregated the D.C. public school system . So would 372 U.S. 335 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Some believe Heller similarly lacks any historical foundation. See 554 U.S. at 683–87 (Breyer , J., dissenting) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Viability Line Is Well Grounded in the Constitution and the Court's Broader Jurisprudence.",
		"context": "The Court has long recognized that \"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the com- mon law, than the right of every individual to the pos- session and control of his own person.\" Union Pacific Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Fur- ther, the common law permitted abortion up to a cer- tain point in pregnancy, and many states maintained that common law tradition as of the late 1850s. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 (concluding that, for much of his- tory and particularly during nineteenth century, \"a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to ter- minate a pregnancy than she does in most States to- day\"); see also generally Historians Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Recent technological developments have reshaped our social and legal understandings of privacy",
		"context": ". The legal dimensions of this case cannot be ade- quately understood without first identifying how tech- nological change has impacted our conceptualization of what privacy is and why it matters. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court recognized how technologies such as the cell phone have fundamentally changed our lives in the two cen- turies since the framing of the Bill of Rights. As Chief Justice Roberts rightly recognized: Modern cell phones are not just another tech- nological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans \"the privacies of life.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "(emphasis added). Section 113(h) contains five enumerated exceptions, each of which relates to a specific type of CERCLA enforcement action at a particular time in the clean-up process. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fourth excep- tion, for example, permits CERCLA citizen suits \"alleg- ing that the removal or remedial action taken was in violation of any requirement\" of CERCLA, but only once no further remedial action \"is to be undertaken at the site.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "581 F.3d 865",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9613(h)(4). Through its prohibi-tion on \"challenges\" and its enumerated exceptions, Section 113(h) channels suits questioning the legality of EPA's selected remedy to specified times, generally postponing the \"presumptive right of judicial review\" until \"completion of the remedial action.\" North Shore Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 113(h) is thus a prohibition on premature review of EPA actions under CERCLA. Topol & Snow, Superfund Law and Procedur e § 2.5, 108 (1992) (\"In short, Section 113(h) bars judicial review of an EPA 33 removal or remedial action until the Agency has taken some enforcement action related thereto.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 1239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "Topol & Snow, Superfund Law and Procedur e § 2.5, 108 (1992) (\"In short, Section 113(h) bars judicial review of an EPA 33 removal or remedial action until the Agency has taken some enforcement action related thereto.\"). Congress believed litigation regarding EPA's orders while reme- diation was underway had \"the effect of slowing down or preventing the EPA's cleanup activities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] thus sets forth comprehen- sive procedures for judicial review of EPA's actions. 2. Because Landowners' claims do not depend on the invalidity of any EPA action, Landowners do not advance a Section 113(h) \"challenge.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "990 F.2d 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9622(e)(6). Con trary to ARCO's contentions, this provision does not forever prevent all property 8 See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]467 F.3d 1223311 F.3d 1066750 F.3d 86347 F.3d 325. 36 owners at Superfund site s from removing the hazard- ous wastes others left on their land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9622(e)(6). Con trary to ARCO's contentions, this provision does not forever prevent all property 8 See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, 213 F.3d 1108[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]311 F.3d 1066750 F.3d 86347 F.3d 325. 36 owners at Superfund site s from removing the hazard- ous wastes others left on their land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 F.3d 1223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9622(e)(6). Con trary to ARCO's contentions, this provision does not forever prevent all property 8 See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, 213 F.3d 1108467 F.3d 1223[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]750 F.3d 86347 F.3d 325. 36 owners at Superfund site s from removing the hazard- ous wastes others left on their land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 F.3d 1066",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9622(e)(6). Con trary to ARCO's contentions, this provision does not forever prevent all property 8 See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, 213 F.3d 1108467 F.3d 1223311 F.3d 1066[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]47 F.3d 325. 36 owners at Superfund site s from removing the hazard- ous wastes others left on their land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Landowners Do Not \"Challenge\" EPA's Orders",
		"context": "§ 9622(e)(6). Con trary to ARCO's contentions, this provision does not forever prevent all property 8 See ARCO Envtl. Remediation, 213 F.3d 1108467 F.3d 1223311 F.3d 1066750 F.3d 863[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 owners at Superfund site s from removing the hazard- ous wastes others left on their land.",
		"citation_value_orig": "47 F.3d 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Stare Decisis Should Compel This Court To Reject Petitioners' Invitation To Overrule Well-Established Precedent",
		"context": "June Med. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 1 William Black- stone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 69 (1765)). This \"[r]espect fo r precedent promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Stare Decisis Should Compel This Court To Reject Petitioners' Invitation To Overrule Well-Established Precedent",
		"context": "That judicial power includes \"judicial review\" of state legislative actions for compliance with the state constitution. See State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The North Carolina Supreme Court acted consistently with this constitu-tional structure when it held the congressional re- 14 districting plan violated Arti cles X, XII, XIV, and XIX of North Carolina's Constitution.4 Petitioners attempt to show that their theory of the Elections Clause best accords with its original intent. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 S.E.2d 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The \"purposes of\" paragraph (14) include aligning reimbursement rates with drug-acquisition costs",
		"context": "1395l (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II). And it is not plausible to conclude that the \"purposes of \" paragraph (14) as a whole are limited to accoun ting for overhead -cost ad- justments and the like. See, e.g., Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] are limited to making overhead -cost adjustments. They instead dispute ( Br. 43 -45) the court of appeals' conclusion that reading subclause (II) to have such a purpose would make it superfluous, given that para- graph (14) separately specifies that subclause (II) is \"subject to subparagraph [(14)] (E),\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Extraordinary Facts Of This Case Demonstrate A Violation Under Any Standard",
		"context": "To go beyond the facts and legal theories raised in a case and rule that an entire category of cases is nonjust i- ciable would violate \"the cardinal principle of judicial restraint —if it is not necessary to decide more, it is necessary not to decide more.\" PDK Labs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The claims in this case are plainly judicially de- terminable. Invidious intent is clear —indeed , admi t- ted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Failed National Blaine Amendment and Its State-Level Progeny Were Motivated by Animus",
		"context": ". \"[H]ostility to aid to pervasively sectarian schools has a shameful history that we do not hesitate to disavow.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Anti -Aid Amendment in Massachusetts was only the prototype of a series of amendments across the United States that were aimed at constitutionally preventing Catholic institut ions from gaining access to public funds. These later amendments would come to be known as \"Blaine\" amendments after James G. Blaine, the leading advocate for the proposed federal amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "OPINIONS BELOW The Tenth Circuit's opinion (Pet. App. 1a-27a) is reported at [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The District Court's opinion (Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 1262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "That is because a corporation's estate in bankruptcy includes any property, includ- ing tax refunds, in which the estate holds both \"legal title\" and \"an equitable interest.\" 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (d); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But a subsidiary may claim that it is the equitable owner of a refund, on the ground that the parent is merely holding the refund for that subsidiary in an agency or trust capacity. See 5Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 541.28 (16th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "382 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "22-26. First, these courts use state contract and corporation law to determine whether, as an initial matter, the TAA or principles of fiduciary duty require a parent to distribute the refund to a particular subsidiary. See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, if the answer to that question is yes, these courts consult state agen- cy and trust law to determine the capacity in which the parent holds the refund: whether as an agent or trustee—in which case the subsidiary may be the equitable owner of the refund—or as a debtor—in which case the parent owns the refund, and the 11 subsidiary is merely an unsecured creditor. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "269 B.R. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "Second, if the answer to that question is yes, these courts consult state agen- cy and trust law to determine the capacity in which the parent holds the refund: whether as an agent or trustee—in which case the subsidiary may be the equitable owner of the refund—or as a debtor—in which case the parent owns the refund, and the 11 subsidiary is merely an unsecured creditor. See, e.g. , In re593 F. App'x 123; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re729 F.3d 1344.2 3. Some courts, however, have not left it to private parties and state law to resolve this question. In- stead, they have resolved disputes over the owner- ship of tax refunds in an affiliated group by crafting a rule of \"federal common law\" known as the Bob Richards rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "757 F.3d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "Second, if the answer to that question is yes, these courts consult state agen- cy and trust law to determine the capacity in which the parent holds the refund: whether as an agent or trustee—in which case the subsidiary may be the equitable owner of the refund—or as a debtor—in which case the parent owns the refund, and the 11 subsidiary is merely an unsecured creditor. See, e.g. , In re593 F. App'x 123; 757 F.3d 530; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 3. Some courts, however, have not left it to private parties and state law to resolve this question. In- stead, they have resolved disputes over the owner- ship of tax refunds in an affiliated group by crafting a rule of \"federal common law\" known as the Bob Richards rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 1344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "So has the FDIC. That agency is a frequent litigant in this area, in its capacity as the receiver for insolvent depository institutions that are subsidiaries of bank- ing corporations, and it too has consistently under- stood and defended Bob Richards as a rule of federal common law. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 13-3669); see also Opp. 16 for 35 years\" and \"[i]t ha[d] always been the practice to assess tax liability\" in a particular manner.",
		"citation_value_orig": "757 F.3d 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "16 for 35 years\" and \"[i]t ha[d] always been the practice to assess tax liability\" in a particular manner. Bob Richards , 473 F.2d at 264 n.4; cf. Capital Bancshares, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B. Factual Background 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "957 F.2d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION SHOULD BE REVERSED",
		"context": "Id. at 43a. But the court concluded that the Tenth Circuit had adopted the Bob Richards rule in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and that the District Court was therefore bound to follow it. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 1185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If the Court Reaches the Question, It Can Affirm Denial of Intervention With or Without a Presumption of Adequacy",
		"context": "If the Court announces a new adequacy standard, it should vacate and remand for appl ication of that standard. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But if the Court does assess adequacy, it should af- firm. Unless Rule 24(a) requ ires intervention on a mere showing of differences of op inion about trial strategy—a standard that would read the inadequacy prong out of ex-istence—petitioners fail to establish inadequacy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Allowing Employers to Create Their Own Undue Hardship Thwarts Title VII's Fundamental Purpose",
		"context": "The accommodation ques- tion, however, should still consider whether it has an actual effec t on the conduct of the business or whether the rationale was overstated (or worse, invented out of whole cloth) to covertly implement a desired look policy. This type of concern is magnified because an employer will have superior knowledge of how its business runs and can easily proffer a reasonable sounding —though potentially pretextual —justifica - tion for rejecting an accommodation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have come close to saying as much: \"[The employer] was in a better position than [the employ- ee] to know whether [an accommodation could be made and] the Court does not substitute the speculation of an employee for the judgment of an employer.\" 2013 WL 6095118.",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Based on this \"princi- ple,\" they argue that the petitioners had a duty to warn about the dangers of third -party asbestos \" fore- seeably\" used with their equipment. The hornbooks say just the opposite: tort -law du- ties do not arise from \"foreseeability alone.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, \"foreseeability is an important limiting factor in tort litigation,\" Resps. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 P.3d 987",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Br. 3, because de- fendants are not generally liable for unforeseeable events. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But foreseeability alone does not create a duty; something more is needed. Defining \"product.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 N.W.2d 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "This argument, never raised in the 4 Third Circuit or in the plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition, is wrong. In products -liability law, the relevant \"products\" are the defendant's goods, in the form they were in w hen they left its hands. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, later -added parts and materials are distinct products for which the original manufacturer has no duty to warn. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "202 F.3d 376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Thus, later -added parts and materials are distinct products for which the original manufacturer has no duty to warn. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 487 N.E.2d 1374; 571 A.2d 420; O'Neil , 266 P.3d at 991. Consider a manufacturer that makes and sells passenger jets that contain everything but the seats, the sale of which it leaves to third parties \"in the business of airline seating.\" In re356 F. Supp. 2d 1055.",
		"citation_value_orig": "780 F.2d 1131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Thus, later -added parts and materials are distinct products for which the original manufacturer has no duty to warn. See, e.g. , 780 F.2d 1131; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 571 A.2d 420; O'Neil , 266 P.3d at 991. Consider a manufacturer that makes and sells passenger jets that contain everything but the seats, the sale of which it leaves to third parties \"in the business of airline seating.\" In re356 F. Supp. 2d 1055.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 N.E.2d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Thus, later -added parts and materials are distinct products for which the original manufacturer has no duty to warn. See, e.g. , 780 F.2d 1131; 487 N.E.2d 1374; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; O'Neil , 266 P.3d at 991. Consider a manufacturer that makes and sells passenger jets that contain everything but the seats, the sale of which it leaves to third parties \"in the business of airline seating.\" In re356 F. Supp. 2d 1055.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 A.2d 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": ", 780 F.2d 1131; 487 N.E.2d 1374; 571 A.2d 420; O'Neil , 266 P.3d at 991. Consider a manufacturer that makes and sells passenger jets that contain everything but the seats, the sale of which it leaves to third parties \"in the business of airline seating.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even though the jets are useless for their intended purpose without seats, the manufacturer's \"products\" are not the completed jets; they are the almost - complete jets, lacking seats. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 F. Supp. 2d 1055",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "of Multiple Veterans Organizations 18. And a wheel manufactur er may be liable if it fails to warn that the wheel may explode when used with a par- ticular type of tire; but the maker of a tire specifical- ly designed for that wheel has no duty to warn about the wheel's risks. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In these cases, the manufacturer is liable for defects that shipped with its product, not defects introduced or re - introduced later. The plaintiffs cannot evade this principle by rede- fining the equipment the petitioners made as \"inte-grated product[s]\" that include post -sale additions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "989 F.2d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "This is sometimes called \"assembler's liability.\" See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But manufacturers have no duties as to third -party parts and materials added to their integrated products post -sale. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 P.3d 493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "And products -liability defendants are not liable for failing to warn about the danger of products foreseeably used with their own—even complementary th ird-party products that they recommend. Thus, the maker of a dialysis ma-chine that recommends using formaldehyde as a cleaner has no duty to warn about the chemical's risks. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If products - liability law permitted such liability, cases outside the asbestos context would say so. But neither the plaintiffs nor their amici have identified a single such case, and the petitioners are not aware of any.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 N.W.2d 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "2018). The plaintiffs' own authority says so. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent there is a difference, negligent failure- to-warn claims are harder to prove, because they require proof as to state of mind; the whole point of strict li-ability is to remove that element, making it easier for plaintiffs to recover. See 2 Products Liability § 12.02.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 N.E.3d 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The plaintiffs' various appeals to tort law doctrine fail",
		"context": "Superseding cause. \"The doctrine of superseding cause\" applies \"where the defendant's negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury, but the injury was actually brought about by a lat er cause of independent origin that was not foreseea- ble.\" Exxon Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiffs accuse petitioners of mak-ing a \"thinly veiled\" argument for extending the su- perseding -cause doctrine so that it applies e ven to foreseeable intervening acts. Resps.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations",
		"context": "The first constitutional issue that arises if Section 2 is understood as a pure disparate-impact provision is easy to spot. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, there must be \"congruence and proportionality\" between Congress's chosen means and the \"injury to be prevented or remedied.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress must use \"rational means\" to enforce \"the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.\" South 383 U.S. 301.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations",
		"context": "City of 521 U.S. 507. Under the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress must use \"rational means\" to enforce \"the constitutional prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And under both of these provisions, the essential evil to be avoided or cured is intentional racial discrimination. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations",
		"context": "And under both of these provisions, the essential evil to be avoided or cured is intentional racial discrimination. See, e.g. , City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, if Section 2 could be violated by racial disparities, without more, then it would prohibit a broad swath of conduct that is constitutionally innocuous: electoral regulation that lacks a discriminatory purpose but produces a disparate impact. This wide reach could arguably make Section 2 noncongruent with, and disproportionate to, the underlying injury of intentional racial discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations",
		"context": "Similarly, a provision of such sweep could arguably be an unreasonable response to deliberate racial discrimination in voting. See, e.g. , Veasey , 830 F.3d at 315 (Jones, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 24 part) (if Section 2 \"eliminate[s] disparate impact,\" then it is \"not congruent and proportional as a remedy for violation of voting rights\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, the two-part test recently adopted by certain lower courts does not make Section 2 a pure disparate-impact provision. The test's second element requires an electoral policy's disparate impact to be caused by the policy's interaction with historical and ongoing discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "359 F.3d 1116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Usual Framework Tightens Section 2's Fit with Underlying Constitutional Violations",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Vill. of Arlington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting \"the limited probative value of ongoing discrimination. Discrimination helps explain minority citizens' worse education, higher poverty, and greater residential isolation. These socioeconomic disadvantages, in turn, help explain why minority citizens are less likely to register to vote, to have photo IDs, to vote on Election Day, and so on.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
		"context": ". There is no question the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishments provides bounda- ries within which states must operate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Ford , this Court recognized that the civilized standards embodied in the Eighth Amendment pro- hibited the execution of pr isoners found to be incom- petent. 477 U.S. at 409-10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
		"context": "In Ford , for example, this Court never even elucidated the facts of the offense for which Mr. Ford was con-victed. In fact, a jury found that \"on July 21, 1974, Al- vin Bernard Ford murdered a helpless, wounded police officer by shooting him in th e back of the head at close range.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Scott Panetti was convicted of killing his mother-in-law and father-in-law in front of his wife and daughter. 551 U.S. at 935-36.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.2d 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
		"context": "551 U.S. at 935-36. At no point did this Court question whether these facts were determinative of whether the Eighth Amendment permitted their execution despite evi- dence suggesting each was incompetent. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, this Court's Eighth Amendment hold- ings in Roper and Atkins barring certain defendants from being sentenced to death contain no exemption 16 dependent upon the circumstances of the crime. See 543 U.S. 551.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
		"context": "See also 523 U.S. 637. Similarly, this Court's Eighth Amendment hold- ings in Roper and Atkins barring certain defendants from being sentenced to death contain no exemption 16 dependent upon the circumstances of the crime. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, despite Respondent's insistence to the contrary, Ford 's and Panetti 's prohibition on executing the mentally in- competent provides no exe mption for an incompetent person to be executed if the State deems the prisoner to be the \"worst murderer[ ]\" or the case to be one in which the State \"has an especially strong interest.\" Resp't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Finding that Mr. Madison Is Incompetent Does Not Implicate the State's Ability to Punish but Rather Enforces the Community's Understanding of Human Dignity in the Context of Punishment",
		"context": "Indeed, Ford still permits the execution of someone found in- competent so long as that person regains competence. See 477 U.S. at 425 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) (\"[I]f pe- titioner is cured of his diseas e, the State is free to exe- cute him. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, finding Mr. Madison incompetent based on his significant mental disabilities does not \"inter- pos[e]\" any additional step between conviction and ex- ecution, as the State alleges, Resp't Br. 39, because Ford and Panetti already establish that the Eighth Amendment requires, or \"interposes\" a requirement of, competence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 F.3d 1018",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.",
		"context": "In its seminal decision Thornburg v. Gingles , the Court developed a test by which courts should adjudicate claims of minority vote dilution brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (\"VRA\") as amended June 29, 1982, 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (\"Section 2\"). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court stated that to prevail in a Section 2 claim of minority vote dilution, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the minority which is allegedly injured by a challenged election practice is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member electoral district; (2) that the minority group is politically cohesive; and (3) that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.",
		"context": "The Gingles test was developed by this Court after years of judicial confusion as to how to properly 5 apply Section 2. See generally e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Various courts viewed the legislative history of Section 2 differently, especially the Senate Report issued by the Committee on the Judiciary that accompanied the 1982 Senate Bill. Kosterlitz, Note, Thornburg v. Gingles: The Supreme Court's New Test For Analyzing Minority Vote Dilution, 36 Cath.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.",
		"context": "U. L. Re v. 531, 543 (1987). After examining the 1982 Amendments to Section 2, the accompanying Senate Report, and the varying standards developed by different lower courts in adjudicated Section 2 vote dilution claims since that time, the Court ultimately se ttled on the three-factor plus the totality of the circumstances test we know today. Gingles , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These changes and developments did not occur in a vacuum. During the time of the 1982 Amendment and Senate Report, as well as the 1986 Gingles test, minority populations were significantly concentrated in racially polarized areas that lacked diversity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.",
		"context": "Minority political participation and political success has also increased significantly in the last four decades. See, e.g. , Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 547 (observing that \"[b]latantly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare\" \"[a]nd minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels\" (quoting Northwest Austin Mun. Util.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nation Has Experienced Dramatic Increases in Diversity and Minority Participation and Representation Since the Gingles Test Was Created.",
		"context": "Util. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); id. (stating that when Congress reauthorized the Act in 2006, 11 \"[s]ignificant progress ha[d] been made in eliminating first generation barriers experienced by minority voters, including increased numbers of registered minority voters, minority voter turnout, and minority representation in Congress, State legislatures, and local elected offices.\" (quotation omitted); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FRAMERS WOULD HAVE INTENDED FOR THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO APPLY TO THE STATES",
		"context": "Beca use the Clause protects against abusive governmental practices of the kind commonly used to subjugate Black people in the post- Civil War period, the Framers would have intended its protections to apply against the States. The Court has explained that the Excessive Fines Clause \"was taken verbatim from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Excessive Fines Clause in the English Bill of Rights \"was a reaction to the abuses of the King's judges during the reigns of the Stuarts.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FRAMERS WOULD HAVE INTENDED FOR THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO APPLY TO THE STATES",
		"context": "The Framers no doubt would have wanted the Eighth Amendment's protection against excessive punishment—including excessive fines—to extend to the States. Consistent with what the Framers intended, the Court has said that the Fourteenth Amendment \"makes the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishments applicable to the States.\" Cooper Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].57 The Framers made their intent of incorporating the entire Eighth Amendment clear when debating the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. Throughout the debates, congressmen repeatedly highlighted the concern of States using exorbitant punishment to suppress Black people with no federal recourse. For example, as Representative Bingham said when closing debate on the Fourteenth Amendment: \"cruel and unusual punishments have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the 57 The Indiana Supreme Court believed this was dictum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 424",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FRAMERS WOULD HAVE INTENDED FOR THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE TO APPLY TO THE STATES",
		"context": "Throughout the debates, congressmen repeatedly highlighted the concern of States using exorbitant punishment to suppress Black people with no federal recourse. For example, as Representative Bingham said when closing debate on the Fourteenth Amendment: \"cruel and unusual punishments have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citizens not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the 57 The Indiana Supreme Court believed this was dictum. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. granted138 S. Ct. 2650 (Mem.). 19 United States had no provided remedy and could provide none.",
		"citation_value_orig": "84 N.E.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The FHFA Removal Restriction Lacks Any Historical Pedigree",
		"context": "For 21 example, independent agencies headed by multimember commissions have existed since at least 1887, when Congress created the Interstate Commerce Commission. Congress's right to provide for-cause removal protection to inferior officers appointed by the heads of their departments has been recognized by the Court since at least 1886. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 NCLA is not suggesting that Humphrey's Executor (which upheld removal restrictions for the heads of multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power) was correctly decided. Indeed, Seila Law called into question the continued viability of Humphrey's Executor , and NCLA urges the Court to overrule it. As Justice Thomas has warned: Continued reliance on Humphrey's Executor to justify the existence of independent agencies creates a serious, ongoing threat to our Government's design.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "When federal courts confront a removed takings claim, they are often compelled to dismiss the claim as unripe for lack of compliance with Williamson County 's state litigation requirement. Arrigoni , 136 S. Ct. at 1411 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of cert. ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 The removed takings plaintiff is thus left without reasonable access to either the state or federal forum. The takings claim cannot be raised as an initial matter in federal court, it cannot be adjudicated in state court because of removal, and it cannot be litigated in federal court after removal due to Williamson County . This outcome is striking —and emblematic of the state litigation doctrine's wholly unworkable character— because it arises from perfect compliance with the doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.3d 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "By filing in state court, the takings plaintiff did exactly what is required to secure a hearing on a takings claim . San Remo Hotel , 545 U.S. at 3 46. Yet, through 10 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 134 F. Supp. 2d 156. 32 no fault of the plaintiff, the claim instantly goes from alive to dead based on a defendant's choice to remo ve. Doak Homes, 2008 WL 191205.11 In recent years, a few federal circuit courts have held that a defendant waives Williamson County 's state litigation rule when removing a takings claim from state to federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 F. Supp. 2d 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "By filing in state court, the takings plaintiff did exactly what is required to secure a hearing on a takings claim . San Remo Hotel , 545 U.S. at 3 46. Yet, through 10 See also 53 F. Supp. 2d 957 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 no fault of the plaintiff, the claim instantly goes from alive to dead based on a defendant's choice to remo ve. Doak Homes, 2008 WL 191205.11 In recent years, a few federal circuit courts have held that a defendant waives Williamson County 's state litigation rule when removing a takings claim from state to federal court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 F. Supp. 2d 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "32 no fault of the plaintiff, the claim instantly goes from alive to dead based on a defendant's choice to remo ve. Doak Homes, 2008 WL 191205.11 In recent years, a few federal circuit courts have held that a defendant waives Williamson County 's state litigation rule when removing a takings claim from state to federal court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 752 F.3d 554. But, after shuffling takings claims between state and federal courts for 33 years under Williamson County , with judicial and litigant resources wasted 11 It is true that some federal courts will remand a removed takings claim to state court, rather than dismiss it, upon finding the claim unripe under Williamson County . Del-Prairie Stock 572 F. Supp. 2d 1031.",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "See 724 F.3d 533; 752 F.3d 554. But, after shuffling takings claims between state and federal courts for 33 years under Williamson County , with judicial and litigant resources wasted 11 It is true that some federal courts will remand a removed takings claim to state court, rather than dismiss it, upon finding the claim unripe under Williamson County . Del-Prairie Stock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This outcome is of little solace to the plaintiff. That removed and remanded litigant has been involuntarily yanked from the state court —which is supposedly the only proper forum for a takings claim —to a federal court —which is not a proper forum —only to be sent back to the state court where it all began, without any hearing in the process.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F. Supp. 2d 1031",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The State Litigation Requirement Deprives Takings Plaintiffs of Reasonable Access to State Courts",
		"context": "Through it all, valuable resources and time are wasted, allowing government defendants to prevail by attrition. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 and claims disappearing along the way, this bit of progress is not enough. Courts have tried for decades to apply the state litigation requirement in a rational and predictable fashion, and failed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT",
		"context": "The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit properly held that the Women's Health Amendment to the Affordable Care Act (ACA) does not grant the federal government the authority to create broad exemptions excusi ng organizations from providing insurance coverage for preventive health care services, including contraceptive care. 7 Nothing in the text of the statute gr ants agencies the authority to \"wholly exempt actors of its choosing from providing the guideline services.\" 8 The enabling plainly states: A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or individual health coverage shall, at a minimum provide coverage for and shall 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Id. at 570.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE TEXT OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT, AS WELL AS CONGRESSIONAL INTENT",
		"context": "§300gg-13(a)(3) (\"with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the comprehensive guidelines supported by the [HRSA].\"). 16 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Preventive Care Benefits for Children, https://www.healthcare.gov/preventive-care-children. 17 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Finally, Congress considered and rejected an amendment similar to the promulgated exemption, thus, making clear its intention to not provide for the broad exemption at issue here. 18 Accordingly, for good reason, circuit courts have agreed that the federal government acted outside of its statutory authority when it promulgated the challenged exemption.19 II.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "§ 703, under the INA 's 1996 amendments. Second, g iven that parties like the States had a pre-1996 right of review , the 1996 INA amendments cannot be read expansively because repeals by implicatio n are disfavored. Nat'l Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the APA recognizes a difference between systemic actions like the this section in the event that the Court decides to address the scope of § 1252(f)(1). 6 purported rescission of the MPP and the application of the immigration process to any individual alien : If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across the board to all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become ripe for review …, it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected [.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "Moreover, the APA recognizes a difference between systemic actions like the this section in the event that the Court decides to address the scope of § 1252(f)(1). 6 purported rescission of the MPP and the application of the immigration process to any individual alien : If there is in fact some specific order or regulation, applying some particular measure across the board to all individual classification terminations and withdrawal revocations, and if that order or regulation is final, and has become ripe for review …, it can of course be challenged under the APA by a person adversely affected [.] [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the APA, § 1252(f)(1) does not provide a \"clear and manifest \" indica tion of congressional intent to terminate systemic APA review by plaintiffs with no future INA proceeding in which to challenge an INA administrative action. Indeed, the relative order of the APA 's and INA 's enactment provides further assurance that the States retain their APA cause of action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "§702 ( \"[n]othing herein … confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought \") (emphasis added), post -APA statutes must deny review expressly. 5 U.S.C. § 559 ( \"[s]ubsequent statute may not be held to supersede or modify this subchapter …, except to the extent that it does so expressly \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The leading implied -preclusion authorities concern pre-APA statutes. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "The leading implied -preclusion authorities concern pre-APA statutes. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like implied preclusion, these decisions have no bearing on the preclusion of review under post-APA statutes like INA and its 1996 amendments. As post-APA statutes, for INA and its subsequent amendments to preclude APA review, they would need to do so expressly, but they do not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "The arguments for the APA 's ongoing viability here rel y on the plain language of the relevant statutes and this Court 's decisions. Because Congress knows this Court 's important decis ions, Chemical Mfrs. Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court can assume that Congress would have been express in displacing APA review by aggrieved parties like the States that have no future INA proceeding in which to challenge the unlawful actions of an administrative agency. Because the full range of APA review is available to non -alien plaintiffs like the States with no future INA procee ding in which to challenge INA procedures , this Court need not consider the separate availability of injunctive or declaratory relief , apart f rom the APA. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA does not bar the States' APA claims",
		"context": "§ 2201(a). Congress has plenary authority to channel aliens ' claims to the INA proceedings available to individual aliens like the ones in Aleman Gonzalez , and th ose statutes define the extent of Due Process for aliens seeking admission to the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners are simply wrong to suggest that the arguments in Aleman Gonzalez control here.3",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. Superiority should not rest on the size of the settlement amount",
		"context": "The argument is too clever by half: It ignores that there would be no cy pres remedy in the absence of sufficient class participation. Too many opt-outs would lead a court to reject the settlement. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The argument is overbroad as well, as any injunctive relief that affects a defendant's general conduct—including the disclosures Google agreed to make here (JA94)—inevitably benefits nonmembers of a class as well as class members. And petitioners' proposal has the practical effect of thwarting settlement (or substantially 39 overinflating the settlement value of) the low-value, large-class cases for which cy pres relief is most appropriate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
		"context": ". remain studiously oblivious to the effects of its ac-tions.' \" Santa Fe Independent School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 And the \"cross dramatically conveys a message of gov- ernmental support for Christianity, whatever the in- tentions of those responsible for the display may be.\" St. Charles , 794 F.2d at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
		"context": "St. Charles , 794 F.2d at 271. Moreover, \"[w]hen the power, prestige, and financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Alle- gheny , Justice Kennedy explicitly recognized the coer- cive effect of \"the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city ha ll.\" 492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part).",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
		"context": "492 U.S. at 661 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). The Lemon test, although criticized, merely en- shrined unquestioned bedro cks of Establishment Clause jurisprudence into a formal test. See Wallace , 472 U.S. at 55-56; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For instance, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp , the Court announced: \"[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact- ment? If either is the advanc ement or inhibition of re- ligion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu- tion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
		"context": "For instance, in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp , the Court announced: \"[W]hat are the purpose and the primary effect of the enact- ment? If either is the advanc ement or inhibition of re- ligion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitu- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And despite its criticism, Lemon 's context-driven approach has produced consistent results in display cases and does not require \"e radication of all religious symbols in the public realm.\" Buono , 559 U.S. at 718.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Legion seeks to upend decades of settled jurisprudence for a \"per se\" rule that outs vital Establishment Clause precepts",
		"context": "Lemon only renders unconstitutional those displays that transgress the \"wholesome 'neu-trality' \" at the heart of the Establishment Clause. Schempp , 374 U.S. at 222. E.g., McCreary , 545 U.S. at 881; Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 598-99; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"principle of neutrality has provided a good sense of direction: the government may not favor one religion over another, or religion over irreligion.\" McCreary , 545 U.S. at 875-76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 39",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress may not commandeer Texas officials to enforce ICWA",
		"context": ". This Co urt has repeatedly held that Congress may not \"commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This principle is not lim- ited to state legislatures: other s tate officials similarly may not be \"dragooned . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress may not commandeer Texas officials to enforce ICWA",
		"context": ". into administering federal laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Murphy , 138 S. Ct. at 1477. And this Court has explained, \"[i]t is an e ssential at- tribute of the States' retained sovereignty that they re-main independent and autonomous within their proper sphere of authority.\" Printz , 521 U.S. at 928.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE RAMOS RULE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT AN IMPERMISSIBLY LARGE RISK OF AN INACCURATE CONVICTION",
		"context": ". This Court has explained that for a new rule of criminal procedure to apply retroactively on federal habeas review, the rule \"must be necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of an inaccurate convic- tion.\" Whorton , 549 U.S. at 418 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). While \"[i]t is . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH DEMONSTRATES THAT THE RAMOS RULE IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT AN IMPERMISSIBLY LARGE RISK OF AN INACCURATE CONVICTION",
		"context": ". to say that [the] rule is aimed at improving the accu- racy of trial, or that the rule is directed toward the en- hancement of reliability and accuracy in some sense,\" id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), this Court has made clear that a new rule should apply retroactively if it \"remedie[s] an imper- missibly large risk of an inaccurate conviction,\" id. (in- ternal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 356). The Ramos rule satisfies this demanding standard, as empirical studies have consistently demonstrated that requiring unanimous jury verdicts is necessary to ensure the accuracy of convictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The U.S. Securities Laws Do Not Adequately Protect Investors from ESG Transgressions",
		"context": "ESG-minded investors currently cannot rely on the federal securities laws to hold companies account- able for misrepresentations relating to ESG-related conduct. Although, as noted in Section II.B., supra , some courts have found statements concerning a com-pany's ethics or moral code of conduct to be actionable under the federal securities regime, there are signifi- cant hurdles to achieving recovery, and more often, in-vestors have failed. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court dismissed claims that the defendant company had made false statements regarding risks to product safety even though its livestock products had tested positive for drug and antibiotic residues, and its food standards and safety protocols had proven ineffective. Similarly, in 918 F.3d 57, the court dismissed claims focused on breaches of the company's ethical code, holding that the related statements were mere \"puffery.\" Many investors have fare d no better when seek- ing recourse for losses occurring after news that a 38 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "620 F. App'x 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "Article III authorizes this Court to take direct \"appellate jurisdiction\" of cases from inferior Article III courts, state courts and territorial courts, including the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Constitution's grant of \"appellate jurisdiction\" to this Court and vesting of the \"judicial Power of the United States\" in Article III courts, taken together, confer on the Supreme Court the authority to review and to revise lower federal court judgments. In addition, this Court held at an early date in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that it had the authority to correct errors by a State's highest court. Justice Story, writing for the Court, reasoned that \"the framers of the constitution did contemplate that cases within the judicial cognizance of the United States not only might but would arise in the state 24 courts,\" id. at 340, and that the view that the Court could take appellate jurisdiction over state judgments was \"uniformly and publicly avowed by [the Constitution's] friends, and admitted by its enemies, as the basis of their respective reasonings,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "an appeal would certainly lie from the latter to the Supreme Court of the United States\"). While territorial courts have long been understood to pose complex constitutional questions, they are best understood within the federal scheme as functional equivalents of state courts where state government does not exist. In American Insurance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that, although territorial courts were not composed of judges with Article III's structural protections, those courts were \"created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United States.\" Id. at 546; see U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "belonging to the United States\"). Territorial courts thus stand in the same position for constitutional purposes as state courts precisely because \"[i]n legislating for them, Congress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state government .\" Canter, 26 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Based on that logic, this Court has asserted \"appellate jurisdiction\" over courts in the territories. See, e.g., 155 U.S. 76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "50 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "Canter, 26 U.S. at 546 (emphasis added); see, e.g., 50 U.S. 235. Based on that logic, this Court has asserted \"appellate jurisdiction\" over courts in the territories. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court has, by the same logic, exercised appellate jurisdiction over courts within the District of Columbia. See 411 U.S. 389; 289 U.S. 516; U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "See, e.g., 155 U.S. 76. And the Court has, by the same logic, exercised appellate jurisdiction over courts within the District of Columbia. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 289 U.S. 516; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "See, e.g., 155 U.S. 76. And the Court has, by the same logic, exercised appellate jurisdiction over courts within the District of Columbia. See 411 U.S. 389; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "Thus, \"[i]t should be obvious that the powers exercised by territorial courts tell us nothing about the nature of an entity,\" such as the CAAF, \"which administers the general laws of the Nation.\" Freytag, 501 U.S. at 914 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Northern Pipeline Const. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. By contrast, as this Court has already determined, notwithstanding its name, the CAAF is an \"Executive Branch entity\" for relevant constitutional purposes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "2. By contrast, as this Court has already determined, notwithstanding its name, the CAAF is an \"Executive Branch entity\" for relevant constitutional purposes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that its members lack Article III's structural protections for judges, that conclusion is unassailable. The CAAF and its members do not exercise \"judicial Power\" from which this Court may exercise direct review, but rather the \"executive Power\" of the Executive Branch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "in the sense in which judicial power is granted to the courts of the United States.\" 68 U.S. at 253 (quoting Ferreira , 54 U.S. at 48); see Carl B. Swisher, The Taney Period, 1836-64 , at 929 (Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise 1974) (noting the argument in Vallandigham that, because \"[c]ourts- martial and military commissions exercised their power from sources under the Constitution other than the judicial power,\" \"direct review would [ ] be an exercise of the Court's original, not appellate, jurisdiction, beyond the authority conferred by Article III\"). Vallandigham 's holding on this point echoed the Court's prior determination in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the power to convene courts- 27 martial \"is given without any connection between it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the United States\" and \"that the two powers are entirely independent of each other.\" Id. at 79.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "Freytag, 501 U.S. at 909 (Scalia, J., concurring). That is why, for example, this Court noted that the President's role in reviewing the proceedings of courts-martial is a \"judicial\" power that he must exercise personally. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. President's Approval of the Sentence of a Court Martial , 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 19. The critical point, however, is that \"[t]o be a federal officer and to adjudicate are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of federal judicial power.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "122 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "The critical point, however, is that \"[t]o be a federal officer and to adjudicate are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of federal judicial power.\" Freytag, 501 U.S. at 909 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see, e.g. , City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 29 (observing that agency adjudications may take \"'judicial' forms, but they are exercises of — indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of — the 'executive Power'\"); Murray's 59 U.S. 272. Likewise, to be sure, the CAAF is described as having been \"established under article I of the Constitution.\" 10 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "The critical point, however, is that \"[t]o be a federal officer and to adjudicate are necessary but not sufficient conditions for the exercise of federal judicial power.\" Freytag, 501 U.S. at 909 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see, e.g. , City of 569 U.S. 290 29 (observing that agency adjudications may take \"'judicial' forms, but they are exercises of — indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of — the 'executive Power'\"); Murray's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, to be sure, the CAAF is described as having been \"established under article I of the Constitution.\" 10 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "Because they lack life tenure, because their salaries may be diminished, and because they are removable by the President on various statutory grounds (including \"neglect of duty\"), they cannot exercise the federal Government's \"judicial Power,\" nor do they exercise the \"judicial Power\" of a state or territory. In this respect, it is substance, not form, that matters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this instance, the substance cannot be clearer: The members of the CAAF are subordinate to — indeed, they are removable by — the President. As this Court noted with respect to a similar statutory removal provision, that removal may occur \"for any number of actual or perceived transgressions\" — making the members of the CAAF Executive Branch officers by any metric.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "In this instance, the substance cannot be clearer: The members of the CAAF are subordinate to — indeed, they are removable by — the President. As this Court noted with respect to a similar statutory removal provision, that removal may occur \"for any number of actual or perceived transgressions\" — making the members of the CAAF Executive Branch officers by any metric. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 3. Allowing this Court to direct executive branch officers undermines the constitutional scheme by heightening the risk, on the one hand, that a multimember body might directly oversee the Executive Branch instead of the Constitution's single Chief Magistrate and, on the other hand, that Congress may assign to, and thereby inundate this Court with, the routine, direct review of agency decisionmaking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "If this Court were to hold that the CAAF exercises \"judicial Power,\" it would naturally raise the question whether the President could properly remove its members. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the D.C. Circuit recently observed in Kuretski , \"the constitutional status of the Tax Court mirrors that of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "755 F.3d 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Fundamental separation-of-powers principles preclude this Court from issuing writs to executive branch officers",
		"context": "The Court has identified three circumstances in which a non-Article III judge or court may be given adjudicatory authority that is conclusive in some shape or form: (1) territorial courts, (2) courts-martial, and (3) cases involving a \"public right.\" Northern Pipeline , 458 U.S. at 64-70 (plurality); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this approach seems equally problematic. For one thing, it fails to take account of Vallandigham , and other related cases, which show that the Court has not historically exercised \"appellate jurisdiction\" from courts-martial and other military tribunals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Any Claim That Petitioner Was Indicted Without Probable Cause, Which Would Arise Under The Fourth Amendment, Is Barred By Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "22 See Pet. for Cert. i, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2015 WL 9855124137 S. Ct. 923 (Alito, J., dissenting). And in holding that the Fourth Amendment was the source of a claim that an individual was wrongly indicted, the Court in Manuel relied on the views of five Justices in Albright —another case in which the claim resembled one for \"malicious prosecution.\" See 510 U.S. 266.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Any Claim That Petitioner Was Indicted Without Probable Cause, Which Would Arise Under The Fourth Amendment, Is Barred By Absolute Immunity",
		"context": "i, 137 S. Ct. 9112015 WL 9855124137 S. Ct. 923 (Alito, J., dissenting). And in holding that the Fourth Amendment was the source of a claim that an individual was wrongly indicted, the Court in Manuel relied on the views of five Justices in Albright —another case in which the claim resembled one for \"malicious prosecution.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"malicious prosecution\" claim in this case therefore should be viewed as raising a Fourth Amendment issue. And that claim was dismissed on grounds of absolute immunity and is not before this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. There is no precedential basis for a felony/misdemeanor distinction in the hot pursuit context",
		"context": "\"[T]hough Santana involved a felony suspect, [it] did not expressly limit [its] hold-ing based on that fact.\" Stanton , 571 U.S. at 9. And Scher , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], did not even mention whether the underlying offense was a felony or misdemeanor. 4 For example, one officer in 1691 Massachusetts asserted the inherent authority \"to search an entire town\" house by house—without a warrant—for two women who had escaped home confinement. C UDDIHY , supra , at 416.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. There is no precedential basis for a felony/misdemeanor distinction in the hot pursuit context",
		"context": "The sole precedential hook for the felony limita- tion (and thus the circ uit split) appears to be Welsh v. Wisconsin . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At issue there was the constitu- tionality of a \"warrantless, nighttime entry into [Welsh's] home to arrest him for a civil traffic offense.\" Welsh , 466 U.S. at 754.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 So. 3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Guidelines do not violate Sections 1226 and 1231",
		"context": "The district court concluded that the word \"shall\" impose s a judicially enforceable man- date to apprehend and deta in everyone in those groups . But that language does not ordinarily displace back- ground principles of law -enforcement discretion , and the context and history of the relevant provisions con- firm that ordinary understanding here . See Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Especially given perennial constraints on detention capacity, the Executive retains authority to focus its limited re- 9 sources on those noncitizens who are higher priorities for apprehension. The court's contrary conclusion ru ns counter to longstanding practice spanning multiple Ad- ministrations .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Guidelines do not violate Sections 1226 and 1231",
		"context": "1. A case or controversy exists only if the plaintiff has standing —that is, only if the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and would likely be redressed by judi cial relief. Trans Union [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An Article III injury , in turn , requires the inva- 11 sion of a \"legally and judicially cognizable\" interest , which means the dispute must be of the sort \" 'tradition- ally thought to be capable of resolution through the ju- dicial process.' \" 521 U.S. 811 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 S. Ct. 2190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Guidelines do not violate Sections 1226 and 1231",
		"context": "Trans Union 141 S. Ct. 2190. An Article III injury , in turn , requires the inva- 11 sion of a \"legally and judicially cognizable\" interest , which means the dispute must be of the sort \" 'tradition- ally thought to be capable of resolution through the ju- dicial process.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The district court held that Texas has standing based on a chain of possible effects: that the Guidelines will increase the State's popul ation of noncitizens ; that some of those noncitizens will commit crimes or use social ser- vices ; and that Texas will then expend additional sums in response. J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS INTERPRETED BELOW, RULE 32.1(g) IS NOT ADEQUATE OR INDEPENDENT BECAUSE IT CONFLICTS WITH FEDERAL LAW",
		"context": ". The Supremacy Clause \" 'creates a rule of decision' directing state courts that they 'must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law[ ].' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] conflicts with federal law governing the retroactivity of this Court's decisions—which, like all federal law, binds federal and state courts alike. That interpretation accord- ingly cannot be given effect under the Supremacy Clause. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The AEA Preempts State Laws Imposed for the Purpose of Regulating Radiological Safety",
		"context": "logical Safety. Because the language of a statute \"necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive in-tent,\" the preemption inquiry should begin with \"text and structure of the statute at issue.\" CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, the text and structure of the AEA clearly mark the boundaries of the preempted sphere: States may regu- late only \"for purposes other than protection against radiation hazards.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause",
		"context": ". Again, Establishment Clause concerns are no basis for prohibiting the display of a flag with a cross, because the public display of the cross on flags and by other means is an unbroken American tradition that predates the adoption of the First Amendment. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],14 this Court upheld the Nebraska Legislature's practice of opening each day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State. Noting that legislative 13 David J. Brewer, The United States a Christian Nation 12 (1905).",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Noting that legislative 13 David J. Brewer, The United States a Christian Nation 12 (1905). 14 Because the Foundation believes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is inapplicable to this case, we will not comment on the District Court's Lemon analysis except to note that she ignores the modifications of the test in 521 U.S. 203 , and her only illustration of \"excessive entang lement\" is that \"Blowing in the wind, these side-by-side flags could quite literally become entangled.\" (p. 14). 13 chaplains and legislative prayers were a common practice in the American colonies and in the states after in dependence, that the Continental Congress had prayers, and that Congress itself in 1789 instituted congressional chaplains, the Court held that \"historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but a lso on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress – their actions reveal their intent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The public display of a cross is a historic and uninterrupted practice that does not violate the Establishment Clause",
		"context": "Noting that legislative 13 David J. Brewer, The United States a Christian Nation 12 (1905). 14 Because the Foundation believes 403 U.S. 602, is inapplicable to this case, we will not comment on the District Court's Lemon analysis except to note that she ignores the modifications of the test in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and her only illustration of \"excessive entang lement\" is that \"Blowing in the wind, these side-by-side flags could quite literally become entangled.\" (p. 14). 13 chaplains and legislative prayers were a common practice in the American colonies and in the states after in dependence, that the Continental Congress had prayers, and that Congress itself in 1789 instituted congressional chaplains, the Court held that \"historical evidence sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but a lso on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress – their actions reveal their intent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned",
		"context": "For instance, a Swiss arbitrator has conveyed nonreceptivity to Section 1782 discovery 14 while an Israeli arbitrator has expressed receptivity .15 And the arbitral tribunal in Servotronics, Inc. v. Rolls- Royce PLC expressed its view by issuing a decision stating its preference that U.S. courts in the Northern District of Illinois and the District of South Carolina be permitted to hear Servotronics' d iscovery requests on their merits, leaving it to the tribunal to determine whether any material obtained pursuant to the Secti on 1782 application would subsequently be relevant or admissible in the arbitration. See Third Interim Award, In the Matter of an Arbitration Under the Rules of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators Between Rolls Royce PLC and Servotronics Inc. , No. 20 -mc- 14 See El Paso [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 15 See In re Hallmark Capital Corp. , 534 F . Supp. 2d 951, 957 (D. Minn .",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 F. App'x 31",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned",
		"context": "One such concern is the discrepancy between Section 1782, which permits parties to invoke the power of federal district courts to obtain nonparty evidence, and Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which only permits arbitrators to do so. See Servotronics, 975 F.3d 689, cert. granted141 S. Ct. 1684[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Republic of 168 F.3d 880 . By aligning district court decisions with the preferences of arbitrators presiding over tribunals, the notice requirement would reduce tension between Section 1782 and the FAA. While Section 1782 need not be in perfect unison with the FAA—Intel 's rejection of both the foreign discoverability requirement and the requirement that the sought -after discovery be discoverable in an analogous U.S. proceeding made such equivalence unnecessary —harmony among the regimes is clearly preferable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Clarifying The Intel Factors Will Strengthen The Framework This Court Envisioned",
		"context": "One such concern is the discrepancy between Section 1782, which permits parties to invoke the power of federal district courts to obtain nonparty evidence, and Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), which only permits arbitrators to do so. See Servotronics, 975 F.3d 689, cert. granted141 S. Ct. 1684165 F.3d 184 ; Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By aligning district court decisions with the preferences of arbitrators presiding over tribunals, the notice requirement would reduce tension between Section 1782 and the FAA. While Section 1782 need not be in perfect unison with the FAA—Intel 's rejection of both the foreign discoverability requirement and the requirement that the sought -after discovery be discoverable in an analogous U.S. proceeding made such equivalence unnecessary —harmony among the regimes is clearly preferable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 F.3d 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Quill Was Not Badly Reasoned",
		"context": "Notably, lower courts have not questioned the va- lidity of the Quill rule for sales and use taxes, but ra- ther have declined to apply it to other types of tax, such as state income taxes. See, e.g. , KFC [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied565 U.S. 817; Capital One 899 N.E.2d 76 (Mass. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 N.W.2d 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Quill Was Not Badly Reasoned",
		"context": "denied557 U.S. 919. These decisions are almost universally premised on the conclusion that sales and use taxes impose substantially greater burdens on out-of-state companies than do income taxes. KFC Corp. , 792 N.W.2d at 325 (\"the burden of state income taxation, however, is substantially less\" than the burden of col- lecting and remitting sales tax); Capital One , 899 N.E.2d at 85 (\"the collection of franchise and income taxes did not appear to cause similar compliance bur- dens\"); Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "640 S.E.2d 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "The panel was correct to doubt PennEast's proposition. The conclusion that no generalized in rem exception to state sovereign immunity exists follows from the consistent decisions of this Court going bac k over a century. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 305 U.S. 382458 U.S. 670; Coeur d'Alene , 521 U.S., at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (\"A federal court cannot summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the State of a property interest.\"). That is why PennEast has not found a single case that identifies a sweeping in rem exemption. To be sure, and as PennEast argues, federal courts have recognized that the States consented to specific types of in rem suits—namely, bankruptcy and admiralty matters— but the States never consented to in rem actions generally.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "The panel was correct to doubt PennEast's proposition. The conclusion that no generalized in rem exception to state sovereign immunity exists follows from the consistent decisions of this Court going bac k over a century. See, e.g., 313 U.S. 274; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]458 U.S. 670; Coeur d'Alene , 521 U.S., at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (\"A federal court cannot summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the State of a property interest.\"). That is why PennEast has not found a single case that identifies a sweeping in rem exemption. To be sure, and as PennEast argues, federal courts have recognized that the States consented to specific types of in rem suits—namely, bankruptcy and admiralty matters— but the States never consented to in rem actions generally.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "The panel was correct to doubt PennEast's proposition. The conclusion that no generalized in rem exception to state sovereign immunity exists follows from the consistent decisions of this Court going bac k over a century. See, e.g., 313 U.S. 274; 305 U.S. 382[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Coeur d'Alene , 521 U.S., at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (\"A federal court cannot summon a State before it in a private action seeking to divest the State of a property interest.\"). That is why PennEast has not found a single case that identifies a sweeping in rem exemption. To be sure, and as PennEast argues, federal courts have recognized that the States consented to specific types of in rem suits—namely, bankruptcy and admiralty matters— but the States never consented to in rem actions generally.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 670",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "That is why PennEast has not found a single case that identifies a sweeping in rem exemption. To be sure, and as PennEast argues, federal courts have recognized that the States consented to specific types of in rem suits—namely, bankruptcy and admiralty matters— but the States never consented to in rem actions generally. See Central Va. Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If anything, thes e specialized cases prove the point—confirming the proposition that the States maintain their immunity in adjudications over their property rights, but that particular features of bankruptcy and admiralty law called for a different result. Just this Term, this Court rejected the argument that a generalized in rem exception to state sovereign immunity exists.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "ii. PennEast incorrectly relies on a purported in rem exception to sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "It makes sense that courts have rejected any purported in rem exception. As a threshold matter, calling a lawsuit in rem —i.e., \"judicial jurisdiction over a thing\"—is \"a customary elliptical way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests of persons in a thing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In practice as in name, then, this in rem action is as much a suit against New Jersey—which stands to lose properties, and is forced to litigate what it is owed—as against its parcels. It also makes no sense for state sovereign immunity to turn on such state-law naming conventions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Conclusion",
		"context": "280 state, 18 U.S.C. § 1162, and out of the 229 Alaska Na- tive governments, only one has territory considered In- dian country. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Therefore, until the 2022 Violence Against Women Reauthorization, the state insisted its jurisdiction was exclusive. Roadmap, supra , at 45.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Conclusion",
		"context": "25 State jurisdiction, however, undermines support and accountability for tribal and federal criminal jus- tice institutions. As Justice Brandeis recognized long ago, \"Responsibility is the great developer,\" and divid-ing responsibility tends to \"emasculate and demoral- ize.\" St. Joseph Stock Yards [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Indian country, dividing authority among many governments may lead to none accepting full authority. See Regina Branton, Kimi King & Justin Walsh, Criminal Justice in Indian Country: Examining Declination Rates of Tribal Cases, 103 Soc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "298 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Conclusion",
		"context": "Re- cent decisions uphold federal refusals to enter into self-determination contracts for law enforcement with tribes in P.L. 280 states. See Hopland Band of Pomo 624 Fed.Appx. 562; 26 Los Coyotes Band of Cahuilla & Cupeno [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although federal law is beginning to recognize the deficits of state jurisdiction, tribal governments are still struggling to overcome years of divided responsi- bility. Granting states jurisdiction in this case would extend this debilitating dilution of funding and ac- countability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.3d 1025",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Program does not waive or modify the cited statutory and regulatory provisions",
		"context": "But \"modify\" \"means to change moderately or in a minor fashion.\" MCI Telecomms. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rewriting 46 statutes and regulations to add a new cancellation program—with unique eligibility requirements and discharge amounts—\"is effectively the introduction of a whole new regime\" of loan cancellation. MCI, 512 U.S. at 234.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress expressly and deliberately included ANCs in the ISDA definition",
		"context": "1606( l ). Congress's decision in ISDA to include ANCs , con- trolled by Alaska Natives, is also consistent with ISDA's stated goals of achieving \"maximum Indian par- ticipation in the direction of Federal services to Indian communities\" and of making \"s uch services more responsive to the needs and desires of those communi- ties. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To exclude ANCs from ISDA contracting would have been to ex- clude hundreds of Alaska Native entities that Congress itself had only recently established in ANCSA to benefit Alaska Natives. Indeed, shortly after Congress enacted ISDA, experts opined that ANCs \"might well be the form or organization best suited to sponsor certain kinds of federally funded programs\" in Alaska .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress expressly and deliberately included ANCs in the ISDA definition",
		"context": "Print 1977) (AIPRC Report). 22 ISDA also reflects a concern for promoting \"eco- nomic development\" in Indian communities. Washing- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The inclusion of ANCs further ed that goal as well. ANCs were themselves de- signed to address the \"economic needs\" of Alas ka Natives , 43 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3.The phrase as a whole compels the Eleventh Circuit's construction",
		"context": "§ 1330(b)(3)(iii)(D) (\"The Attorney General shall prepare and submit annually to the Congress statements 25 not use that language here. Congress's use of a broadening term must be understood as intentional. SeeRussello v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. iii. As to \"financial condition,\" the Eleventh Cir- cuit (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Oklahoma Confuses the Court for a Political Branch of Government",
		"context": "See, e.g., June Med. Servs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"It has long been an established rule to abide by former precedents … as well to keep the scale of justice even and steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion .… The constraint of precedent distinguishes the judicial method and phi-losophy from those of the political and legislative pro-cess.\" ). Oklahoma's petitions have been less nakedly po- litical, claiming instead that McGirt has created enor- mous crim inal and civil disruption that only its over- ruling can rectify .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": ". This Court has developed clear -statement rules in certain \"traditionally sensitive areas \" of the law where important constitutional principles are at stake, such as federalism or separation of powers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These rules help courts \"' act as faithful agents 20 of the Constitution. '\" West 142 S. Ct. 2587.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": "See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Read- ing Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 288– 89 (2012). The rule dates back to Justice Iredell 's opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, where he contended that \"nothing but express words, or an insurmountable im- plication \" may authorize federal courts to entertain citizen suits against the states. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More recently, the Court has reiterated that the standard is \"particularly strict, \" Port Auth. Trans- Hudson 495 U.S. 299, requiring statu- tory language that is \" unmistakably clear, \" id., and \"unequivocal, \" Dellmuth , 491 U.S. at 230.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": "2 U.S. 419. More recently, the Court has reiterated that the standard is \"particularly strict, \" Port Auth. Trans- Hudson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], requiring statu- tory language that is \" unmistakably clear, \" id., and \"unequivocal, \" Dellmuth , 491 U.S. at 230. Like all clear -statement rules, this one serves sev- eral critical purposes . First, it protect s vital constitu- tional norms .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": "at 227 (quotation marks and emendations omitted). 21 Second, the rule prom otes deliberative policymak- ing by ensur ing that Congress does not legislate inad- vertent ly or without due deliberation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The requirement thus encourages Congress to make a thoughtful, considered decision about the extent to which it wants to depart from con- stitutional status quo, \"assur[ing]\" courts that \" Con- gress has specifically considered . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": ". and has inten- tionally legislated on the matter. \" Sossamon , 563 U.S. at 290 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Third, the rule promotes predictability, ensuring that those affected by congressional acts have notice of Congress 's intended consequences. See Pennhurst State Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. To Abrogate Sovereign Immunity, a Statute Must Be Clear and Unmistakable on Its Face",
		"context": "Third, the rule promotes predictability, ensuring that those affected by congressional acts have notice of Congress 's intended consequences. See Pennhurst State Sch. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These purp oses are especially crucial to the Board. Given the importance, scope, and complexity of its statutory mission, the Board has a unique inter- est in the clarity of the legal framework to which it is subject, especially its exposure to suit .",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Foreign nationals are not \"Inhabitants\" and Cannot be Included in a State's Population for Apportionment Purposes",
		"context": "4. Under this provision, Congre ss may make rules \"covering all aspects of ad- mission of aliens to this country, whether for business or pleasure, or as immigrants seeking to become per- manent residents.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Restrictions can also be imposed to pr e- vent foreign nationals from est ablishing domicile within the United States. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 647",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "THE FDCPA'S PURPOSES CONFIRM THAT THE STATUTE APPLIES TO NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS. Congress enacted the FDCPA to protect consumers from the adverse consequences of abusive and deceptive debt collection practices, and to ensure that there is a uniform nationwide remedy against such practices. The decision below would create an \"enormous loophole\" in the FDCPA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and therefore frustr ate both purposes. In passing the FDCPA, Congress found that \"[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "ALLIANCE , ZIP CODE INEQUALITY : DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS IN THE MAINTENANCE OF HOMES IN NEIGHBORHOODS OF COLOR (Aug. 27, 2014), https://nationalfairhousing.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2014-08-27_NFHA_REO_report.pdf (finding that banks often fail to maintain real estate owned properties in communities of color). 16 See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No Circuit has held that the FDCPA does not appl y to judicial foreclosures. But applying the FDCPA to judicial foreclosures, but not nonjudicial foreclosures, would create precisely the patchwork Congress was seeking to avoid through the uniform FDCPA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.3d 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "And it would do so in a particularly anomalous fashion: the FDCPA would protect borrowers who alread y have more protection from, and recourse for, abusive practices by virtue of being a party to a judicial proceeding. Borrowers who face unfair, abusive, or deceptive practices in nonjudicial foreclosures, by contrast, would be denied a federal cause of action to redress the same kinds of harms, even though they already have fewer protections given the lack of judicial oversight. Indeed, evidence indicates that the deceptive and abusive practices Congress sought to address through the FDCPA are common in nonjudicial foreclosure foreclosure are covered by the FDCPA); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 464 F.3d 524. 15 proceedings. Sections 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA protect borrowers from misrepresentations about the amount or character of a debt, and from attempts to collect amounts not authorized by the underlying agreement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F.3d 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "And it would do so in a particularly anomalous fashion: the FDCPA would protect borrowers who alread y have more protection from, and recourse for, abusive practices by virtue of being a party to a judicial proceeding. Borrowers who face unfair, abusive, or deceptive practices in nonjudicial foreclosures, by contrast, would be denied a federal cause of action to redress the same kinds of harms, even though they already have fewer protections given the lack of judicial oversight. Indeed, evidence indicates that the deceptive and abusive practices Congress sought to address through the FDCPA are common in nonjudicial foreclosure foreclosure are covered by the FDCPA); 704 F.3d 453; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 proceedings. Sections 1692e and 1692g of the FDCPA protect borrowers from misrepresentations about the amount or character of a debt, and from attempts to collect amounts not authorized by the underlying agreement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.3d 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "at 748; see also Davies, supra , at 603, 608 (discussing the relevance of the house's \"special status at common law\" to the Framers). Consistent with this history, this Court has deemed the home \"first among equals\" for Fourth Amendment purposes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 445 U.S. 573. Because we have \"lived our whole national history with an understanding of the ancien t adage that a man's house is his castle,\" one occupant's consent for the police to enter and search is invalid if a present co-occupant objects. 547 U.S. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "at 748; see also Davies, supra , at 603, 608 (discussing the relevance of the house's \"special status at common law\" to the Framers). Consistent with this history, this Court has deemed the home \"first among equals\" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 569 U.S. 1; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because we have \"lived our whole national history with an understanding of the ancien t adage that a man's house is his castle,\" one occupant's consent for the police to enter and search is invalid if a present co-occupant objects. 547 U.S. 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "569 U.S. 1; see also 445 U.S. 573. Because we have \"lived our whole national history with an understanding of the ancien t adage that a man's house is his castle,\" one occupant's consent for the police to enter and search is invalid if a present co-occupant objects. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To preserve that sanctity, the Court recognizes a prophylactic protection for the area \"immediately surrounding and associated with the home,\" Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6, and has held that employing thermal imaging from a public street to detect heat levels within the home must satisfy Fourth Amendment scrutiny, see 533 U.S. 27. Moreover, this Court has considered the special importance of the home in interpreting constitutional protections that do not specifically mention it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "Because we have \"lived our whole national history with an understanding of the ancien t adage that a man's house is his castle,\" one occupant's consent for the police to enter and search is invalid if a present co-occupant objects. 547 U.S. 103. To preserve that sanctity, the Court recognizes a prophylactic protection for the area \"immediately surrounding and associated with the home,\" Jardines , 569 U.S. at 6, and has held that employing thermal imaging from a public street to detect heat levels within the home must satisfy Fourth Amendment scrutiny, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, this Court has considered the special importance of the home in interpreting constitutional protections that do not specifically mention it. For example, in the Second Amendment context, District of Columbia v. Heller emphasized that the Amendment \"elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "Moreover, this Court has considered the special importance of the home in interpreting constitutional protections that do not specifically mention it. For example, in the Second Amendment context, District of Columbia v. Heller emphasized that the Amendment \"elevates above all other interests the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, invalidating a ban on same-sex intimate conduct as violating the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court in Lawrence v. Texas recognized that \"[i]n our tradition the State is 20 not omnipresent in the home.\" 539 U.S. 558.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "554 U.S. 570. And, invalidating a ban on same-sex intimate conduct as violating the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court in Lawrence v. Texas recognized that \"[i]n our tradition the State is 20 not omnipresent in the home.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's treatment of the home in 547 U.S. 220, is particularly notable here. Settled Fourteenth Amendment due-process law required notice and opportunity for a hearing \"[b]efore a State [could] take property and sell it for unpaid taxes[.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "And, invalidating a ban on same-sex intimate conduct as violating the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, this Court in Lawrence v. Texas recognized that \"[i]n our tradition the State is 20 not omnipresent in the home.\" 539 U.S. 558. This Court's treatment of the home in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is particularly notable here. Settled Fourteenth Amendment due-process law required notice and opportunity for a hearing \"[b]efore a State [could] take property and sell it for unpaid taxes[.]\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "The question in Flowers was whether the government could seize a homeowner's property based on nothing more than the undelivered return of a notice of tax sale mailed to the owner. See id. The nature of the process due \"varies according to specific factual contexts[,]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the linchpin in Flowers was the home. In holding that more process was constitutionally required, the Court in Flowers emphasized repeatedly that the petitioner's home was at stake. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "at 239 (\"In this case, the State is exerting extraordinary power against a property owner—taking and selling a house he owns.\"). In short, it does not overstate the matter to call the home \"the most constitutionally protected place on earth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has recognized, the \"interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home\" is \"of the highest order in a free 21 and civilized society.\" 447 U.S. 455.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 F.3d 1073",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "539 F.3d 1073. As this Court has recognized, the \"interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home\" is \"of the highest order in a free 21 and civilized society.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with this lega l tradition, the home has been uniquely linked to the idea of the \"American dream. \"19 Both before and after slavery—despite antebellum bars on property ownership and postbellum barriers to its acquisition—African Americans sought to be part of this tradition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Housing Scholars Supporting Respondent, Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2014 WL 7405732, at 10–21 (discussing this history). These exclusionary practices often relegated African Americans to substandard, exploitative housing. For example, the Federal Housing Administration intentionally imposed racial ly restrictive covenants 22 Brad Greenburg, Consolidation After Crisis: How a Few Private Investors Bought Distressed, Fed erally-Insured Mortgages After the Foreclosure Crisis , 20 N.Y.U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Are Designed to Collect on an \"Obligation\"",
		"context": "23 and \"redlined\" African American families into blocks ineligible for Federal Housing Administration insured mortgages. 24 Seeking to eliminate these and other injustices, Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, which aimed to create \"truly integrated and balanced living patterns.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As one of our most significant civil rights statutes, the Fair Housing Act represents our recognition that the promise of security, stability, and full citizenship that a home represents must be available to all Americans. This history and context should illuminate the question presented here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Defendants Who Are Granted Relief from Mandatory Minimum Statutes Because of Their Substantial Assistance to the Government Are Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under Section 3582(c)(2)",
		"context": ". \"[Section] 3582(c)(2) represents a congressional act of lenity intended to give prisoners the benefit of later enacted adjustments to the judgments reflected in the Guidelines.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That provision allows def endant s who have already been sentenced to seek a sentence modification if they were originally \"sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission.\" 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Defendants Who Are Granted Relief from Mandatory Minimum Statutes Because of Their Substantial Assistance to the Government Are Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under Section 3582(c)(2)",
		"context": ". . disregard the manda - tory minimum,\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and impose a different sentence \"in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,\" 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e). In other words, when a sentencing court grants the Government's Section 3553(e) \"substantial assistance\" motion, an otherwise -applicable statutory minimum sentence drops out, and the defendant's sentence is necessarily \"based on\" the Guidelines, which the sen tencing court is required to consult .",
		"citation_value_orig": "722 F.3d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Defendants Who Are Granted Relief from Mandatory Minimum Statutes Because of Their Substantial Assistance to the Government Are Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under Section 3582(c)(2)",
		"context": "As both this Court and the Sentencing Commis - sion have long recognized, the basic function of Sec - tion 3553(e) is to relieve a sentencing court of the obli - gation to impose the statutory minimum. \"[A]n offend er may escape a minimum by providing sub - stantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the words of the Commission's commentary , \"[w]here a mandatory (statutory) mini - mum sentence applies, this mandatory minimum sen - tence may be 'waived' and a lower sentence imposed . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Defendants Who Are Granted Relief from Mandatory Minimum Statutes Because of Their Substantial Assistance to the Government Are Eligible for Sentence Reductions Under Section 3582(c)(2)",
		"context": "See Br. for Pet'rs 19 –23; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At that poin t, then, the Guidelines , as explicated in the Commission's \"policy statements ,\" see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.7 —not some \"creature of statute,\" In re Sealed Case , 722 F.3d at 369—become the basis for the new sentence.2 And because Petitioners' applicable Guidelines ranges were indisputably lowered by the Commission, 2 As Petitioners poin t out, the Government's previous position in this litigation and others has been that Section 3553(e) removes the statutory minimum from the picture.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "In addition to causation-in-fact, the patentee must show that the defendant's infringing acts were the proximate cause of the claimed lost profits. \"For 19 centuries, it has been a well established principle of the common law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.\" Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At heart, this is a \"judicial tool[] used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of [his] own acts,\" 503 U.S. 258, rooted in the recognition that it would be impossible to trace the consequences of events ad infinitum. See Associated Gen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "\"For 19 centuries, it has been a well established principle of the common law, that in all cases of loss, we are to attribute it to the proximate cause, and not to any remote cause.\" Lexmark Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 1377. At heart, this is a \"judicial tool[] used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of [his] own acts,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rooted in the recognition that it would be impossible to trace the consequences of events ad infinitum. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 U.S. 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "At heart, this is a \"judicial tool[] used to limit a person's responsibility for the consequences of [his] own acts,\" 503 U.S. 258, rooted in the recognition that it would be impossible to trace the consequences of events ad infinitum. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 3. The Federal Circuit's standard for measuring proximate causation is \"objective foreseeability,\" see Rite-Hite , 56 F.3d at 1546, which Petitioner appears to adopt approvingly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "See Petitioner's Opening Brief at 2, 3, 18, 22, 26, 41, 48, 51-52 & 54 . It should be noted, however, that this Court has never announced foreseeability as the operative test for proximate causation in patent law, and that it is far from clear whether it would be appropriate to do so. Compare Consolidated Rail [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 1 Sedgwick §§ 139 & 140 (cautioning against use of \"foreseeability\" in cases in which underlying liability is not founded on negligence). The Court need not reach this question in the present case. 20 Proximate cause limitations have been an established feature of patent remedies for well over a century.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "See 3 Walker on Patents § 832. Notably, several of the recent cases in which the Federal Circuit has curtailed damages on \"extraterritoriality\" grounds were cases in which the patent holder had likely failed to establish that the claimed losses were proximately caused by the defendant's domestic acts of infringement. For example, in Carnegie Mellon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the patentee sought to collect a reasonable royalty on chips the defendant had both made and sold abroad. Of course, chips made and sold abroad did not themselves infringe the patent, but the patentee claimed these foreign sales would not have been possible without the benefit of certain design, testing, and customer-integration steps performed in the United States. The foreign sales, the theory went, were the direct result of these infringing pre-production 23 activities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "807 F.3d 1283",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "This theory was ripe for disposal on grounds of proximate cause. But instead of engaging that question and relying on well-established common law principles, the Federal Circuit relied on its nascent extraterritoriality-of-damages jurisprudence, even extending the rule to deny claims for a reasonable royalty. See Carnegie Mellon , 807 F.3d at 1306-07 ( citing Power Integrations , 711 F.3d at 1348, and WesternGeco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). For its part, Power Integrations also involved a remote theory of damages, one which the traditional proximate cause requirement was again well-equipped to handle. There, the patentee argued that the defendant could not have made any foreign sales without the infringing domestic sales, on the theory that most customers would insist on using the same chip in all their devices throughout the world.",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Proximate Causation",
		"context": "June 22, 2011), 2011 WL 2827447. This claim could have been rejected in an unpublished opinion; circuit law already held that a customer preference for purchasing infringing and non-infringing products as a package was too remote a connection to obtain lost profits on the non-infringing products. See American Seating [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But instead of resting on grounds of proximate cause, the court crafted its newfound territorial limit on damages, thereby setting the course towards the error presently before the Court. This is not simply a matter of words.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 F.3d 1262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "1. Government action undertaken to retaliate against individuals for speech protected by the First Amendment is constitutionally forbidden \"as a general matter. \" Hartman , 547 U.S. at 256; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A plaintiff seeking dam- ages for such retaliation in a constitutional tort action , however, must show that retaliatory animus was the \"but -for cause\" of the action. Hartman , 547 U.S. at 256, 260.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Dist. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Once the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would ha ve taken the same action \"even without the impetus to re- taliate.\" Hartman , 547 U.S. at 260 (citing Mt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "13 3. Similar considerations counsel in favor of requir- ing the plaintiff to plead and prove a lack of probable cause as an eleme nt of a retaliatory -arrest tort action . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Retaliatory -arrest cases, like retaliatory -prosecution cases, are distinct from \"stand- ard\" retaliation cases in the same two respects empha- sized by the Court in Hartman . a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": ". Probable cause is an objective standard, the existence of which generally provides a \"legal justification\" for an arrest irrespective of the \"actual motivations of the individual officers in-volved.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 553 U.S. 164. As in the case of a criminal prosecution, the exis tence of probable cause for an arrest provides an objective and independent ground for the challenged action .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U. S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Probable cause is an objective standard, the existence of which generally provides a \"legal justification\" for an arrest irrespective of the \"actual motivations of the individual officers in-volved.\" 517 U. S. 806; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in the case of a criminal prosecution, the exis tence of probable cause for an arrest provides an objective and independent ground for the challenged action . \"[E] stablishing the existence of probable cause \" in a retaliatory -arrest case will therefore \" suggest that [the arrest] would have occurred ev en without a retaliatory motive,\" whereas demonstrating \"that there was no probable cause for the [arrest] will tend to reinforce the retaliation evidence and show that retaliation was the 14 but-for basis for \" the arrest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "That requirement is neither new nor impractical. A plaintiff already must plead and prove the absence of probable cause to arrest for any crime —including ones not initially relied upon for the arrest —in order to pre- vail on a Fourth Amendment constitutional tort claim challenging a warrantless arrest. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner offers no reason why that requirement, already commonplace in constitutional tort actions challenging arrests, would be impractically burdensome whe n the underlying cla im of a constitutional violation ari ses under the First Amendment. Indeed, in addition to his First Amend- ment retaliatory -arrest claim, petitioner also alleged in his complaint a Fourth Amendment claim under Section 1983 ( just as many plaintiffs do ) and a false -arrest cl aim under state law , contending that he was \"arrested without probable cause\" and \"had not committed any crime. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Br. 35; see ibid. 4 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If petitioner had brought a retaliatory -prosecution claim asserting that the council member 's allegedly re- taliatory animus ultimately induced a prosecutor to bring criminal charges against h im, Hartman would have require d petitioner to plead and prove the absence of probable cause as a means of bridging the causal gap between the council member 's animus and the prosecu- tor's action . It would be incongruous to permit peti- tioner to proceed on a retaliatory -arrest claim similarly premised on the council member 's alleged retaliatory animus and the injurious actions of another person (here, the arresting officer) without any need to demon- strate the absence of probable cause in order to bridge that sa me causal gap.",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F.3d 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Reichle , 566 U.S. at 668. Speech may , for example, provide evidence of a crime and thus bear directly on the probable cause de- termination. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same may be true where a suspect's statements, though not directly implicating him in a crime, support an inference that he is or has engaged in criminal conduct . See District of Columbia v. Wesby, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "10 (Jan. 22, 2018) (explaining that \"untruthful and evasive\" answers to police questioning \"suggest[] a guilty mind\" and may support probable cause) (citation omitted). Even if probable cause otherwise exists, e xpressive activity may be relevant to an officer 's decision whether 5 See, e.g., Board of Cnty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Officers may properly conclude, for example, that an individual who physically touches a public official after making critical comments about the official's positions is more likely to pose a threat than a person who ma de supportive or neutral comments. See Reichle , 566 U.S. at 661 ; see also id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Br. 12 -15 (describing the importance of objective standards for police conduct). As this Court has recognized, \" potentially serious problem[s] \" arise from subjective -intent standards in constitutional -tort litigation because \"an official 's state of mind is ' easy to allege and hard to disprove, ' \" Crawford [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An officer 's hon- est admission that expressive activity played a role in his arrest decision c ould easily —and unfairly —be used against him. Conversely, an officer may be improperly discouraged from arresting a suspect who has engaged Amendment,\" Reichle , 566 U.S. at 665 n.5, much less that it could give rise to damages liability in a tort action for retaliatory arrest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "Conversely, an officer may be improperly discouraged from arresting a suspect who has engaged Amendment,\" Reichle , 566 U.S. at 665 n.5, much less that it could give rise to damages liability in a tort action for retaliatory arrest. Unlike expressive activity, immutable characteristics such as race will \"seldom provide a relevant basis for disparate treatment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And an equal -protection claim based on such dis- parate treatment already includes a stringent objective screen, requiring detailed proof that the gov ernment in fact treated simi- larly situated people differently. See 517 U.S. 456.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Retaliatory arrest, like retaliatory prosecution, requires a plaintiff to prove the absence of probable cause",
		"context": "133 S. Ct. 2411. And an equal -protection claim based on such dis- parate treatment already includes a stringent objective screen, requiring detailed proof that the gov ernment in fact treated simi- larly situated people differently. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 in protected speech, notwithstanding the existence of probable cause, out of fear that an arrest will result in drawn -out litigation and personal liability. Those are not idle concerns: as respondent explains (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Basic And Halliburton II Assigned Defendants The Burden Of Persuasion",
		"context": "See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] on Basic's passing citation to Rule 301 is misguided. See U.S. Br. 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondents' Defense Of The District Court's Alternative Compensation System Fails",
		"context": "6 6 Respondents insinuate (RB11, 18) that if no valid less- restrictive alternative exists, the challenged rules' anticompetitive and procompetitive effects must be \"balanc[ed]\" at a fourth rule- of-reason step. Accord U.S. Br.3. But respondents have waived any balancing argument, by failing to actually make one in their brief and by conceding at the petition stage that \"the rule of rea-son involves a 'three-step[] … framework,'\" Opp.24; see Granite Rock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless , no coherent balancing of the incommensu- rate anticompetitive and procompetitive effects is possible here. See Hovenkamp, Antitrust Balancing, 12 N.Y.U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Using Individual Stalls For Sows Has No Negative Effect On Human Health",
		"context": "\"67 Third, it is even less likely that sow housing ar- rangements could correlate with any risk of disease transmission from their offspring's meat to humans. As this Court has observed, federal law \"establishes an elaborate system of inspecting live animals and carcasses in order to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome, and unfit meat and meat -food prod- ucts.\" Nat'l Meat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . So, even if a housing arrangement for sows somehow created a lifelong risk of illness in their offspring, there is no reason to think that such illness would be at all likely to evade detection and contaminate the human food supply. Finally, some advocacy groups have argued that the alleged overuse of antibiotics in pig herds can promote the development and spread of antibiotic - resistant disease in humans.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There Is No Reason for This Court to Review the D.C. Circuit's Decision",
		"context": "§ 1395 l(t)(14)(A). Because the Secretary's payment rate adjustment is entirely consistent with the statute's grant of discretionary authority, this Court need not engage in a searching examination of the principles established in Chevron as requested by Petitioners. See Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, this case raises no significant question of federal law that compels review. Given the OPPS budget neutrality requirement, the current payment policy does not affect federal spending on the Medicare program; it simply partially redistributes funds among Medicare providers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"",
		"context": "§§ 3102(2)-(3). In short, \"interests\" alone are not enough; instead, ANILCA requires that title to any such \"interests\" must be vested in the United States.6 6. N PS (at 32-33) cites Amoco , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition t hat a f ederal \" interest\" i s s ufficient t o c onstitute \"public l ands\" r egardless o f t itle. B ut Amoco merely held that the Outer Continental Shelf was not covered by a provision of ANILCA t hat a pplied t o f ederal l ands \" in A laska.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"",
		"context": "Br. 34-41—merely hold t hat t he g overnment i s e ntitled t o a s ufficient v olume of w ater t o a ccomplish t he o bjectives o f r eserved f ederal lands. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court has never held that a reserved water right confers plenary regulatory power over the body of water at issue. To the contrary, the Court has emphasized that \"[t]he i mplied-reservation-of-water-rights d octrine … reserves o nly t hat a mount o f w ater n ecessary t o f ulfill the p urpose o f t he r eservation, n o m ore.\" Cappaert , 426 U.S. at 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"",
		"context": "17a ( \"Water c annot b e o wned.\"). T he t hree c ases N PS cites in support of its position are wholly inapposite. In Federal Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that \"the water itself, the corpus of the stream, never becomes or, in the nature of things, can become, the subject of fixed appropriation or exclusive dominion, in the sense that property in the water itself can be acquired or become the s ubject o f t ransmission f rom o ne t o a nother,\" id. at 247 n.10 (emphasis added). And the other two cases cited b y N PS u se t he w ord \" title\" i n p assing b ut d o n ot contain any analysis of whether a reserved water right equates t o a \" title\" i nterest i n s uch w ater.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"",
		"context": "See 30 P.2d 30; Racliff's 4 N.Y. 195. Cases that have actually addressed the question hold that \"the navigational servitude and reserved water rights are not the type of property i nterests t o w hich t itle c an b e h eld.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Kohl Indus. Park 710 F.2d 895. 20",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 P.2d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Reserved Water Rights Doctrine Cannot Convert the Nation River into \"Public Land\"",
		"context": "Cases that have actually addressed the question hold that \"the navigational servitude and reserved water rights are not the type of property i nterests t o w hich t itle c an b e h eld.\" 905 P.2d 954; see also Kohl Indus. Park [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20",
		"citation_value_orig": "710 F.2d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "Constitutional challenges. \"[W]hen constitu- tional questions are in issue, th e availability of judicial re- view is presumed,\" because su ch issues \"obviously are un- suited to resolution in ad ministrative hearing proce- dures.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Sims , 530 U.S. at 115 (Breyer, J. , dissenting) (recognizing \"established exception\" to \"ordinary 'exhaustion'\" rules for \"constitutional claims\"); IJ Br. 5-8; Professors' Br. 23- 24; PLF Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "The government (at 41) asse rts that parties can only raise constitutional challenges for the first time in court if they would be \"unfixable\" in the agency. But Mathews v. Eldridge rejected the fixable/unfixable distinction as \"not … significant,\" allowing the claimant to raise his con-stitutional challenge for the first time in court even though the SSA could have adjusted the challenged pro- cedures had the claimant raised his challenge there first. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Bowen , 476 U.S. at 10 483-86 (claimants could challeng e unstated SSA policy for the first time in court); Free Enter. 561 U.S. 477 ( 2010) (addressing Ap- pointments Clause challenge no t raised before agency). The government (at 42-43) shoehorns these cases into an \"interests of justice\" exceptio n to issue exhaustion, but if the exception is broad enough to cover those cases, it should apply here, too.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "But Mathews v. Eldridge rejected the fixable/unfixable distinction as \"not … significant,\" allowing the claimant to raise his con-stitutional challenge for the first time in court even though the SSA could have adjusted the challenged pro- cedures had the claimant raised his challenge there first. 424 U.S. 319; accord Bowen , 476 U.S. at 10 483-86 (claimants could challeng e unstated SSA policy for the first time in court); Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2010) (addressing Ap- pointments Clause challenge no t raised before agency). The government (at 42-43) shoehorns these cases into an \"interests of justice\" exceptio n to issue exhaustion, but if the exception is broad enough to cover those cases, it should apply here, too. The government's purported counterexamples (at 41) do not hold otherwise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "The government's purported counterexamples (at 41) do not hold otherwise. None of the cited cases rest on a fixable/unfixable distinction within constitutional chal- lenges; some do not even involve exhaustion. See Renego- tiation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]236 U.S. 699273 U.S. 103 is also far afield. That case rests on a Fifth Amendment-specific rule: witnesses who wish to rely on the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimi nation must invoke the privilege during adversarial proceedings. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "The government's purported counterexamples (at 41) do not hold otherwise. None of the cited cases rest on a fixable/unfixable distinction within constitutional chal- lenges; some do not even involve exhaustion. See Renego- tiation 415 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]273 U.S. 103 is also far afield. That case rests on a Fifth Amendment-specific rule: witnesses who wish to rely on the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimi nation must invoke the privilege during adversarial proceedings. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "236 U.S. 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "The government's purported counterexamples (at 41) do not hold otherwise. None of the cited cases rest on a fixable/unfixable distinction within constitutional chal- lenges; some do not even involve exhaustion. See Renego- tiation 415 U.S. 1236 U.S. 699[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is also far afield. That case rests on a Fifth Amendment-specific rule: witnesses who wish to rely on the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimi nation must invoke the privilege during adversarial proceedings. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "273 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "That case rests on a Fifth Amendment-specific rule: witnesses who wish to rely on the Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimi nation must invoke the privilege during adversarial proceedings. Id. at 113; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Futility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "11 This argument is baseless. Futility exists when the agency \"lack[s] authority to grant the type of relief re- quested\" or \"lacks institutio nal competence to resolve the particular type of issue.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Carr Br. 39; Davis Br. 38; Profes- sors' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under Remedy-Exhaustion Principles, Claimants' Appointments Clause Challenges Are Reviewable",
		"context": "23-24. Even in cour ts, forfeiture involves \"the failure to make timely assert ion of the right before a tri- bunal having jurisdiction to determine it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is irrelevant that Appointments Clause viol ations do not deprive ALJs of jurisdiction to render decisions, U.S. Br. 40; if ALJs lacked jurisdiction to resolve Appointments Clause chal- lenges, objecting would have been futile.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated",
		"context": "that neither advances nor inhibits religion,\" and (3) \"not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.'\" 403 U.S. at 612-613 (quoting Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But it has also said that the Lemon criteria are \"no more than helpful signposts,\" and do not represent a comprehensive test. 413 U.S. 734.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated",
		"context": "of 392 U.S. 236). But it has also said that the Lemon criteria are \"no more than helpful signposts,\" and do not represent a comprehensive test. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has, at times, refused to apply Lemon , preferring instead to ask whether a 17 government action impermissibly \"compelled\" conformity with an \"explicit religious exercise,\" Lee, 505 U.S. at 596, 598, whether it has impermissibly \"endorse[d]\" religion, Santa Fe Indep. Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 734",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated",
		"context": "The Court has, at times, refused to apply Lemon , preferring instead to ask whether a 17 government action impermissibly \"compelled\" conformity with an \"explicit religious exercise,\" Lee, 505 U.S. at 596, 598, whether it has impermissibly \"endorse[d]\" religion, Santa Fe Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or whether the challenged religious practice or message was sufficiently grounded in historical practice. 463 U.S. 783. At other times, it has emphasized \"endorsement,\" relying on Justice O'Connor's view that religious expression by the state is forbidden when its purpose or effect is to endorse religion or nonreligion, or one religion over another.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated",
		"context": "Sch. 530 U.S. 290, or whether the challenged religious practice or message was sufficiently grounded in historical practice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At other times, it has emphasized \"endorsement,\" relying on Justice O'Connor's view that religious expression by the state is forbidden when its purpose or effect is to endorse religion or nonreligion, or one religion over another. Lynch , 465 U.S. at 687-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court uses multiple tests to determine whether the Establishment Clause has been violated",
		"context": "Government must not make a person's religious beliefs \"relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community\" by conveying a message \"that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.\" Id. at 593-94 (first quoting Lynch , 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring), then quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Creating New Rights",
		"context": "Consider the EEOC's claim that Title VII, \"discrimination\" against gay or lesbian persons is necessarily associational. Most courts so holding have done so in cases alleging claims under both Title VII and §1981. See Respondents' Br., Altitude 139 S. Ct. 1599[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See of Respondent's Br. at 32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.3d 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Creating New Rights",
		"context": "It asks courts to impute a relationship whenever a gay or lesbian person faces discrimination (or differentiation). (It also skips over the tricky question of whether the associational right is in Title VII or the Constitution.) Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2584; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) As applied to Zarda, the EEOC's theory also claims that Title VII guarantees a right to talk about oneself in the workplace. Zarda was openly gay at work. Plt'fs Second Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "598 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ................................ ................................ 3 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ................................ ................................ 3 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 15 503 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ................................ ................................ 3 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "................................ ............................ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Page Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 ................................ ..................... 11 Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234 ................................ ................................ 5 572 U.S. 844 ........................ 11 543 U.S. 371 ............................... 18 566 U.S. 30 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 College Savings 527 U.S. 666 ................................ .............. 2, 4, 6, 7, 11 Employees of the Department of Public Health & 411 U.S. 279 ................................ ................................ 6 Environmental 549 U.S. 561 ................................ .............................. 14 566 U.S. 284 ................................ . 4, 12 510 U.S. 471 .............................. 10, 16 II Cases —Continued: Page Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 598 U.S. 339 ............. 1, 3, 4, 8 -10 555 U.S. 246 ................................ .............................. 21 974 F.3d 564 ................................ ............... 21 528 U.S. 62 ................................ ............................. 8, 9 Nevada Department of Human 538 U.S. 721 ................................ ................................ 8 377 U.S. 184 ....................... 7, 13 Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89 (1 984) ................................ ............................... 13 491 U.S. 1 .................... 7 440 U.S. 332 ................................ .. 22 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 ........................ 21 519 U.S. 337 ............. 16, 17 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ................................ ........................... 8, 18 563 U.S. 277 ............................... 5 312 U.S. 600 ................................ .............................. 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................... 13 Utility Air Regulatory 573 U.S. 302 ................................ .............................. 14 III Statutes: Page Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq. ................................ ................................ 3 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "1681 et seq. , that \"says in so many words that i t is stripping immunity from a sovereign en- tity.\" Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ult imately, therefore, re- spondent appears to acknowledge that FCRA does not actually \"address immunity expressl y.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "598 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "What respondent is really arguing, instead , is that FCRA contains an unwritten waiver of sovereign im- munity. And such implicit waivers can be found, if at all, only where the y are compelled \"by such overwhelm- ing implications from the text as will leave no room for 2 any other reasonable construction .\" College Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] is that every cause of action broad enough to cover a sovereign auto- matically \"carries with it\" an implicit waiver of sover- eign immunity. But if that were true, there would be no need for the freestanding waivers of sovereign immun- ity, found elsewhere in the U.S. Code, that exist only to allow suits under separate ly codified causes of action that already textually cover government entities. This Court has accordingly refused to find that generally worded causes of action like the ones at issue here are sufficient, by themselves, to implicitly waive sovereign immunity —even when it was undisputed that their terms would cover sovereign agencies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Respondent thus cannot show that Congress has \" 'une- quivocally express[ed]' its intent to waive immunity 'in statutory text.' \" Br. 12 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . Instead, he effectively asks the Court to infer that Congress meant to waive sovereign immunity when it amended FCRA in 1996, even though Congress did not expressly say that it was doing so . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "If respondent were correct t hat every federal cause of ac- tion that is broad enough to apply to a federal agency also carries with it an implicit waiver of sovereign im- munity, none of those freestanding express waivers of sovereign immunity would be necessary . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent's view is also inconsistent with multiple decisions of this Co urt. In Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234, for example, the Court ex- plained that merely identifying a \"general authorization for suit in federal court\" that is broad enough to cover a governmental entity is not sufficient to strip that entity of sovereign immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "563 U.S. 277. Respondent's view is also inconsistent with multiple decisions of this Co urt. In Atascadero State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court ex- plained that merely identifying a \"general authorization for suit in federal court\" that is broad enough to cover a governmental entity is not sufficient to strip that entity of sovereign immunity. Id. at 246.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "The Court nevertheless found the broadly worded cause of action insufficient, because nothing in th at cause of action \"specifically abrogate[d]\" sovereign immunity. Ibid. 6 The Court's decision in Employees of the Depart- ment of Public Health & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is even clearer in its rejection of respondent's approach. Id. at 283-285; see Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Applying that rule here, respondent's claim s plainly fail. Respondent therefore contends (Br. 46) that the Court should simply disregard Employees of the De- 7 partment of Public Health & Welfare on the theory that it reflects the \"obsole[te]\" mode of interpretation exem- plified by this Court's since -overruled decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But t he flaw that led this Court to overrule Parden was that the de- cision too readily inferred a waiver of sovereign immun- ity in the absence of any express language to that effect. See, e.g., College Savings Bank , 527 U.S. at 676 -677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "at 677 . The fact that the Court continued that retreat in subsequent decisions casts only further doubt on respondent's attempt to broaden the circumstances in which courts will infer an unwrit- ten waiver of sovereign immunity . For example, respondent claims t hat in Pennsylva- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court \"held that Congress had abrogated state immunity when it amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) to 'explicitly include' states 'withi n the statute's definition of \"persons.\" ' \" Br. 47 (quoting Union Gas , 491 U.S. at 7) (citation and brackets omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "39 -40), no decision of this Court supports his premise that every federal cause of action broad enough to cover a sovereign entity necessarily carries with it an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Respondent points (ibid. ) to the Court's decisions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Nevada Depart- ment of Hum an 538 U.S. 721, and 566 U.S. 30 . But the statutes at issue in those cases \"all expressly authorized suits against sovereigns\" by specifically calling out gover n- mental entities as permissible defendants in the causes of action themselves. Financial Oversight & Manage- ment Board , 598 U.S. at 348 ; see 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "39 -40), no decision of this Court supports his premise that every federal cause of action broad enough to cover a sovereign entity necessarily carries with it an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Respondent points (ibid. ) to the Court's decisions in 528 U.S. 62, Nevada Depart- ment of Hum an [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 566 U.S. 30 . But the statutes at issue in those cases \"all expressly authorized suits against sovereigns\" by specifically calling out gover n- mental entities as permissible defendants in the causes of action themselves. Financial Oversight & Manage- ment Board , 598 U.S. at 348 ; see 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "39 -40), no decision of this Court supports his premise that every federal cause of action broad enough to cover a sovereign entity necessarily carries with it an implicit waiver of sovereign immunity. Respondent points (ibid. ) to the Court's decisions in 528 U.S. 62, Nevada Depart- ment of Hum an 538 U.S. 721, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the statutes at issue in those cases \"all expressly authorized suits against sovereigns\" by specifically calling out gover n- mental entities as permissible defendants in the causes of action themselves. Financial Oversight & Manage- ment Board , 598 U.S. at 348 ; see 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Allowing as- the view that \"because CERCLA includes 'States' within its defini- tion of 'persons,' and because the statute makes 'persons' who are 'owners or operators' liable , Congress expressed in CERCLA an 'unmistakably' clear intent to make the Sta tes liable to suit by private parties\") (citations omitted) . The Court subsequently over- ruled the separate portion of Union Gas holding that Congress has authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity through Commerce Clause legislation . See Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 9 sertion of sovereign immunity would have rendered that language in the causes of action surplusage, \"negat[ing]\" Congress's express authorization. Finan- cial Oversight & Management Board , 598 U.S. at 348 ; see Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Indeed, p ermit- ting a subset o f the covered \"person [s]\" to raise a sovereign -immunity defense no more negates the terms of the cause of action than does permitting a different subset of covered \"person[s]\" to raise a statute -of- limitations defense or any other defense that is not di- rected at the merits of a plaintiff 's claim. Respondent's contrary position would depart from this Court's prece- dent by \"c onflat [ing] two 'analytically distinct ' inquir- ies\": (1) \"whether the source of substantive law upon which the claimant relies provides an avenue for relief \" against a non-immune defendant, and (2) \"whether there has been a waiver of sovereign immunity .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is at the very least plausible that Congress would have anticipated that a sovereign -immunity defense, like a statute -of-limitations or other defense, would be available in the subset of cases covered by Section 1681n and 1681 o where the defense's prerequisites are met. As the government explained in its opening brief ( Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Thus, unlike in cer- tain prior cases, there is no textual bas is—let alone an \"overwhelming\" one, College Savings Bank , 527 U.S. at 678—for inferring that Congress must have intended to waive sovereign immunity . Instead, this case fits the paradigm of decisions in which the Court has recognized that combining a non - specific substantive provision with a statute's expan- sively written \"general definition\" of a term does not necessarily \"constitute a clear statement that Congress meant the statute \" to have improbable effects , such as overriding a de fault rule of interpretation favoring a less expansive approach. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Abitron Austria 600 U.S. 412 the relevance of those decisions on the theory that they read the relevant statutes narrowly and that FCRA's definitional provision cannot be so read . See Br. 27 -28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Thus, unlike in cer- tain prior cases, there is no textual bas is—let alone an \"overwhelming\" one, College Savings Bank , 527 U.S. at 678—for inferring that Congress must have intended to waive sovereign immunity . Instead, this case fits the paradigm of decisions in which the Court has recognized that combining a non - specific substantive provision with a statute's expan- sively written \"general definition\" of a term does not necessarily \"constitute a clear statement that Congress meant the statute \" to have improbable effects , such as overriding a de fault rule of interpretation favoring a less expansive approach. 572 U.S. 844; see Abitron Austria [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the relevance of those decisions on the theory that they read the relevant statutes narrowly and that FCRA's definitional provision cannot be so read . See Br. 27 -28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "44 (quoting Parden , 377 U.S. at 189). In that context, Congress may have chosen to preserve sovereign immunity ex plicitly, out of an understandable abundance of caution. By 1996, however, when Congress amended Sections 1681n and 1681 o, this Court had made clear that it would not find a waiver of immunity absent an \"unequivocal ex- pression of congressional intent ,\" Pennhurst State School & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , obviating any need for an express disclaimer. Moreover, while pointing to TILA and ECOA to ar- gue that Congress could have more clearly preserved sovereign immunity, respondent looks past the numer- ous examples , identified in the government's opening brief, demonstrating how Congress could have more clearly waived sovereign immunity. See Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "As the citations in the text demonstrate, that statement was incorrect. 14 immunity waiver simply situates Sections 1681n and 1681 o in the wide category of ambiguous provision s—to which the Court applies a default rule that preserves sovereign immunity . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B. Respondent Fails Even To Establish That Sections 1681n And 1681 o Unambiguously Create Causes Of Action That Encompass The United States The absence of a textual waiver of sovereign immun- ity is in itself a sufficient basis for reversing the court of appeals' erroneous decision to allow respondent to sue a federal agency under Sections 1681n and 1681 o. But respondent's position also fails for a second, inde- pendent reason —namely, that those causes of action do not even unambiguously encompass the United States .",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "6992e(a) and (b). The directness with which Congress spoke there to three different things —the definition of \"person,\" the waiver of sovereign immunity, and the waiver's inclusion of provisions prescribing \"criminal penalties\" —confirms that Congress would not have understood its mere use of the word \"person\" in Section 1681q to subject the United States to criminal punishment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 4 Similarly, the statutes that respondent identifies (Br. 24 -25) as explicitly authorizing enforcement suits against federal agencies by other federal agencies or the States se rve only to confirm that Con- 16 As a fallback , respondent argues that even if back- ground principles preclude \"prosecuting a federal agency\" under Section 1681q, courts can still \"apply[] FCRA's def inition of 'person' to section 1681q, to ensure that the provision applies to those governmental bodies that can be subject to criminal liability.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "It reflects recog- nition that even if a FCRA liability provision is broad enough by its terms to cover both entities that possess immunity and entities that do not, the cause of action need not be read to take the \"analytically distinct\" step , Meyer , 510 U.S. at 484 (citation omitted) , of waiving the former group's immunity. 2. Attempting , in the alternative, to distinguish Sec- tions 1681n and 1681 o from Section 1681q, respondent relies on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for the proposition that \"[a] statutory term 'may have a plain meaning in the context of a particular sec- tion' even if it does not have 'the same meaning in all other sections and in all other contexts. ' \" Br. 21 -22 (quoting Robinson , 519 U.S. at 343).",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "The path through which the language might encompass federal and state entities is identical ; Congress either intended to eliminate the defense for both, or neither. 18 It is thus highly relevant t hat Congress adopted the FCRA amendments at issue here just months after this Court held that Congress had exceeded its constitu- tional authority by purporting to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity through Commerce Clause legisla- tion. See Seminole Tri be of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Against that backdrop, for Congress to attempt a new Commerce Clause -based abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity in FCRA would have been \"insurrectionary .\" 917 F.3d 799, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "See Seminole Tri be of 517 U.S. 44 . Against that backdrop, for Congress to attempt a new Commerce Clause -based abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity in FCRA would have been \"insurrectionary .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 1440 ; see Gov't Br. 33-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 799",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Against that backdrop, for Congress to attempt a new Commerce Clause -based abrogation of the States' sovereign immunity in FCRA would have been \"insurrectionary .\" 917 F.3d 799, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Gov't Br. 33-34. Congress does not lightly flout this Court's deci- sions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Respondent's position creates inexplicable incongruities",
		"context": "Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency , 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 142-143 (2010); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A] presumption never ought to be indulged, that congress meant to exercise or usurp any unconstitutional author- ity, unless that",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Congress's choice to cabin §2's mandate to equal opportunity means that §2 does not invalidate neu- tral, generally applicable voting laws whenever a protected class contends that those laws will \"reduce the likelihood that they will use the opportunities they possess. \" Luft, 963 F.3d at 672-6 73. State laws that \"do[] not draw any line by race,\" Frank , 768 F.3d at 753 , but give \"every registered voter\" the \"full ability \" to \"participate in the political process ,\" \"do[] not violate §2 ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not condemn a voting practice just because it has a dis- parate effect on minorities.\" Id. \"A showing of dis- proportionate racial impact alone does not establish a per se violation of Section 2.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Id. \"A showing of dis- proportionate racial impact alone does not establish a per se violation of Section 2.\" Ohio Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , only when the disparity between \"minori- ty group members\" and other members of the elec-torate is \" substantial ,\" 478 U.S. 30 . After all , \"[a] law cannot disparately impact minority voters if its impact is in- significant to begin with.\" Ne.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Id. \"A showing of dis- proportionate racial impact alone does not establish a per se violation of Section 2.\" Ohio Democratic 834 F.3d 620 , only when the disparity between \"minori- ty group members\" and other members of the elec-torate is \" substantial ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After all , \"[a] law cannot disparately impact minority voters if its impact is in- significant to begin with.\" Ne.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Ne. Ohio Coal. for the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And insubstantial impacts may suggest that voters face \" disparate inconveniences … whe n vot- ing,\" but §2 does not outlaw voting inconveniences — it forbids the \"denial or abridgement of the right to vote.\" Lee, 843 F.3d at 600-6 01.",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "§10301(a) . And statutory text imposing liability when one thing \"'[r]esults from'\" another has long indicated \"a requirement of ac tual causality.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Similarly, the requirement that the sub- stantial disparate impact arise \" on account of race or color\" underscores that §2 demands proof of causa- tion. §10301(a) (emphasis added) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Virtually every court of appeals has therefore rec- ognized a causation requirement for §2 claims . See Greater Birmingham Ministries, 966 F.3d at 1233 (\"the challenged law must have caused the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of race\"); id. at 1233- 1234 (collecting cases); Ohio Democratic Party , 834 F.3d at 638-639 (requiring proof that chal- lenged l aw \" causally contributes to the alleged dis- criminatory impact\" ) (emphasis added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 2 thus mirrors other statutor y anti-discrimination laws that require proof of causation. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 F.3d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Section 2 thus mirrors other statutor y anti-discrimination laws that require proof of causation. See, e.g. , Com- cast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Like the inquiry at step one, step two's causation inquiry considers the \"totality of circum stances.\" §10301(b) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 2's text requires a vote-denial plaintiff to establish that a challenged law causes a substantial disparity in minority voters' opportunity to vote and to elect their preferred candidates",
		"context": "Critically, that includes confirming that the substantial disparate impact arises from \"the state's actions rather than those of other persons,\" Luft, 963 F.3d at 672 —an express textual limit, since §2 applies only to actions by \"any State or political subdivision,\" §10301(a) . Enforcing that limit is \"im- portant, becau se units of government are responsible for their own discrimination but not for rectifying the effects of other persons' discrimination.\" Frank , 768 F.3d at 753 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); see Ohio Democratic Party , 834 F.3d at 638 (§2 cannot \"punish a state for the effects of private discrimination\") . Section 2's \"robust causality re- quirement … thus protects defendants from being held liable for racial d isparities they did not create.\" Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judge That Authored Rogers Later Repudiated The Explicitly Misleading Formulation That Was Used In This Case",
		"context": "Under this approach, while a pa- rodic dog toy may not be entitled to as much free ex- pression weight as a parodic film, it should receive at least some free expression weight. The Court need not draw an arbitrary binary line between artistic speech and ordinary commercial products. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Second Circuit first extended the Rogers bal- ancing framework beyond the co ntext of titles to apply as well to the content of artistic works in Cliffs Notes , stating: \"we hold that the Rogers balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression, a category that includes parody.\" Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490.",
		"citation_value_orig": "989 F.2d 1512",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judge That Authored Rogers Later Repudiated The Explicitly Misleading Formulation That Was Used In This Case",
		"context": "See 989 F.2d 1512. The Second Circuit first extended the Rogers bal- ancing framework beyond the co ntext of titles to apply as well to the content of artistic works in Cliffs Notes , stating: \"we hold that the Rogers balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic expression, a category that includes parody.\" Cliffs Notes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But importantly, in referring to the \" Rogers bal- ancing approach,\" the court appears to have been re- ferring to the general approach of balancing the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion against the public interest in free ex pression, rather than the more specific no artistic relevance or explicitly misleading language that Rogers proposed specifically for alleg- edly infringing titles using celebrity names. This dis- tinction is the source of some confusion as there are really two quite different things – one very general and 11 one much more specific – that courts sometimes refer to as the Rogers doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Judge That Authored Rogers Later Repudiated The Explicitly Misleading Formulation That Was Used In This Case",
		"context": "at 496 (\"a Cliffs Notes book is not likely to be bought as an impulse purchase\"). A few years later, this more flexible approach was endorsed by the very judge that wrote the Rogers opin- ion, Judge Jon Newman of the Second Circuit. Twin Peaks [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interestingly, the Twin Peaks court very briefly stated the more specific Rogers test, but dropped the word \"explicitly,\" finding artistic rele- vance and then stating: \"the question then is whether 12 the title is misleading in the sense that it induces members of the public to believe the Book was pre- pared or otherwise authorized by TPP.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "996 F.2d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "First, holding the last two sentences of § 3583(k) un- enforceable and leaving the rest of the statutory struc- ture of supervised release untouched would be more consistent with c ongress ional intent. See Booker , 543 U.S. at 258 -59 (\"[W]e must retain those port ions of the 31 Act that are (1) constitutionally valid, (2) capable of 'functioning independently,' and (3) consistent with Congress' basic objectives in enacting the statute.\") (quoting Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Congress in tended that judges, not juries, supervise defendants who have completed a term of imprison- ment. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 697 (noting that super- vised release is a \"form of postconfinement monitoring overseen by the sentencing court\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "Empaneling a jury in connection with a revocation proceeding to make \"any required findings,\" U.S. Br. 53, is a \"system far more complex than what Congress could have intended.\" Booker , 543 U.S. at 2 54; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, engrafting jury trial requirements to the current revocation system would transform the focus of supervised release revocation proceedings from is- sues of transition and rehabilitation overseen by a judge acting with full discretion to address a defend- 32 ant's individual needs to an adversarial setting pro- moted by prosecutors seeking reimprisonment as their primary objective. Prison would no longer be \"a last resort,\" Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 785, it w ould be the only goal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "What Congress may not do is to exceed even the maximum penalty for recidivist crimes of this na- ture by exposing a recidivist to a life sentence through 8 The mandatory penalties imposed by § 3583(k) were largely based upon assumptions about the recidivism risk posed by non - contact sexual offenders that are contradicted by empirical data. Several empirical studies have cast \"serious doubt on the exist- ence of a substantial relationship between the consumption of child pornography and the likelihood of a contact sexual offense against a child.\" U nited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files /pdf/news/congressional - testimony -and-reports/sex -offense -topics/201212- federal -child - pornography -offenses/Full_Report_to_Congress.pdf (noting that penalty ranges for sexual offenses assume a high risk of recidi- vism but finding in a study of released offen ders that the rate of \"sexual recidivism\" measured by arrests or convictions for new sexual offenses was 7.4% and the rate of \"general recidivism\" was consistent with the overall population of offenders). 33 the expediencies of revocation proceedings. See infra I.B.1-2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 1077",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "52 -53. In Southern Union, it was a sensible and workable constitutional fix to ha ve a jury that would already be empaneled for a criminal trial make factual findings that set the maximum criminal fine. S. Union [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, there is no jury ready and waiting to make factual determinations at a revocation hearing. In Cunningham , the Court left it to the California legislature to decide whether to modify the system to retain determinate sentencing or give j udges discretion at sentencing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "Here, there is no jury ready and waiting to make factual determinations at a revocation hearing. In Cunningham , the Court left it to the California legislature to decide whether to modify the system to retain determinate sentencing or give j udges discretion at sentencing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One possible solution the Court suggested would be to modify the law to have juries already empaneled make addition- alfactual determinations that trigger an enhanced sentence. Finally , empaneling a jury at a revocation hearing to make \"required findings beyond a reasonable doubt\" would raise a host of constitutional and procedural questions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE PROPER REMEDY FOR section 3583(K)'S CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES IS TO HOLD THE OFFENDING PORTIONS OF THE STATUTE UNENFORCEABLE",
		"context": "Presumably, the findings relate to whether a defendant has \"com- mit[ed] any criminal offense\" enumerated in the stat- ute \"for which imprisonment for a term longer than 1 year can be imposed.\" But s uch a solution may violate double jeopardy protections if a jury decides that a de- fendant has committed a new criminal offense and a 35 subsequent prosecution is brought for the same of- fense. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts h ave previously rejected double jeopardy challenges in the context of a revocation hear- ing precisely because the punishment imposed is not punishment for the new criminal conduct. Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700 (citing cases).",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 688",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "Proof of the constancy of Appointments Clause challenges is found in recently concluded, pending or anticipated Article II litigation. First, there is the matter of Article II controver- sies recently concluded. Leading that category is PHH [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the PHH I tribunal forcefully declared that the statutory provi-sions insulating an agency director from removal by the Chief Executive was an irremediable violation of the Appointments Clause, PHH I , supra , 839 F.3d at 7- 9, a sharply divided D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc , sub- sequently reversed, and declared that the sanctity of the Appointments Clause was not violated by the Pres-ident's inability to unseat that agency chief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "Circuit, sitting en banc , sub- sequently reversed, and declared that the sanctity of the Appointments Clause was not violated by the Pres-ident's inability to unseat that agency chief. PHH II , supra , 881 F.3d at 137. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the saga of PHH I and PHH II is seemingly concluded, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that similar, if not identical, Appointments Clause chal-lenges shall ensue. Moreover , the executive agency at the heart of PHH I and PHH II gives indications of be- ing an abundant source of Article II litigation, as the following evinces.",
		"citation_value_orig": "871 F.3d 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "That noble maxim animates the Appointments Clause, one of several \"accountability checkpoints,\" which furthermore secures separation of powers and 20 checks and balances. Id., 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1237 (Alito, J., concurring). See also id ., 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1244 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (the Appointments Clause exemplifies the Framers' \"dedication\" and \"devotion to the separa- tion of powers\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In prescribing the manner by which officers of the United States assume their posts, the Appointments Clause assures that those who wield executive author-ity remain \"accountable to th e political force and will of the people.\" Freytag , supra , 501 U.S. at 884.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "In prescribing the manner by which officers of the United States assume their posts, the Appointments Clause assures that those who wield executive author-ity remain \"accountable to th e political force and will of the people.\" Freytag , supra , 501 U.S. at 884. See also Dep't of Transportation , supra , 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1238 (Alito, J., co ncurring) (the Appointments Clause assures that executive appointees remain \"ac- countable to the President, who himself is accountable to the people\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As so succinctly – and accurately – described by Justice Thomas, the Appointments Clause \"maintains clear lines of accountability – encouraging good ap- pointments and giving the public someone to blame for bad ones.\" Lucia , supra , 585 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "As so succinctly – and accurately – described by Justice Thomas, the Appointments Clause \"maintains clear lines of accountability – encouraging good ap- pointments and giving the public someone to blame for bad ones.\" Lucia , supra , 585 U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 2056 (Thomas, J., concurring). Accord Free Enterprise [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, by regulating the manner in which officers of the United States are appointed, the Appointments Clause upholds the immeasurably important maxim that liberty requires accountability. Yet, when reviewing the op erative facts of the case at hand, it is startling to find how that precept was, with all due respect, disregarded in the process by which the members of the Board took office.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE MUST GOVERN THE APPOINTMENT OF THE BOARD MEMBERS FOR REASON THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION PRESENTED HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR RECURRING APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE CONTROVERSIES",
		"context": "It is a threat to accountability, and, consequently, individual liberty. Once more, the \"wolf comes as a wolf.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], quoted by PHH I , supra , 839 F.3d at 8. Indeed, the instant case makes for an apt compar- ison to Morrison . Like its antecedent, the case at bar is, at bottom, about one thing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The VRA Operates As A Prohibition On Voting Rules Abridging Or Denying Voting Rights \"On Account Of Race,\" Not An Affirmative Obligation To Redistrict \"On Account Of Race.\"",
		"context": "Nor does it require States to consider race at all times, for all lines, in all places. \"Section 2 requires an electoral process 'equally open' to all, not a process that favors one group over another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 F.3d 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. This Court should grant certiorari to ensure the IRS's pattern and practice of rule-of-law violations is subject to judicial review",
		"context": "for Med. Educ. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 55–58 8 The IRS has a well-documented history of systematically claiming to be exempt from th e legal constraints imposed by oversight mechanisms such as the Regulatory Flexibility Act, White House review under Exec utive Order 12,866, and the Congressional Review Act. See James Valvo, Evading Oversight: The Origins and Implications of the IRS Claim That Its Rules Do Not Have an Economic Impact , Cause of Action Inst. (Jan. 2018), available at https://coainst.org/38EcPIg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right",
		"context": "Ginsburg, Factor Four Revisited , at 20. These courts discern that an al l-embracing interpretation of transformativeness risks in particular \"extinguish- ing [an] author's rights\" to prepare derivative works. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Asking exclusively whether something is transformative not only replac es the list [of factors] in § 107 but could also override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects\" the copyright owner's derivative works rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right",
		"context": "\"Asking exclusively whether something is transformative not only replac es the list [of factors] in § 107 but could also override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2), which protects\" the copyright owner's derivative works rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also TCA Tel. 839 F.3d 168. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Fourth Fair Use Factor Plays a Critical Role in Protecting the Derivative Work Right",
		"context": "§ 106(2), which protects\" the copyright owner's derivative works rights. 766 F.3d 756; see also TCA Tel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "839 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. An order holding Section 5000A unenforceable would be the only appropriate remedy",
		"context": "That theory appears to be inconsistent with how this Court typi-cally approaches severability. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. NFIB , 567 U.S. at 696- 697 (joint dissent) (\"The response to this argument is that our cases do not support it.\"). 22 they recycle arguments from various briefs and opin- ions filed in NFIB and King .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "That statement must simply provide \"enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.\" Bell Atl. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, \"[s]pecific facts are not ne cessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\" 551 U.S. 89.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "550 U.S. 544. Yet, \"[s]pecific facts are not ne cessary; the statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As th is Court has explained: This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "Other provisions of the Federal Rules of Civi l Procedure are inextricably linked to Rule 8(a) 's simplified notice pleading standard. Rule 8(e)(1) states that \"[n]o technical forms of pleading or motions are required,\" and Rule 8(f) provides that [a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substant ial justice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in large part to get away from some of the old procedural booby traps which 4 common- law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fai r judicial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in large part to get away from some of the old procedural booby traps which 4 common- law pleaders could set to prevent unsophisticated litigants from ever having their day in court. If rules of procedure work as they should in an honest and fai r judicial system, they not only permit, but should as nearly as possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, Rule 8 \"demands more than an unadorned, the -defendant -unlawfully -harmed- me accusation.\" 556 U.S. 662.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "383 U.S. 363. However, Rule 8 \"demands more than an unadorned, the -defendant -unlawfully -harmed- me accusation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It requires enough factual content for a court to draw reasonable inferences. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "With respect to standing, the plaintiff 's complaint must provide \"general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant 's conduct . . .. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 422 U.S. 490. However, the plaintiff need not \"allege all of the facts supportive of the chain of causation upon which his allegation of injury rests\" because that \"would return [the courts] to the unpredictable and fact -laden system of code pleading.\" American Soc' y of Travel Agents, 566 F.2d 145 to satisfy itself that the plaintiff is entitled to judicial action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": "With respect to standing, the plaintiff 's complaint must provide \"general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant 's conduct . . .. \" 504 U.S. 555; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, the plaintiff need not \"allege all of the facts supportive of the chain of causation upon which his allegation of injury rests\" because that \"would return [the courts] to the unpredictable and fact -laden system of code pleading.\" American Soc' y of Travel Agents, 566 F.2d 145 to satisfy itself that the plaintiff is entitled to judicial action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and Article III Govern Standing Allegations",
		"context": ".. \" 504 U.S. 555; 422 U.S. 490. However, the plaintiff need not \"allege all of the facts supportive of the chain of causation upon which his allegation of injury rests\" because that \"would return [the courts] to the unpredictable and fact -laden system of code pleading.\" American Soc' y of Travel Agents, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to satisfy itself that the plaintiff is entitled to judicial action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.2d 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "Unlike here , see infra 9-13, there is strong historical support for the way in which these doctrines have been implemented . See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 5 U.S. 137 . Even still, the Court has been cautio us in defining judicial review, limiting it to disputes that would have been heard \"in the period imm ediately before and afte r the frami ng of the Constitution. \" Vt. Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 ; see 307 U.S. 433 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "Unlike here , see infra 9-13, there is strong historical support for the way in which these doctrines have been implemented . See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal 139 S. Ct. 1485 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Even still, the Court has been cautio us in defining judicial review, limiting it to disputes that would have been heard \"in the period imm ediately before and afte r the frami ng of the Constitution. \" Vt. Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 ; see 307 U.S. 433 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "of Cal 139 S. Ct. 1485 ; 5 U.S. 137 . Even still, the Court has been cautio us in defining judicial review, limiting it to disputes that would have been heard \"in the period imm ediately before and afte r the frami ng of the Constitution. \" Vt. Agency of Natural [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 307 U.S. 433 . The Committees have not done the same here. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "of Cal 139 S. Ct. 1485 ; 5 U.S. 137 . Even still, the Court has been cautio us in defining judicial review, limiting it to disputes that would have been heard \"in the period imm ediately before and afte r the frami ng of the Constitution. \" Vt. Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Committees have not done the same here. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "This analogy also ignores special concerns that arise when it co mes to the exercise of imp lied powe rs by Congress. The default rule under the Constitution is tha t sovereign immunity applies unless it has been expressly abrogated or waived. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Constitution vests all \"judicial power of the Uni ted State s\" in 6 Article III courts. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "Accordingly, Con gress's exercise of implie d power imperils the Constitution's structure in a manner other implied doctrines do not. See NFIB , 567 U.S. at 559 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .1 The Court' s approac h to sovereign immunity and judicial review provides no suppo rt for broadly interpreting Congress' s implied power to legislatively subpoena the President's perso nal records. The Committees retreat to the argument (at 43-46) that 273 U.S. 135 , requires broad deference to Congress. That i s wrong .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "See NFIB , 567 U.S. at 559 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) ; 570 U.S. 387 .1 The Court' s approac h to sovereign immunity and judicial review provides no suppo rt for broadly interpreting Congress' s implied power to legislatively subpoena the President's perso nal records. The Committees retreat to the argument (at 43-46) that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , requires broad deference to Congress. That i s wrong . McGrain and its progeny h old that Congress has the implied power to issue legislative subpoenas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "273 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "Id. at 43-44. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1880 ), is the only relevant case that comes cl ose 1 The ample historical support, as well as the differences in the respect ive vesting clauses, also distinguishes Congress' s implied subpoena authority from the immunity that has been afforded to the Chief Executive. See 457 U.S. 731; 520 U.S. 681 44. The C ourt has not defer red to Congress when Congress takes an unprecedented step to invade the province of the other branch es.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "at 43-44. 103 U.S. 168 (1880 ), is the only relevant case that comes cl ose 1 The ample historical support, as well as the differences in the respect ive vesting clauses, also distinguishes Congress' s implied subpoena authority from the immunity that has been afforded to the Chief Executive. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 520 U.S. 681 44. The C ourt has not defer red to Congress when Congress takes an unprecedented step to invade the province of the other branch es. Appendix to the Petition (\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "at 43-44. 103 U.S. 168 (1880 ), is the only relevant case that comes cl ose 1 The ample historical support, as well as the differences in the respect ive vesting clauses, also distinguishes Congress' s implied subpoena authority from the immunity that has been afforded to the Chief Executive. See 457 U.S. 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 44. The C ourt has not defer red to Congress when Congress takes an unprecedented step to invade the province of the other branch es. Appendix to the Petition (\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "Br. 3 -8. Had they done so, the dispute might have been resolved through the well -worn p ath of accommodation and negotiation , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as it was during the Whitewater investigation, Pet. Br. 30 ; S. Rep. 104 -204 (Jan. 22, 1996) (d escribing bipartisan cooperation and compromise) ; S. Hrg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 F.2d 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Committees' request for broad deference to Congress conflicts with governing precedent",
		"context": "In the end, t he Committees acknowledge (at 45-46) that the \"investigato ry power \" of Congress is \"'not unlimited. '\" But they just repeat the test for assessing whether there is a legitimate legis lative 2 Had the Committees directly subpoena ed Petitioners, they also could have raised First Amendment defenses, including political retribution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But since the Committees subpoenaed third -party custodians, Petitioners may on ly test the subpoenas' legitimate legislative purposes. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Rule 32.1(g) does not treat state court decisions more favorably than decisions of this Court",
		"context": "at 1178, ¶ 14. And, in fact, the Arizona courts have several times held that a decision of this Court constituted a significant change in the law. See Valencia, 386 P.3d at 395, ¶ 15 (Miller v. Alabama as modified by Montgomery v. Louisiana) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "64 P.3d 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defies More Recent Holdings of This Court and of the Seventh Circuit, and Fails to Implement Express Statutory Amendments Enacted by Congress",
		"context": "Unfortunately, it now appears that the Fourth Circuit's decision, despite its infirmi- ties, is being exported for use nationwide. The Fourth Circuit's decision below (hereinafter \"Baltimore \"), while published only this year, has its foundations in a holding from the 1970s that has foundered in changing legal seas since then, and was implicitly swamped by a holding of this Court twenty years ago. That Fourth Circuit opinion, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) as that statute re ad during the Ford Admin- istration, held that remand orders are essentially un- reviewable unless they are based on very narrow statutory grounds. Although stare decisis is no doubt an important legal principle, in this case the Fourth 8 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9315350 Envtl. L. Rep. 201362020 WL 2769681, 962 F.3d 9372020 U.S. App. LEXIS 190972020 WL 3287024, Cty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 F.2d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defies More Recent Holdings of This Court and of the Seventh Circuit, and Fails to Implement Express Statutory Amendments Enacted by Congress",
		"context": "of Cty. 965 F.3d 7922020 U.S. App. LEXIS 2105350 Envtl. L. Rep. 201612020 WL 3777996 8 Circuit's adherence to its ow n precedents has placed it at odds with both the text of the statute as it reads today, and with the intervening decisions of both the Seventh Circuit and this Court interpreting identical statutory language. The Fourth Circuit's decision below acknowledges that this Court subsequently interpreted the same statutory language differently in Yamaha Motor Corp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Cir- cuit even acknowledged that the Yamaha decision was \"entirely textual.\" Baltimore , 952 F.3d at 460.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defies More Recent Holdings of This Court and of the Seventh Circuit, and Fails to Implement Express Statutory Amendments Enacted by Congress",
		"context": "at 461. Although it is the practice of federal circuit court pan-els in the Fourth Circuit not to overrule the precedents of a prior panel, it is the role of this Court to step in to ensure circuit courts are implementing statutes as written rather than relying on decades-old precedents that deviate from the current text. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit's reliance on Noel also com- pelled it to reject the 7th Circuit's expressly textual conclusion relating to the same statute and the same language about the reviewability of district court or- ders on remand in Lu 792 F.3d 9. Even assuming, arguendo , that the Fourth Circuit properly decided the Noel case in 1976, its cont inued reliance on Noel is no longer appropriate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F.3d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fourth Circuit's Decision Defies More Recent Holdings of This Court and of the Seventh Circuit, and Fails to Implement Express Statutory Amendments Enacted by Congress",
		"context": "112-51, 125 Stat. 545, made plain the Congressional intent to \"clarify and improve certain provisions relating to the removal of litigation against Federal officers or agen- cies to Federal courts.\" Al though the circuit courts once perceived a \"strong congressional policy against review of remand orders,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Congress has now expressly modified the relevant stat- utory text to broaden reviewability in the Removal Clarification Act. As this Court recognized in Bostock , the direction \"Congress has moved\" is a relevant con- sideration in interpreting the text of a statute. Bostock v. Clayton Cty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 F.3d 1180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The owner's reason for exclusion controls.",
		"context": "413, 421- 55 (2017). 10 as a good reason is determined first by the purposes for which the owner holds open to licen sees. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Also relevant are the values and moral commitments of the property owner. Racists did not confer the right of exclusive possession upon property owners in the aftermath of Reconstruction, as some property scholars mistakenly assert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "653 A.2d 891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The owner's reason for exclusion controls.",
		"context": "Essential to property ownership is the right to decide for what purposes property will be used. Cf. Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . How the owner exercises that right determines in large part whether any particular exercise of the right to exclude is done for a \"good reason.\" See 515 U.S. 557 , citing Lane v. Cotton , 12 Mod.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The owner's reason for exclusion controls.",
		"context": "Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the 561 U.S. 661 . How the owner exercises that right determines in large part whether any particular exercise of the right to exclude is done for a \"good reason.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , citing Lane v. Cotton , 12 Mod. 472, 484– 485, 88 Eng. Rep. 1458, 1464– 1465 (K.B.1701) (Holt, C.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lamps Plus's new theory that class arbitration is a matter of \"arbitrability\" does not support its position",
		"context": "Legal Stud. 1 (2011). 53 Witter Reynolds, Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Even if the Court were to overlook La mps Plus's waiver of this argument, it is difficult to see how invoking Howsam supports its position. First, Lamps Plus received a judi- cial determination on the issu e. Therefore, even if its position that class arbitration is a matter of arbitrabil- ity were correct, it has already had the benefit of the principle it invokes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lamps Plus's new theory that class arbitration is a matter of \"arbitrability\" does not support its position",
		"context": "Second, if the Court were to enter- tain Lamps Plus's new argument that whether an agreement permits class arbitration is a matter of ar-bitrability requiring a clear and unmistakable contrac- tual basis, it would logically also have to consider that the delegation clause in the parties' agreement pro- vides that issues of arbitrability are for the arbitrator . Lamps Plus cannot have its ca ke and eat it, too: If the Court entertains an issue Lamps Plus waived, it must also take up matters \"predi cate to an intelligent reso- lution\" of that issue. Caterpillar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Doing so would require the conclu-sion that Lamps Plus agreed to let the arbitrator decide whether class arbitration is permitted, foreclosing its plea for an order compelling arbitration only of individ- ual claims. In any event, Lamps Plus is wrong to assert that the considerations that call for a \"clear and unmistak-able\" standard for the questi on of who decides matters of arbitrability are applicable to decisions about whether an agreement is properly interpreted to allow class arbitration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lamps Plus's new theory that class arbitration is a matter of \"arbitrability\" does not support its position",
		"context": "The decisi on whether to compel arbi- tration is made against a statutory backdrop that per-mits a court to compel arbitr ation only on finding that the parties entered into a va lid agreement to arbitrate a particular subject. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 4; Mitsubishi , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]–26; First Options , 514 U.S. at 945; Rent- A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71. In light of that statutory 54 structure, an agreement to allow arbitrators to decide questions of arbitrability ru ns so counter to the pre- sumed expectations of all parties to an agreement that the Court adopted the unusual clear-and-unmistakable standard to protect the reas onable expectations of the parties. See First Options , 514 U.S. at 945.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Hardison's Departure from the Text Causes Grave Constitutional Problems",
		"context": "This Court must therefore overrule Hardison to rectify this constitutional problem. The First Amendment, applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,10 forbids the government from \"prohibiting the free exercise\" of \u0003 9 Significant , Merriam Webster (2023), https://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/significant. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \u0003 11 \u0003religion. U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Hardison's Departure from the Text Causes Grave Constitutional Problems",
		"context": "amend. I. And while \"the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability,\" Emp't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], discretionary and subjective governmental decisions regarding whether to grant a religious accommodation request are generally afforded no such deference. That is because such an inquiry constitutes what this Court described as a \"mechanism for individualized exemptions\" in Fulton v. City of Philadelphia —one kind of non-generally applicable policy that is subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment. 141 S. Ct. 1868; Smith , 494 U.S. at 884 (\"where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Microsoft, 137 S. Ct. at 1712; see also Dig. Equip. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By restricting parties to a single appeal as of right, it \"prevents the de bili- tating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of a single controversy.\" 417 U.S. 156.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "511 U.S. 863. By restricting parties to a single appeal as of right, it \"prevents the de bili- tating effect on judicial administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of a single controversy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It preserves \"the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a 'special role' in managing ongoing litigation.\" Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber 449 U.S. 368).",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "417 U.S. 156. It preserves \"the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a 'special role' in managing ongoing litigation.\" Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And it protects parties from \"the harassment and cost\" that would inevita- bly arise if unsuccessful litigants could subject t heir opponents to \"a succession of separate appeals.\" 309 U.S. 323.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber 449 U.S. 368). And it protects parties from \"the harassment and cost\" that would inevita- bly arise if unsuccessful litigants could subject t heir opponents to \"a succession of separate appeals.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In light of these important objectives, the Court \" 'has long given' § 1291 a 'practical rather than a technical construction.' \" Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting 337 U.S. 541).",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "309 U.S. 323. In light of these important objectives, the Court \" 'has long given' § 1291 a 'practical rather than a technical construction.' \" Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As a general matter, a deci- sion is \"final\" within the meaning of section 1291 only if it \"ends the litigation on the merits and l eaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg- 17 ment.\" Riley , 553 U.S. at 419 (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233).",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "As a general matter, a deci- sion is \"final\" within the meaning of section 1291 only if it \"ends the litigation on the merits and l eaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg- 17 ment.\" Riley , 553 U.S. at 419 (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233). The Court has explained that such a decision bears several important hallmarks of final i- ty: It is a decision \"by which a district court di sasso- ciates itself from a case,\" Swint, 514 U.S. at 42; it furnishes a party's last effective opportunity for appeal, Coopers & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and it leaves undecided only those anci l- lary questions—regarding attorney's fees and other similar matters—whose resolution would not assist appellate review of the merits, Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs , 134 S. Ct. 773. The Court has also recognized \"a 'small class' of collateral rulings that, although they do not end t he litigation, are appropriately deemed 'final.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Riley , 553 U.S. at 419 (quoting Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233). The Court has explained that such a decision bears several important hallmarks of final i- ty: It is a decision \"by which a district court di sasso- ciates itself from a case,\" Swint, 514 U.S. at 42; it furnishes a party's last effective opportunity for appeal, Coopers & 437 U.S. 463; and it leaves undecided only those anci l- lary questions—regarding attorney's fees and other similar matters—whose resolution would not assist appellate review of the merits, Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has also recognized \"a 'small class' of collateral rulings that, although they do not end t he litigation, are appropriately deemed 'final.' \" Mo- hawk , 558 U.S. at 106 (quoting Cohen , 337 U.S. at 545-546).",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "Id. (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 42). There is only a \"modest\" set of decisions, however, that sat isfy these demanding criteria, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and are so important as to \"over- come the usual benefits of deferring appeal until litigation concludes,\" Mohawk , 558 U.S. at 107. Apart from these collateral orders, section 1291 does not permit appeal from decisions—\"even from fully consummated decisions\"—that do not conclude the litigation on the merits. Cohen , 337 U.S. at 546.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "at 431-432. Numerous cases have reaffirmed this basic principle. See, e.g., Gulfstream Aerospace [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.7 (2d ed. 2017 update). Rule 54(b) reflects this settled understanding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "This language gives the district court discretion to certify an appeal as to some claims in a multiple-claim cas e. Mackey , 351 U.S. at 435. But it does not afford litigants an appeal as of right prior to entry of final judgment on all claims. See Stolt-Nielsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Mackey , for instance, the Court held that a plaintiff needed to obtain Rule 54(b) certification to appeal a judgment \"striking out Counts I and II\" of her complaint \"without disturbi ng Counts III and IV.\" 351 U.S. at 430, 438.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Litigants Are Generally Entitled To A Single Appeal From Final Judgment In Cases Involving Multiple Claims",
		"context": "It explicitly stated that it \"express[ed] no opinio n on whether an order deciding one of multiple cases combined in an all-purpose consolidation qualifies under § 1291 as a final decision appealable as of right\"—and indeed quoted the Seventh Circuit's holding that such cases \"become a single judicial u nit\" once consolidated. Id. at 904 n.4 (emphasis added) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Moreover, the Court stated that it \"need not decide whether or how Rule 54(b) applies to cases consolidated for all purposes involving closely related issues,\" which, it noted, often \"co uld have been brought under the umbrella of one com- plaint.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "976 F.2d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Under maritime law, there was no superseding cause",
		"context": "This is a thinly veiled argument that the replacement of the original asbestos gasket, packing or insulation constituted a superseding cause that excused petitioners' failure to warn at the time they sold their machines, spare parts and maintenance manuals to the Navy. See e.g. , Exxon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Sofec , Justice Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the doctrine of superseding cause applied to products liability claims under maritime law: \"The doctrine of superseding cause is applied where the defendant's negligence in fact substantially contributed to the plaintiff's injury but the injury was actually brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable .\" Sofec, 517 U.S. at 837 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Under maritime law, there was no superseding cause",
		"context": "Petitioners cannot claim that the use of replacement asbestos parts in their machines was \"not foreseeable\" when their machines required asbestos parts to operate and their maintenance manuals specified asbestos parts and directed their repeated replacement. The predictable replacement of asbestos-containing component parts here does not constitute an unforeseeable superseding cause that breaks the chain of causation any more than refilling the gas tank of the exploding Ford Pinto constitutes a superseding cause of the Pinto's negligent design. See 36 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Gas was required for the Pinto to run, just like asbestos components were required for petitioners' machines to operate. But the Pinto had been refilled many times before the gas tank exploded, just as the asbestos components had been replaced many times before Mr. DeVries and Mr. McAfee were exposed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 Cal. Rptr. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Under maritime law, there was no superseding cause",
		"context": "Pet.Br. 14. Indeed, in both Sofec and more recently in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court had no difficulty applying the doctrine of superseding cause based on foreseeability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal and State Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld the FFDA Against Elections Clause Challenges.",
		"context": "State legislators' efforts to thwart the FFDA did not cease there. In 2012, the Legislature made a \"mockery\" 11 of the required t ransparent and fair redistricting pro- cess by passing a blatantly gerrymandered map. League of Women Voters of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a \"shadow\" redistricting process marked by subterfuge, lawmakers colluded in back -room meetings with party operatives to draw extreme gerrymanders favor ing Re- publicans. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 So. 3d 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal and State Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld the FFDA Against Elections Clause Challenges.",
		"context": "com/yc59cjk3 . 20 2014 WL 3797315, aff'd sub nom. League of Women Voters of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 Apportionment VI, 172 So. 3d at 363.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 So. 3d 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Federal and State Courts Have Repeatedly Upheld the FFDA Against Elections Clause Challenges.",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. at 2507. Despite getting a second bite at the apple, Florida's Legislature again failed to propose a congressional map that complied with the FFDA. League of Women Voters of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The trial court subsequently adopted a remedial map. Acknowledging its \"solemn obligation to ensure compliance with the Florida Constitution in this unique context,\" the Flor- ida Supreme Court upheld the trial court's remedial plan.",
		"citation_value_orig": "179 So. 3d 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "This Court's earliest cases holding that the FLSA must be \"broad ly\" or \"liberally\" interpreted , and the corollary, that exemptions to the Act be narrowly construed, were prefigured by Justice Frankfurter . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 In Addison , citrus fruit cannery employees obtained a judgment on an FLSA claim for unpaid wages. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "While the judicial function in construing legislation is not a mechanical process from which judgment is excluded, it is nevertheless very different from the legislative function. Construction is not legislation and must avoid \"that retrospective expansion of meaning which properly deserves the stigma of judicial legislation.\" Kirschbaum Co [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To blur the distinctive functions of the legislative and judicial processes is not conducive to responsible legislation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "at 618 (emphasis added). There followed a series of decisions by the Court tha t made the point more bluntly. See A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493 (1945) (because the FLSA is a humanitarian and remedial law, any exemption 21 narrowly construed; any attempt to \"extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]508 U.S. 22132 S. Ct. 2156134 S. Ct. 870. In both instances the Court provided the same rationale as to why the rule was not applicable: the \"narrowly construed\" rule applies to exemptions, and the issues in Christopher and Sandifer went beyond Section 213. 132 S. Ct. at 2172 n. 21; 134 S. Ct. at 879 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "at 618 (emphasis added). There followed a series of decisions by the Court tha t made the point more bluntly. See A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493 (1945) (because the FLSA is a humanitarian and remedial law, any exemption 21 narrowly construed; any attempt to \"extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process\"); 339 U.S. 497[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]132 S. Ct. 2156134 S. Ct. 870. In both instances the Court provided the same rationale as to why the rule was not applicable: the \"narrowly construed\" rule applies to exemptions, and the issues in Christopher and Sandifer went beyond Section 213. 132 S. Ct. at 2172 n. 21; 134 S. Ct. at 879 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "at 618 (emphasis added). There followed a series of decisions by the Court tha t made the point more bluntly. See A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493 (1945) (because the FLSA is a humanitarian and remedial law, any exemption 21 narrowly construed; any attempt to \"extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process\"); 339 U.S. 497508 U.S. 22[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]134 S. Ct. 870. In both instances the Court provided the same rationale as to why the rule was not applicable: the \"narrowly construed\" rule applies to exemptions, and the issues in Christopher and Sandifer went beyond Section 213. 132 S. Ct. at 2172 n. 21; 134 S. Ct. at 879 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 2156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "at 618 (emphasis added). There followed a series of decisions by the Court tha t made the point more bluntly. See A.H. Phillips, 324 U.S. at 493 (1945) (because the FLSA is a humanitarian and remedial law, any exemption 21 narrowly construed; any attempt to \"extend an exemption to other than those plainly and unmistakably within its terms and spirit is to abuse the interpretive process\"); 339 U.S. 497508 U.S. 22132 S. Ct. 2156[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In both instances the Court provided the same rationale as to why the rule was not applicable: the \"narrowly construed\" rule applies to exemptions, and the issues in Christopher and Sandifer went beyond Section 213. 132 S. Ct. at 2172 n. 21; 134 S. Ct. at 879 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 870",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "593 F.3d 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 F.3d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "651 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F.3d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "745 F.3d 1249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 555 F.3d 1300 (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "779 F.3d 1184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Has Regularly And Consistently Construed The Act's Section 213 Exemptions Against The Employer",
		"context": "\"We have held [Section 213] exemptions are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakably within their terms and spirit. \" Arnold , 361 U.S. at 394 (emphasis added).6 6 Nor do the Courts of Appeals treat the FLSA narrowly- construed rule as dicta. See, e.g., 23 F.3d 431593 F.3d 265809 F.3d 111452 F.3d 4232016 U.S. App. LEXIS 3860651 F.3d 658809 F.3d 1006; 745 F.3d 1249 (FLSA liberally construed in favor of employee, exemptions narrowly construed against employers, and an employee will not be exempt except if found plainly and unmistakably within the terms and spirit of the exemption; 779 F.3d 1184; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11th 24",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 F.3d 1300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government's Interpretation of the CFAA Wrongly Criminalizes a Broad Swath of Innocent Conduct",
		"context": "8 Additional examples abound.9 Put simply, the consequences of accepting the Government's liability theory will radiate far beyond this case. See Nosal , 676 F.3d at 862 (criticizing co urts that, in interpreting 8 By contrast, this Court struck down as inconsistent with the First Amendment the Stolen Valor Act, which criminalized lying about military decorations and medals. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 See Statement of Orin S. Kerr, U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and Investigations, \"Investigating and Prosecuting 21st Century Cyber Threats,\" at 9 (Mar. 13, 2013) [hereinafter \"Statement of Orin S. Kerr\"], available at https://bit.ly/37eMDnG.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government's Interpretation of the CFAA Wrongly Criminalizes a Broad Swath of Innocent Conduct",
		"context": "Put differently, even though \"most people are only dimly aware of and virtually no one reads or understands\" these private agreements and website policies, see Nosal , 676 F.3d at 861, ignora nce as to the specific terms and conditions of us e would presumably not be a defense to criminal liability under the Government's overbroad interpretation of Section 1030(a)(2). Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Therefore, Section 1030(a)(2)'s \"exceeds authorized access\" language necessarily plays a key gatekeeping function in establishing the limits of the CFAA's reach and screening out innocent, innocuous Internet-related conduct from the hacking-related intrusions Congress intended to target and criminalize. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government's Interpretation of the CFAA Wrongly Criminalizes a Broad Swath of Innocent Conduct",
		"context": "Therefore, Section 1030(a)(2)'s \"exceeds authorized access\" language necessarily plays a key gatekeeping function in establishing the limits of the CFAA's reach and screening out innocent, innocuous Internet-related conduct from the hacking-related intrusions Congress intended to target and criminalize. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (money-or-property requirement in federal property fraud statutes \"prevents these statutes from criminalizing all acts of dishonesty by state and local officials\"). And as Prof essor Kerr has explained elsewhere: \"If we interpret the phrase 'exceeds authorized access' to include breaches of contract, we create a remarkably broad criminal prohibition that has no connection to the rationales of criminal punishment.\" Orin Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting \"Access\" and \"Authorization\" in Computer Misuse Statutes , 78 N.Y.U.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government's Interpretation of the CFAA Wrongly Criminalizes a Broad Swath of Innocent Conduct",
		"context": "1596, 1663 (2003). Blithely dispen sing with any meaningful culpability inquiry by criminalizing mere breaches of contract without any clear indication that Congress intended such an absurd result would also appear to be \"inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And as other legal scholars have noted, \"as long as 13 courts fail to make proof of a culpable mental state an unyielding prerequisite to punishment, federal prosecutors will continue to water down mens rea requirements in ways that allow conviction without blameworthiness.\" Smith, 102 J. Crim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "4 Second Amendment —therefore New York's law cannot stand. The text of the Second Amendment protects \"the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.\" District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The history and tradition of that right confirm that it has been understood, since our Nation's founding, to include the carrying of common arms in public for self - defense. Indeed, \"public carrying o f firearms was widespread during the Colonial and Founding Eras.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "The history and tradition of that right confirm that it has been understood, since our Nation's founding, to include the carrying of common arms in public for self - defense. Indeed, \"public carrying o f firearms was widespread during the Colonial and Founding Eras.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. M any of our Nation's founders themselves openly carried firearms. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "187 F.Supp.3d 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "Thus, even when they were regulating firearms, officials in the Northwest Territory did so respectful of the expectation that men and women w ould carry arms outside their homes. They assumed that citizens would carry arms for a very specific purpose —what this Court has called the \"core lawful purpose of self -defense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] had contemporaneous constitutional provisions that used the phrase \"bear arms\" in a manner that included carrying arms for private purposes such as self - defense. See 270 F.3d 203 (\"the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State, shall not be questioned\"); O HIO CONST . art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "They assumed that citizens would carry arms for a very specific purpose —what this Court has called the \"core lawful purpose of self -defense.\" 561 U.S. 742 had contemporaneous constitutional provisions that used the phrase \"bear arms\" in a manner that included carrying arms for private purposes such as self - defense. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"the right of the citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the State, shall not be questioned\"); O HIO CONST . art. VIII, § 20 (1803) (\"the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State\"); IND.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 F.3d 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "of Amici Curiae Professors of Second Amendment Law, at 25 -26 (collecting examples). Likewise, the great weight of nineteenth century case law \"assume[s] the importance of carrying as well as possessing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[O]ne doesn't have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for personal self -defense in the eighteenth century could not have rationally been limited to the home.\" 702 F.3d 933.",
		"citation_value_orig": "864 F.3d 650",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "864 F.3d 650. \"[O]ne doesn't have to be a historian to realize that a right to keep and bear arms for personal self -defense in the eighteenth century could not have rationally been limited to the home.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the hist orical record is clear that Second Amendment rights were not limited in this way. Bearing arms outside one's 7 home was commonplace and , in many circumstances , it was expected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Historical Record Demonstrates That In Ohio, The Northwest Territory, And The Rest Of The Nation, To \"Bear Arms\" Meant To Be Armed In Public",
		"context": "However, neither decision even hints that one's right to self -defense ends at her doorstop, because it does not. Heller makes clear that to \"bear arms\" means \"being armed and ready for defensive or offensive action in a case of conflict with another person.\" Heller, 554 U.S. at 584 (qu oting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quotations omitted). That is precisely why lawmakers in the Northwest Territory and elsewhere expected people to bear arms. It is also why they recognized the nee d for defense against highwaymen, robbers, thieves, and other assailants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "at 312 n.48 (quoting Bowen, Admissions and the Relevance of Race , Princeton Alumni Weekly 7, 9 (Sept. 26, 1977)). But this endorsement included a glaring quali- fier: \"In the nature of things, it is hard to know how, and 4 \"The void -for-vagueness doctrine reflects the principle that 'a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that [persons] of common in telligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 when, and even if, this informal 'learning through diver- sity' actually occurs . It does not occur for everyone.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "3. One of the basic premises of First Amendment doctrine is that government regulation affecting pro- tected activity must be neutral. This concept has long but-tressed, for instance, the Court's decisions in Free Exer-cise cases, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]408 U.S. 92. But the diversity rationale is obviously not neutral when it comes to race. Decisions before and after Bakke demonstrate that schools cannot rely on First Amend-ment freedoms when it comes to disadvantaging minority students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "3. One of the basic premises of First Amendment doctrine is that government regulation affecting pro- tected activity must be neutral. This concept has long but-tressed, for instance, the Court's decisions in Free Exer-cise cases, see, e.g., 406 U.S. 205[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the diversity rationale is obviously not neutral when it comes to race. Decisions before and after Bakke demonstrate that schools cannot rely on First Amend-ment freedoms when it comes to disadvantaging minority students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "But the diversity rationale is obviously not neutral when it comes to race. Decisions before and after Bakke demonstrate that schools cannot rely on First Amend-ment freedoms when it comes to disadvantaging minority students. For example, the Court has rightly rejected claims that a private high school had a freedom-of -associ- ation right to exclude minorities, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and that a pri- vate religious university could maintain its tax-exempt status based on an asserted Free Exercise Clause right to exclude certain black applicants and maintain policies against inter-racial dating. Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574. Indeed, the academic free- dom \"justification would be considered ludicrous if ad- vanced as a basis for preferring members of the white ma-jority .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "Decisions before and after Bakke demonstrate that schools cannot rely on First Amend-ment freedoms when it comes to disadvantaging minority students. For example, the Court has rightly rejected claims that a private high school had a freedom-of -associ- ation right to exclude minorities, see, e.g., 427 U.S. 160, and that a pri- vate religious university could maintain its tax-exempt status based on an asserted Free Exercise Clause right to exclude certain black applicants and maintain policies against inter-racial dating. Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the academic free- dom \"justification would be considered ludicrous if ad- vanced as a basis for preferring members of the white ma-jority .\" McCormack, Race & Politics in the Supreme Court: Bakke to Basics , 1979 Utah L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Diversity Rationale Conflicts With Basic First Amendment Doctrine In Multiple Respects.",
		"context": "Bakke 's compelling interest analysis was fatally flawed, and Grutter only compounded its errors. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The rule of lenity does not support petitioner's requested limitations on restitution",
		"context": "31 (citing Hughey , 495 U.S. at 412- 413). But this Court has explained that the rule of lenity comes into play \"only if, after using the usual tools of statutory construction, [the Court is ] left with a 'griev- ous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.' \" Robers , 134 S. Ct. at 1859 (quoting Muscarel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see Dolan, 560 U.S. at 621. No such circumstance exists here. The Court has previously declined to apply the rule of lenity to multiple provisions of the MVRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U. S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "This Court's pre- Hall decisions reflect the Fram- ing-era understanding that nonc onsenting States could not be subject to suit anywhere, including in other States' courts. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Cou rt stated that it \"is an established principle of jurisp rudence in all civilized na- tions that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any other , without its consent and permis- sion.\" Id. at 529 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "Id. at 529 (emphasis added). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court stated with equal clarity that \"neither a state nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court in this country without their consent.\" Id. at 451.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "at 451. In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court observed that \"[t]he suability of a State without its consent was a thing un-known to the law\" at the t ime the Constitution was rat- ified, and that \"the cognizance of suits and actions un-known to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Western Union Telegraph 368 U.S. 71, the Court held that because the State of New York was a necessary party to proceedings commenced in the Pennsylvania courts, 29 those proceedings had to be dismissed, since the Penn- sylvania courts had \"no power to bring other States be-fore them.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "In Hans v. Louisiana, the Court observed that \"[t]he suability of a State without its consent was a thing un-known to the law\" at the t ime the Constitution was rat- ified, and that \"the cognizance of suits and actions un-known to the law, and forbidden by the law, was not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power of the United States.\" 134 U.S. 1. And in Western Union Telegraph [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that because the State of New York was a necessary party to proceedings commenced in the Pennsylvania courts, 29 those proceedings had to be dismissed, since the Penn- sylvania courts had \"no power to bring other States be-fore them.\" Id. at 80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 71",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "at 55. Like- wise, when New Hampshire want ed to help its citizens recover debts owed by other States, it did not assert a power to entertain suits agai nst sister States in its own courts; rather, it enacted a statute allowing citizens to assign to the State claims that the State would then pursue in original actions before this Court. See New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That pre- Hall understanding of interstate sover- eign immunity is confirmed by the surprised reaction of state supreme courts to the decision in Hall. The New York Court of Appeals remarked, a year after Hall, that it had been \"long thought that a State could not be sued by the citizens of a si ster State except in its own courts.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "108 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "That pre- Hall understanding of interstate sover- eign immunity is confirmed by the surprised reaction of state supreme courts to the decision in Hall. The New York Court of Appeals remarked, a year after Hall, that it had been \"long thought that a State could not be sued by the citizens of a si ster State except in its own courts.\" Ehrlich-Bober & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Iowa Supreme Court likewise noted that \"[f]or the first two hundred years of this nation's existence it was generally as-sumed that the United States Constitution would not allow one state to be sued in the courts of another state,\" because \"this immunity was an attribute of state sovereignty that was preserved in the Constitution.\" 30 322 N.W.2d 84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 N.E.2d 726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "Ehrlich-Bober & 404 N.E.2d 726. The Iowa Supreme Court likewise noted that \"[f]or the first two hundred years of this nation's existence it was generally as-sumed that the United States Constitution would not allow one state to be sued in the courts of another state,\" because \"this immunity was an attribute of state sovereignty that was preserved in the Constitution.\" 30 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Delaware Supreme Court la ter observed that \"[f]or almost two hundred years, it had been assumed that the United States Constitu tion implicitly prohibited one state from being sued in the courts of another state—just as the Eleventh Amendment explicitly pro-hibited states from being sued in federal courts.\" Kent 713 A.2d 290.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 N.W.2d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Pre-Hall decisions of this Court and other courts reflect the Framing-era consensus",
		"context": "30 322 N.W.2d 84. And the Delaware Supreme Court la ter observed that \"[f]or almost two hundred years, it had been assumed that the United States Constitu tion implicitly prohibited one state from being sued in the courts of another state—just as the Eleventh Amendment explicitly pro-hibited states from being sued in federal courts.\" Kent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "713 A.2d 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Laufer's alleged injury is not particularized.",
		"context": "Spokeo , 578 U.S. at 339 (citation omitted). An \"undifferentiated, generalized grievance\" does not give rise to standing. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Laufer characterizes herself as an \"advocate\" on behalf of both herself and \"similarly situated disabled persons.\" J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Laufer's alleged injury is not particularized.",
		"context": "Under this Court's precedents, a plaintiff cannot satisfy Article III's particularization requirement merely by showing that she falls within a group protected by a particular law. Instead, Article III requires that the plaintiff be personally affected by the law. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a bank holding company sought to 23 open an insured industrial savings bank (ISB). The application was denied because Florida law prohibited out-of-state bank holding companies from operating ISBs, but the controversy was later mooted with respect to insured ISBs of the type the holding company proposed to open. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Laufer's alleged injury is not particularized.",
		"context": "If merely visiting a website were sufficient to establish a \"particularized\" injury sufficient to support injunctive relief, the law of standing would be dramatically expanded. Any generalized injury could be transformed into a particularized injury merely by exposure to that injury on the Internet. To take one 25 example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the plaintiff sued, under a theory of taxpayer standing, alleging that he was legally entitled to information regarding the CIA's expenditures. This Court found that he was impermissibly pursuing a \"generalized grievance … since the impact on him is plainly undifferentiated and common to all members of the public.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Laufer's alleged injury is not particularized.",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Am. Humanist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Laufer's theory prevails, someone who visits a website displaying that religious symbol 26 could allege a \"particularized\" injury sufficient to establish standing. Laufer stands in the same position with respect to Coast Village as millions of others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.3d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": ". The construction we urge is further supported by the strong presumption in favo r of judicial review over agency action. The Court applies a \"well-settled\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) and \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial re-view of administrative action\" ( 139 S. Ct. 1765136 S. Ct. 2131139 S. Ct. 1776. It \"takes 'clear and convincing evi- dence' to dislodge the presumption\" in favor of judicial review. 558 U.S. 233.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": ". The construction we urge is further supported by the strong presumption in favo r of judicial review over agency action. The Court applies a \"well-settled\" ( 509 U.S. 43) and \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial re-view of administrative action\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S. Ct. 2131139 S. Ct. 1776. It \"takes 'clear and convincing evi- dence' to dislodge the presumption\" in favor of judicial review. 558 U.S. 233.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": ". The construction we urge is further supported by the strong presumption in favo r of judicial review over agency action. The Court applies a \"well-settled\" ( 509 U.S. 43) and \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial re-view of administrative action\" ( 139 S. Ct. 1765[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]139 S. Ct. 1776. It \"takes 'clear and convincing evi- dence' to dislodge the presumption\" in favor of judicial review. 558 U.S. 233.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "The Court applies a \"well-settled\" ( 509 U.S. 43) and \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial re-view of administrative action\" ( 139 S. Ct. 1765136 S. Ct. 2131139 S. Ct. 1776. It \"takes 'clear and convincing evi- dence' to dislodge the presumption\" in favor of judicial review. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This presumption stems, in significant part, from separation-of-powers principles. As the Court has held, \"[s]eparation-of-powers concerns\" caution \"against reading legislation, absent clear statement, to place in executive hands authority to remove cases from the Judiciary's domain.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "Cuozzo Speed Techs ., 136 S. Ct. at 2151 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 18 Judicial review of Board determinations is espe- cially critical, as \"the content and reasoning of the BIA opinion can mean life or death to a deportee.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is, \"[i]mmigration decisions, especially in asylum cases, may have life or death consequences, and so the costs 18 The Court has also long constr ued \"ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien's favor.\" 132 S. Ct. 1166.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 F.3d 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "512 F.3d 80. That is, \"[i]mmigration decisions, especially in asylum cases, may have life or death consequences, and so the costs 18 The Court has also long constr ued \"ambiguities in deportation statutes in the alien's favor.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 38 of error are very high.\" 318 F.3d 365.19 The issue in a CAT claim is whether the litigant has shown that it is more lik ely than not that he or she will be tortured upon removal to a particular country.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 1166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "132 S. Ct. 1166. 38 of error are very high.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].19 The issue in a CAT claim is whether the litigant has shown that it is more lik ely than not that he or she will be tortured upon removal to a particular country. An erroneous Board denial means that a noncitizen has shown that he or she is more likely than not to be tortured—but the administrative agency botched the adjudication. And, as a result of that mistake, the indi- vidual will be sent to the place where torture is likely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 F.3d 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "id. (\"[Immigration] Judges say they must handle 'death-penalty' cases in a traffic court setting, with inade- quate budgets and grueling ca seloads.\"). The presump- 19 See also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 433 (Reinhardt and Hawkins, JJ., specially concurring) (\"[J]udicial review of asylum cases may mean the difference between life and death for refugees from tyranny or from religious or racial persecution.\"). 39 tion in favor of judicial review should apply with full force here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "39 tion in favor of judicial review should apply with full force here. That is all the more so because, despite these mas- sively high stakes, Board errors occur . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the court of appeals—noting that \"a competent immigra- tion service would not ignore world events\"—vacated a Board decision that had turn ed on a finding that the outbreak of a violent civil war in South Sudan, \"with the young nation described as 'cracking apart' and United Nations officials raising concerns about geno- cide,\" did not amount to materially changed circum- stances. Id. at 667.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 665",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government's contrary position conflicts with the presumption in favor of judicial review",
		"context": "Id. at 667. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court of appeals was \"compelled to remand for further proceedings to allow the BIA to explain why it denie[d] [the petitioner] relief from re- moval when, on apparently identical facts, the agency granted such relief to her husband .\" Id. at 169 (empha- sis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 F.3d 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Subsection (IV) Could Criminalize Lawful Conduct",
		"context": "§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). Su bsection (iv) provides no reliable way to determine what speech or conduct is punishable as \"encouragement or inducement.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] serves to narrow the broad, ordinary meanings of \"encourage and induce.\" See 910 F.3d 461, vacated and remanded sub nom 206 L. Ed. 2d 866. Yet the government urges that \"encourage[]\" and \"induce[]\" cannot be divorced from facilitation or solicitation of a criminal act, and thus any risk that Subsection (iv) could criminalize lawful speech is hypothetical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Subsection (IV) Could Criminalize Lawful Conduct",
		"context": "Su bsection (iv) provides no reliable way to determine what speech or conduct is punishable as \"encouragement or inducement.\" See 553 U.S. 285 serves to narrow the broad, ordinary meanings of \"encourage and induce.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated and remanded sub nom 206 L. Ed. 2d 866. Yet the government urges that \"encourage[]\" and \"induce[]\" cannot be divorced from facilitation or solicitation of a criminal act, and thus any risk that Subsection (iv) could criminalize lawful speech is hypothetical. Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.3d 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Subsection (IV) Could Criminalize Lawful Conduct",
		"context": "at 26. But as the government has previously recognized, it is not a crime for an undocumented person to remain in the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Brief for the United States at 32, Arizona v. United States, No. 11–182 (S.Ct. Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.3d 1040",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Managed Care Pharmacy Professionals Should Be Permitted To Develop Tools For Patient Outcomes And Management Of Costs Without The Constraint Of Disparate State Regulation",
		"context": "§ 1144(b)(2); Metro . Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th is leads to a substantial difference in cost : because self-funded benefit plans do not need to comply with a patchwork of state and local laws restricting potential cost-saving measures , they face lower administrative expenses than fully funded plans. See The Alliance, When You're Considering Self - Funding 4 (Aug. 2014) , https://the -alliance.org/wp - content/uploads/2017/08/WhenYoureConsideringSelf Funding_whitepaper.pdf .",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Indeed, even those federal appeals courts that have construed § 13(b) as impliedly authorizing claims for monetary relief have recognized that Con- gress did not expressly authorize such claims by au- thorizing FTC to seek a temporary or permanent \"in- junction.\" See, e.g. , 815 F.3d 593; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bronson Partners , 654 F.3d at 365. FTC contends that \"it has long been understood that an injunction can provide for restitution or other forms of monetary relief to undo harm caused by the defendant's conduct.\" FTC Ce rt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.3d 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "That understanding of what constitutes an \"in- junction\" is consistent with this Court's teachings on when injunctive relief is appropriate. The \"basic pre-requisites\" for obtaining an injunction are demon- strating \"the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FTC cannot demonstrate that it will suffer any irrep-arable harm if it is denied an \"injunction\" granting monetary relief against AMG Capital and Credit Bu- reau Center—particularly because other FTC Act pro- visions authorize FTC to seek monetary relief from those who violate the Act. FTC's reliance on 22 U.S. 738, is misplaced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "414 U.S. 488. FTC cannot demonstrate that it will suffer any irrep-arable harm if it is denied an \"injunction\" granting monetary relief against AMG Capital and Credit Bu- reau Center—particularly because other FTC Act pro- visions authorize FTC to seek monetary relief from those who violate the Act. FTC's reliance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is misplaced. FTC Cert. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "at 14. The injunction issued in that case barred future enforcement of a state tax law against the Sec- ond Bank of the United States; the injunction was not the basis of the Court's separa te order directing a re- fund of money previously collected by state tax offi-cials. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is similarly unhelpful to FTC. American Stores involved an antitrust challenge by California to the purchase of one large grocery-store chain by an-other. The Court held that California's proposed di-vestiture of the acquired chain was a form of \"injunc- tive relief\" authorized by § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "Finally, the Court's decisions governing claims for injunctive relief against a State are closely analo-gous to the issue raised here—and suggest that judi-cial authority to issue an \"injunction\" does not author- ize issuance of monetary relief. The Eleventh Amend- ment provides an unconsenting State with immunity from suit by its own citizens as well as by citizens of another State. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has recognized one major exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity: it does not prohibit 11 a citizen from suing a state official in his official ca- pacity for injunctive relief, based on a claim that the official is acting in violatio n of the U.S. Constitution. Ex parte209 U.S. 123.3 But the Court has made clear that the injunc- tive relief authorized by Young is limited to prospec- tive relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "134 U.S. 1. The Court has recognized one major exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity: it does not prohibit 11 a citizen from suing a state official in his official ca- pacity for injunctive relief, based on a claim that the official is acting in violatio n of the U.S. Constitution. Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 But the Court has made clear that the injunc- tive relief authorized by Young is limited to prospec- tive relief. Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89; 415 U.S. 651. In particular, \"a federal court's remedial power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "The Court has recognized one major exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity: it does not prohibit 11 a citizen from suing a state official in his official ca- pacity for injunctive relief, based on a claim that the official is acting in violatio n of the U.S. Constitution. Ex parte209 U.S. 123.3 But the Court has made clear that the injunc- tive relief authorized by Young is limited to prospec- tive relief. Pennhurst State School & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 415 U.S. 651. In particular, \"a federal court's remedial power. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 13(b) Authorizes a \"Permanent Injunction,\" but Injunctions Do Not Encompass Monetary Relief",
		"context": "The Court has recognized one major exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity: it does not prohibit 11 a citizen from suing a state official in his official ca- pacity for injunctive relief, based on a claim that the official is acting in violatio n of the U.S. Constitution. Ex parte209 U.S. 123.3 But the Court has made clear that the injunc- tive relief authorized by Young is limited to prospec- tive relief. Pennhurst State School & 465 U.S. 89; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, \"a federal court's remedial power. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "Both this Court and Congress have recognized the importance of reducing delay, both for society and the victims. Shortly before the enactment of the Antiterror- ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), this Court characterized a \"2½-year stay of execution\" as \"severe prejudice.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), Congress recognized that victims of crime have a right to \"pro- ceedings free from unreasonable delay.\" 18 U. S. C. § 3771(a)(7).",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U. S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "Persons with such sentences can be released via executive clemency, retroactive legislation, see, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 3051(b)(4), or retroactive invention of new constitutional rules with no basis in the original understanding. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Escape is also a possibility that cannot be completely eliminated. 9 federal habeas review, including appeal to the court of appeals and a petition for writ of certiorari to this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U. S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "When that review is completed, execution of the judg- ment should follow shortly in most cases, with addi- tional proceedings reserved for extraordinary cases. That is what Congress intended when it severely restricted successive federal habeas corpus petitions in AEDPA. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Initially, the successive petition reform was one of the most successful changes made by AEDPA, and there was a large increase in the number of judgments carried out. See U. S. Dept.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U. S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment 2005, Figure 4, p. 10 (2006). In the mid-2000s, though, not one but two new layers of litigation emerged. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that Rule 60(b) could be imported from the Rules of Civil Proce- dure into habeas corpus but not when doing so circum- vented AEDPA's restrictions on raising new claims or relitigating rejected claims. Yet 583 U. S. None, invoked the vague and expansive phrase \"extraordinary circumstances\" to require further litigation on a 60(b) motion that sought to do exactly what AEDPA forbids: reopen a previously litigated claim, see id., 138 S. Ct., at 549-550, 199 L. Ed. 2d, at 428-429 (Thomas, J., dissent- ing), without meeting AEPDA's stringent requirements for reopening.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U. S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "See supra, at 2. The other new layer is civil litigation, the subject of this case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], poked a seemingly small hole in the dyke by allowing civil litigation to enjoin one execution procedure while conceding the acceptability of another. But it is the natural course for such small holes to widen, and this one did. 547 U. S. 573, held that a court may stay execution altogether, not just direct use of one method rather than another, with general language about respecting the state's interest in enforcing its judgments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U. S. 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "541 U. S. 637, poked a seemingly small hole in the dyke by allowing civil litigation to enjoin one execution procedure while conceding the acceptability of another. But it is the natural course for such small holes to widen, and this one did. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that a court may stay execution altogether, not just direct use of one method rather than another, with general language about respecting the state's interest in enforcing its judgments. Notwithstanding that language, widespread method-of-execution litiga- tion took off, leading to the multi-year delays of justice noted and denounced in Bucklew , supra. And now we have religious practice litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U. S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "It is easy to scoff at \"slippery slope arguments,\" but we know from long and bitter experience in capital cases that the slopes are indeed almost always slippery. Nelson is far from the only example. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], nominally allows ineffective assistance claims only for gravely deficient representa- tion \"outside the wide range of professionally compe- tent assistance,\" but it is a rare capital case today where the inmate does not claim ineffective assistance, no matter how skilled and dedicated his lawyer was. 438 U. S. 58617 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 131. Those whose goal is to gum up the works of capital punishment are likely salivating at the opportunities this case may open.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U. S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "Nelson is far from the only example. 466 U. S. 668, nominally allows ineffective assistance claims only for gravely deficient representa- tion \"outside the wide range of professionally compe- tent assistance,\" but it is a rare capital case today where the inmate does not claim ineffective assistance, no matter how skilled and dedicated his lawyer was. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]17 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 131. Those whose goal is to gum up the works of capital punishment are likely salivating at the opportunities this case may open. Inmate religious claims are unique in that plaintiffs can claim nearly any belief they like, and the defendants are nearly powerless to challenge it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U. S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "This certainly raises a reasonable suspicion that petitioner, his attorneys, or both are making it up as they go along, asserting whatever belief it takes to object to whatever procedure is going to be used. Even if they are not in this case, there is no reason to believe that the next capital inmate will not do so in the next case. Given the history of shameless obstructionism by the capital defense bar, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is every reason to believe they will. Neither AEDPA nor CVRA specifically addresses the use of civil suits to block the enforcement of criminal justice, but that is because this additional layer of delay barely existed at the times of those enactments. It was not until after 547 U. S. 573, that the floodgates were opened to routine use of federal civil rights suits as a stratagem for delay.",
		"citation_value_orig": "610 Pa. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "Given the history of shameless obstructionism by the capital defense bar, see, e.g., 610 Pa. 17, there is every reason to believe they will. Neither AEDPA nor CVRA specifically addresses the use of civil suits to block the enforcement of criminal justice, but that is because this additional layer of delay barely existed at the times of those enactments. It was not until after [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the floodgates were opened to routine use of federal civil rights suits as a stratagem for delay. That does not mean that these statutes are not important in this case. As with the Anti-Injunction Act in 401 U. S. 37, discussed in the next part, the policies expressed by Congress in enacting them deserve substantial weight as courts decide how to exercise equitable powers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U. S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "It was not until after 547 U. S. 573, that the floodgates were opened to routine use of federal civil rights suits as a stratagem for delay. That does not mean that these statutes are not important in this case. As with the Anti-Injunction Act in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], discussed in the next part, the policies expressed by Congress in enacting them deserve substantial weight as courts decide how to exercise equitable powers. The policy behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) also has weight, of course. But it does not deserve a tunnel- visioned focus oblivious to all other considerations and policies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U. S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The needs of society and of victims of crime weigh heavily against creating more opportunities for last-minute litigation delay",
		"context": "Nowhere in the text of RLUIPA is there any indication that Congress contemplated its use to prevent the enforcement of criminal judgments. Nor- mally, prisoner civil litigation deals only with the conditions of confinement, while the fact and duration 13 of confinement—the subject of the criminal judgment in noncapital prisoner cases—is reserved for habeas corpus. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].6 This case therefore deals with competing policies of statutes that Congress did not anticipate would compete. In a broader sense, though, the competing consider- ations when civil rights litigation interferes with a state criminal case are not new. This Court addressed them a half a century ago.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U. S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "A state law has a \"reference to\" ERISA plans if it \"acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans \" or if \"the existence of ERISA plans is essential to the law's operation.\" California Div. of Labor Standards [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That standard is not satisfied here. As amended by Act 900, Ark.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "1003(a) (1) and (2) (prov iding that ERISA applies only to employee benefit plans estab-lished or maintained by an \"employer\" or \"employee or- ganization\"). Because the plans that PBMs administer or manage \"need not necessarily be ERISA plans\" in order for a PBM to be subject to Sect ion 17 -92-507, the state law does not \" act[] immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans .\" Dillingham , 519 U.S. at 325; see New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that a state statute that imposed surcharges on patients and health maintenance organizations could \"not be said to make 'reference to' ERISA plans\" be- cause the surcharges were imposed \"regardless of whether\" the benefits were \"ultimately secured by an ERISA plan , priv ate purchase, or otherwise\") . Nor is the \"existence of ERISA plans essential\" to Section 17 -92-507's \"operation.\" Dillingham , 519 U.S. at 325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "Because its definition of \" [p]harmacy benefits plan or program\" encompasses non -ERISA plans as well as ERISA plans, Ark. Code Ann. § 17-92-507(a)(9) , Section 17 -92-507 \"functions irrespective of [] the exist- ence of an ERISA plan, \" Ingersoll -Rand [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because a PBM's ob- ligations under Section 17 -92-507 do not vary depending on the nature of the plan the PBM administers or man- ages , application of Section 17 -92-507 does not require any \"inquiry\" \"directed to the plan.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "at 140. Section 17-92-507 thus does not resemble state laws that this Court has previously fou nd preempted under a \"refer- ence to\" theory . See District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ingersoll - Rand , 498 U.S. at 140 ( finding preempted a Texas com- mon -law cause of action that made \"specific reference to,\" and was \"premised on ,\" the existence of an ERISA - covered pension plan and that required a court to con- duct an \"inquiry directed to the plan\" ). The court of appeals found Section 17 -92-507 to con- tain an \"implicit \" reference to ERISA plans because the plans to which PBMs provide services may \" include \" ERISA plans . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Arkansas statute does not make \"reference to\" ERISA plans",
		"context": "But if such an \"implicit\" reference were enough to trigger ERISA preemption , there would never be any point in asking whether the state law \" acts immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans ,\" Dillingham , 519 U.S. at 325 (empha sis added). The ap- proach of the court of appeals thus would give ERISA's preemption provision nearly \"limitless application,\" far beyond what any \" 'sensible person could have in- tended. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "Accordingly, the 4Not one of the cases Varela cites (Opp. 21-22) involved an or- der imposing class arbitration on a defendant over its objection; most involved different locations or forums for an individual ar- bitration. Al Rushaid v.Nat'l Oilwell Varco, Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]360 F.3d 1149126 F.3d 95 incorporating language found in most any arbitration agreement. Varela concedes that the FAA displaces an inter- pretation of state law that \"impose[s] class arbitra- tion for policy reasons rather than on the basis of contract-law principles that 'give effect to the con- tractual rights and expectations of the parties.'\" Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.3d 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "Accordingly, the 4Not one of the cases Varela cites (Opp. 21-22) involved an or- der imposing class arbitration on a defendant over its objection; most involved different locations or forums for an individual ar- bitration. Al Rushaid v.Nat'l Oilwell Varco, Inc. , 814 F.3d 300[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]126 F.3d 95 incorporating language found in most any arbitration agreement. Varela concedes that the FAA displaces an inter- pretation of state law that \"impose[s] class arbitra- tion for policy reasons rather than on the basis of contract-law principles that 'give effect to the con- tractual rights and expectations of the parties.'\" Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "360 F.3d 1149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "Accordingly, the 4Not one of the cases Varela cites (Opp. 21-22) involved an or- der imposing class arbitration on a defendant over its objection; most involved different locations or forums for an individual ar- bitration. Al Rushaid v.Nat'l Oilwell Varco, Inc. , 814 F.3d 300360 F.3d 1149[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] incorporating language found in most any arbitration agreement. Varela concedes that the FAA displaces an inter- pretation of state law that \"impose[s] class arbitra- tion for policy reasons rather than on the basis of contract-law principles that 'give effect to the con- tractual rights and expectations of the parties.'\" Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 F.3d 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "Pet. 15 n.5. 9 Rounsavell , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.FERC , 746 F.2d 1383.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 Cal.App.4th 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "9 Rounsavell , 189 Cal.App.4th 348; accord Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.FERC , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, the FAA forecloses the panel major- ity's reliance on a state-law canon to manufacture consent to class arbitration. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "746 F.2d 1383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Decision Below Defies This Court's Precedents Interpreting The FAA",
		"context": "Pet. 18-19. Varela points to this Court's decision in Mastrobuono v.Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but Mastrobuono did not hold, or even suggest, that the Federal Arbitration Act takes a backseat to any state- law maxim. Mastrobuono de- cided the question presented—whether the contract at issue authorized arbitration of punitive-damages claims—by applying the strong federal policy favor- ing arbitration. The Court first drew the pro- arbitration conclusion that punitive-damages claims are arbitrable absent a clear statement of the parties' contrary intent, which the parties had not made.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The original meaning of seizure of persons arises from the common law of arrest",
		"context": "Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 627 n.3. \"There is no doubt that by the reference to the seizure of persons, the Fourth Amendment was intended to apply to arrests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment largely in response to the British use of \"general warrant[s]\" for \"arrest[]\" as well as \"writs of assistance\"—both of which \"perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.\" 361 U.S. 98; see Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The original meaning of seizure of persons arises from the common law of arrest",
		"context": "423 U.S. 411. Indeed, the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment largely in response to the British use of \"general warrant[s]\" for \"arrest[]\" as well as \"writs of assistance\"—both of which \"perpetuated the oppressive practice of allowing the police to arrest and search on suspicion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (landmark case on general warrants in- terchangeably using \"arrest\" and \"seize\" with respect to persons). And so just as the Framers understood a common-law trespass on property to be a Fourth Amendment search, see Jones , 565 U.S. at 409, 411, they understood a common-law arrest to be a Fourth Amendment seizure and wrote an amendment that guarded against both.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The original meaning of seizure of persons arises from the common law of arrest",
		"context": "Webster, when defining \"seize,\" explained, \"We say, to arrest a person, to seize goods.\" 2 Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 67 (1828); see also Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755) 17 (defining \"arrest\" as including to \"seize by a mandate from a court or officer of justice\" and to \"seize, to lay hands on\"). And several colonial constitutions—in- cluding ones that \"served as models for the Fourth Amendment,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—used the word \"arrest\" when dis- cussing \"seizure\" of persons. See, e.g. , N.H. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Content-based commercial disclosure requirements are subject to relaxed scrutiny",
		"context": "Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651. The Zau- derer disclosure standard and the rational-basis standard applicable to \"'regulatory legislation affect-ing ordinary commercial tr ansactions'\" are \"similarly permissive.\" Expressions , 137 S. Ct. at 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This Court explained in Zauderer that the differ- ence in the standards of review rests on \"material dif-ferences between disclosure requirements and out- right prohibitions on speech.\" 471 U.S. at 650.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Content-based commercial disclosure requirements are subject to relaxed scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 651 (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But when commercial speakers are required to disclose information about their products or busi-nesses, \"the interests at st ake … are not of the same order.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Content-based commercial disclosure requirements are subject to relaxed scrutiny",
		"context": "These considerations led the Court in Zauderer to hold heightened scrutiny in any form (including Central Hudson 's intermediate scrutiny) inapplicable to re- quirements of factual disclosures in commercial ad- vertising, and to limit its re view to the most deferen- tial level of constitutional scrutiny. Id. In Zauderer and the Court's later decision in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the legiti mate interest that justi- fied disclosure was the \"interest in preventing decep- tion of consumers.\" Id . at 253; Zauderer , 471 U.S. at 651.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Content-based commercial disclosure requirements are subject to relaxed scrutiny",
		"context": "The Court in Zauderer applied \"reasonable relationship\" review because commercial speakers' 9 interest in not disclosing factual information about their products, services, or businesses is only mini- mally protected by the Constitution. That reasoning compels the conclusion that whenever a law \"requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its regulation is consistent with the rea- sons for according constitutional protection to com- mercial speech[.]\" 44 Liquormart, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Disclosure requirements subject to the Zauderer standard are necessarily co ntent- and speaker-based: They are triggered by advertisements or other com-mercial speech with specific content, made by particu- lar types of speakers, and they specify the content of the required disclosures. In Zauderer , for example, the disclosure requirement ap plied only to particular speakers (attorneys) and only to speech with particu-lar content (advertisements mentioning contingent-fee representation), and it told attorneys running such ads exactly what they had to say about a client's potential liability for costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Scope of the Injunction Is Proper",
		"context": "Finally, the Ninth Circuit's injunction is not over- broad. This Court has long made clear that \"the scope of injunctive relief\" must be \"dictated by the extent of the violation established.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, when an Executive Branch policy violates a statute or the Constitution, it is invalid and must be struck down on its face. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Scope of the Injunction Is Proper",
		"context": ",UARG , 134 S. Ct. at 2449. A \"facial challenge\" is thus a \"proper response to the systemic disparity between [a] statutory standard\" and an Executive Branch policy. Sullivan v.Zebley , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government argues (at 32) that constitutional principles require the injunction to be narrowed. No precedent supports that proposition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Scope of the Injunction Is Proper",
		"context": "No precedent supports that proposition. The cases cited by the Government hold only that courts must limit injunctive relief to the policy or provision \"that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.\" Lewis v.Casey , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see512 U.S. 753 that the in- junction is not \"necessary to afford complete relief to respondents themselves.\" That is wrong. Respond- ents cannot identify in advance precisely which individuals may wish to enroll in the State's Univer- sity or join the Association.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Scope of the Injunction Is Proper",
		"context": "No precedent supports that proposition. The cases cited by the Government hold only that courts must limit injunctive relief to the policy or provision \"that produced the injury in fact that the plaintiff has established.\" Lewis v.Casey , 518 U.S. 343; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the in- junction is not \"necessary to afford complete relief to respondents themselves.\" That is wrong. Respond- ents cannot identify in advance precisely which individuals may wish to enroll in the State's Univer- sity or join the Association.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A VOCATIONAL EXPERT'S TESTIMONY CANNOT CONSTITUTE \"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE\" OF \"OTHER WORK\" UNDER 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) IF THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT REFUSES TO PROVIDE, UPON REQUEST, THE DATA UNDERLYING THAT TESTIMONY",
		"context": ". In interpreting provisions of the Social Security Act, this Court begins, \"as usual, with the statutory text.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 535 U.S. 789. The relevant statutory provision here provides \"[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1918",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A VOCATIONAL EXPERT'S TESTIMONY CANNOT CONSTITUTE \"SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE\" OF \"OTHER WORK\" UNDER 42 U.S.C. section 405(g) IF THE VOCATIONAL EXPERT REFUSES TO PROVIDE, UPON REQUEST, THE DATA UNDERLYING THAT TESTIMONY",
		"context": ". In interpreting provisions of the Social Security Act, this Court begins, \"as usual, with the statutory text.\" 137 S. Ct. 1918; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The relevant statutory provision here provides \"[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Fundamental Right To Elective Abortion Under The Reasoned-Judgment Test",
		"context": "Roe and Casey f ail t h e \"r e as o n e d j u d gm e n t\" approach.3 By requiring consistency , careful reasoning, 2. This brief does not address all the factors this Court considers in deciding whether stare decisis warrants adhering to a constitutional decision that the Court concludes is erroneous. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The failures of \"reasoned judgment\" in the Roe and Casey opinions described herein, however, are highly relevant to one of them: \"the quality of [the precedent's] reasoning.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reject any interpretation of \"usual course of professional practice\" that would expose pharmacists to liability under 21 C.F.R. section 1306.06 for minor infractions or mere non-compliance with professional standards",
		"context": "of Health Law & Policy in Supp. of Pet'r at 15–25, Ruan v. United States , No. 20-1410 (U.S. May 7, 2021), construing the CSA to criminalize negligent medical conduct plainly invades an area of the law long reserved to the States (regulating medical malprac- tice), triggering signific ant federalism concerns, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the Court should define what consti- tutes conduct outside the \"usual course of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Solicitor General's Arguments Do Not Explain Why DACA Is Unlawful",
		"context": "\"[U]nsuccessful attempts at legislation\" are un- illuminating. Red Lion Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even if th at rule were otherwise, surely the more illuminating \"unsuccessful\" congres- sional action was the failure of legislation to end DACA . See JA 828 n.9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing",
		"context": "\"Article III of the Constitution limits the 'judicial power' of the United States to the resolution of 'cases' and 'controversies.'\" Valley Forge Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in the absen ce of an \"actual\" conflict between legitimate parties, \"[t]he power to declare the rights of individuals and to measure the authority of governments . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing",
		"context": "in the sense in which judicial power is granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"As an incident to 10 the elaboration of this bedr ock [case or controversy] requirement, th[e Supreme] Court has always required that a litigant have 'standing' to challenge the action sought to be adjudicated in the lawsuit.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "13 How. 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing",
		"context": "Spokeo, 578 U.S. 330, as revised (May 24, 2016). It can be established only where, among other things, \"the plai ntiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' as to warrant his invocation of federal -court jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"Article III standing . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing",
		"context": "Where, as he re, a necessary party lacks Article III standing, the Supreme Court lacks juris - diction. 11 Standing \"cannot be 'inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,' but rather 'm ust affirmatively appear in the record.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]139 S. Ct. 1041. 11",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Respondents Lack Article III Standing",
		"context": "Where, as he re, a necessary party lacks Article III standing, the Supreme Court lacks juris - diction. 11 Standing \"cannot be 'inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings,' but rather 'm ust affirmatively appear in the record.'\" 493 U.S. 215[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's",
		"context": "§ 2(a), 38 Stat. 786. In Jin Fuey [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled in part on other grounds by 290 U.S. 371, this Court confirmed that a regist ered physician who dispensed opium pursu- ant to a prescription could face criminal liability under the Harrison Act. The Court found \"no necessary re- pugnance between prescribing and selling \" because \"one may take a principal part in a prohibited sale \" of a controlled substance \" by unlawfully issuing a prescrip- tion to the would -be purchaser.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's",
		"context": "§ 2(a), 38 Stat. 786. In Jin Fuey 254 U.S. 189, overruled in part on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court confirmed that a regist ered physician who dispensed opium pursu- ant to a prescription could face criminal liability under the Harrison Act. The Court found \"no necessary re- pugnance between prescribing and selling \" because \"one may take a principal part in a prohibited sale \" of a controlled substance \" by unlawfully issuing a prescrip- tion to the would -be purchaser.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's",
		"context": "at 192-193. This Court's later Harrison Act cases involving rogue doctors are similar in their application of its crim- inal provisions . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court reiterated that \"[f ]ormer decisions of this court have held that the pur- pose of the exception is to confine the distribution of these drugs to the regular and lawful course of profes- sional practice.\" Id. at 287.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress designed the CSA to allow for the prosecution of doctors who elevate their own views of acceptable medicine above the medical community's",
		"context": "at 28 8. Congress's incorporation (or strengthening ) of the Harrison Act 's standards for physician prosecutions when it enacted the CSA, see Moore , 423 U.S. at 132- 133, demonstrates that physicians may not avoid liabil- ity by rejecting or ignoring the norms of the medical profession. W hile the Court reversed Harrison Act con- victions where, for example, the indictment failed to \"al- lege that [a physician] dispensed the drugs otherwise than to a patient in the course of his professional prac-tice or for other than medical purposes ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it did not do so on the theo ry that a physician's subjective view of medical practice was alone dispositive of his criminal liability. And no such standard can be found, or should be grafted onto, the CSA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Physical Presence Standard Is Not \"Unworkable\"",
		"context": "If a company is physically present in a state, directly 24 or through third-parties acti ng on its behalf to make a market for sales in the state, then the company may be required to collect and remit the state's sales and use taxes. See, e.g. , Standard Pressed Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If neither the company nor a third party acting for it is physic ally present in the state, then the State may not compel an out-of-state entity to collect use tax. Quill , 504 U.S. at 314-18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Physical Presence Standard Is Not \"Unworkable\"",
		"context": "This is not to say that the rule forecloses all litiga- tion regarding its reach. Lower courts have, for exam-ple, differed over the question of when a demonstrable, but minimal, physical presence is sufficient to create nexus. E.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the recognition of a de minimis standard has always been an acknowledged caveat to the \"bright line,\" physical presence test and does not make it \"un- workable\" in any sense. Quill , 504 U.S. at 315 n.8; see also Wis. Dep't of 505 U.S. 214.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 P.3d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Physical Presence Standard Is Not \"Unworkable\"",
		"context": "E.g., In re14 P.3d 1111. But the recognition of a de minimis standard has always been an acknowledged caveat to the \"bright line,\" physical presence test and does not make it \"un- workable\" in any sense. Quill , 504 U.S. at 315 n.8; see also Wis. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Legal Consensus That Interfaces Are Not Copyrightable, Resting Upon the Explicit Language of Section 102(b), Has Emerged Over Decades.",
		"context": "17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In the United States, judicial recognition of the non-copyrightability of interfaces began with the Second Circuit's rejection in Computer Associates International , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], of the Third Circuit's decision in Whelan Associates, 797 F.2d 1222. Whelan had afforded a very broad 16 scope of copyright protection to essentially any aspect of a computer program other tha n its overall function defined at the highest level. In an influential decision, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates concluded that th e Court's decision in Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340, undercut Whelan , and it ruled that under Section 102(b) copyright did not extend to program elements that are necessary for compatibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Legal Consensus That Interfaces Are Not Copyrightable, Resting Upon the Explicit Language of Section 102(b), Has Emerged Over Decades.",
		"context": "17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In the United States, judicial recognition of the non-copyrightability of interfaces began with the Second Circuit's rejection in Computer Associates International , 982 F.2d 693, of the Third Circuit's decision in Whelan Associates, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whelan had afforded a very broad 16 scope of copyright protection to essentially any aspect of a computer program other tha n its overall function defined at the highest level. In an influential decision, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates concluded that th e Court's decision in Feist Publications, 499 U.S. 340, undercut Whelan , and it ruled that under Section 102(b) copyright did not extend to program elements that are necessary for compatibility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "797 F.2d 1222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Legal Consensus That Interfaces Are Not Copyrightable, Resting Upon the Explicit Language of Section 102(b), Has Emerged Over Decades.",
		"context": "In the United States, judicial recognition of the non-copyrightability of interfaces began with the Second Circuit's rejection in Computer Associates International , 982 F.2d 693, of the Third Circuit's decision in Whelan Associates, 797 F.2d 1222. Whelan had afforded a very broad 16 scope of copyright protection to essentially any aspect of a computer program other tha n its overall function defined at the highest level. In an influential decision, the Second Circuit in Computer Associates concluded that th e Court's decision in Feist Publications, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], undercut Whelan , and it ruled that under Section 102(b) copyright did not extend to program elements that are necessary for compatibility. 982 F.2d at 711. The First Circuit reached a similar outcome in Lotus , where the court ruled that the menu commands and command structure of Lotus 1 -2-3, which Borland reproduced in its competitive spreadsheet program to achieve compatibility, constituted an uncopyrightable method of operation under Section 102(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Legal Consensus That Interfaces Are Not Copyrightable, Resting Upon the Explicit Language of Section 102(b), Has Emerged Over Decades.",
		"context": "As \"neces sary incidents\" to a system or method of operation, they are not copyrightable. The Federal Circuit failed to take account of this fundamental rule of Baker when it ruled that \"copyrightability is focused on the choices available to the [author ] at the ti me the computer 18 program was created.\" Oracle Am., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. PROPRIETY OF CONSIDERING AMERICAN PUBLIC'S BROAD-BASED, STABLE, NATIONAL CONSENSUS AGAINST RACIAL ADMISSIONS POLICIES",
		"context": "It is one thing when the Court ignores public opin- ion that favors the kind of discrimination barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. That's what courts are sup- posed to do: ignore the passions of the moment, exer- cise their independent judgment of what law requires, and ensure that Americans' ri ghts are not tossed aside by discriminatory policies without exceedingly rare, truly compelling justifications. 54 But Grutter presents the opposite scenario: the public isn't just unconvinced 51 Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 54 Federalist No. 78 (\"[I]ndependence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence of particul ar conjunctures, sometimes dis- seminate among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better in formation, and more deliberate re- flection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the mi-nor party in the community.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Foreign sovereigns fu ndamentally differ from other actors, let alone ordinary criminal defendants. For- eign sovereigns are \"abs olute[ly] independen[t],\" operating outside our constitu tional system, pursuant to their own laws and the law of nations. See Helmerich , 137 S. Ct. at 1319 (quoting Berizzi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Haling foreign sovereigns before American courts to answer to American law thus affronts the sovereign's \"independence and dignity.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "(quoting Berizzi Bros. , 271 U.S. at 575). As \"the founding era's foremost expert on the law of nations\" explained, one sov-ereign could not \"'set himself up for a judge of [another sovereign's] conduct, and to oblige him to alter it.'\" Fran- chise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Exercising any jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns was inconceivable. Foreign so vereigns enjoyed \"virtually absolute immunity\" from U.S. jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Exercising any jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns was inconceivable. Foreign so vereigns enjoyed \"virtually absolute immunity\" from U.S. jurisdiction. Verlinden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any attempt to bring foreign sovereigns into American courts—whether for criminal or civil offenses—would have blatantly violated \"the prevailing view of interna- tional law,\" under which \"a foreign state was absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state.\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Any attempt to bring foreign sovereigns into American courts—whether for criminal or civil offenses—would have blatantly violated \"the prevailing view of interna- tional law,\" under which \"a foreign state was absolutely immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of another state.\" U.S. Br. 51, Argentine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even when a sovereign entered another sovereign's territory, \"his dignity alone … exempt[ed] him from all jurisdiction.\" Vattel, supra , at 486 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Vattel, supra , at 486 (emphasis added). In short, \"[t]he freedom of a foreign sovereign from being haled into court as a defendant has impressive title- deeds.\" Nat'l City Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To this da y, \"[t]he exer cise of crimi- nal jurisdiction directly over another State … contravenes international law.\" Hazel Fox & Philippa Webb, The Law of State Immunity 91 (3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "2013). That red line was especially important at the Found- ing when America was a \"fle dgling Republic—struggling to receive international recognition.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Founders considered it \"of high import ance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations.\" The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Given the Republic-threatening consequences of attempting to regulate foreign sovereigns, this Court has held from the start that federal jurisdictional statutes pre- sumptively do not extend to foreign sovereig ns. For more than two centuries, the rule has been that to \"claim and exercise jurisdiction\" over a foreign sovereign in a way that breaches the sovereig n's \"immunities,\" Congress must act \"in a manner not to be misunderstood.\" Schooner [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]11 U.S. 146. The issue first arose in Schooner Exchange , where American claimants invoked another provision of the 1789 Act broadly granting federal jurisdiction over \"all civil causes of admiralty and mariti me jurisdiction.\" § 9, 1 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "L. Rev. 109, 136 & n.120 (2010), Schooner Exchange rests on a broader, related clear-statem ent rule: courts will not construe federal statutes \"to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has put it more recently, before so intruding on the \"delicate field of international rela-tions there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.\" 372 U.S. 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "6 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "6 U.S. 64. As this Court has put it more recently, before so intruding on the \"delicate field of international rela-tions there must be present the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Since Schooner Exchange , this Court has repeat- edly reiterated that Congress must speak clearly to extend federal-court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities, including commercial enter-prises.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Since Schooner Exchange , this Court has repeat- edly reiterated that Congress must speak clearly to extend federal-court jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities, including commercial enter-prises. Generally worded juri sdictional grants do not do the trick. For instance, L'Invincible , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], inter- preted the same admiralty-juri sdiction provision of the 1789 Act to exclude sovereign instrumentalities operated by private individuals acting on the sovereign's behalf. Americans sought to reclaim a ship captured by French privateers operating unde r French commission. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "at 116 (citation omitted). 21 So too, the Federal Employer s' Liability Act contains \"broad jurisdictional language\" imposing liability on rail- roads engaged in \"'interstate or foreign commerce.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Imposing liability for activity abroad \"would be an interference with the authorit y of another sovereign, con- trary to the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "at 32 (citation omit- ted). This Court has even refuse d to apply U.S. labor law to a strike in a U.S. port by foreign seamen against their foreign ship. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Again, the Court would not \"run interference in such a delicate field of international rela-tions\" without \"the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Congress Did Not Authorize Criminal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Sovereigns",
		"context": "Thus, the Court's cases since the Founding have charted a consistent course: in the face of a generally worded statute, federal cour ts do not assume that Con- gress meant to reach foreign actors, let alone foreign sovereigns. Courts \"assume that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign inter ests of other nations\" and follow international law. F. Hoffman-La Roche [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If regulating conduct abroad \"creates a se rious risk of interference with a foreign nation's ability independently to regulate 22 its own commercial affairs,\" id. at 165, regulating the for- eign nation itself creates even greater risks.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "(Lambda Legal Amicus Br. 8.) Ac- cord Hively , 853 F.3d at 347 (acknowledging that sex and sexual orientation are different; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 Bostock essentially argues that merely noticing or being aware of an employee's sex is the equivalent of being motivated by the employee's sex. However, this is incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "12 Bostock essentially argues that merely noticing or being aware of an employee's sex is the equivalent of being motivated by the employee's sex. However, this is incorrect. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Staub v. 12 The Court's decisions concerning the constitutional rights of gays and lesbians confirm that the Court never has treated sex-ual orientation discrimination as a form of sex discrimination. (Bostock Br. 46 n.14 (citing cases) .)",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2028",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "Hively , 853 F.3d at 372 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 33 Proctor Hosp. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Price Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 1805 (\"Race and gender always 'play a role' in an employ- ment decision in the benign sense that these are hu-man characteristics of which decisionmakers are aware\") (O'Connor, J., concurring). An employer's intent or motive is the reason for the challenged employment decision. Price Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 1790.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "For this reason, the Courts of Appeals routinely have upheld employment pr actices that require the employer to be aware of th e employee's sex in order to apply a policy that does not treat one sex more favora- bly than the other sex. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"an employer does not contra-vene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness stand- ards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on bo th men and women requir- ing the same level of physical fitness for each\"); 444 F.3d 1104; 502 F.3d 1216 (\"[b]ecause an employer's re- quirement that employees use restrooms matching their biological sex does not expose biological males to disadvantageous terms and does not discriminate against employees who fail to conform to gender stereo- types, [the employer's] proffered reason of concern over restroom usage is not dis criminatory on the basis of sex\"). See also 518 U.S. 515. In sum, \"[u]nder the longstanding view, univer- sally accepted by federal circuits for forty years, Title VII prohibits employers from favoring men over women, or vice versa.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "812 F.3d 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "For this reason, the Courts of Appeals routinely have upheld employment pr actices that require the employer to be aware of th e employee's sex in order to apply a policy that does not treat one sex more favora- bly than the other sex. See, e.g. , 812 F.3d 340 (\"an employer does not contra-vene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness stand- ards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on bo th men and women requir- ing the same level of physical fitness for each\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 502 F.3d 1216 (\"[b]ecause an employer's re- quirement that employees use restrooms matching their biological sex does not expose biological males to disadvantageous terms and does not discriminate against employees who fail to conform to gender stereo- types, [the employer's] proffered reason of concern over restroom usage is not dis criminatory on the basis of sex\"). See also 518 U.S. 515. In sum, \"[u]nder the longstanding view, univer- sally accepted by federal circuits for forty years, Title VII prohibits employers from favoring men over women, or vice versa.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Decisions Based On Sexual Orientation Are Not Motivated By Sex And Do Not Favor One Sex Over The Other Sex",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 812 F.3d 340 (\"an employer does not contra-vene Title VII when it utilizes physical fitness stand- ards that distinguish between the sexes on the basis of their physiological differences but impose an equal burden of compliance on bo th men and women requir- ing the same level of physical fitness for each\"); 444 F.3d 1104; 502 F.3d 1216 (\"[b]ecause an employer's re- quirement that employees use restrooms matching their biological sex does not expose biological males to disadvantageous terms and does not discriminate against employees who fail to conform to gender stereo- types, [the employer's] proffered reason of concern over restroom usage is not dis criminatory on the basis of sex\"). See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, \"[u]nder the longstanding view, univer- sally accepted by federal circuits for forty years, Title VII prohibits employers from favoring men over women, or vice versa.\" Wittmer , 915 F.3d at 334 (Ho, J., concur- ring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress eschewed an obvious alternative formulation for extending the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "630(b). \"When Con- gress amends one statutory provision but not another, it is presumed to have acted intentionally.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has thus previously explained that it \"cannot ig- nore Congress' decision to amend Title VII's relevant provisions but not m ake similar changes to the ADEA.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress eschewed an obvious alternative formulation for extending the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "Here, too, Congress chose to amend Section 630(b)'s definition of \"employer\" rather than Section 630(a)'s definition of \"person,\" and its choice to forgo a clear alternative path \"requires respect, not disregard.\" Wisconsin Ce nt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Tellingly, in the same enactment, Congress made the same choice in amending the FLSA— on which parts of the ADEA had been modeled . See 434 U.S. 575.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress eschewed an obvious alternative formulation for extending the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 2067. Tellingly, in the same enactment, Congress made the same choice in amending the FLSA— on which parts of the ADEA had been modeled . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner does not appear to dispute that the 1974 amendments expanded the FLS A to reach all governmental entities , regardless of their size. FLSA Amendments § 6(a), 88 Stat .",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "Those limits mean that, in minority-rule jurisdictions, Rule 50 movants must dilute their sufficiency of the evidence arguments—the undisputed core of Rule 50 practice— by asking the district court to reconsider its earlier holding on a purely legal issue. Rule 50 exists to \"focus on the evidence that was actually admitted at trial\" because the trial evidence, not the summary judgment record, is what matters for 4 evidentiary purposes after trial. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ericsson 955 F.3d 1317. For that reason, \"once evidence is presented at a trial, any challenge to evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment becomes moot.\" 688 F.3d 779; accord Chemetall 320 F.3d 714.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.3d 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "373 F.3d 275; see also Ericsson 955 F.3d 1317. For that reason, \"once evidence is presented at a trial, any challenge to evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment becomes moot.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Chemetall 320 F.3d 714. Indeed, as this Court has \"repeatedly held, an appellate court is 'powerless' to review the sufficiency of the evidence after trial\" in the absence of Rule 50 motions. 562 U.S. 180.",
		"citation_value_orig": "688 F.3d 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "373 F.3d 275; see also Ericsson 955 F.3d 1317. For that reason, \"once evidence is presented at a trial, any challenge to evidentiary sufficiency at summary judgment becomes moot.\" 688 F.3d 779; accord Chemetall [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, as this Court has \"repeatedly held, an appellate court is 'powerless' to review the sufficiency of the evidence after trial\" in the absence of Rule 50 motions. 562 U.S. 180.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F.3d 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "688 F.3d 779; accord Chemetall 320 F.3d 714. Indeed, as this Court has \"repeatedly held, an appellate court is 'powerless' to review the sufficiency of the evidence after trial\" in the absence of Rule 50 motions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the same logic does not extend to purely legal summary-judgment issues, the resolution of which is necessarily unaffected by the trial evidence. Chemetall , 320 F.3d at 719 (\"[T]he principle that an order denying summary judgment is rendered moot by trial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": ". is intended for cases in which the basis for the denial was that the party opposing the motion had presented enough evidence to go to trial.\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). The heartland of Rule 50 practice is therefore challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, 5 not legal issues. Parties do not have infinite space in which to mount those challenges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 F.3d 1313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "No experienced advocate would willingly choose the second course. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Usually, . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "Respondent's incorporation-by-reference suggestion thus has no foundation in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. What's more, courts are loath to consider arguments raised in just a sentence or two and not fully developed in a brief. See, e.g., Grayson O [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 469 F.3d 402. Rather, courts routinely consider such arguments forfeited.3 This axiomatic principle 3 As the previous citation sentence shows, courts often use the words \"waiver\" and \"forfeiture\" interchangeably. 540 U.S. 443.",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "Respondent's incorporation-by-reference suggestion thus has no foundation in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. What's more, courts are loath to consider arguments raised in just a sentence or two and not fully developed in a brief. See, e.g., Grayson O 856 F.3d 307; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, courts routinely consider such arguments forfeited.3 This axiomatic principle 3 As the previous citation sentence shows, courts often use the words \"waiver\" and \"forfeiture\" interchangeably. 540 U.S. 443.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 F.3d 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "See, e.g., Grayson O 856 F.3d 307; 469 F.3d 402. Rather, courts routinely consider such arguments forfeited.3 This axiomatic principle 3 As the previous citation sentence shows, courts often use the words \"waiver\" and \"forfeiture\" interchangeably. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right\" as opposed to the \"intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,\" forfeiture is the more appropriate label for the effect of a party's failure to adequately 10 applies with equal force to perfunctory renewals of summary-judgment arguments. See, e.g., Equal Emp't Opportunity 503 F. Supp. 3d 801.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Requiring parties to renew purely legal arguments in motions for judgment as a matter of law puts them between a rock and a hard place and disserves judicial economy",
		"context": "Accordingly, respondent's suggestion of a sentence-or-two recitation is no panacea for the obvious practical problems associated with requiring brief an issue. Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 11 parties who lost at summary judgment to reassert purely legal issues in Rule 50 motions. Parties should not be required to seek reconsideration as a matter of course solely to ensure that the already-decided issue can be raised on appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS APPLIED BY THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT, ART. X, SECTION 6 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "The First Amendment's Religion Clauses represent a unifying principle of religious neutrality that exerts competing pressures on courts as they evaluate the legislative balance -beam routine that states must per- form to avoid both excessive entanglement with and disapprobation of religio n. While th is Court has never found the government's footing to be so narrow as to constitutionalize the entire field of relations between church and state , it has never been hesitant to offer correction when states fall on the sid e of either estab- lishment or burdens on free exercise. Since [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the space for permissible state action between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has been referred to as the \"play in the joints,\" and discrete lines of precedent chart its borders with either prohibited domain. At the establishment frontier a watch word has been \" endorsement ,\" the overriding imperative be- ing that government must avoid even the appearance of unequal citizenship between those who do and do not adhere to a favored religio n. Cty. of 492 U.S. 573 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS APPLIED BY THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT, ART. X, SECTION 6 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Since 397 U.S. 664 , the space for permissible state action between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has been referred to as the \"play in the joints,\" and discrete lines of precedent chart its borders with either prohibited domain. At the establishment frontier a watch word has been \" endorsement ,\" the overriding imperative be- ing that government must avoid even the appearance of unequal citizenship between those who do and do not adhere to a favored religio n. Cty. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . At the free -exercise frontier, a s described in Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2023 , the boundary sits between what an organization does and what an organization is. States ma y not deny religious organizations generally available benefits just because those groups are religious , but only when it is necessary to avoid direct aid to a pastoral function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS APPLIED BY THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT, ART. X, SECTION 6 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "The Tax Credit Program is not such an expenditure. Second , if § 6 simply mandates a maximalist posi- tion with in the \"play in the joints ,\" it repre sents a le- gitimate and permissible balancing of concerns in pur- suit of state neutrality. Were this case to involve the training of the clergy , as in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , or other forms of state subsidization of doc- trinal religious education and devotional practices , § 6 could block such a program even if that result is not required by the U.S. Constitution . Whatever interest the sta te might have in ministers, their purpose, un- ambiguously, is to evangelize. Just as Montana would be free to fund these endeavors for the secular pur- poses of aiding her citizens' educational aspirations , the state is equally free to decide that the risked infer- ence of establishment would be too great.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS APPLIED BY THE MONTANA SUPREME COURT, ART. X, SECTION 6 OF THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION VIOLATES THE U.S. CONSTITUTION",
		"context": "Third , it is only when § 6 creates invidious dis tinc- tions between secular and religious actors that it runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause. Hard -on-their-luck preachers may not be excluded from public soup kitch- ens, nor their children barred from public schools. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The question here is whether such discrimination exists when a tax-credit program is struck down merely be- cause it leads to private funds being directed by tax- payers to facilitate attendanc e at religious ly affiliated 6 schools. Such a neutral -funding program neither re- semble s Locke 's direct support of devotional education , nor violate s the Establishment Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6; ABA Model Rules of Profl Conduct, r. 1.2 (2016). Indeed, if defense counsel seeks to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a client, the record must be clear that the client has given informed consent to the guilty plea. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Through a plea of not guilty, the defendant requires the prosecution to carry its constitutional burden and prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re397 U.S. 358; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "384 U.S. 1. Through a plea of not guilty, the defendant requires the prosecution to carry its constitutional burden and prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. The decision to plead 4 authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.\" 463 U.S. 745.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "In re397 U.S. 358; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. The decision to plead 4 authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These decisions are grounded in inherently personal rights, and fundamental fairness requires that the accused retain the autonomy to decide them. See 553 U.S. 242.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "463 U.S. 745. These decisions are grounded in inherently personal rights, and fundamental fairness requires that the accused retain the autonomy to decide them. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A concession of guilt by the defense lawyer where the defendant's clear and unequivocally expressed decision is to maintain his innocence necessarily injures these constitutional protections. 1.Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty Allowing counsel to concede guilt over the client's express objection would deprive the defendant of his fundamental right to plead not guilty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "Jones, 463 U.S. at 753 n.6; ABA Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct, r. 1.2 (2016). Indeed, if defense counsel seeks to enter a guilty plea on behalf of a client, the record must be clear that the client has given informed consent to the guilty plea. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Through a plea of not guilty, the defendant requires the prosecution to carry its constitutional burden and prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re397 U.S. 358; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "384 U.S. 1. Through a plea of not guilty, the defendant requires the prosecution to carry its constitutional burden and prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. The decision to plead 5 not guilty reflects the defendant's choice of his ultimate trial objective: to secure an acquittal. Regardless of the lawyer's view of the likelihood of success, a refusal to honor this particular wish of the defendant has been recognized as a severe infringement of the client's constitutionally protected decision to plead not guilty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "See, e.g., Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. Moreover, in defying the defendant through this unauthorized concession, counsel unfairly and irrevocably eliminates potential arguments otherwise available to a client choosing to plead not guilty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, in circumstances where the defendant has expressed no opinion about conceding guilt, this Court has held that a concession of guilt is not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187-88.",
		"citation_value_orig": "223 P.3d 686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Conceding Guilt Against a Client's Express Desire Compromises the Fundamental Right to Plead Not Guilty",
		"context": "See, e.g., Cooke, 977 A.2d at 843. Moreover, in defying the defendant through this unauthorized concession, counsel unfairly and irrevocably eliminates potential arguments otherwise available to a client choosing to plead not guilty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, in circumstances where the defendant has expressed no opinion about conceding guilt, this Court has held that a concession of guilt is not the functional equivalent of a guilty plea. Nixon, 543 U.S. at 187-88.",
		"citation_value_orig": "223 P.3d 686",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized that arbitra- tion's \"speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness\" were the core \"virtues Congress originally saw in ar-bitration.\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333; 14 Penn Plaza 556 U.S. 247— arbitration is a superior alternative to litigation to resolve disputes and receive compensation. But that invites the question: if injured parties have the option to resolve their claims in a more favorable arbitral forum, why do so many in- stead initially file in federal court, often—like Mr. Bielski and Mr. Suski have done here—styling their complaint as a putative class action? The answer is unsurprising.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized that arbitra- tion's \"speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness\" were the core \"virtues Congress originally saw in ar-bitration.\" Epic Sys. 138 S. Ct. 1612; accord AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 14 Penn Plaza 556 U.S. 247— arbitration is a superior alternative to litigation to resolve disputes and receive compensation. But that invites the question: if injured parties have the option to resolve their claims in a more favorable arbitral forum, why do so many in- stead initially file in federal court, often—like Mr. Bielski and Mr. Suski have done here—styling their complaint as a putative class action? The answer is unsurprising.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.",
		"context": "Indeed, this Court has repeatedly recognized that arbitra- tion's \"speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness\" were the core \"virtues Congress originally saw in ar-bitration.\" Epic Sys. 138 S. Ct. 1612; accord AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333; 14 Penn Plaza [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]— arbitration is a superior alternative to litigation to resolve disputes and receive compensation. But that invites the question: if injured parties have the option to resolve their claims in a more favorable arbitral forum, why do so many in- stead initially file in federal court, often—like Mr. Bielski and Mr. Suski have done here—styling their complaint as a putative class action? The answer is unsurprising.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.",
		"context": "This princi- ple is equally applicable to attempted end-runs of arbitration agreements via federal class actions. It is \"well known\" to plaintiffs' attorneys that class actions \"can unfairly 'place pressure on the defendant to settle even unmeritorious claims,'\" Epic Sys. , 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, although these cases may eventually be sent to arbitration, the plaintiffs' bar knows that in class proceedings, \"the risk of an error will often be- come unacceptable\" and \"even a small chance of a devastating loss\" inherent in class actions may cause an \"in terrorem\" pressure to settle independent of the merits. Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Empirical Data Show that Arbitration Benefits Consumers Who are Actually Injured.",
		"context": "Revealing this gambit, sometimes plaintiffs them- selves move to compel individual arbitration after losing class certification —an implicit recognition that they are better off resolving their disputes according to their arbitration agreements for the reasons dis- cussed above. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reversing dis-trict court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration following denial of class certification, and rejecting defendants' argument that they \"met their burden to show that they were prejudiced by the time and expense of litigating this case for the past three years\" (citation omitted)). As the following section shows, the Ninth Circuit's minority approach permitting district court litigation to proceed while the appellate court simultaneously decides whether the case can be litigated in court at all exacerbates these issues by rewarding and encour-aging the tactical filing of class action lawsuits for claims that should be individually arbitrated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 F. App'x 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Certiorari is not appropriate because this case is not justiciable",
		"context": "s not justiciable, (2) there is no m eaningful circuit split, (3) this case is not a good vehicle to reexamine Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and (4) Colorado's Anti -Discrimination Act (the Act) is constitutional. First, 303 Creative LLC and its owner (together, the Company) fail to show that it faces a credible threat of enforcement under the Act. Nor can it demonstrate that the case is fit f or judicial review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Certiorari is not appropriate because this case is not justiciable",
		"context": "at (4) . In the past ten years, the Commission has set only ten public accommodation s cases for hearing before an adminis trative law judge . Since this Court's decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Commission has not adju- dicated a public accommodations case through a final hearing. Since then, a ll the cases that the Commission has referred for hearing have resulted in settlements , and no administrative law judge has issued a decision in a public accommodations case. For the same reason, the Commission has not issued a final agency order in 5 a public accommodations case since its revision to the Masterpiece order based on this Court's ruling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around",
		"context": "art. I, § 2, cl. 3, reflecting that \"'every individual of the community at large has an equal right to the protection of government,'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Constitution also establishes explicit rules concerning the right to vote in federal elections and to run for Congress, recognizing that \"[i]f the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. At the Framing, the Constitution Established a System of Government in Which the People Choose Their Elected Representatives, Not the Other Way Around",
		"context": "Even more on point, the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 gives Congress the power to override state regulation of the time, place, and manner of federal elections, a reflection of the Framers' \"distrust of the States re- garding elections.\" U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As history shows, this grant of power was \"a safeguard against manipulation of electoral rules by politicians and factions in the States to entrench themselves or place their interests over those of the electorate.\" Ariz. State Legislature , 135 S. Ct. at 2672; see Vieth , 541 U.S. at 275 (discuss- ing the Framers' conclusion that \"Congress must be 11 given the power to check partisan manipulation of the election process by the States\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The cat's-paw theory cannot impute intent among co-equal, independent actors such as legislators",
		"context": "That was reversible error. 46 \"The term 'cat's paw' derives from a fable conceived by Aesop … and [was] injecte d into United States employment discrimination law by Judge Posner in 1990.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Courts most often use the \"cat's paw\" theory \"to hold [an] employer liable for the animus of a su- pervisor who was not charged with making the ulti- mate employment decision.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The cat's-paw theory cannot impute intent among co-equal, independent actors such as legislators",
		"context": "Bu t princi- ples of agency law are central to this theory's prem- ise. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of Agency §219 (Am. Law Inst. 1958) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The cat's-paw theory cannot impute intent among co-equal, independent actors such as legislators",
		"context": "JA 719. That reasoning accords precisely with this Court's prior warning against in- validating a statute \"on the basis of what fewer than a handful\" of legislators said about it, since \"[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute i s not necessarily what motivates scores of 47 others to enact it[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Worse yet, the Nint h Circuit imputed unlawful ra- cial animus to the entire Arizona Legislature not based on statements from a \" handful\" of legislators, but on statements from just one: former Sen. Don Shooter. JA 677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Hot Pursuit Exception Has Common-Law Roots",
		"context": ". This Court is \"guided\" in Fourth Amendment cases not just by interest-balancing but also \"by 'the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing.'\" Atwater , 532 U.S. at 326 (quoting Wil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The weight afforded to Framing-era practice varies. To some ques- tions, the common law provides clear answers, e.g., Wilson , 514 U.S. at 933; as to others, \"the common-law rule cannot be directly translated to the present day,\" 471 U.S. 1; see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 927",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Hot Pursuit Exception Has Common-Law Roots",
		"context": "Atwater , 532 U.S. at 326 (quoting Wil- 514 U.S. 927). The weight afforded to Framing-era practice varies. To some ques- tions, the common law provides clear answers, e.g., Wilson , 514 U.S. at 933; as to others, \"the common-law rule cannot be directly translated to the present day,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g. , 445 U.S. 573. This case falls somewhere in between: Although the present-day landscape differs significantly from the common-law map, common-law authorities generally considered warrantless entry to be justified in hot pur-suit cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Hot Pursuit Exception Has Common-Law Roots",
		"context": "The weight afforded to Framing-era practice varies. To some ques- tions, the common law provides clear answers, e.g., Wilson , 514 U.S. at 933; as to others, \"the common-law rule cannot be directly translated to the present day,\" 471 U.S. 1; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case falls somewhere in between: Although the present-day landscape differs significantly from the common-law map, common-law authorities generally considered warrantless entry to be justified in hot pur-suit cases. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Hot Pursuit Exception Has Common-Law Roots",
		"context": "a. Hot pursuit, as a distinct justification for war- rantless entry, has \"deep r oots in 17th- and 18th-cen- tury English common law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is little dispute that constables could chase a fleeing felon into a home. E.g., 1 J OSEPH CHITTY & RICHARD PETERS , A PRACTI- CAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 23–31 (1819).",
		"citation_value_orig": "867 N.E.2d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "This argument, however, is foreclosed by the very legal treatise upon which FEC relies to make it: Wright & Miller's treatise explicitly explains that \"deliberate provocation of litigation does not defeat the existence of a controversy.\" Charles Alan Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3531.5 (2019). Wright & Miller's conclusion reflects this Court's longstanding reasoning in Havens Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which ruled that housing applicants had standing to sue a realty company even when the applicants' sole purpose in applying for housing was to uncover racial discrimination. Thus, \"when an individual searches for and finds a violation of the law, it is the violation itself—not the search—that causes the plaintiff 16 injury.\" 887 F.3d 845.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "Wright & Miller's conclusion reflects this Court's longstanding reasoning in Havens Realty 455 U.S. 363, which ruled that housing applicants had standing to sue a realty company even when the applicants' sole purpose in applying for housing was to uncover racial discrimination. Thus, \"when an individual searches for and finds a violation of the law, it is the violation itself—not the search—that causes the plaintiff 16 injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same logic applies where, as here, a plaintiff \"searches for and finds a violation of the law\" by intentionally flouting a legal requirement to create an injury-in-fact for a lawsuit. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "887 F.3d 845",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "The same logic applies where, as here, a plaintiff \"searches for and finds a violation of the law\" by intentionally flouting a legal requirement to create an injury-in-fact for a lawsuit. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FEC quotes but fails to grasp Wright & Miller's explanation that \"[s]tanding is not defeated merely because the plaintiff has in some sense contributed to his own injury\"—rather \"the injury [must be] so completely due to the plaintiff's own fault as to break the causal chain.\" FEC Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "An injury is \"completely due to the plaintiff's own fault\" only if it fully displaces all other causes. Such displacement does not occur where a plaintiff intentionally violates a law to challenge its constitutionality because the entire point is to preserve the causal chain by ensuring that the challenged law causes the injury. This strategy has been a keystone in the effort to protect constitutional rights through litigation since at least the time of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled by 347 U.S. 483. The fact that Senator Cruz \"has in some sense contributed to his own injury\" by intentionally delaying repayment does not break the causal chain 17 between Section 304's loan-repayment limit and the injury-in-fact. Rather, as FEC acknowledges, the intentional \"delay had … been essential to trigger the regulatory requirement that $10,000 of the total loan amount be recharacterized as a contribution,\" and thus not repayable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "An injury is \"completely due to the plaintiff's own fault\" only if it fully displaces all other causes. Such displacement does not occur where a plaintiff intentionally violates a law to challenge its constitutionality because the entire point is to preserve the causal chain by ensuring that the challenged law causes the injury. This strategy has been a keystone in the effort to protect constitutional rights through litigation since at least the time of 163 U.S. 537, overruled by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that Senator Cruz \"has in some sense contributed to his own injury\" by intentionally delaying repayment does not break the causal chain 17 between Section 304's loan-repayment limit and the injury-in-fact. Rather, as FEC acknowledges, the intentional \"delay had … been essential to trigger the regulatory requirement that $10,000 of the total loan amount be recharacterized as a contribution,\" and thus not repayable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Cases cited by FEC in support of its \"self-inflicted injury argument\" do not alter this conclusion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 540 U.S. 93; and 426 U.S. 660, cited at FEC Br. at 21-23. Unlike here, the statutory provisions challenged in FEC's cases did not directly inflict the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Cases cited by FEC in support of its \"self-inflicted injury argument\" do not alter this conclusion. See 568 U.S. 398; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and 426 U.S. 660, cited at FEC Br. at 21-23. Unlike here, the statutory provisions challenged in FEC's cases did not directly inflict the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Cases cited by FEC in support of its \"self-inflicted injury argument\" do not alter this conclusion. See 568 U.S. 398; 540 U.S. 93; and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cited at FEC Br. at 21-23. Unlike here, the statutory provisions challenged in FEC's cases did not directly inflict the plaintiffs' alleged injuries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "Injuries sustained based on \"such a fear [are] insufficient to create standing\" because they were entirely the result of plaintiffs' own decisions, rather than the operation of FISA. Id. The same is true of Pennsylvania , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Court held that the decisions by a group of States to reimburse their own residents for taxes levied by other States was not a basis for standing. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. APPELLEES' INTENTIONAL DELAY OF REPAYMENT DOES NOT DEFEAT THEIR STANDING",
		"context": "This logic, however, would require Appellees to avoid an injury by subjecting themselves to the loan-repayment framework they contend is unconstitutional. For standing purposes, the Court must accept Senator Cruz's claim that Section 304's loan-repayment limitation unconstitutionally burdens free speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If so, then Senator Cruz had a First Amendment right to repay the loan using post-election rather than pre-election 20 contributions. Mandating that Senator Cruz instead use pre-election funds, as FEC urges, therefore would require him to forfeit a right he is assumed to have, and to subject himself to the very framework that is assumed to unconstitutionally burden his free speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
		"context": "591, 594 (2016) (collecting case statistics). Rightly so—this Court has made clear statements about the narrow scope of review under AEDPA, the strong policy favoring arbitration reflected in the Arbi- tration Act, the Sixth Amendment's requirement that facts that increase a criminal sentence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and when a constitutional right is clearly established. Yet despite the Court's 20 directions, lower courts ignored AEDPA, weakened ar- bitration clauses, carved out baseless exceptions to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and nar- rowed qualified immunity. And so, in later cases violat-ing those clear rules, the Court summarily reversed egregiously errant lower-court decisions to ensure con- sistent, fair, and correct application of this Court's opinions. During the Civil Rights era, too, the Court exer- cised its summary-reversal powers to defend constitu- tional rights under siege by recalcitrant state officials who refused to follow the obvious implication of the Court's merits decisions or even concede that certain rights existed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
		"context": "And so, in later cases violat-ing those clear rules, the Court summarily reversed egregiously errant lower-court decisions to ensure con- sistent, fair, and correct application of this Court's opinions. During the Civil Rights era, too, the Court exer- cised its summary-reversal powers to defend constitu- tional rights under siege by recalcitrant state officials who refused to follow the obvious implication of the Court's merits decisions or even concede that certain rights existed. For example, this Court issued a flurry of summary decisions to extend the desegregation com-mand of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to public golf courses, public buses, public beaches, public housing, and segregated traffic courts. See 350 U.S. 879. Those decisions served both to bridge Brown 's holding beyond the schoolhouse context and as a rebuke to wayward states that refused to recognize the constitutional rights of their citizens.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Western-state courts and officials need a clear message from this Court: summary reversal",
		"context": "They are instead features of a healthy democratic society. This Court has now several times promised that its decisions recognizing the rights of gay and lesbian Americans would not simultaneously diminish the rights of religious Americans. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Masterpiece I , 138 S. Ct. at 1727 (\"[T]he religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instance s protected forms of ex- pression. \"); Obergefell , 576 U.S. at 679 (\"[I]t must be 22 emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with ut- most, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same- sex marriage should not be condoned.\"). Religious Americans, and those that defend them like the Public Trust Institute, are depending on this Court to make good on its promises.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The word \"expenses,\" without any reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees",
		"context": "Because the background rule is that each person pays his or her own attorneys' fees, the Court has held several times that Congress's use of a broad term such as \"compensation,\" \"costs ,\" or \"expenses ,\" without an express reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees. Thus in Baker Botts 135 S. Ct. 2158, the Court held that a statute authorizing the award of \"compensation\" for \"necessary service s\" does not authorize the award of attorneys' fees. Likewise, in Key Tronic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a stat- ute authorizing the award of \"necessary costs\" does not authorize the award of attorneys' fees. Such \"generalized commands,\" the Court concluded, are not sufficient, without a specific reference to attor-neys' fees. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The word \"expenses,\" without any reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees",
		"context": "See also 3 Although our brief focuses on attorneys' fees, the argument in section A applies equally to other professional fees, such as fees for accountants and consultants. These professional fees, like attorneys' fees, are nothing like child care an d trans portation expenses in nature or magnitude. 10 Summit Valley Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, for a general term like \"expenses\" or \"costs\" to encompass attorneys' fees, the statute must explicitly include attorneys' fees in the defini- tion of that general term. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The word \"expenses,\" without any reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees",
		"context": "By contrast, for a general term like \"expenses\" or \"costs\" to encompass attorneys' fees, the statute must explicitly include attorneys' fees in the defini- tion of that general term. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (interpreting the IDEA, which authorizes the court to \"award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs\"); 473 U.S. 1's fai lure to mention attorneys' fees is particularly telling, because other restitution statutes do specifically authorize restitution of the victim's attorneys' fees. For instance, under the res- titution statute applicable to sexual abuse offenses, the court is expressly authorized to include the vic- tim's \"attorneys' fees\" in the restitution award. 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The word \"expenses,\" without any reference to attorneys' fees, does not encompass attorneys' fees",
		"context": "By contrast, for a general term like \"expenses\" or \"costs\" to encompass attorneys' fees, the statute must explicitly include attorneys' fees in the defini- tion of that general term. See, e.g. , 134 S. Ct. 1188 (interpreting the IDEA, which authorizes the court to \"award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s fai lure to mention attorneys' fees is particularly telling, because other restitution statutes do specifically authorize restitution of the victim's attorneys' fees. For instance, under the res- titution statute applicable to sexual abuse offenses, the court is expressly authorized to include the vic- tim's \"attorneys' fees\" in the restitution award. 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. IMMEDIATE REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO END ABUSIVE ATS SUITS WHOSE PRINCIPAL GOAL IS TO ATTRACT PUBLICITY BY KEEPING LITIGATION ALIVE",
		"context": "When the revival of ATS litigation began four decades ago, ATS claims typically targeted deposedforeign officials accused of torturing citizens of their own countries. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But for the past 20 years, mostall ATS litigation has targeted large multi-nationalcorporations. The lawsuits rarely allege that the corporate defendant violated human rights (by, e.g., engaging in genocide, torture, or slavery).",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.2d 876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Policy Concerns Are No Basis to Rewrite Statutory Text",
		"context": "Securities laws are no exception. This Court has rejected interpretations of the securities laws that de- pend on their perceived remedial purpose rather than the text Congress enacted . In Er nst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the plaintiffs took issue with the longstanding interpretation of Sec- tion 10(b) requiring plaintiffs to prove scienter, argu- ing that the \" 'remedial purposes' of the [securities] Acts demand a con struction ...that embraces negli- gence as a standard of liability.\" Id. at 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "Section 1915(g) does not require that the action have been dismissed \"with prejudice,\" and it does not create an exception for actions dismissed \"without prejudice.\" The absence of such limiting language indicates that Section 1915(g) applies to all dismissals on any of the three enumerated grounds. See, e.g., Virginia Uranium , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (new ac- tion may not be filed inv olving the National Vaccine In- jury Compensation program where a plaintiff has pre- viously brought a suit \"which was dismissed with preju- dice\"); 29 U.S.C. 216(c) (Secretary's filing of a suit bars employee lawsuits unless \"such action is dismissed with- out prejudice on motion of the Secretary\"). Those pro- visions demonstrate that Congress is aware of the dif- ference between dismissals with and without prejudice —and when it intends to refer exclusively to either type, it says so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "In Section 1915(g) , Congress referred broadly to all dismis sals on certain grounds without any limita- tion for prejudicial effect, and that textual contrast is alone fatal to petitioner's case , even if this Court had not interpreted Section 1915(g) before. Of course, t his Court has i nterpreted Section 1915(g) before , and it declined to read in a limit that Congress did not provide. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court unanimously rejected an analo- gous request to \"read the [PLRA] as if it\" included terms that wer e absent from \"the statute itself.\" Id. at 1763 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "at 1763 -1764 . Moreover, t he Court's other PLRA precedents simi- larly decline to read extra -textual limitations into the statute . For example, i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court observed that, in interpreting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, it has \"reject[ed] eve ry attempt to deviate \" from the statute's \"textual man- date\" by creating exceptions that Congress did not in- clude. Id. at 1857 (citing 548 U.S. 81; 534 U.S. 516; 532 U.S. 731).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "For example, i n 136 S. Ct. 1850, the Court observed that, in interpreting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, it has \"reject[ed] eve ry attempt to deviate \" from the statute's \"textual man- date\" by creating exceptions that Congress did not in- clude. Id. at 1857 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 534 U.S. 516; 532 U.S. 731). The Court reiterated that judges have no discretion to \"add unwritten limits onto \" a statute's \" rigorous textual requirements.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 81",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "For example, i n 136 S. Ct. 1850, the Court observed that, in interpreting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, it has \"reject[ed] eve ry attempt to deviate \" from the statute's \"textual man- date\" by creating exceptions that Congress did not in- clude. Id. at 1857 (citing 548 U.S. 81; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 532 U.S. 731). The Court reiterated that judges have no discretion to \"add unwritten limits onto \" a statute's \" rigorous textual requirements.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "For example, i n 136 S. Ct. 1850, the Court observed that, in interpreting the PLRA's exhaustion requirement, it has \"reject[ed] eve ry attempt to deviate \" from the statute's \"textual man- date\" by creating exceptions that Congress did not in- clude. Id. at 1857 (citing 548 U.S. 81; 534 U.S. 516; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court reiterated that judges have no discretion to \"add unwritten limits onto \" a statute's \" rigorous textual requirements.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "Ibid. And in the Court's most recent PLRA case, it echoed that sentiment, observing that \"respect for Congress's prerogatives as p olicymaker means carefully attending to the words it chose rather than replacing them with others of [the Court's] own.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, \"t he words [Congress] chose\" in S ection 1915(g) make only one criterion relevant in determining whether the dismissal of an action counts as a strike: the \"grounds\" —that is, the court's basis or reason —for the dismissal. Black's Law Dictionary 710 (7th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "Whether an action was dis- missed with prejudice has no bearing on that criterion. Rather, the prejudice distinction determines whether a dismissal will \"bar[] the plaintiff from returning later, to the same court, with the same underlying claim.\" 15 Semtek Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An action dismissed with prejudice is an \" 'adjudication upon the merits ' \" that will \"bar[] re- filing of the same claim.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "To the contrary, a district court may dismiss an action on any one of the three enu- merated grounds with or without prejudice. A few years before the PLRA was enacted, this Court recognized that a dismiss al for frivolousness or maliciousness un- der the in forma pauperis statute may be either \"with or without prejudice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Courts of appeals have recognized the same remains true for that provision as amended and expanded by the PLRA. See, e.g., 133 F.3d 546617 Fed. Appx. 114136 S. Ct. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "504 U.S. 25 . Courts of appeals have recognized the same remains true for that provision as amended and expanded by the PLRA. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]617 Fed. Appx. 114136 S. Ct. 1. Dismissals on the ground that a complaint \"fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted \" may 16 also be with or without prejudice. 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "15-16) that although \"most\" Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals are with prejudice, \"some\" are issued without prejudice —where, for example, it ap- pears that the defect in the complaint might ultimately be remedied .2 Petitioner therefore explicitly acknowl- edges that, under Rule 12(b)(6), a dismissal for \"failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted\" may be a dismissal either with or without prejudice. When a statutory term is \"obviously transplanted from another legal source, \" it generally \"brings the old soil with it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the phrase maintained its broad, well -established meaning as a term that covers dismissals issued both with and without prejudice. 2 This Court and th e courts of appeals have considered cases in- volving both forms of dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Northwest, 572 U.S. 273881 F.3d 1155535 F.3d 1316 should be understood as a term of art referring exclusive ly to dismissal s with prejudice .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "570 U.S. 729, the phrase maintained its broad, well -established meaning as a term that covers dismissals issued both with and without prejudice. 2 This Court and th e courts of appeals have considered cases in- volving both forms of dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Northwest, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]881 F.3d 1155535 F.3d 1316 should be understood as a term of art referring exclusive ly to dismissal s with prejudice . Pe- titioner offers (Br. 17 -26) three textual arguments to support that contention —the first based on the Federal Rules, and the second and third based on the text of Section 1915(g) itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "570 U.S. 729, the phrase maintained its broad, well -established meaning as a term that covers dismissals issued both with and without prejudice. 2 This Court and th e courts of appeals have considered cases in- volving both forms of dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Northwest, 572 U.S. 273[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]535 F.3d 1316 should be understood as a term of art referring exclusive ly to dismissal s with prejudice . Pe- titioner offers (Br. 17 -26) three textual arguments to support that contention —the first based on the Federal Rules, and the second and third based on the text of Section 1915(g) itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "881 F.3d 1155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "570 U.S. 729, the phrase maintained its broad, well -established meaning as a term that covers dismissals issued both with and without prejudice. 2 This Court and th e courts of appeals have considered cases in- volving both forms of dismissal for failure to state a claim. See Northwest, 572 U.S. 273881 F.3d 1155[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] should be understood as a term of art referring exclusive ly to dismissal s with prejudice . Pe- titioner offers (Br. 17 -26) three textual arguments to support that contention —the first based on the Federal Rules, and the second and third based on the text of Section 1915(g) itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 F.3d 1316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "Petitioner next turns to the actual text of Section 1915(g) and relies on \" 'the familiar interpretive canon 19 noscitur a sociis .' \" Br. 21 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Petitioner asserts that when an action is dismissed on one of the other two enumerated grounds in Section 1915(g) —i.e., that the action is \" 'frivolous ' \" or \" 'malicious ' \"—the court necessarily has found the complaint \"irredeemable\" and determined that the action \"cannot succeed and should not return.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "2 3-26, infra , Congress included the third ground for dismissal —failure to state a claim —precisely to expand the statute beyond its historical application to frivolous and malicious suits. Seven years before the PLRA was enacted, this Court recognized that the federal dockets were clogged with a \"surfeit\" of prisoner suits that failed to state a claim under Rule 12( b)(6), but that could not be dismissed under the then -existing version of the in forma pauperis statute because they could not be de- scribed as frivolous or malicious. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress closed that gap in the PLRA by adding \"fail[ure] to state a claim\" as a ground for dismissal in the general in forma pauperis statute and as a ground for strikes in the newly enacted Section 1915(g). Interpreting that phrase based on the two existing grounds for dismissal —rather th an based on its established meaning in Rule 12(b)(6) —would de- feat Congress's expansion of the statute beyond frivo- lous and malicious actions to meritless actions as well.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1915(g)'s text applies to all dismissals on the listed grounds, whether with or without prejudice",
		"context": "Congress closed that gap in the PLRA by adding \"fail[ure] to state a claim\" as a ground for dismissal in the general in forma pauperis statute and as a ground for strikes in the newly enacted Section 1915(g). Interpreting that phrase based on the two existing grounds for dismissal —rather th an based on its established meaning in Rule 12(b)(6) —would de- feat Congress's expansion of the statute beyond frivo- lous and malicious actions to meritless actions as well. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an omission that he says is best explained as an attempt to exclude any ground that might give rise to a dismissal without prejudice. But the argument fails at the threshold because all three 21 grounds included in Section 191 5(g) may give rise to dis- missals with or without prejudice. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State grand jury subpoenas are the kind of criminal process to which immunity should apply",
		"context": "Portraying this grand -jury subpoena as involving something other than \"criminal litigation\" blink s reality. Allowing the g rand jury to target the President and subpoena his personal documents likewise would impair the Chief Executive's \"energetic performance of [his] constitutional duties .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Fif th Circuit informed a grand jury in Alabama that was criminally probing a Justice Department lawyer: Both the Supremacy Clause and the general principles of our federal system of government dictate that a state grand 31 jury may not investigate the operation of a federal agency…. [T]he investigation … is an interference with the proper governmental function of the United States … [and] an invasion of the sovereign powers of the United States of America.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State grand jury subpoenas are the kind of criminal process to which immunity should apply",
		"context": "The state having the power to subpoena … could embarrass, impede, and obstruct the administration of a federal agency. No federal agency can properly function if its employees are being constantly called from their duties …. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 15 F. Supp. 736. 32 If a state grand jury cannot target officials from a federal agency, a fortiori it cannot target the Chief Executive for criminal prosecution. The President , as this Court has explained, must \"concern himself with matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings,\" and thus must have the leeway to \"deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 F.2d 734",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State grand jury subpoenas are the kind of criminal process to which immunity should apply",
		"context": "The state having the power to subpoena … could embarrass, impede, and obstruct the administration of a federal agency. No federal agency can properly function if its employees are being constantly called from their duties …. 385 F.2d 734 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 If a state grand jury cannot target officials from a federal agency, a fortiori it cannot target the Chief Executive for criminal prosecution. The President , as this Court has explained, must \"concern himself with matters likely to arouse the most intense feelings,\" and thus must have the leeway to \"deal fearlessly and impartially with the duties of his office.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "15 F. Supp. 736",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State grand jury subpoenas are the kind of criminal process to which immunity should apply",
		"context": "Amar & Kalt 12. That is why \"all aspects of criminal prosecution of a President must follow impeachment\" and that \"removal from office must precede any form of criminal process against an incumbent President .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the President cannot be subjected to any form of \"criminal process\" while he in office, Bork Memo 20, the Second Circuit should have invalidated the grand - jury subpoena.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 F.2d 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. English Common Law Did Not Recognize Sovereign Immunity from Mandamus, Which Issued in the Sovereign's Name.",
		"context": "816, 825 (1969) . Coke was, after all, \"widely recognized by the American colonists as the greatest authority of his time on the laws of England. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"By 1762, on the eve of the American Revolution,\" use of mandamus in English courts \"was widesp read. \"20 One recent survey of the English reports between 1220 and 1867 found up to 7 ,111 19 Costello , supra , at 174.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Taken together, these provisions incorporate gen- eral principles of injunctive relief, including the princi- ples that govern the imposition of sanction s for con- tempt . Contempt is the traditional means by which courts enforce their injunctions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, a court's power to impose contempt 14 \"is essential to the administration of justice.\" Michael- son v. United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 787",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Michael- son v. United States ex rel. Chicago, St. Paul, Minne- apolis & Omaha Ry. Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu- ries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed .\" 342 U.S. 246 ; see 570 U.S. 729.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Co., 266 U.S. 42 . \"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu- ries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 570 U.S. 729. Particularly when read in light of that interpretive principle, t he statutory di- rective that a discharge order \"op erates as an injunc- tion,\" 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(2), is best understood to author- ize bankruptcy courts to enforce their discharge orders under Section 105(a) in accordance with the same prin- ciples that govern courts' traditional powers to enforce their injunctio ns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Co., 266 U.S. 42 . \"[W]here Congress borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centu- ries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed .\" 342 U.S. 246 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Particularly when read in light of that interpretive principle, t he statutory di- rective that a discharge order \"op erates as an injunc- tion,\" 11 U.S.C. 524(a)(2), is best understood to author- ize bankruptcy courts to enforce their discharge orders under Section 105(a) in accordance with the same prin- ciples that govern courts' traditional powers to enforce their injunctio ns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "524(a)(2), is best understood to author- ize bankruptcy courts to enforce their discharge orders under Section 105(a) in accordance with the same prin- ciples that govern courts' traditional powers to enforce their injunctio ns. Consistent with that natural under- standing of the statutory text , courts of appeals largely have recognized that the imposition of civil contempt for violations of a discharge injunction \" is governed by the same standards applicable to all civil contempt proceedings .\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 239 F.3d 910 . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 F.3d 996",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Consistent with that natural under- standing of the statutory text , courts of appeals largely have recognized that the imposition of civil contempt for violations of a discharge injunction \" is governed by the same standards applicable to all civil contempt proceedings .\" In re450 F.3d 996; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2. One fundamental principle governing enforce- ment of injuncti ons is that civil-contempt sanctions may 15 not be imposed if there is a n objectively fair ground of doubt that the conduct at issue violated the injunction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "239 F.3d 910",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "2. One fundamental principle governing enforce- ment of injuncti ons is that civil-contempt sanctions may 15 not be imposed if there is a n objectively fair ground of doubt that the conduct at issue violated the injunction. In California Artificial Stone Paving [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, this Court agreed with the lower court's refusal to impose contempt , and it or- dered that the case be dismissed . Id. at 618.",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "The Court explained that \"[p] rocess of contempt is a severe remedy, and should not be resorted to where there is fair ground of doubt as to the wrongfulness of the de- fendant's conduct.\" Ibi d. An objectively fair ground of doubt about the ap- plicability of an injunction can arise from a lack of clar- ity in the terms of the injunction itself. I n International Longshoremen's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court re- versed a finding of contempt that had been entered against a union for violating an order requiring compli- ance with an arbitral award . Id. at 74.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Lower cour ts routinely apply the \"fair ground of doubt\" standard in deciding whether the defendant should be sanctioned for violating an injunction in the ordinary civil context. See, e.g. , TiVo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Con- sistent with that test, courts recognize that injunctions must \"have clearly and unambiguously forbidden the 17 precise conduct on which the contempt allegation is based \" before the court may impos e contempt sanc- tions . Saccoccia , 433 F.3d at 28 (emphasis omitted) ; see, e.g., CFE Racing Prod s., 793 F.3d 57192 F.3d 1539 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": ", TiVo 646 F.3d 869 . Con- sistent with that test, courts recognize that injunctions must \"have clearly and unambiguously forbidden the 17 precise conduct on which the contempt allegation is based \" before the court may impos e contempt sanc- tions . Saccoccia , 433 F.3d at 28 (emphasis omitted) ; see, e.g., CFE Racing Prod s., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]92 F.3d 1539 . And in applying that test, courts generally resolve ambiguities in favor of the putative contemnor . See, e.g., Axia NetMedia 889 F.3d 1; 875 F.3d 795, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 F.3d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": ", TiVo 646 F.3d 869 . Con- sistent with that test, courts recognize that injunctions must \"have clearly and unambiguously forbidden the 17 precise conduct on which the contempt allegation is based \" before the court may impos e contempt sanc- tions . Saccoccia , 433 F.3d at 28 (emphasis omitted) ; see, e.g., CFE Racing Prod s., 793 F.3d 571[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And in applying that test, courts generally resolve ambiguities in favor of the putative contemnor . See, e.g., Axia NetMedia 889 F.3d 1; 875 F.3d 795, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 F.3d 1539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Saccoccia , 433 F.3d at 28 (emphasis omitted) ; see, e.g., CFE Racing Prod s., 793 F.3d 57192 F.3d 1539 . And in applying that test, courts generally resolve ambiguities in favor of the putative contemnor . See, e.g., Axia NetMedia [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 875 F.3d 795, cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 2576 . 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "889 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "Saccoccia , 433 F.3d at 28 (emphasis omitted) ; see, e.g., CFE Racing Prod s., 793 F.3d 57192 F.3d 1539 . And in applying that test, courts generally resolve ambiguities in favor of the putative contemnor . See, e.g., Axia NetMedia 889 F.3d 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,138 S. Ct. 2576 . 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.3d 795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "That result follows 20 from the established rule that, even if an injunction is unclear in some respects, the court may impose civil - contempt sanctions if there is no fair ground of doubt that the injunction prohibited the specific conduct in which the alleged contemnor engaged . See, e.g. , 514 F.3d 280; Northeast Women's Ctr., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But where there is an objec tively reasonable dispute about whether a particular debt has been discharged, it is both consistent with traditional equitable principles, and important to the achievement of an appropriate bal- ance between debtor and creditor interests, to hold that a creditor's attempt to collect that debt cannot subject it to civil contempt. I n an analogous Chapter 13 context involving a claimed violation of a plan confirmation , the Eighth Circuit recently declined to hold a state agency in civil contempt for seeki ng to collect domestic -support obligations from the debtors because the agency \"had a reasonable basis for believing that the debt would survive the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "939 F.2d 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Traditional principles governing injunctive relief apply to the enforcement of discharge orders entered in bankruptcy cases",
		"context": "But where there is an objec tively reasonable dispute about whether a particular debt has been discharged, it is both consistent with traditional equitable principles, and important to the achievement of an appropriate bal- ance between debtor and creditor interests, to hold that a creditor's attempt to collect that debt cannot subject it to civil contempt. I n an analogous Chapter 13 context involving a claimed violation of a plan confirmation , the Eighth Circuit recently declined to hold a state agency in civil contempt for seeki ng to collect domestic -support obligations from the debtors because the agency \"had a reasonable basis for believing that the debt would survive the Chapter 13 bankruptcy case .\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Even if [the agency] was wrong on the merits,\" the court held, \"its action did not warrant a contempt order and sanctions.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.3d 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "at 851. This Court interpreted this constitutional lan- guage to provide that \"in legislating for [territories] Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a state government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 411 U.S. 389. This doctrine, first stated in 1828 and expanded in the Insular Cases , applies only where Congress exer- cises the \"powers . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "at 851. This Court interpreted this constitutional lan- guage to provide that \"in legislating for [territories] Congress exercises the combined powers of the general and of a state government.\" 182 U.S. 244; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This doctrine, first stated in 1828 and expanded in the Insular Cases , applies only where Congress exer- cises the \"powers . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "It may do for the territories what the people, under the Constitu-tion of the United States, may do for the states.\" Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 195 U.S. 138, and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 190 U.S. 197, among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Id. at 196 (quoting First Nat'l 101 U.S. 129). 15 The Insular Cases are often said to include De 182 U.S. 1, 182 U.S. 222, 182 U.S. 243, 182 U.S. 244, 258 U.S. 298, 234 U.S. 91, 195 U.S. 138, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], among others. 16 See 48 U.S.C. § 731a (\"All laws, regulations, and public documents and records of the United States in which such island is designated or referred to under the name of 'Porto Rico' shall be held to refer to such island under and by the name of 'Puerto Rico.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "190 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Because the Insular Cases address only the Terri- torial Clause, they have no relevance to the validity of congressional action creating a federal assistance pro- gram like Social Security. Su ch a program isn't created through Congress's Territorial Clause authority, but is \"grounded on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, of the Con- stitution (Congress' power to spend and tax in the aid of the 'general welfare').\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Insular Cases are distinguishable from the case now before the Court, making summary reversal inappropriate. This Court should instead follow its re- cent decision and hold that because \"[t]hose cases did not reach this issue, .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 F. Supp. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Insular Cases are limited to defining congressional power under the Territorial Clause",
		"context": "Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors",
		"context": "The Sixth Amendment does not guard against all attorney errors. This Court has emphasized that the \"right to effective representation\" is a right to \" effective (not mistake -free) representation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, even where an attorney has rendered constitutionally defi- cient performance —i.e., performance that falls \"outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,\" Strickland , 466 U.S. at 690 —\"a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to effective representation is not 'com- plete' until the defendant is prejudiced,\" Gonza lez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at 147. \"Counsel,\" the Court has explained, \"cannot be 'ineffective' unless his mistakes have harmed the defense (or, at least, unless it is reasonably likely that they have).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors",
		"context": "137 S. Ct. 18. In evaluating whether the defendant has carried that burden, t he Court has gen- erally avoided \"categorical rules,\" which are \"ill suited to an inquiry that demands a 'case -by-case exami- nation' of the 'totality of the evidence .' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Although prejudice to the defendant is an invaria- ble component of an ineffective -assistance claim, Gonzalez - Lopez , 548 U.S. at 147, the Court has identified a \"very short list of errors for which prejudice is presumed,\" Weaver , 137 S. Ct. at 1916 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors",
		"context": "2. Although prejudice to the defendant is an invaria- ble component of an ineffective -assistance claim, Gonzalez - Lopez , 548 U.S. at 147, the Court has identified a \"very short list of errors for which prejudice is presumed,\" Weaver , 137 S. Ct. at 1916 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). The Court has cautioned, however, that a presumption of prejudice will be justified only \"infre- quently,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and it has repeatedly resisted attempts to create new categories of presumptively prejudicial errors. See, e.g., id. at 190 -191 (rejecting presumption of prejudice where counsel conceded defendant's guilt during capital case); 535 U.S. 685; 399 U.S. 42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 175",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors",
		"context": "The Court has cautioned, however, that a presumption of prejudice will be justified only \"infre- quently,\" 543 U.S. 175, and it has repeatedly resisted attempts to create new categories of presumptively prejudicial errors. See, e.g., id. at 190 -191 (rejecting presumption of prejudice where counsel conceded defendant's guilt during capital case); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 399 U.S. 42. The Court's pathmarking decision in Strickland v. Washington , supra , identified three limited circum- stances in which prejudice may be presumed: an \"[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel alto- gether\"; where the \"state interfere[s] with counsel's as- sistance\"; and where \"counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.\" 466 U.S. at 692.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An ineffective assistance claim requires that any inadequacies in the judicial process be traceable to counsel's errors",
		"context": "The Court has cautioned, however, that a presumption of prejudice will be justified only \"infre- quently,\" 543 U.S. 175, and it has repeatedly resisted attempts to create new categories of presumptively prejudicial errors. See, e.g., id. at 190 -191 (rejecting presumption of prejudice where counsel conceded defendant's guilt during capital case); 535 U.S. 685; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's pathmarking decision in Strickland v. Washington , supra , identified three limited circum- stances in which prejudice may be presumed: an \"[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel alto- gether\"; where the \"state interfere[s] with counsel's as- sistance\"; and where \"counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest.\" 466 U.S. at 692.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "First , in determining whether application of a state tax to a nonresident comports with due process, 9 this Court has relied on cases addressing the due process standard for judicial jurisdiction. The Court's articulation of the due process limi- tations on tax jurisdiction in Quill expressly \"[a]pplied\" the due process principles from this Court's modern \"judicial jurisdiction\" cases. 504 U.S. at 307-308 (citing International Shoe , 326 U.S. at 316; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476). The standards an- nounced in these cases, the Court explained, should be applied to the requirement for tax jurisdiction— which it phrased in terms analogous to the minimum contacts required for personal jurisdiction: that there be a \"definite link, some minimum connection, be- tween a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Br. 21 n.9. The concurrence agreed with the majority's due process holding—overruling Bellas Hess , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because it was incon- sistent with International Shoe and subsequent judi- cial jurisdiction decisions—but stated: \"I do not un- derstand this to mean that the due process standards for adjudicative jurisdiction and those for legislative (or prescriptive) jurisdiction are necessarily identi- cal.\" Quill , 504 U.S. at 319-320. To begin with, saying the two standards are not \"necessarily identical\" does not mean that judicial ju- risdiction decisions are inapposite when a case in- volves jurisdiction to tax nonresidents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Subsequent decisions reaffirm that distinction between judicial jurisdiction and jurisdiction to apply a State's non-tax law. A year after Shaffer , the Court explained that California's undeniable \"substantial interests in protecting resident children and in facili- tating child-support actions on behalf of those chil- dren\" did not suffice to exercise personal jurisdiction over the appellant, \"who lacks any relevant con- tact with the State, either to defend a child-support suit or to suffer liability by default.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a plurality of Justices later summarized, \"[t]he Court has recognized that examination of a State's contacts may result in di- vergent conclusions for jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes.\" Allstate Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Taxing power more closely resembles judicial ju- risdiction, because it is an assertion of direct state power over the target of the tax, not merely over the particular controversy. See pages 9-10, supra . The key to understanding the sentence in Justice Scalia's opinion lies in his citation of Asahi Metal In- dustry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]380 U.S. 451, just af- ter his statement that he did not interpret the major- ity's opinion to mean that the standards for judicial and legislative jurisdiction were necessarily identi- cal. Those citations show that his statement was meant to preserve in the context of tax jurisdiction his position in Asahi (as part of a plurality) that the \"stream of commerce\" theory is not a valid ground for judicial jurisdiction. See Asahi , 480 U.S. at 108-113 (plurality); see also American Oil , 380 U.S. at 457- 14 458 (rejecting a similar theory in the tax jurisdiction context).",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Taxing power more closely resembles judicial ju- risdiction, because it is an assertion of direct state power over the target of the tax, not merely over the particular controversy. See pages 9-10, supra . The key to understanding the sentence in Justice Scalia's opinion lies in his citation of Asahi Metal In- dustry 480 U.S. 102[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], just af- ter his statement that he did not interpret the major- ity's opinion to mean that the standards for judicial and legislative jurisdiction were necessarily identi- cal. Those citations show that his statement was meant to preserve in the context of tax jurisdiction his position in Asahi (as part of a plurality) that the \"stream of commerce\" theory is not a valid ground for judicial jurisdiction. See Asahi , 480 U.S. at 108-113 (plurality); see also American Oil , 380 U.S. at 457- 14 458 (rejecting a similar theory in the tax jurisdiction context).",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "In other words, Justice Scalia wanted to make sure that any subsequent decisions weakening judi- cial jurisdiction would not spill over to the tax juris- diction context. As it turns out, the Court never en- dorsed the \"stream of commerce\" approach to judicial jurisdiction. See J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the con- trary, the Court in recent years has rejected efforts to weaken the due process test for specific judicial ju- risdiction, in particular lower courts' unreasonably expansive approaches to jurisdiction. See,137 S. Ct. 1773; Walden, 571 U.S. 277.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. 873. To the con- trary, the Court in recent years has rejected efforts to weaken the due process test for specific judicial ju- risdiction, in particular lower courts' unreasonably expansive approaches to jurisdiction. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Walden, 571 U.S. 277. Accordingly, Justice Scalia's concurrence offers petitioner no sup- port for applying a weakened due process standard in the tax jurisdiction context. In sum, because a State's imposition of a tax on a nonresident imposes burdens similar to those result- ing when a nonresident is forced to appear in a State's courts, it is logical for this Court to look to its precedents in the judicial jurisdiction context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Precedent And First Principles Demonstrate The Relevance In The Tax Context Of Decisions Applying The Due Process Standard For Specific Judicial Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. 873. To the con- trary, the Court in recent years has rejected efforts to weaken the due process test for specific judicial ju- risdiction, in particular lower courts' unreasonably expansive approaches to jurisdiction. See,137 S. Ct. 1773; Walden, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, Justice Scalia's concurrence offers petitioner no sup- port for applying a weakened due process standard in the tax jurisdiction context. In sum, because a State's imposition of a tax on a nonresident imposes burdens similar to those result- ing when a nonresident is forced to appear in a State's courts, it is logical for this Court to look to its precedents in the judicial jurisdiction context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "2 Noah Webster, An American Diction- ary of the English Language (1828). And \"Blackstone's usage\" of the term \"appears to have accorded with th[at] ordinary meaning.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which he distinguished from other phases of the criminal process, such as \"execution\" of the sentence, id. at 286. In accord with the plain meaning of the term \"crimi- nal prosecution,\" this Court has repeatedly recognized that the Sixth Amendme nt does not require a jury find- ing beyond a reasonable doubt in a postjudgment pro-ceeding involving only the implementation of a sentence that has already been imposed .",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "at 286. In accord with the plain meaning of the term \"crimi- nal prosecution,\" this Court has repeatedly recognized that the Sixth Amendme nt does not require a jury find- ing beyond a reasonable doubt in a postjudgment pro-ceeding involving only the implementation of a sentence that has already been imposed . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment does not extend to a proceeding con- cerning the \"revocation of parole,\" in which a defendant who has been serving part of his sentence out of prison, subject to conditions, may be reimprisoned for violating those conditions (with no credit for t he time spent on parole). Id. at 480; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "Id. at 480. Likewise, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court reached an identical conclusion with respect to a proceeding concerning the revocation of probation, in which a defendant whose sentence consisted of a term of conditional liberty was sent to prison for violating the conditions that were imposed. Id. at 779- 781.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 778",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "Id. at 782. Ad ditionally, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court recognized that \"[p]rison discipli- nary proceedings ,\" such as the denial of good -time credit on a sentence already imposed, \"are not part of a criminal prosecution ,\" and that \"the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not ap- ply.\" Id. at 556. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "And the Court stressed that any right to counsel in the con- text of a probation -revocation hearing arises not from the Sixth Am endment —which does not apply because probation revocation does not involve the \"right of an accused to co unsel in a criminal prose cution\" —but ra- ther from the \"more limited due process right\" applica-ble to a defendant who has already \"been convicted of a crime.\" Gagnon , 411 U.S. at 789; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In none of the decisions did the Court suggest that a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt would be re- quired as a prerequisite to additional imprisonment for a defendant's violation of the terms of his conditional 28 liberty. To the contrary, the Court recognized that a \"traditional parole board ,\" or similar entity, could find the relevant facts .",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Administering a sentence by revoking a defendant's conditional liberty is not part of a \"criminal prosecution\" that requires jury factfinding",
		"context": "In none of the decisions did the Court suggest that a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt would be re- quired as a prerequisite to additional imprisonment for a defendant's violation of the terms of his conditional 28 liberty. To the contrary, the Court recognized that a \"traditional parole board ,\" or similar entity, could find the relevant facts . Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 489; see Gag- non, 411 U.S. at 781- 782 (permitting revocation of pro- bation based on findings by a state administrative agency); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The viability standard, which has changed since Roe, is unworkable and arbitrary",
		"context": "Thus, Roe and its progeny \"can and should be overruled consistently with [this Court's] traditional approach to stare decisis in constitutional cases.\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 ARGUMENT Because it acted apart from the Constitution, the Roe majority had to create \"judicial legislation\" by engaging in \"conscious weighing of competing factors.\" 410 U.S. 113.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The viability standard, which has changed since Roe, is unworkable and arbitrary",
		"context": "505 U.S. 833. 3 ARGUMENT Because it acted apart from the Constitution, the Roe majority had to create \"judicial legislation\" by engaging in \"conscious weighing of competing factors.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While this departure from the Constitution warrants correction, even Roe's efforts to weigh competing factors fall short. Legal and factual developments have undercut the strength of factors used to support abortion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Abolishing the Equal-Treatment Principle Would Deprive Parties Contracting to Arbitrate of Protections Other Contracting Parties Enjoy",
		"context": "Instead, its admonition that arbitration clauses ma y be invalidated on the same grounds as \"any contract,\" 9 U.S.C. § 2, reinforces that its objective \"was to make arbitration agreements 22 as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so.\" Prima Paint [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, Sundance charges that there can be no waiver when a party delays in asserting its right to ar- bitration for bad-faith reas ons because such a \"sand- bagging\" party never intended to relinquish its rights. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Colorado has many, less intrusive alternatives to achieving its asserted goals.",
		"context": "If Colorado adopted this interpretation, CADA would still stop status discrimination, while simultaneously freeing speakers like Smith from state-sponsored coercion. Numerous lower courts, at least 19 states, and the federal government have already done this. United States.Amicus.Br.22, Masterpiece Cakeshop , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16-111); Neb.Amici.Br.4, Carpenter v. James , No. 22-75 (2d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Colorado has many, less intrusive alternatives to achieving its asserted goals.",
		"context": "22-75 (2d Cir. Mar. 14, 2022); Telescope Media , 936 F.3d at 752–53; Brush & Nib 48 Studio, 448 P.3d 890; World Peace [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Colorado cannot explain its refusal to give Smith the same protection. CA10 Appellee.Br.62.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 P.2d 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Colorado has many, less intrusive alternatives to achieving its asserted goals.",
		"context": "Fulton , 141 S. Ct. at 1880; accord 204 F. Supp. 3d 1149. Colorado has done nothing to show why these \"available, effective alternatives\" would fail where only speech coercion can succeed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-based speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be ineffective to achieve its goals.\" Playboy , 529 U.S. at 816.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Preventing \"Persuasion\" or \"Influence\" by Speech is Not a Legitimate Government Interest and Attempting to do so Inherently Amounts to Content-Based Censorship",
		"context": "6 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N1DHfOuXilc. 20 by serving as a poll worker on election day and intro- ducing herself to voters, because her name also ap- peared on the ballot. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But influencing and persuading voters is what elections are for. At the time the First Amendment was written, this was the ordinary practice for federal and state elections, which were ty pically held in the open; after both candidates spoke to the crowd, voters would immediately and openly express their preferences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 P.2d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Preventing \"Persuasion\" or \"Influence\" by Speech is Not a Legitimate Government Interest and Attempting to do so Inherently Amounts to Content-Based Censorship",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Miller ex rel. Mil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the Purcell case, for example, a Maricopa County official instructed poll workers that they could not allow vot- ers to wear shirts that said \"Don't Tread on Me\"—a phrase that appeared on one of the nation's earliest flags—because, in that official's opinion, the flag had been \"co-opted\" by \"the Tea Party.\" Complaint, Reed v. Purcell , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "588 F. Supp. 2d 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The enacted leadership structure for the Bureau is a mishmash",
		"context": "filed Nov. 26, 2017) (law suit by CFPB Deputy Director alleging the Trump Administration violated 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(B) when the President appointed Mick Mulvaney to be Acting Direc-tor of the Bureau). 8 Indeed, by the final version, which had jettisoned the bipar- tisan commission or advisory board, the advice Congress received on Humphrey's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the structure of the OCC, was outdated and inapposite. See Br. of Amicus Curiae of U.S. House of Reps. in Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "at 56 (emphasis added). One of the means Congress chose to accomplish these goals was to \"deregulate the stru cture of the broadcast and cable television industries\" through the elimination of 26 unnecessary ownership regulations. Fox TV Stations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress itself began the process of media ownership deregulation. For example, the 1996 Act \"repealed the statutes prohibiting telephone/cable and cable/broadcast cross-ownership,\" \"overrode the few remaining regulatory limits upon cable/network cross-ownership,\" \"eliminated the national and relaxed the local restrictions upon [radio station] ownership, and eased the 'dual network' rule.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Rotkiske , 140 S. Ct. at 361. Where congressional instruction \"to consider\" a particular factor \"has elsewhere, and so often, been expressly granted,\" this Court has \"refused to find\" the existence of the same factor \"implicit in ambiguous sections\" of the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress can and does direct the FCC to consider minority and female ownership diversity when it wishes to do so. For example, when Congress authorized the FCC to auction initial spectrum licenses prior to the 1996 Act, it expressly instructed the agency to \"consider the use of .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Nor can Section 202(h)'s generalized reference to \"the public interest\" be interpreted as an implicit mandate that the FCC consider minority or female ownership diversity in its regulatory reform reviews. In upholding Congress' broad delegation of authority to regulate media ownership in \"the public interest\" against a non-delegation challenge in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States , this Court explained that the Commission was \"not left at large in performing this duty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, the statutory \"requirement\" to regulate in the public interest must \"be interpreted by its context.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "30 suggests that the \"public interest\" as used in that provision requires the Commission to consider minority and female ownership. The statutory phrase \"the public interest\" had a well-known legal meaning when Congress enacted Section 202(h) in the 1996 A ct. For decades, this Court and the FCC had regularly explained that in the context of broadcast ownership restrictions, the public interest embraces competition, localism, and \"diversity of program and service viewpoints .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And less than two years prior to the 1996 Act, this Court stated that access to \"diverse and antagonistic\" viewpoints had \"long been a basic tenet of national communications policy,\" Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. 622 (identifying \"viewpoint, outlet and source diversity\" as the \"three types of diversity\" that the FCC's television ownership rules \"attempted to foster\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "436 U.S. 775. And less than two years prior to the 1996 Act, this Court stated that access to \"diverse and antagonistic\" viewpoints had \"long been a basic tenet of national communications policy,\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (identifying \"viewpoint, outlet and source diversity\" as the \"three types of diversity\" that the FCC's television ownership rules \"attempted to foster\"). Furthermore, the Commission had made clear that its structural \"ownership rules were not primarily intended to function as a vehicle for promoting minority ownership in broadcasting.\" In re100 FCC 2d 74.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Furthermore, the Commission had made clear that its structural \"ownership rules were not primarily intended to function as a vehicle for promoting minority ownership in broadcasting.\" In re100 FCC 2d 74. Because Congress \"took the term\" as the \"law found it,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it incorporated competition, localism, and viewpoint diversity as potentially relevant public- interest considerations that could justify ownership restrictions. And among those, Congress plainly selected competition as the key consideration for the Commission's Section 202(h) reviews. There is no basis in the historical co ntext of Section 202(h) for supposing that Congress, without saying so, required the Commission to consider minority and female ownership diversity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Because courts may not read \"a specific concept into general words when precise language in other statutes reveals that Congress knew how to identify that concept,\" William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law 415 (2016), it would be improper to read such an obligation into \"the public interest\" in Section 202(h). In addition to enforcing the non-delegation doctrine's limits on unbounded agency authority by interpreting \"the public intere st\" in light of context, courts must also avoid conflict with other provisions of the Constitution, including the Fifth Amendment's limits on race- and gender-based decisionmaking. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 137 S. Ct. 1678; see also 958 F.2d 382. Interpreting the \"public interest\" as mandating the consideration of minority and female ownership, or the retention of ownership restrictions for the sole purpose of promoting minority and female ownership, would raise serious constitutional concerns. 11 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Because courts may not read \"a specific concept into general words when precise language in other statutes reveals that Congress knew how to identify that concept,\" William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law 415 (2016), it would be improper to read such an obligation into \"the public interest\" in Section 202(h). In addition to enforcing the non-delegation doctrine's limits on unbounded agency authority by interpreting \"the public intere st\" in light of context, courts must also avoid conflict with other provisions of the Constitution, including the Fifth Amendment's limits on race- and gender-based decisionmaking. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 32; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 958 F.2d 382. Interpreting the \"public interest\" as mandating the consideration of minority and female ownership, or the retention of ownership restrictions for the sole purpose of promoting minority and female ownership, would raise serious constitutional concerns. 11 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Because courts may not read \"a specific concept into general words when precise language in other statutes reveals that Congress knew how to identify that concept,\" William N. Eskridge Jr., Interpreting Law 415 (2016), it would be improper to read such an obligation into \"the public interest\" in Section 202(h). In addition to enforcing the non-delegation doctrine's limits on unbounded agency authority by interpreting \"the public intere st\" in light of context, courts must also avoid conflict with other provisions of the Constitution, including the Fifth Amendment's limits on race- and gender-based decisionmaking. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 32; 137 S. Ct. 1678; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interpreting the \"public interest\" as mandating the consideration of minority and female ownership, or the retention of ownership restrictions for the sole purpose of promoting minority and female ownership, would raise serious constitutional concerns. 11 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "958 F.2d 382",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Third Circuit Contravened Section 202(h) By Elevating Policy Concerns Over The Competition Analysis That Congress Specifically Required",
		"context": "Ownership Rules & Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of Telecommunications Act of 1996 , 17 FCC Rcd. 18503, 18521 & n.123 (2002) (citing, among other cases, Adarand ). 33 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, as the FCC explained, the ownership rules were \"not \" adopted to \"promote or protect minority and female ownership.\" Pet.App.117a (emphasis added); see also , e.g., Pet.App.122a, 139a-40a, 161a- 62a; JA171-72, 293, 309-10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Pre-SOX Case Law Does Not Justify Elimination Of The Intent Requirement",
		"context": ". Finally, petitioner claims (at 18-19, 29-31) that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which he says held that a plaintiff need not prove intent, is \"the authoritative construction of the 'contributing factor' standard.\" Marano is a thirty- year-old circuit opinion interpreting the WPA, not SOX, and thus provides no support for the claim that intent need not be proven under a statute that—un- like the WPA—proscribes \"discriminat[ion] … be-cause of\" protected activity. In fact, the Marano court reasoned that the mechanism Congress used to re-move the intent element for federal government whis-tleblowers was deletion of the phrase \"as a reprisal for.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 1137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Pre-SOX Case Law Does Not Justify Elimination Of The Intent Requirement",
		"context": "While the court there gave a lengthy prefatory discourse on the WPA amend- ments, it stated that \"[t]he only issue to be resolved\" was 43 If the Court considers any court of appeals prece- dent, it should be case law interpreting the ERA, not Marano . Opinions applying the ERA both before and after the Energy Policy Act's enactment recognize the requirement that plaintiffs prove intent. See Kauf- man, 745 F.3d at 533 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in the judgment) (the \"central issue\" is whether the ad-verse action \"was motivated by discriminatory or re- taliatory bias\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]285 F.3d 243.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 688",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Pre-SOX Case Law Does Not Justify Elimination Of The Intent Requirement",
		"context": "While the court there gave a lengthy prefatory discourse on the WPA amend- ments, it stated that \"[t]he only issue to be resolved\" was 43 If the Court considers any court of appeals prece- dent, it should be case law interpreting the ERA, not Marano . Opinions applying the ERA both before and after the Energy Policy Act's enactment recognize the requirement that plaintiffs prove intent. See Kauf- man, 745 F.3d at 533 (Srinivasan, J., concurring in the judgment) (the \"central issue\" is whether the ad-verse action \"was motivated by discriminatory or re- taliatory bias\"); 575 F.3d 688[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 F.3d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future",
		"context": "[T]he crime is complete once the words are spoken with the requisite intent . \" White , 610 F.3d at 10 960. This intent is the \"inten[t] that acts constituting a federal offense result,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], labeled \"purpose\" in Model Penal Code terms: \"A person is guilty of solici- tation to commit a crime if with the purpose of pro- moting or facilitating its commission he commands, encourages or requests another person to engage in specific conduct that would constitute such crime .\" Model Penal Code § 5.02(1) . Urging someone to criminally enter the United States or to remain here when it is a crime to do so, with th e purpose that the hearer act on this urging, is thus punishable solicitation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.2d 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future",
		"context": "Speech asking one's fol- lowers to kill a particular juror may be soli citation even if one is not encouraging the foll owers to impul- sively act right away. See, e.g. , White, 610 F.3d at 957-58, 96 1 (concluding that soliciting murder was punishable even though no timetable had been set); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Inde ed, the speaker would presumably want to encoura ge the followers to plan carefully and deliberately, taking what time is needed. Likewise, speech arranging a tryst with a minor can be criminal solicitation even if the encounter is to take place in a week or a month.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 867",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future",
		"context": "Speech urging someone to cheat in a particular way on his tax return sh ould be solicitation on January 14 as much as on April 14. Some courts have offhandedly characterized crim- inal so licitation as focused on requests for imminent criminal conduct. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Freeman , 761 F.2d at 552 (conclud- ing that urging someone to commit tax fraud, if spe-cific enough, could be punishable because it is \"in- tended and likely t o produce an imminent criminal act\") . But, for the reasons given above, such a limitation is not consistent with the logic of the solicitation ex- ception recognized by Williams . Indeed, some of the cases that purport to apply an imminence require- ment for so licitations do so just by implicitly redefin- ing imminence, so that even behavior many months in the future would qualify as \"imminent.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "595 F.3d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future",
		"context": "Indeed, some of the cases that purport to apply an imminence require- ment for so licitations do so just by implicitly redefin- ing imminence, so that even behavior many months in the future would qualify as \"imminent.\" See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (concluding that solicitation of murder involved an \"imminent\" crime even when \"the plan was for [the solicitee, who was in jail] to get out of jail on bond, lay low for a while, observe the [pro- spective victims], and find a routine where he could catch them toge ther\"); Freeman , 761 F.2d at 552 (de- scribing solicitation of tax fraud as involving urging of imminent conduct, even though there was no indi-cation that the solicitation happened on the eve of the 12 tax filing); Phipps, 595 F.3d at 247 (likewise); 96 Cal. App. 3d 968 . Such redefining of \"imminent\" is not sound, and it could tend to erode the imminence threshold rightly required under the Brandenburg test for abstr act ad- vocacy of crime. But even if this Court thinks that the crime of solicitation should include some proximity element, it should (1) uphold § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as impl icitly including such an element (much as Free- man and Phipps appeared to do as to the solicitation of tax fraud), and (2) make clear that this element can be sat isfied —unlike with incitement under Bran- denburg —even when there is a delay of weeks or months between the solicitation and the prospective criminal conduct being solicited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 S.W.3d 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Solicitation of crime may be punished even if it purposefully solicits conduct that would happen months in the future",
		"context": "Indeed, some of the cases that purport to apply an imminence require- ment for so licitations do so just by implicitly redefin- ing imminence, so that even behavior many months in the future would qualify as \"imminent.\" See, e.g. , 494 S.W.3d 52 (concluding that solicitation of murder involved an \"imminent\" crime even when \"the plan was for [the solicitee, who was in jail] to get out of jail on bond, lay low for a while, observe the [pro- spective victims], and find a routine where he could catch them toge ther\"); Freeman , 761 F.2d at 552 (de- scribing solicitation of tax fraud as involving urging of imminent conduct, even though there was no indi-cation that the solicitation happened on the eve of the 12 tax filing); Phipps, 595 F.3d at 247 (likewise); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Such redefining of \"imminent\" is not sound, and it could tend to erode the imminence threshold rightly required under the Brandenburg test for abstr act ad- vocacy of crime. But even if this Court thinks that the crime of solicitation should include some proximity element, it should (1) uphold § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) as impl icitly including such an element (much as Free- man and Phipps appeared to do as to the solicitation of tax fraud), and (2) make clear that this element can be sat isfied —unlike with incitement under Bran- denburg —even when there is a delay of weeks or months between the solicitation and the prospective criminal conduct being solicited.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 Cal. App. 3d 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "1989). Thus, by \"virtue of the word other[] ,\" Section 1514A \"concerns itself not with every discharge\" or unfavorable employment action, but \"only with those discharg es [or actions] that involve discrimination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This also follows from the ejusdem generis canon. Because \"catchall clauses\" are \"naturally understood as a summary\" of the \"specifically enumerated\" ite ms of a list, limitations in a catchall clause properly apply 16 to the enumerated items.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "This also follows from the ejusdem generis canon. Because \"catchall clauses\" are \"naturally understood as a summary\" of the \"specifically enumerated\" ite ms of a list, limitations in a catchall clause properly apply 16 to the enumerated items. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Often [] the examples standing alone are broader than the general category, and must be viewed as limited in light of that category.\"). Compare Pet'r Br. 35 (claiming \"no authority for th[is] sort of reverse eju sdem generis reasoning\"), with Safe Food & 350 F.3d 1263.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "572 U.S. 434 (\"Often [] the examples standing alone are broader than the general category, and must be viewed as limited in light of that category.\"). Compare Pet'r Br. 35 (claiming \"no authority for th[is] sort of reverse eju sdem generis reasoning\"), with Safe Food & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, Sect ion 1514A closely follows the conventional structure of federal employment discrimination laws. For instance, like Section 1514A, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits a series of employment actions (\"to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual\"), followed by a catchall phrase indicating that the previous examples were instances of discrimination (\"or otherwise to discriminate against any individual\"), \"because of such individual's\" protected characteristics.",
		"citation_value_orig": "350 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "576 U.S. 519. Thus, a statute that simply prohibits discrimination \"because of\" a protected trait establishes \"[d]isparate treatment\" liability, Int'l Bhd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], under which \"the difference in treatment … must be intentional,\" Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1740; accord Ledbetter v. Goodyear Ti re550 U.S. 618544 U.S. 228 prohibits \"discrimination\" \"because of\" an employee's protected conduct. It contains no additional language \"focuse [d] on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the action of the employer.\" Inclusive Communities , 576 U.S. at 533 (internal citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "576 U.S. 519. Thus, a statute that simply prohibits discrimination \"because of\" a protected trait establishes \"[d]isparate treatment\" liability, Int'l Bhd. of 431 U.S. 324, under which \"the difference in treatment … must be intentional,\" Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1740; accord Ledbetter v. Goodyear Ti re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]544 U.S. 228 prohibits \"discrimination\" \"because of\" an employee's protected conduct. It contains no additional language \"focuse [d] on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the action of the employer.\" Inclusive Communities , 576 U.S. at 533 (internal citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "576 U.S. 519. Thus, a statute that simply prohibits discrimination \"because of\" a protected trait establishes \"[d]isparate treatment\" liability, Int'l Bhd. of 431 U.S. 324, under which \"the difference in treatment … must be intentional,\" Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1740; accord Ledbetter v. Goodyear Ti re550 U.S. 618[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] prohibits \"discrimination\" \"because of\" an employee's protected conduct. It contains no additional language \"focuse [d] on the effects of the action on the employee rather than the motivation for the action of the employer.\" Inclusive Communities , 576 U.S. at 533 (internal citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "True enough, an employer can engage in intentional discrimination even if it does not act out of feelings of hatred toward the employee. But discriminatory intent —or, for that matter retaliatory intent, which is just the intent to discriminate based on past conduct —can exist without animosity. Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1743; see Automobile [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To use one of Petitioner's examples, a school that fires white teachers \"to preserve role models for minority schoolchildren\" may lack animus, but it still has discriminatory intent. Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "To have a viable claim, the plaintiff must be an employee, the employer must be one covered by the statute, and the employer must have taken a covered unfavorable personnel action. Section 42121 does not define the burden of proof for these elements, so they are instead governed by the \"ordinary default rule\" of proof by the plaintiff by a preponderance of evidence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 42121 likewise does not define the burden of proof for discriminatory intent. Section 42121 defines the required link the employee must show between his pr otected activity and \"the unfavorable personnel action\" —i.e.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). And it alters that standard from the default of but -for causation to the more relaxed requirement of \"contributing factor.\" See Comcast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But altering the causation standard does not affect the employee's burden to establish discriminatory intent. Title VII, for example, provides that a plaintiff need only establish that the employer's discrimination \"was a motivating factor for any employment practice.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. As an Anti-Discrimination Statute, Section 1514A Requires Proof of Retaliatory Intent",
		"context": "Ct. at 1740; see Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 In any event, a \"contri buting factor\" in Section 42121 is one that contributes to the employer's motive for acting. A \"contributing factor\" must contribute to \"the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The decision below faithfully applied the rule of reason framework",
		"context": "If the plaintiff carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the defend- ant to show a procompetitive rationale for the restraint. If the defendant makes this showing then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the procompetitive efficien-cies could be reasonably achieved through less anticompetitive means. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' only legal objection to the Ninth Cir- cuit's analysis is their suggestion that it \"effectively requir[ed] defendants to prove that they had adopted the least restrictive alternative that would preserve college sports.\" AAC Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The reasons given below for treating the Commission's ALJs as employees are unpersuasive",
		"context": "The panel's c onclusion is based on a mis- understanding about the fun ction of the Commission's ALJs and is, in any event , legally erroneous . 1. The panel below relied on its prior decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 F.3d 1125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Government's Proposed Framework Abandons ERISA's Duty Of Prudence For ESOP Fiduciaries",
		"context": "Further, only ESOP fi- duciaries who actually have disclosure obligations un- der the securities laws should be obliged to make disclosures, because \"[a]n individual on whom the se- curities laws do not impose such a duty may be less likely to have the familiarity with both the facts and the law to accurately dete rmine what those obligations are.\" Id. at 21 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). An ESOP fiduci-ary without disclosure obligat ions under the securities laws might only be obliged \"to urge a co-fiduciary or other responsible corporate officers to make a required disclosure, to utilize internal company reporting mech- anisms, or to report possib le violations to the SEC . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 F.3d 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Government's Proposed Framework Abandons ERISA's Duty Of Prudence For ESOP Fiduciaries",
		"context": "Time and again \"this Court has not hesitated to give effect to two statutes that overlap, so long as each reaches some distinct cases.\" J.E.M. Ag Supply, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, ERISA's duty of prudence required Petition- ers to make a corrective disclosure to fix the artificial inflation of IBM's stock. Whether the securities laws independently required disclosure is somewhat of an open question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Government's Proposed Framework Abandons ERISA's Duty Of Prudence For ESOP Fiduciaries",
		"context": "Varity , 516 U.S. at 506. The duty that ESOP fiduciaries owe plan participants under ERISA is, as Judge Friendly put it many years ago, \"the highest known to the law.\" Don- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sometimes an ESOP fiduciary might be called upon to do more than would a garden-variety corporate officer. The Government even admits that \"it would not violate the securities laws to make a full and fair pub- lic disclosure of \" inside info rmation as Respondents al- lege Petitioners should have done.",
		"citation_value_orig": "680 F.2d 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON \"UNOCCUPIED LANDS\" IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY STATEHOOD OR BY THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FOREST",
		"context": "The theory t hat statehood alone has the force to extinguish a tribe's treaty right to hunt off - reservation was fully discredited when th is Court issued the Mille Lacs decision, holding that \"statehood by itself is insufficient to extinguish Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on land within state boundaries.\" 526 U.S. at 205. To the extent the Court's prior decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], suggested otherwise, Race Horse has thus been overruled. Accordingly, because the Wyoming District Court's conclusion that Wyoming's statehood abrogated the Crow Tribe's hunting rights relied entirely on Crow 866 F. Supp. 520, aff'd,73 F.3d 982, which in turn relied on Race Horse , the analysis was flawe d, and should be reversed. The lower court's alternative theory regarding the Bighorn National Forest, taken from the \"alternative\" determination in the Tenth Circuit's Repsis decision, was likewise misguided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON \"UNOCCUPIED LANDS\" IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY STATEHOOD OR BY THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FOREST",
		"context": "526 U.S. at 205. To the extent the Court's prior decision in 163 U.S. 504, suggested otherwise, Race Horse has thus been overruled. Accordingly, because the Wyoming District Court's conclusion that Wyoming's statehood abrogated the Crow Tribe's hunting rights relied entirely on Crow [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,73 F.3d 982, which in turn relied on Race Horse , the analysis was flawe d, and should be reversed. The lower court's alternative theory regarding the Bighorn National Forest, taken from the \"alternative\" determination in the Tenth Circuit's Repsis decision, was likewise misguided. The 1897 proclamation establishing the Bighor n National Forest could not have possibly rendered the land \"occupied\" for at least two reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F. Supp. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE RIGHT TO HUNT ON \"UNOCCUPIED LANDS\" IS NOT EXTINGUISHED BY STATEHOOD OR BY THE CREATION OF A NATIONAL FOREST",
		"context": "526 U.S. at 205. To the extent the Court's prior decision in 163 U.S. 504, suggested otherwise, Race Horse has thus been overruled. Accordingly, because the Wyoming District Court's conclusion that Wyoming's statehood abrogated the Crow Tribe's hunting rights relied entirely on Crow 866 F. Supp. 520, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which in turn relied on Race Horse , the analysis was flawe d, and should be reversed. The lower court's alternative theory regarding the Bighorn National Forest, taken from the \"alternative\" determination in the Tenth Circuit's Repsis decision, was likewise misguided. The 1897 proclamation establishing the Bighor n National Forest could not have possibly rendered the land \"occupied\" for at least two reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 F.3d 982",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE POLICY CONCERNS THAT UNDERLIE ILLINOIS BRICK SUPPORT THE iPHONE OWNERS' RIGHT TO SEEK DAMAGES",
		"context": "To be clear, a virtue of the Illinois Brick direct- purchaser rule is that it is not a multi-factor balancing test, and it eliminates the need to weigh such consid- erations before a claim for damages may proceed. See Pacific Bell Tel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Apple could not have doubted that it would have to defend against damages claims asserted by purchasers from the Apple App Store, as it effectively conceded in the Apple eBooks case. In any event, policy considerations undermine any possible argument that the Court should make a new exception to Illinois Brick here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Guidance the Government Seeks Cannot be Provided Without Answering the Second Question Presented",
		"context": "See U.S. Br. 21. Because the Ninth Circuit recognized a Bivens remedy in Swartz , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the petition in that case does not even allude to the constitutionality of the Westfall Act , and the Respondent did not raise it in her brief in opposition . A decision by this Court in that case alone , especially along the lines for which the government advocates in its amicus brief, would therefore provide even less guidance to lower courts going forward. See Reply Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Vaden Confirmed That Jurisdiction Over An FAA Petition Is Based On The Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "Rather, the ve nue provision crystallized a broadly applicable analysis that focuses on the \"sub- stantive conflict between the parties,\" 556 U.S. at 62-67 (internal quotation marks omitted), or, as this Court put it in an earlier case, the parties' \"'underlying dis- 5 pute.'\" See id. at 63 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Vaden Court rejected any \"[a]rtful dodges\" that might \"divert us from recognizing the actual di- mensions of [the] controversy\" for purposes of federal question jurisdiction. Vaden , 556 U.S. at 67-68.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Vaden Confirmed That Jurisdiction Over An FAA Petition Is Based On The Parties' Underlying Controversy",
		"context": "As with Section 4 peti- tions, a rule of law based on the \"'totally artificial dis- tinction'\" of whether a preemptive anchor suit has been filed would lead to wasteful litigation and perverse re- sults. Id. ; see also Pershing, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "The Court's qualified -immunity jurisprudence re- mains faithful to the common -law background of section 1983, which protected societal values by limiting official liability for good -faith, reasonable conduct. And it is proper to consider the statute's common -law back- ground. See Bryan A. Garner & Antonin Scalia, Reading Law 318-19 (2012); accord Comcast [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]386 U.S. 547. This role is to protect val- ues that are \"important to 'society as a whole. '\" White , 137 S. Ct. at 551 (first citing City of San 135 S. Ct. 1765.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "The Court's qualified -immunity jurisprudence re- mains faithful to the common -law background of section 1983, which protected societal values by limiting official liability for good -faith, reasonable conduct. And it is proper to consider the statute's common -law back- ground. See Bryan A. Garner & Antonin Scalia, Reading Law 318-19 (2012); accord Comcast 140 S. Ct. 1009[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This role is to protect val- ues that are \"important to 'society as a whole. '\" White , 137 S. Ct. at 551 (first citing City of San 135 S. Ct. 1765.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "See Bryan A. Garner & Antonin Scalia, Reading Law 318-19 (2012); accord Comcast 140 S. Ct. 1009386 U.S. 547. This role is to protect val- ues that are \"important to 'society as a whole. '\" White , 137 S. Ct. at 551 (first citing City of San [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, the Court has explained that qualified immunity allows public officials to carry out their duties without being overly cautious for \"fear of personal monetary liability a nd harassing litigation.\" Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting 483 U.S. 635).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "White , 137 S. Ct. at 551 (first citing City of San 135 S. Ct. 1765. Specifically, the Court has explained that qualified immunity allows public officials to carry out their duties without being overly cautious for \"fear of personal monetary liability a nd harassing litigation.\" Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1866 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Qualified immunity gives officials \"breathing room\" to do their jobs well, al- lowing for \"reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal ques tions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "The Court ex- plained this symmetry best in Pierson . That dec ision rec- ognized the defense as a common -law counterpart to the Court's previous interpretation of \"under color of [ state ] law,\" within the meaning of section 1983, to include con- duct that violates state law. 386 U.S. at 554 -57; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As set out in Part III, infra , if Petitioner want s to revisit section 1983 immunity , he must also accede to a reeval- uation of Monroe and section 1983 liability . Petitioner takes issue with the absence of explicit statutory text stating the current doctrine of qualified immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "Whether the Court would rec- ognize a common -law defense in a statute passed today sheds no light on how the 1871 Congress that passed sec- tion 1983 expected the Court to interpret the statute. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner also claims that qualified immuni ty is in- consistent with the common -law background of section 1983. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": ", Filarsky , 566 U.S. at 388 (collecting nineteenth -century cases noting the \"well settled\" good -faith defense for in- dividuals enforcing the law). As one treatise explained, courts applied a \"legal presumption in favor of the valid- ity of [the officer's] official acts,\" giving an officer \"the most lenient consideration consistent with the law, when it is manifest that he has acted throughout with perfect good faith, and striven honestly to do his whole duty.\" William L. Murfee, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs and Other Ministerial Officers 495 (1884); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The common -law defense contemplated, at least sometimes, the reasonableness of the conduct: \"If an of- ficer uses a reasonable and due discretion he cannot be made liable as for wrongful conversion . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "48 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "The Court's current doctrine correctly reflects section 1983's federalism -promoting underpinnings. \"Among the background principles of construction that our cases have recognized are those grounded in the re- lationship between the Federal Government and the States under our Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 501 U.S. 452. The Court \"construes statutes narrowly when a broader construction would infringe on federalism interests.\" Nielson & Walker, Federalism , supra , at 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "The Court's current doctrine correctly reflects section 1983's federalism -promoting underpinnings. \"Among the background principles of construction that our cases have recognized are those grounded in the re- lationship between the Federal Government and the States under our Constitution.\" 572 U.S. 844; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court \"construes statutes narrowly when a broader construction would infringe on federalism interests.\" Nielson & Walker, Federalism , supra , at 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Qualified immunity correctly interprets section 1983",
		"context": "Had Pierson not recognized a common- law defense counterpart to Monroe 's common -law scope of liability, section 1983 liability would undoubtedly be broader. This liability implicates the functions and interests of States in their sovereign capacities. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The functions in- clude \"States' ability to enforce their laws without undue federal interference\"; the interests include \"hiring com- petent officers\" and \"preventing those officers from shirking their dut[ies] for fear of federal liability\" —all of which the Court consistently considers in appl ying qual- ified immunity. Nielson & Walker, Federalism , supra , at 5; see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Targets a Specific Class Based upon the Message That Class Conveys —One Intended to Help Mothers Keep Their Children —Making It a Content-based Regulation Subject to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "8-14; 31-34. \"[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter.\" Reed , 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (2015) ( citing , Consolidated Edison Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Act is content-specific, because it cannot be \"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.\" 468 U.S. 288.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Act Targets a Specific Class Based upon the Message That Class Conveys —One Intended to Help Mothers Keep Their Children —Making It a Content-based Regulation Subject to Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "Reed , 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (2015) ( citing , Consolidated Edison Co. of 447 U.S. 530). The Act is content-specific, because it cannot be \"justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most offensive is that it forces a message contrary to the mission of the centers in order to suppress their message and force conformity to the message the state wishes to promote. Therefore, it is subject to strict scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A functional approach to the ministerial exception protects Catholic schools' ability to further the Church's principal mission",
		"context": "Lay educators \"perform[] the important role of transmitting\" the Catho- lic \"faith to the next generation\"—by, among other things, modelling good behavior, teaching Catholic doctrine and practice, and exhibiting \"faith in action,\" Porter-Magee, supra , at 10. See generally Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 192. If the First Amendment is to give Catholic schools the \"power to decide for themselves, free from state interfer- ence, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it must allow them the freedom to make employ- ment decisions regarding those they have entrusted to 17 pass on the faith to the next generation, irrespective of formal job title or religious training.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 94",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Arizona's position contravenes AEDPA's design",
		"context": "Pinholster , 563 U.S. at 182. Consistent with those premises , AEDPA strictly limits federal review of claims that were raised, or reasonably could have been raised, in state court . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Williams , 529 U.S. at 437; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) ( limiting federal review of claims ad- judicated on the merits in state court); 28 U.S.C. § 2254( e)(1) (state -court factual determinatio ns are presumed correct).",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Arizona's position contravenes AEDPA's design",
		"context": "In contr ast, under AEDPA, \"[i]n cases where a n applicant for federal habeas relief is not barred from obtaining an evidentiary hearing by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)( 2), the decision to grant such a hear- ing rests in the discretion of the district court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 44",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": ". The FAA \"establishes 'a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration.'\" Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). This pro-arbitration policy reflects the fact that arbitration is a faster and cheaper alternative to litigation that is fair and beneficial to businesses and employees. Indeed, both Congress and this Court have recognized the many benefits of arbitration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Gilmer , 500 U.S. at 24. Congress's intended goal was \"to place an arbitration agreement 'upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.'\" Dean Witter Reynolds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because it recognized the many advantages of arbitration. The House Report accompanying the FAA stated that \"the costliness and delays of litigation … can 4 be eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable.\" H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Id. This Court likewise has acknowledged the \"real benefits\" of arbitration. Circuit City Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For more than three decades, the Court consistently has enforced the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, recognizing that the FAA \"creates federal substantive law requiring parties to honor arbitration agreements.\" Southland 465 U.S. 1; accord Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Circuit City Stores, 532 U.S. 105. For more than three decades, the Court consistently has enforced the liberal federal policy favoring arbitration, recognizing that the FAA \"creates federal substantive law requiring parties to honor arbitration agreements.\" Southland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24. And in doing so, the Court repeatedly has highlighted the \"advantages\" of arbitration. Allied-Bruce 5 Terminix 513 U.S. 265; see, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution\"); Stolt- Nielsen 559 U.S. 662473 U.S. 614.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Southland 465 U.S. 1; accord Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24. And in doing so, the Court repeatedly has highlighted the \"advantages\" of arbitration. Allied-Bruce 5 Terminix [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution\"); Stolt- Nielsen 559 U.S. 662473 U.S. 614. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that these benefits and advantages are every bit as real in the employment context. See Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123 (\"[F]or parties to employment contracts …, it is true … that there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Southland 465 U.S. 1; accord Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24. And in doing so, the Court repeatedly has highlighted the \"advantages\" of arbitration. Allied-Bruce 5 Terminix 513 U.S. 265; see, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution\"); Stolt- Nielsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]473 U.S. 614. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that these benefits and advantages are every bit as real in the employment context. See Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123 (\"[F]or parties to employment contracts …, it is true … that there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Southland 465 U.S. 1; accord Moses H. Cone , 460 U.S. at 24. And in doing so, the Court repeatedly has highlighted the \"advantages\" of arbitration. Allied-Bruce 5 Terminix 513 U.S. 265; see, e.g., Concepcion , 563 U.S. at 345 (arbitration \"reduc[es] the cost and increas[es] the speed of dispute resolution\"); Stolt- Nielsen 559 U.S. 662[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the Court has emphasized that these benefits and advantages are every bit as real in the employment context. See Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123 (\"[F]or parties to employment contracts …, it is true … that there are real benefits to the enforcement of arbitration provisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "State and federal courts are empowered by Congress to invalidate arbitration clauses that run afoul of generally applicable principles of state contract law, such as unconscionability. 15 U.S.C. § 2; see Marmet Health Care Center, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have not hesitated to strike down arbitration provisions that subject employees to unfair procedures. For example, courts routinely invalidate arbitration provisions that purport to limit a employee's right to recover certain types of damages, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 1201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Liberal Federal Policy Favoring Arbitration Reflects the Fact that Arbitration Is a Fair, Efficient, and Inexpensive Alternative to Litigation that Benefits Businesses and Employees Alike",
		"context": "Courts have not hesitated to strike down arbitration provisions that subject employees to unfair procedures. For example, courts routinely invalidate arbitration provisions that purport to limit a employee's right to recover certain types of damages, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and provisions that unreasonably shorten statutes of limitation, see, e.g. , 936 F. Supp. 2d 1145. At the same time, the vast majority of arbitration agreements do not contain these defects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 F.3d 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "When interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, the inquiry must begin with the language of the Code itself. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the statutory text is plain and does not lead to an absurd result, the sole function of the courts is to enforce the plain language of the statute. 540 U.S. 526.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "562 U.S. 61. When the statutory text is plain and does not lead to an absurd result, the sole function of the courts is to enforce the plain language of the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a court interprets a statute, it must assume that Congress said what it meant in the statute, and meant what it said. Connecticut Nat'l 503 U.S. 249.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "540 U.S. 526. When a court interprets a statute, it must assume that Congress said what it meant in the statute, and meant what it said. Connecticut Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The language of Section 1306(b) is clear: \"Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate .\" 11 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "§.1306(b) (emphasis added) . The use of the word \"shall\" in a statute indicates a requirement to do something, whereas the use of \"may\" implies discretion. Kingdomware Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2016). When a statute distinguishes between \"may\" and \"shall,\" it is generally clear that \"shall\" imposes a mandatory duty. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 1969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "Under Section 1306(b), the sole exceptions to the rule that the debtor must remain in possession of all property of the estate are that a confirmed plan or confirmation order states otherwise. This Court has held that when the Bankruptcy Code has enumerated exceptions, courts are not permitted to create additional ones. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Therefore, Section 1306( b) plainly requires the debtor to have possession of all property of the estate prior to confirmation. The question then becomes, what does it mean for the property to \"remain\" in the debtor's possession?",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S.Ct. 1188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "The Bankruptcy code does not define the term \"remain.\" When a term is undefined in a statute, a 6 court gives it its ordinary meaning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Merriam-Webster defines \"remain\" as \"to stay in the same place or with the same person or group; to continue unchanged. \"2 Consequently, in order for property of the estate to remain in the debtor's possession, it must first be in the debtor's possession.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S.Ct. 1882",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Plain Language and Legislative History of Section 1306(b) Indicate that Property of the Estate must be Returned to the Debtor.",
		"context": "Nowhere else does the Code refer to the debtor being able to regain possession of property of the estate. If Congress includes specific language in one section of a statute but omits that language in another section, it is presumed that Congress was doing so intentionally. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court will \"refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "But they don't agree on how much weight history should be given. Some courts use the first step as a significant threshold before engaging in any constitutional scrutiny. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 70 0–03; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 628 F.3d 673 . Other courts take an intermediate approach and look to see if the regulation is analogous to another restriction that has historical roots. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "679 F.3d 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "But they don't agree on how much weight history should be given. Some courts use the first step as a significant threshold before engaging in any constitutional scrutiny. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 70 0–03; 679 F.3d 510 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Other courts take an intermediate approach and look to see if the regulation is analogous to another restriction that has historical roots. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.3d 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "Other courts take an intermediate approach and look to see if the regulation is analogous to another restriction that has historical roots. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 664 F.3d 1180 . And finally, some courts don 't use history at all. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher , From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "Other courts take an intermediate approach and look to see if the regulation is analogous to another restriction that has historical roots. See, e.g. , 614 F.3d 85 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And finally, some courts don 't use history at all. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher , From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "664 F.3d 1180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "And finally, some courts don 't use history at all. Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher , From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 Duke L.J. 1433, 1492 (2018) (finding that of the more than 1 ,100 post -Heller cases, only 29 cite any source from before 1791 and 11 only 42 any source from 1791 –1868); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 91 (declining to engage in a historical analysis as the \"history and t radition\" of \"the meaning of the Amendment\" is \"highly ambiguous \"). 2. Courts have shrunk the \" core\" of the Second Amendment , so regulations are evaluated under a less- exacting form of scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "When many courts f ind that the Second Amendment is implicated in a given claim , they then consider whether the regulation at issue burdens the core of the constitutional rights or rests at its periphery. To determine what level of scrutiny to apply, courts typically will \"consider the nature of the conduct being regulated and the degree to which the challenged law burdens the right.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Most courts agree that any law that burdens core Second Amendment rights receive s strict scrutiny. E.g., Masciandaro , 638 F.3d at 471 (\"We assume that any law that would burden the 'fundamental, ' core right of self -defense in the home by a law -abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "746 F.3d 953 ; New York State Rifle & Pistol 804 F.3d 12 . For less severe burdens, the courts apply a standard that resembles intermediate scrutiny. Skoien , 614 F.3d at 641 –42; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Second Circuit applies rational basis for \"[l]aws that neither implicate the core protections of the Second Amendment nor substantially burden their exercise do not receive heigh tened scrutiny.\" N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n , 804 F.3d at 258.",
		"citation_value_orig": "627 F.3d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "See Ezell , 651 F.3d at 709. When analyzing both the genuineness of the purported dangers and the effectiveness of the proposed restrictions in alleviating those dangers, this Court has further emphas ized the need for precision rather than vague generalities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But time and again, lowers courts have simply deferr ed to the government's \"policy judgment\" about how \"the state can best protect public safety.\" Drake, 724 F.3d at 439; see also 898 F.3d 969 ; 843 F.3d 816 ; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97–99.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "507 U.S. 761 . But time and again, lowers courts have simply deferr ed to the government's \"policy judgment\" about how \"the state can best protect public safety.\" Drake, 724 F.3d at 439; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 843 F.3d 816 ; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97–99. Although the right is \"fundamental,\" the perceived danger of guns leads courts to defer to the legislature in making policy judgments. Often, a ll the government needs to show is that there' s a logical and plausible basis for the law's benefits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "898 F.3d 969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "507 U.S. 761 . But time and again, lowers courts have simply deferr ed to the government's \"policy judgment\" about how \"the state can best protect public safety.\" Drake, 724 F.3d at 439; see also 898 F.3d 969 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 97–99. Although the right is \"fundamental,\" the perceived danger of guns leads courts to defer to the legislature in making policy judgments. Often, a ll the government needs to show is that there' s a logical and plausible basis for the law's benefits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "Often, a ll the government needs to show is that there' s a logical and plausible basis for the law's benefits. The Ninth Circuit is perhaps the most notorious for applying a rational basis -type test, going out of its way to bless the most restrictive gun regulations. Jackson , 746 F.3d 953[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 14 it more recently declared that heightened scrutiny is appropriate only if the law \"meaningfully\" burdens the right to bear arms . Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 680. While this Court struck down a requirement \"that firearms in the home be rendered and kept inoperable at all times,\" as \"mak[ing ] it impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self -defense,\" Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, the Ninth Circuit upheld a nearly functionally identical law that required all firearms to be \"stored in a locked container or disabled with a trigger lock.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "873 F.3d 670",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "But see Ezell , 651 F.3d at 697 (\"In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court long ago made it clear that 'one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.' The same principle applies here.\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Having this strict view of what it is to burden the Second Amendment allows regulations to continue to escape meaningful review . Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit is not alone in applying a form of deferential scrutiny to gun regulations .",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs , 910 F.3d at 126 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority and five other circuit s that \"err in subjecting the Second Amendment to different, watered -down rules and demanding little if any proof. \"); Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 93 (allowing state officials to refuse handgun -carry permits solely because they oppose the idea of ordinary citizens' carrying arms for protection); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Friedman , 784 F.3d at 412 (upholding a ban on assault weapons under intermediate scrutiny because, while it may not reduce the overall dangerousness of crime , it \"may increase the public's sense of safety. \"); 840 F. Supp. 2d 813 , aff'd sub nom , 724 F.3d 426. Alt hough the just-listed cases are among the worst offenders in applying a deferential form of scrutiny , such decisions can be found in every circuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F.3d 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Most Courts Have Adopted a Two-Step Balancing Test That Has Diluted the Second Amendment",
		"context": ", Ass'n of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs , 910 F.3d at 126 (Bibas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority and five other circuit s that \"err in subjecting the Second Amendment to different, watered -down rules and demanding little if any proof. \"); Kachalsky , 701 F.3d at 93 (allowing state officials to refuse handgun -carry permits solely because they oppose the idea of ordinary citizens' carrying arms for protection); 682 F.3d 160; Friedman , 784 F.3d at 412 (upholding a ban on assault weapons under intermediate scrutiny because, while it may not reduce the overall dangerousness of crime , it \"may increase the public's sense of safety. \"); 840 F. Supp. 2d 813 , aff'd sub nom , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alt hough the just-listed cases are among the worst offenders in applying a deferential form of scrutiny , such decisions can be found in every circuit. See, e.g., Ruben & Blocher , supra, at 1473 (finding that of the more than 1,100 gun cases since Heller, only 9 percent have been successful).",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 F.3d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standard of review",
		"context": ". In cases on direct review from both federal and state courts, this Court has long held that a trial judge's decision on the question of jury bias \"ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U. S. 415; 561 U. S. 358. The same standard was applied on federal habeas corpus in 4. This is part of document 1744-1 from the District Court docket.",
		"citation_value_orig": "98 U. S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standard of review",
		"context": ". In cases on direct review from both federal and state courts, this Court has long held that a trial judge's decision on the question of jury bias \"ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.\" 98 U. S. 145; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 561 U. S. 358. The same standard was applied on federal habeas corpus in 4. This is part of document 1744-1 from the District Court docket.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U. S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standard of review",
		"context": ". In cases on direct review from both federal and state courts, this Court has long held that a trial judge's decision on the question of jury bias \"ought not to be set aside by a reviewing court, unless the error is manifest.\" 98 U. S. 145; 500 U. S. 415; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same standard was applied on federal habeas corpus in 4. This is part of document 1744-1 from the District Court docket.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U. S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Standard of review",
		"context": "The same standard was applied on federal habeas corpus in 4. This is part of document 1744-1 from the District Court docket. 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 Reynolds involved a challenge to a specific juror, but Irvin applied the standard to a broader claim, that the massive publicity has tainted the community as a whole. See 366 U. S., at 725-728. Patton applied the same standard to a \"finding that the jury as a whole was impartial.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U. S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "To the extent the framework created by the Insu- lar Cases undermines the First Circuit's decision, it must be set aside. \"[ S]tare decisis is not an inexorable command, but instead reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is more important that the applica-ble rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"That policy is at its weakest when we interpret the Constitution because our interpretation can be altered only by constitutional amendment or by overruling our prior decisions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": ". overruling a previous decision where there has been a significant change in, or subsequent development of, our constitu- tional law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It \"cannot possibly be controlling when . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": ". the decision in question has been proved manifestly erro- neous, and its underpinnings eroded, by subsequent decisions of this Court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Or when \"related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.\" Planned Parenthood of Se.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "Or when \"related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Oliver Wendell Holmes, The 15 Common Law 8 (1963) (\"The customs, beliefs, or needs of a primitive time establish a rule or a formula. In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity dis- appears, but the rule remains.\"). There has been a sea change in constitutional law since the Insular Cases were decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "In the course of centuries the custom, belief, or necessity dis- appears, but the rule remains.\"). There has been a sea change in constitutional law since the Insular Cases were decided. \"With the excep- tion of two of its members, all justices of the Court that decided the Insular Cases had in 1896 also joined the Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Consejo de Salud Playa de 586 F. Supp. 2d 22. And so \"[t]here is no question that the Insular Cases are on par with the Court's infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in li- cencing the downgrading of the rights of discrete mi- norities within the political hegemony of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "There has been a sea change in constitutional law since the Insular Cases were decided. \"With the excep- tion of two of its members, all justices of the Court that decided the Insular Cases had in 1896 also joined the Court's decision in 163 U.S. 537.\" Consejo de Salud Playa de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And so \"[t]here is no question that the Insular Cases are on par with the Court's infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in li- cencing the downgrading of the rights of discrete mi- norities within the political hegemony of the United States.\" Igartua-De La 417 F.3d 145.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F. Supp. 2d 22",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "Consejo de Salud Playa de 586 F. Supp. 2d 22. And so \"[t]here is no question that the Insular Cases are on par with the Court's infamous decision in Plessy v. Ferguson in li- cencing the downgrading of the rights of discrete mi- norities within the political hegemony of the United States.\" Igartua-De La [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Still the legacy of the Plessy Court gov- erns the lives of millions of Americans—or as the au- thor of Plessy put it in announcing the judgment of the Court in the first of the Insular Cases , millions of members of \"alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought.\" 182 U.S. 244 (\"[S]ince the Insular Cases were decided, the facts used to rationalize the 16 Court's holdings have changed and are viewed so dif- ferently that the old holdings have been robbed of sig- nificant justification.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.3d 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "Igartua-De La 417 F.3d 145. Still the legacy of the Plessy Court gov- erns the lives of millions of Americans—or as the au- thor of Plessy put it in announcing the judgment of the Court in the first of the Insular Cases , millions of members of \"alien races, differing from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[S]ince the Insular Cases were decided, the facts used to rationalize the 16 Court's holdings have changed and are viewed so dif- ferently that the old holdings have been robbed of sig- nificant justification.\"). Further, substantial changes in Supreme Court ju- risprudence have undermined the entire framework on which the Insular Cases are built. The main consequence of the Insular Cases is that Americans living in \"unincorporated\" U.S. territories don't enjoy the same constitutional rights with respect to the territorial governme nt (or Congress acting as the territorial legislature) as Americans in the states do until the territory is \"incorporated\" into the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "But it may not have seemed so strange in the early 1900s, when even Americans living in states had no federal constitu- tional rights with respect to their state governments. \"When ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights applied only to the Federal Government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Four- teenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights didn't begin to restrict state governments until many years later, with the First Amendment applied against state governments fo r the first time in 1925.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Four- teenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights didn't begin to restrict state governments until many years later, with the First Amendment applied against state governments fo r the first time in 1925. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]330 U.S. 1372 U.S. 229. Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Four- teenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights didn't begin to restrict state governments until many years later, with the First Amendment applied against state governments fo r the first time in 1925. 268 U.S. 652[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]372 U.S. 229. Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "And when the Insular Cases were decided in the early 1900s, the Supreme Court had yet to hold that the Bill of Rights restricted the authority of state governments by virtue of the Four- teenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. The Bill of Rights didn't begin to restrict state governments until many years later, with the First Amendment applied against state governments fo r the first time in 1925. 268 U.S. 652330 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since then, \"[w]ith only 'a handful' of exceptions, this Court has held that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the protections con- tained in the Bill of Rights, rendering them applicable to the States.\" Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687. This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]561 U.S. 742, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines earlier this year. Timbs , 139 S. Ct. 682. So because Congress has a ll the same powers as a state government with respect to a territory, and when the Insular Cases were decided a state government was not restricted by the Bill of Rights, there is at least some logic to holding that Congress, when acting with the power of a state government, would likewise not be restricted by the Bill of Rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "Timbs , 139 S. Ct. at 687. This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. 367 U.S. 643[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines earlier this year. Timbs , 139 S. Ct. 682. So because Congress has a ll the same powers as a state government with respect to a territory, and when the Insular Cases were decided a state government was not restricted by the Bill of Rights, there is at least some logic to holding that Congress, when acting with the power of a state government, would likewise not be restricted by the Bill of Rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "This includes the Fourth Amendment in the 1960s. 367 U.S. 643561 U.S. 742, and the Eighth Amendment prohibition on excessive fines earlier this year. Timbs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So because Congress has a ll the same powers as a state government with respect to a territory, and when the Insular Cases were decided a state government was not restricted by the Bill of Rights, there is at least some logic to holding that Congress, when acting with the power of a state government, would likewise not be restricted by the Bill of Rights. The Insular Cases even acknowledged this distinction, noting that \"we have 18 also held that the states, wh en once admitted as such, may dispense with grand juries,\" when holding that grand juries were not required in a territorial criminal prosecution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "While courts of appeals have disagreed with this analysis, see, e.g., Commw. of N. Mar. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 520 F.2d 1140, Gov't of the 427 F.2d 532, this Court has never addressed the impact the Fourteenth Amend- ment's incorporation doctrine has on the continued ap- plication of the Insular Cases . The Court should do so now. Stare decisis couldn't save Plessy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "723 F.2d 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "While courts of appeals have disagreed with this analysis, see, e.g., Commw. of N. Mar. 723 F.2d 682, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Gov't of the 427 F.2d 532, this Court has never addressed the impact the Fourteenth Amend- ment's incorporation doctrine has on the continued ap- plication of the Insular Cases . The Court should do so now. Stare decisis couldn't save Plessy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F.2d 1140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. STARE DECISIS SHOULD NOT SAVE THE INSULAR CASES",
		"context": "While courts of appeals have disagreed with this analysis, see, e.g., Commw. of N. Mar. 723 F.2d 682, 520 F.2d 1140, Gov't of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has never addressed the impact the Fourteenth Amend- ment's incorporation doctrine has on the continued ap- plication of the Insular Cases . The Court should do so now. Stare decisis couldn't save Plessy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 F.2d 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime has no basis in the statutory text",
		"context": "Section 1231(a)(6) says nothing about six-month cutoffs, bond hearings, exceptions for noncitizens whose release or remov al is imminent, immigration judges, or proof by clear and convincing evidence. The Third and Ninth Circuits simply \" created out of thin air a requirement for bond hearings that does not exist in the statute\" and \"adopted new standards that the government must meet\" at those hearings. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court, however, may not \"add words to the law to produce what is thought to be a de-sirable result.\" 575 U.S. 768.",
		"citation_value_orig": "912 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Third and Ninth Circuits' bond-hearing regime has no basis in the statutory text",
		"context": "But a bond hearing need not be held if release or re- moval is imminent. 13 However desirable (or not) those revisions, a court's task \"is to apply the text, n ot to improve upon it.\" Pavelic & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. T he Third and Ninth Circuits' bond -hearing re- gime also violates the rule of construction in 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.",
		"context": "The Constitution's structure and history establish that \"States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As the Court has held, such immunity is confirmed by , but is not limited to, the Eleventh Amendment. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.",
		"context": "The Court has subsequently reiterat ed this same concern. See Vt. Agency of Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, there are good reasons to think that the States' consent to federal government suits did not include consent to suits by private delegees: the \"meaningful differences between suits brought by the United States … and suits by private citizens.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. PennEast incorrectly argues that the right to sue the States can be \"delegated\" to private parties.",
		"context": "A qui tam case brought under the FCA is filed in the name of the government; the suit is based on \"false claims submitted to the government\"; the United States receives \"the lion's share of any amount recovered\"; the United States \"may choose to intervene and pursue the action itself\"; the \"case may not be settled or voluntarily dismissed without the government's consent\"; and the government \"may change its mind and intervene at any point in the litigation\" if it has a reason to do so. E.g., United States ex rel. Mil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But despite these features—which suggest that qui tam suits to recover federal dollars are \"inherently governmental\"— this Court expressed its \"serio us doubt\" as to whether a relator could sue a State under the Eleventh Amendment. Stevens , 529 U.S., at 787.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 F.2d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. ANILCA's Use of \"Public Lands\" Was Employed in Different Parts of the Act with Different Intent",
		"context": "Moreover, because ANILCA \"is far from a chef d'oeuvre of legislative draftsmanship\" no court should presume that \"identical words used in different parts of the same statute are intended to have the same meaning[.]\" Util. Air Regulatory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized that this presumption \"readily yields to context, and a stat- utory term—even one defined in the statute—may 33 take on distinct characteristics from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different imple- mentation strategies.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. ANILCA's Use of \"Public Lands\" Was Employed in Different Parts of the Act with Different Intent",
		"context": ". . Environmental [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put simply, courts \"must do [their] best, bearing in mind the 'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 34 context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.' \" Util.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. ANILCA's Use of \"Public Lands\" Was Employed in Different Parts of the Act with Different Intent",
		"context": "Put simply, courts \"must do [their] best, bearing in mind the 'fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their 34 context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.' \" Util. Air Regulatory Group , 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). For example, in 135 S. Ct. 2480, this Court held that tax credits are available in each state regardless of whether the state creates its own insurance exchange or has a federal exchange. No-tably, a straightforward reading of the critical text pointed toward a conclusion that the credits are avail-able only for state exchanges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. ANILCA's Use of \"Public Lands\" Was Employed in Different Parts of the Act with Different Intent",
		"context": "\" Util. Air Regulatory Group , 134 S. Ct. at 2441 (quoting 529 U.S. 120). For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that tax credits are available in each state regardless of whether the state creates its own insurance exchange or has a federal exchange. No-tably, a straightforward reading of the critical text pointed toward a conclusion that the credits are avail-able only for state exchanges. As Justice Scalia ex-plained in his dissent: \"The Court holds that when the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act says 'Ex-change established by the State' it means 'Exchange established by the State or the Federal Government.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Establishment Clause has a narrower application to foreign affairs than to domestic matters",
		"context": "matters. The United States correctly asserts that constitutional challenges to immigration matters are governed by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which subjected such challenges to a low ­ 3 scrutiny rational basis test. American history supports this conclusion. Thomas Jefferson, an ardent advocate of separation of church and state, said in his Second Inaugural Address: In matte rs of religion I have considered that its free exercise is placed by the Constitution independent of the powers of the General Gover nment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TCPA'S CELLPHONE-CALL BAN VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "The First Amendment prohibits the government from \"restrict[ing] expressi on because of its message, its ideas, its subject ma tter, or its content.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 529 U.S. 803. Here, application of these principles is straightforward. The cellphone-call ban is a sweeping restriction on speech, imposing a draconian punishment on \"an entire medium of expression.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TCPA'S CELLPHONE-CALL BAN VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "The First Amendment prohibits the government from \"restrict[ing] expressi on because of its message, its ideas, its subject ma tter, or its content.\" 135 S. Ct. 2218; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, application of these principles is straightforward. The cellphone-call ban is a sweeping restriction on speech, imposing a draconian punishment on \"an entire medium of expression.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TCPA'S CELLPHONE-CALL BAN VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Here, application of these principles is straightforward. The cellphone-call ban is a sweeping restriction on speech, imposing a draconian punishment on \"an entire medium of expression.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FCC has acknowledged that whether the ban applies depends on the \"content of the call.\" August 2016 Order 9104.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laufer has not experienced, and will not experience, the type of discrimination that gives rise to Article III standing.",
		"context": "Discriminatory treatment can, in some cases, inflict a stigmatic injury that gives rise to Article III standing. As this Court explained in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"discrimination itself, by perpetuating archaic and stereotypic notions or by stigmatizing members of the disfavored group as innately inferior and therefore as less worthy participants in the political community, can cause serious noneconomic injuries to those persons who are personally denied equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored group.\" Id. at 739-40 (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 728",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laufer has not experienced, and will not experience, the type of discrimination that gives rise to Article III standing.",
		"context": "Id. at 739-40 (internal quotation marks omitted). TransUnion , too, stated that \"intangible harms can also be concrete\" and cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that \"discriminatory treatment\" can constitute an actionable injury. 141 S. Ct. at 2204-05. In the cited footnote, Allen observed that a stigmatic injury \"is judicially cognizable to the extent that [the plaintiffs] are personally subject to discriminatory treatment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 737",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Laufer has not experienced, and will not experience, the type of discrimination that gives rise to Article III standing.",
		"context": "Nothing in Havens Realty or any other case suggests that a litigant can establish Article III injury by threatening to deliberately inflict stigma on herself for stigma's sake. To the contrary, this Court has rejected the view that a plaintiff can establish standing 43 via such self-inflicted injuries. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the plaintiffs challenged a provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act allowing surveillance of communications between Americans and individuals in foreign countries. However, they could not prove that their communications with foreign individuals would be monitored. Hence, they spent their own money seeking to avoid surveillance and alleged that these expenditures constituted an Article III injury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Coercion Criterion",
		"context": "That is not an injury sufficient to confer standing under Art. III, even though the disagreem ent is phrased in constitutional terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 made out any time a person experiences a sense of affront from the expression\" of views which arecontrary to his own. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Coercion Criterion",
		"context": "Cases involving public schoolchildren are inapplicable here. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman . 545 U.S. at 691 (plurality opinion); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 39",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Coercion Criterion",
		"context": "(\"Passersby who disagree with themessage conveyed by these displays are free to ignorethem, or even to turn their backs, just as they are free to do when they disagree with any other form ofgovernment speech. \"); see also Am. Jewish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lower court's Establishment Clause analysis is therefore not only plainly inconsistent with Town ofGreece 's historical foundations criterion, but its coercion criterion as well. Indeed, as a practical matter,why should the plaintiffs in Town of Greece , who witnessed sectarian prayers at a town council meeting,and who felt offended thereby, ultimately fail in theirEstablishment Clause challenge, while Respondentshere, who come into \"unwelcome contact\" with a 20 passive Latin cross while driving a car or riding a bike, prevail?",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Coercion Criterion",
		"context": "Comm'rs, 788 F.3d at 601 (Batchelder, J., concurring in part) (\"[N]otwithstanding Town of Greece 's broad language regarding the test that properly governs the Establishment Clause . . .unless and until the Supreme Court explicitly holdsthat it has abandoned the Lemon /endorsement test, the lower courts are bound to continue applying that test incontexts where the Court has previously employed it\"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "847 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Lax Approach To Class Certification Harms Businesses And The Judicial System",
		"context": "Friendly, Federal Jurisdiction: A General View 120 (1973). This Court has long recognized the power of class-action lawsuits to induce settlement. See AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Court noted over 40 years ago, \"[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages li- ability and litigation costs that he may find it econom- ically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.\" Coopers & 437 U.S. 463.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit's Lax Approach To Class Certification Harms Businesses And The Judicial System",
		"context": "See AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333. As the Court noted over 40 years ago, \"[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential damages li- ability and litigation costs that he may find it econom- ically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.\" Coopers & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 It therefore is not surprising that businesses often yield to the hydraulic pressure generated by class cer- tification to settle even meritless claims. Indeed, the pressures today are even greater than they were then.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Cy Pres Is An Improper Use Of Judicial Power Under Article III",
		"context": "Chief among the perils posed by a cy pres award of class action proceeds is the flouting of Article III's case or controversy requirement and the 15 separation of powers doctrine. ―Article III of the Constitution limits the ‗judicial power' of the United States to the resolution of ‗cases' and ‗controversies. '‖ Valley Forge Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The case or controversy requ irement is intertwined with standing because ―at an irreducible minimum, Art icle III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.‖ Id. at 472 (citations and quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Cy Pres Is An Improper Use Of Judicial Power Under Article III",
		"context": ". in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the conseque nces of judicial action.‖ Id. A recent decision from this Court arising in the class action context emphasize s that to establish an actual injury ―a plaintiff must show that he or she suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest 16 that is concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.‖ Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as revised (May 24, 2016) (internal quotations and punctuation omitted). ―For an injury to be ‗particularized,' it must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Procedural default is a court-created bar to habeas relief, untethered to AEDPA, and Martinez is an exception to that bar",
		"context": "The rule also creates a n incentive, as the dissenting J ustices further noted, for prisoners to attack post -conviction counsel's performance in every case in order to access the \"free pass to federal 29 habeas\" relief Martinez authorized. Id. at 28; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The State Has No Compelling Interest In Prohibiting Pastor Moore's Audible Prayer And His Laying Hands On Petitioner In The Execution Chamber",
		"context": "Courts must look \"beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.\" O Centro , 546 U.S. at 431; see also id. (analogizing to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Any argument that an exception based on a sincere religious belief would \"open the door\" to additional exceptions has no place in the compelling- interest analysis. See Cutter , 544 U.S. at 723 n.11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress Has Ratified This Court's Decisions",
		"context": "That is a powerful signal to the Court that Congress approves of this Court's ERISA preemption jurisprudence, and that the Court's jurisprudence should stay where it is. \"Stare decisis … is a foundation stone of the rule of law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"What is more, stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision … interprets a statute. Then, unlike in a constitutional case, critics of our ruling can take their objections across the street, and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress Has Ratified This Court's Decisions",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Forest Grove Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has even adopted the same view with respect to interpretations of a statute by federal 6 That provision states: \"Notwithstanding subsection (d) of section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (relating to effect on other laws), nothing in this subsection shall be construed to alter, amend, modify , invalidate, impair, or supersede subsections (a), (b), and (c) of such section 514 as it applies with respect to any procedure referre d to in paragraph (1) and any expedited procedure referred to in paragraph (2), except to the extent that such procedure would be consistent with the requirements of section 206(d)(3) of such Act (relating to qualified domestic relations orders) or the requirements of section 609(a) of such Act (relating to qualified me dical child support orders) if the reference in such section 206(d)(3) to a domestic re lations order and the reference in such section 609(a) to a medical child support order were a reference to a support order referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2) relating to the same matters, respectively.\" 23 appellate courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Congress Has Ratified This Court's Decisions",
		"context": "Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, not only has Congress amended surrounding provisions without amending § 1144(a), but Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes specifically stating that ERISA's preemption provision was staying intact. The Court should therefore adhere to its longstanding ERISA preemption jurisprudence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Colorado Supreme Court violated the Electors Clause and the Colorado Election Code",
		"context": "U.S. Const. art. I, § 1, ¶ 2; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Colorado legislature allows the state judiciary to intervene in ballot disputes only when a person \"charged with a duty\" under the Colorado Election Code \"has committed or is about to commit a breach or neglect of duty or other wrongful act.\" Colo. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The Colorado Supreme Court violated the Electors Clause and the Colorado Election Code",
		"context": "49 yers have powers of divination that would have enabled them to foresee how the state supreme court would in- terpret section 1-4-1203(2)(a) in its eventual ruling. Pres- ident Trump also insisted throughout the state-court proceedings that the judiciary has no authority under state law to order Secretary Griswold to remove Presi-dent Trump from the ballot, 60 and a litigant need not frame his state-law arguments as an Electors Clause claim until a court actually interprets the relevant elec- tion statute in a manner that departs from the directions of the legislature. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ye t even apart from the Electors Clause, there is nothing wrong with a ruling from this Court that rejects the Colorado Supreme Court's interpretation of state election law on state-law grounds. There is no federal statute or constitutional provision that bans this Court from reviewing state-law questions under 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "And in public incitement cases, the target of the incitement often hears the statement and fears \"imminent\" violence. See id. at 445 (public message that \"there might have to be some revengeance taken\" during upcoming Ku Klux Klan march); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Obscenity and chil d pornography.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "Br. 32. The State's reliance on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Resp. Br. 32, is pa rticularly inapt because the statute there expressly required that the defendant \"hav[e] knowledge that the ma tter is obscene,\" and proof of that element was not disputed, 413 U.S. at 16 n.1 (quoting statute).",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "32, is pa rticularly inapt because the statute there expressly required that the defendant \"hav[e] knowledge that the ma tter is obscene,\" and proof of that element was not disputed, 413 U.S. at 16 n.1 (quoting statute). And this Court struck down a statute that purported to eliminate any mens rea requirement for possessing obscene material. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the United States acknowledges, a similar analysis governs child pornography cases. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "18-19. In that context, \"the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence from wrongful conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A statute without a mens rea as to age would thus present \"substantial constitutional questions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "23- 24. The State fails to address F. C . C [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which explained that the \"fighting words\" exception allows the government to \"forbid speech calculated to provoke a fight.\" Id. at 745 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "Id. at 745 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], similarly explains that the fighting words exception requires a \"direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange fisticuffs.\" Id. at 409 (emphases added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "Ibid. (quoting Brandenburg , 395 U.S. at 447). Regardless, this Court has confined the fighting words exception to a \"narrowly limited\" category of nose-to-nose interactions involvin g acute risk of immediate violence, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has rejected every request to expand the exception beyond that limited context, see, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. 141 S. Ct. 2038; R.A.V 505 U.S. 377; Johnson , 491 U.S. at 409. There is no ba sis for transforming a limited protection against imminent vi olence into a catch-all to prohibit disfavored speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "(quoting Brandenburg , 395 U.S. at 447). Regardless, this Court has confined the fighting words exception to a \"narrowly limited\" category of nose-to-nose interactions involvin g acute risk of immediate violence, see 315 U.S. 568, and has rejected every request to expand the exception beyond that limited context, see, e.g., Mahanoy Area Sch. 141 S. Ct. 2038; R.A.V [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Johnson , 491 U.S. at 409. There is no ba sis for transforming a limited protection against imminent vi olence into a catch-all to prohibit disfavored speech. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "Unable to demons trate a historical tradition of criminally punishing negligent speech, the State turns to civil defamation. But the State overlooks the \"special concern\" that \"[t]he severity of criminal sanctions\" poses far greater risk of chilling speech than civil liability . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the State concedes that \"[c]riminal libel prosecutions are subject to the same constitutional limitations as those set forth in New York Times v. Sullivan .\" Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "49 (cleaned up). Even in the civil context, heightened intent is required where the First Amendment stakes are raised. The State acknowledges that New York [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], requires knowing falsity or recklessness for public figures to obtain compensatory damages. Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "30 & n.7. But even for private figures, \"the States may not permit r e c o v e r y o f p u n i t i v e damages\" absent \"knowledge of falsity or reckless 10 disregard for the truth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 5. Commercial speech . The State likewise tries to shoehorn commercial speech into its listener-focused standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "28-29. But the State fails to acknowledge Illinois ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which recognized that the First Amendment limits actions for commercial fraud and emphasized the \"prime importance\" of requiring proof that the defendant \"kn[ew] that the representation was false\" and \"inten[ded] to mislead the listener.\" Id. at 620.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Categorical Exception Penalizes Negligent Speech",
		"context": "Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The distinction rests on \"[t]wo features\" no t present \"[i]n most other contexts.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Reasonable concerns about frivolous Section 1983 claims do not justify an affirmative-indications-of-innocence requirement",
		"context": "Even assuming that an affirmative -indications -of-innocence requirement would provide some additional protections against frivolous Fourth Amendment claims, that policy concer n cannot overcome the requirement's inconsistency with the common law at the time of Section 1983's enactment and with the constitutional values and purposes that the favorable -termination element serve s. ARGUMENT Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 , which has been codified at 42 U.S.C. 1983, \" creates a species of tort liability \" for vindicating federal constitutional rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1983 provides a cause of action against \"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Reasonable concerns about frivolous Section 1983 claims do not justify an affirmative-indications-of-innocence requirement",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2149. T o determine the elements of the Section 1983 claim based on that constitutional right, the Court's precedents then require ident ifying the common -law cause of action that provides \"the closest analogy \" to the type of constitutional claim at issue, Heck , 512 U.S. at 484, and incorporating ( or adapting ) the elements of that common -law cause of action at the time of Section 1983's enactment into the Section 1983 claim to the ex- tent they are consistent with \"the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 139 S. Ct. 1715 . Under that approach, the court of appeals' judgment should be reversed. Petitioner asserts a Fourth Amend-ment claim that is most analogous to the common -law tort of malicious prosecution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Reasonable concerns about frivolous Section 1983 claims do not justify an affirmative-indications-of-innocence requirement",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2149. T o determine the elements of the Section 1983 claim based on that constitutional right, the Court's precedents then require ident ifying the common -law cause of action that provides \"the closest analogy \" to the type of constitutional claim at issue, Heck , 512 U.S. at 484, and incorporating ( or adapting ) the elements of that common -law cause of action at the time of Section 1983's enactment into the Section 1983 claim to the ex- tent they are consistent with \"the values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue. \" 137 S. Ct. 911 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under that approach, the court of appeals' judgment should be reversed. Petitioner asserts a Fourth Amend-ment claim that is most analogous to the common -law tort of malicious prosecution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Statutory History Requires Expansive Interpretation of Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation Discrimination",
		"context": "Pension Ben. Guar. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is why the Court should focus not on the \"sort of unenacted legislative history that is often neither truly legislative . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Statutory History Requires Expansive Interpretation of Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation Discrimination",
		"context": ". nor truly his-torical,\" and instead focus on the \"record of enacted changes Congress made to the relevant statutory text over time,\" BNSF Ry. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the statutory history demonstrates that Congress ratified a broader understanding of sex discrimination to include discrimination based on sex roles and behavioral stereotypes, which as a matter of common sense include sexual orientation. And Con-gress intended the Court to interpret the sex dis- crimination provision broadl y to cover forms of sex discrimination not expressly mentioned in the statute. In fact, the Court has already held that the 1991 amendments ratified its inter pretation of the sex dis- crimination prohibition beyond the original statutory 14 language.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 893",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Statutory History Requires Expansive Interpretation of Title VII to Include Sexual Orientation Discrimination",
		"context": "And Con-gress intended the Court to interpret the sex dis- crimination provision broadl y to cover forms of sex discrimination not expressly mentioned in the statute. In fact, the Court has already held that the 1991 amendments ratified its inter pretation of the sex dis- crimination prohibition beyond the original statutory 14 language. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Faragher , the Court determined the scope of an employer's liability for sexual harassment committed by one of its employees. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "As the government explains ( at 15-16), it was filed in violation of the bankruptcy automa tic stay. This is a jurisdictional obstacle to this Court's review—or at a minimum, a serious vehicle problem because th e Court would have to decide whether the issue is jurisdictional, which it has not previously ad-dressed. In suggesting otherwise ( at 16), the government relies entirely on a Seventh Circuit case, In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], addressing a dis- tinct question: whether a state court may interpret the scope of a bankruptcy court's order lifting an au- tomatic stay. More on point are other appellate deci- sions treating the automatic stay as jurisdictional where a notice of appeal is filed in contravention of the automatic stay and is thus \"void,\" mean ing no valid notice of appeal was ever filed to vest the court of appeals wit h jurisdiction. E.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 566",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "More on point are other appellate deci- sions treating the automatic stay as jurisdictional where a notice of appeal is filed in contravention of the automatic stay and is thus \"void,\" mean ing no valid notice of appeal was ever filed to vest the court of appeals wit h jurisdiction. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Constitution 68 F.3d 685. The same is true here. There is no valid petition to vest this Court with any sort of certiorari jurisdiction — whether it be to GVR or to grant plenary review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 1131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "More on point are other appellate deci- sions treating the automatic stay as jurisdictional where a notice of appeal is filed in contravention of the automatic stay and is thus \"void,\" mean ing no valid notice of appeal was ever filed to vest the court of appeals wit h jurisdiction. E.g. , 68 F.3d 1131; Constitution [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same is true here. There is no valid petition to vest this Court with any sort of certiorari jurisdiction — whether it be to GVR or to grant plenary review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "That is not to say this Court lacks all authority over interlocutory state -court proceedings. Justices Alito and Breyer previously denied a stay in this case based on the Court 's general authority to stay inter- locutory state -court proceedings. E.g., CBS, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is all the Court did in Nat'l Socialist Party of 432 U.S. 43, which the government cites in support of jurisdiction here. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 1315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "Justices Alito and Breyer previously denied a stay in this case based on the Court 's general authority to stay inter- locutory state -court proceedings. E.g., CBS, 510 U.S. 1315. That is all the Court did in Nat'l Socialist Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which the government cites in support of jurisdiction here. Br. 15.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "15. To read Skokie more broadly as authorizing merits revi ew of state- court preliminary injunctions would effectively annul the statute limiting jurisdiction to \" final\" judgments. The government also cites several cases applying Cox Broadcasting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which prescribes four narrow exceptions to the final-ity rule. The government seeks expansion of Cox through recognition of what would be a fifth sprawl-ing exception: allowing review whenever a state- court ruling would \"restrict[] the exercise of an important 8 federal right.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly re- jected such an argument, which would allow the Cox exceptions \"to swallow the rule\" of finality. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 541 U.S. 428. 3. Finally, the government suggests (a t 18-19) that, if the Court grants review, it should \"direct the parties to brief\" whether the Puerto Rico Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 619",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly re- jected such an argument, which would allow the Cox exceptions \"to swallow the rule\" of finality. E.g. , 451 U.S. 619; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Finally, the government suggests (a t 18-19) that, if the Court grants review, it should \"direct the parties to brief\" whether the Puerto Rico Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government identifies three significant vehicle obstacles that foreclose GVR or plenary review",
		"context": "§1446(d) be- cause it issued its decision while P etitioners' removal notice remained pending in feder al court. That, how- ever, would be extraordinary and unwarranted: Ab- sent \"the most exceptional\" circumstances , this Court will not \"consider questions not raised in the petition.\" Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, the Court should treat this as it would any other potential vehicle obstacle: a basis for deny- ing review. This is particularly appropriate here be-cause Petitioners have separately appealed this issue to the First Circuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
		"context": ". Legal and factual developments have \"eroded\" Roe and Casey 's \"underpinnings.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Start with legal developments. First, Roe and Ca- sey are irreconcilable with this Court's rigorous, now \"established method of substantive -due-process anal- ysis.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
		"context": "Supra Part I -A. Second, since Roe and Casey this Court has refused to hold in any other context that liberty or pri- vacy interests support a constitution al right to effect \"the purposeful termination\" of a human life (actual or \"potential\"). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Glucksberg , 521 U.S. at 728 (holding that a right to \"assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty inte rest protected by the Due Process Clause\"). This reaffirms that the right to abortion is an outlier among this Court's cases. And third, the special -rules regime applied in abortion cases shows that Roe and Casey represent a stark de- parture from this Court's general approach of apply-ing neutral rules of law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
		"context": "See, e.g., infra Part I -B-5. And today all 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted \"safe haven\" laws, giving women bearing un- wanted children the option of \"leaving [the] newborn directly in the care of t he state until it can be adopted.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://perma.cc/ZL5D -9X24. Second, even if abortion may once have been thought critical as an alternative to contraception, see Casey , 505 U.S. at 856, changed circumstances under- mine that view. Policy can effect dramatic expansions in access to contraceptives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 F.3d 846",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
		"context": "Ibid. Whatever the truth of that statement in 1992, events have left it behind. Advances in \"neonatal and medi-cal science,\" McCorvey , 385 F.3d at 852 (Jones, J., con- curring), now show that an unborn child has \"taken on 'the human form' in all relevant respects\" by 12 weeks' gestation, App.66a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Knowledge of when the unborn are sensitive \"to pain\" has progressed con- siderably. MKB Mgmt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Legal And Factual Progress Have Overtaken This Court's Abortion Precedents",
		"context": "Knowledge of when the unborn are sensitive \"to pain\" has progressed con- siderably. MKB Mgmt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And while the Roe Court thought there was no \"consensus\" among those \"trained in ... medicine\" as to whether \"life ... is pre- sent throughout pregnancy,\" 410 U.S. at 159, the Court has since acknowledged that \"by common un-derstanding and scientific terminology, a fetus is a 31 living organism while within the womb,\" before and after viability, Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 147. Yet Casey and Roe still impede a State from acting on this infor- mation by prohibiting pre -viabi lity abortions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "795 F.3d 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "As with all federal statutes, Congress is presumed to have draft ed and enacted the FSIA having in mind this Court's decisions. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court made clear for decades prior to the FSIA's enactment that instances where there is need and authority for federal com mon law are \"few and restr icted.\" 373 U.S. 647 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "See, e.g., 519 U.S. 482. This Court made clear for decades prior to the FSIA's enactment that instances where there is need and authority for federal com mon law are \"few and restr icted.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Those instances generally fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decisi on is \"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,\" 23 Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398 ; and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, Wheeldin , 373 U.S. at 652 . See also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 ; 140 S. Ct. 713.10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases .",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 647",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "This Court made clear for decades prior to the FSIA's enactment that instances where there is need and authority for federal com mon law are \"few and restr icted.\" 373 U.S. 647 . Those instances generally fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decisi on is \"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,\" 23 Banco Nacional de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, Wheeldin , 373 U.S. at 652 . See also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 ; 140 S. Ct. 713.10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases . See 820 F.2d 1000; Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A .",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "373 U.S. 647 . Those instances generally fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decisi on is \"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,\" 23 Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398 ; and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, Wheeldin , 373 U.S. at 652 . See also Texas Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 140 S. Ct. 713.10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases . See 820 F.2d 1000; Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A . de C .V.,930 F.2d 777 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "373 U.S. 647 . Those instances generally fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decisi on is \"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,\" 23 Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398 ; and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, Wheeldin , 373 U.S. at 652 . See also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases . See 820 F.2d 1000; Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A . de C .V.,930 F.2d 777 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "Those instances generally fall into two categories: those in which a federal rule of decisi on is \"necessary to protect uniquely federal interests,\" 23 Banco Nacional de 376 U.S. 398 ; and those in which Congress has given the courts the power to develop substantive law, Wheeldin , 373 U.S. at 652 . See also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 ; 140 S. Ct. 713.10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A . de C .V.,930 F.2d 777 . Instead, the Ninth Circuit turned this Court's approach to federal common law on its head, explaining: \"[i]n the absence of specific statutory guidance, we prefer to resort to the federal common law for a choice -of-law rule.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.2d 1000",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "See also Texas Indus., 451 U.S. 630 ; 140 S. Ct. 713.10 When the Ninth Circuit first created the FSIA choice of law rule that it ultimately employed in this case, the Ninth Circuit did not even acknowledge this important line of cases . See 820 F.2d 1000; Schoenberg v. Exportadora de Sal, S.A . de C .V.,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, the Ninth Circuit turned this Court's approach to federal common law on its head, explaining: \"[i]n the absence of specific statutory guidance, we prefer to resort to the federal common law for a choice -of-law rule.\" Harris , 820 F.2d at 1003.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.2d 777",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "Id. Had the Ninth Circuit considered this Court's decisions concerning federal common law, it would have recognized that \"[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in 10 Like this Court, Congress recognizes that even \"[c]ontroversies directly affecting the o perations of federal programs, although governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance, 547 U.S. 677 . 24 the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal common law,\" Texas Industries , 451 U.S. at 640 –41, and that FS IA choice of law does not fit within any of the \"few and restricted\" domains of federal common law.11 Although the Ninth Circuit ignored this Court's precedents limiting the creation and use of federal common law, Congress is presumed to have legislated with these constraints in mind. Applying that presumption to the FSIA casts serious doubt on the Ninth Circuit's FSIA choice of law rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "Id. Had the Ninth Circuit considered this Court's decisions concerning federal common law, it would have recognized that \"[t]he vesting of jurisdiction in 10 Like this Court, Congress recognizes that even \"[c]ontroversies directly affecting the o perations of federal programs, although governed by federal law, do not inevitably require resort to uniform federal rules.\" 440 U.S. 715 ; see also Empire Healthchoice Assurance, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 24 the federal courts does not in and of itself give rise to authority to formulate federal common law,\" Texas Industries , 451 U.S. at 640 –41, and that FS IA choice of law does not fit within any of the \"few and restricted\" domains of federal common law.11 Although the Ninth Circuit ignored this Court's precedents limiting the creation and use of federal common law, Congress is presumed to have legislated with these constraints in mind. Applying that presumption to the FSIA casts serious doubt on the Ninth Circuit's FSIA choice of law rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "Id. at 837 . 12 The Ninth Circuit's FSIA choice of law rule also runs co unter to the FSIA's \"overall structure,\" Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , designed, in significant pa rt, to narrow federal common law by displacing aspects of it with a statute. By seeking to create new federal common law and extend it into an are a where there is already \"ready made\" law, 440 U.S. 715 , the Ninth Circuit's rule misreads FSIA and \"bypass[es] its design.\" Federal Republic of 141 S. Ct. 703.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Is Presumed to Legislate Aware of This Court's Decisions, Including Its Limitations on the Creation of Federal Common Law",
		"context": "at 837 . 12 The Ninth Circuit's FSIA choice of law rule also runs co unter to the FSIA's \"overall structure,\" Republic of 541 U.S. 677 , designed, in significant pa rt, to narrow federal common law by displacing aspects of it with a statute. By seeking to create new federal common law and extend it into an are a where there is already \"ready made\" law, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Ninth Circuit's rule misreads FSIA and \"bypass[es] its design.\" Federal Republic of 141 S. Ct. 703. 25",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Is A Suitable Vehicle.",
		"context": "And they do not dispute that misallocation of the bu rden of proof is \"deemed 'prejudicial and require[s] reversal.'\" Pet. 33 (quoting Terra Firma Investments (GP) 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 5 Proper allocation is 5 Respondents' attempt to misc onstrue facts in their favor, see BIO 29, is thus beside the point, as is qualified immunity. On petitioner's facts, EMTs immediately knew the 911 caller was \"not all there,\" had seen the baby healthy minutes earlier, and respondents' only suspect was wi th them, handcuffed, when they entered his home.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F.3d 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION REINFORCES THE CLAUSE'S PLAIN MEANING",
		"context": "The Elections Clause thus must mean what it says: the state legis lature—not a state court, not the people of a state—prescribes the rules for congressional elections. This Court has held that the (related) Electors Clause \"leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of\" selecting Presidential electors. McPherson , 146 U.S. at 27 (emphasis added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That Clause states that \"[e]ach State shall appoint , in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct , a Number of Electors . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's cases on \"inconsistent verdicts\" do not undermine Georgia's rule because they say nothing about juries affirmatively contradicting themselves via special findings",
		"context": "Accordingly, the verdicts just stand. Id. This Court ul- timately confirmed that rule in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Powell Court also reaffirmed that the justifi- cation for the inconsistent-verdicts rule is precisely that a court cannot know what the jury has done: the reason for the seeming inconsistency could be \"mis-take, compromise, or lenity.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's cases on \"inconsistent verdicts\" do not undermine Georgia's rule because they say nothing about juries affirmatively contradicting themselves via special findings",
		"context": "Powell , 469 U.S. at 64. 41 always speak to the [factual] guilt or innocence of the defendant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The inconsistent-verdicts cases do not, then, \"necessarily\" implicate \"contradictory findings.\" Con- tra Pet.Br.19.",
		"citation_value_orig": "959 So. 2d 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "PDR's arguments regarding the adequacy of the Hobbs Act procedures are also not ripe. PDR has never petitioned the FCC to challenge the free-goods- or-services rule, and it cannot complain that a remedy is inadequate while refusing t o avail itself of that rem- edy. If the \"practical problems\" PDR complains of are serious enough to warrant this Court's review, then it should reserve that question \"for a case in which it is not hypothetical,\" Campbell -Ewald [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], i.e., a case in which the peti- tioner has availed itself of those allegedly inadequate review mechanisms. PDR is also mistaken that the Hobbs Act does not afford an adequate means to challenge FCC rules. A business like PDR considering a mass -faxing cam- paign in the United States always has the option of consulting with experienced TCPA counsel before sending its faxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "A business like PDR considering a mass -faxing cam- paign in the United States always has the option of consulting with experienced TCPA counsel before sending its faxes. Contrary t o PDR's assertion, any competent TCPA lawyer would have advised PDR that sending faxes offering free copies of its e -Book would , at the very least, be risky, given the FCC's rul- ing that faxes offering \"free publications\" are \"adver- tisements,\" and that it s hould petition the FCC to ei- ther change the rules or, if counsel determined the 2006 Order was ambiguous, clarify whether the con- templated fax campaign would be permitted. See Functional Music, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir.1958), cert. denied361 U.S. 813 . A statu- tory remedy provided by Congress is not ina dequate 27 where it is the party's \"own inaction which foreclosed review.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 F.2d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "denied361 U.S. 813 . A statu- tory remedy provided by Congress is not ina dequate 27 where it is the party's \"own inaction which foreclosed review.\" Sable Commc'ns of Cal., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 333 F.3d 1295 ; Town of 140 F.3d 20. Even af ter a defendant has been sued, the Hobbs Act affords an adequate means to challenge the FCC's interpretations. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recognizes in its amicus brief , \"[l]itigants have op- tions, even aft er the Hobbs Act period, in which to bring substantive challenges to agency rules.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "denied361 U.S. 813 . A statu- tory remedy provided by Congress is not ina dequate 27 where it is the party's \"own inaction which foreclosed review.\" Sable Commc'ns of Cal., 827 F.2d 640; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Town of 140 F.3d 20. Even af ter a defendant has been sued, the Hobbs Act affords an adequate means to challenge the FCC's interpretations. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recognizes in its amicus brief , \"[l]itigants have op- tions, even aft er the Hobbs Act period, in which to bring substantive challenges to agency rules.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 1295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "denied361 U.S. 813 . A statu- tory remedy provided by Congress is not ina dequate 27 where it is the party's \"own inaction which foreclosed review.\" Sable Commc'ns of Cal., 827 F.2d 640; 333 F.3d 1295 ; Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even af ter a defendant has been sued, the Hobbs Act affords an adequate means to challenge the FCC's interpretations. As the U.S. Chamber of Commerce recognizes in its amicus brief , \"[l]itigants have op- tions, even aft er the Hobbs Act period, in which to bring substantive challenges to agency rules.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 F.3d 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "The Chamber ex- plains that a party may at any time \"fil[e] a petition for amendment or rescission of the agency's regula- tions, and challeng[e] the denial of that petition\" in the court of appeals. ( Id., n.3 (quoting Edison Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ).12 12 The Chamber of Commerce asks this Court to rule that the Hobbs Act allows TCPA defendants to challenge the validity of FCC rules in the district court, but ba rs TCPA plaintiffs from doing the same . The Hobbs Act's language that the co urt of ap- peals has \"exclusive jurisdiction\" to \"determine the validity of\" an FCC order cannot mean completely contradictory things de-pending on whether it is a defendant seeking to challenge an FCC order or a plaintiff seeking to challenge an FCC order. 28 PDR complains t hat pet itioning the agency and then taking a Hobbs Act appeal is \" cumbersome at best and almost always illusory \" and that the 2006 Order was \"effectively unreviewable\" by the time this case was filed in 2015 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "969 F.2d 1221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "28 PDR complains t hat pet itioning the agency and then taking a Hobbs Act appeal is \" cumbersome at best and almost always illusory \" and that the 2006 Order was \"effectively unreviewable\" by the time this case was filed in 2015 . (PDR Br. at 17).13 But PDR glosses over Bais Yaakov of Spring [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied138 S. Ct. 1043 , a recent case in which TCPA defend- ants used the Hobbs Act to obtain relief from a differ- ent part of the 2006 Order by petitioning the FCC and then challenging the denial of their petitions in the court of appeals, which they did long after the 60-d ay period for direct review of the 2006 Order expired. The Bais Yaakov litigation was related to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Nack , 715 F.3d at 686 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 1078",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "The Bais Yaakov litigation was related to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Nack , 715 F.3d at 686 . Following the Eighth Circuit's 2013 decision that the Hobbs Act required the district court to apply the FCC's 2006 regulation requiring opt -out notice on fax advertisements sent with the recipient' s prior express permission , 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), the Nack defendant obtained a stay of the district court litiga- tion, see 2013 WL 13 PDR argues that \"for orders promulgating rules of general ap- plicability, a party may not be 'aggrieved' in any legal or practi- cal sense until it faces a judicial enforcement action,\" and \"[i]n that circumstance, section 703 preserves the right to judicial re-view,\" citing this Court's decisions in Port of Boston Marine Ter- minal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 466 U.S. 463. (PDR Br. at 29 –30).",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "The Bais Yaakov litigation was related to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Nack , 715 F.3d at 686 . Following the Eighth Circuit's 2013 decision that the Hobbs Act required the district court to apply the FCC's 2006 regulation requiring opt -out notice on fax advertisements sent with the recipient' s prior express permission , 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(4)(iv), the Nack defendant obtained a stay of the district court litiga- tion, see 2013 WL 13 PDR argues that \"for orders promulgating rules of general ap- plicability, a party may not be 'aggrieved' in any legal or practi- cal sense until it faces a judicial enforcement action,\" and \"[i]n that circumstance, section 703 preserves the right to judicial re-view,\" citing this Court's decisions in Port of Boston Marine Ter- minal 400 U.S. 62, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. (PDR Br. at 29 –30).",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "Consumer Protection Act of 1991 , 30 FCC Rcd. 7961 ( July 10, 2015), which decided multiple issues regarding the rules governing voic e telephone calls and text messages, in- cluding interpreting t he statutory term \"automatic telephone di- aling system\" (\"ATDS\"). See ACA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Numerous petitioners in that appeal were defendants in private TCPA litigation. The D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part, id., and the matter is pending before the FCC on remand. As PDR would have it, however the FCC rules on remand, courts hearing future TCPA actions will be free to apply their own interpretations of the statute, without being required to accept the FCC's interpretation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 out notice on faxes sent with prior express permission, which was issued years earlier in the 2006 Order.16 Although PDR chose not to petition the FCC, t here are three relevant petitions currently pending before the FCC filed by defendants in private TCPA actions seeking declaratory rulings regarding the meaning of the ter m \"advertisement\" in the fax context . See Best Doctors, Inc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "02 -278 (filed Dec. 14, 2018) (seeking de- claratory ruling that fax asking physician to confirm conta ct information for inclusion in a \"Best Doctors in America\" publication was not an advert isement );17 16 The more difficult question is whether TCPA defendants who were not parties to the Bais Yaakov appeal remain subject to the regulation, or whether the regulation was \"invalidated\" univer- sally, such that it cannot be enforced against an y defendant. Three circuit courts of appeal have ruled on this question, each holding that the 2006 opt -out regulation could not be enforced against the defendant, even though the defendant was not a party to Bais Yaakov . See Sandusky Wellness Ctr., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied138 S. Ct. 1284, peti- tion for cert. filed , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "863 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "The Court should not answer these hypothetical question s. PDR has never sought a stay from the district court, has never indicated any interest in petitioning the FCC, and has not even file d comments on other relevant pe- titions pending before the FCC. These questions are \"appropriately reserved for a case in which [they are] not hypothetical. \" Campbell -Ewald [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . PDR's argument s are also mistaken . District courts routinely grant stays of TCPA litigation while the defendant petitions the FCC , as in Nack and the litigation against Inovalon .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "290, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2017). PDR argues that any relief a TCPA defendant could hope to obtain from petitioning the FCC and ap-pealing a denial would do the defendant no good be- cause it would be prospective and \"not retroactive \" under Bowe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. (PDR Br. at 37).",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "at 37). Again, PDR is mis- taken. See Manhattan Gen. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that application of an amended regulation, which was 37 issued after the original regulation was declared in- valid as ultra vires , to pending cases was not \"retro- active\" because \"[a] regulation which does not [carry into effect the will of Congress] but operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nul- lity . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": ". Since the original regulation could not be ap- plied, the amended regulation in effect became the primary and controlling rule. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The D.C. Circuit has a line of cases dealing with this precise issue, beginning with Functional Music, 274 F.2d 543361 U.S. 813.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "\"); 381 U.S. 68. The D.C. Circuit has a line of cases dealing with this precise issue, beginning with Functional Music, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]361 U.S. 813. This line of cases is best summarized in NLRB 834 F.2d 191 seeking a rul- ing that regulations the FLRA had issued years ear- lier were inconsistent with the authorizing statute. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 F.2d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit has a line of cases dealing with this precise issue, beginning with Functional Music, 274 F.2d 543361 U.S. 813. This line of cases is best summarized in NLRB [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] seeking a rul- ing that regulations the FLRA had issued years ear- lier were inconsistent with the authorizing statute. Id. at 193.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.2d 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "To be clear: Functional 25 In contrast to challenges to the agency's statutory authority to issue a rule, \"challenges to the procedural lineage of agency reg- ulations , whether raised by direct appeal, by petition for amend- ment or rescission of the regulation or as a defense to an agency enforcement proceeding, will not be entertained outside the 60 - day period provided by statute.\" JEM Broad. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 40 Music \"involved an appeal from [the FCC's] refusal to reconsider its denial of a petition for rescission of the disputed regulations,\" not an appeal from an FCC en-forcement action. NLRB Union , 834 F.2d at 197.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 F.3d 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "(PDR Br. at 31). PDR argues that the Fourth Circuit's logic \"would preclude review\" of these standards \"in enforcement ac tions\" brought by the government, such as Whirlpool [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 970 F. Supp. 1346. ( Id. at 32).",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "(PDR Br. at 31). PDR argues that the Fourth Circuit's logic \"would preclude review\" of these standards \"in enforcement ac tions\" brought by the government, such as Whirlpool 445 U.S. 1, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ( Id. at 32).",
		"citation_value_orig": "970 F. Supp. 1346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "at 32). And PDR notes that the Exchange Act provides in 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) & (b) that \"[a] person aggrieved by a final order of\" the SEC \"may obtain review of the order\" in the court of ap-peals within 60 days, which, under the Fourth Cir-cuit's ruling, PDR argues would have \"preclude[d]\" the courts from considering whether particular SEC rules were valid in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Ernst & 425 U.S. 185, and 308 F. Supp. 3d 775. PDR is mistaken. First, it does not appear any party argued 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 642",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "at 32). And PDR notes that the Exchange Act provides in 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a) & (b) that \"[a] person aggrieved by a final order of\" the SEC \"may obtain review of the order\" in the court of ap-peals within 60 days, which, under the Fourth Cir-cuit's ruling, PDR argues would have \"preclude[d]\" the courts from considering whether particular SEC rules were valid in 521 U.S. 642, Ernst & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 308 F. Supp. 3d 775. PDR is mistaken. First, it does not appear any party argued 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "§ 78y, this language \"does not expressly limit the jurisdiction that other statutes confer on district courts ,\" and \"[n] or does it do so implicitly. \" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .26 In contrast, the \"statutory scheme\" of the Hobbs Act displays a \"fairly discernible\" intent to limit juris- diction, and the claims at issue \"are of the type Con- gress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure.\" Id. (quoting Thunder Basin Coal 510 U.S. 200 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477 .26 In contrast, the \"statutory scheme\" of the Hobbs Act displays a \"fairly discernible\" intent to limit juris- diction, and the claims at issue \"are of the type Con- gress intended to be reviewed within th[e] statutory structure.\" Id. (quoting Thunder Basin Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). And, \"[g] ener- ally, when Congress creates procedures ' designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on par-ticular problems,'\" those procedures \" 'are to be exclu- sive. '\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "And, \"[g] ener- ally, when Congress creates procedures ' designed to permit agency expertise to be brought to bear on par-ticular problems,'\" those procedures \" 'are to be exclu- sive. '\" Id. (quoting Whitney Nat'l Bank in Jefferson [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). 26 It is true that courts have held a defendant subject to a final order in an administrative SEC enforcement action must \"pro- ceed exclusively through\" 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "26 It is true that courts have held a defendant subject to a final order in an administrative SEC enforcement action must \"pro- ceed exclusively through\" 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that is no different than saying PDR would be required to challenge a \"final order\" issued against PDR in an FCC administrative enforcement action through the Hobbs Act, which PDR admits is the case. 42 There is an exception where (1) \"a finding of pre- clusion could foreclose all meaningful judicial review\"; (2) the suit is \" wholly collateral to a statute's review provisions\"; and (3) the claims are \"outside the agency's expertise.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. PDR cannot complain that the Hobbs Act procedures are inadequate, where it has refused to avail itself of those procedures",
		"context": "by taking the violative ac- tion\" before \" testing the validity of the law. \" Id. (quot- ing MedImmune, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But here, PDR was not required to send its fax advertisements before challenging the va-lidity of the FCC's free -goods- or-services ruling. It could have easily filed a petition before it took the \"vi-olative action.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing unlicensed use of copyright-protected works by simply adding an arguably new meaning or message will undermine a core building block of multiple creative industries",
		"context": "For example, a parody or non- commercial fan fiction, might, under certain circumstances, be considered fair use. See, e.g. , Suntrust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 Copyright Law Revision: H earings on H.R. 2223 Before the Subcomm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 F.3d 1257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Allowing unlicensed use of copyright-protected works by simply adding an arguably new meaning or message will undermine a core building block of multiple creative industries",
		"context": "See. e.g. , Brownmark Films, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Warhol's use in this case was, however, non- incidental, commercial, and not cri tical of Goldsmith's work. 17 be the rule rather than the exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F. 3d 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": ". Blackstone observed \"that the English Constitu- tion required that no subject be deprived of core pri- vate rights except in a ccordance with the law of the land.\" Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. True to that tradition, this Court often prohibits government in- fringement of core private rights absent an express law, strictly construed. The Court has consistently sought to tread lightly where core constitutional and civil rights are concerned.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "801, 801 (2003) (noting that under Su- preme Court doctrine, various constitutional criminal protections can be waived or bargained away). Yet, be- fore such a waiver can occur, a high standard for find- ing that a party waived constitutional rights is ap- plied. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fur- ther, under the doctrine o f unconstitutional condi- tions, constitutional rights cannot be waived for a gov- ernment benefit, whereas non -constitutional rights can be so forfeited. See 408 U.S. 593.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "See, e.g., 444 U.S. 469. Fur- ther, under the doctrine o f unconstitutional condi- tions, constitutional rights cannot be waived for a gov- ernment benefit, whereas non -constitutional rights can be so forfeited. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Mazzone, at 807 -08 (\"the Supreme Court has invali- dated a wide range of government efforts to compel in- dividuals to forego constitutional rights as the condi- tion for receiving governmental benefits\" ). 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "Injunctive relief. In seeking a preliminary in- junction, a plaintiff must show irreparable harm. See eBay [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that all changes in the context of constitu- tional rights as plaintiffs have a much lower hurdle to clear: \"When an alleged deprivation of a constitutional right is involved, most courts hold that no further showing of irreparable injury is necessary.\" Charles Alan Wright et al., 11A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "Charles Alan Wright et al., 11A Federal Practice & Procedure § 2948.1. In Elrod v. Burns , Justice Brennan declar ed that \"[t]he loss of First Amendment fr eedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (197 6) (plurality op.) Since then , lower courts have applied this stand- ard in various constitutional contexts . See Beatrice Catherine Frankl in, Irreparability, I Presume?",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "Constitutional facts under Bose. Normally, federal appellate courts defer to a lower court's factual findings under a \"clearly erroneous\" standard of re- view. See Icicle Seafoods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But when examining a \"constitutional fact\" —facts necessary to the constitut ional analysis of a claim —the C ourt has instead required appellate courts to \"make an independent examination of the whole record.\" Bose 466 U.S. 485.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has recognized in a variety of contexts that government actions burdening core private rights are forbidden absent express law strictly construed",
		"context": "See Icicle Seafoods, 475 U.S. 709. But when examining a \"constitutional fact\" —facts necessary to the constitut ional analysis of a claim —the C ourt has instead required appellate courts to \"make an independent examination of the whole record.\" Bose [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"constitutional fact doctrine\" has been viewed by scholars as \"truly foun- dational to our constitutional system and essential to the judicial protection of constitutional rights \" be- cause it \"serves as the cornersto ne of our system of separation of powers.\" Martin H. Redish & William D. Gohl, The Wandering Doctrine of Constitutional Fact , 59 Ariz. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Crossing Borders Is Necessary For The Section 1 Exemption To Apply",
		"context": "1, and dictionaries from the time of the FAA's enact- ment demonstrate that being \"engaged\" in commerce means being \"occupied\" or \"employed\" in transporta- tion between different countries or states. See, e.g., Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 333 (3d ed. 1919) (de- fining \"engaged\"); see also New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Engaged in\" is thus a far more limited phrase than the \"more open -ended formulations 'affecting commer ce' and 'in- volving commerce,'\" Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 118, which Congress has chosen to use in other contexts. That more limited phrase is best understood to denote only direct work by a class of workers in actually mov- ing articles of commerce from one state to another.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized a miscarriage -of- justice exception to procedural rules that would bar consideration of a claim of innocence on the merits. Where a habeas petitioner proves that he is actually innocent of a criminal offense, for example, he i s not held to his procedural default of the claim at an earlier stage of proceedings. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He is not barred from relief even if he fails to file his claim within the statute of limitations. 569 U.S. 383.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "513 U.S. 298. He is not barred from relief even if he fails to file his claim within the statute of limitations. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. New evidence of factual innocence provides a path to filing a second or successive habeas petition. 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "New evidence of factual innocence provides a path to filing a second or successive habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(1); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And neither the failure to develop facts in the state court, nor the failure to comply with state filing deadlines preclude s federal courts from considering claims of innocence. 504 U.S. 1; 501 U.S. 722.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.3d 1059",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "§ 2255(h)(1); see 790 F.3d 1059. And neither the failure to develop facts in the state court, nor the failure to comply with state filing deadlines preclude s federal courts from considering claims of innocence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 501 U.S. 722. 19 This Court has been willing to overlook all such procedural missteps because \"concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system.\" Schlup , 513 U.S. at 325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "§ 2255(h)(1); see 790 F.3d 1059. And neither the failure to develop facts in the state court, nor the failure to comply with state filing deadlines preclude s federal courts from considering claims of innocence. 504 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 This Court has been willing to overlook all such procedural missteps because \"concern about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long been at the core of our criminal justice system.\" Schlup , 513 U.S. at 325.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "Schlup , 513 U.S. at 325. Thus, even granting \"AEDPA's central concern that the merits of concluded criminal proceedings not be revisited,\" that concern, too, must yield in the face of a \"strong showing of actual innocence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where a compelling case of actual innocence is presented, interests in comity and finality must bend to permit that claim to be heard. Moreover, this Court and the lower courts have extended the miscarriage -of-justice exception beyond those who claim that they are innocent of the offense of conviction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "Where a compelling case of actual innocence is presented, interests in comity and finality must bend to permit that claim to be heard. Moreover, this Court and the lower courts have extended the miscarriage -of-justice exception beyond those who claim that they are innocent of the offense of conviction. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that one can be innocent of the death penalty. Though \"innocent of death\" might not be a \"natural usage,\" the Court deemed it appropriate to \"strive to construct an analog\" that was narrow but permitted these compelling cases to be considered on their merits. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "Id. Since then, several circuits have accepted that on e can be innocent of a non- capital sentencing enhancement in at least some circumstances. See 950 F.3d 1184; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 186 F.3d 490. 20 A § 1326(d) defendant who claims an invalid deportation in the context of a criminal case is differently positioned from a habeas petitioner, but the two contexts share several important features that make the analogy apt . Both challenge the validity of a final adjudication that continues to have an ongoing prejudicial impact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "219 F.3d 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "Id. Since then, several circuits have accepted that on e can be innocent of a non- capital sentencing enhancement in at least some circumstances. See 950 F.3d 1184; 219 F.3d 162; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 A § 1326(d) defendant who claims an invalid deportation in the context of a criminal case is differently positioned from a habeas petitioner, but the two contexts share several important features that make the analogy apt . Both challenge the validity of a final adjudication that continues to have an ongoing prejudicial impact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "186 F.3d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "A s this Court recognized long ago , removability, especially for permanent residents like Mr. Palomar -Santiago , has consequences akin to those in a criminal proceeding. In Bridges v. Wixon , the Court considered whether a longtime resident of the United States would be banished to Australia because of his affiliation with the Communist party. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court recognized: Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty —at times a most serious one—cannot be do ubted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "Indeed, at least one court has already extended the miscarriage -of-justice exception to th e immigration context. Drawing the analogy to factual innocence in a criminal case, the Tenth Circuit overlooked a noncitizen's failure to exhaust remedies in immigration court becau se his claim went to the very basis of his deportation. Batrez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The miscarriage -of-justice exception had a role to play, the Court held, where the noncitizen 22 alleges an error that would make him \"actually innocent\" of deportation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 F.3d 1206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "The miscarriage -of-justice exception had a role to play, the Court held, where the noncitizen 22 alleges an error that would make him \"actually innocent\" of deportation. Id. The government argues that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , presents an insuperable barrier to this argument. It does not. Ross v. Blake held, in the context of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) , that courts could not engraft a special - circumstances exception on to a statutory exhaustion requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). And yet, as with other procedural rules, the exhaustion rule would not bar one who claims actual innocence,; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 526 F.3d 189; 640 F.3d 478, at least so long as there was not a remaining door through which petitioner's claim of 23 innocence could be exhausted in the state court. 94 F.3d 958. Even after Ross v. Blake, courts have continued to apply these cases to exempt the rare person who establishes his innocence from having to return to state court to exhaust his claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 F.3d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). And yet, as with other procedural rules, the exhaustion rule would not bar one who claims actual innocence,; 22 F.3d 693; 526 F.3d 189; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at least so long as there was not a remaining door through which petitioner's claim of 23 innocence could be exhausted in the state court. 94 F.3d 958. Even after Ross v. Blake, courts have continued to apply these cases to exempt the rare person who establishes his innocence from having to return to state court to exhaust his claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "640 F.3d 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The exhaustion requirement of section 1326(d) should be deemed satisfied because Mr. Palomar-Santiago was \"actually innocent\" of removability",
		"context": "§ 2254(b)(1)(A). And yet, as with other procedural rules, the exhaustion rule would not bar one who claims actual innocence,; 22 F.3d 693; 526 F.3d 189; 640 F.3d 478, at least so long as there was not a remaining door through which petitioner's claim of 23 innocence could be exhausted in the state court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even after Ross v. Blake, courts have continued to apply these cases to exempt the rare person who establishes his innocence from having to return to state court to exhaust his claims. E.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 F.3d 958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Consistent with Google, it is important to consider whether Warhol's use of the Goldsmith photograph furthered the creativity objectives of copyright law",
		"context": "This Court should likewise reject the Goldsmith decision's effort to dramatically narrow the scope of what can be considered tran sformative for fair use pur- poses and consider whether Warhol's works are con- sistent with copyright's constitutional objectives. 4 As Campbell , its predecessors, and its progeny have long observed, the fair use doctrine \"permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright stat-ute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativ- ity which that law is designed to foster.\" Campbell , 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (alteration in Campbell ). 4 The Second Circuit was sufficiently troubled by Gold- smith's claims that it announced that Goldsmith could only re- cover money damages for the Foun dation's commercial licensing of the Warhol works. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Excessive Fines Clause Limits the Forfeiture of Tyler's Equity",
		"context": ". A civil sanction that is \"at least partially punitive\" is subject to scrutiny under the Excessive Fines Clause . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court explained in 137 S.Ct. 1635, \"[s]anctions imposed for the purpose of more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution 's commands.\" 506 U.S. 56.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Excessive Fines Clause Limits the Forfeiture of Tyler's Equity",
		"context": "139 S.Ct. 682. As this Court explained in 137 S.Ct. 1635, \"[s]anctions imposed for the purpose of more than a single right and, accordingly, can implicate more than one of the Constitution 's commands.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, as in Soldal, the seizure of property implicates two constitutional commands. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Excessive Fines Clause Limits the Forfeiture of Tyler's Equity",
		"context": "See id. Where multiple constitutional violations are alleged, \" [t]he proper question is not which Amendment controls but whether either Amendment is violated.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Soldal, 5 06 U.S. at 70 (court does not identify which claim is \"dominant ,\" but rather examines each \"provision in turn\"). 35 deterring infractions of public laws are inherently punitive .\" The histor ical genesis of the Clause and the public understanding of its terms at the time of ratification buttress the conclusion that the forfeiture at issue here is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Excessive Fines Clause Limits the Forfeiture of Tyler's Equity",
		"context": "The prohibition of excessive fines traces its lineage to English law where i t served , among other purposes, as protection against the sovereign \"raising revenue in unfair ways .\" Browning -Ferris Indus. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, the terms \"fine\" and \"forfeiture \" were used interchangeably when referencing both civil and criminal economic sanctions in early American history , suggesting a n original public meaning of the Clause consistent with its application to the forfeiture at hand. See Austin , 509 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (\"'Forfeiture' and 'fine' each appeared as one of many definitions of the other in various 18th- century dictionaries.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit analyzed a lesser included offense.",
		"context": "This language suggests that the comparison to be drawn is between offenses. Sinc e offenses are statutorily defined, that comparison is appropriately conducted by reference to the statutory elements of the offenses in question [.] [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the elements test, the Ninth Circuit 's stand -alone violatio n of §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) w ithout a financial -gain element is a lesser included offense of the crime charged here. By analyzing only this lesser included offense, the Ninth Circuit plainly did not analyze the crime charged here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit analyzed a lesser included offense.",
		"context": "By analyzing only this lesser included offense, the Ninth Circuit plainly did not analyze the crime charged here. Of course, there is nothing wrong with a court 's analyzing two related crimes and subjecting only the lesser included offense to an overbreadth analysis. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is, however, something very wrong with a court not analyzing the crime charged .",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 F.2d 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Bivens does not encroach on the separation of powers",
		"context": "Pfander & 22 Baltmanis, supra , at 123. To begin with, the Westfall Act eliminates state common law remedies as a source of relief for litigants' constitutional injuries. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition, the Federal Tort Claims Act route is also unavailable, since in 1974, Congress de clined the Department of Justice's proposal to substitute the United States as a defendant in cases involving constitutional viola- tions. 11 As a result, the only generally available way to recover money damages for co nstitutional violations is Bivens .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly denied preliminary injunctive relief under any level of scrutiny",
		"context": "28-30, supra) and minimal burdens (pp. 39-40, 42-47, supra), and the State's compelling interest in ensuring that a particularly vulnerable population can make prompt, fully informed decisions. Under these circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion, see Ash- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in denying petitioners' motion for preliminary relief. Petitioners summarily suggest alternative approaches that would excuse licensed facilities from 43 See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The district court properly denied preliminary injunctive relief under any level of scrutiny",
		"context": "A truly minimal disclosure—two sentences and a phone number—satisfies women's vital informational needs in a way that neither interferes with nor in-trudes upon any clinic's speec h. Indeed, the disclosure serves a purpose that petitioners acknowledge as val-uable: allowing women to \"know the facts and be fully informed.\" 46 If a woman visiting a limited-service 45 When San Francisco passed an ordinance targeting \"'untrue or misleading'\" statements concerning pregnancy-related services, one of Petitioners' amici sued. The amicus argued that the law was subject to and fail ed strict scrutiny, see First Resort, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], pet. for cert. pending, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "860 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit dangerously suggested that a vigorous public defense of First Amendment rights may justify discipline.",
		"context": "of Educ. of Westside Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The panel's ruling thus has our longstanding national commitment to freedom of ex- pression exactly backwards. As Circuit Judge Ryan D. Nelson asked, in dissenting from the denial of Ken- nedy's petition for rehearing en banc : \"[W]ould we ever pejoratively refer to members of various civil rights movements as 'pugilistic ' when they publicly, peacefully, and vocally tried to vindicate their rights?",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life",
		"context": "\"). 4. See Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 157 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"significant physical and psychological risks to the maternal patient\" increase with gestational age, such that \"as the second trimester progresses, in the vast majority of uncomplicated pregnancies, the maternal health risks of undergoing an abortion are greater than the risks of carrying a pregnancy to term.\" mISS. code ann.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life",
		"context": "code ann. § 41- 41-191(2)(b) (2018). The Legislature explicitly noted its authority to take such action to restrict abortions past 15-week gestational age in line with the precedent of this Court, which has \"long recognized that the State of Mississippi has an 'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and specifically that 'the state has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn.' Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 505 U.S. 833.\" mISS.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Mississippi Legislature values life",
		"context": "§ 41- 41-191(2)(b) (2018). The Legislature explicitly noted its authority to take such action to restrict abortions past 15-week gestational age in line with the precedent of this Court, which has \"long recognized that the State of Mississippi has an 'important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human life,' 410 U.S. 113, and specifically that 'the state has an interest in protecting the life of the unborn.' Planned Parenthood of Southeastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" mISS. code ann.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Correctly applying the TCPA to autodialers that make robocalls to stored numbers poses no threat to ordinary smartphone users.",
		"context": "The reason it has not is that conven- tional use of a smartphone, or an ordinary telephone, is not the \"functional equivalent\" to using an ATDS and will not violate the TCPA regardless of the out-come of this case. 955 F.3d 279; c f. Cty. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, speed-dialed calls, whether from smart- phones or landlines, aren't ATDS calls because phones that use speed-dialing lack the required capacity to dial mass calls automatically . 47 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Correctly applying the TCPA to autodialers that make robocalls to stored numbers poses no threat to ordinary smartphone users.",
		"context": "15 That Congress did not anticipate in 1991 that powerful computers would be integrated with cellphones and supplied with software that would enable them to function as autodialers is no reason to limit the TCPA's application to such equipment. The applica-tion of a statute's language to circumstances Congress did not envision \"simply demonstrates the breadth of a legislative command.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When smartphones are actually used –––––––––––––––––––––––– 15 https://energycommerce.hous e.gov/sites/democrats.energy commerce.house.gov/files/documents/2019.4.30.PALLONE. %20Robocalls%20Hearing.CAT_.pdf 50 as the functional equivalent of autodialers, the Court should not shrink from reading the TCPA to regulate such uses consistently with its text, structure, and purposes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": "nt Or Exigent Circumstances Reflecting this common -law tradition, the Fourth Amendment draws \"a firm line at the entrance to the house.\" Payton , 445 U.S. at 590; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At its \"very core, \" the Fourth Amendment prioritizes \"the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government al intrusion. \" Payton , 445 U.S. at 5 89–90 (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": "Steagald , 451 U.S. at 215. Similarly, the plain -view doctrine allows officers to seize incriminating evidence without a warrant, but only if they \"have a lawful right of access to the object itself. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 137 n.7 ( \"[E]ven where t he object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": ". to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained, either from the individual whose property is searched, or from a third party who possesses common authority over the premises. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After all, tenants who share their quarters assume the risk that \"any of the co -inhabitants has the right t o permit the inspection in his own right \" and that \"any one of them may admit visitors, with the consequence that a guest [is] obnoxious. \" Randolph , 547 U.S. at 110 –11 (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": "29 As with other exceptions, however, the exigent circumstances exception is \"strictly circumscribed, \" Randolph , 547 U.S. at 113 n.3 (citation omitted) , and must \"be supported by a genuine exigency, \" King , 563 U.S. at 470 . Thus, the destruction of evidence must be \"imminent, \" id. at 460 ( citation omitted), and a \"hot pursuit \" requires \"some sort of a chase, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The exigency of \"emergency aid \" requires officers to have \"an ob jectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. \" Brigham 547 U.S. 398 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": "at 460 ( citation omitted), and a \"hot pursuit \" requires \"some sort of a chase, \" 427 U.S. 38 . The exigency of \"emergency aid \" requires officers to have \"an ob jectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. \" Brigham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This exigency is limited to situations where police \"reasonab ly believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid,\" so police need to act in a matter of moments \"to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. \" 437 U.S. 385 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Fourth Amendment Prohibits Warrantless Entries Into The Home In The Absence Of Consent Or Exigent Circumstances",
		"context": "Brigham 547 U.S. 398 . This exigency is limited to situations where police \"reasonab ly believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid,\" so police need to act in a matter of moments \"to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Mincey thus rejected Arizona 's so-called \"murder scene exception \" allowing warrantless searches conducted in the investigation of a homicide, even after the suspects had been apprehended . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Majority View Recognizes that Parties Suffering An Irreparable First Amendment Injury Cannot, By Definition, Be Made Whole",
		"context": "At least in the context of the First Amendment, it is incorrect to argue that \"nominal damages would serve no practical purpose, would have no effect on the legal rights of the parties, and would have no effect on the future.\" Utah Animal Rights [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has long been recognized that \"[t]he loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.\" Elrod , 427 U.S. at 373 (Brennan, J., concurring ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 1248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Majority View Recognizes that Parties Suffering An Irreparable First Amendment Injury Cannot, By Definition, Be Made Whole",
		"context": "Elrod , 427 U.S. at 373 (Brennan, J., concurring ). If even a fleeting deprivation of an enumerated right is irreparable, it is, by definition, a harm that cannot be made whole through the remittance of compensation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Free speech, a free press, the free exercise of religion , and free association are all priceless , and for that reason, \"[h]istory and tradition do not afford any sound 5 guidance concerning the precise value that juries should place on [these] constitutional protections .\" Stachura, 477 U.S. at 310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Majority View Recognizes that Parties Suffering An Irreparable First Amendment Injury Cannot, By Definition, Be Made Whole",
		"context": "at 308 n.11. Accordingly, \"federal courts have consistently awarded nominal damages for violations of First Amendment rights ,\" Allah , 226 F.3d at 251, to \"vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued solely in monetary terms. \" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . An award of nominal damages would recognize that Mr. Uz uegbunam suffered a constitutional injury and that there is not enough money in the world to make him whole for the loss of his First Amendment freedoms.3 Although r espondents later eliminated their Speech Code in the middle of litigation , Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming",
		"context": "First, they themselves produce original content that is transmitted over the cable systems that they own. Second, with respect to content produced by others, \"cable operators exercise 'a significant amount of editorial discretion regarding what their pr ogramming will include.'\" City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Thus, through original programming or by exercising editorial discretion over which stations or programs to include in its repertoire, [a cable operator] seeks to communicate messages on a wide variety of topics and in a wide variety of formats.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming",
		"context": "Id. Cable operators thus are entitled to the full First Amendment protections afforded to traditional members of the print media who both produce their own content and exercise editorial discretion. As this Court stated in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"Cable television provides to its subscribers news, information, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First Amendment, and is, in much of 6 its operation, part of the 'press.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming",
		"context": "at 444. Indeed, it is now so well-settled, that \"[t]here can be no disagreement\" that \"cable operators engage in and transmit speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First Amendment.\" Turner Broadcasting System, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727; Cablevision Sys.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming",
		"context": "Turner Broadcasting System, 512 U.S. 622; see also Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cablevision Sys. 597 F.3d 1306.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cable Operators Have First Amendment Rights in the Selection and Transmission of Cable Programming",
		"context": "Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. 727; Cablevision Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "597 F.3d 1306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent States Have Asserted Real and Particularized Harm More than Sufficient to Establish Standing to Challenge the Final Memorandum",
		"context": "Theissue in this case is not at its root a \"policy\" or\"political\" dispute, but in response to the nationalExecutive's blatant refusal to enforce mandatoryaspects of the nation's immigration laws. As this Court has made clear: \"States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a suit is filed \"'by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi -sovereign'\" ( id. ), the State \"is entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing analysis.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent States Have Asserted Real and Particularized Harm More than Sufficient to Establish Standing to Challenge the Final Memorandum",
		"context": "Dual sovereignty is not a new concept, but it is routinely downplayed by the national government. Over 120 years ago, the Court described theimportance of protecting the sovereignty of Statesunder our constitutional scheme: The people of each State compose a State, having its own government, and endowed withall the functions essential to separate andindependent existence... Not only, therefore,can there be no loss of separate andindependent autonomy to the States, throughtheir union under the Constitution, but it maybe not unreasonably said that thepreservation of the States , and the maintenance of their governments, are asmuch within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government. [ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].] 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Opining That Act 620 Would Not Burden Abortion Access",
		"context": "See Br. for Med. Staff Prof'ls as Amici Curiae 21-22, 31-33, Whole Woman's Health , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reviewing Texas bylaws admitted into evidence). Contrary to the Fifth Circuit's supposition, the by- laws in the record here confirm that Louisiana hospi- tals are identical to their Texas counterparts. Nearly all of Louisiana's relevant hospitals have explicit or implicit patient-minimum requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Opining That Act 620 Would Not Burden Abortion Access",
		"context": "See Br. for Med. Staff Prof'ls as Amici Curiae 21-22, 31-33, Whole Woman's Health , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such requirements are ubiq- uitous in Louisiana hospital bylaws. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The Fifth Circuit Erred In Opining That Act 620 Would Not Burden Abortion Access",
		"context": "In any event, the testimony of Louisiana's abor- tion providers makes clear that Act 620 would cause the clinic closures. And, unlike the potential super- seding causes that were at play in Texas (e.g., cuts in funding and restrictions on abortion providers that had no relationship to H.B.2, see Whole Woman's Health , 136 S. Ct. at 2345 & n. 18 (Alito, J., dissent- ing)), Louisiana abortion providers' efforts to obtain admitting privileges and comply with Act 620 are di- rectly and inextricably linked to Act 620's prohibi- tions. See Exxon Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 41 brought about by a later cause of independent origin that was not foreseeable\" (quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, even if each individual provider's ef- forts to obtain admitting privileges were relevant, the Fifth Circuit had no basis to reverse the district court's factual finding that Does 2, 5, and 6 engaged in good faith efforts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Was Correct",
		"context": "Industry Petitioners (Br. 48-49) contend that the Third Circuit should have remanded without vacatur. But even if rema nd without vacatur is a permissible remedy, see Milk Train, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Courts use the remand without vacation remedy only in relatively unusual circumstances.\"). 14 Vacatur was appropriate here given the \"seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly).\" Allied-Signal, 988 F.2d 146.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 F.3d 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Was Correct",
		"context": "But even if rema nd without vacatur is a permissible remedy, see Milk Train, 310 F.3d 747 (\"Courts use the remand without vacation remedy only in relatively unusual circumstances.\"). 14 Vacatur was appropriate here given the \"seriousness of the order's deficiencies (and thus the extent of doubt whether the agency chose correctly).\" Allied-Signal, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed,\" id. at 150-51, likewise favor vacatur.",
		"citation_value_orig": "988 F.2d 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Was Correct",
		"context": "Direction to correct flawed analysis is an administrative commonplace when an agency arbitrarily assesses or ignores an important aspect of the problem before it. See, e.g. , Dep't of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not dictate otherwise. It is silent on a court's authority to retain jurisdiction in any given case. 55 DHS so that it may consider the problem anew\" when it \"failed to consider [two] conspicuous issues\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Remedy Was Correct",
		"context": "This directive to show your work poses no Vermont Yankee problem. That case recognized that the APA authorizes a reviewing court to \"remand an agency decision because of the inadequacy of the record.\" Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Third Circuit properly left the agency free \"to develop the needed evidence\" and determine \"how its prior decision should be modified in light of such evidence.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The text of the Anti-Injunction Act does not cover CIC's suit",
		"context": "169, §10, 14 Stat. 471, 475 (1867). It \"has no recorded legislative history,\" Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and its operative text has never been meaningfully amended. But the Act's history and purpose are no mystery. See generally K. Hickman & G. Kerska, Restoring the Lost Anti-Injunction Act, 103 Va. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The text of the Anti-Injunction Act does not cover CIC's suit",
		"context": "1683 (2017) . The Act's \"manifest purpose\" is to ensure the \"prompt collection\" of \"lawful revenue.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It \"was part of a much larger reconstruction bill … aimed at maintaining revenues sufficient to pay down Civil War debt.\" E. Hawley, The Equitable Anti-Injunction Act, 90 Notre Dame L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The text of the Anti-Injunction Act does not cover CIC's suit",
		"context": "20 F. Cas. 44. Courts of equity \"generally followed\" the rule that \"a 17 suit will not lie to restrain the collection of a tax upon the sole ground of its illegality.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such suits would allow tax delinquents \"to delay payment or possibly to escape their lawful burden, and so to interfere with [and] thwart the collection of revenues for the support of the government.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 U.S. 498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Failing To Hold Americans Liable For Outsourcing Child Slavery Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy And The Rule Of Law",
		"context": "8 Nor has this Court receiv ed objections from any members of Congress or ex ecutive agencies tasked with implementing and advancing human rights policies. Neither former Senator Harkin nor 8 There are also myriad examples of foreign states appearing as amici curiae before United States Circuit Courts in ATS cases. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. granted,569 U.S. 945504 F.3d 254. 15 Representative Engel has appeared to suggest that ATS liability under these child slavery-infected circumstances would so mehow undermine the Harkin-Engel Protoc ol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.3d 736",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Failing To Hold Americans Liable For Outsourcing Child Slavery Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy And The Rule Of Law",
		"context": "Neither former Senator Harkin nor 8 There are also myriad examples of foreign states appearing as amici curiae before United States Circuit Courts in ATS cases. E.g., 671 F.3d 736, cert. granted,569 U.S. 945[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 Representative Engel has appeared to suggest that ATS liability under these child slavery-infected circumstances would so mehow undermine the Harkin-Engel Protoc ol. Far from it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 F.3d 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Failing To Hold Americans Liable For Outsourcing Child Slavery Undermines U.S. Foreign Policy And The Rule Of Law",
		"context": "Not a single overseas institution – public or private – suggests that federal judicial intercession with respect to U.S.-countenanced child slavery exploitation will some how inflame diplomatic tensions or dissuade private investment. Indeed, to draw from the Great Chief Justice's observation in Marbury v. Madison , that sort of assertion is simply too extravagant seriously to be maintained. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "The Petition seeks to cast the D.C. Circuit's entertainment of Sudan's challenge as in conflict with Pioneer Investment Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Petition overstates Pioneer as establishing a categorical rule prohibiting Rule 60(b)(6) relief where the movant bears any fault whatsoever. As numerous cases make clear, Pioneer establishes no such rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Indeed, cases before and after Pioneer make clear that 60(b)(6) relief is a mo re flexible concept than Petitioners contend, and courts often will weigh the movant's fault against other potentially \"extraordinary\" circumstances. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]379 F.3d 277599 F.3d 79570 Fed. App'x 176810 F.3d 132. The D.C. Circuit's decision is not inconsistent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Indeed, cases before and after Pioneer make clear that 60(b)(6) relief is a mo re flexible concept than Petitioners contend, and courts often will weigh the movant's fault against other potentially \"extraordinary\" circumstances. See, e.g. , 335 U.S. 601[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]599 F.3d 79570 Fed. App'x 176810 F.3d 132. The D.C. Circuit's decision is not inconsistent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 F.3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Indeed, cases before and after Pioneer make clear that 60(b)(6) relief is a mo re flexible concept than Petitioners contend, and courts often will weigh the movant's fault against other potentially \"extraordinary\" circumstances. See, e.g. , 335 U.S. 601379 F.3d 277[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]570 Fed. App'x 176810 F.3d 132. The D.C. Circuit's decision is not inconsistent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F.3d 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Indeed, cases before and after Pioneer make clear that 60(b)(6) relief is a mo re flexible concept than Petitioners contend, and courts often will weigh the movant's fault against other potentially \"extraordinary\" circumstances. See, e.g. , 335 U.S. 601379 F.3d 277599 F.3d 79570 Fed. App'x 176[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The D.C. Circuit's decision is not inconsistent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "810 F.3d 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Circuit. As such , Petitioners waived any reliance upon Pioneer here. See Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the D.C. Circuit nevertheless acted within its discretion in entertaining the argument on direct appeal. The Petition artfully attempts to conflate the standard under Rule 60(b)(6 ) with the standard for considering forfeited arguments on direct appeal, suggesting that the purported \"faultless\" requirement of Pioneer applies equally to each.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 922",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "When a party has taken a timely appeal from a judgment, in contrast, differe nt standards apply to an appellate court considering whether to entertain a forfeited argument. In the circumstances of a direct appeal, appellate courts have considerable discretion to entertain the forfeited argument, without regard to whether the proponent of the argument is \"faultless.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord City of 453 U.S. 247 circumstances must 17 be present before a forfeited argument will be considered on direct appeal , the cases do not hold or even suggest that those \"exceptional\" circumstances are limited to where the proponent is \"faultless.\" Nor do those cases hold or suggest that the considerations for entertaining arguments on direct appeal are the same as those for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6), even if the cases use the adjectives \"exceptional\" or \"extraordinary\" in both contexts. Indeed, a court deciding whether to hear an argument for the first time on direct appeal is concerned primarily not with \"fault,\" but with whether the argument constitutes a pure legal question and whether the opposing party has had a chance to advocate its position, either in the court below or in appellate briefing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "When a party has taken a timely appeal from a judgment, in contrast, differe nt standards apply to an appellate court considering whether to entertain a forfeited argument. In the circumstances of a direct appeal, appellate courts have considerable discretion to entertain the forfeited argument, without regard to whether the proponent of the argument is \"faultless.\" See 428 U.S. 106; accord City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] circumstances must 17 be present before a forfeited argument will be considered on direct appeal , the cases do not hold or even suggest that those \"exceptional\" circumstances are limited to where the proponent is \"faultless.\" Nor do those cases hold or suggest that the considerations for entertaining arguments on direct appeal are the same as those for granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6), even if the cases use the adjectives \"exceptional\" or \"extraordinary\" in both contexts. Indeed, a court deciding whether to hear an argument for the first time on direct appeal is concerned primarily not with \"fault,\" but with whether the argument constitutes a pure legal question and whether the opposing party has had a chance to advocate its position, either in the court below or in appellate briefing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The D.C. Circuit's Decision Is Not Inconsistent With Pioneer And, Even If It Were, The Inconsistency Would Be Inconsequential Because The Decision Is Sound On Alternative Grounds",
		"context": "Indeed, a court deciding whether to hear an argument for the first time on direct appeal is concerned primarily not with \"fault,\" but with whether the argument constitutes a pure legal question and whether the opposing party has had a chance to advocate its position, either in the court below or in appellate briefing. See, e.g. , Hormel , 312 U.S. at 556 (explaining that the reason appellate courts do not \"ordinarily\" consider issues for the first time on appeal is because \"parties should have an opportunity to offer evidence\"); Singleton , 428 U.S. at 120 (noting that even where additional evidence would not aid the court's decision, the opposing party \"should have the opportunity to present whatever legal arguments he may have\"); Texas Rural Legal Aid, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. NML Capital, Ltd. , 134 S. Ct. at 2255 n.2 (\"We will not revive a fo rfeited argument simply because the petitioner gestures toward it in its reply brief.\"). 18 Here, the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "940 F.2d 685",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court has characterized Section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination \"because of\" race, meaning that race must be the, not merely a, reason for the challenged action",
		"context": "Although this Court has not ruled directly on the appropriate causation standard applicable to Section 1981 claims, it has had occasion to resolve other important questions arising under the Act, including for example its application to race discrimination in the employment context, Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 459-60, as well as the scope of its employment protec- tions. See CBOCS West, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While none of the Court's Section 1981 decisions specifies what causation standard applies, many generally describe the statute's primary aim being to prohibit discrimination \"because of\" race, which the Court has said means that race was the but- for reason for the employ er's action. See, e.g., Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 459-60 (\"it is well settled among 14 the federal Courts of Appeals—and we now join them—that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race\") (footnote omitted); 392 U.S. 409 (obs erving as to Section 1981's legislative history and purposes, \"it seemed evident that, with respect to basic civil rights—including the 'right to … purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey … property,' Co ngress must provide that 'there … be no discrimination' on grounds of race or color\") (footnote omitted); 427 U.S. 160; Gen. Bldg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court has characterized Section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination \"because of\" race, meaning that race must be the, not merely a, reason for the challenged action",
		"context": "See CBOCS West, 553 U.S. 442. While none of the Court's Section 1981 decisions specifies what causation standard applies, many generally describe the statute's primary aim being to prohibit discrimination \"because of\" race, which the Court has said means that race was the but- for reason for the employ er's action. See, e.g., Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 459-60 (\"it is well settled among 14 the federal Courts of Appeals—and we now join them—that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race\") (footnote omitted); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (obs erving as to Section 1981's legislative history and purposes, \"it seemed evident that, with respect to basic civil rights—including the 'right to … purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey … property,' Co ngress must provide that 'there … be no discrimination' on grounds of race or color\") (footnote omitted); 427 U.S. 160; Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. 375. The Court in these case s describes Section 1981 consistently as prohibiting discrimination \"because of race,\" in no way suggestin g, even in passing, that contracting parties may be held liable for adverse decisions based only tangenti ally on race.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court has characterized Section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination \"because of\" race, meaning that race must be the, not merely a, reason for the challenged action",
		"context": "See CBOCS West, 553 U.S. 442. While none of the Court's Section 1981 decisions specifies what causation standard applies, many generally describe the statute's primary aim being to prohibit discrimination \"because of\" race, which the Court has said means that race was the but- for reason for the employ er's action. See, e.g., Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 459-60 (\"it is well settled among 14 the federal Courts of Appeals—and we now join them—that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race\") (footnote omitted); 392 U.S. 409 (obs erving as to Section 1981's legislative history and purposes, \"it seemed evident that, with respect to basic civil rights—including the 'right to … purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey … property,' Co ngress must provide that 'there … be no discrimination' on grounds of race or color\") (footnote omitted); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. 375. The Court in these case s describes Section 1981 consistently as prohibiting discrimination \"because of race,\" in no way suggestin g, even in passing, that contracting parties may be held liable for adverse decisions based only tangenti ally on race.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. This Court has characterized Section 1981 as prohibiting discrimination \"because of\" race, meaning that race must be the, not merely a, reason for the challenged action",
		"context": "While none of the Court's Section 1981 decisions specifies what causation standard applies, many generally describe the statute's primary aim being to prohibit discrimination \"because of\" race, which the Court has said means that race was the but- for reason for the employ er's action. See, e.g., Railway Express, 421 U.S. at 459-60 (\"it is well settled among 14 the federal Courts of Appeals—and we now join them—that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race\") (footnote omitted); 392 U.S. 409 (obs erving as to Section 1981's legislative history and purposes, \"it seemed evident that, with respect to basic civil rights—including the 'right to … purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey … property,' Co ngress must provide that 'there … be no discrimination' on grounds of race or color\") (footnote omitted); 427 U.S. 160; Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court in these case s describes Section 1981 consistently as prohibiting discrimination \"because of race,\" in no way suggestin g, even in passing, that contracting parties may be held liable for adverse decisions based only tangenti ally on race. Its char- acterization of Section 1981 as barring discrimination \"because of\" race thus stro ngly suggests that but-for causation applies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FDCPA's context and purpose confirm that non-judicial foreclosure is subject to the Act",
		"context": ", Glazer , 704 F.3d at 462. Respondents' reading, by contrast, would leave this sub-stantive provision with no realistic application. E.g., Kal- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These exclusions appe ar in the same section that defines \"debt collector.\" When Congress wanted to carve out an exception, it thus did so expressly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.3d 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FDCPA's context and purpose confirm that non-judicial foreclosure is subject to the Act",
		"context": "A fami ly could lose its home if a debt collector falsely infla tes the amounts owed beyond the family's capacity to cure, or a consumer is left without the information necessary to make an informed decision 11 Congress also defined \"debt\" as \" any obligation,\" not just unse- cured obligations. 15 U.S.C. 1692a(5); see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Congress felt that all security interests should be treated differently, it would have said so expressly. See, e.g., Ambridge, 372 P.3d at 213 (\"The definition of 'debt' plainly encompasses a home mortgage, and the defini- tion does not differentiate between consumer debts that are secured and those that are not.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "678 F.3d 1211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FDCPA's context and purpose confirm that non-judicial foreclosure is subject to the Act",
		"context": "The FDCPA provides critical safeguards to root out debt-col-lector mistakes, ward off abusive conduct, and ensure fair and honest treatment. If Congress intended to create a massive \"loophole\" for this significant category of con- sumer debt, it would have said so expressly. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wil- son, 443 F.3d at 378-379. In sum, there is no apparent reason that Congress would regulate all manner of co llection activity (including state-court litigation), yet wo uld not regulate non-judicial foreclosure. Respondents' attempt to read an atextual ex-clusion into the Act is directly at odds with its language, context, and purpose, an d it should be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Powerful equities support the State given the federal role in designing and approving the culverts at issue",
		"context": "At every step in this process—encouraging highway construction, prov iding culvert designs, and granting culvert permits—the federal government was supposed to ensure that its actions complied with its treaty obligations. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But throughout the many decades in which the federal government undertook these actions, it never 47 informed the State that it might be breaching treaty obligations by building culverts in compliance with federal law. JA 101a, 375a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; 233 F.3d 538; 148 F.3d 943; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 F.3d 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 233 F.3d 538; 148 F.3d 943; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 F.3d 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 148 F.3d 943; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "233 F.3d 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; 233 F.3d 538; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "148 F.3d 943",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; 233 F.3d 538; 148 F.3d 943; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 F.3d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; 233 F.3d 538; 148 F.3d 943; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ruston Gas Turbines, 9 F.3d 415; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "985 F.2d 1534",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "Similar examples abound. See, e.g. , 445 F.3d 809; Luv N' care, 438 F.3d 465; 233 F.3d 538; 148 F.3d 943; 25 F.3d 610; Ver- 985 F.2d 1534; Ruston Gas Turbines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Boat Serv. of Galveston, 2019 WL 6716907. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 F.3d 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "2. State courts too have routinely addressed these issues. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Supreme Court of Iowa confronted \"whether a Chin ese tire manufacturer that sold thousands of tires in Iowa through an American distributor may be compelled to defend a lawsuit\" within the State, where th e plaintiff was injured by one of the manufacturer's tires. Id. at 579.",
		"citation_value_orig": "860 N.W.2d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "And in any event, the court rec- ognized that \"indirect shipments count,\" and the com-pany had sold hundreds of th ousands of the particular, defective tire at issue to a distributor for the U.S. 20 market, which in turn shipped many to Iowa; thus, the manufacturer \"at least indirectly served the Iowa mar-ket through [its distributor] 'with the expectation that its tires would be purchased by consumers in the fo-rum State.'\" Id. at 596 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (brackets omitted). The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia came to a similar conclusion against the petitioner in this very case. In State ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia came to a similar conclusion against the petitioner in this very case. In State ex rel. Ford Motor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Ford urged the court to adopt the reasoning of a single district court case, which held that ther e was no personal jurisdic- tion when the plaintiffs bought a Ford vehicle in one State and then drove it to another where they were in-jured, even though Ford sold the same defective vehi- cle model in the forum State. Id. at 342-43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "788 S.E.2d 319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "This statement of the rule— fully embodied by Audi's decision not even to contest personal jurisdiction in World-Wide Volkswagen , both decides this case and demands application of the stream-of-commerce rule as formulated above. See id. at 288 & n.3 (explaining that the manufacturer Audi and importer Volkswagen had abandoned any 23 personal jurisdiction challenges); J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is also fully consistent with both the plurality and the dissent in Nicastro . None of the opinions in Nicastro questioned whether there was an adequate relationship between the defendant, the New Jersey forum, and the claims at is sue, because the plaintiff was suing regarding an injury he sustained from one of the defendant's machines in New Jersey.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "The stream-of-commerce test as set forth above satisfies the \"relatedness\" require- ment because it requires t hat the item at issue have caused the plaintiff's injury in the forum State. It is therefore plain that the element that this Court re-cently said was \"needed\" in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California is present—namely, \"a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the confusion in th is case seems to result from wholly ignoring that personal jurisdiction is grounded in a three-way \"relationship among the de- fendant, the forum, and the litigation,\" Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, 466 U.S. 408, rather than just the two- way relationship between the defendant's forum con-tacts and the plaintiff's claims. Where the stream-of-commerce conditions described above are met, all three relationships are tightly bound together by the same thread—namely, the defendant's own product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "It is therefore plain that the element that this Court re-cently said was \"needed\" in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California is present—namely, \"a connection between the forum and the specific claims at issue.\" 137 S. Ct. 1773. Indeed, the confusion in th is case seems to result from wholly ignoring that personal jurisdiction is grounded in a three-way \"relationship among the de- fendant, the forum, and the litigation,\" Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rather than just the two- way relationship between the defendant's forum con-tacts and the plaintiff's claims. Where the stream-of-commerce conditions described above are met, all three relationships are tightly bound together by the same thread—namely, the defendant's own product. (1) The relationship betw een the forum and the de- fendant is tightly bound because the defendant inten-tionally markets the product in the forum; (2) the re-lationship between the foru m and the litigation is as tight as possible, because it concerns a claim arising within the forum from an item of that same product; and (3) the relationship between the litigation and the defendant concerns its design of that same product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "25 Thus, where the defendant puts an item into the stream of commerce with the expectation that it will be sold or used in a forum and it there causes a plain- tiff's injury, that forum is an appropriate venue for that plaintiff to sue that defendant on that injury—precisely as World-Wide Volkswagen says. Notably, neither the Solicitor General nor peti- tioner cites a single case in which the three criteria above were satisfied and a court found that personal jurisdiction was lacking. The closest either can come is this Court's 1907 decision in Old Wayne Mutual Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —decided under the pre- International Shoe regime for personal juris- diction. That decision is wholly inapplicable because it does not involve an item in commerce that ever reached the forum State. Instead, it involved a con- tract that was avowedly entered into in Indiana with an Indiana insurance company.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 U.S. 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "10. Instead, the argument in Old Wayne was that Old Wayne had consented to suits in Pennsylvania—on any business done anywhere in the country—through service of process on the Pennsylvania insurance com-missioner alone, because it was present in Pennsylva- nia and doing insurance business without registering to do so. Applying the physical-presence rule of Pen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court agreed that Old Wayne had consented to such impersonal ser-vice with respect to any business done in 26 Pennsylvania, but that this \"assent\" did not extend to \"business transacted in another State.\" 204 U.S. at 23. In fact, this appears to have been a construction of Pennsylvania's statute, not the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts have been fairly applying the stream-of-commerce test for years",
		"context": "This application of Pennoyer is plainly unhelpful under the International Shoe regime, but if this Court is inclined to follow it, then under that regime, corpo-rations are forbidden from operating outside their home States at all except on such terms as the States of operation may require. See, e.g. , Old Wayne , 204 U.S. at 21-23; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, if Minnesota and Montana want to condition Ford's operations in their respective States on assenting to suits respecting any car crashes within their borders, they are perfectly free to do so. International Shoe signaled a different approach less tied to physical presence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government misplaces its reliance on Johnson, Cotton, and Puckett",
		"context": "The government argues this C ourt's deci sions in Johnson v. United Sta tes, 520 U.S . 461 (1997) , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 556 U.S. 129 , show that an ap- pellate court may review materials outside the trial record at prong four whe n reviewing a trial error. But none of t hese cases i nvolved a claim of insuffi- cient ev idence, and none of them considered evidence outside the trial record when reviewing a trial error. 13 Johnson and Cotton are also distinguishable be- cause in those cases, as in Nede r, the defendant s had notice a nd a meaning ful opportunity to defend against the unr ecognized element .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government misplaces its reliance on Johnson, Cotton, and Puckett",
		"context": "The government argues this C ourt's deci sions in Johnson v. United Sta tes, 520 U.S . 461 (1997) , 535 U.S. 625 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , show that an ap- pellate court may review materials outside the trial record at prong four whe n reviewing a trial error. But none of t hese cases i nvolved a claim of insuffi- cient ev idence, and none of them considered evidence outside the trial record when reviewing a trial error. 13 Johnson and Cotton are also distinguishable be- cause in those cases, as in Nede r, the defendant s had notice a nd a meaning ful opportunity to defend against the unr ecognized element .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The government misplaces its reliance on Johnson, Cotton, and Puckett",
		"context": "There, the g rand jury re turned an indict ment that fail ed to alleg e drug quantity as an element. 53 5 U.S. at 632. But the defendants knew that drug q uantity would affect their sentences and that the government would 5 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 introduce evidence of drug quantity at trial. The de- fendants never disputed th e threshold dr ug quantity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court Should Expeditiously Resolve The Petition For Certiorari And, If Necessary, The Merits Of This Dispute",
		"context": "35 only undermine the Office 's duty to enforce New York's criminal laws , but could also work to the detriment of those who may be charged in any indictment returned by the grand jury and might wish to use this evidence in their defense. See, e.g. , Toussi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Nixon , 418 U.S. at 711 (rejecting claim of presidential privilege to vindicate criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights). Although, as Petitioner notes, t here are other cases currently pending in which Petitioner has sought to prevent the enforcement of subpoenas regar ding his financial records (including tax returns ), those cases should not delay resolution of this petition because they present different questions than that presented here . Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Claims concerning interstate emissions are removable because they arise under federal common law.",
		"context": "Although the federal-officer removal statute pro- vides ample basis for removing claims \"for or relating to\" the production of fossil fuels, federal common law also provides a substantial basis for removing climate- change claims like the ones presented by respondent here. While \"[t]here is no federal general common 29 law,\" Erie R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is \"federal decisional law in areas of national concern,\" particularly for \"s ubjects within national leg- islative power where Congress has so directed, or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so de-mands.\" Am. Elec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 64",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Claims concerning interstate emissions are removable because they arise under federal common law.",
		"context": "Am. Elec. Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"[w]hen we deal with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common law.\" Id. at 103.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Claims concerning interstate emissions are removable because they arise under federal common law.",
		"context": "Tort claims alleging harm arising from interstate and international emissions are exactly the sort of \"transboundary pollution\" cl aims that are exclusively committed to federal law. Native Vill. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While plaintiffs bringing climate change claims try to sidestep the application of federal common law by fo-cusing in part on fossil-fuel production and promotion, allegations about cross-border emissions by oil and natural-gas producers lie at the root of their claims. E.g., J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "696 F.3d 849",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 418 U.S. 683. If this Court were to accept review, it would be required, in order to determine its own jurisdic- tion, to consider whether the court of appeals had ju- risdiction over the appeal. Jurisdiction was not con- tested in the court of appeals and the panel did not discuss it, but there is significant reason to doubt the court's jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., 457 U.S. 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court were to accept review, it would be required, in order to determine its own jurisdic- tion, to consider whether the court of appeals had ju- risdiction over the appeal. Jurisdiction was not con- tested in the court of appeals and the panel did not discuss it, but there is significant reason to doubt the court's jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "§ 16(b)(2). A court of appeals may not consider an appeal's merits in the face of such an express statutory denial of jurisdiction. See Firestone Tire & Rubber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The FAA is designed \"to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.\" Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "See Firestone Tire & Rubber 449 U.S. 368. The FAA is designed \"to move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out of court and into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible.\" Moses H. Cone Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Fourth Circuit explained, \"Congress sought to prevent parties from frustrating arbitration through lengthy preliminary appeals.\" Stedor Enters., 947 F.2d 727.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "Moses H. Cone Mem'l 460 U.S. 1. As the Fourth Circuit explained, \"Congress sought to prevent parties from frustrating arbitration through lengthy preliminary appeals.\" Stedor Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- deed, the Second Circuit has held that, in general, \"a 21 party cannot appeal a district court's order unless, at the end of the day, the pa rties are forced to settle their dispute other than by arbitration.\" Augustea Impb Et 126 F.3d 95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "947 F.2d 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "Stedor Enters., 947 F.2d 727. In- deed, the Second Circuit has held that, in general, \"a 21 party cannot appeal a district court's order unless, at the end of the day, the pa rties are forced to settle their dispute other than by arbitration.\" Augustea Impb Et [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellate courts thus routinely re-fuse appeals from interlocutory orders favoring arbi- tration. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 F.3d 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "Appellate courts thus routinely re-fuse appeals from interlocutory orders favoring arbi- tration. See, e.g. , Preferred Care of Del., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Attempting to skirt the FAA's limits on appellate jurisdiction, Lamps Plus characterizes the district court as having \"denied the request for individual ar- bitration.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "845 F.3d 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "§ 16(b)(2). Faced with district court orders compelling arbitration, \"albeit not in the first-choice\" manner for the party wishing to enforce the arbitration agreement, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that they lack appellate juris- diction to reach the merits. Al [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., 671 F.3d 635. In Al Rushaid , the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had appellate jurisdiction over an order that compelled arbitration but denied the defendant's request that the arbitration take place before the In- ternational Chamber of Commerce. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.3d 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "§ 16(b)(2). Faced with district court orders compelling arbitration, \"albeit not in the first-choice\" manner for the party wishing to enforce the arbitration agreement, courts of appeals have uniformly concluded that they lack appellate juris- diction to reach the merits. Al 814 F.3d 300; see also Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Al Rushaid , the Fifth Circuit considered whether it had appellate jurisdiction over an order that compelled arbitration but denied the defendant's request that the arbitration take place before the In- ternational Chamber of Commerce. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "671 F.3d 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "Con- cluding that taking jurisdiction would frustrate § 16's purpose of promoting arbitration, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction. Id. at 304; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Augustea, 126 F.3d at 98 (holding the court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal over an order to arbitrate in London instead of New York). Similarly, in Blue Cross, the Seventh Circuit held that an order denying a motion seeking to direct ar-bitrators to \"hold separate rather than consolidated proceedings\" was not a refusal to \"order arbitration to proceed\" within the meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(B), 671 F.3d at 638, even though the mov- ing party described its motion as a petition \"to com-pel a de-consolidated arbitration,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "360 F.3d 1149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "§ 1291 and 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(3) because the district court dismissed Mr. Varela's claims without prejudice. An order dismissing a plaintiff' s claims in favor of arbi- tration was deemed final by this Court for purposes of appeal by the plaintiff in Green Tree Financial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the dismissa l was \"with prejudice,\" and the Court deemed it fina l because it \"disposed of the entire case on the merits\" and left the court \"nothing to do but execute the judgment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals' jurisdiction over this case was highly doubtful",
		"context": "Microsoft , 137 S. Ct. at 1712–15. Moreover, a party is generally not aggrieved by, and hence cannot appeal, an order granting relief it re- –––––––––––––––––––––––– 3 The Ninth Circuit and other circuits have extended Ran- dolph to allow appeals by plaintiffs whose claims have been dismissed without prejudice in favor of arbitration. See, e.g., Interactive Flight Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Assuming their correctness, however, such decision s offer little support for an appeal by a defendant who procures dismissal without prejudice of the plaintiff's claims. 24 quested.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 F.3d 1177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": ". b etween 'the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortu- nate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable c orruption. \"' Miller , 567 U.S. at 479 –80 (quoting Roper , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And in that alternate realit y, Montgomery does not exist at all.1 Montgomery could not be clearer about Miller 's permanent -incorrigibility rule —it repeats the rule seven times . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroac- tive.\" Id. at 734 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); see also id. (\"Miller . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "The permanent -incorrigibility rule therefore repre- sents a bedrock holding of Montgomery . \"[I]t is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result by which we are bound.\" Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 140 S. Ct. 1390 (\"[A] court' s stated and, on its view, necessary basis for de- ciding does not become dictum because a critic would have decided on another basis . \"). To be sure, as Mississippi points out, Miller and Montgomery held that mandatory life -without -parole sentences violate the Eighth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "37, then it would have made no sense to conclude that Miller set out a substantive rule that applies retroactively. Rules requiring consider ation of fac tors are procedur- al rather than substantive because they \"regulate on- ly the manner of determining the defendant's culpa- bility.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, Mississippi's position conflicts with Graham v. Collins , where a h abeas petitioner retro- actively attacking his sentence put forth a rule simi- lar to Mississippi's understanding of Miller . See506 U.S. 461 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "542 U.S. 348. For example, Mississippi's position conflicts with Graham v. Collins , where a h abeas petitioner retro- actively attacking his sentence put forth a rule simi- lar to Mississippi's understanding of Miller . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The rule considered in Graham would have required jury instructions in a capital case to permit considera tion of mitigating evidence of \"youth, unstable childhood , and positive character traits.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "at 477. The Court has also rejected retroactive application of other Eighth Amendment rules regarding consid- eration of factors or evidence in mitigation of pun- ishment. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]521 U.S. 151. Nor would a rule that simply bans mandatory life without parole for juveniles, in favor of discretion, be a substantive rule. Requiring discretion does not \"prohibit [] 'a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or of- fense.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 484",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "at 477. The Court has also rejected retroactive application of other Eighth Amendment rules regarding consid- eration of factors or evidence in mitigation of pun- ishment. E.g., 494 U.S. 484[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor would a rule that simply bans mandatory life without parole for juveniles, in favor of discretion, be a substantive rule. Requiring discretion does not \"prohibit [] 'a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or of- fense.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "Montgomery , 136 S. Ct. at 732. General proportionality principles were not new- ly discovered in Miller . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A procedural rule also does not turn into a substan- tive rule when it poses a \"grave or significant risk of 3 If new rules making mandatory sentencing regimes advisory were held substantive , then United States v. Booker would apply retroactively—a result that would authorize a torrent of habeas petitions. See 543 U.S. 220.",
		"citation_value_orig": "217 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Miller's Substantive Rule Bans Life Without Parole For Juvenile Homicide Offenders Who Are Not Permanently Incorrigible",
		"context": "See 217 U.S. 349. A procedural rule also does not turn into a substan- tive rule when it poses a \"grave or significant risk of 3 If new rules making mandatory sentencing regimes advisory were held substantive , then United States v. Booker would apply retroactively—a result that would authorize a torrent of habeas petitions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 disproportionate punishment.\" Resp .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)",
		"context": "N oth- ing in the text or context of Section 21(d)(5) supports that reading . Petitioners rely in part (Br. 26 -27) on Grupo Mexi- cano de Desarrollo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, this Court held that a court 's general eq uity powers under the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)",
		"context": "1001 et seq. But in those cases , thi s Court explained that whether Con- gress meant to recreate historical distinctions between legal and equitable remedies \"remains a question of in- terpretation in each case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court acknowledged that, \"[a]s memories of the divided bench, and familiarity with its technical refinements, recede further into the past, [that] meaning becomes, perhaps, increasingly un- likely.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)",
		"context": "In any event, the SEC has identified a close histori- cal analog for the remedy of disgorgement: the tradi-tional equitable remedy of accounting. \"That the term 'disgorgement' has entered common legal parlance only recently cannot obscure that the ancient remed[y] of ac- counting compelled wrong doers to 'disgorge' — i.e., account for and surrender— their ill -gotten gains for centuries.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners also object (Br. 32) that the SEC does not trace monies to be disgorged to any part icular asset or fund, but an accounting has always allowed a plaintiff to recover illicit gain s \"even if he cannot iden- tify a particular res containing the profits sought to be recovered.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 F.3d 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)",
		"context": "Petitioners also object (Br. 32) that the SEC does not trace monies to be disgorged to any part icular asset or fund, but an accounting has always allowed a plaintiff to recover illicit gain s \"even if he cannot iden- tify a particular res containing the profits sought to be recovered.\" Great -West Life & Annuity Insurance Co. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And while pe- titioners object ( Br. 32) to joint and several liability for disgorgement, courts of equity have long held wrongdo- ers jointly and severally liable for profits in appropriate cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Historical practice does not support petitioners' cramped reading of Section 21(d)(5)",
		"context": "And while pe- titioners object ( Br. 32) to joint and several liability for disgorgement, courts of equity have long held wrongdo- ers jointly and severally liable for profits in appropriate cases. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "254 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "2. The provision \"is among the significant structural safeguar ds of the constitutional scheme.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After being subjected to the British Empire's \"ma- nipulation of official appointments\" to offices in the American territories, the Constitution's framers re-strained that \"insidious and powerful weapon of eight- eenth century despotism\" by \"carefully husbanding the appointment power.\" 501 U.S. 868 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "520 U.S. 651 . After being subjected to the British Empire's \"ma- nipulation of official appointments\" to offices in the American territories, the Constitution's framers re-strained that \"insidious and powerful weapon of eight- eenth century despotism\" by \"carefully husbanding the appointment power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Appointments Clause thus vests the President with the appointment power to \"pre-vent[ ] cong ressional encroachment,\" while \"curb[ing] Executive abuses\" by requiring Senate confirmation of 14 principal officers. Edmond , 520 U.S. at 659.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Id. at 660. I t is the exclusive means for appointing \" all Officers of the United States,\" and \"[n]o class or type of officer is ex-cluded because of its special functions,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it has abandoned that argument. All parties now concede that all federal officers, even those whose jurisdiction is geographically limited to a territory —such as fed- eral judges and U nited States Attorneys —are Officers of the United States to whom the Appointments Clause applies. See U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Under Buckley's controlling test, the Board members are O fficers of the United States. This Court has recognized only one test for deter- mining whether officials are \"Officers of the United States\" within the meaning of the Appointments Clause , and has adhered to it for decades : Do the of- ficials occupy a \"continuing\" position established by federal law, and do they \"exercis[e] significant author- ity pursuant to the laws of the United States\" ? [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Freytag , 501 U.S. at 881 ; Buckley , 424 U.S. at 126 . That straightfor- ward test controls this case and compels the conclu- sion that the Board members' appointments are un- constitutional . The Board members undisputedly hold cont inuing office s established by federal law .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "§ 2121(e) ; JA173 (Board members \"answerable to and remova ble only by the President\") . Therefore, t he Board members \"must fear\" and \"obey\" only the f ederal government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is true even though the President may remove the Board members only for cause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "at 118 . That is because the Buckley test \"turns on whether the power wielded by a person or body has its source in federal author-ity.\" Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft N oise, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,501 U.S. 252 . Of course, non-federal offic ials, such as state offic ials and elected territorial officials , can have some non -exclusive authority to enforce federal law. See Board Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.2d 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "at 118 . That is because the Buckley test \"turns on whether the power wielded by a person or body has its source in federal author-ity.\" Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft N oise, 917 F.2d 48, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Of course, non-federal offic ials, such as state offic ials and elected territorial officials , can have some non -exclusive authority to enforce federal law. See Board Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "In Clinton v. Englebrecht , the Court distinguished a territorial attorney and marshal from the territory's U.S. Attor- ney and U.S. Marshal, \"who may properly enough be called the attorney and marshal of the United States for the Territory; for their duties in the courts have exclusive relation to cases arising under the laws and Constitution of the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, in Snow v. United States , the Court held that the territorial attorney general, who had been appointed by the territorial legislature, was empowered to prosecute cases arising under the \"[t]erritorial laws,\" while \" [t]he proper business of\" the presidentially appointed U nited States Attorney was to prosecute cases under federal law. 85 U.S. (1 8 Wall.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "21 This Court has held that a similar territorial debt - limitation statute was federal, not local. Guam's Or- ganic Act contains a provision restricting the amount of bonds that Guam can sell. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court concluded that the provision was \"not a matter of purely local con-cern\" but rathe r was a \"federal statute\" because it \"protects both Guamanians and the United States from the potential consequences of territorial insol-vency.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Thus , lower courts have used Buckley to determine whether offices established under Article IV exercise \"significant federal authority ,\" and whether their oc- cupants were \"selected in violation of the Appoint- ments Clause.\" 845 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. ), aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 22 Although the United States tries to rewrite his- tory, t he Executive Branch , prior to this case, rou- tinely applie d Buckley to determine when territorial official s become \" Officer s of the United States .\" It was the United States that urged the D.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 F.3d 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Boar d Br. 46. To answer that question, they urge the Court to apply their new test, adapted from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners' framework applies the wrong test to the wrong question . The Appointments Clause ap- plies to \"Officers of the United States,\" not \"entities.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "O.L.C. at 100 n.10. Even if the Board's governmental status were rel- evant, this Court already established a test for deter- mining whether an entity is federal in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Board readily satisfies that test, as one court al- ready has held. Altair Glob.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "The United States argues that the federal government's absolute control over the Board's appointments (not to mention its on- going remov al power) is \"not even relevant,\" U.S. Br. 51-53, but this Court has long considered this factor in determining the s ource of an officer's authority. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court determined that a D.C. Justice of the Peace was an \"officer of the government of the United States\" be- cause the justice was \"appointed, by the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate.\" Id. at 336.",
		"citation_value_orig": "7 U.S. 331",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "\"Deriving all his authority from the legislature and president of the United States, he certainly is not 25 the officer of any other governmen t.\" Ibid. And in United States v. Hartwell , the Court concluded that a Treasury clerk was an O fficer of the United States in part because he \"was appointed by the head of a de- partment within the meaning of the [Appointments Clause].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The United States itself classified \"method of ap- pointment\" as a factor that courts consider \"relevant\" and that \"may provide evidence of whether an office exists,\" even if it is not dispositive. Appointments Clause , 31 Op.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Tr . of Oral Arg . at 47, Freytag , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 90 -762), 1991 WL 636473. 4 Thus, under Lebron , the Board is federal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "4 Thus, under Lebron , the Board is federal . In fact, the Board's powers are substantially greater than those of the Board of Review for the MWAA ⁠—another Article IV entity that this Court held wielded \"federal power .\" MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft 4 Petitioners cite Metropolitan Railroad [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 91 U.S. 540, but those cases analyzed th e D.C. officials only for statutory purposes, not under the Constitution. Metro. R.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "4 Thus, under Lebron , the Board is federal . In fact, the Board's powers are substantially greater than those of the Board of Review for the MWAA ⁠—another Article IV entity that this Court held wielded \"federal power .\" MWAA v. Citizens for Abatement of Aircraft 4 Petitioners cite Metropolitan Railroad 132 U.S. 1, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but those cases analyzed th e D.C. officials only for statutory purposes, not under the Constitution. Metro. R.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "R.R. , 132 U.S. at 7- 8; Barnes , 91 U.S. at 544. 26 Noise, Inc., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Board of Review consisted of members of Congress and had no unilateral power. It could only veto the MWAA's ac- tions, such as the \"adoption of a budget, authorization of bonds, promulgation of regulations, [and] endorse- ment of a maste r plan.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "2. The term \"territory\" \"is merely descrip- tive of one kind of property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress has the same power over\" territories as \"over any other property,\" ibid. , because \"[i]t is the Property Clause … that provides the basis for governing the Ter-ritories of the United States,\" Kleppe v. New Mexico , 426 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "39 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "This novel test has no footing in Appointments -Clause jurisprudence and it fails even on its own flawed terms . The first two prongs of petitioners ' test would call for courts simply to defer to Congress's \"Article IV\" and \"territorial\" label s. As this Court repeatedly has admonished , however, the \"separation -of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity\" or \"ipse dixit ,\" even when Congress legislates ex- pressly pursuant to \"Art[icle] IV.\" MWAA, 501 U.S. at 267, 270 ; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court's \"inquiry into\" an entity's \"status under the Constitution\" must be \"in-depend ent\" of Congress's pronouncements , Dep't of 135 S. Ct. 1225 , and \"it is not for Congress to make the final determination\" regarding \"status as a Government entity for [constitutional] purposes,\" Lebron , 513 U.S. at 392 . This is true even in areas where Congress's power is \"plenary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "The first two prongs of petitioners ' test would call for courts simply to defer to Congress's \"Article IV\" and \"territorial\" label s. As this Court repeatedly has admonished , however, the \"separation -of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity\" or \"ipse dixit ,\" even when Congress legislates ex- pressly pursuant to \"Art[icle] IV.\" MWAA, 501 U.S. at 267, 270 ; accord 553 U.S. 723. A court's \"inquiry into\" an entity's \"status under the Constitution\" must be \"in-depend ent\" of Congress's pronouncements , Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and \"it is not for Congress to make the final determination\" regarding \"status as a Government entity for [constitutional] purposes,\" Lebron , 513 U.S. at 392 . This is true even in areas where Congress's power is \"plenary.\" MWAA, 501 U.S. at 267.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Petitioners rely on Palmore 's distinction between D.C.'s Article III courts and its non -Article III courts. Palmore recognized that, for the District's Article III 30 courts, adjudication of \" 'purely local affairs was obvi- ously subordinate and incidental ,'\" and held that courts focused \"primarily upon cases arising under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local concern \" were not entitled to Article III's tenure and salary protections. 411 U.S. at 407 (quot- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1933 ) (alteration omitted)). Petitioners contend that Palmore 's \"critical point\" is \"the geographic extent of the law .\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "But petition ers fundamentally misapprehend this aspect of Palmore on which they seek to rely . As this Court later explained, when Palmore focused on the D.C. courts' authority over \"'distinctively local contro- versies that arise under local law, including local criminal laws having little, if any, impact beyond the local jurisdiction,'\" it was referring not to the law's \"limited geographical impact ,\" but rather t o its \"na- ture\" as \"equivalent to those enacted by state and local governments … for the general welfare of their citi- zens.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and reflects \"the police and regulatory powers which a state legislature or municipal go vernment would have in legislating for state or local purposes,\" Palmore , 411 U.S. at 397. PROMESA obviously is not a law \"equivalent to those enacted by state and local governments … for the general welfare of their citizens,\" Key , 434 U.S. at 68 n.13, an d the powers and duties conferred on the Board by that statute therefore cannot plausibly be described as local. Puerto Rico's debts are widely dis- tributed throughout the Nation, and its fiscal crisis — and PROMESA's measures to resolve it —necessarily affec ts creditors nationwide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "PROMESA obviously is not a law \"equivalent to those enacted by state and local governments … for the general welfare of their citizens,\" Key , 434 U.S. at 68 n.13, an d the powers and duties conferred on the Board by that statute therefore cannot plausibly be described as local. Puerto Rico's debts are widely dis- tributed throughout the Nation, and its fiscal crisis — and PROMESA's measures to resolve it —necessarily affec ts creditors nationwide. See , e.g., Franklin Cali- fornia Tax -Free [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,136 S. Ct. 1938. And any adjustment of Puerto Rico's debts would be bind-ing throughout the nation. See , e.g., 11 U. S.C. § 944(a); 48 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "805 F.3d 322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "PROMESA obviously is not a law \"equivalent to those enacted by state and local governments … for the general welfare of their citizens,\" Key , 434 U.S. at 68 n.13, an d the powers and duties conferred on the Board by that statute therefore cannot plausibly be described as local. Puerto Rico's debts are widely dis- tributed throughout the Nation, and its fiscal crisis — and PROMESA's measures to resolve it —necessarily affec ts creditors nationwide. See , e.g., Franklin Cali- fornia Tax -Free 805 F.3d 322, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And any adjustment of Puerto Rico's debts would be bind-ing throughout the nation. See , e.g., 11 U. S.C. § 944(a); 48 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "Indeed, PROMESA's list mechanism inde- pendently violate s the separation of powers because it seizes for members of Congress an appointment power vested in the Executive alone. \"[T]he Legislature can-not exercise\" \"executive\" \"power .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.\" Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "And \"if any power whatsoever is in its nature Executive, it is the power of appointing, overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws.\" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress therefore can exercise no part of the appointments power; after Congress has created the office, it \"ought to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office.\" 272 U.S. 52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Board Members Are \"Officers Of The United States.\"",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477 . Congress therefore can exercise no part of the appointments power; after Congress has created the office, it \"ought to have nothing to do with designating the man to fill the office.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The United States effectively conceded the uncon- stitutionality of PROMESA's list-mechanism when it urged the courts below to apply the \"constitutional avoidance\" canon to read PROMESA as \"not hav[ing] 34 any constraining effect on the President's authority going forward.\" Gov't C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat",
		"context": ". \"[S]tatutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional doubts.\" Clark v.Martinez , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And courts \"assum[e] that Congress does not casually authorize administrative agencies to interpret a statute to push the limit of congressional authority.\" SWANCC , 531 U.S. at 172-173.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat",
		"context": "SWANCC , 531 U.S. at 174. \"Regulation of land use\" is \"a quintessential state and local power.\" Rapanos v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just ask St. Tammany Parish, where Unit 1 is located. It opposes the designation for \"usurp[ing]\" its land-use authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat",
		"context": "b. FWS's designation also tests the boundaries of federal commerce power. \"The Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate 'commerce,' not habitat.\" Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v.Babbitt , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no interstate commerce in the dusky gopher frog. These frogs live only in Mississippi and spend most of their lives underground.",
		"citation_value_orig": "130 F.3d 1041",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. The Avoidance Canon Favors A Narrow Reading Of Habitat",
		"context": "Even if the frog had commercial value—or if the overall scheme of protecting rare species were enough to satisfy Commerce Clause requirements—there still would be no commerce element to designating Unit 1. The frog does not and cannot live there; hence the landowners' activities have no effect on the frog. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the non-commercial frog's absence from a place it 35 does not and cannot live is sufficient to satisfy the Commerce Clause, nothing at all lies beyond the power of federal regulators. The Fifth Circuit should have \"read the statute as written to avoid the[se] significant constitutional and federalism questions,\" by rejecting FWS's extravagant claim that it may designate unoccupied non-habitat as critical habitat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "Because the relator brought suit in the Eleventh Circuit, however, petitioners would need to engage in costly discovery to determine the \"identity and knowledge of a government official,\" Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295, even though the official is not a party to the action and the alleged violations occurred more than seven years before the relator filed suit. Such starkly different results caused by dint of geography and nothing else undermine the certainty that statutes of limitations are designed to promote. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 444 U.S. 111. Allowing the longer limitations period in relator- only suits is also unfair to False Claims Act defendants. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutes of limitations \"embody a 'policy of repose, designed to 15 protect defendants'\" by fostering \"'elimination of stale claims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "Because the relator brought suit in the Eleventh Circuit, however, petitioners would need to engage in costly discovery to determine the \"identity and knowledge of a government official,\" Sanders, 546 F.3d at 295, even though the official is not a party to the action and the alleged violations occurred more than seven years before the relator filed suit. Such starkly different results caused by dint of geography and nothing else undermine the certainty that statutes of limitations are designed to promote. See 572 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing the longer limitations period in relator- only suits is also unfair to False Claims Act defendants. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutes of limitations \"embody a 'policy of repose, designed to 15 protect defendants'\" by fostering \"'elimination of stale claims.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "Allowing the longer limitations period in relator- only suits is also unfair to False Claims Act defendants. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that statutes of limitations \"embody a 'policy of repose, designed to 15 protect defendants'\" by fostering \"'elimination of stale claims.\" Lozano , 572 U.S. at 14; see also John R. Sand & Gravel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Businesses that provide services to the government, like all businesses, are entitled to the \"'security and stability to human affairs'\" th at are \"'vital to the wel- fare of society'\" and should not be \"'surprise[d] through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slum-ber.'\" 568 U.S. 442.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "Lozano , 572 U.S. at 14; see also John R. Sand & Gravel 552 U.S. 130. Businesses that provide services to the government, like all businesses, are entitled to the \"'security and stability to human affairs'\" th at are \"'vital to the wel- fare of society'\" and should not be \"'surprise[d] through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slum-ber.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Eleventh Circuit's decision undermines that fair-ness by requiring False Claims Act defendants to liti-gate claims over alleged violations that occurred long ago. That uncertainty imposes real costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "In one recent case involving a defense contract, for exam-ple, the defendant \"produced over two million pages of documents\" before the relator's claims were dismissed on summary judgment nine years after the relator filed the suit. United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreo- ver, the burden would be higher the longer a relator waited to file an action (as would be allowed under sub-section 3731(b)(2)) because stale claims force \"defend-ants and the courts … to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be se riously impaired by the loss 17 of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of wit- nesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.\" Kubrick , 444 U.S. 111.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "848 F.3d 1027. Moreo- ver, the burden would be higher the longer a relator waited to file an action (as would be allowed under sub-section 3731(b)(2)) because stale claims force \"defend-ants and the courts … to deal with cases in which the search for truth may be se riously impaired by the loss 17 of evidence, whether by death or disappearance of wit- nesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents, or otherwise.\" Kubrick , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Eleventh Circuit suggested that the discovery burden occasioned by its view of subsection 3731(b)(2) is overstated because the government's knowledge may be relevant to other defenses, such as showing that the defendant did not \"'knowingly'\" submit false claims or that the false statements were not \"material\" to the government's decision to pay. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ALLOWING RELATORS TO LENGTHEN THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD UNDER SUBSECTION 3731(b)(2) IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT BURDENS ON FALSE CLAIMS ACT DEFENDANTS",
		"context": "App. 22a-23a n.10 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) and Universal Health Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But allowing relators to take ad-vantage of the longer limitations period in non-intervened suits removes the threshold requirement that would have precluded any discovery on such issues in the first place. Those additional costs are undeniable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "Pfaff , 525 U.S. at 66. Further, this Court generally \"assumes that 'iden- tical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an adjacent subsection of the Patent Act requiring that the claims \"particu- larly point[] out and distinctly claim[] the subject mat- ter which the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention .\" 35 U.S.C. 112(b) (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 851",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "(defining \"full disclosure\" as \"[a] complete revelation of all material facts\"). 2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-web- ster.com/dictionary/exact. 3 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]304 U.S. 364, inventors who claim narrow inventions need only enable narrow inventions, but inventors who claim broad inventions must enable broad inventions. As this Court has explained, \"the word 'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea,\" and \"must refer to a concept that is com- plete, rather than merely one that is 'substantially complete.'\" Pfaff , 525 U.S. at 60, 66 (interpreting 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "(defining \"full disclosure\" as \"[a] complete revelation of all material facts\"). 2 Merriam-Webster Dictionary , https://www.merriam-web- ster.com/dictionary/exact. 3 See 141 U.S. 419[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], inventors who claim narrow inventions need only enable narrow inventions, but inventors who claim broad inventions must enable broad inventions. As this Court has explained, \"the word 'invention' in the Patent Act unquestionably refers to the inventor's conception rather than to a physical embodiment of that idea,\" and \"must refer to a concept that is com- plete, rather than merely one that is 'substantially complete.'\" Pfaff , 525 U.S. at 60, 66 (interpreting 35 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "Pfaff , 525 U.S. at 60, 66 (interpreting 35 U.S.C. 102(b)). And since \"a patentee cannot obtain greater coverage by failing to describe his invention than by describing it as the statute commands\" ( Halli- burton Oil Well Cementing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), if the specification equips a skilled artisan to make and use only part of the claimed invention, the invention is not enabled. Accordingly, the panel below was correct in stating that U.S. law \"has always been, or at least has been since the Patent Act of 1870, that specification strictly, can, without more, construct an appa- ratus which, when used in the way pointed out, will do all that it is claimed the method or process will do. \"); 56 U.S. 62 (\"The words of the acts of Congress [regarding the enablement requirement] show that no patent can lawfully issue upon such a claim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "And since \"a patentee cannot obtain greater coverage by failing to describe his invention than by describing it as the statute commands\" ( Halli- burton Oil Well Cementing 329 U.S. 1), if the specification equips a skilled artisan to make and use only part of the claimed invention, the invention is not enabled. Accordingly, the panel below was correct in stating that U.S. law \"has always been, or at least has been since the Patent Act of 1870, that specification strictly, can, without more, construct an appa- ratus which, when used in the way pointed out, will do all that it is claimed the method or process will do. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The words of the acts of Congress [regarding the enablement requirement] show that no patent can lawfully issue upon such a claim. For he claims what he has not described in the manner required by law. And a patent for such a claim is as strongly forbid- den by the act of Congress, as if some other person had in- vented it before him.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The \"full scope\" requirement is squarely rooted in the text of Section 112(a) and this Court's precedents.",
		"context": "And a patent for such a claim is as strongly forbid- den by the act of Congress, as if some other person had in- vented it before him. He can lawfully claim only what he has invented and described, and if he claims more his patent is void. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 a patent applicant must enable one's invention , what- ever the invention is.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "20 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "In a merger case, for example, cou rts define the market in which the 36 challenged merger could \"substantially lessen competi- tion\" in violation of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Defining the relevant market and measur- ing the defendant's market share is also the usual means of assessing market power under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "Defining the relevant market and measur- ing the defendant's market share is also the usual means of assessing market power under both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See, e.g. , Kodak , 504 U.S. at 464 (Sections 1 and 2); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In all of those contexts, the purpose of defining the market is to identify the products that compete with the defendant's products . Consistent with that purpose, an antitrust market consists of those products \"that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced ,\" such that customers would switch from one to another if faced with a price increase.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "Consistent with that purpose, an antitrust market consists of those products \"that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced ,\" such that customers would switch from one to another if faced with a price increase. du Pont , 351 U.S. at 404; see, e.g. , Kodak , 504 U.S. at 482; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Times -Picayune Publ'g 345 U.S. 594479 U.S. 1033. This Court's decision in Continental Can illustrates the application of the rule that market definition turns on the identification of substitutes . The United States challenged a merger between \"the Nation' s second larg- est producer of metal containers\" and its \"third largest 37 producer of glass containers .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "Consistent with that purpose, an antitrust market consists of those products \"that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced ,\" such that customers would switch from one to another if faced with a price increase. du Pont , 351 U.S. at 404; see, e.g. , Kodak , 504 U.S. at 482; 378 U.S. 441 ; Times -Picayune Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]479 U.S. 1033. This Court's decision in Continental Can illustrates the application of the rule that market definition turns on the identification of substitutes . The United States challenged a merger between \"the Nation' s second larg- est producer of metal containers\" and its \"third largest 37 producer of glass containers .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "That point is well illustrated by this Court's decision in 7 An antitrust case may implicate multiple , separate markets com- posed of products that are not substitutes. For example, a merger in the shoe industry could affect separate markets for \"men's, women's, and children's shoes.\" Brown Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the proper course in such a circum- stance is not to depart from settled market -definition principles by collapsing the affected markets; it is to consider the impact of the challenged action in each of the relevant markets. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Services to merchants and services to cardholders do not belong in the same antitrust market because they are not substitutes",
		"context": "The court of appeals did not adopt that argu- ment, and it is incorrect. Amex relies on this Court's observation that it may be appropriate \"to combin [e] in a single market a number of different products or ser- vices where that combination ref lects commercial reali- ties.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that principle applies to related products and services that are offered to the same consumer s—in Grinnell , centrally monitored \"burglar alarm\" and \"fire alarm\" services. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 563",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Prohibiting Slavery and Its Application to Abortion",
		"context": "The Thirteenth Amendment resolved the pressure building from treating slaves as property, rather than persons. Adopted in 1865, it reads, \"Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punishment of crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United 65 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court upheld a state statute that required parental notification before a minor has an abortion , but that provided a judicial bypass of the notification requirement if the minor could convince a court that notification would not be in her best interests. Of course, even in this situation, the best interests of the fetus are not directly taken into account. 27 States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The United States cannot sue indirectly those it cannot sue directly",
		"context": "§ 2201(a), does 28 a. The United States ' substitution of the State for specific state officials does not solve its standing problem because an injunction \"operat[e s] in personam\" and must be \"directed at someone, and g overn[ing] that party's conduct.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that \"[a] state can act only through its agents,\" 36 U.S. 257, an injunction against Texas must operate by requiring some agent to take, or refrain from taking, some action. Since an injunction against each po-tential alleged agent would be improper, supra I.A, an injunction against Texas —or against the United States for that matter —is improper too.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The United States cannot sue indirectly those it cannot sue directly",
		"context": "The United States ' substitution of the State for specific state officials does not solve its standing problem because an injunction \"operat[e s] in personam\" and must be \"directed at someone, and g overn[ing] that party's conduct.\" 556 U.S. 418. Given that \"[a] state can act only through its agents,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an injunction against Texas must operate by requiring some agent to take, or refrain from taking, some action. Since an injunction against each po-tential alleged agent would be improper, supra I.A, an injunction against Texas —or against the United States for that matter —is improper too. Although a few plaintiffs have attempted to evade this limitation on federal jurisdiction by suing a govern- ment directly, those that have tried have failed because even when sovereign immunity is not at issue, plaintiffs lack standing to sue a state defendant where the chal- lenged law \"doesn't require (or even contemplate) 'en- forcement' by anyone, let alone \" the named defendant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The United States cannot sue indirectly those it cannot sue directly",
		"context": "b. The United States has countered that even if the federal courts cannot prevent a state court from hearing an SB 8 suit to final judgment, it can enjoin county -level not expand the jurisdiction o f the federal courts. See Skelly Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 executive officials (like a county sheriff) from enforcing SB 8 judgments. U.S. Appl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The United States cannot sue indirectly those it cannot sue directly",
		"context": "But beyond the fact that county officials are not state officials within the scope of Rule 65(d) , such an injunction would fail for at least three reasons. First , it would not redress the alleged harm, as pri- vate citizens would nonetheless have non- executive means of enforcing SB 8 judgments under state law . See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second , there are no such judgments to be enjoined, and even the United States has admitted that there may never be any: it predicts \"that few enforce ment proceed- ings will be brought ,\" U.S. Appl. 24 , and insists that SB 8 is \"plainly unconstitutional,\" U.S. Appl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "154 S.W.3d 114",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Article 55 of the UCMJ Bars Imposition of the Death Penalty for Adult Rape",
		"context": "Wappler, 9 C.M.R. at 26.14 Ever since Wappler, both the Court of Military Appeals and the CAAF have consistently understood Article 55 to mean what it says —and to incorporate this Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence into courts -martial. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 19 M.J. 744. Even if Coker does not apply to courts -martial of its own force , Article 55 thus forecloses a court -martial from imposing the death penalty for the crime of adult rape. In nevertheless suggest ing that Article 55 \"has no bearing on the ultimate question here.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "53 M.J. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Article 55 of the UCMJ Bars Imposition of the Death Penalty for Adult Rape",
		"context": "But i f any doubt remained as to whether Article 55 incorporates Coker 's understanding that the death penalty is a \"cruel and unusual punishment\" for adult rape, another fundamental principle of statutory interpretation —constitutional avoidance —settle s the matter. After all, \"i t is ' a well -established principle governing the prudent exercise of this Court 's jurisdiction that normally the Court will not decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of the case. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] obviates the need for this Court to settle the unanswered question of whether the Eighth Amendment applies of its own force . Respondents certainly do not believe that a statute that bars courts - martial from imposing \"cruel or unusual punishment\" is ambiguous as to whether it necessarily bars a punishment this Court has deemed foreclosed by the 40 Eighth Amendment's ban on \"c ruel an d unusual punishment s.\" But a ny ambiguity militates only in favor of the decisions below, not against them. Respondents' offenses were not \"punishable by death\" because the death penalty was categorically foreclosed as a n available punishment for those offenses by the Eighth Amendment , Article 55 , or both.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "See infra Part II. 9 The Tenth Circuit , acknowledging that \" [t]he precise bounds of the Locke holding … are far from clear,\" reasoned that while it was \"disinclined to think that Locke is confined to its facts,\" it could not conclude that \"that Locke subjects all 'state decisions about funding religious education' to no more than 'rational basis review.'\" Colo. Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this framework, it struck down a Colorado student -aid program that excluded \"pervasively sectarian\" schools. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 1245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "at 1250, 1269 . Likewise, the Seventh Circuit struck down a Un i- versity of Wisconsin student activity fund exclusion for religious activities because Locke still requires \"that the state's program not evince hostility to religion\" when determining \"how to use funds over which it had retained plenary control.\" Badger Catholic, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the First Circuit read Locke \"more broadly: the decision there recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide education, may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entangl e- ment with religion, even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so.\" 386 F.3d 344 (1st Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "620 F.3d 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "Badger Catholic, 620 F.3d 775. But the First Circuit read Locke \"more broadly: the decision there recognized that state entities, in choosing how to provide education, may act upon their legitimate concerns about excessive entangl e- ment with religion, even though the Establishment Clause may not require them to do so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir. 2004 ). So \"[i]t follows inexorably that we must apply rational basis scrutiny to the lines that the Maine statute actually draws. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 F.3d 344",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "Eulitt , 386 F.3d at 356. The Maine Supreme Court followed suit, conclu d- ing that Maine's exclusion of \"sectarian\" schools from 10 its school voucher program was constitutional because, while \" the State may be permitted to pass a statute authorizing some form of tuition payments to religious schools … Locke and Eulitt hold that it is not compelled to do so ,\" and so the program \" falls within the 'play in the joints ' between the two religion clauses. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Me. 2006 ). The court below joined the First Circuit and Maine Supreme Court, further cementing this circuit split .",
		"citation_value_orig": "895 A.2d 944",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "See Morris Cty . Bd. of Chosen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should grant certiorari to resolve this conflict among the circuits . II.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "21 -22 (emphasis in original). Compare with Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2023 ( \"Washington's schola r- ship program went 'a long way toward including religion in its benefits. ' Locke , 540 U. S., at 724, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 158 L. Ed. 2d 1. Students in the program were free to use their scholarships at 'pervasively 11 religious schools. ' Ibid.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 S. Ct. 1307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "21 -22 (emphasis in original). Compare with Trinity Lutheran , 137 S. Ct. at 2023 ( \"Washington's schola r- ship program went 'a long way toward including religion in its benefits. ' Locke , 540 U. S., at 724, 124 S. Ct. 1307, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Students in the program were free to use their scholarships at 'pervasively 11 religious schools. ' Ibid.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 L. Ed. 2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "The court below's interpr e- tation construes Article X, Section 6 to mirror in scope the Blaine Amendment, an 1875 federal constitutional amendment proposed in Congress that was designed with clear animus towards Catholicism and its parochial school system by forbidding direct government aid to educational institutions with a religious affiliation.5 Around forty states have similar, \"sectarian\" proscriptions in their state constitutions.6 Expansion s of these provisions , like that unde r- taken in the court below, allows state governments to extend this religious discrimination and animus to not only all forms of Christianity but all religious conduct. This violates not only the Free Exercise Clause, but principles of equal protection: \"gover n- ment may not use religion as a basis of classification for the imposition of duties, penalties, privileges or benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Kavanaugh recently observed , \"[u]nder the Constit u- tion, the government may not discriminate against religion generally or against particular religious denominations. See 456 U. S. 228.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U. S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "435 U. S. 618. As Justice Kavanaugh recently observed , \"[u]nder the Constit u- tion, the government may not discriminate against religion generally or against particular religious denominations. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Morris Cty., 139 S. Ct. at 909. [A] law may not discriminate against 'some or all religious beliefs,' and 'a law targeting reli- 5 Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns , 26 Harv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U. S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "6 Patrick Lougher y, Note, Inhibiting Educational Choice: State Constitutional Restrictions on School Choice , 30 N otre Dame J. L. Eth ics & Pub Pol'y 449, 456 (2016) See DeForrest, supra note 5, at 554 n.14 (providing examples of state Blaine Amen d- ments). 12 gious beliefs as such is never permiss i- ble.' Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. … the gover n- ment may not 'impose special disabilities on the basis of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U. S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "religious status.' Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Id. at 910.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U. S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Lower Courts Have Used Locke to Resolve the Interplay Between the Religion Clauses, With Conflicting Results",
		"context": "The same is true for students and parents who choose religious private education . Religious individuals who, like every other citizen, participate in the burdens and obligations of our civil society are now being exclu ded from participating in any corollary benefits of that social contract that would otherwise inure to them simply because they choose to integrate their religious faith in their education and daily life. Parents are placed in the position of exercising their fundamental right to raise their children according to their religious tenets and beliefs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with the financial realit y that they will be on their own in doing so where others lacking those convi c- tions are not . Pet. at 34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Remaining State-Law Questions Render This Petition A Poor Vehicle For Addressing Section 122(e)(6)'s Scope",
		"context": "1-3:14-15; Sunburst , 165 P.3d at 1089. This Court does not \"ordinarily\" consider \"state-law issues[s].\" The Wharf (Holdings) [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if this Court were to reverse and hold that Landowners are Section 116(e) \"potentially responsi-ble part[ies],\" application of this provision would not necessarily preclude Landowners from recovering restoration damages. Contra Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 588",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "Pet. App. 25a -26a; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2. Petitio ners argue (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "774 F.3d 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "2. Petitio ners argue (Br. 28- 31) that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], requires applying strict scrutiny to all content -based regulations of speech, in- cluding all disclosure requirements . Reed held uncon- stitutional a town ordinance subjecting \"ideological signs\" and \"political signs\" to different rules than signs displaying other types of content. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "The Court had no occasion to address requirements to disclose truthful, factual information regarding one's own services. Indeed, since Reed this Court has as- sumed the continuing vitality of Zauderer and related cases. See Expressions Hair [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that neither the Zauderer standard nor height- ened scrutiny ever applies —and therefore strict scru- tiny always govern s—when professionals offer their services without charge. This categorical rule is also in- correct. This Court has never held that the applicable level of First Amendment scrutiny for speech related to com- mercial or professional services depends on the price charged .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "App. 32a n.8; cf. Polk [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, the fact that a doctor treats a patient for free should not automatically absolve the doctor from otherwise -applicable professional stand- ards —such as a requirement to apprise the patient of the risks of forgoing certain medical treatments , even if the doctor himself opposes those treatments . Petitioners appear to contend that Zauderer and other commercial -speech principles are inapplic able be- cause commercial speech \" 'does no more than propose a commercial transaction ,' \" and providers of free ser- vices like petitioners do not \" propose commercial trans- actions. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "Br. 21 (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Phar- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). I t does not follow from the fact that a professional elects not to charge for a partic- ular service that disclosure requirements governing that service do not regulate commercial speech. A man- ufacturer that offers free samples as a promotion, or a professional that offers free consultations to attract customers, is still entering the marketplace in competi- tion with other providers , and the government's inter- est in requiring disclosures about the goods or services does not automatically disappear merely because they are offered without charge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "A man- ufacturer that offers free samples as a promotion, or a professional that offers free consultations to attract customers, is still entering the marketplace in competi- tion with other providers , and the government's inter- est in requiring disclosures about the goods or services does not automatically disappear merely because they are offered without charge. Accordingly, this Court has held that speech may be commercial even if is not a \" proposal[] to engage in com- mercial transactions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 62, 65 -68 (holding that \" informational pamphlets discussing the desirabil- ity and availability of pro phylactics in general or Youngs' products in particular,\" but not proposing a transaction, were commerc ial speech). For example, a service provider may already have entered into a trans- action with a client and be in the course of providing the agreed- to service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "There is no evident reason why , be- cause the parties' subsequent communication s will con- cern the execution of a commercial transaction rather than its proposal, the government should lose its ability to regulate those communications or require appropri- ate disclosures. Petitioners cite (Br. 41, 44) In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 371 U.S. 415, but neither held that strict scrutiny always applies to speech by professionals who offer their services for free. Both Button and Primus addressed prohibitions on soliciting pro bono clients for litigation by advocacy organi zations \"furthering [their] civil -rights objec- tives,\" which the Court held violated the organizations' associational freedoms. See Primus , 436 U.S. at 421- 432; Button , 371 U.S. at 431 -445.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The parties' categorical arguments for different standards of scrutiny lack merit",
		"context": "There is no evident reason why , be- cause the parties' subsequent communication s will con- cern the execution of a commercial transaction rather than its proposal, the government should lose its ability to regulate those communications or require appropri- ate disclosures. Petitioners cite (Br. 41, 44) In re436 U.S. 412, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but neither held that strict scrutiny always applies to speech by professionals who offer their services for free. Both Button and Primus addressed prohibitions on soliciting pro bono clients for litigation by advocacy organi zations \"furthering [their] civil -rights objec- tives,\" which the Court held violated the organizations' associational freedoms. See Primus , 436 U.S. at 421- 432; Button , 371 U.S. at 431 -445.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass",
		"context": "13. That view ignores the 1Van Cannon , 890 F.3d at 665 (citation omitted). 2[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 Although the government strains to redefine \"contemporane- ous intent,\" e.g., U.S. Br. 12, Quarles uses that phrase in the sense traditional to burglary—i.e., intent at the time of initial trespass, e.g., Opening Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass",
		"context": "That reading is particu- larly reasonable given that this Court paired \"remain- ing\" with an \"entry\" prong that all agree requires in- tent at the first moment of trespass. See U.S. Br. 12- 13; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], one nat- urally expects the modifying condition to exist at the commencement of \"remaining.\" If, after missing a day of work, an employee tells his boss that he had re- mained home \"with a cough\" (U.S. Br. 13-14), the em- ployer would surely feel misled if she later discovered the employee skipped work to host a party, and devel- oped the cough only mid-afternoon from cigar smoke.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass",
		"context": "Whether or not \"entry\" would be entirely redundant, see U.S. Br. 16-18, the government cannot deny its reading of \"remaining\" leaves the \"entry\" prong with little-to-no work to do in the mine run of cases.4 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government's selec- tive protest against reading Taylor \"like a statute,\" U.S. Br. 16, rings hollow, given its own analysis doing 4 The government dwells on alleged conduct associated with Quarles's home-invasion conviction, see U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass",
		"context": "Neither Con- gress nor this Court would have hidden that elephant in the \"remaining\" mousehole. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is far more likely that Taylor viewed \"remaining\" burglary as an incremental modification retaining the age-old requirement of trespass for the purpose of committing a crime. In fact, that is precisely how the contempora- neous sources central to Taylor explained the change: i.e., \"captur[ing] defendants who lawfully enter a loca- tion and then remain, once their license to be there is lost, in order to commit a crime.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor Requires Criminal Intent At Initial Trespass",
		"context": "Herrold, 883 F.3d at 532-533 (citing LaFave & Scott § 8.13(b), at 468 (1986), and American Law Institute, Model Penal Code § 221.1, cmt. (3) (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980) (Model Penal Code (1980))). The government's invocation of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—supposedly central to the meaning of \"remaining,\" yet never cited below—is mis- placed. Cores held that a foreign crewman who \"will- fully remains\" in the country beyond the time author- ized in his permit commits \"a continuing offense,\" and 7 can be prosecuted in the district where he is appre- hended, not only where he first overstayed. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance",
		"context": "In Curtis Johnson , the Court deferred to the Florida Supreme Court's holding that, consistent with the common law, Florida battery could be committed \"by any intentional physical contact.\" 559 U.S. at 138-39 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Similarly here, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly embraced the common law rule that 1 The current version of the Florida robbery statute, which was in effect at the time of Petitioner's conviction, defines \"[r]ob-bery\" as \"the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from the person or custody of another, with in-tent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.\" Fla. Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 So. 2d 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance",
		"context": "Id. (emphasis added); accord 129 So. 112. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Florida Supreme Court, after citing Montsdoca , reaf- firmed that the degree of force used is immaterial, by stating: \" Any degree of force suffices to convert larceny into a robbery.\" Id. at 258 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 So. 2d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance",
		"context": "Only \"[w]here no force is exerted upon the victim's person, as in the case of a pickpock et,\" does a larceny rather than a robbery occur. Id. at 259; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying McCloud , Florida courts recognized that the degree of force necessary to overcome resistance could 30 be \"ever so little.\" 497 So. 2d 975.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 So. 2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance",
		"context": "at 259; accord 465 So. 2d 490. Applying McCloud , Florida courts recognized that the degree of force necessary to overcome resistance could 30 be \"ever so little.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 692 So. 2d 883, the Florida Supreme Court clarified whether purse snatching constituted theft or robbery. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 So. 2d 975",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Florida Robbery Can Be Committed by Any Degree of Force, Provided it Overcomes Resistance",
		"context": "Applying McCloud , Florida courts recognized that the degree of force necessary to overcome resistance could 30 be \"ever so little.\" 497 So. 2d 975. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Florida Supreme Court clarified whether purse snatching constituted theft or robbery. Id. at 884.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 So. 2d 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Director's Designation Authority Is No Substitute for Removal from Office",
		"context": "In any case, control over assignments is no substitute for removal from office. Removal power matters because its in terrorem effect gives superiors leverage to induce compliance. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The threat of receiving a paycheck while not being assigned any work does not have the same potency as the threat of losing one's job. Some less-than-diligent officers may even welcome what amounts to a paid vacation (or, at worst, unspecified \"committee\" work, Gov't Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding medical judgment that admitting privileges help ensure current physician competence",
		"context": ". Abortion providers are doctors of obstetric s and gynecolog y (OB/GYN), which is regarded as a surgical 39 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 specialty.41 Louisiana's Act 620 requires abortion providers to \"have active admitting privileges at a hospital\" that \"provides obstetrical or gynecological health care services\" and \"is located not further than thirty miles\" from the abortion location. La.",
		"citation_value_orig": "218 So.3d 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding medical judgment that admitting privileges help ensure current physician competence",
		"context": "At trial, Petitioners —purporting to rely on a similar decision by this Court42—convinced the 41 American College of Surgeons, What are the surgical specialties? , https://www.facs.org/education/resources/medical - students/faq/specialties (identifying OB/GYN as one of the surgical specialt ies and noting that its specialist s are trained \"to provide medical and surgical care for the pregnant patient\"). 42 Petitioners and their amici argue this Cour t decided the admitting -privileges issue once for all time in Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See,140 S. Ct. 35. But even their most pointed arguments acknowledge that this Court's ruling about a Texas law did not decide the issue for every state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding medical judgment that admitting privileges help ensure current physician competence",
		"context": "Id. 45 Joint Commission Standard MS -32 discourages criteria for privileging unrelated to patient care or physician competence by requiring that, if a hospital uses such criteria, it must provide evidence evaluating \"the impact of resulting decisions on the quality of care, treatment, and services.\" See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 physicians in court, which rightly act s as a judicial check on arbitrary decision -making.46 Petitioners and their amici argue at length that requiring abortion providers to follow the same process as other physicians would r equire them to go through \"exhaustive and futile efforts. \"47 The faulty premise of their argument is that abortion providers cannot receive and retain admitting privileges in Louisiana or elsewhere.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 F.3d 1026",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's findings undermine the longstanding medical judgment that admitting privileges help ensure current physician competence",
		"context": "MED. 54−55 (1964). See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 47 Amic us Br. of the Amer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 A.2d 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "All states require a physician to obtain a written consent before the physician can perform a medical procedure on a patient, and failure to obtain such consent exposes the physician to liability for a battery. See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Cal.1972) (\"Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially 21 different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery\"); 800 A.2d 73; see, also, 70 P.3d 435. Thirty-five states and the federal government now have fetal homicide statutes making it a criminal homicide to kill an unborn child. In twenty-six of these jurisdictions, including South Dakota, killing an unborn child at any age after conception is a homicide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 P.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "All states require a physician to obtain a written consent before the physician can perform a medical procedure on a patient, and failure to obtain such consent exposes the physician to liability for a battery. See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal.1972) (\"Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially 21 different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, also, 70 P.3d 435. Thirty-five states and the federal government now have fetal homicide statutes making it a criminal homicide to kill an unborn child. In twenty-six of these jurisdictions, including South Dakota, killing an unborn child at any age after conception is a homicide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 A.2d 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "All states require a physician to obtain a written consent before the physician can perform a medical procedure on a patient, and failure to obtain such consent exposes the physician to liability for a battery. See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1 (Cal.1972) (\"Where a doctor obtains consent of the patient to perform one type of treatment and subsequently performs a substantially 21 different treatment for which consent was not obtained, there is a clear case of battery\"); 800 A.2d 73; see, also, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thirty-five states and the federal government now have fetal homicide statutes making it a criminal homicide to kill an unborn child. In twenty-six of these jurisdictions, including South Dakota, killing an unborn child at any age after conception is a homicide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 P.3d 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "§97-3-37 (2011) (conception); Missouri, V.A.M.S. 1.205 (Mo. 1988) (conception) and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nebraska, Neb. Rev. St. §28-388 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 SW.3d 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "§14-23.1 22 There are two general standards for physician disclosure under the laws of the various states, with some modest variations. The older standard is the \"professional standard\" in which a doctor must disclose the risks of a proposed procedure which practitioners determine should be disclosed. See, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Canterbury introduced the newer standard of disclosure, the \"reasonable patient standard,\" under which the physician must disclose the nature of the procedure, all of the risks of the procedure, and the alternatives that a reasonable patient would consider relevant to the patient's decision. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 F.2d 772",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "Canterbury introduced the newer standard of disclosure, the \"reasonable patient standard,\" under which the physician must disclose the nature of the procedure, all of the risks of the procedure, and the alternatives that a reasonable patient would consider relevant to the patient's decision. See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 540 A.2d 504; Wheeldon , 374 N.W. 2d at 375; 379 A.2d 1014; 606 P.2d 554; 49 A.3d 180; 928 A.2d 672. et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 P.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "Canterbury introduced the newer standard of disclosure, the \"reasonable patient standard,\" under which the physician must disclose the nature of the procedure, all of the risks of the procedure, and the alternatives that a reasonable patient would consider relevant to the patient's decision. See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wheeldon , 374 N.W. 2d at 375; 379 A.2d 1014; 606 P.2d 554; 49 A.3d 180; 928 A.2d 672. et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 A.2d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1; 540 A.2d 504; Wheeldon , 374 N.W. 2d at 375; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 606 P.2d 554; 49 A.3d 180; 928 A.2d 672. et seq. (2011) (conception); North Dakota NDCC 12.1-17.1-02 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 A.2d 1014",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1; 540 A.2d 504; Wheeldon , 374 N.W. 2d at 375; 379 A.2d 1014; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 49 A.3d 180; 928 A.2d 672. et seq. (2011) (conception); North Dakota NDCC 12.1-17.1-02 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "606 P.2d 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "See, e.g. 502 P.2d 1; 540 A.2d 504; Wheeldon , 374 N.W. 2d at 375; 379 A.2d 1014; 606 P.2d 554; 49 A.3d 180; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. et seq. (2011) (conception); North Dakota NDCC 12.1-17.1-02 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 A.2d 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "Some states still adhere to the \"professional standard\" of negligence in obtaining a consent for a medical procedure. See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Laui v. NYU Hospital Center , 133 AD. 3d 830, 832 (N.Y. App. Div.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 So.2d 1261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "3d 830, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 943 P.2d 423; GA Code ANN. §31-9-6.1 (Georgia Statutory Law); 42 P.3d 228. In \"professional standard\" jurisdictions, in order to establish the standard of care with respect to the physician's duty to disclose before taking a consent, the plaintiff patient must have an expert testify to what the accepted standard was in the profession.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 So.2d 1150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "3d 830, 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); 479 So.2d 1150; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; GA Code ANN. §31-9-6.1 (Georgia Statutory Law); 42 P.3d 228. In \"professional standard\" jurisdictions, in order to establish the standard of care with respect to the physician's duty to disclose before taking a consent, the plaintiff patient must have an expert testify to what the accepted standard was in the profession.",
		"citation_value_orig": "943 P.2d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Traditional Standards Applicable to Required Disclosures Made by a Physician Before Obtaining Consent for a Medical Procedure",
		"context": "Div. 2015); 479 So.2d 1150; 943 P.2d 423; GA Code ANN. §31-9-6.1 (Georgia Statutory Law); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In \"professional standard\" jurisdictions, in order to establish the standard of care with respect to the physician's duty to disclose before taking a consent, the plaintiff patient must have an expert testify to what the accepted standard was in the profession. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "42 P.3d 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review",
		"context": "App. 92a. This holding follows directly from this Court's seminal holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that an explicit reservation of tribal rights in land implies the reservation of water rights necessary to their use. \"Just as the land on th e Belknap Reservation [in Win- ters] would have been worthless without water to 25 irrigate the arid land, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "207 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review",
		"context": "Second, the attack questions the factbound appli- cation of settled law. This Court enunciated the Win- ters doctrine over a century ago, and has reaffirmed it repeatedly. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 373 U.S. 546. The relevance of the doctrine to fishing rights under the Stevens Treaties was ce- mented in Fishing Vessel , which relied on Arizona v. California (a Winters case) for the \"central principle\" that the Treaties reserve fisheries to the tribes suffi-cient for a moderate living. 443 U.S. at 686.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The State's Attack on the Court of Appeals' Alternate Holding Suggests No Basis for this Court's Review",
		"context": "Second, the attack questions the factbound appli- cation of settled law. This Court enunciated the Win- ters doctrine over a century ago, and has reaffirmed it repeatedly. See, e.g., 426 U.S. 128; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The relevance of the doctrine to fishing rights under the Stevens Treaties was ce- mented in Fishing Vessel , which relied on Arizona v. California (a Winters case) for the \"central principle\" that the Treaties reserve fisheries to the tribes suffi-cient for a moderate living. 443 U.S. at 686.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Declining to Prohibit Private Religious Exercise Does Not Create Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841 (quoting Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250) . And time and again, the Court has reiterated that merely tolerating the latter does not implicate Establishment Clause concerns that justify the suppression of private religious speech. See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-19; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 838-46; Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761 -70; Lamb's Chapel , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-53; Widma r, 454 U.S. at 270- 75. Simply put, the Establishment Clause does not require the government to do what the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses forbid or \" compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partake s of the religious. \" Van 545 U.S. 677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Declining to Prohibit Private Religious Exercise Does Not Create Establishment Clause Concerns",
		"context": "See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 113-19; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 838-46; Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 761 -70; Lamb's Chapel , 508 U.S. 38; Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250-53; Widma r, 454 U.S. at 270- 75. Simply put, the Establishment Clause does not require the government to do what the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses forbid or \" compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partake s of the religious. \" Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The relevant clauses of the First Amendment are not on a collision course and do not put government officials between a rock and a hard place. To the contrary, there is ample \"play in the joints\" if the government recognizes private religious speech for what it is: constitutionally protected activity that the government may neither prohibit n or abridge, not an Establishment Clause violation waiting to happen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "asion. The Respondents' reliance on Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is equally misplaced. Like the Ninth Circuit, they contend that Kaiser Aetna illustrates that the facts of the present case require the use of \"a multi-factor regulatory takings analysis under Penn Central .\" BIO at 12; see also Cedar Point 923 F.3d 524.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "The Respondents' reliance on Kaiser 444 U.S. 164, is equally misplaced. Like the Ninth Circuit, they contend that Kaiser Aetna illustrates that the facts of the present case require the use of \"a multi-factor regulatory takings analysis under Penn Central .\" BIO at 12; see also Cedar Point [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, Kaiser Aetna was clearly not a Penn Central case. InKaiser Aetna , the United States brought an action against the owners of a marina.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "In the pivotal passage of the decision, the Court reasoned as follows: In this case, we hold that the \"right to exclude,\" so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and in 317 U.S. 369. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. See 328 U.S. 256; Portsmouth 260 U.S. 327.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "In the pivotal passage of the decision, the Court reasoned as follows: In this case, we hold that the \"right to exclude,\" so universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right, falls within this category of interests that the Government cannot take without compensation. This is not a case in which the Government is exercising its regulatory power in a manner that will cause an insubstantial devaluation of petitioners' private property; rather, the imposition of the navigational servitude in this context will result in an actual physical invasion of the privately owned marina. Compare 444 U.S. 51, and in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. See 328 U.S. 256; Portsmouth 260 U.S. 327.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 U.S. 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "Compare 444 U.S. 51, and in 317 U.S. 369. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Portsmouth 260 U.S. 327. Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 179-180 (emphasis added). The citations given in that passage, which twice mentions physical invasions, are decisive as to what kind of taking analysis underlies Kaiser Aetna .",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "Compare 444 U.S. 51, and in 317 U.S. 369. And even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay just compensation. See 328 U.S. 256; Portsmouth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Kaiser Aetna , 444 U.S. at 179-180 (emphasis added). The citations given in that passage, which twice mentions physical invasions, are decisive as to what kind of taking analysis underlies Kaiser Aetna .",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Kaiser Aetna Was Not Decided As A Penn Central Regulatory Taking; The Easement Was Treated As An Imposed Physical Invasion",
		"context": "3-11. While Kaiser Aetna at one point (444 U.S. at 174- 75) acknowledges the takings law principles \"recently pointed out\" in Penn Central and says later (id. at 178) that the public access claimed by the government is a taking \"under the logic\" of Penn Central 's progenitor, Pennsylvania Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Kaiser Aetna clearly was not decided on the basis of a Penn Central multifactor regulatory takings analysis. It was decided on the principle that a permanent physical invasion is a taking. See Lucas , 505 U.S. at 1029.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. NAACP's Holding and Analysis Apply to All Circumstances of Potential Retribution for Exercising Freedom of Association",
		"context": "Id. at 1010 (quoting John Doe No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 16 As the Ninth Circuit recognized in University of Washington , non-violent harassment is as capable of chilling First Amendment freedoms as physical force. Indeed, as the California Atto rney General full well knows, activists who suppo rt same-sex marriage targeted the former CEO of Mozilla and forced him to resign his job after discovering that he had donated $1,000 to California Proposition 8.5 Activists likewise targeted the Artistic Director of the California Musical Theater, who was for ced to resign his job once his $1,000 donation to Proposition 8 was publicly disclosed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under a flexible and fact-bound inquiry, a subjective parental agreement is not categorically necessary",
		"context": "Because it is a question of pure fact, a district court's determination of habitual residence should be reviewed on appeal for clear error. That conclusion re- mains unchanged even if such determinations invo lve mixed questions of law and fact. As this Court ex-plained in U.S. Bank National [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the standard of appellate review for a mixed question depends \"on whether answering it entails primarily legal or factual work.\" Id. at 967.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Under a flexible and fact-bound inquiry, a subjective parental agreement is not categorically necessary",
		"context": "Indeed, courts of other contracting states to the Convention, including the Supreme Court of Can- ada and the Court of Appeal of the High Court of H ong Kong, agree that trial -court determinations of habitual residence should be reviewed deferentially on appeal. ARGUMENT This case presents two questions: first, the standard of appellate review applicable to a district court's deter- mination of a child's habitual residence under the Con-vention, and second, whether a court must find a sub- jective parental agreement as part of that determina-tion. In U.S. Bank National [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court ex- plained that for mixed questions of law and fact, the standard of appellate review depends on whether apply- ing the substantive rule of decision \"entails primarily legal or factual work .\" Id. at 967.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Auer Undermines the APA's Important Safeguards of the Public Interest",
		"context": "The APA requires that agencies engage in deliberative lawmaking. Notice-and-comment rulemaking is grounded in \"notions of fairness\" because it promotes \"informed administrative decisionmaking\" by allowing an agency to enact regulations \"only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Notice-and-comment rulemaking provides regulated entities with a vital opportunity to help shape the administrative decisions that affect them, and they have the opportunity to present evidence and make policy arguments to support their position on proposed regulations. Notice-and-comment (and the agency's response to comments) encourage such deliberative rulemaking, or at least afford the public (and a court) to ferret out arbitrary and capricious agency action.4 4 As Justice Scalia expla ined, aband oning Seminole Rock /Auer deference would still leave \"[t]he agency .",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Auer Undermines the APA's Important Safeguards of the Public Interest",
		"context": "Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1213 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphas is added). 14 Auer eviscerates rates a fundamental protection of the APA by allowing agencies to resolve ambiguity5 by reinterpreting regulations instead of using the APA's noticeand-comment requirements to amend them. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] drafts the substantive rules that are the object of those interpretations, givingthem deference allows the agency to control the extent of its notice-and-comment-free domain.\"). The requirement of notice-andcomment rulemaking (see 5 U.S.C. § 553) is among the APA's chief \"safeguards.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Auer Undermines the APA's Important Safeguards of the Public Interest",
		"context": "The requirement of notice-andcomment rulemaking (see 5 U.S.C. § 553) is among the APA's chief \"safeguards.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 632",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "43 -53. That contention is incorrect and the anal- ogy to racial discrimination is fundamentally inapposite . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court observed that it \" has consistently repudiated 'distinc- tions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality.' \" Id. at 11 (br ack- ets and citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "at 11 (br ack- ets and citation omitted). Reflecting the fact that race - based distinctions often are rooted in beliefs that one race is superior to another, see ibid. , nearly all such dis- tinctions are invidious classifications that \"seldom pro- vide a relevan t basis fo r disparate treatment, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So even if, for example, an employer refuses to hire both white and black applicants in inter- racial marriages, it violates Title VII because it has treated each subset of applicants (white applicants with black spouses and black applicants with white spouses) worse than a similarly situated subset of a different race 29 (i.e., black applicants with black spouses and white ap- plicants with white spouses, respectively). See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "103 (Lynch, J., dissenting). As this Court has recognized, \"[p]hysical differences between men and women are enduring\" and \" 'the two sexes are not fungible.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, those differences may even \"require alterations\" to pre- viously sex -neutral policies to make them sex -specific. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "But no ordinary speaker of English would call an employer who refuses to hire an applicant in a same -sex relationship a sexist. D. Congress Has Ratified The Settled Understanding That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Because Of Sexual Orientation This Court has long held that \"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpreta- tion of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re -enacts a statute without change.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Texas Department of Housing & Community 135 S. Ct. 2507 , for example, the Court observed that in 1988, when Con gress amended the Fair Housing Act (FHA) , 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "D. Congress Has Ratified The Settled Understanding That Title VII Does Not Prohibit Discrimination Because Of Sexual Orientation This Court has long held that \"Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpreta- tion of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re -enacts a statute without change.\" 434 U.S. 575 . In Texas Department of Housing & Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for example, the Court observed that in 1988, when Con gress amended the Fair Housing Act (FHA) , 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq. , it \"was aware of th[e] unanimous precedent\" of the courts of appeals holding th at the FHA authorized disparate -impact claims, and \"with that understanding, [Congress] made a considered judgm ent to retain the relevant statutory text.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "That express recognition belies any \"in- ference that the existing legislation already incorpo- rated the offered change.\" Pension Benefit Guar. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The argument for congressional ratification of the uniform interpretation of Title VII's language is partic- ularly strong here because the 1991 amendments ex- pressly abrogated several decisions that Congress be- lieved had \"sha rply cut back on the scope and effective- ness\" of the statute. 557 U.S. 557, and for mixed -motive claims in response to Price Wa- terhouse , see 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "496 U.S. 633. The argument for congressional ratification of the uniform interpretation of Title VII's language is partic- ularly strong here because the 1991 amendments ex- pressly abrogated several decisions that Congress be- lieved had \"sha rply cut back on the scope and effective- ness\" of the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and for mixed -motive claims in response to Price Wa- terhouse , see 42 U.S.C. 2000e -2(m) and 2000e -5(g)(2). Yet Congress let stand the unan imous interpretation of the statute as excluding claims of sexual -orientation dis- crimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "3 -4, supra . Congress \"has not been shy\" about amending anti- discrimination statutes to disapprove judicial or admin- istrative interpretations that it deems unduly narrow. General Dynamics Land Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Title VII is no exception, as the 1991 amendments demonstrate. In addition, Congress re- acted swiftly to this Court's decision in General Electric 429 U.S. 125, to make clear that 33 \"[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' in- clude, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute improper associational discrimination",
		"context": "General Dynamics Land Sys., 540 U.S. 581. Title VII is no exception, as the 1991 amendments demonstrate. In addition, Congress re- acted swiftly to this Court's decision in General Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to make clear that 33 \"[t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' in- clude, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions .\" 92 Stat. 2076.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. LAMBERT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT POSTPONE OR RESET THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
		"context": "While this Court has held that a motion for reconsideration can postpone a deadline to appeal, thatrule only applies if the motion is timely filed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this context, a motion for reconsideration is \"timely\" only if it is filed before the deadline to appeal expires. Healy , 376 U.S. at 77–78 (\"[A] timely petition 44 for rehearing by the Government filed within the permissible time for appeal renders the judgment not final for purposes of appeal until the Court disposes of the petition.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. LAMBERT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT POSTPONE OR RESET THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
		"context": "In this context, a motion for reconsideration is \"timely\" only if it is filed before the deadline to appeal expires. Healy , 376 U.S. at 77–78 (\"[A] timely petition 44 for rehearing by the Government filed within the permissible time for appeal renders the judgment not final for purposes of appeal until the Court disposes of the petition.\" (emphasis added)); United States v.Ibarra, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] deadline, includingthe Ninth Circuit below, has held that only a timely motion for reconsideration—i.e., one filed within the14-day window in Rule 23(f)—can toll the deadline. Blair, 181 F.3d at 837 (\"[A] motion for reconsiderationtolls the time for appeal, provided that the motion ismade within the time for appeal. \"); Gutierrez, 523 F.3d at 193 (\"We stress that, for the purpose of tolling thetime within which to file a Rule 23(f) petition, a 'timely'motion to reconsider is one that is filed within the [14]-day period set forth in Rule 23(f).",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. LAMBERT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DID NOT POSTPONE OR RESET THE RULE 23(f) DEADLINE",
		"context": ". then appeal mustwait until the final judgment. \"); McNamara, 410 F.3d at 281; Nucor Corp., 760 F.3d at 343; Carpenter , 456 F.3d at 1191; Fleischman , 639 F.3d at 31; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Lambert , 870 F.3d at 1178. Here, there is no dispute that Lambert's motion was filed after the Rule 23(f) deadline had expired. 45 Specifically, it is undisputed that Lambert did not file a motion for reconsideration until March 12, 2015, eventhough the 14-day deadline under Rule 23(f) expired onMarch 6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 F.3d 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Common Law Would Not Support Fraud Liability Here",
		"context": "First , the common law holds that no person has unique knowledge of what the law requires. Instead, \"[t]he law is presumed to be equa lly wit hin the knowledge of a ll parties.\" Up [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So \"[a] repres entation of wh at the law will or will not perm it to be d one is one on w hich the party to whom it is made has no right to rely; an d if 6 The rejection of fraud liability for misrep resen tations of law has been consistently recognized, from early English cases, see Eaglesfield v. Marquis of Londonde rry, [1876] 4 Ch 693, 709-13, through modern American commentary, D an B. Dobbs et al. , The Law of Torts § 677 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Common Law Would Not Support Fraud Liability Here",
		"context": "It is, in other words, a prediction of what a court or regulator—an entity cloaked with governmental authority—will eventually declare the law to be. But \"fraud mu st relate to a pr esent or preexisting fact ,\" and cannot be predica ted on predic- tions as to \"the future .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (N.J. 1950 ). \"Representations , although fal se, concerning matters not susc eptible of act ual knowledge,\" like a prediction of some future author i- tative clarification of the law , \"have been held to be non-actionable .\" 25 N. E.2d 740.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 A.2d 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Common Law Would Not Support Fraud Liability Here",
		"context": "Resta tement (Second) of Torts § 54 5 cmt. d. Common-law sources across generations are fully in acco rd. E.g., Utah Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 334 P.2d 471 that make an express or implied statement of legal opinion (compliance with explicit legal re- quirements) false or misleading, there can be fraud. 579 U.S. at 181; see Restateme nt (Second) of Torts § 545 cmt. c. Additionally, a stateme nt of legal opi n- ion can support fraud liability \"if the maker of the repre sentati on purports to have special knowledge of the law that the recipient does not have.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "983 F.2d 1549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Argument That the Appalachian Trail Is Merely a \"Footpath\" or \"Right-of-Way\" Has No Legal Basis",
		"context": "Arguments that the Trail is a mere \"footpath\" or \"right- of-way,\" that the decision below undermines other right-of-way authorities, and that it conflicts with the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, were not presented to the panel below, only in petitions for rehearing. Because those petitions were denied without respon- sive briefing, this Court would hear those arguments for the first time. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 unit,\" they cannot deny that it is \"land\" in the National Park System. The NTSA clearly identifies the \"area[] of land\" the Park Service administ ers for the Appalachian Trail, as depicted on official maps \"in the office of the Director of the National Park Service.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Argument That the Appalachian Trail Is Merely a \"Footpath\" or \"Right-of-Way\" Has No Legal Basis",
		"context": "6. But this Co urt has recognized that land ownership does not determine whether land is \"in the National Park Sy stem.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (emphasis added). Moreover, for purposes of the MLA, the relevant distinction is whether the A ppalachian Trail is federally owned land \"in the National Park System.\" Petitioners effectively ask the Court to rewrite the MLA to exclude only federal \"land [owned in fee 30 simple by the Park Service] in the National Park System\" rather than federal \"land in the National Park System.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1066",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "It is well-established that the official obstacles to voter registration and turnout by blacks in Alabama have ended. And, the practi cal effect has been noted to be equal participation by blacks and whites. See Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Voting practices in Alabama today are vastly different from those that prevailed prior to the enactment of the Voting Rights Act . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Thus, in Alabama, polarization only occurs when whites refuse to support Democrats. That kind of under- standing of the conditions which warrant judicial intervention are not what builds public confidence in a judicial role. In ALGOP's view, that polarization can be explained best on the basis of policy choices of individuals (that are not race-based) favoring the Republicans, and not by any ALGOP efforts to limit participation in its affairs on the basis of race, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That blacks may choose Democrats over Republicans on the basis of the policy po sitions should give no basis for judicial intervention. Given the limited role of statistics in a § 2 results case, there would not be an inference from that data of what is the reason for the polarization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "In those days, there were two Democrats and five Republicans nominees filling the U.S. House seats. The district lines were established as a result of black legislators exercising their bargaining power in the Alabama legislature in the process of setting U.S. House lines. See, e.g, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2008, those State legislatively es tablished U.S. House lines resulted in the election of a third Democrat nominee. In other words, by 2008, the candidates of choice for black voters won 42% of the seats in Congress, but black voters comprised about 25% of the State's population.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 997",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Inst. 2005), available at https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/-exec utive-summary-of-the-bullockgaddie-expert-report-on- alabama_134411621012.pdf?x91208 (last visited April 27, 2022). Much of the expans ion came in the wake of the class action litigation initiated under the then new \"results\" test of § 2 of the Act, and captioned as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The affected lo cal governments resolved claims in large measure by consent decrees that ordered the creation of single member districts and an increase in the number of officeholders used in local governance. Though this Court later rejected the idea that vote dilution could be remedied by a court order requiring an increase in the number of elected officeholders in 512 U.S. 874, and thus called into doubt the Dillard remedial orders, see generally, 39 F. 3d 1494, there was no retrenchment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "640 F. Supp. 1347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Much of the expans ion came in the wake of the class action litigation initiated under the then new \"results\" test of § 2 of the Act, and captioned as 640 F. Supp. 1347. The affected lo cal governments resolved claims in large measure by consent decrees that ordered the creation of single member districts and an increase in the number of officeholders used in local governance. Though this Court later rejected the idea that vote dilution could be remedied by a court order requiring an increase in the number of elected officeholders in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and thus called into doubt the Dillard remedial orders, see generally, 39 F. 3d 1494, there was no retrenchment. Instead, in 2006, the legislature and its Democrat majorities, still composed of black members in leader-ship positions, eventually ratified the court orders by State statute. See Ala. Act No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 874",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Much of the expans ion came in the wake of the class action litigation initiated under the then new \"results\" test of § 2 of the Act, and captioned as 640 F. Supp. 1347. The affected lo cal governments resolved claims in large measure by consent decrees that ordered the creation of single member districts and an increase in the number of officeholders used in local governance. Though this Court later rejected the idea that vote dilution could be remedied by a court order requiring an increase in the number of elected officeholders in 512 U.S. 874, and thus called into doubt the Dillard remedial orders, see generally, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there was no retrenchment. Instead, in 2006, the legislature and its Democrat majorities, still composed of black members in leader-ship positions, eventually ratified the court orders by State statute. See Ala. Act No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "39 F. 3d 1494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Instead, in 2006, the legislature and its Democrat majorities, still composed of black members in leader-ship positions, eventually ratified the court orders by State statute. See Ala. Act No. 2006-252 (codified at Ala. Code §11-80-12); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court's canvas of factors recognized as bearing on the Section 2 inquiry here led to rejection of the State's argument that racially polarized voting implied something other than race-based decision- making. Thus, the court was unwilling to conclude that the pattern of blacks and whites supporting different candidates was \"attributable to politics.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "615 F. Supp. 2d 1292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "The district court in the 2020 NAACP case also made findings that partisan affiliation was not a proxy for race, but was based, by large majority, on an agree- ment with the issues of the political party. 2020 WL 583803 at 47–53 (discussing recent Alabama political history, and \"whether party is a proxy for race\"). The conclusions of the NAACP district court decision are consistent with a pattern of partisan motives driving elections noted over 25 years ago, when Democrats dominated Alabama politics, in the en banc decision of Eleventh Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the circuit court affirmed a finding that \"factors other than race, such as party politics and the availability of qualified candidates\" were driving the election results for judges. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F. 3d 1281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Moreover, the comment arises in the context of a ssessing the credibility of two senators (who had been wire d by the FBI) in assessing whether certain others, who were criminal defendants in a bribery scheme seeking to lift limits on gambling in Alabama, could be retried . The remark reflects a single Senator's private bias, and his supposed comments to one official colleague aimed, according to the court, at \"increasing Republican chances to take control of the state leg islature\" in the upcoming November 2010 elections. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the McGregor case, the court was clear that there was no indication that \"prosecutors in this case condoned or shared any of the biases of their coop- erating witnesses,\" id. at 1348.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F. Supp. 2d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The partisan effect of equal voter participation and opportunity better account, under the totality of the circumstances, for Alabama election results than does racial polarization",
		"context": "Though the court did not say so, there was no indication that the biases extended to other officials, including those of the State — or to ALGOP. A proper assessment of the \"totality of the circumstances\" under the Act would not treat this single, isolated remark as official discrimi- nation effecting State government administration. Compare Brnovich , 141 S. Ct. at 2349–50 (race-tinged start to debate does not mean \"legislature as a whole was imbued with racial motives\"), with, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, ALGOP urges the Court not find Alabama's old history of racial discrimination controlling in the \"totality of the circumstances.\" Over twenty-five years ago, Alabama's Constitution was revised to discard restrictions on voting established in 1901 by racially minded political leaders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What \"Additional Preventive Care\" They Should Mandate",
		"context": "Congress's grant of unbridled authority to HHS/HRSA to mandate cove rage of \"additional pre- ventive care and screenings\" raises serious constitu- tional concerns under the nondelegation doctrine. This Court has held repeatedly that Article I's grant of \"[a]ll legislative Powers\" to Congress means that Congress may not transfer to others \"powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Writ- ing for the Court, Chief Justice John Marshall ex- plained that while Congress may delegate to another branch of government the task of \"fill[ing] up the de-tails\" of legislation, Congress itself must perform the task of announcing overri ding general policies. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What \"Additional Preventive Care\" They Should Mandate",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2116. The Court has upheld congressional delegation of fact-finding responsibilities, so long as Congress makes clear in advance the policy determinations that will flow from specific factual findings. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But where, as here, Congress has delegated to others au thority to adopt binding laws without articulating any policies to guide the exercise of that authority—nor even establishing an intelligible principle underlying its delegation—the Court has struck down the delegation as a violation of Article I, § 1 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Panama Refining 293 U.S. 388.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What \"Additional Preventive Care\" They Should Mandate",
		"context": "See, e.g., 109 U.S. 385. But where, as here, Congress has delegated to others au thority to adopt binding laws without articulating any policies to guide the exercise of that authority—nor even establishing an intelligible principle underlying its delegation—the Court has struck down the delegation as a violation of Article I, § 1 of the Constitution. See, e.g., Panama Refining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Third Circuit sought to read into the ACA the requisite intelligible principle; it held that the Fi- nal Rule violated 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) by ex- panding the religious exemption and thereby reduc-ing the scope of the Contraceptive Mandate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "293 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ACA Includes No Intelligible Principle to Guide the Agencies in Determining What \"Additional Preventive Care\" They Should Mandate",
		"context": "Given these broad exemptions, Congress could not possibly have intended the word \"comprehensive\" to mean that every employer must be requ ired to provide coverage for the \"additional preventive care\" to be listed in HRSA's guidelines. Nor can the appeals court plausi- bly argue that Congress intended the exemptions ex- pressly granted by the ACA to be the only permissible exemptions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the Third Circuit failed to come to grips with an underlying inconsistency in its statu- tory interpretation. It held that the religious exemp- tions created by the Final Rule violated the ACA be- cause the ACA does not permit HHS to establish ex-emptions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "See p p. 36-37, supra. Peti- tioner therefore relies (Br. 49 -51) on two Board decisions as reflecting prior contrary positions , only one of which —In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —is pertinent . The Board in Mendoza -Hernandez , supra, however, reasonably explained why Camarillo —which this Court abrogated in Pereira —was wrong. In Camarillo , the Board concluded that Section 1229b(d)(1)'s stop -time rule was triggered by service of an NTA —i.e., a \"document\" styled as a \"notice to ap- pear\" —even if the NTA \"d[id] not include the date and time of the initial hearing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 I. & N. Dec. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "But this Court has repeatedly applied the Chevron framework to sustain the Board's interpretation of ambiguous INA provisions, including provisions addressing relief from removal. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Aguirre -Aguirre , 526 U.S. at 424 -432. See also 573 U.S. 41. Those decisi ons resolving ambiguities by according deference to the agency's position refute pe-titioner's suggestion that uncertainty must be resolved in his favor.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "Petitioner's reliance (Br. 46) on decisions predating Chevron by decades are plainly 10 Petitioner also relies (Br. 15, 32, 49) on a footnote in In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which adds noth- ing to Camarillo . Citing Camarillo , that footnote stated —in dict a —that Section 1229b(d)(1) \"affords 'stop -time' effect to a single instrument —the [NTA] that is the subject of the proceedings.\" Ibid .",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 I. & N. Dec. 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "47 inapposite. And although petitioner heavily relies (Br. 46-47) on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court there rested its holding on the presumption against ret-roactivity, concluding that its application left \"no ambi- guity\" under Chevron for the Board to resolve. Id . at 321 n.45; see id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "51 -52) that deference should not extend to questions of statutory construction or formal agency adjudicat ory decisions fundamentally misunde rstands the \"theoretical foundations \" of defer- ence . Chevron deference applies where Congress has delegated authority to an agency to \"speak with the force of law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see, e.g., City of 569 U.S. 290. \"[A] very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorization [] to enga ge in the process of adjudication that pro- duces rulings for which deference is claimed .\" Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "51 -52) that deference should not extend to questions of statutory construction or formal agency adjudicat ory decisions fundamentally misunde rstands the \"theoretical foundations \" of defer- ence . Chevron deference applies where Congress has delegated authority to an agency to \"speak with the force of law .\" 533 U.S. 218 ; see, e.g., City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] very good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment [is] express congressional authorization [] to enga ge in the process of adjudication that pro- duces rulings for which deference is claimed .\" Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "Not only does t hat expan- sive statutory delegation itself make it \"clear that prin- ciples of Chevron deference\" apply, ibid. ; \"deference in the immigration context is of special importance, for ex- ecutive officials ' exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the application of Chevron in the immigration context might be reconsidered. But given the express and longstanding conferral of interpretive author- ity on the Attorney General and the \"well settled\" application of Chevron deference to the Board as the Attorney General's delegee, Negusie , 555 U.S. at 516- 517, petitioner's limited submission falls far short of providing the \"special justification\" needed to warrant overruling this Court's numerous relevant precedents. M 572 U.S. 782.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Board's reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference",
		"context": "\" 555 U.S. 511 that the application of Chevron in the immigration context might be reconsidered. But given the express and longstanding conferral of interpretive author- ity on the Attorney General and the \"well settled\" application of Chevron deference to the Board as the Attorney General's delegee, Negusie , 555 U.S. at 516- 517, petitioner's limited submission falls far short of providing the \"special justification\" needed to warrant overruling this Court's numerous relevant precedents. M [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be af- firmed. Respectfully submitted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied This Court's Exacting Scrutiny Standard",
		"context": "of Trs. of State Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])—one that \"avoid[s] unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms,\" Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25, and does not \"b roadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved,\" Shelton , 364 U.S. at 488. Here, where the \"evidence plainly show[ed] at least the possibility\" that the disclosure requirement might burden associ-ational activity, Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Ninth Circuit Misapplied This Court's Exacting Scrutiny Standard",
		"context": "Supp. Excerpts of Record, at SER134, Ams. for Prosperity [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], ECF No. 27. Yet the Ninth Circuit would have an organization pro-vide even more compelling evidence to show a \"reason- able probability\" of public disclosure and its conse- quences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1000",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California 2020: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Prop. 16",
		"context": "Pretending otherwise only \"perpetu- ate[s] the stereotype that minorities and women can't make it unless they ge t special preferences.\" 45 It took 43 Id. 44 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Roberts, C.J. ) (2007) (\"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.\"). 45 Ward Connerly, Gail Heriot & Betty Tom Chu, Argument Against Proposition 16, Official Voter Information Guide: Califor-nia General Election: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 29 (2020), https:// vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2020/gene ral/pdf/complete-vig.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. California 2020: Electorate Refuses to Reauthorize Public Discrimination by Defeating Prop. 16",
		"context": "Pretending otherwise only \"perpetuate[s] the stereotype that minorities and women can't make it unless they get special preferences.\" 47 I t t o o k n o great insight to admit these points, while also admitting that California also has men and women—of all races and ethnicities—who could use a little extra 45 Id. 46 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Roberts, C.J. ) (2007) (\"The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.\"). 47 Ward Connerly, Gail Heriot & Betty Tom Chu, Argument Against Proposition 16, Official Voter Information Guide: California General Election: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 29 (2020), https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/20 20/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute prohibited sex stereotyping",
		"context": "Sexual -orientation discrimination also does not im- properly discriminate based on sex stereotypes. Sex stereo typing is not a freestanding violation of Title VII; instead, it is forbidden only insofar as it results in \" dis- parate treatment of men and women.\" Manhart , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at 707 n.13 (emphasis added ; citation omitted ); see Witt- mer, 915 F.3d at 339 (Ho, J., concurring) (observing that \"under Price Waterhouse , sex stereotyping is actiona- ble only to the extent it provides evidence of favoritism of one sex over the other\") . As the Price Waterhouse plurality explained, \"sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employ- ment decision,\" but \"can certainly be evidence that gen- der played a part.\" 490 U.S. at 251; see 332 F.3d 1058, overruled by Hively , supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute prohibited sex stereotyping",
		"context": "Manhart , 435 U.S. 24 at 707 n.13 (emphasis added ; citation omitted ); see Witt- mer, 915 F.3d at 339 (Ho, J., concurring) (observing that \"under Price Waterhouse , sex stereotyping is actiona- ble only to the extent it provides evidence of favoritism of one sex over the other\") . As the Price Waterhouse plurality explained, \"sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employ- ment decision,\" but \"can certainly be evidence that gen- der played a part.\" 490 U.S. at 251; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled by Hively , supra . Accordingly , \"employment decisions cannot be pred- icated on mere 'stereotyped' impressions about the char- acteristics of males or females ,\" such as \"[m]yths and purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work \" that result in an indi- vidual woman's being treated worse than a similarly sit- uated man. Manhart , 435 U.S. at 707.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 1058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute prohibited sex stereotyping",
		"context": "To be clear , Title V II prohibits disparate treatment of men and women regardless of sexual orientation. Gay, lesbian , and bisexual employees, no less than straight employees, may invoke Price Waterhouse if they are subjected to gender -based stereotypes ; a gay man who is fired for being too effeminate has just as strong a claim as a straight man who is fired for that reason. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[G]ay, lesbian, and bisexual individuals do not have less protection under Price Waterhouse against traditional gender stereotype discrimination than do heterosexual individuals.\" 852 F.3d 195.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Discrimination because of sexual orientation does not constitute prohibited sex stereotyping",
		"context": "As in all Title VII cases, determining those answers may require resolving difficult and contested factual is- sues. But that neither make s the statute unworkable nor justifies judicially rewriting the statute to avoid such difficulties . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And although Bostock asserts that courts have \"gone off the tracks\" in applying Price Waterhouse , 17-1618 Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Insanity Defense Reflects The Core Values And Long Historical Tradition Of Anglo-American Criminal Law",
		"context": "§ 22-3220 \"abandons lack of ability to know right from wrong as a defense\" and \"allows conviction of an individual who had no capacity to know that what he or she was doing was wrong.\" J.A. 243-44 (citing in part [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 In 1716, a legal treatise explaine d that \"Guilt of offending against any Law whatsoever, necessarily su pposing a willful Disobedience thereof, can never justly be imputed to those who are … uncapable of understanding it\" and thus \"those who are under a natural Disability of distinguishing between Good and Evil, as Infants under the Age of Discretion, Ideots and Lunaticks, are not punishable by any criminal Prosecution whatsoever.\" I William Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown , 1-2 (1716) (cleaned up).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 1038",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Insanity Defense Reflects The Core Values And Long Historical Tradition Of Anglo-American Criminal Law",
		"context": "ABA Criminal Justice Men tal Health Standards 336 (1989) (quoting M'Naghten's Case , 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843)); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Underlying the M'Naghten formulation was the premise that a defendant must \"possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,\" 8 Eng. Rep. at 722, a presumption to which the insanity defense responds, and a presumption that, in the vast majority of criminal prosecutions, goes unrebutted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Offended Observer\" Standing Harms Minority Religions Like Judaism",
		"context": "While many Christian symbols and practices are a familiar feature of American life, 9 many Jewish practices are not and may still be considered unusual by many Amer- icans. \"Offended observer\" standing thus threatens to subject religious minorities like Jews to a dispropor-tionate number of legal challenges to their public reli-gious practices, contrary to one of the very goals of the First Amendment. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Expansive standing for Establishment Clause claims also has important consequences for accommo-dation of religious minorities, including Jews. Despite perceived tension between the Establishment Clause 9 For instance, the federal go vernment recognizes Christmas Day as a federal holiday, but reco gnizes no other religiously based holidays.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Offended Observer\" Standing Harms Minority Religions Like Judaism",
		"context": "16 and religious accommodation, this Court has long rec- ognized the validity of state accommodation of religious practices. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The State may 'ac-commodate' the free exercise of religion by relieving people from generally applic able rules that interfere with their religious callings. Contrary to the views of some, such accommodation does not necessarily signify an official endorsement of religious observance over disbelief.\" (citations omitted)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Offended Observer\" Standing Harms Minority Religions Like Judaism",
		"context": "(citations omitted)). And this Court has long embraced government accommodation of religion, go-ing so far as to praise it as in \"the best of our tradi-tions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Religious minorities therefore rely on the government's authority to provide tailored religious accommodations within the bounds of the Establishment Clause. Practitioners of Judaism have sought government accommodations for a variety of religious practices, from physical movement on the Sabbath, to Kosher meals, to observance of Jewish holidays.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Offended Observer\" Standing Harms Minority Religions Like Judaism",
		"context": "Practitioners of Judaism have sought government accommodations for a variety of religious practices, from physical movement on the Sabbath, to Kosher meals, to observance of Jewish holidays. A notable ex-ample is the eruv, which is a visible physical \"ceremo- nial demarcation of an area\" typically constructed by enclosing a section of a town by hanging wires on preexisting municipal utility poles. See Tenafly Eruv [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. According to Jewish law, adherents may not carry objects—including keys, strollers, food, and chil-dren—outside their private residences on the Sabbath, but they may move freely within the area enclosed by an eruv, which notably facilitates their journey to and from synagogue on the Sabbath. In efforts to accom-modate the Jewish religious minority, numerous munic- 17 ipal governments have approved construction of eruvs within their city limits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 F.3d 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees",
		"context": "Yet although the rule is easily stated, satisfying the \"similarly situated\" test is no t always simple. Cf. Ala. Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At least three principles guide this inquiry. First , as long as \"[t]he class defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one,\" 355 U.S. 466, identifying similarly situated taxpayers \"must focus on the nature of the classification\" a challenged tax statute itself draws , viewed in context with \"the whole 40 tax structure of the state. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees",
		"context": "Ala. Dep't of 135 S. Ct. 1136. At least three principles guide this inquiry. First , as long as \"[t]he class defined is not an arbitrary or invidiously discriminatory one,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], identifying similarly situated taxpayers \"must focus on the nature of the classification\" a challenged tax statute itself draws , viewed in context with \"the whole 40 tax structure of the state. \" Phillips Chem. , 361 U.S. at 383; see also Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees",
		"context": "of Fresno , 429 U.S. at 464) . Third , it is not enough to show kinship with some set of state employees; the federal employee must be 42 treated differently than the most comparable class of state employees. In the dormant commerce clause context, for instance, \"any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities, \" Gen. Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and a court may reject a challenger's proposed comparison class where the entity is in fact more similar to another , id. at 300 -01 (analyzing 366 U.S. 199). Similarly, plaintiffs bear the burden under Title VII3 to show they received different treatment than similarly s ituated employees , see, e.g., Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees",
		"context": "Third , it is not enough to show kinship with some set of state employees; the federal employee must be 42 treated differently than the most comparable class of state employees. In the dormant commerce clause context, for instance, \"any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities, \" Gen. Motors 519 U.S. 278 , and a court may reject a challenger's proposed comparison class where the entity is in fact more similar to another , id. at 300 -01 (analyzing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Similarly, plaintiffs bear the burden under Title VII3 to show they received different treatment than similarly s ituated employees , see, e.g., Tex. Dep't of Cmty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Intergovernmental Tax Immunity Doctrine Is Not Violated Under Any Theory Because Mr. Dawson Is Not Similarly Situated To The Exempt State Retirees",
		"context": ", 361 U.S. at 383 , Section 12(c)(6)'s limited scope makes clear that West Virginia 's choice to designate specific state retirement plans was not pretextual or the functional equivalent of a blanket or otherwise broadly applicable tax exemption . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 79 -82 (Mo. 1989 ) (striking down exemption scheme scattered throughout state retirement plan statutes that, taken together, had the effect of exempting all state —but no federal —retirees' income). Similarly, the distinctions Section 12(c)(6) draws are not a \"cloak for discrimination,\" Barker , 503 U.S. at 605, becaus e there is no suggestion that the statute is applied less than evenhandedly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "771 S.W.2d 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A defendant commits property fraud by scheming to obtain money or property, using a material misrepresentation, with intent to defraud",
		"context": "18 U.S.C. 1343. The ordinary meaning of \"money or property\" \"extend[s] to every species of val- uable right and interest,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —a definition that can clearly encompass contract funds. And a defendant \" ob- tains\" that property even if he provides consideration in return. In the contracting context, the materiality re- quirement requires the government to prove that a rea- sonable person would attach, or it was evident that the victim did attach, critical impo rtance to the existence or nonexistence of a misrepresented fact in determining his choice of action in the transaction —that is, that the misrepresentation went to the essence of the contract.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "Not all \"discrimination\" is unlawful. Defining w hat constitutes unlawful differential treatment, and a plaintiff's burden in establishing as much, are \"decision [s] for Congress to make.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In enacting SOX, Congress made those decisions, a s reflected in the statute's plain text : Differential treatment is unlawful when it is taken \"because of\" any of the acts specified in section 1514A (a)(1) –(2). And a plaintiff's burden to establish differential treatment \"because of\" one of those acts is the \"burden [] of proof set forth in section 4212 12(b) of Title 49 , United States Code .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "Br. in Opp. 16– 17 (citing Jackson , 544 U.S. at 173–74 (Title IX) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike SOX, though, the statutes cited by UBS do not 8 incorporate the AIR -21 burden -shifting framework . And as this Court has frequently recognized , Congress can assign different burdens to plaintiffs under different discrimination statutes .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "If, as Babb and Gross recognize, Congress is free to choose whether a plaintiff's burden is to show that a protected characteristic was the \"but -for\" cause of an employment action, was a \"motivating factor\" for such an action, or was merely considered adversely during the decision -making process, there is no reas on why Congress cannot require the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing that protected activity was a \"contributing factor,\" without also requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing retaliatory intent. That is what Congress did here : In enacting SOX, Congress made th e decision that \"the only proof of discriminatory intent that a plaintiff is required to show is that his or her protected activity was a 'contributing factor' in the resulting adverse employment action .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]708 F.3d 152503 U.S. 249 . Here, Congress specifie d that the \"burdens of proof\" for the parties in a secti on 1514A case are those set out in AIR-21, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2)(C) , and AIR -21 in turn sets out the \"required showing\" by an aggrieved employee, before the burden shifts to the employer , 49 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 F.3d 1189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "If, as Babb and Gross recognize, Congress is free to choose whether a plaintiff's burden is to show that a protected characteristic was the \"but -for\" cause of an employment action, was a \"motivating factor\" for such an action, or was merely considered adversely during the decision -making process, there is no reas on why Congress cannot require the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing that protected activity was a \"contributing factor,\" without also requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing retaliatory intent. That is what Congress did here : In enacting SOX, Congress made th e decision that \"the only proof of discriminatory intent that a plaintiff is required to show is that his or her protected activity was a 'contributing factor' in the resulting adverse employment action .\" 914 F.3d 1189[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]503 U.S. 249 . Here, Congress specifie d that the \"burdens of proof\" for the parties in a secti on 1514A case are those set out in AIR-21, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2)(C) , and AIR -21 in turn sets out the \"required showing\" by an aggrieved employee, before the burden shifts to the employer , 49 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "If, as Babb and Gross recognize, Congress is free to choose whether a plaintiff's burden is to show that a protected characteristic was the \"but -for\" cause of an employment action, was a \"motivating factor\" for such an action, or was merely considered adversely during the decision -making process, there is no reas on why Congress cannot require the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing that protected activity was a \"contributing factor,\" without also requiring the plaintiff to bear the burden of show ing retaliatory intent. That is what Congress did here : In enacting SOX, Congress made th e decision that \"the only proof of discriminatory intent that a plaintiff is required to show is that his or her protected activity was a 'contributing factor' in the resulting adverse employment action .\" 914 F.3d 1189708 F.3d 152[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, Congress specifie d that the \"burdens of proof\" for the parties in a secti on 1514A case are those set out in AIR-21, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (b)(2)(C) , and AIR -21 in turn sets out the \"required showing\" by an aggrieved employee, before the burden shifts to the employer , 49 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "Congress could have included retaliatory intent or motive as part of the required showing. Because i t did not, such a showing should not be read into the statute. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The context in which Congress enacted section 1514A and other statutes that adopt the contributing factor burden -shifting regime of AIR -21 and its predecessors make clear th at Congress purposely did not impose on plain tiffs the burden of establish ing retaliatory intent . See, e.g., 599 U.S. None.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "§ 1221(e). At that tim e, courts had held that \"proof of discriminatory motive is critical to establish a prima facie case of discrimination\" under discrimination a nd whistleblower protection statutes . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]813 F.2d 639; Wilcox 812 F.2d 1401987 WL 36561 .2 In enacting the Whistleblower Protection Act, Congress overrode this interpreta tion, based on its determination that requiring civil service whistle - blowers to show that their protected activity \"constituted a 'significant' or 'motivating' factor\" imposed an \"excessively heavy burden … on the employee .\" 2 F.3d 1137. This deliberate choice refle cted the view that , \"[r]egardless of the official 's motives, personnel actions against employees should quite simply not be based on protected activities such as whistleblowing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.2d 1401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "§ 1221(e). At that tim e, courts had held that \"proof of discriminatory motive is critical to establish a prima facie case of discrimination\" under discrimination a nd whistleblower protection statutes . 770 F.2d 1401[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wilcox 812 F.2d 1401987 WL 36561 .2 In enacting the Whistleblower Protection Act, Congress overrode this interpreta tion, based on its determination that requiring civil service whistle - blowers to show that their protected activity \"constituted a 'significant' or 'motivating' factor\" imposed an \"excessively heavy burden … on the employee .\" 2 F.3d 1137. This deliberate choice refle cted the view that , \"[r]egardless of the official 's motives, personnel actions against employees should quite simply not be based on protected activities such as whistleblowing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "813 F.2d 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "At that tim e, courts had held that \"proof of discriminatory motive is critical to establish a prima facie case of discrimination\" under discrimination a nd whistleblower protection statutes . 770 F.2d 1401813 F.2d 639; Wilcox 812 F.2d 1401987 WL 36561 .2 In enacting the Whistleblower Protection Act, Congress overrode this interpreta tion, based on its determination that requiring civil service whistle - blowers to show that their protected activity \"constituted a 'significant' or 'motivating' factor\" imposed an \"excessively heavy burden … on the employee .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This deliberate choice refle cted the view that , \"[r]egardless of the official 's motives, personnel actions against employees should quite simply not be based on protected activities such as whistleblowing.\" S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 1137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "S. Rep. No. 413, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1988) , quoted in Marano , 2 F.3d at 1141 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since 1989, Congress has incorporated the contributing factor burden -shifting standard in to several other statutes to eliminate judicial ly impos ed intent or motive requirements . For example, in 1992, Congress amended the Energy Reorganization Act \"to include a burden -shifting framework distinct from the 2 The Merit Systems Protection Board had also incorporated a motivating factor requirement for cases of reprisal under the Civil Service Reform Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "For example, in 1992, Congress amended the Energy Reorganization Act \"to include a burden -shifting framework distinct from the 2 The Merit Systems Protection Board had also incorporated a motivating factor requirement for cases of reprisal under the Civil Service Reform Act. See 8 M.S.P.B. 599,\" in order \"to make it easier for whistleblowers to prevail in their discrimination suits .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, in 1993, Congress amended the whistleblower protections of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which courts had previously interpreted as incorporating the same intent standard as Title VII, to incorporate the contributing factor burden of proof —an amendment that \"quite clearly ma[d]e it easier for the plaintiff to make her case under the statute\" by requiring only \"circumstantial evidence that her disclosure was a contributing (not necessarily a substantial or motivating) factor in the adverse personnel action.\" 152 F.3d 602.",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 F.3d 1098",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "174 F.3d 1098. Similarly, in 1993, Congress amended the whistleblower protections of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, which courts had previously interpreted as incorporating the same intent standard as Title VII, to incorporate the contributing factor burden of proof —an amendment that \"quite clearly ma[d]e it easier for the plaintiff to make her case under the statute\" by requiring only \"circumstantial evidence that her disclosure was a contributing (not necessarily a substantial or motivating) factor in the adverse personnel action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Again in 2000 when it enacted AIR -21, Congress used the \"contributing factor\" standard \"to protect whistleblowers\" in the airline industry by \"mak[ing] it difficult for employers to avoid paying damages in 'mixed -motive cases .'\" Ameris tar Airways, 771 F.3d 268.",
		"citation_value_orig": "152 F.3d 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "152 F.3d 602. Again in 2000 when it enacted AIR -21, Congress used the \"contributing factor\" standard \"to protect whistleblowers\" in the airline industry by \"mak[ing] it difficult for employers to avoid paying damages in 'mixed -motive cases .'\" Ameris tar Airways, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, in 2007, after incorporating the AIR -21 standard into SOX, Congress incorporat ed the 14 standard into the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) . In so doing, it \"impos ed a lower burden on the employee than existed previously [ for retaliation claims under that statute ], when the employee was required to show the protected activity had 'motivated ' the adverse action. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "771 F.3d 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "Likewise, in 2007, after incorporating the AIR -21 standard into SOX, Congress incorporat ed the 14 standard into the Surface Transportation Assistance Act (STAA) . In so doing, it \"impos ed a lower burden on the employee than existed previously [ for retaliation claims under that statute ], when the employee was required to show the protected activity had 'motivated ' the adverse action. \" Maverick Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See also Araujo , 708 F.3d at 159 –60 (noting legislative history of incorporation of AIR -21 standard into FRSA reflected that \"Congress intended to be protective of plaintiff -employees\"). The Second Circuit's view, essentially overriding Congress's decision not to require plaintiffs to establish retaliatory intent to prevail under this regime, runs counter to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that \"Congress remains free to alter what [the courts] have done.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "739 F.3d 1149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "See also Araujo , 708 F.3d at 159 –60 (noting legislative history of incorporation of AIR -21 standard into FRSA reflected that \"Congress intended to be protective of plaintiff -employees\"). The Second Circuit's view, essentially overriding Congress's decision not to require plaintiffs to establish retaliatory intent to prevail under this regime, runs counter to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that \"Congress remains free to alter what [the courts] have done.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. 386 U.S. 547. It also contravenes the principle that the courts' job is to apply the law that Congress has written.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There is no basis to disturb Congress's specification of the plaintiff's burden under section 1514A.",
		"context": "The Second Circuit's view, essentially overriding Congress's decision not to require plaintiffs to establish retaliatory intent to prevail under this regime, runs counter to the fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that \"Congress remains free to alter what [the courts] have done.\" 491 U.S. 164 ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It also contravenes the principle that the courts' job is to apply the law that Congress has written. 142 S. Ct. 1063.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": ". of criminal justice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 536 U.S. 584. But here, no conflict exists between the constitutionally man-dated procedures and a judicially administrable standard. 6 During the ten -year period between October 2009 and Septem- ber 2019, courts have imposed 4,480 ACCA sentences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": ". of criminal justice.\" 542 U.S. 296 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But here, no conflict exists between the constitutionally man-dated procedures and a judicially administrable standard. 6 During the ten -year period between October 2009 and Septem- ber 2019, courts have imposed 4,480 ACCA sentences.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "This represents just 5.9 percent of 4,480 ACCA sen- tences imposed. 28 necessary to satisfy a statutory standard. For exam- ple, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court held that the domestic relationship necessary to qualify a prior misdemeanor conviction for prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (prohibit- ing firearms possession by a person convicted of a mis- demeanor crime of domestic violence) must be estab- lished to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And the government conceded the same with respect to the amount of loss involved in a prior fraud conviction of- fered fo r sentencing enhancement in an illegal reentry prosecution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "§ 922(g)(9) (prohibit- ing firearms possession by a person convicted of a mis- demeanor crime of domestic violence) must be estab- lished to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. And the government conceded the same with respect to the amount of loss involved in a prior fraud conviction of- fered fo r sentencing enhancement in an illegal reentry prosecution. S ee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The courts of a ppeal have done so as well . See, e.g., 630 F.3d 1181, as amended on reh'g in part (2011) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "S ee 557 U.S. 29 . The courts of a ppeal have done so as well . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as amended on reh'g in part (2011) . These cases refle ct an understanding that j uries are well suited to make determinations about no n-el- emental facts surrounding a prior conviction . They are equally well suited to determin ing whether a de- fendant's prior convictions arose from multiple crimi-nal episodes separated by significant intervening events .",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 1181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "Cf. H.J. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Juries frequently apply general standards of this type to particular sets of facts. See, e.g., 576 U.S. 591.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "Having a jury make this determination is just as workable as the regime currently appli ed in the lower courts, which relies on the sentencing judge to make the different \"occasions\" determination. And i t avoid s the reversal of ACCA enhancements when sentencing courts rely on inadequate Shepard documents. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is also more reliable because s ending this issue to the jury expands the universe of evidence that can be relied upon in making the different \"occasions\" determination, which allow s for more accurate out- come s. And prosecutors are capable of gathering ad- missible evidence to establish the conduct involved in prior criminal activity, whether it must be presented to the sentencing judges or juries. 7 Evidence of prior crimes can be prejudicial, but courts are fully capable of devising procedures to avoid any unfairness to defendants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "789 F.3d 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "7 Evidence of prior crimes can be prejudicial, but courts are fully capable of devising procedures to avoid any unfairness to defendants. Cf. Old [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (judges apply- ing Federal Rule of Evidence 403 must balance com- peting concerns in a way that protects defendants 7 To the extent it is more onerous on prosecutors, that is no rea- son to disregard the Constitution's requirements. Cf. Cunning- 549 U.S. 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "Old 519 U.S. 172 (judges apply- ing Federal Rule of Evidence 403 must balance com- peting concerns in a way that protects defendants 7 To the extent it is more onerous on prosecutors, that is no rea- son to disregard the Constitution's requirements. Cf. Cunning- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Po- tential procedures to limit any unfairness could in-clude limiting instructions, or bifurcated proceedings where the risk of unfair prejudice is high. See 476 F.3d 767.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "Cunning- 549 U.S. 270. Po- tential procedures to limit any unfairness could in-clude limiting instructions, or bifurcated proceedings where the risk of unfair prejudice is high. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And some de- fendants may decide to waive the jury determination on this issue altogether, calculating that the risk of jury prejudice outweighs the benefit of allowing the jury to make this determination. See Shepard , 544 U.S. at 26 n.5 (\"[I]f the dissent turns out to be right that Apprendi will reach further, any defendant who feels that the risk of prejudice is too high can waive the right to have a jury decide questions about his prior convictions.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 F.3d 767",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "This is so be- cause , as the lower courts have administered the stat- ute, the judge ultimately determines whether the ACCA applies at sentencing. This means that p rose- cutors have no discretion to forgo seeking an ACCA sentence because the enhancement \"is not subject to governmental waiver or prosecutorial discretion .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Accordingly, many defendants 31 choose trial, viewing it as the best possi ble way to avoid a potential fifteen -year mandatory minimum. If this Court agrees that Apprendi applies to the differ- ent \"occasions\" requirement , prosecutors must alleg e different \"occasions\" in the indictment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.3d 1308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "Accordingly, many defendants 31 choose trial, viewing it as the best possi ble way to avoid a potential fifteen -year mandatory minimum. If this Court agrees that Apprendi applies to the differ- ent \"occasions\" requirement , prosecutors must alleg e different \"occasions\" in the indictment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But t he government could forgo charging the different \" occa- sions\" issue in exchange for a plea in appropriate cases , eliminating the sentencing court's authority to impose a n ACCA sentence. And prosecutors may well do so since the defendant would be subject to the crim- inal history rules that most defendants already face under the Sentencing Guidelines, and a guideline range that in many cases approaches the ten -year statutory maximum .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 625",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Requiring a jury determination of the different \"occasions\" inquiry provides a workable rule",
		"context": "When Congress enacted the ACCA, it had no rea- son to anticipate the need for a jury trial ; Apprendi lay years in the future. But that is true for all of the sentencing schemes in which this Court has vindi-cated Sixth Amendment rights. See, e.g., United 32 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And any pro- posed test for the different \"occasions \" inquiry re- quires fact -finding outside of the judgment of convic- tion and the elements of the offense. In other words, the lower courts' test s, like ours, equall y triggers the jury trial right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. At a Minimum, Security Interest Enforcers Are Liable for Violations of Section 1692f(6)",
		"context": "33 F.3d at 1224 n.4. All other courts that endors ed the narrow view of debt collection in the foreclosure context have agree d that the provisions of §1692f(6) apply to entities carrying out nonjudicial foreclosures. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All parties in Ho agreed that the trustee was a debt collector within the narrow scope of §1692f(6). Ho, 858 F.3d at 573.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 964",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Current Revisionist Challenge to Federal Authority Rests on Doctrinal Confusion and Incomplete Scholarship",
		"context": "at 48— in which, as discussed above, James Madison advance d an interpretation of the Indian Commerce Clause endorsing expanded federal authority \"unfettered\" by the protections of state authority in the Articles . Instead, to support 2 In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, this Court found that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, though a valid exercise of congressional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause, violated the Eleventh Amendment by attempting to abrogate state sovereign immunity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27 their revisionist conclusions, Plaintiffs proffer a handful of law review articles. Even then, this scholarship offers less than meets the eye .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Current Revisionist Challenge to Federal Authority Rests on Doctrinal Confusion and Incomplete Scholarship",
		"context": "Many subsequent commentators have criticized this atextual basis for claiming federal plenary power over tribes. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Robe rt N. Clinton, There Is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian Tribes, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 113 (2002); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law , 81 Minn. L. Rev. 31 (1996); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility , 89 Cornell L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Current Revisionist Challenge to Federal Authority Rests on Doctrinal Confusion and Incomplete Scholarship",
		"context": "Tex . at 23 .4 In prior cases, Justice Thomas has admirably reevaluated earlier tentative conclusions based on additional evidence of original constitutional understanding. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such reexamination is warranted here. Every scholar to examine the issue since Natelson's article —including those cited extensively and approvingly by Plaintiffs and their amici —has explicitly rejected his conclusions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": ". The automobile exception also rests on reduced expectations in privacy because \"'[a]utomobiles, unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls.'\" Carney , 471 U.S. at 392 (quoting South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). That pervasive regu lation reduces privacy expectations because \"[a]s an everyday occurrence, police stop and examine vehicles when license plates or inspection stickers have expired, or if other violations, such as exhaust fumes or excessive noise, are noted, or if headlights or other safety equipment are not in proper working order. \" Opperman , 428 U.S. at 368.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "For instance, illegal drugs carry not just reduced expectations of privacy but no reasonable expectation of privacy at all. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But police cannot search homes or curtilage for illegal drugs without a warrant. Horton , 496 U.S. at 137 n.7 (\"[E]ven where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a warrantless seizure.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "(noting the \"obviously public nature of automobile travel\"). But in Carney , the Court conclusively rejected that suggestion : \"These reduced expectations of privacy derive not from the fact that the area to be searched is in plain view,\" but rather from pervasive vehicle regulation. 471 U.S. at 392; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Anyway, automobiles parked within the curtilage are not \"travel[ing] public thoroughfares\"; they are stationed where the Fourth Amendment's privac y protections reach their peak. 26 detached garage that yielded 122 cases of bootleg whiskey for lack of a warrant).",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "26 detached garage that yielded 122 cases of bootleg whiskey for lack of a warrant). What is clearly true for pure contraband should be at least equally true for vehicles, which are after all still protected \"effects\" as \" that term is used in the [Fourth] Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Knotts and Karo illustrate how expectations of privacy in the home control over any reduced expecta tion of privacy in vehicles. Because \"[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, \" United States v. Knotts held that police did not need a warrant to track a car to a cabin using a beeper hidden in the car's cargo .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "Knotts and Karo illustrate how expectations of privacy in the home control over any reduced expecta tion of privacy in vehicles. Because \"[a] person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements, \" United States v. Knotts held that police did not need a warrant to track a car to a cabin using a beeper hidden in the car's cargo . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Significantly, the record in Knotts did \"not reveal that the beeper was used after the location in the area of the cabin had been initially determined.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Pervasive regulation does not diminish reasonable expectations of privacy in the home and curtilage",
		"context": "at 278 –79. In United States v. Karo , however, police continued monitoring the beeper after the c ar parked at a home . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By using \"an electronic device to obtain information that it could not have obtained by observation from ou tside the curtilage ,\" the police violated the expectation that our homes enjoy \"privacy free of governmen tal intrusion not authorized by a warrant .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "Cy p res serves important purposes in class action settlements, particularly in cases involving small claims. The cy pres doctrine takes its name from the Norman French term \"cy pres comme possible,\" meaning \"as near as possible.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Originally used as an equitable means of distributing trust fund assets when the trust's original purpose could not be achieved, the principles of cy pres have been applied to mod ern class action settlements. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.3d 1034",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "Stewart R. Sheph erd, Comment, Damage Distribution in Class Actions: The Cy Pres Remedy , 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 448, 448 (1972) ; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Significant growth of cy pres awards followed from approximately once per year between 1974 and 2000 to approximately eight per year between 2001 and 2008. Redish, 62 F LA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "Distributing the residual to class members that have already received full compensat ion would provide a windfall to those members. Susan Beth Farmer, More Lessons from the Laboratories: Cy Pres Distributions in Parens Patriae Antitrust Actions Brought by State Attorneys General , 68 F ORDHAM L. REV. 361, 393 (1999) (citing Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Returning unclaimed settlement funds would be equally inequitable. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 F.2d 812",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "Returning unclaimed settlement funds would be equally inequitable. Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Cy pres \"serves deterrence better than returning funds to the defendant; it avoids windfalls to class members, and it directs left -over funds in a way that creates some benefit to the class.\" Robert G. Bone, Justifying Class Action Limits: Parsing the Debate over Ascertainability and Cy Pres, 65 U. KAN. L. REV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "356 F.3d 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "913, 943 -44 (2017). Cy pres awards in class action settlements were envisioned to \" 'put[] the unclaimed fund to its next best compensation use, e.g., for the aggregate, indirect, prospective benefit of the class. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Nachsin , 663 F.3d at 1038. Under rules proposed by the American Law Institute's Principles of Law of Aggregate Litigation(, when feasible, undistributed residual funds should be distributed to recipients \"who se interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 F.3d 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Oetting v. Green Jacobson, P.C. (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re677 F.3d 21 ; 658 F.3d 468; Six (6) Mexican 904 F.2d 1301 . 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "775 F.3d 1060",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Oetting v. Green Jacobson, P.C. (In re775 F.3d 1060; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 658 F.3d 468; Six (6) Mexican 904 F.2d 1301 . 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "677 F.3d 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Oetting v. Green Jacobson, P.C. (In re775 F.3d 1060; In re677 F.3d 21 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Six (6) Mexican 904 F.2d 1301 . 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 468",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Cy Pres Serves Important Purposes in Class Action Settlements",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Oetting v. Green Jacobson, P.C. (In re775 F.3d 1060; In re677 F.3d 21 ; 658 F.3d 468; Six (6) Mexican [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "904 F.2d 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. De Novo Adjudication By Civil Action In District Court",
		"context": "§ 1071(b)(1). This and other courts have consistently recognized the important role of the right of civil action under 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) as noted inferentially in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue( s) on which the co urt may entertain additional evidence beyond that which was considered at the administrative stage include, e.g., distinctiveness evincing a secondary me aning of an otherwise presumptively descriptive mark. Booking.Com B.V. chose this avenue in order to be able to supplement the administrative record with additional evidence in the form of a \"Teflon\" consumer survey showing the distinctiveness and hence the secondary meaning and consequent registrability of the mark.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "a. The immunity for discretionary functions is a cru- cial and longstanding form of immunity that protects the government from \"liability for errors in the exercise of discretionary functions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Its foundation is \"a concept of substantial historical ancestry in American law.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "at 34. That history in the United States, this Court noted in Dalehite , id. at 34 n.30, dates at least to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which Chief Justice Marshall stated that \"[t]he province of the court is, solely, to dec ide on the rights of individ- uals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive of-ficers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.\" Id. at 170.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "See Dalehite , 346 U.S. at 34 & n.30. In 1845, for example, the Court stated that \"a public officer is not liable to an action if he falls into error in a case where the act to be done is n ot merely a ministerial one, but is one in relation to which it is his duty to exercise judgment and discretion; even although an individual may suffer by his mistake.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court added that \"[w]e are not aware of any case in England or in this country\" to the contrary. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "44 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "The Court added that \"[w]e are not aware of any case in England or in this country\" to the contrary. Id. at 97 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citing cases from the 19th and early 20th centuries \"in which the courts have had occasion to consider the meaning of 'discretionary functions' and to disclaim judicial power to interfere with, to enjoin or mandamus, or inquire into the wisdom or unwisdom or 'negligence' in their perfor- mance within the scope of a uthority lawfully granted\"). The decisions recognizing immunity of the govern- ment from liability for errors in the exercise of discre- tionary functions are grounded in separation -of-powers principles. See, e.g., Marbury , 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170 (\"Questi ons, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "181 F.2d 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "Under those princi- ples, challenges to the discretionary determinations of government officials are not appropriatel y addressed in a court of law through an individual action in tort. In- deed, t his Court has explained that the purpose of im- munity from damages actions based on such functions is to \"prevent judicial 'second -guessing' of legislative 22 and administrative deci sions grounded in social, eco- nomic, and political policy through the medium of an ac- tion in tort.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"A contrary principle would indeed be preg- nant with the greatest mischiefs.\" Kendall , 44 U.S. (3 How.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "See 161 U.S. 483 (\"In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive D epartment, keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an ap-prehension that the motives that control his official con- duct may , at any time , become the subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages.\" ). Thus aside from some gov- ernment officials like prosecutors, judges, and legisla- tors, who enjoy absolute immunity from suit for per- forming their assigned functions, se e [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], government officers have traditionally been protected by a qualified immun-ity from suit. With regard to state -law tort actions, this Court held that federal employees are immune from suits arising out of actions that i nvolved the employee's exercise of \" discretionary \" judgment. 484 U.S. 292.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "Thus aside from some gov- ernment officials like prosecutors, judges, and legisla- tors, who enjoy absolute immunity from suit for per- forming their assigned functions, se e 457 U.S. 800, government officers have traditionally been protected by a qualified immun-ity from suit. With regard to state -law tort actions, this Court held that federal employees are immune from suits arising out of actions that i nvolved the employee's exercise of \" discretionary \" judgment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court reasoned in Westfall that the limitation of official immunity to actions arising out of an employee's discretionary actions reflect ed a balance between the benefits and costs of insulating government employees from suit. O fficial immunity is intended not \"to protect an erring official, but to insulate the decisionmaking process from the harassment of prospective litigation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "In particular, official immunity seeks to counter the possibility that \"the threat of liability will make federal officials unduly timid in carrying out their official duties, and that effective government will be promoted if officials are freed of the costs of vexatious and often frivolous damages suits.\" Ibid. ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the Court explained, \"[i]t is only when officials exercise deci-sionmaking discretion that potential liability may shackle 'the fearles s, vigorous, and effective admin- istration of policies of government.' \" Westfall , 484 U.S. at 297 (quoting 360 U.S. 564 (1959 ) (opinion of Harlan, J.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "; see 412 U.S. 306. Thus, the Court explained, \"[i]t is only when officials exercise deci-sionmaking discretion that potential liability may shackle 'the fearles s, vigorous, and effective admin- istration of policies of government.' \" Westfall , 484 U.S. at 297 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1959 ) (opinion of Harlan, J.) ). Subsequently, in the Westfall Act, enacted in re- sponse to this Court's decision in Westfall , Congress ex- panded the immunity of federal employees beyond their performance of discretionary functions to cover all com- mon -law tort suits for actions taken within the scope of the their employment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "360 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "4 c. The scope of review of governmental action in suits for declaratory or injunctive relief has broa dened since Marbury and Kendall under the Administrative 4 Before the Court's decision in Westfall , the Eleventh Circuit had held that TVA employees were protected by official immunity for their exercise of discretionary functions. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 701 et seq.",
		"citation_value_orig": "769 F.2d 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "26 467 U.S. at 810 . In other words, the discretionary func- tion exception \"merely makes explicit w hat would oth- erwise be implicit.\" Sea -Land Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]465 U.S. 1100 . Shortly after the FTCA was enacted , the Eighth Circuit observed that Congress had adopted the discretionary function exception \"in recognition of the separation of powers among the three branches of the government and the considerations of public policy which have moved the courts to refuse to interfere with the action s of officials at all levels of the executive branch who, acting within the scope of their authority, were required to exercise discretion or judgment.\" Coates , 181 F.2d at 818.",
		"citation_value_orig": "919 F.2d 888",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "For the same reasons, it would have been expected that the general sue- and- be-sued clause in the TVA Act would be construed not 27 to waive sovereign immunity from damages actions for tort claims based on the performance of discretionary functions. d. In other areas, this Court has adopted limiting constructions to preserve traditional immunities and protections of the federal government. In Library of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that a provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. , making the United States' liability \"the same as a private person\" did not waive the government's sovereign immunity from interest payments, despite the statute's silence on the issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "The Court noted that \"[o]ther stat- utes placing the United States in the same position as a private party also have been read narrowly to preserve certain immunities that the U nited States has enjoyed historically.\" Ibid. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that the broad waiver of sovereign immunity in the FTCA did not ap- ply to claims by military personnel for service -related injuries. Id. at 146.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "This Court concluded that it could not \"impute to Congress such a radical departure from established law in the absence of express congressional command.\" Ibid. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that in amending the Age Dis-crimination in Employment Act of 1967 , 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. , so as to bring the federal government within its scope, Congress did not grant a right to a jury trial to federal employees suing the government under that Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The longstanding immunity from suit based on the performance of discretionary functions is grounded in separation-of-powers principles",
		"context": "at 162. Similarly , a number of courts of appeals construing the SIAA have concluded that a waiver of the govern- ment's established immunity from tort suits based on the performance of discretionary functions \"requires clear statutory expression.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Sea -Land Serv. , 919 F.2d at 891 (\"Congress must speak with unmistak- able intent in order to waive tort immunity for the gov- ernment's discretionary functions. \"); 540 F.2d 536 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.2d 962",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The disclosure provides vital factual information to a specific population at a critical point",
		"context": "In healthcare, information can \"save lives,\" Sorrell , 564 U.S. at 566, permit \"allevi ation of physical pain,\" Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and enable people to act in \"'their own best interest,'\" Sorrell , 564 U.S. at 578. Information about how to receive prena-tal care lessens the risk of illness, mortality, miscar- riage, and birth defects. See p. 3, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The disclosure provides vital factual information to a specific population at a critical point",
		"context": "And 28 information about contraception and abortion allows women to decide whether and when to obtain legal medical treatments concerning \"intimate and personal choices … central to personal dignity and autonomy.\" Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act is crafted to addr ess the needs of a narrow class of women in great need of information. Infor- mation concerning state-funded prenatal care, family planning, and abortion is appropriately targeted to clinics whose \"primary purp ose\" is the provision of \"family planning or pregnancy-related services,\" including clinics that pr ovide abortions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The disclosure provides vital factual information to a specific population at a critical point",
		"context": "For her, the notice's brief acknowledg- ment of free and low-cost programs offering a compre- hensive range of care ensures her ability to \"access … a multiplicity of information sources\"—\"a governmen-tal purpose of the highest order.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, some women who greatly value the clinic's services and counseling may still benefit from the notice's infor- mation about ways to supplement those services with additional sources of care. At the same time, the Legislature crafted the dis- closure requirement in a manner that fully respects a clinic's ability to limit what services it will provide or endorse.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any error in the district court's handling of the Waltham issue was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt",
		"context": "See 18 U.S.C. 3595(c)(2) (\" The court of appeals shall not re- verse or vacate a sentence of death on account of any error which can be harmless where the Govern- ment establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the error was harmless . \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals' speculation that jurors might have conclu ded that respondent was intimidated by Tamerlan into committing the marathon bombing, Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should adhere to Williamson County",
		"context": "\"[T]his Court does not overturn its precedents lightly,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and there is no \"special justification\" for doing so in this case . 491 U.S. 164, 1 75 n.1 ( 1989). The Court follows an \"almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases,\" 542 U.S. 466 , and it should decline petitioner's invitation to transform 45 \"the meaning and coverage of one of our oldest civil rights statutes \" solely to allow property owners to forum shop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should adhere to Williamson County",
		"context": "\"[T]his Court does not overturn its precedents lightly,\" 134 S. Ct. 2024, and there is no \"special justification\" for doing so in this case . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1 75 n.1 ( 1989). The Court follows an \"almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases,\" 542 U.S. 466 , and it should decline petitioner's invitation to transform 45 \"the meaning and coverage of one of our oldest civil rights statutes \" solely to allow property owners to forum shop. Patterson , 491 U.S. at 168.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court should adhere to Williamson County",
		"context": "\"[T]his Court does not overturn its precedents lightly,\" 134 S. Ct. 2024, and there is no \"special justification\" for doing so in this case . 491 U.S. 164, 1 75 n.1 ( 1989). The Court follows an \"almost categorical rule of stare decisis in statutory cases,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and it should decline petitioner's invitation to transform 45 \"the meaning and coverage of one of our oldest civil rights statutes \" solely to allow property owners to forum shop. Patterson , 491 U.S. at 168. Williamson County \"does not preclude Congress from allowing just compensation claims to be brought in federal court,\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS",
		"context": "Critical to the notion of equal access is that those with fewer resources not be dissuaded from seeking redress from the courts by financial impediments to justice. To that end, courts waive filing and tran- script fees for the indigent. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 Fee shifting is used in similar fashion in federal law; it is designed to increase access to justice, ra- ther than limit it. When Congress has provided for fee shifting, it generally has done so to correct an imbalance of power by permitting a successful plain- tiff to collect attorneys' fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS",
		"context": "10 Cal. Motor Transp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, \"the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.\" Bill Johnson's Rests., 461 U.S. 731.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS",
		"context": "404 U.S. 508. Specifically, \"the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances.\" Bill Johnson's Rests., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By rejecting the PTO's reading of Section 145, the Court can avoid the con-stitutional concerns implicated by that reading. See, e.g., 733 F.2d 735.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE PTO'S PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 145 WOULD ERECT AN INSURMOUNTABLE ROADBLOCK TO JUSTICE FOR MANY PATENT APPLICANTS",
		"context": "Bill Johnson's Rests., 461 U.S. 731. By rejecting the PTO's reading of Section 145, the Court can avoid the con-stitutional concerns implicated by that reading. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One court has suggested that Congress enacted the expense provision \"to discourage applicants from undertaking this type of proceeding, which enables them to introduce new evidence ... thereby raising the potential for gamesmanship.\" Taylor, 2016 WL 9308420, was not persuaded by the proposition that an applicant would intentionally withhold evidence from the PTO with the goal of presenting that evidence for the first time to a non- expert judge at the district court: \"An applicant who pursues such a strategy would be intentionally un- dermining his claims before the PTO on the specula- tive chance that he will gain some advantage in the § 145 proceeding by presenting new evidence to a district court judge.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "733 F.2d 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Of the existing tests, the plurality's test most closely follows congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent",
		"context": "While it has flaws, the relative p ermanence test appropriately draws a line between waters subject to federal and state regulation, and is the best existing interpretation of the CWA and Supreme Court precedent. Following the significant nexus test as applied in the 2015 Rule, features are pulled into federal jurisdiction that clearly violate the SWANCC holding. Solid Waste [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In SWANCC, the Court was asked, a nd declined, to assert jurisdiction over isolated features. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Of the existing tests, the plurality's test most closely follows congressional intent and Supreme Court precedent",
		"context": "37053 (June 29, 2015). Such an unambiguous assertion of jurisdiction to isolated features is a clear departure from SWANCC . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Allowing the implementing agencies to follow significant nexus alone or find features jurisdictional under either standard would stretch jurisdiction beyond the limits established by SWANCC . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "If Ramos applied an old rule, AEDPA's relitigation bar forecloses retroactive application of Ramos to Edwards' case. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has explained that Teague provides a \"threshold . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "Because §2254 establishes the standard for \"cases on federal collateral review\" arising out of state court judgments, the interaction between §2254(d)(1) and Teague falls within the question presented. 47 required by AEDPA.\" Beard , 542 U.S. at 409 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). If Ramos reiterated an old rule, then Teague's retroactivity bar does not apply. Who rton, 549 U.S. at 416 (\"[A]n old rule applies both on direct and collateral review.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "Who rton, 549 U.S. at 416 (\"[A]n old rule applies both on direct and collateral review.\"). But that does not end the inquiry: Edwards must still satisfy AEDPA's \"difficult\" standard before he can obtain habeas relief. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Greene, 565 U.S. at 39; Horn , 536 U.S. at 272. Generally speaking, if a state prisoner seeks a writ of habeas corpus in federal court after a state court has adjudicated his claim on the merits, AEDPA's religitgation bar prevents relief. But Congress has provided two exceptions to the relitigation bar: The state prisoner must show ei ther that the state court's adjudication of the claim \"resulted in a decision that was [1] contrary to, or [2] involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is not contrary to this Court's precedent unless it \"arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —or if it \"confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a [different] result.\" Id. at 406.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "(emphasis added). In other words, the relitigation bar forecloses relief unless a prisoner can show that the state court's error was \" well understood and comprehende d in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Ramos applied an old rule, Edwards cannot surmount AEDPA's relitigation bar. It is undisputed that the state courts adjudicated Edwards' non - unanimity claim on the merits during post -conviction review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Ramos Applied An \"Old Rule,\" AEDPA Bars Relief Because That Rule Was Not Clearly Established.",
		"context": "That means a federal court can grant habeas relief only if Edwards' claim meets one of the two narrow exceptions articulated in § 2254(d)(1). This Court has explained that, when conducting this analysis, the federal court should \"train its attention on the particular reasons —both leg al and factual —why state courts rejected a state prisoner's 49 federal claims.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When the state supreme and state intermediate appellate court decisions do not \"come accompanied\" with reasons —as in this case —the federal habeas court should \"look through the unexplained decision to the last related state- court decision that does provide a relevant rationale.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly alluded to a govern- ment's ability to close a nontraditional public forum. For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association , this Court observed 47 that, \"[a]lthough a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna 505 U.S. 672. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., 390 F.3d 65378 F.3d 133885 F.2d 167796 F.2d 643.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly alluded to a govern- ment's ability to close a nontraditional public forum. For example, in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association , this Court observed 47 that, \"[a]lthough a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.\" 460 U.S. 37; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., 390 F.3d 65378 F.3d 133885 F.2d 167796 F.2d 643.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "460 U.S. 37; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna 505 U.S. 672. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]378 F.3d 133885 F.2d 167796 F.2d 643. In Ridley , the First Circuit noted that the decision to close a forum must be made in \"good faith,\" such as where the government \"acted in response to expressed constitutional concerns about its prior guidelines, and cannot be faulted for trying to adhere more closely to the constitutional line.\" 390 F.3d at 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 F.3d 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "460 U.S. 37; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna 505 U.S. 672. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., 390 F.3d 65[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]885 F.2d 167796 F.2d 643. In Ridley , the First Circuit noted that the decision to close a forum must be made in \"good faith,\" such as where the government \"acted in response to expressed constitutional concerns about its prior guidelines, and cannot be faulted for trying to adhere more closely to the constitutional line.\" 390 F.3d at 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 F.3d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "460 U.S. 37; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna 505 U.S. 672. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., 390 F.3d 65378 F.3d 133[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]796 F.2d 643. In Ridley , the First Circuit noted that the decision to close a forum must be made in \"good faith,\" such as where the government \"acted in response to expressed constitutional concerns about its prior guidelines, and cannot be faulted for trying to adhere more closely to the constitutional line.\" 390 F.3d at 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.2d 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "460 U.S. 37; see also International Soc'y fo r Krishna 505 U.S. 672. Several Circuits have explicitly held that govern- ment may close nontraditional public forums. See, e.g., 390 F.3d 65378 F.3d 133885 F.2d 167[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Ridley , the First Circuit noted that the decision to close a forum must be made in \"good faith,\" such as where the government \"acted in response to expressed constitutional concerns about its prior guidelines, and cannot be faulted for trying to adhere more closely to the constitutional line.\" 390 F.3d at 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.2d 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. To the extent the City inadvertently converted the flagpole into a public forum, it is permitted to remove that designation and create a new program",
		"context": "390 F.3d at 77. The Ninth Cir- cuit adopted a similar standard. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, in denying Camp Constitution's application, the City was motivated by its legitimate concerns about adhering to the City's policies to refrain in its own speech (in the context of the flag-raising program) from seemingly endorsing a religious view, rather than animus to any particular private expression regarding religion. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "200 F.3d 1256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "As courts have repeatedly pointed out, \"the CWA does not even define nonpoint-source pollution.\" Ctr. for Native [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Simsbury-Avon Preservation Soc'y, 575 F.3d 199; Or. Nat. Res.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 F.3d 1310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "As courts have repeatedly pointed out, \"the CWA does not even define nonpoint-source pollution.\" Ctr. for Native 509 F.3d 1310; see, e.g., Simsbury-Avon Preservation Soc'y, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Or. Nat. Res.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "Nat. Res. Counc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a re- sult, \"nonpoint source\" is a catchall term for sources that do not fall within the point-source definition, and \"nonpoint-source pollution\" means \"nothing more than a water pollution problem not involving a dis- charge from a point source.\" Cables , 509 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.2d 842",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "As a re- sult, \"nonpoint source\" is a catchall term for sources that do not fall within the point-source definition, and \"nonpoint-source pollution\" means \"nothing more than a water pollution problem not involving a dis- charge from a point source.\" Cables , 509 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Am. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also EPA Interpretive Statement, 84 Fed. Reg. at 16,813 (\"nonpoint source pollution [is] the broad cate gory of other forms of wa- ter pollution that do not fall within the point source definition and [are] not defined under the Act\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 F.3d 1192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "at 16,813 (\"nonpoint source pollution [is] the broad cate gory of other forms of wa- ter pollution that do not fall within the point source definition and [are] not defined under the Act\"). Thus, nonpoint-source pollution \"is commonly understood to be pollution arising from dispersed activities over large areas that is not traceable to a single, identifia- ble source or conveyance.\" Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, nonpoint-source pollution is defined not by what it is, but by what it is not: It is \"pollution that 38 does not result from the 'discharge' or 'addition' of pol- lutants from a point source.\" Or.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 F.3d 1133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (requiring NPDES permits for point-source stormwater dis- charges); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The CWA contains exemp- tions to this general rule that would be unnecessary if the Act broadly categorized all runoff as nonpoint- source pollution regardless of its relationship to a point source. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Congress did not foreclose regulation of indirect point-source pollution when it declined to regulate nonpoint-source pollution",
		"context": "El Paso Gold Mines , 421 F.3d at 1140 n.4. Just as \"[g]rav- ity flow, resulting in a discharge into a navigable body of water, may be part of a point source discharge\" when pollutants were \"at least initially collected or channeled,\" so the \"subsequent percolation\" of wastewater initially discharg ed from a point source is within the Act if it reaches navigable waters. Sierra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the pollutants here come from point- source wells, it is irreleva nt that, as the County notes, Congress declined to extend the Act's prohibitions to nonpoint-source pollution. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "620 F.2d 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1's reference to seamen, railroaders, and their relationship to interstate commerce exemplifies the type of work exempted from the FAA",
		"context": "e type of work exempted from the FAA. As this Court recognizes, \"[i]t's a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary mean- ing at the time Congress enacted the statute.\" New Delaware, L. & W.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 As Southwest expressly acknowledges, at the time, \"inter- state commerce\" was defined as a modification of the more general term \"commerce,\" concerning such traffic \"between . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1's reference to seamen, railroaders, and their relationship to interstate commerce exemplifies the type of work exempted from the FAA",
		"context": "See142 S. Ct. 638 (No. 21-309); Balt. & Ohio Sw. R. R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Congress intended to use the term \"seamen\" ac- cording to its accepted definition in the 1920s, it likely intended \"railroad employees\" to incorporate a group of workers associated with the conduct and business of trains into the exemption. 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 U.S. 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1's reference to seamen, railroaders, and their relationship to interstate commerce exemplifies the type of work exempted from the FAA",
		"context": "1910). The term \"commerce\" was not limited to \"only the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities, but also [included] the instrumentalities 8 As discussed infra at 18-19, this commonsense application is the test adopted by the Seventh Circuit here and by many of the circuit courts. See, e.g., 966 F.3d 10; 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 3804; 939 F.3d 210; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 and agencies by which it is promoted and the means and appliances by which it is carried on.\" Commerce , Black's Law Dictionary , (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 F.3d 588",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW SQUARELY PRESENTS A CIRCUIT CONFLICT ON THE STANDARDS FOR ASSESSING PUBLIC DISPLAYS UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE",
		"context": "); id. at 704 (Breyer, J., concurring in judg- ment). In doing so, this Court declined to apply the three-part test from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 686 (plurali- ty op. ); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor And ACCA Demand Contemporaneous Intent",
		"context": "at 589-590. \"The most natural reading of Taylor \" is that its def- inition of generic burglary \"requires intent to commit a crime at the time of the unlawful or unprivileged en- try or the initial 'remaining in' without consent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"en- try\" refers to a particular moment in time, the parallel \"remaining prong\" is most naturally read as similarly referring \"to the initiation of the trespass.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "850 F.3d 925",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor And ACCA Demand Contemporaneous Intent",
		"context": "Ibid. Therefore, like entry, \"[t]he act of 'remaining in' a building, for purposes of generic burglary, is not a con- tinuous undertaking\"; rather, \"it is a discrete event that occurs at the moment when a perpetrator, who at one point was lawfully present, exceeds his license and overstays his welcome.\" McArthur , 850 F.3d at 939; accord Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Tay- lor's use of the word \"with\" in defining the intent re- quirement—\" with intent to commit a crime\"—indi- cates that \"the intent [must] accompany\" the defend- ant's initial unlawful \"entry\" or \"remaining.\" 687 F.3d 188; Bernel- Aveja , 844 F.3d at 218 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in judgment) (same).",
		"citation_value_orig": "890 F.3d 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor And ACCA Demand Contemporaneous Intent",
		"context": "McArthur , 850 F.3d at 939; accord Van 890 F.3d 656. And Tay- lor's use of the word \"with\" in defining the intent re- quirement—\" with intent to commit a crime\"—indi- cates that \"the intent [must] accompany\" the defend- ant's initial unlawful \"entry\" or \"remaining.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bernel- Aveja , 844 F.3d at 218 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in judgment) (same). The government's contrary reading would render Taylor 's\"unlawful entry\" language superfluous. McArthur , 850 F.3d at 939.",
		"citation_value_orig": "687 F.3d 188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Taylor And ACCA Demand Contemporaneous Intent",
		"context": "If \"remaining\" refers to a continuous condition rather than a discrete moment in time, then \"every unlawful entry with intent would be- come 'remaining in' with intent as soon as the perpe- trator enters,\" so Taylor 's \"unlawful entry\" prong 17 would be meaningless. Ibid. ; accord Bernel-Aveja , 844 F.3d at 218 (Higginbotham, J., concurring in judg- ment); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has previously rejected gov- ernment efforts to rewrite Taylor , emphasizing that \"a good rule of thumb for reading [this Court's] decisions is that what they say and what they mean are one and the same.\" Mathis , 136 S. Ct. at 2254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulatory Text, Structure, and History Make Clear That section 541.604 Does Not Apply to the HCE Regulation",
		"context": "2007) (defining \"deem\" to mean \"to consider or judge something in a particular way\"). When someone is deemed to have a certain status, there is no room for further inquiry or the application of additional criteria. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By specifying that employees who satisfy the HCE regulation are thereby \"deemed exempt,\" full stop, the regulatory text makes clear that the HCE regulation is self- contained and that the only provisions relev ant to determining whether a highly compensated employee is exempt are those within the HCE regulation itself or expressly cross -referenced therein. The HCE regulation does not cross -reference or otherwise incorporate §541.604.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulatory Text, Structure, and History Make Clear That section 541.604 Does Not Apply to the HCE Regulation",
		"context": "While the agency was thus understandably concerned about employers using low base salaries and substantial \"extras\" to overwork their lower -earning staff—after all, the EAP regulations can apply to workers earning as little as $23,660 per year—such concerns dissipate when the employees reach six figures and above. More to the point, the fact that the two provisions create different rules regarding \"extras\" confirms that they do not both apply to the same employees. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by contrast, is to address employees making less than the HCE threshold and whose hourly, daily, or per- shift rate is les s than the weekly minimum (and it still allows some of those relatively low -paid employees to be treated as exempt). S ee Anani , 730 F.3d at 149 (\"The reading that give s full meaning to both C.F.R. 35 §541.601 and C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Regulatory Text, Structure, and History Make Clear That section 541.604 Does Not Apply to the HCE Regulation",
		"context": "§541.602(a)(3)(i) (2020) . The ten -percent cap on such payments underscores the agency's closer scrutiny of pay structure for lower- earning EAP employees as compared to its largely hands -off approach to pay structure for highly compensated employees. 37 Land Servs., Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] expands the group of employees to whom the statutory exemption applies. It does so by providing an alternative path to satisfying the salary -basis test for employees whose normal mode of payment falls short of the weekly -minimum requirement—i.e. , those with an hourly, daily, or per- shift wage below the week ly minimum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Unanimous Decision Below Reflects A Proper Application Of Sovereign Immunity Law And Statutory Interpretation Rules.",
		"context": "PennEast and the State agree private parties generally lack the power to hale States into court. PennEast and the State also agree Congress ca nnot abrogate that sovereign immunity through passage of the NGA, which was adopted under its Commerce Clause authority. Panhandle E. Pipe Line [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The remaining issue is whethe r Congress can nevertheless \"delegate\" to private parties the federal government's own ability to sue the States. And th e related statutory issue is whether Congress in fact did \"delegate\" that authority in passing the NGA—even as the law does not mention States or condemning state lands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's predictions all proved wrong",
		"context": "RFRA has now applied to fed- eral law for twenty -seven years, and the Religious Land Use and I nstitutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) has been in place for twenty years. Contrary to Smith 's warnings, these statues prove that the judiciary is \"up to the task\" of determining when laws should trump free exercise rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Decades of experience show that, r ather than open- ing the floodgates, claims under RFRA and RLUIPA have prove n to be a small portion of the federal case- load, and only infrequently troubled this Court. See Luke W. Goodrich & Rachel N. Busick , Sex, Drugs , and Eagle Feathers : An Empirical Study of Federal Religious Freedom Cases , 48 Seton Hall L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's predictions all proved wrong",
		"context": "39 RFRA, RLUIPA, and similar state standards —not Smith —have proven to be the more administrable rule. Courts have proven adept at resolvin g RFRA and RLUIPA claims. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, Smith led to a deep split over the meanin g of neutrality and general applicability . Smith has not only created a circuit split over these terms , it has also had the counterintuitive effect of emphasizing the subjective motivations and legislative history behind government actions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's predictions all proved wrong",
		"context": "But subsequent history shows that growing regulatory power —not democratic law- making —is the source of most religious liberty dis- putes today. Today , \"the danger posed by the growing power of the administrative state cannot be dis- missed.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet nothing in Smith contemplates government by regulation. See Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exer- cise, 1990 Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Smith's predictions all proved wrong",
		"context": "Even one of Smith 's fore- most academic proponents urges limiting its applica- tion in cases i nvolving administrative actions . See Phillip P. Hamburger, Exclusion and Equality: How Exclusion from the Political Process Renders Religious Liberty Unequal , 90 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1919, 1938 - 1940 (2015) ; see also City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, and relatedly, Smith 's prediction of demo- cratic \"s olicitude\" toward religion has not been borne out in experience . Restrictions on religious freedom 41 have been imposed by unsolicitous and unelected ad- ministrative officials.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Then, as now, the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the purported threat 17",
		"context": "26, 2018); see also CWRIC Report at 51 (noting FBI and Naval Intelligence \"saw only a very limited security risk from the ethnic Japanese; none recom-mended a mass exclusion or detention of all people of Japanese ancestry\"); Irons, supra , at 198-218, 278-302, 311-13 (identifying additional concealment and mis-representations by Government officials). This lack of candor serv ed as the basis for success- ful coram nobis petitions that Korematsu and Hira- bayashi brought to overturn their decades-old wrongful convictions, in part based on claims that Government lawyers had concealed eviden ce and misled the Court. 19 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 627 F. Supp. 1445, affirmed in part, re-828 F.2d 591. Troubling echoes of this deception have already surfaced in relation to the travel bans. For example, in February 2017, newspapers reported the existence of a leaked Department of Homeland Security assessment that concluded citizenship is an \"unreliable\" threat indicator and that \"citizens of countries affected by [EO-1] are rarely implicated in US-Based Terrorism.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "584 F. Supp. 1406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Then, as now, the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the purported threat 17",
		"context": "26, 2018); see also CWRIC Report at 51 (noting FBI and Naval Intelligence \"saw only a very limited security risk from the ethnic Japanese; none recom-mended a mass exclusion or detention of all people of Japanese ancestry\"); Irons, supra , at 198-218, 278-302, 311-13 (identifying additional concealment and mis-representations by Government officials). This lack of candor serv ed as the basis for success- ful coram nobis petitions that Korematsu and Hira- bayashi brought to overturn their decades-old wrongful convictions, in part based on claims that Government lawyers had concealed eviden ce and misled the Court. 19 See 584 F. Supp. 1406; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], affirmed in part, re-828 F.2d 591. Troubling echoes of this deception have already surfaced in relation to the travel bans. For example, in February 2017, newspapers reported the existence of a leaked Department of Homeland Security assessment that concluded citizenship is an \"unreliable\" threat indicator and that \"citizens of countries affected by [EO-1] are rarely implicated in US-Based Terrorism.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "627 F. Supp. 1445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Then, as now, the Government was unwilling to reveal its own intelligence agencies' views of the purported threat 17",
		"context": "26, 2018); see also CWRIC Report at 51 (noting FBI and Naval Intelligence \"saw only a very limited security risk from the ethnic Japanese; none recom-mended a mass exclusion or detention of all people of Japanese ancestry\"); Irons, supra , at 198-218, 278-302, 311-13 (identifying additional concealment and mis-representations by Government officials). This lack of candor serv ed as the basis for success- ful coram nobis petitions that Korematsu and Hira- bayashi brought to overturn their decades-old wrongful convictions, in part based on claims that Government lawyers had concealed eviden ce and misled the Court. 19 See 584 F. Supp. 1406; 627 F. Supp. 1445, affirmed in part, re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Troubling echoes of this deception have already surfaced in relation to the travel bans. For example, in February 2017, newspapers reported the existence of a leaked Department of Homeland Security assessment that concluded citizenship is an \"unreliable\" threat indicator and that \"citizens of countries affected by [EO-1] are rarely implicated in US-Based Terrorism.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "828 F.2d 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "But this argu- ment misunderstands the nature of as-applied chal-lenges. If Austin's off-premises sign prohibition can constitutionally apply to respondent's signs, the Court cannot invalidate the code based on its hypo- thetical application to other, purely noncommercial signs, except by applying the overbreadth doctrine. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 559 U.S. 460. Respondent seeks to avoid that conclusion by as- serting that its commercial speech is \"inextricably in- tertwined\" with noncommercial speech and so de- serves heighted protection. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "But this argu- ment misunderstands the nature of as-applied chal-lenges. If Austin's off-premises sign prohibition can constitutionally apply to respondent's signs, the Court cannot invalidate the code based on its hypo- thetical application to other, purely noncommercial signs, except by applying the overbreadth doctrine. 362 U.S. 17; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent seeks to avoid that conclusion by as- serting that its commercial speech is \"inextricably in- tertwined\" with noncommercial speech and so de- serves heighted protection. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "47. But re-spondent identifies no example of a sign face contain- ing both commercial and noncommercial messages that would need to be parsed phrase-by-phrase. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, respond- ent's billboards primarily display purely commercial messages but occasionally display separate noncom- mercial messages. Because those messages are car-ried on distinct sign faces, Austin can unquestionably regulate the purely commercial speech the sign pri- marily displays.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "of Trs. of State Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 Any other ruling would create an enormous loop- hole. So long as a sign bore a single noncommercial message (even for ten seconds once a year on a digital sign), Austin would be required to regulate the entire sign as though it always displayed purely noncom- mercial speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "45-48, preclud- ing relief on that doctrine here, see 140 S. Ct. 1575. And respondent has introduced no evidence that Austin's ordinance reaches so much purely noncommercial speech that facial invalidation would be appropriate. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent's amici, although relying on abundant creative hypotheticals, provide no such evidence ei- ther. The record thus falls far short of the showing of \"real\" and \"substantial\" overbreadth.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondent Has Not Shown an Entitlement to Facial or As-Applied Relief",
		"context": "Respondent's amici, although relying on abundant creative hypotheticals, provide no such evidence ei- ther. The record thus falls far short of the showing of \"real\" and \"substantial\" overbreadth. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "App. 98a (enumerating veteran status as eligibility criteria for DACA).) In addition, \"[s]ome discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations ,\" Arizo na, 567 U.S. at 396, a field where circumstances often change, some- times rapidly, and this Court has a \"customary policy of deference to the President ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], petitioners upend the fundamental premise of immigration law that \"flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.\" See United States ex rel. 338 U.S. 537.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "In addition, \"[s]ome discretionary decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation's international relations ,\" Arizo na, 567 U.S. at 396, a field where circumstances often change, some- times rapidly, and this Court has a \"customary policy of deference to the President ,\" 543 U.S. 335, petitioners upend the fundamental premise of immigration law that \"flexibility and the adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute the essence of the program.\" See United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The relevant inquiry here inappropriate here to uphold petitioners' legal conclusion based on legal reasons not asserted by any agency decisionm aker in this case, especially given petitioners' failure to produce the complete record for review. (See infra at 51 -53.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "Claims that challenge an agency's reasons for acting cannot be resolved against an APA plaintiff on the merits until the agency has presented the complete administrative record undergirding its decision. The contrary course that petitioners urge would permit and incentivize agencies to withhold evidence unfavorable to the agency's position. See Walter O. Boswell Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . APA plaintiffs are thus entitled to a complete administrative record, and a court may properly direct completion when the record presented is demonstrably incomplete. See Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. at 2574 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.2d 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "Here, the dismissal o f respondents' APA c laims that petitioners request cannot be granted at the 52 current stage of the proceedings because petitioners have yet to produce a complete administrative record. In December 2017, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's determination in R egents that the administrative record produced by petitioners was facially deficient, this Court directed the district court to address petitioners' \"threshold arguments\" about jurisdiction and reviewability before considering whether \"amend ments to the r ecord are necessary and appropriate.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Shortly afterwards, the Second Circuit denied petitioners' mandamus application , which had sought to preclude completion of the administrative record in Bat alla Vidal , a case where the district court had already rejected petitioners' jurisdiction and reviewability arguments. Order at 4 , In re Nielsen , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "The Court should decline to disturb the R egents and Batalla Vidal rulings denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the equal protection claim s in those cases. 19 The respondents in the New York and California cases who raised an equal protection claim adequately alleged that the termination of DACA w as motivated by discriminatory animus against Latinos from Mexico , and resulted in a discriminatory effect on that group. See Village of Arlington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To sufficiently plead animus, a plaint iff need only raise a plausible inference that \"an invidious discriminatory (See Batalla Vidal Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioners' Defective Legal Analysis Led to a Flawed Legal",
		"context": "A high- level government official cannot launder his animus through subordinate officers. T his Cour t has recognized that animus can be an unlawful \"motivating factor\" when an otherwise unbiased decisionmaker is spurred by the animus of others in the same organization—even others to whom the decisio nmaker does not report. S ee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And plainly, the inclinations and directi ves of the President can motivate an agency head who serves at the President's pleasure . In an attempt to obtain a more favorable standard of review, petitioners miscast respondents' equal protection claim s as a selective -enforcement challenge .",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Narrow corporate jurisdictional rules harm the states.",
		"context": "\"[J]urisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority.\" J. Mcintyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The traditional stand- ard allowing states to exercise jurisdiction over corpo- rations whose presence is si gnified by registration to do business vindicates state authority over corpora-tions that claim protection of state law. By contrast, the theory that corporate general jurisdiction is lim- ited to the one or two states where a corporation is incorporated and headquartered \"never explains why the State should lose [general jurisdiction] when, as is increasingly common, a corporation 'divides its com-mand and coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Narrow corporate jurisdictional rules harm the states.",
		"context": "The traditional stand- ard allowing states to exercise jurisdiction over corpo- rations whose presence is si gnified by registration to do business vindicates state authority over corpora-tions that claim protection of state law. By contrast, the theory that corporate general jurisdiction is lim- ited to the one or two states where a corporation is incorporated and headquartered \"never explains why the State should lose [general jurisdiction] when, as is increasingly common, a corporation 'divides its com-mand and coordinating functions among officers who work at several different locations.'\" Daimler , 571 19 U.S. at 157 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cleaned up). Narrow jurisdictional rules also artificially shift the playing field, misallocating cases to, and poten- tially burdening, states where corporations incorpo- rate at the expense of states where they carry on most of their activities: Heavy reliance on at-home jurisdiction, however, leads to a jurisdictional \"allocation\" that is une- ven and unfair. Some states are home to many more corporations than others, even though their corporations engage in business all over the country.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Class counsel maximize fee awards by using cy pres to inflate settlements",
		"context": "Defendants will not object to the use of a c y pres awards —far from it —because they gain significant public -relations benefit , often at minimal to no cost. The benefit to defendants is derived by appearing t o accept responsibility and agreeing to settle, a nd the benefit will be higher with a cy pres award because defendants will be seen as engaging in charitable giving. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] In extreme cases, such as the present one, the defendant may not object because it directly benefit s from the cy pres award — as it has a pre -existing relationship with four of the recipient organizations. Id. (\"[D]efendants may also channel money into causes and organizations in which they already have an interest.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 F. Supp. 2d 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": ". Before Employment [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court had interpreted the Free Exer- cise Clause to prohibit incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by application of an otherwise neutral law, unless applying the law served a compelling gov- ernment interest. E.g., 374 U.S. 398; 406 U.S. 205. Smith departed from the individualized ap- proach, holding instead that the Free Exercise Clause permitted incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by neutral, generally applicable, and otherwise valid laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": ". Before Employment 494 U.S. 872, this Court had interpreted the Free Exer- cise Clause to prohibit incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by application of an otherwise neutral law, unless applying the law served a compelling gov- ernment interest. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 406 U.S. 205. Smith departed from the individualized ap- proach, holding instead that the Free Exercise Clause permitted incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by neutral, generally applicable, and otherwise valid laws. 494 U.S. at 878-80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": ". Before Employment 494 U.S. 872, this Court had interpreted the Free Exer- cise Clause to prohibit incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by application of an otherwise neutral law, unless applying the law served a compelling gov- ernment interest. E.g., 374 U.S. 398; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Smith departed from the individualized ap- proach, holding instead that the Free Exercise Clause permitted incidental burdens on religious exercise caused by neutral, generally applicable, and otherwise valid laws. 494 U.S. at 878-80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "494 U.S. at 878-80. Congress enacted RFRA to \"adopt[ ] a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in Smith .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under RFRA, the government \"may substantially burden a 37 person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burde n to the person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest.\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "As nine courts of appeals have now recognized, supra note 3, the contraceptive care guarantee, as modified by the accommodation, does not impose such a burden. While courts may not inquire into the reasonable- ness of a sincere religious belief, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 725, the question of whether a law imposes a 38 substantial burden is one courts must answer. Hernan- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 476 U.S. 693; Tony & Susan 471 U.S. 290; 401 U.S. 437; cf. Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 680",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "As nine courts of appeals have now recognized, supra note 3, the contraceptive care guarantee, as modified by the accommodation, does not impose such a burden. While courts may not inquire into the reasonable- ness of a sincere religious belief, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 725, the question of whether a law imposes a 38 substantial burden is one courts must answer. Hernan- 490 U.S. 680; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Tony & Susan 471 U.S. 290; 401 U.S. 437; cf. Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "As nine courts of appeals have now recognized, supra note 3, the contraceptive care guarantee, as modified by the accommodation, does not impose such a burden. While courts may not inquire into the reasonable- ness of a sincere religious belief, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 725, the question of whether a law imposes a 38 substantial burden is one courts must answer. Hernan- 490 U.S. 680; 476 U.S. 693; Tony & Susan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 401 U.S. 437; cf. Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "As nine courts of appeals have now recognized, supra note 3, the contraceptive care guarantee, as modified by the accommodation, does not impose such a burden. While courts may not inquire into the reasonable- ness of a sincere religious belief, Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 725, the question of whether a law imposes a 38 substantial burden is one courts must answer. Hernan- 490 U.S. 680; 476 U.S. 693; Tony & Susan 471 U.S. 290; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance. E. Texas Baptist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated on other grounds Zubik , 136 S. Ct. 1557. If the law imposes a considerable demand and compels compliance through a meaningful penalty, then the law imposes a substantial burden. But if the activity re-quired by the law does not itself create a substantial burden, then the consequences for failure to comply are beside the point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "793 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "Zubik , 136 S. Ct. at 1560 (expressing \"no view on whether pe- titioners' religious exercise has been substantially bur- dened\"). This legal inquiry examines what the law requires as well as the cost of noncompliance. E. Texas Baptist 793 F.3d 449, vacated on other grounds Zubik , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the law imposes a considerable demand and compels compliance through a meaningful penalty, then the law imposes a substantial burden. But if the activity re-quired by the law does not itself create a substantial burden, then the consequences for failure to comply are beside the point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "LS-Br. 37 (quoting Br. for Resp'ts 38, Zubik, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But the cited source expressly notes that \"if the employer has a self- insured church plan any contraceptive coverage voluntarily provided by the TPA is not part of the em-ployer's ERISA-exempt plan.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "But the cited source expressly notes that \"if the employer has a self- insured church plan any contraceptive coverage voluntarily provided by the TPA is not part of the em-ployer's ERISA-exempt plan.\" Br. for Resp'ts 38 n.15, Zubik, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Little Sisters cannot allege that their religious exercise is burdened by the operation of the accommodation with respect to other employers. 9 9 An ERISA \"plan\" is simply a \"set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforcement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "And the Little Sisters cannot allege that their religious exercise is burdened by the operation of the accommodation with respect to other employers. 9 9 An ERISA \"plan\" is simply a \"set of rules that define the rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforcement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If a self-insured employer uses the accommodation, the government, utilizing its authority under section 3(16)(A) of ERISA, then designates the TPA as the plan administrator for purposes of providing contraceptive cover-age. 29 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "To the contrary, TPAs are willing to volun- tarily provide separate coverage. Br. for Resp'ts 60-61, Zubik, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regulatory schemes that serve a compelling inter- est while allowing for certain exceptions are common. No one disputes the government's compelling interest in raising revenue, raising an army, or preventing em-ployment discrimination even though those have ex- emptions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "E.g., 50 U.S.C. 3802 (exempting women from the draft); 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (exempting small em-ployers from Title VII); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. O Centro is perfectly consis tent. There, the gov- ernment claimed a compelling interest in the \" uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "O Centro is perfectly consis tent. There, the gov- ernment claimed a compelling interest in the \" uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (emphasis in origi nal). The longstanding ex- emption for use of peyote by Native Americans was fatal to a purported interest in uniformity. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "The agencies' failure to directly challenge this con- clusion reflects their inability to identify any other means of achieving the goals of the Women's Health Amendment. RFRA also requires courts to \"take adequate ac- count of the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.\" Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. at 47 730 n.37 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The agencies' exemption not only deprives women of access to the preventive services the law guarantees, but also re-imposes the very harms the law set out to ameliorate. In the rules, the agencies brushed aside these concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "Ibid. But it is the law, not the government, that provides women with a right to cost-free preven- tive care. For the same reason, Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not aid their argu- ment. Br. 31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "1. An agency is powerless to act \"unless and until Congress confers power upon it.\" Louisiana Public Ser- vice [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Both their power to act and how they are to act is authori- tatively prescribed by Congress[.]\" City of 569 U.S. 290.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "Louisiana Public Ser- vice 476 U.S. 355. \"Both their power to act and how they are to act is authori- tatively prescribed by Congress[.]\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"first step in as- sessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to determine what authority the statute confers.\" 531 U.S. 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "City of 569 U.S. 290. The \"first step in as- sessing whether a statute delegates legislative power is to determine what authority the statute confers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. RFRA does not contain an independent grant of rulemaking authority. Instead, the agencies rely on the fact that RFRA applies to \"all Federal law, and the im- plementation of that law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "2000bb-3(a). But this provision simply indica tes that \"[a]ny law is sub- ject to challenge at any time by any individual.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not 49 authorize agencies to use RFRA as a sword to create exemptions from other laws where no violation of RFRA exists in the first place. The agencies' claim of au thority is particularly incongruent because they do not administer RFRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "29, then it does not authorize the agencies to disregard their obli- gation to enforce the ACA's preventive services guar- antee. Broad implicit authority to go beyond what RFRA requires would contravene basic principles of separa-tion of powers. This Court has never found that \"Con- gress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a second statute it does not ad-minister,\" Epic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], much less the authority to go beyond what an- other statute requires in creating exemptions from a statute it does administer, see Pension Benefit Guar- anty 496 U.S. 633. 50 Recognizing such a broad grant of rulemaking au- thority in RFRA would undermine the central role courts play in interpreting and enforcing the statute. O Centro ¸ 546 U.S. at 434.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "29, then it does not authorize the agencies to disregard their obli- gation to enforce the ACA's preventive services guar- antee. Broad implicit authority to go beyond what RFRA requires would contravene basic principles of separa-tion of powers. This Court has never found that \"Con- gress implicitly delegated to an agency authority to address the meaning of a second statute it does not ad-minister,\" Epic 138 S. Ct. 1612, much less the authority to go beyond what an- other statute requires in creating exemptions from a statute it does administer, see Pension Benefit Guar- anty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 50 Recognizing such a broad grant of rulemaking au- thority in RFRA would undermine the central role courts play in interpreting and enforcing the statute. O Centro ¸ 546 U.S. at 434.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. RFRA does not require the religious rule",
		"context": "3. The agencies' reliance, Br. 29, on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], undermines their case. Putting aside that Ricci involved a municipal- ity—and so did not address the delegated powers of federal agencies—the case shows why the religious rule is impermissible. In Ricci , a city had cancelled ra- cially disparate results from a firefighter promotion exam because it feared liability under Title VII for dis-parate-impact discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. If the Court Believes this is a Close Case, It Should Defer to Congress and Hold that Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers",
		"context": ". deference to the political branches' j udgment is appropriate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rev'd sub nom. Morrison , 487 U.S. 654 . As explained in section I.A , supra , the statutory scheme of Title 35 confirms that Congress did not intend for APJs to be principal Officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. If the Court Believes this is a Close Case, It Should Defer to Congress and Hold that Administrative Patent Judges are Inferior Officers",
		"context": "deference to the political branches' j udgment is appropriate.\" 510 U.S. 163 , rev'd sub nom. Morrison , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As explained in section I.A , supra , the statutory scheme of Title 35 confirms that Congress did not intend for APJs to be principal Officers for purposes of the Appointments Clause. A finding to the contrary not only renders the appointments of these APJs unconstitutional —despite nume rous indications that the Director exhibits direction and supervision over their work in a multitude of ways —but also risks \"upsetting Congress' considered judgment on the matter.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court Should Direct The Lower Court To Dismiss The Title III Proceedings",
		"context": "This Court then has the power to stay the effectiveness of its judgment for a brief period to allow the President to nominate and the Senate to confirm a new Board consistent with the Appointments Clause. The n, after a considered re- view, the constitutionally appointed Board members 70 could decide which of the unconstitutional Board's ac- tions should be ratified . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All this could take place before this Cou rt's judg- ment comes into effect. And i f the constitutionally ap- pointed Board appropriately decides to ratify the fil- ing of the Commonwealth and PR HTA Title III cases, there would be no need for the district court actually to dismiss them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Court Should Direct The Lower Court To Dismiss The Title III Proceedings",
		"context": "The President and the Senate subsequently remedied the Recess Appointments Clause violation, and \"all five members of a properly constituted Board\" then rati- fied cert ain prior decisions. Advanced Disposal Servs. E., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This remedy vindicate s the separation of powers, and also is faithful to PROMESA's design . PROMESA purports to commit significant federal power to the Board members' \"discretion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.3d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos altered our understanding of a bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings",
		"context": "That ar- gument misconstrues the standard. The test for a wa- tershed rule does not require a bedrock principle to be heretofore unknown ; it is enough that the right was unrecognized for a time because it was obscur ed by a decision of this Court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the paradigmatic watershed rule, illustrates the point. The right to counsel in Gideon did not come from whole cloth ; instead, 316 U.S. 455 , had \"departed from the sound wisdom\" of pre - existing authority. Gideon , 372 U.S. at 344– 45 (de- scribing Betts as \" an anachronism when handed down \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos altered our understanding of a bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings",
		"context": "The test for a wa- tershed rule does not require a bedrock principle to be heretofore unknown ; it is enough that the right was unrecognized for a time because it was obscur ed by a decision of this Court. 372 U.S. 335 , the paradigmatic watershed rule, illustrates the point. The right to counsel in Gideon did not come from whole cloth ; instead, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , had \"departed from the sound wisdom\" of pre - existing authority. Gideon , 372 U.S. at 344– 45 (de- scribing Betts as \" an anachronism when handed down \"). Although many States affor ded counsel to in- 9 digent defendants , some outlier states did not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ramos altered our understanding of a bedrock procedural element essential to the fairness of criminal proceedings",
		"context": "II, § 11 ). But the Sixth Amendment's jury trial right does not apply in Puerto Rico's courts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce",
		"context": "13, 18-19) its strained interpretation of Steele as involving a mere domestic application of the Act. It is implausi- ble to argue that Steele was concerned with the Act's \"focus,\" a concept this Court did not articulate until its decision in Morrison 60 years later. 29 Just as Congress may regulate intra state activity that has a \"substantial effect\" on inter state commerce, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g. , Unit- ed 514 U.S. 549, Congress may regulate overseas activity that substantially af- fects commerce moving between the United States and foreign countries. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434.8 2.The nature of the harm caused by trademark in- fringement explains why Congress extended the Lan- ham Act extraterritorially even though it did not do so with other forms of intellectual-property protection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce",
		"context": "It is implausi- ble to argue that Steele was concerned with the Act's \"focus,\" a concept this Court did not articulate until its decision in Morrison 60 years later. 29 Just as Congress may regulate intra state activity that has a \"substantial effect\" on inter state commerce, 545 U.S. 1; see, e.g. , Unit- ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Congress may regulate overseas activity that substantially af- fects commerce moving between the United States and foreign countries. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434.8 2.The nature of the harm caused by trademark in- fringement explains why Congress extended the Lan- ham Act extraterritorially even though it did not do so with other forms of intellectual-property protection. See Impression Prods., 581 U.S. 360.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce",
		"context": "29 Just as Congress may regulate intra state activity that has a \"substantial effect\" on inter state commerce, 545 U.S. 1; see, e.g. , Unit- ed 514 U.S. 549, Congress may regulate overseas activity that substantially af- fects commerce moving between the United States and foreign countries. See Japan Line, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].8 2.The nature of the harm caused by trademark in- fringement explains why Congress extended the Lan- ham Act extraterritorially even though it did not do so with other forms of intellectual-property protection. See Impression Prods., 581 U.S. 360. Copyright and patent infringement consummated abroad may cost a plaintiff sales.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 46 (quoting Trade-Mark Cases , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 more consequential character: it tarnishes the mark owner's reputation both domestically and abroad, thus creating the potential for a cascading loss of sales, dis- ruption of business, and harm to U.S. commerce. Ac- cord U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Lanham Act's Extraterritorial Reach Rightfully Encompasses Foreign Infringement That Substantially Affects U.S. Commerce",
		"context": "The damage caused by trademark infringement does not stop at international borders—and that is why the Lanham Act does not, either.9 3. Seven decades of experience applying the Lan- ham Act extraterritorially have vindicated Congress's judgment to impose liability for all infringement within its control, not just infringement confined within the United States. In Trader Joe's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for instance, the well-known grocery chain re- ceived a complaint \"from a consumer who became sick after eating a Trader Joe's-branded product she pur- chased from Pirate Joe's,\" a knockoff store in Canada. Id. at 964.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.3d 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "\"Waive\" is often used to refer to a decision to decline to seek payment of an amount owed. See Brooklyn Sav. 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And by authorizing the Secretary to \"modify\" these provisions, the Act allows him to change them so that the amount of a student debtor's loan obligation is re- duced. American Heritage Dictionary 545 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 U.S. 697",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "2003) (\"to make less extreme\"). To be sure, this Court has observed that the term \"modify\" sometimes connotes only limited or incremental changes, see MCI Telecomm. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see46 Op. O.L.C. 1, but that is only when surrounding context suggests that connotation. In MCI, this Court held that the FCC's authority to \"mod- ify\" tariff filing requirements did not \"contemplate\" a rule that would exempt most of the regulated market from filing at all. 512 U.S. at 228.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "§ 1098bb(a)(1). There are no \"exceptions\" to the modification authority. In fact, the authority exists \"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,\" id., and alongside the companion authority to \"waive\" pro- visions, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, the word \"modify\" can, in some cir- cumstances, refer to \"substantial\" changes up to and including the elimination of certain obligations in their entirety. For example, the power to \"modify\" a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "Furthermore, the word \"modify\" can, in some cir- cumstances, refer to \"substantial\" changes up to and including the elimination of certain obligations in their entirety. For example, the power to \"modify\" a term of imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) gives courts \"the power to 'reduce' an otherwise final sen- tence\" by any degree, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in federal budgeting, the authority to \"modify\" a loan authorizes \"changes [to] the estimated cost of an outstanding direct loan\" and can include \"forgiveness.\" Off.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 817",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "Nov. 14, 2022) (citing cancellation actions for students of closed schools). Courts have also permitted the Department of Ed- ucation and its predecessor, the Office of Education, to use the \"waiver\" authority to \"decline to enforce\" rights against a student, so long as the declination is \"in the larger interests of the student loan program.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Stipulation of Dismissal, Carr, No. 19-cv-6597 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2019), Dkt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.2d 1477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "§ 1098bb(a)(2). This text plainly grants the Secretary broad dis- cretion to determine what relief is appropriate for stu- dent borrowers affected by a national emergency. The phrase \"deems necessary\" \"fairly exudes deference\" to the Secretary, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and confers \"legitimate discretionary power,\" City of New 486 U.S. 57. In Webster, this Court emphasized the importance of the word \"deem\" in a statute granting the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency the authority to ter- minate an employee \"whenever he shall deem such ter- mination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.\" Webster, 486 U.S. at 615.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "§ 1098bb(a)(2). This text plainly grants the Secretary broad dis- cretion to determine what relief is appropriate for stu- dent borrowers affected by a national emergency. The phrase \"deems necessary\" \"fairly exudes deference\" to the Secretary, 486 U.S. 592, and confers \"legitimate discretionary power,\" City of New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Webster, this Court emphasized the importance of the word \"deem\" in a statute granting the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency the authority to ter- minate an employee \"whenever he shall deem such ter- mination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States.\" Webster, 486 U.S. at 615.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "; see id. at 615-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that it was \"com- pellingly obvious\" that the statutory text committed \"individual employee discharges to the Director's dis- cretion,\" but disagreeing with the conclusion that the 13 Director's decision was reviewable for constitutional defect); Fed. Energy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like the statute at issue in Webster, the HE- ROES Act \"exudes deference\" to the Secretary to de- termine when a waiver or modification of loan-related provisions is appropriate. To be sure, § 1098bb(a)(2) guides the Secretary's discretion by specifying the circumstances in which certain relief is appropriate, but even this guidance confers \"broad authority\" on the Secretary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 548",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "Like the statute at issue in Webster, the HE- ROES Act \"exudes deference\" to the Secretary to de- termine when a waiver or modification of loan-related provisions is appropriate. To be sure, § 1098bb(a)(2) guides the Secretary's discretion by specifying the circumstances in which certain relief is appropriate, but even this guidance confers \"broad authority\" on the Secretary. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This subsection provides that the Secretary may waive or modify student loan conditions \"as may be neces- sary to ensure\" that borrowers who are affected by na- tional emergencies \"are not placed in a worse position financially in relation to that financial assistance be- cause of their status as affected individuals,\" 20 U.S.C. § 1098bb(a)(2)(A), and that administrative require- ments placed on these borrowers are \"minimized .",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,\" Mourning , 411 U.S. at 369 (1973) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1408), require a \"reasonabl[e]\" relationship between the provisions of the Act and an agency's reg- ulation, id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also Merck & 962 F.3d 531. As the federal government explains in detail, the plan at is- sue here bears a \"reasonable\" relationship and a \"dis- cernible nexus\" to the goals articulated in § 1098bb(a)(2). See Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "§§ 1601 et seq. ; id. § 1621(b); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2003, the National Emergencies Act authorized the President to declare a national emergency and required that \"such 16 proclamation shall immediately be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.\" 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Text of the HEROES Act Makes Clear That the Secretary Has Broad Authority to Respond to National Emergencies",
		"context": "at 17, at issue here—an appropriate exercise of the au- thority that Congress has delegated to the agency charged with facilitating the administration of student loans. See supra 2-3; see also Ala. Ass'n of 141 S. Ct. 2485. It may be that Congress does not \"hide elephants in mouseholes,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but here the statute places the elephant in plain sight. Because the statute clearly authorizes the Secretary to take broad action, it authorizes policy decisions—even allegedly \"major\" ones, States' Resp. to Appl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Step 2: If visual indicators are present, does the feature have relatively permanent flow with a continuous surface connection to navigable-in-fact water?",
		"context": "And the rest belongs to the states. Supreme court precedent clearly indicates a disinterest in asserting federal jurisdi ction over isolated features and ephemeral tributaries that have little impact on downstream water quality. See generally Solid Waste [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 578 U.S. 590. A feature should only be jurisdictional if it satisfies both the visual indicators and relative permanen ce 20 requirements . Both steps are necessary to ensure that the federal government is regulating those water bodies that are contributing to downstream water quality and are more than \" the merest trickle. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Arizona Supreme Court's holding that Lynch is not a significant change in the law under Arizona's post-conviction procedural rules is an independent and adequate state-law ground to support the judgment",
		"context": "578 U.S. 488. In cases like this one, involving direct review of a state court judgment, the indepe ndent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional because \"this Court has no power to review a state law determination 14 that is sufficient to support the judgment,\" and \"resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A state court judgment r ests on an independent and adequate state procedural ground when the \"state court decline[s] to address a prisoner's federal claims because the prisoner … failed to meet a state procedural requirement.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Civil forfeitures operate as punishments",
		"context": ". Likewise, regardless o f what they are called, forfeitures involve ends, not means, as they constitute deprivation of criminal defendants (and sometimes unindicted persons or other completely innocent persons) of their property. This Court has recognized that both criminal forf eitures and civil forfeitures constitute fines for the purposes of the Excessive Fines Clause; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Austin the Court noted that various provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments expressly applied only to criminal proceedings, but The text of the Eighth Amendment includes no similar limitation. ...",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Civil forfeitures operate as punishments",
		"context": "The point of the exercise is to demonstrate that one cannot say categorically that imprisonment is more \"cruel and unusual\" than a fine or forfeiture. 17 such costs. As this Court said in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"forfeiture of property...[is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no correlation to any damages sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law.\" Purely and simply, civil forfeitures are additional punishment, procur ed through the civil courts rather than the criminal courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Automated Scraping of the Internet for Publicly Posted Data, for Whatever Purpose, Is Not Prohibited by the CFAA",
		"context": "; (4) subsequent dissemination of copyrighted material accessed may be prohibited by copyright law, including 12 the criminal provisions of the No Electronic Theft Act, 17 U.S.C. § 506(a)(B) & (C); and (5) taking of government information may be addressed by another provision of the CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B), or by 18 U.S. Code § 641 ( see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Another example is the violation of the terms of service for a website. Such a violation may result in a claim for breach of contract and the termination of service to the user who violated the terms of service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.2d 1057",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "Ct. Sept. 27, 2021).23 Any decision on the validity of those charges would be advisory. See 21 https://bit.ly/3jKkYm6 22 https://bit.ly/3m5lixr 23 https://bit.ly/3jdj7pX. 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Steel 523 U.S. 83.24 Second, the State earlier affirmatively accepted the Reservation in other cases, and the courts accepted that position. See Suppl. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "Ct. Sept. 27, 2021).23 Any decision on the validity of those charges would be advisory. See 21 https://bit.ly/3jKkYm6 22 https://bit.ly/3m5lixr 23 https://bit.ly/3jdj7pX. 13 568 U.S. 165; Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].24 Second, the State earlier affirmatively accepted the Reservation in other cases, and the courts accepted that position. See Suppl. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "filed Apr. 19, 2021).26 The State is therefore barred from raising this argument here in an unfair appellate ambush. See New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, the State did not challenge the Reservation in the proceedings below and thus waived its chal- lenge to McGirt . \"Waiver is the intentional relin- quishment or abandonment of a known right,\" 566 U.S. 463.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "See New 532 U.S. 742. Third, the State did not challenge the Reservation in the proceedings below and thus waived its chal- lenge to McGirt . \"Waiver is the intentional relin- quishment or abandonment of a known right,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is exactly what happened below. The OCCA remanded for a hearing on the existence of the Reservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "The OCCA remanded for a hearing on the existence of the Reservation. 27 24 This case does not deal with injuries too fleeting to be litigated but likely to recur. See Kingdomware Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 https://bit.ly/3lM1Wgz 26 https://bit.ly/3jjP67S. The State's decision to allow Hogner to become final suggests its chal lenge to the Reservation is barred by non-mutual collateral estoppel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "25 https://bit.ly/3lM1Wgz 26 https://bit.ly/3jjP67S. The State's decision to allow Hogner to become final suggests its chal lenge to the Reservation is barred by non-mutual collateral estoppel. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1980); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 905 F.2d 571. 27 Order Remanding for Evidentiary Hr'g at 4, Castro-Huerta v. State , No. F-2017-1203 (Oka.",
		"citation_value_orig": "895 P.2d 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "25 https://bit.ly/3lM1Wgz 26 https://bit.ly/3jjP67S. The State's decision to allow Hogner to become final suggests its chal lenge to the Reservation is barred by non-mutual collateral estoppel. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1980); see also 895 P.2d 947; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27 Order Remanding for Evidentiary Hr'g at 4, Castro-Huerta v. State , No. F-2017-1203 (Oka.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.2d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The State Cannot Challenge the Existence of the Cherokee Reservation in this Moot Case",
		"context": "filed Aug. 19, 2020), https://bit.ly/3aL99r0. 14 The State neither challenged McGirt ,28 nor the Nation's and Respondent's arguments that the Reser- vation still exists.29 After remand, the State repeated without objection the District Court's conclusion that the Reservation exists.30 The State's effort to reverse its decisions not to challenge the existence of the Reservation \"comes too late in the day.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If more were needed to show this petition is a poor vehicle, Respondent has pleaded guilty to federal charges for his crime. United States v. Castro-Huerta , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The court of appeals' concern that the scandalous-marks provision has been applied inconsistently provides no basis for invalidating that provision",
		"context": "Like analysis of other regis- trab ility criteria, i t also requires consideration of evi- dence of \"contemporary attitudes,\" whi ch naturally change over time. Ibid. ; cf., e.g., De Walt, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that some marks bear superficial similarities to others therefore does not establish that the USPTO erred in treating them differently. See In re774 F.3d 747.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 F.2d 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The court of appeals' concern that the scandalous-marks provision has been applied inconsistently provides no basis for invalidating that provision",
		"context": "; cf., e.g., De Walt, 289 F.2d 656. The fact that some marks bear superficial similarities to others therefore does not establish that the USPTO erred in treating them differently. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the USPTO examines more than 400,000 trademark applications each year. If an individual USPTO examining attorney improperly allows a mark to be registered or improperly refuses registration, that error \"do[es] not bind the USPTO to improperly regis- ter\" or refuse to register similar marks in the future.",
		"citation_value_orig": "774 F.3d 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The court of appeals' concern that the scandalous-marks provision has been applied inconsistently provides no basis for invalidating that provision",
		"context": "Thus, even if respondent could identify clear in- consistenc ies between particular registration decisions, there would be no sound basis to conclude that the scandalous -marks provision is incapable of principled application. In any event, concerns about outcomes in individual cases do not justify the \"strong medic ine\" of facial in- validation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 559 U.S. 460 ( explaining that, \"[i]n the First Amendment con- text,\" the Court recognizes a \" 'type of facial challenge,' whereby a law m ay be invalidated as overbroad if 'a sub- stantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep' \") (citation omitted). Any alleged inconsistencies reflected in prior USPTO decisions provide no valid ba- sis for holding that the agency must register scandalous marks, including even those \"whose offensiveness can- not be reasonably questioned.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The court of appeals' concern that the scandalous-marks provision has been applied inconsistently provides no basis for invalidating that provision",
		"context": "Thus, even if respondent could identify clear in- consistenc ies between particular registration decisions, there would be no sound basis to conclude that the scandalous -marks provision is incapable of principled application. In any event, concerns about outcomes in individual cases do not justify the \"strong medic ine\" of facial in- validation. 413 U.S. 601; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( explaining that, \"[i]n the First Amendment con- text,\" the Court recognizes a \" 'type of facial challenge,' whereby a law m ay be invalidated as overbroad if 'a sub- stantial number of its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep' \") (citation omitted). Any alleged inconsistencies reflected in prior USPTO decisions provide no valid ba- sis for holding that the agency must register scandalous marks, including even those \"whose offensiveness can- not be reasonably questioned.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A noninvestigatory search of the home does not relegate it to a lesser degree of scrutiny",
		"context": "Id. at 126 n.5. If there was evidence that the presence of a firearm in the house posed an imminent threat of bodily harm to someone in the house, then the police would have been permitted to enter without a warrant unde r Brigham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (200 6). Finally, concluding that the officers' intentions determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection would be anomalous . The practical impact of such a holding would provide officers with more leniency to invade the privacy of average citizens than the officers enjoy when investigating those suspected of crimes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A noninvestigatory search of the home does not relegate it to a lesser degree of scrutiny",
		"context": "The practical impact of such a holding would provide officers with more leniency to invade the privacy of average citizens than the officers enjoy when investigating those suspected of crimes. Fourth Amendment protections should not apply with more force when the person searched is suspected of a crime than when the person is not. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. TVA's immunity from suit based on performance of discretionary functions is necessary to avoid interference with important governmental functions",
		"context": "For similar reasons, construing the TVA Act's sue - and-be-sued clause not to waive sovereign immunity for discretionary functions is appropriate under the second (and related) justification described in Burr because it 37 \"is necessary to avoid grave interference with the per- formance of governmental function [s]\" that Con- gress has assigned to TVA. Burr , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition to the prevention of judicial second - guessing of executive policymaking decisions in dam- ages actions , immunity for discretionary function s \"pro- tect[s] the Government from liability that would seri- ously handicap efficient government operations. \" Varig Airlines , 467 U.S. at 814 (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. TVA's immunity from suit based on performance of discretionary functions is necessary to avoid interference with important governmental functions",
		"context": "That mandate was critical to bring electricity to the Tennessee Val- ley's vast rural areas, TVA History 5, 9, 12, 45, and TVA's power operations \"improve the economy of the area served by TVA power and promote the general welfare of the nation.\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff 'd, 375 F.2d 120. Moreover, this Court recognized in Ashwander , su- pra, that TVA's furnishing of electric power, which here is accomplished by power transmission lines like the one that was being repaired in this case when the accident occurred, is an exercise of the government's a uthority under Article IV , § 3 of the Constitution to dispose of the property of the United States. 297 U.S. at 330 (ob-serving with respect to generation of hydroelectric power that \"[t] he power of falling water \" is an inevitable result of the construction of a dam and the \"electric en- ergy thus produced[] constitute[s] property belonging to the United States \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "246 F. Supp. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. TVA's immunity from suit based on performance of discretionary functions is necessary to avoid interference with important governmental functions",
		"context": "That mandate was critical to bring electricity to the Tennessee Val- ley's vast rural areas, TVA History 5, 9, 12, 45, and TVA's power operations \"improve the economy of the area served by TVA power and promote the general welfare of the nation.\" United States ex rel. 246 F. Supp. 263 , aff 'd, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, this Court recognized in Ashwander , su- pra, that TVA's furnishing of electric power, which here is accomplished by power transmission lines like the one that was being repaired in this case when the accident occurred, is an exercise of the government's a uthority under Article IV , § 3 of the Constitution to dispose of the property of the United States. 297 U.S. at 330 (ob-serving with respect to generation of hydroelectric power that \"[t] he power of falling water \" is an inevitable result of the construction of a dam and the \"electric en- ergy thus produced[] constitute[s] property belonging to the United States \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.2d 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. TVA's immunity from suit based on performance of discretionary functions is necessary to avoid interference with important governmental functions",
		"context": "The Court has observed that \"[l] egitimate activities of govern ments are sometimes classified as ' govern- mental ' or 'proprietary ,' \" but the Court's \" decisions have made it clear that the Federal Government per-forms no ' proprietary ' functions. If the enabling Act is constitutional and if the instrumentality 's activity is within the authority granted by the Act, a governmental function is being performed .\" Federal Land [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 10 Http://www.usbr.gov/power/who/who.html (last updated Jan. 1, 2018). 40 (footnote omitted) . The repairs being conducted by TVA to the power transmission line in t his case were specifically authorized by Congress, and TVA was therefore engaged in a governmental function.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any alternative apportionment-based injuries are also too speculative",
		"context": "See J.S. App. 43a; see also United States Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It likew ise is too speculative for appellees to allege that they might be \"disproportionately deprive[d] of federal funding .\" D. Ct. Doc.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any alternative apportionment-based injuries are also too speculative",
		"context": "Appellees have suggested that they bear a lesser burden in showing their alleged apportionment -based injuries because they are seeking to defeat mootness ra-ther than to establish standing. NY Mot. 17 (citing Frien ds of the Earth, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Even setting aside that their premise is wrong —their \"chilling ef- fect\" injuries were always insufficient to establish standing, see pp. 17 -18, supra— their conclusion is le- gally flawed .",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any alternative apportionment-based injuries are also too speculative",
		"context": "The Memorandum's effects will be more concrete at that point, and appellees will su ffer no harm at this time from that modest delay . See pp . 16-17, su- pra; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The environmental impact statement that the court of appeals cited lacks any prescriptive, trust-creating force",
		"context": "Navajo II , 556 U.S. at 302. Rather, it is an agency's \"written consideration of environmental issues in con- nection with certain major federal actions .\" Aberdeen & Rockfish R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 42 U.S.C. 4332(2)(C). The Final EIS thus lacks the \"prescripti[ve] ,\" \"rights -creating or duty -imposing\" force necessary to establish that the government has ac- cepted a judicially enforceable trust obligation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. AN OVERTURN OF ROE WOULD NOT LIKELY INCREASE MATERNAL MORTALITY BECAUSE ROE WAS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REDUCTION IN MATERNAL MORTALITY FROM ABORTION",
		"context": "TALITY FROM ABORTION. Abortion proponents frequently make grossly erroneous assertions with respect to the number of women supposedly dying fr om back-alley and self- induced abortions prior to Roe. For example, in briefs submitted to this Court in Planned [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Petitioners claimed that in the 1950's and 1960's as many as \"5,000 to 10,000 women died each year\" from \"back-alley and self-induced abortions.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability",
		"context": ". This Court has repeatedly emphasized the care courts must take before invalidating an Act of Con- gress. It is \"the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform,\" Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's reluctance to frustrate the democratic process by striking down an Act of Congress applies equally to the question of severability. In those cases, the question becomes whether to strike down an entire Act of Congress because only part of it is unconstitu- tional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability",
		"context": "In those cases, the question becomes whether to strike down an entire Act of Congress because only part of it is unconstitu- tional. Time and again, this Court has emphasized that courts must \"refrain from in validating more of [a] stat- ute than is necessary.\" Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[W]hen confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,\" this Court will endeavor \"to limit the solution to the prob- lem,\" severing any \"problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.\" Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability",
		"context": "\"[W]hen confronting a constitutional flaw in a statute,\" this Court will endeavor \"to limit the solution to the prob- lem,\" severing any \"problematic portions while leaving the remainder intact.\" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, a Court must sever an un- constitutional portion of a statute from the remainder 13 \"[u]nless it is evident that [Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.'\" Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting 424 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability",
		"context": "561 U.S. 477. Thus, a Court must sever an un- constitutional portion of a statute from the remainder 13 \"[u]nless it is evident that [Congress] would not have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of that which is not.'\" Alaska Airlines, Inc., 480 U.S. at 684 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"touchstone\" of the severability analysis \"is leg- islative intent\": \"Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statut e to no statute at all?\" Ayotte , 546 U.S. at 328-330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There Is A Strong Presumption In Favor Of Severability",
		"context": "The \"touchstone\" of the severability analysis \"is leg- islative intent\": \"Would the legislature have preferred what is left of its statut e to no statute at all?\" Ayotte , 546 U.S. at 328-330. To an swer that question, the Court looks to whether, absen t the stricken provision, the statute is \"'fully operat ive as a law,'\" and whether \"the infirmity [of one part of the Act]\" results in \"the total frustration of Co ngress' basic purpose,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As detailed below, the legislative history unambiguously confirms that the BPCIA is severable from the individ- ual mandate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cases Addressing the Government's Authority as a Contracting Party and as the Manager of Its Own Internal Affairs Should Decide this Case",
		"context": "Like any private entity, the City may properly refuse to enter into a contract with a party that expressly refuses to perform a material term of that contract—as CSS has done here. 2 See Perkins , 310 U.S. at 127; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Short of circumstances not present in this case indicating a 2 Indeed, discussed in Section II, under modern federal con- tracting law, a federal agency cannot award a contract when it knows that the contractor cannot or will not meet material terms of the contract. 13 deliberate attempt to exclude or discriminate against a contractor willing and ab le to perform the contract for services, the government should have the authority and discretion to decide wi th whom it will contract and on what terms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cases Addressing the Government's Authority as a Contracting Party and as the Manager of Its Own Internal Affairs Should Decide this Case",
		"context": "Short of circumstances not present in this case indicating a 2 Indeed, discussed in Section II, under modern federal con- tracting law, a federal agency cannot award a contract when it knows that the contractor cannot or will not meet material terms of the contract. 13 deliberate attempt to exclude or discriminate against a contractor willing and ab le to perform the contract for services, the government should have the authority and discretion to decide wi th whom it will contract and on what terms. Perkins , 310 U.S. at 127; Engquist , 553 U.S. at 598-99; NASA , 562 U.S. at 150; Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 422; Atkin , 191 U.S. at 221-23; Ellis , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners argue that the Court should look to Free Exercise authorities that, from my perspective, have no relevance in the context of an objection to an otherwise lawful requirement of a contract for govern-ment services. In particular, I have significant concern that if the Court accepts Petitioners' invitation to overturn Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Divi- 494 U.S. 872, particularly in the context of a contract for government services, it would severely undermine the government's ability to effec-tively contract and manage its own affairs, for all of the reasons recognized in Engquist , Atkin , and the other cases discussed above.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Cases Addressing the Government's Authority as a Contracting Party and as the Manager of Its Own Internal Affairs Should Decide this Case",
		"context": "Perkins , 310 U.S. at 127; Engquist , 553 U.S. at 598-99; NASA , 562 U.S. at 150; Garcetti , 547 U.S. at 422; Atkin , 191 U.S. at 221-23; Ellis , 206 U.S. 246. Petitioners argue that the Court should look to Free Exercise authorities that, from my perspective, have no relevance in the context of an objection to an otherwise lawful requirement of a contract for govern-ment services. In particular, I have significant concern that if the Court accepts Petitioners' invitation to overturn Justice Scalia's opinion in Employment Divi- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], particularly in the context of a contract for government services, it would severely undermine the government's ability to effec-tively contract and manage its own affairs, for all of the reasons recognized in Engquist , Atkin , and the other cases discussed above. 3 To put it plainly, Petitioners 3 Petitioners have the misconception that CSS, not the City, has rightful authority to direct these services. See Petitioners' Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "That does not further legiti- mate state interests. \"[P]olitical belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected b y the First Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Vieth , Justice Kennedy explained partisan ger- rymand ering implicates \"the First Amend ment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, 14 their ass ociation with a political party, or their expression of political views. \" Vieth , 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing427 U.S. 347 (plurality opinion) ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "427 U.S. 347. In Vieth , Justice Kennedy explained partisan ger- rymand ering implicates \"the First Amend ment interest of not burdening or penalizing citizens because of their participation in the electoral process, their voting history, 14 their ass ociation with a political party, or their expression of political views. \" Vieth , 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (plurality opinion) ). He explained that a First Amend- ment inquiry would focus on \"whether political classifica- tions were used to burden a group 's representational rights. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "Id. at 324–25 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Elrod , 427 U.S. at 356 (plurality op inion) ). Justice Kennedy's reasoning came before the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which is a prior decision in the case that is now captioned Lamone v. Benisek , No. 18 -726. The plaintiff s had as- serted a First Amendment partisan gerrymandering claim based on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Vieth .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": "Because Justice Kennedy 's legal theory was \"uncontra- dicted by the majority in any of [the Court's] cases, \" the claim invoking it was not \"'constitution ally insubstan- tial,'\" and should have been referred to a three -judge 15 panel. Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). On remand , the three -judge panel appropriately adopted a standard reflecting the longstanding First Amendment norm prohibiting a partisan purpose for state action absent a legitimate state interest. See Benisek , 348 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "409 U.S. 512",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Court's First Amendment decisions support the norm that government action solely for partisan advantage is illegitimate",
		"context": ". to some extent 16 represent the views of one political party transiently en- joying majority power. \" 479 U.S. at 224; see also Cling- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[I]t must be recognized that [the State] is not a wholly independent or neu tral arbiter. Rather, the State is itself controlled by the political party or parties in power, which presumably have an incentive to shape the rules of the electoral game to their own benefit. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations",
		"context": "Ultimately, that concern proved unfounded. See CCC Info. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a company alleged that Michigan had used its advertising materials without permission. Register's Report 92-93. The Sixth Circuit rejected that claim, holding that Michigan had not infringed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "44 F.3d 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations",
		"context": "Lane , 737 F. Supp. at 119. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a company alleged that Illinois had infringed its copyrights. Register's Report 93-94. But the district court held that the company was not likely to succeed on its claim because it could not \"establish[ ] the threshold requirement of infringement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 F. Supp. 499",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Congress did not identify a widespread pattern of violations",
		"context": "See Garrett , 531 U.S. at 371 (observing that \"had Congress truly understood\" the legislative record to \"reflect[ ] a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by States, one would expect some mention of that conclusion in the Act's legislative findings\"). 49 Amendment because Congress had \"document[ed] in considerable detail the factual basis\" for its conclusion that States had carried out \"unremitting\" \"racial discrimination in voting.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing even approaching that level of unconstitutional activity is present here. In sum, the record here reveals \"scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "1. Article III standing is \"an essential and unchang- ing part of the case -or-controversy requirement.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In order for a party to have standing to sue, it \"must 14 have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly trace- able to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.\" Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. 1540.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "504 U.S. 555. In order for a party to have standing to sue, it \"must 14 have (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly trace- able to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.\" Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Each of these elements \"must be supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation,\" from com- plaint through trial. Lujan , 504 U.S .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "at 561. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that \"stand- ing is not dispensed in gross ,\" such that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.\" Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but that alone does not entitle it also to seek a prospective in- junction, see, e.g., City of Los 461 U.S. 95 . In short, a plaintiff bringing a claim for nominal dam- ages must always demonstrate an injury -in-fact, causa- tion, and redressability , regardless of what other claims for relief are sought for the alleged legal violation . As demonstrated below, where the violation concerns a vi- olation of the plaintiff 's own rights, a claim for nominal damages will typically satisfy these Article III re quire- ments , even if the alleged violation has ended .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "at 561. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that \"stand- ing is not dispensed in gross ,\" such that \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.\" Town of 137 S. Ct. 1645 , but that alone does not entitle it also to seek a prospective in- junction, see, e.g., City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, a plaintiff bringing a claim for nominal dam- ages must always demonstrate an injury -in-fact, causa- tion, and redressability , regardless of what other claims for relief are sought for the alleged legal violation . As demonstrated below, where the violation concerns a vi- olation of the plaintiff 's own rights, a claim for nominal damages will typically satisfy these Article III re quire- ments , even if the alleged violation has ended .",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "While \"tangible injuries\" like the loss of money are paradigmatic examples, even \" intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.\" Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549. For example, this Court has held that a plaint iff 's \"ina- bility to obtain information\" to which it allegedly has a statutory right is a judicially cognizable injury -in-fact, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as is the \"denial of equal treatment\" from an alleged violation of the E qual Protection Clause, Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the As- sociated Gen. 508 U.S. 656 . Although there are some circum- stances in which a violation of a plaintiff 's own personal legal rights , without a further showing of concrete harm, will not qualify as an Article III injury -in-fact sufficient to support any type of relief, those exceptions prove the rule. See Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1 550 (discuss- ing \"a bare procedural violation\" unconnected to any substantive entitlement, o r allegedly \"incorrect\" re- porting of immaterial information); see also id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "While \"tangible injuries\" like the loss of money are paradigmatic examples, even \" intangible injuries can nevertheless be concrete.\" Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1549. For example, this Court has held that a plaint iff 's \"ina- bility to obtain information\" to which it allegedly has a statutory right is a judicially cognizable injury -in-fact, 524 U.S. 11 , as is the \"denial of equal treatment\" from an alleged violation of the E qual Protection Clause, Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the As- sociated Gen. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Although there are some circum- stances in which a violation of a plaintiff 's own personal legal rights , without a further showing of concrete harm, will not qualify as an Article III injury -in-fact sufficient to support any type of relief, those exceptions prove the rule. See Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1 550 (discuss- ing \"a bare procedural violation\" unconnected to any substantive entitlement, o r allegedly \"incorrect\" re- porting of immaterial information); see also id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "This Court has not ques- tioned the basic principle that a plaintiff must establish an Article III in jury -in-fact before a federal court can exercise jurisdiction over a nominal damages claim. Cf. Vermont Agency of Natural Re [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. A government's actual abridgement of a person's own freedom of speech, as alleged here, is unquestiona- bly an intangible Article III injury -in-fact itself , even apart from the tangible punishment that would be im-posed for vi olating the speech restriction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "b. A government's actual abridgement of a person's own freedom of speech, as alleged here, is unquestiona- bly an intangible Article III injury -in-fact itself , even apart from the tangible punishment that would be im-posed for vi olating the speech restriction. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Uzuegbunam alleges that he was affirma- tively prevented from engaging in constitutionally pro-tected speech by the university's enfo rcement of the challenged polic ies against him . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "at 104a -113a. Thus, in \"challeng[ing] governmental action as a violation of the First Amendment,\" petitioners suf-ficiently pleaded \" 'a claim of specific [past] objective harm.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Here, however, B radford's claim does not rest merely on subjective chill , but on the existence and active en- forcement of a rule that p rohibit ed his intended con- duct. See p. 4, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "3. Because petitioners have alleged cognizable Arti- cle III injuries -in-fact caused by respondents' chal- lenged conduct, the only remaining question for pur- poses of Article III standing is whet her nominal dam- ages redress the injur ies. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They do. As historical prac tice confirms, n ominal dam- ages are a recognized form of redress for violation s of a 18 plaintiff 's legal rights, and they provide that redress by vindicating legal rights while also providing a modest measure of monetary re compens e. See 422 U.S. 490.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "See 555 U.S. 488. They do. As historical prac tice confirms, n ominal dam- ages are a recognized form of redress for violation s of a 18 plaintiff 's legal rights, and they provide that redress by vindicating legal rights while also providing a modest measure of monetary re compens e. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a. At the outset, t he historical provenance of nomi- nal damages strongly supports the conclusion that they satisfy Article III's redressability requirement .",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "At the outset, t he historical provenance of nomi- nal damages strongly supports the conclusion that they satisfy Article III's redressability requirement . Histor- ical practice \"is particularly relevant to the constitu- tional standing inquiry since Article III's restric - tion of the judicial power to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' is properly understood to mean 'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and reso lved by, the judicial process.' \" Vermont Agency , 529 U.S. at 774 (quoting Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see Sprint Commc'ns Co., L. 554 U.S. 269. \"Common -law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the awa rd of a nominal sum of money.\" Carey , 435 U.S. at 266.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "At the outset, t he historical provenance of nomi- nal damages strongly supports the conclusion that they satisfy Article III's redressability requirement . Histor- ical practice \"is particularly relevant to the constitu- tional standing inquiry since Article III's restric - tion of the judicial power to 'Cases' and 'Controversies' is properly understood to mean 'cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and reso lved by, the judicial process.' \" Vermont Agency , 529 U.S. at 774 (quoting Steel 523 U.S. 83); see Sprint Commc'ns Co., L. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Common -law courts traditionally have vindicated deprivations of certain 'absolute' rights that are not shown to have caused actual injury through the awa rd of a nominal sum of money.\" Carey , 435 U.S. at 266.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "A s discussed above, plaintiffs at common law were not re- quired to show that they had suffered compensable in- juries in ord er to recover nominal damages, and nomi- nal damages were char acteristically awarded where plaintiff s failed to prove entitlement to a compensatory damages award —or did not seek compensatory dam- ages in the first place. See pp. 10 -12, supra ; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reaffirming that nominal damages \"are the appropriate means of 'vindicating' \" 19 violations of constitutional and other personal legal rights in appropriate circumstances). b. Importantly, the means through which nominal damages vindicate the past deprivation of a plaintiff 's own legal rights is not through an abstract declaration, but through a concrete award of monetary relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "And for Ar- ticle III purposes, it is sufficient that a judicial remedy \"would at least partially redress\" the plaintiff 's inju- ries. Keene , 481 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added); cf. Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, nominal damages also have a significant non-compensatory element in vindicating a plaintiff 's legal rights, but it is well established that Article III courts can a ward monetary relief as a means of redressing past injury even where that relief is non -compensatory. For example, \"[p]unitive damages by definition are not intended t o compensate the injured party .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "To be sure, nominal damages also have a significant non-compensatory element in vindicating a plaintiff 's legal rights, but it is well established that Article III courts can a ward monetary relief as a means of redressing past injury even where that relief is non -compensatory. For example, \"[p]unitive damages by definition are not intended t o compensate the injured party .\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, they \"advance the interests of punish- ment and deterrence, which are also among the inter- ests advanced by the criminal law.\" Exxon Shipping 554 U.S. 471.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "City of 453 U.S. 247. Rather, they \"advance the interests of punish- ment and deterrence, which are also among the inter- ests advanced by the criminal law.\" Exxon Shipping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Punitive damages are nonetheless an accepted remedy for willful or reckless violations of constitu-tional rights under Section 1983 , without regard to 20 whether the plaint iff himself faces a threat of future in- jury that is being prevented . 461 U.S. 30 ; see Stachura , 477 U.S. at 305 n.8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "Exxon Shipping 554 U.S. 471. Punitive damages are nonetheless an accepted remedy for willful or reckless violations of constitu-tional rights under Section 1983 , without regard to 20 whether the plaint iff himself faces a threat of future in- jury that is being prevented . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Stachura , 477 U.S. at 305 n.8. Because \"standing is not dispensed in gross,\" Town of Chester , 137 S. Ct. at 1650 (citation omitted) , standing for puni- tive damages must exist separate and apart from st and- ing for compensatory damages —and a punitive dam- ages award thus necessarily provides Article III re- dress for past violations despite its non -compensatory character. Indeed, without any suggestion of Article III concerns, courts of appeals have authorized punitive damages under Section 1983 even when compensatory damages are not awarded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "Because \"standing is not dispensed in gross,\" Town of Chester , 137 S. Ct. at 1650 (citation omitted) , standing for puni- tive damages must exist separate and apart from st and- ing for compensatory damages —and a punitive dam- ages award thus necessarily provides Article III re- dress for past violations despite its non -compensatory character. Indeed, without any suggestion of Article III concerns, courts of appeals have authorized punitive damages under Section 1983 even when compensatory damages are not awarded. See , e.g., Cush [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[T] he general rule [is] that a punitive award may stand in the absence of actual damages where there has been a con- stitutional violation . \"), cert. denied,532 U.S. 904.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 F.3d 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For Article III purposes, when a plaintiff suffers a cognizable injury-in-fact, nominal damages provide redress",
		"context": "If Congress were to amend Section 1983 to authorize a m inimum $1 000 award for First Amend- ment violations , a plaintiff whose own speech had been suppressed would have standing to seek tha t remedy without any further showing . See Spokeo , 136 S. Ct. at 1548- 1550; Vermont Agency , 529 U.S. at 773- 778; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( inter- preting a particular federal statute to provide that \"ad- versely affected \" plaintiffs \"must prove some actual 21 damages to qualify for a minimum statutory award of $1,000,\" without suggesting that the contrary interpre- tation would have raised Article III concerns) . Such fixed monetary relief for a past legal violation do es not somehow cease t o provide redress for the plaintiff 's injury -in-fact if Congress or the courts instead cho ose to fix the quantum of damages below some floor that is deemed \"non -compensatory,\" such as $100, $10, or $1. Article III provides neither a legal principle nor a work- able standard to second -guess the amount of monetary relief awarded.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "The statute's text, structure, and history all rebut the inclusion—express or implied—of such a stay. As in all statutory interpretation cases, the Court must \"begin [its] search for Congress's intent\" in the FAA by analyzing the statute's \"text and structure.\" 142 S. Ct. 2486[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because the \"search for significance\" in Congress's silence is \"often the pursuit of a mirage,\" Scripps-Howard 316 U.S. 4. Section 16 makes for quick work textually. It lists seven specific instances in which appeals (most of them interlocutory) \"may be taken,\" § 16(a), and it lists four specific instances in which interlocutory appeals \"may not be taken,\" § 16(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "The statute's text, structure, and history all rebut the inclusion—express or implied—of such a stay. As in all statutory interpretation cases, the Court must \"begin [its] search for Congress's intent\" in the FAA by analyzing the statute's \"text and structure.\" 142 S. Ct. 2486561 U.S. 320, because the \"search for significance\" in Congress's silence is \"often the pursuit of a mirage,\" Scripps-Howard [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 16 makes for quick work textually. It lists seven specific instances in which appeals (most of them interlocutory) \"may be taken,\" § 16(a), and it lists four specific instances in which interlocutory appeals \"may not be taken,\" § 16(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "§ 3. This stay is mandatory; Section 3 \"requires courts to stay litigation of arbitral claims\" once compelled. AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has long read the FAA holistically, understanding that its sections talk to each other and form \"integral parts of a whole.\" New Prime 139 S. Ct. 532, allowing appeals to be taken from orders \"refusing a stay\" under Section 3, § 16(a)(1)(A), but barring appeals from orders \"granting a stay\" under Section 3, § 16(b)(1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333. This Court has long read the FAA holistically, understanding that its sections talk to each other and form \"integral parts of a whole.\" New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], allowing appeals to be taken from orders \"refusing a stay\" under Section 3, § 16(a)(1)(A), but barring appeals from orders \"granting a stay\" under Section 3, § 16(b)(1). When Congress wrote Section 16 and tied it to Section 3, it was aware of Section 3's explicit mandatory-stay provision. After all, Section 16 twice refers to Section 3 stays.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "In those instances, Congress -12- elected to make Section 16(a) appeals available immediately—not to stay the whole case. \"Congress designed the [FAA] in a specific way,\" and it is not the \"proper role\" of the courts \"to redesign the statute.\" Henry Schein, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given the threads that link Sections 3 and 16, as well as the statutory text that separates them, the Court can confidently draw conclusions about Congress's intent. Two interconnected parts of the FAA work in tandem—in one, Congress requires automatic stays; in the other, it does not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "A statute's \"failure to mention\" certain procedures (such as automatic stays) \"only reinforces that the statute doesn't speak to such procedures.\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The presence of an automatic-stay proviso in one part and the conspicuous absence of such a provision in another part of the same bill is far more probative than language in a different bill passed on a different day on a different subject matter. See Pet'r.Br.3, 17-18, 36, 37, 38.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA's text, structure, and history confirm that Congress did not create an automatic stay for Section 16(a) appeals.",
		"context": "See Pet'r.Br.3, 17-18, 36, 37, 38. This is not the first time the Court has confronted an argument attempting to graft implicit superpowers onto Section 16. In First Options of Chicago, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], petitioner argued that the FAA was \"special\" because Section 16 allowed appellate courts \"to conduct interlocutory review of -14- . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 938",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period",
		"context": "Petitioner's argument (Br. 13) that \"the discovery rule applies\" to private FDCPA actions might be under- stood as contending that Section 1692k(d) should be interpreted to give the plaintiff one year to file suit after he discover s or reasonably should have discovered the alleged violation. Although courts do not use the term \"discovery rule\" consistently, see William A. Graham [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 149 -150 (3d Cir.) (collect- ing cases), cert. denied,565 U.S. 963, this Court and others have often used the term to refer to \"a doc- trine that delays accrual of a cause of action\" —and with it, the start of the limitations p eriod —\"until the plaintiff has 'discovered' it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "646 F.3d 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period",
		"context": "(collect- ing cases), cert. denied,565 U.S. 963, this Court and others have often used the term to refer to \"a doc- trine that delays accrual of a cause of action\" —and with it, the start of the limitations p eriod —\"until the plaintiff has 'discovered' it.\" Merck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 568 U.S. 442; 920 F.2d 446 , cert. denied,501 U.S. 1261 . Where the doctrine applies, an action is deemed to be timely if the plaintiff files suit within the pre- scribed period following discovery of the cause of action .",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period",
		"context": "(collect- ing cases), cert. denied,565 U.S. 963, this Court and others have often used the term to refer to \"a doc- trine that delays accrual of a cause of action\" —and with it, the start of the limitations p eriod —\"until the plaintiff has 'discovered' it.\" Merck & 559 U.S. 633; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 920 F.2d 446 , cert. denied,501 U.S. 1261 . Where the doctrine applies, an action is deemed to be timely if the plaintiff files suit within the pre- scribed period following discovery of the cause of action .",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Section 1692k(d) cannot fairly be construed to identify the plaintiff's actual or constructive discovery of a violation as the event that triggers the FDCPA's one-year limitations period",
		"context": "(collect- ing cases), cert. denied,565 U.S. 963, this Court and others have often used the term to refer to \"a doc- trine that delays accrual of a cause of action\" —and with it, the start of the limitations p eriod —\"until the plaintiff has 'discovered' it.\" Merck & 559 U.S. 633; see, e.g., 568 U.S. 442; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,501 U.S. 1261 . Where the doctrine applies, an action is deemed to be timely if the plaintiff files suit within the pre- scribed period following discovery of the cause of action .",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 F.2d 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "Br. 21 -22 & n.8) supports their broad \"practical effects\" inqu iry. In C&A Carbone, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court invalidated a waste -processing ordinance that deprived \"out-of-state firms [] of access to a local mar- ket,\" holding that the ordinance \"discriminate[d] against interstate commerce.\" Id. at 386, 390; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "Br. 34. In Southern Pacific [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court applied an early form of Pike balanc- ing to strike down an Arizona law that burdened an instrumentality of interstate commerce by limit ing train lengths . The law required \" breaking up and 22 remaking long trains upon entering and leaving the state,\" which \"delay[ ed] the traffic and dimi nish[ed ] its volume moved in a given time .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "Id. at 378. That regime would be profoundly at odds with the Constituti on's commitment to safeguarding the States' \"substantial sovereign authority ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and preserving the \"numer- ous and indefinite\" powers that were meant \"to remain in the State governments,\" The Federalist No. 45 23 (James Madison). From the founding to the present day, States have enacted laws that regulate in -state commerce but have the practical effect of influencing business decisions of actors in other States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "Those statutes rang e from founding -era \"inspection laws,\" Livingston v. Van Ingen , 9 Johns . 507, 580 (N.Y. 1812) (Kent, Ch. ); to \" quarantine laws \" and \" health laws of every description,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; to modern regulations of the \"quality, labeling, health, or safety\" of products sold within a State's borders, Epel , 793 F.3d at 1173.12 Petitioners' suggestion that the dormant Com- merce Clause casts constitutional doubt on so many longstanding state laws is \"audacious\" —\"especially given [the Court's] remarks about the limits of Bald-win doctrine in Walsh .\" Epel , 793 F.3d at 1175; see also, e.g. , Goldsmith & Volokh , State Regulation of Online Behavior, 1 01 Texas L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "(forthcoming ) 12 See also, e.g. , Online Merchs. 995 F.3d 540[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]110 Yale L.J. 785 ( \"products lia bility actions against out -of-state manufacturers,\" \"libel laws, securities requirements , charitable registration requirements, franchise laws, tort laws, and much more\"). 24 (draft at 6 ), https://tinyurl.com/mr3x3cy7 (Healy 's \"dicta ... cannot be taken seriously\") ; Denning, Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce § 6.08[E], p. 6- 115 (2d ed. 2013) (question- ing Healy 's \"sweeping\" dicta ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "In the absence of a constitutional prohibition or valid federal legislation with preemptive effect , the States have \"broad power\" to regulat e markets and sales within their borders. H.P. Hood & Sons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see generally Gibbons , 22 U.S. at 203 (describ- ing \"immense mass \" of valid state legislation, \"em- brac[ing] everything within the territory of a State, not surrendered to the general governmen t\"). The vagueness of p etitioners' \"practical effects\" standard would also invite abusive litigation and produce inconsistent results. As Judge Sutton h as noted, \"I do not think Healy 's suggestion to look to the 'practical effect' of the regulation offers any meaning-ful guidance.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "The Constitution already imposes restrict ions on di- rect extraterritorial regulation . See, e.g. , Phillips Pe- troleum [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as well as the right to interstate travel, see, e.g. , Bigel 421 U.S. 809 ; 142 S. Ct. 2228 . And where a state law with extraterritorial effects either discriminat es against interstate commerce or impos es clearly excessive burdens on interstate commerce, it may be held invalid under this Court's existing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Phillips Pe- troleum 472 U.S. 797 , as well as the right to interstate travel, see, e.g. , Bigel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 142 S. Ct. 2228 . And where a state law with extraterritorial effects either discriminat es against interstate commerce or impos es clearly excessive burdens on interstate commerce, it may be held invalid under this Court's existing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. That e xisting doctrine would, for example, provide a basis for challenging petitioners' hypothetical law \"bar[ring] imports of goods not produced by workers paid California's $15 -an-hour minimum wage, even though in most States the minimum wage is below $10.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The \"practical effects\" inquiry is not an appropriate constitutional standard",
		"context": "An attempt to level the economic playing field in that way would raise serious protec- tionism concern s, as this Court previously indicated in Baldwin , 294 U.S. at 528. And while there may be other problematic hypotheticals for which the dormant Commerce Clause does not provide a solution, 27 cf. CTS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Congress retains the ability at all times to adopt nationwide solution s by exercising its authority under the express terms of the Commerce Clause . Finally, petitioners disregard the possibility of state -level political checks. To be sure, one of the rationales underlying the virtual ly per se prohibition on discriminatory state laws is that \"when 'the burden of state regulation falls on interests outside the state, it is unlikely to be alleviated by the operation of those political restraints normally exerted when interests within the state are affected.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence",
		"context": "at 650. This phrase means \"for all practical purposes, the tribe owned the land\" and \"no beneficial interest\" other than \"naked fe e\" was held by the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This phrase grants the Crow Tribe \"the implicit power to exclude others from the 13 The Race Horse Court described the treaty hunting right as \"temporary and precarious\" not simply because it could expire; the right was temporary and precarious because its application in any particular location \"was to cease whenever the United States parted merely with the title to any of its lands.\" 163 U.S. at 515.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence",
		"context": "163 U.S. at 515. 50 reservation.\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both the Crow and the United States understood the importance of the power to exclude. The 1868 Treaty reserved eight million acres, or 12,500 square miles, for the exclusive use and occupation of approximately 2,000 people.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence",
		"context": "For perspective, the State of Maryland contains about six million acres. \"Under the treaty a relatively few Indians were to 'occupy' millions of acres of l and within the meaning of the treaty, which suggests t hat the signatory Indians' understanding would not necessarily require actual physical presence or use to change land from an 'unoccupied' to an occupied status.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Tribal members knew that this grant of \"exclusive use and occupation\" meant that \"no persons, except a few specially enumerated, and governmental agents en- gaged in the discharge of duties enjoined by law, should 'ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside' in the territory so reserved \" without the Tribe's per- mission. Shoshone Tribe of 299 U.S. 476.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 P.2d 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence",
		"context": "708 P.2d 853. Tribal members knew that this grant of \"exclusive use and occupation\" meant that \"no persons, except a few specially enumerated, and governmental agents en- gaged in the discharge of duties enjoined by law, should 'ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside' in the territory so reserved \" without the Tribe's per- mission. Shoshone Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the sheer size of the Crow Reservation does not demonstrate that \"physical presence\" was not required for occupation, the Tribe had experience with the 51 behavior of the United States. Four years after the 1868 Treaty, the United States created Yellowstone National Park, preventing its settlement and \"pro- ceeding immediately to forbid hunting in a large portion of the Territory\" of the hunting district without establishing an actual phys ical presence throughout that place.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Tribe understood land could be \"occupied\" without physical presence",
		"context": "Yellowstone was not settled, but its creation refle cted an immediate congressional decision that not all lands needed \"settlements\" to lie beyond the off-reservation right. Moreover, when Senator Harlan qualified his understanding with \"I think,\" he not only indicated to his colleagues that he was uncertain about the Treaty's meaning, but he also showed why \"[s]ubse quent legislative history is a 'hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier Congress.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 52 same amount of pasture l and that his brother, the homesteader, is allowed to use of arable land. One hundred and sixty acres of fairly rich and well-watered soil, or a much smaller amount of irrigated land, may keep a family in plenty, whereas no one could get a living from one hundred and si xty acres of dry pasture land capable of supporting at the outside only one head of cattle to every ten acres.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eighth Amendment allows a State to punish a murderer whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital offense",
		"context": "In determining whether the Eighth Amendment bars a particular punishment as \"cruel and unusual,\" the Court has followed a well-established analytical path. First, the Court examines whether the pun- ishment was among \"those modes or acts of punish- ment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted\" in 1791. Ford , 477 U.S., at 405; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, the Court con- siders whether the punishment is deemed cruel and unusual according to modern \"standards of decen- 543 U.S. 551536 U.S. 304. Finally, the Court applies its \"independent judgment\" to evaluate \"the acceptabil- ity of a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eighth Amendment allows a State to punish a murderer whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital offense",
		"context": "First, the Court examines whether the pun- ishment was among \"those modes or acts of punish- ment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted\" in 1791. Ford , 477 U.S., at 405; see also 463 U.S. 277. Second, the Court con- siders whether the punishment is deemed cruel and unusual according to modern \"standards of decen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]536 U.S. 304. Finally, the Court applies its \"independent judgment\" to evaluate \"the acceptabil- ity of a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment.\" Roper , 543 U.S., at 563-64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eighth Amendment allows a State to punish a murderer whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital offense",
		"context": "First, the Court examines whether the pun- ishment was among \"those modes or acts of punish- ment that had been considered cruel and unusual at the time that the Bill of Rights was adopted\" in 1791. Ford , 477 U.S., at 405; see also 463 U.S. 277. Second, the Court con- siders whether the punishment is deemed cruel and unusual according to modern \"standards of decen- 543 U.S. 551[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, the Court applies its \"independent judgment\" to evaluate \"the acceptabil- ity of a particular punishment under the Eighth Amendment.\" Roper , 543 U.S., at 563-64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". [that] the introduction of evidence of a defendant's prior crimes risks significant prejudice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This principle derives from a \"common-law tradition\" in which a \"defendant's prior trouble with the law . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". [were] sa id to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Rules of Evidence incorporate protec- tions against such prejudice. Rule 403 permits exclu- sion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". speaks to the capacity of some conced edly relevant evidence to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof specific to the offense charged.\" Old [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One of the evils that Rule 403 seeks to elimi nate is the use of propen- sity evidence to convict a defendant. As this Court has observed, \"[a]lthough .",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": "Lower courts and members of this Court have recognized the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions in this context. Adhering to such a limiting instruction is \"a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [a jury's] powers, but anybody's else.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Certain categories of evidence \"are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.\" 391 U.S. 123.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 F.2d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": "See 54 F.2d 1006. Certain categories of evidence \"are at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give such evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, although many studies do not distinguish among prior convictions, research suggests that both the nature of the prior offense and its similarity to the present charge negatively impact jurors' impressions of a defendant. See Eisenberg & Hans, supra , at 1361.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": "4. In light of the deeply rooted prejudices that juries and society at large harbor against felons, \"[a] defend-ant's interest in avoiding introduction of prior crimes evidence [at trial] is clear and compelling.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a defendant is tried on felon-in-possession and 15 other charges simultaneously, there is an obvious risk that the defendant will suffer the \"unfair prejudice\" of the jury \"generalizing [the] defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent momentarily).\" Old Chief , 519 U.S. at 180-81.",
		"citation_value_orig": "955 F.2d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 96 F.3d 491. Admitting evidence of a defendant's prior felony convictions can \"rise to the level of a constitutional violation . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "88 F.3d 812",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". .\" 88 F.3d 812; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Admitting evidence of a defendant's prior felony convictions can \"rise to the level of a constitutional violation . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 F.3d 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". if it results in prejudice so great as to deny a defendant his Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial.\" 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it re nders the trial fundamen- tally unfair, the Due Proc ess Clause . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". provides a mechanism for relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g ., 426 U.S. 610. But under the decision below, a defendant must accept the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence in a single trial on felon-in-possession and other charges, or incur a forced waiver of the double jeopardy protec-tion against re-litigation of issues the prosecution already lost in a first trial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Evidence of a Prior Felony Is Unduly Prejudicial",
		"context": ". provides a mechanism for relief.\" 501 U.S. 808; see also, e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But under the decision below, a defendant must accept the admission of unduly prejudicial evidence in a single trial on felon-in-possession and other charges, or incur a forced waiver of the double jeopardy protec-tion against re-litigation of issues the prosecution already lost in a first trial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Railroad Employees' RRA Benefits are Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost Awards",
		"context": "The RRB has explained that [t]he intent behind the pay for time lost concept is to treat an employee as if he or she had actually performed compensated services during an identifiable period of time. The effect of pay for time lost upon eligibility and benefits under the RRA [ ] is identical to the effect of regular earnings for which service and compensation credit are received. Pay for Time Lost From Re gular Railroad Employment at 1; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (where the plaintiff's FELA complaint alleged loss of earnings due to the injury, the settlement award entered into was considered to be pay for time lost, resulting in the five months missed from work being co unted as creditable com- pensation, thereby qualifying the plaintiff for a disability annuity under the RRA). Because the employee receives RRA credit for the time lost, there is no rationale for permitting the employee to avoid the RRTA tax payment obligation. Had the employee-FELA claimant been working, he or she would have been paying railroad retirement taxes, which the railroad employer would deduct automati-cally from the employee's pa ycheck.",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.2d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Railroad Employees' RRA Benefits are Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost Awards",
		"context": "Pet. App. 23a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That statement misses the larger point. While there is not necessarily a dollar- for-dollar correlation between the taxes paid and the benefits received, the taxes paid and hours of service credited directly enhance the benefits for which the employee ultimately will become eligible.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Railroad Employees' RRA Benefits are Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost Awards",
		"context": "That statement misses the larger point. While there is not necessarily a dollar- for-dollar correlation between the taxes paid and the benefits received, the taxes paid and hours of service credited directly enhance the benefits for which the employee ultimately will become eligible. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 69 F.3d 282. Recognizing the connection between the benefits and tax sides of the railroad retirement system, for more than a half-century the IRS has consistently maintained the position that the income tax treatment of personal injury awards under section 104 has no bearing on the RRTA tax treatment of pay for time lost. See1961 WL 12630 (ruling that payment received by a railroad employee under a settlement agreement for personal injuries was exclud ed from gross income for income tax purposes even though that same amount was taxable as pay for time lost under RRTA, explaining that tax treatment of a payment under the RRTA \"is not controlling\" for purposes of determining 19 the tax treatment for income tax purposes); IRS Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 F.3d 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Railroad Employees' RRA Benefits are Enhanced By Their Receipt of Pay for Time Lost and Therefore Railroad Retirement Taxes Must Be Paid on Time-Lost Awards",
		"context": "That statement misses the larger point. While there is not necessarily a dollar- for-dollar correlation between the taxes paid and the benefits received, the taxes paid and hours of service credited directly enhance the benefits for which the employee ultimately will become eligible. See 571 F.3d 511; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recognizing the connection between the benefits and tax sides of the railroad retirement system, for more than a half-century the IRS has consistently maintained the position that the income tax treatment of personal injury awards under section 104 has no bearing on the RRTA tax treatment of pay for time lost. See1961 WL 12630 (ruling that payment received by a railroad employee under a settlement agreement for personal injuries was exclud ed from gross income for income tax purposes even though that same amount was taxable as pay for time lost under RRTA, explaining that tax treatment of a payment under the RRTA \"is not controlling\" for purposes of determining 19 the tax treatment for income tax purposes); IRS Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "69 F.3d 282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Circuit's decision is far reaching",
		"context": "Simply put, the First Circuit provided no princi- pled way to distinguish between the Board Members at issue here and the Governor and other officers of Puerto Rico and other unincorporated territories. Con- sequently, these officers would also be considered sub- ject to the Appointments Clause. To determine that members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico are \"Officers of the United States\" subject to the Appoint- ments Clause of Article II, Section 2, the First Circuit employed a three-part test derived from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 424 U.S. 1. Under this test, an individual is an \"Officer of the 4 United States\" subject to the Appointments Clause if: \"(1) the appointee occupies a 'continuing' position es- tablished by federal law; (2) the appointee 'exercises significant authority;' and (3) the significant authority is exercised pursuant to the la ws of the United States.\" Aurelius Investment, LLC, et 915 F.3d 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Circuit's decision is far reaching",
		"context": "Simply put, the First Circuit provided no princi- pled way to distinguish between the Board Members at issue here and the Governor and other officers of Puerto Rico and other unincorporated territories. Con- sequently, these officers would also be considered sub- ject to the Appointments Clause. To determine that members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico are \"Officers of the United States\" subject to the Appoint- ments Clause of Article II, Section 2, the First Circuit employed a three-part test derived from 138 S. Ct. 2044, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under this test, an individual is an \"Officer of the 4 United States\" subject to the Appointments Clause if: \"(1) the appointee occupies a 'continuing' position es- tablished by federal law; (2) the appointee 'exercises significant authority;' and (3) the significant authority is exercised pursuant to the la ws of the United States.\" Aurelius Investment, LLC, et 915 F.3d 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Circuit's decision is far reaching",
		"context": "To determine that members of the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico are \"Officers of the United States\" subject to the Appoint- ments Clause of Article II, Section 2, the First Circuit employed a three-part test derived from 138 S. Ct. 2044, and 424 U.S. 1. Under this test, an individual is an \"Officer of the 4 United States\" subject to the Appointments Clause if: \"(1) the appointee occupies a 'continuing' position es- tablished by federal law; (2) the appointee 'exercises significant authority;' and (3) the significant authority is exercised pursuant to the la ws of the United States.\" Aurelius Investment, LLC, et [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court held that Board Members occupy \"con- tinuing positions\" because they were appointed to an initial term which was renewable and serve until re- placed. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 838",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO To Assume Strict Liability",
		"context": "\"Perils of the sea[s]\" are \"those perils which are peculiar to the sea,\" and which are \"unfor eseeable\" and \"cannot be guarded against by the ordinary exertions of human skill and prudence.\" Ferrara v. A. & V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has long been established that \"perils of the seas\" include collision with a submerged object. See,171 U.S. 450; Campbell Soup 1935 WL 57939.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 F.3d 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Parties Did Not Intend For CARCO To Assume Strict Liability",
		"context": "& V.99 F.3d 449. It has long been established that \"perils of the seas\" include collision with a submerged object. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Campbell Soup 1935 WL 57939. This General Exceptions clause th erefore further confirms that the parties did not intend for the safe berth clause to impose liability on CARCO—strict or otherwise—for maritime hazards that it could not foresee or prevent, such as the Athos I striking the unknown anchor. To have held otherwise misconstrues the nature of the safe berth clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "171 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "Martin Linen Supply Co ., 430 U.S. at 571 (citing Ball, 163 U.S. at 671). \"[T]he Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause.\" United 25 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"'[A]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy .' Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "\"'[A]cquittals, unlike convictions, terminate the initial jeopardy .' Thus, whether the trial is to a jury or to the bench, subjecting the defendant to postacquittal factfinding proceedings going to guilt or innocence violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A] defenda nt once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" 437 U.S. 82.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "476 U.S. 140. \"[A] defenda nt once acquitted may not be again subjected to trial without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is true even if the acquittal was entered in error. \"A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "This is true even if the acquittal was entered in error. \"A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]451 U.S. 430437 U.S. 16; Fong 369 U.S. 141 . 26 an acquitt al, courts \"must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.\" Martin Linen Supply Co ., 430 U.S. at 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "This is true even if the acquittal was entered in error. \"A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" 568 U.S. 313[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]437 U.S. 16; Fong 369 U.S. 141 . 26 an acquitt al, courts \"must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.\" Martin Linen Supply Co ., 430 U.S. at 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 430",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "This is true even if the acquittal was entered in error. \"A mistaken acquittal is an acquittal nonetheless [.]\" 568 U.S. 313451 U.S. 430437 U.S. 16; Fong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 26 an acquitt al, courts \"must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.\" Martin Linen Supply Co ., 430 U.S. at 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "d. McElrath's acquittal of malice murder bars subsequent prosecution.",
		"context": "Holt, 38 Ga. at 187 (emphasis in original). Georgia pro vides greater Double Jeopardy protections than those in the Georgia and United States Constitution and \"all 'questions of Double Jeopardy in Georgia must be determined under OCGA §§ 16 –1–6, 16 –1–8 and 16 –1–7.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Ga. 2 001) (footnote omitted). Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16 -1-8(a)(1), \"[a] prosecution is barred if the accused was formerly prosecuted for the same crime based upon the same material facts, if such former prosecution[] 29 [r]esulted in either a conviction or an acq uittal [.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 S.E.2d 864",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Rationale of Pacifica Does Not Justify The Scandalous-Marks Provision",
		"context": ". The government also cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that the regulation of profanity is viewpoint neutral. Pet Br. 28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
		"context": ". The facts of this case reveal the tension between the broad language in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which seemingly grants carte blanche standing to abortion providers to assert the rights of women seeking abortions, and the balancing test set forth inWWH . This Court in WWH required courts to weigh the benefits of statutes providing for patient safetyagainst the burdens imposed on abortion access. 136S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
		"context": "Failure to make a good-faith effort at compliance undermines its standing to challenge thestatute at issue. A party cannot manufacture his own standing merely by inflicting harm upon himself. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Adverse consequences stemming from personal choices fail toestablish standing because the constitutionally-mandated causal chain between the challenged statuteand the alleged harm is broken. 540 U.S. 93, overruled on other grounds by Citizens 558 U.S. 310.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
		"context": "568 U.S. 398. Adverse consequences stemming from personal choices fail toestablish standing because the constitutionally-mandated causal chain between the challenged statuteand the alleged harm is broken. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled on other grounds by Citizens 558 U.S. 310. Nor are abortion providers permitted to \"rely on speculation about theunfettered choices made by independent actors notbefore the court.\" Clapper , 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (quoting 7 504 U.S. 555).",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
		"context": "568 U.S. 398. Adverse consequences stemming from personal choices fail toestablish standing because the constitutionally-mandated causal chain between the challenged statuteand the alleged harm is broken. 540 U.S. 93, overruled on other grounds by Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor are abortion providers permitted to \"rely on speculation about theunfettered choices made by independent actors notbefore the court.\" Clapper , 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (quoting 7 504 U.S. 555).",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Abortion providers cannot manufacture their standing by their own misconduct",
		"context": "540 U.S. 93, overruled on other grounds by Citizens 558 U.S. 310. Nor are abortion providers permitted to \"rely on speculation about theunfettered choices made by independent actors notbefore the court.\" Clapper , 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (quoting 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Under settled law, June Medical cannot manufacture its standing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should uphold the Fifth Circuit's application of WWH and provide further clarity on how WWH must be applied in future cases",
		"context": ". With respect to abortion regulations, this Court has acknowledged that States have legitimate inter- ests in: (1) seeing that abo rtion, like any other medical procedure, is performed under circumstances that en-sures maximum safety for the patient; (2) regulating the medical profession in order to promote respect for life, including the life of the unborn; (3) protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child; (4) preserving potential life; (5) assur- ing that a woman's consent to an abortion is fully in- formed; and (6) advancing the state of medical knowledge concerning maternal health and prenatal life. See Roe , 410 U.S. at 150; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Casey , 505 U.S. at 846. In this case, the Court should uphold the Fifth Cir- cuit's application of WWH , else the undue burden standard is toothless. Yet even affirming the Fifth Circuit here, still leaves States uncertain about how to proceed under WWH .",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative",
		"context": "Consider, for example, that Zarda answered a female customer 's charge of sexual harassment by saying he was gay. The claim trots out old tropes: that sexual harassment is about sex (not power) and that only straight men would harass a woman. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], ,r,r38, 43. Conflicts between stakeholder interests have appeared in other, related, litigation. In the marriage cases, advocates decided that they needed to show that gay men lacked political power to argue for the heightened scrutiny Equal Protection standard of City of 473 U.S. 432.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative",
		"context": "See,883 F.3d 100, ,r,r38, 43. Conflicts between stakeholder interests have appeared in other, related, litigation. In the marriage cases, advocates decided that they needed to show that gay men lacked political power to argue for the heightened scrutiny Equal Protection standard of City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, they repeatedly misrepresented the history of black Americans and of women. Consider the Segura Affidavit filed (in only slightly varying forms) in cases all across this country, 9 including before this Court in Obergefell.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative",
		"context": "Consider the Segura Affidavit filed (in only slightly varying forms) in cases all across this country, 9 including before this Court in Obergefell. Aff. of Gary M. Segura, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in l Joint Appendix, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2584, at p. 321. Purporting to compare white gay men's political power with that of women generally, the affidavit stated: \"While sexism certainly existed (and still exists), and political activism could be costly, identity as a woman was not socially controversial, did not attract familial scorn, and did not bar one from such a large range of social institutions, though some institutions were exclusively male.\" [Emphasis added] It continued, \"Women could freely identify one another, gather, coordinate, and act largely free of fear of repressive 9 The affidavit was first filed as early as 2009, submitted by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (\"GLAD\") and also three private law firms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "962 F. Supp. 968",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative",
		"context": "[Emphasis added] It continued, \"Women could freely identify one another, gather, coordinate, and act largely free of fear of repressive 9 The affidavit was first filed as early as 2009, submitted by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders (\"GLAD\") and also three private law firms. See Aff. of Gary M. Segura, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 tactics\"; and that ''Women are and were a majority of the population and, if they so choose, could theoretically determine most political outcomes.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "699 F. Supp. 2d 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Ignoring Conflicts of Interest Between Stakeholders and Subjugating Claims That were Congress' Principal Concern to Claims that are Derivative",
		"context": "See, e.g., Lynching Trial: Accused Freed, Sequel to Death of Negro on Lonely Hillside, The Lancashire Daily Post, May 22, 194 7 (lynching of a black man on a hillside after acquittal of charges he killed a white taxi driver). Racially restrictive covenants blocking blacks from purchasing property were social sanctions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These restrictions cost blacks huge losses in economic value that could have contributed to their political power. Meanwhile, the majority of LGBT+ persons were relatively privileged-white and approximately half were male-bodied .",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "What might be seen as personal religious expres-sion for some may veer into proselytization for others , who feel compelled to go along with what their teachers and coaches say . Such situations would endanger the trust that families put in schools to educate their chil- dren \"on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the student and his or her family.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the very least, schools would no longer \"retain the authority to refuse to associate the school with any position other than neutrality\" in sensitive or con-troversial matters such as religion. See Hazelwood Sch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "Santa Fe Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The potential for coercion, and the school's need to properly regulate it, is particularly important for a school district 's ability to safeguard the education of re- ligious minorities in a pluralistic society. This Court has consistently noted that when \"the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a par- ticular religious belief, the indir ect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing of- ficially approved religion is plain.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "The potential for coercion, and the school's need to properly regulate it, is particularly important for a school district 's ability to safeguard the education of re- ligious minorities in a pluralistic society. This Court has consistently noted that when \"the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a par- ticular religious belief, the indir ect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing of- ficially approved religion is plain.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While religious endorsement or co- ercion by public school employees may not be apparent to all, it is \"obvious to members o [f] minority faiths who are made to feel like religious outsiders in their own schools and communities.\" Dayton, 358 Ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. , 530 U.S. at 316-317; Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-599; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 523 F.3d 153; 37 F.3d 517; Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. , 530 U.S. at 316-317; Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-599; 658 F.3d 954; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 37 F.3d 517; Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 F.3d 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. School districts need to be able to prevent public school students from being exposed to religious coercion",
		"context": "Sch. Dist. , 530 U.S. at 316-317; Lee, 505 U.S. at 598-599; 658 F.3d 954; 523 F.3d 153; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1059.",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 F.3d 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Patent Prosecution Procedure Provides Dissatisfied Patent Applicants with Numerous, Effective Alternatives to Costly section 145 Litigation",
		"context": "2018) (en banc) (Pet. App. 2a); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 527 U.S. 150; Pregis Corp. v. Kappos , 700 F .3d 1348, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Mazzari v. Rogan , 323 F .3d 100, 1003 (Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Patent Prosecution Procedure Provides Dissatisfied Patent Applicants with Numerous, Effective Alternatives to Costly section 145 Litigation",
		"context": "2018) (en banc) (Pet. App. 2a); 566 U.S. 431; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pregis Corp. v. Kappos , 700 F .3d 1348, 145 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Mazzari v. Rogan , 323 F .3d 100, 1003 (Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "A straightforward applicatio n of this Court's prece- dents suffices to reject the co urt of appeals' interpretation of the Basic presumption. But the adverse \"practical con- sequences of an expansion\" of the presumption provide another reason to do so. Stoneridge Investment Partners [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If upheld, the court of appeal s' approach would render the presumption effectively irrebuttable and impose enor- mous costs on public companies and their shareholders. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "The court of appeals' approach would also impose serious costs on public companies and their shareholders. As this Court has long reco gnized, \"[c]ertification of a large class may so increase the defendant's potential dam- ages liability and litigation costs\" that the defendant \"may find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.\" Coopers & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact of certification gives class- 36 action plaintiffs and their lawyers enormous leverage, putting \"hydraulic pressure\" on defendants to settle. He- 366 F.3d 70.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "Coopers & 437 U.S. 463. The fact of certification gives class- 36 action plaintiffs and their lawyers enormous leverage, putting \"hydraulic pressure\" on defendants to settle. He- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Little wonder, then, that class certification in a securities action almost always leads to the \"ext ort[ion]\" of a settlement by \"plaintiffs with weak claims \" but massive potential dam- ages. Stoneridge , 552 U.S. at 163-164.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 F.3d 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "6-8, then they will virtually always man- age to find some earlier statement with a tenuous connec-tion to a \"corrective\" corporate misstep that causes a stock drop. Such event-dr iven securities lawsuits threaten to \"convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of inves-tor's insurance.\" Dura Pharmaceuticals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Investors on the whole do no t benefit from a regime of constant event-driven class actions. Large class-action settlements often simply tran sfer wealth from current shareholders to former ones, with the plaintiffs' bar col-lecting a sizable tax on the transfer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "22-23) that the possibility that a defendant can still challenge materi- ality at the motion-to-dismiss and summary-judgment stages will prevent abusive litigation. But the element of materiality will \"rarely be di spositive\" at the motion-to- dismiss stage. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At that stage, a court will evaluate the statement's material- ity based only on the plaintiffs' allegations and the court's expectations about investor behavior, and it will grant a motion to dismiss only if th e statement is \"so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the qu estion of [its] importance.\" ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of 553 F.3d 187.",
		"citation_value_orig": "592 F.3d 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "In re592 F.3d 347. At that stage, a court will evaluate the statement's material- ity based only on the plaintiffs' allegations and the court's expectations about investor behavior, and it will grant a motion to dismiss only if th e statement is \"so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds could not differ on the qu estion of [its] importance.\" ECA & Local 134 IBEW Joint Pension Trust of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And most securities class actions never reach summary judgment, given the cost of discovery and inordinate pres- sure to settle following class certification. See RLC Cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 F.3d 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "But this rule does not shift the burden of persuasion, which remains on the party who had it originally.\" Because the Federal Rules of Evidence are a \"legislative enactment,\" they are inter- preted according to the \"traditi onal tools of statutory con- struction.\" Beech Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text of Rule 301 reflects this Court's case law on burdens and presumptions. The Court has long distin- guished between the \"burden of production\" and the \"bur-den of persuasion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "The text of Rule 301 reflects this Court's case law on burdens and presumptions. The Court has long distin- guished between the \"burden of production\" and the \"bur-den of persuasion.\" Director, Office of Workers' Compen- sation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The burden of production refers to a party's obligation to \"come fo rward with evidence to sup- port its claim.\" Greenwich Collieries , 512 U.S. at 272.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "at 275. This Court has explained th at a \"presumption\" is a rule that a \"finding of [a] predicate fact\" produces a \"re- quired conclusion in the absence of explanation.\" St. Mary's Honor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 2 McCormick § 342, at 724. A presumption \"assist[s] 39 courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult.\" Basic , 485 U.S. at 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "See Basic , 485 U.S. at 242. And no statute even creates the civil cause of action for se curities fraud; that too is a judicial creation. See Superintendent of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ac- cordingly, the burdens of proo f for the presumption are at least three steps removed from being \"provide[d]\" by a statute. Even if a \"link\" to a statute were all that Rule 301 required, that tenuous link would not suffice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 6",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "But that language supports the opposite conclu- sion. A party obligated to ma ke \"any showing\" bears only a burden of production, not th e ultimate burden of persua- sion. See, e.g., Celotex [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, a few passing statements in an opinion— which is not \"to be parsed [like] language of a statute\"— is scant evidence that the Co urt intended somehow to shift the burden of persuasion. 442 U.S. 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "See, e.g., Celotex 477 U.S. 317. Regardless, a few passing statements in an opinion— which is not \"to be parsed [like] language of a statute\"— is scant evidence that the Co urt intended somehow to shift the burden of persuasion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, th e court of appeals' parsing of Halliburton II ignores more obvious clues that under- mine its claim: in Basic itself, the Court cited Rule 301 in describing the \"presumption\" at issue, and the Court never indicated that its nove l presumption would operate differently from presumptions covered by the rule. See 485 U.S. at 246-247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "Halliburton II , 573 U.S. at 281. But if the defendant actually comes forward with evidence that rebuts the \"indirect proxy,\" the presumption has served its purpose by compelling th e defendant to introduce evi- dence that \"sharpen[s] the inquiry\" on the question of price impact. Texas Department of Community [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Finally on this score, respondents have argued that the Court retains the \"aut hority to establish burden- shifting frameworks consistent with its understanding of a federal statute.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The court of appeals' contrary approach would have serious adverse consequences for public companies",
		"context": "in Opp. 31. But respondents' only authority for that propos ition is a footnote in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which reached a \"cursor y answer to an ancillary and largely unbriefed question.\" Greenwich Collieries , 512 U.S. at 277. Even if the Court retains the \"authority\" to establish burden-shifting frameworks that are not dic-tated by a statute or rule—contrary to Rule 301's plain text—there is no good reason to exercise that authority in the Basic context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Later-Enacted Statutes Do Not Conflict With the Plain-Text Interpretation of ISDA",
		"context": "Title V is likewise not designed to extend to non- recognized entities. It pr ovides funding for state, tribal, and local governments to combat the 49 pandemic. Terms are \"known by the company they keep,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Title V's focus on governmental ex-penditures further confirms \"Indian tribe\" definition's plain meaning. 2. Petitioners attempt to find support for their po- sition in a handful of othe r statutes, but none assists them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1684",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Section 1226(c)'s history shows that Congress intended to prohibit release of all aliens with the requisite criminal history",
		"context": "7 Detention after the entry of a final order of removal is now gov- erned by a separate statute, 8 U.S.C. 1231. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 2. Congress returned to the subject of mandatory detention of criminal aliens in 1990 and 1991.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Section 1226(c)'s history shows that Congress intended to prohibit release of all aliens with the requisite criminal history",
		"context": "Texas Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Forest Grove Sch. 557 U.S. 230. The Executi ve Office for Im- migration Review (EOIR) thereafter issued regulations addressed to immigration judges , again interpreting the general prohibition against release to encompass any detained alien with the requisite criminal history.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Section 1226(c)'s history shows that Congress intended to prohibit release of all aliens with the requisite criminal history",
		"context": "& Cmty. 135 S. Ct. 2507; see Forest Grove Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Executi ve Office for Im- migration Review (EOIR) thereafter issued regulations addressed to immigration judges , again interpreting the general prohibition against release to encompass any detained alien with the requisite criminal history. See 57 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Conditions on Generally Available K-12 Student Aid Must Not Violate the Right to Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "amend. I. In Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held t hat denying the Good News Club, a Christian youth development organization, after-school access to a public school classroom cafeteria constituted impermissible viewpoint discrimination against the \"purely\" religious approach the Club took toward the moral and chara cter education of children. As the Court explained, \"what matters for purposes of the Free Speech Clause is that we can see no logical difference in kind between th e invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty or patriotism by other associations to provide a founda- tion for their lessons.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Colorado Supreme Court correctly found that President Trump was an officer of the United States",
		"context": "This Court, in a different context, stated that a quotation in the flyleaf of a book from a famous author, philosopher, and satirist would not constitutionally redeem an otherwise obscene publication. By direct analogy, President Trump's heated rhetoric and false claims extending many weeks, from the time he first falsely alleged that the 2020 Presidential election had been stolen from him through the horrific events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, drowned out, in number, volume and tenor, his few calls that day to act peacefully. Under the aforesaid precedent from this court, in a different context but applicable by analogy, this eviscerated any right he had to a free-speech defense under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ARGUMENT",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The officials' view of nominal damages contradicts Article III requirements.",
		"context": "That reasoning cannot be right. To begin, \"a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he seeks to press and for each form of relief that is sought.\" Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] stand on its own merits from the case's inception. In addition, \"an actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the com- plaint is filed.\" Arizonans for Official English , 520 U.S. at 67 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Westmoreland's Argument Based on Section 112 Does Not Merit This Court's Review.",
		"context": "The 1990 amendments also did not change the fact that EPA's authority under Section 112 is pollutant -specific, and that the corresponding amendments to Section 111(d) were technical, merely aligning that section to refer to the reorganized Section 112. It is not credible that Congress dissolved the Act's longstanding compre - hensive coverage of all pollutants through a technical rephrasing of a cross- reference. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a self -defeating policy would harm the public interest and undermine the goals of the Clean Air Act. 28",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Statute, Minor Offenders Will Enter Adulthood as Career Criminals.",
		"context": "18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2). 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]801 Fed. App'x 379 (finding the application of ACCA permissible under the 7 One night of adolescent indiscretion or peer- prompted over-indulgence can thus result in designation as a career criminal for life, eliminating the possibility of rehabilitation, growth, and maturity, all of which are the empirically demonstrated attributes of brain development from childhood through adulthood. ACCA prohibits lower courts from considering factors that have been deemed critical by this Court in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence when sentencing individuals whose predicate offenses accrued as juveniles. Adoption of the Sixth Circuit's expansive interpretation of ACCA's \"different occasions\" requirement will exacerbate this situation leading to extremely harsh sentences for even greater numbers of minors who will be unjustifiably designated as \"career criminals \" An estimated 76,000 children are prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system every year in the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.3d 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Statute, Minor Offenders Will Enter Adulthood as Career Criminals.",
		"context": "2020 State Ratings Report on Human Rights Protections for Children in the U.S. Justice System, 10, available at, https://humanrightsforkids.org/ wp-content/uploads/State -Ratings-Report_2020.pdf (last accessed May 9, 2021). 13 Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 interpretation could trigger harsh mandatory minimums for kids is that of Zyion Houston-Sconiers who was 17 years old when he committed offenses in Washington State that led to six convictions of robbery in the first degree when he and another youth robbed several other children of their Halloween candy on Halloween night in 2012. 14 Similarly, 15- year-old Travion Blount was convicted of 49 felonies arising from his role in the robbery of 12 people at a house party in Norfolk, Virginia, in 2008.",
		"citation_value_orig": "985 F.2d 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Statute, Minor Offenders Will Enter Adulthood as Career Criminals.",
		"context": "15 The multiple convictions arising from these single criminal opportunities underscore why the Sixth Circuit's interpretation would be particularly harmful to child offenders. The construction of ACCA applied by the Sixth Circuit and other courts affords juveniles like Mr. Houston-Sconiers and Mr. Blount with no opportunity to learn from a single night's mistakes before carrying the permanent designation of a career criminal In the event that a child is convicted of multiple charges stemming from a single incident, as in the case of the Petitioner, he or she could face the prospect of being branded a career criminal and subject to the harsh mandatory minimum sentence that accompanies such a designation, an outcome that is clearly at odds with this Court's jurisprudence and the intent of Congress. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 890 F.3d 456. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "188 Wash. 2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under the Sixth Circuit's Interpretation of the Statute, Minor Offenders Will Enter Adulthood as Career Criminals.",
		"context": "The construction of ACCA applied by the Sixth Circuit and other courts affords juveniles like Mr. Houston-Sconiers and Mr. Blount with no opportunity to learn from a single night's mistakes before carrying the permanent designation of a career criminal In the event that a child is convicted of multiple charges stemming from a single incident, as in the case of the Petitioner, he or she could face the prospect of being branded a career criminal and subject to the harsh mandatory minimum sentence that accompanies such a designation, an outcome that is clearly at odds with this Court's jurisprudence and the intent of Congress. 14 188 Wash. 2d 1. 15 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10",
		"citation_value_orig": "890 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Act 900 is not rate regulation",
		"context": "Arkansas contends (at 19-30) that Act 900 is not preempted because it regulates pharmacy rates in a manner that only incidentally raises the cost of provid-ing benefits. Arkansas rests that argument on New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Travelers , the Court held that a New York law re- quiring hospitals to add a surcharge to the bill for pa-tients covered by commercial insurers, but not patients covered by Blue Cross Blue Shield insurers, was \"basic rate regulation\" not preempted under ERISA. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Act 900 is not rate regulation",
		"context": "Moreover, Act 900 is preempted not simply because it increases the amount a plan must pay to secure bene-fits for plan participants but because it dictates how benefits are to be administered on behalf of a plan. Arkansas's remaining authorities lend no support. California Division of Labor Standards [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], addressed a state law requiring all contractors on pub- lic-works projects to pay the local prevailing wage, ex- cept that contractors could pay a lower wage to appren-tices in approved programs. Id. at 319.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Act 900 is not rate regulation",
		"context": "Id. at 334. Similarly, in De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court addressed a state tax on healthcare facilities. The tax \"increase[d] the cost of providing benefits\" and would accordingly \"have some Problems Affecting Small Business of the Select Comm. on Small Business, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality",
		"context": "In addition to the problems discusse d above, t he United States seeks t o enjoin potential future litigation to which neither the United States nor Texas would be a party. Such a claim does not satisfy \"[t]he requirement for adversity\" necessary to sustain federal jurisdiction. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a. That the United States and Texas disagree about the constitutionality of SB 8 is not enough to create con- stitutional adversity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality",
		"context": "\"The presence of a disagreement, however sharp and acrimonious it may be, is insufficient by itself to meet Art. III's requirements.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Illustrating that principle is this Court's decision in Muskrat , which considered a series of federal statutes governing Indian property rights. 219 U.S. at 348 -49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality",
		"context": "Indeed, t he United States has itself defended —and benefited from —the principle that a judgment against a sovereign does not bind that sovereign's courts. For ex- ample, i n Jenkins v. United States, a state prisoner had previously sought habeas relief in federal court . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The federal district court in Georgia denied his petition under the Anti- Terrorism and Effec- tive Death Penalty Act (\"AEDPA\"), and the Eleventh 33 Circuit did not grant the broad certificate of appealabil- ity he requested. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 F.3d 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality",
		"context": "Recognizing the jurisdictional defects in this case does not involve forswearing review in a later, \"procedurally proper\" case. Jackson II, 141 S. Ct. at 2496. After all, the laws at issue in Muksrat were later reviewed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the law at issue in Poe was later reviewed in 381 U.S. 479. Moreover, in light of the history of this litigation, there is little 34 doubt that this Court could re view a state -court judg- ment holding in favor of a n SB 8 plaintiff . There is no reason to create (another) abortion -specific exception to the ordinary rules of federal jurisdiction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "224 U.S. 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Texas and the federal government are not adverse merely by virtue of disagreeing as to SB 8's constitutionality",
		"context": "Recognizing the jurisdictional defects in this case does not involve forswearing review in a later, \"procedurally proper\" case. Jackson II, 141 S. Ct. at 2496. After all, the laws at issue in Muksrat were later reviewed in 224 U.S. 640, and the law at issue in Poe was later reviewed in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, in light of the history of this litigation, there is little 34 doubt that this Court could re view a state -court judg- ment holding in favor of a n SB 8 plaintiff . There is no reason to create (another) abortion -specific exception to the ordinary rules of federal jurisdiction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "Pet. Br. 13 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It initially finds that rational basis in the four-decades old summarily 2 The percentages provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid by each state and Puerto Rico according to the table by the total revenues for all states and territories. 3 The percentages of SSI payments in a state provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid to residents of each sample state by the total payments in all states and the CNMI.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "It initially finds that rational basis in the four-decades old summarily 2 The percentages provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid by each state and Puerto Rico according to the table by the total revenues for all states and territories. 3 The percentages of SSI payments in a state provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid to residents of each sample state by the total payments in all states and the CNMI. 14 disposed cases of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 446 U.S. 651 where this Court highlighted that Puerto Rico \"residents do not contribut e to the public treasury .\" Califano at 5 n. 7; Harris at 652. The statements in Califano and Harris that Puerto Rico does not contribute to the federal treasury cannot withstand contemporary scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "It initially finds that rational basis in the four-decades old summarily 2 The percentages provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid by each state and Puerto Rico according to the table by the total revenues for all states and territories. 3 The percentages of SSI payments in a state provided here were calculated by dividing the amount paid to residents of each sample state by the total payments in all states and the CNMI. 14 disposed cases of 435 U.S. 1 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] where this Court highlighted that Puerto Rico \"residents do not contribut e to the public treasury .\" Califano at 5 n. 7; Harris at 652. The statements in Califano and Harris that Puerto Rico does not contribute to the federal treasury cannot withstand contemporary scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "Pet. Br at 21. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It is hard to see how excluding all otherwise qualifying residents of Puerto Rico from SSI is a \"rough accommodation .\" In Danbridge, t he Court evaluated the method used by Maryland to distribute its finite resources among its needy citizens in the Federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "Danbridge would be apposite if Maryland had ruled that the funds would only be distributed to families with up to, say, four children, and those with five or more children would not receive any aid, and this Court would have found that not to violate equal protection. But that is not the case. It is even ha rder to see how this is simply Congress permissibly using different programs –SSI for the States, AABD for Puerto Rico– to address similar issues among different categories, as the United States says United States Railroad Retirement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] allow s. See Pet. Br. 25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. TO DENY VAELLO-MADERO SSI PAYMENTS BECAUSE OF HOW PUERTO RICO CONTRIBUTES TO THE FEDERAL TREASURY HAS NO RATIONAL BASIS",
		"context": "at 177. Similarly. in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court examined a mandatory retirement age for the Foreign Service that did not apply to the Civil Service. The fact that some, very few, in the Civil Service worked abroad under similar conditio ns as those in the Foreign Service but were not subject to the same early retirement rules did not violate equal protection, for equal protection does not require perfection or mathematical nicety. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action",
		"context": "a. Petitioners acknowledge (at 41-42) that the Octo- ber Memoranda seek to justify terminating MPP using reasons not considered in the January Decision or June Termination. But this Court has repeatedly held that an agency's decisions must be supported , if at all, by the rec- ord before it at time it made the decision. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it has cautioned that post hoc rationalizations cannot cure a defective earlier administrative decision —let alone insulate that decision from further review. Regents , 140 S. Ct. at 1907- 09.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action",
		"context": "at 40. But the label petitioner s assign to their adminis- trative actions cannot control; after all, \"courts have long looked to the contents of the agency's action, not the agency's self -serving label .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, petitioners must identify in the administrative record a sufficient ba- sis to establish that the October Memoranda docu- mented the Secretary's authentic reconsideration re- garding whether to terminate MPP. Petitioners have no such record on which they can rely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The October Memoranda are not valid administrative action",
		"context": "43 In short, petitioners have pressed litigation until they have suffered or felt they were likely to suffer adverse decisions, sought to unilaterally vacate those adverse de- cisions through strategically timed memoranda designed to moot respondents' claims, a nd continued to dismantle MPP despite their litigation reversals. An ordinary on- looker would no longer assume that petitioners hewed to the administrative straight and narrow, and this Court is \"not required to exhibit a naiveté from which ordinary citizen s are free.\" Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . c. Without a presumption of regularity, petitioners' conduct demonstrates that the administration has al- ways intended to terminate MPP, regardless of any im- pediments to that outcome. Take DHS's own declarants, who attested that the agency began dismantling MPP in January 2021, immediately following the unreasoned January Decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Contrary to Petitioners' and Amici's Claims, the Impact-Plus Framework Is Constitutional Even If Analyzed Under City of Boerne",
		"context": "See State Pet'rs' Br. at 15, 26. As a threshold matter, this Court's precedents do not establish that the congruence and proportionality requirement from City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], applies, as Petitioners appear to assume. In Shelby County v. Holder , this Court's most recent examination of the constitutionality of a (different) provision of the VRA, the Court asked simply whether the state statute was rational, rather than inquiring into congruence and proportionality. See570 U.S. 529; id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Contrary to Petitioners' and Amici's Claims, the Impact-Plus Framework Is Constitutional Even If Analyzed Under City of Boerne",
		"context": "As a threshold matter, this Court's precedents do not establish that the congruence and proportionality requirement from City of 521 U.S. 507, applies, as Petitioners appear to assume. In Shelby County v. Holder , this Court's most recent examination of the constitutionality of a (different) provision of the VRA, the Court asked simply whether the state statute was rational, rather than inquiring into congruence and proportionality. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 554 (\"Viewing the preclearance requirements as targeting such efforts simply highlights the irrationality of continued reliance on the § 4 coverage formula . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. APJs Are Inferior Officers Under Edmond's Established Framework",
		"context": "501 U. S. at 882. And Lucia recognized that SEC ALJs were \"near-carbon copies\" of the STJs in Freytag because they had \"last-word capacity\" and could issue decisions that were not reviewed \"at all.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. APJs are no different. Every facet of their work is subject to supervision and di rection by principal Offic- ers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. APJs Are Inferior Officers Under Edmond's Established Framework",
		"context": "And the Director can reconsider the institution deci-sion and terminate the proceedings entirely before any final action is taken. See BioDelivery Scis. Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 APJs thus are not rogue o fficials who can bind the Executive on far-reaching decisions without any re-view at all. They are technically trained individuals who make patentability determinations with other panel members and explain their reasoning in highly detailed written decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "935 F.3d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. APJs Are Inferior Officers Under Edmond's Established Framework",
		"context": "Similarly, while Arthrex questions (at 41–42) whether the Director can engage in \"panel stacking,\" that power was not exercised in this case and is not central to the Director's supervision and control of APJs. 16 confirming or canceling patent claims at the conclu- sion of an IPR, it is alwa ys the Director—a principal Officer serving at the President's pleasure—who \"bears the political respon sibility\" for the work APJs do. Saint Regis Mohawk [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].3 2. Arthrex never denies that the Director's suite of supervisory powers means he can direct and control the work APJs do. While Arthrex quibbles (at 39–44) about a few of those powers as unsuitable stand-ins for direct review, Edmond requires a holistic analysis of whether APJs' work is \"d irected and supervised\" by other Officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 F.3d 1322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Mail And Wire Fraud Statutes Extend Solely To Schemes To Obtain Money Or Property",
		"context": "This Court's precedents establish that the mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit only schemes to deprive someone of money or property. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 531 U.S. 12; 484 U.S. 19.4 T h e government therefore must show not only that a defendant \"engaged in deception, but [also] that an object of the[] fraud was [money or] property.\" Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1571 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This requirement reflects that the fraud statutes are not a general license for \"the 4 The Court applies \"the same analysis\" to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which \"share the same language in relevant part.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Mail And Wire Fraud Statutes Extend Solely To Schemes To Obtain Money Or Property",
		"context": "This Court's precedents establish that the mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit only schemes to deprive someone of money or property. See 140 S. Ct. 1565; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 484 U.S. 19.4 T h e government therefore must show not only that a defendant \"engaged in deception, but [also] that an object of the[] fraud was [money or] property.\" Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1571 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This requirement reflects that the fraud statutes are not a general license for \"the 4 The Court applies \"the same analysis\" to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which \"share the same language in relevant part.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Mail And Wire Fraud Statutes Extend Solely To Schemes To Obtain Money Or Property",
		"context": "This Court's precedents establish that the mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit only schemes to deprive someone of money or property. See 140 S. Ct. 1565; 531 U.S. 12; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 T h e government therefore must show not only that a defendant \"engaged in deception, but [also] that an object of the[] fraud was [money or] property.\" Kelly , 140 S. Ct. at 1571 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This requirement reflects that the fraud statutes are not a general license for \"the 4 The Court applies \"the same analysis\" to the mail and wire fraud statutes, which \"share the same language in relevant part.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Mail And Wire Fraud Statutes Extend Solely To Schemes To Obtain Money Or Property",
		"context": "Cleveland , 531 U.S. at 19. The Court has accordingly rejected the extension of these statutes beyond traditional property interests. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that the mail fraud statute proscribed only schemes to obtain money or property, not schemes to defraud aimed at \"the intangible right of the citizenry to good government.\" Id. at 356.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "This Court's cases involving damages accrued abroad for domestic patent infringement show that such damages are recoverable. In Brown v. Duchesne , the Court denied compensation to a patent owner whose invention was installed on a foreign vessel abroad before the vessel entered the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court explained that use of the patented invention outside of the Unites States was not an infringement. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "at 196. Then, in Goulds' Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing , this Court held that a patent owner was entitled to recover profits from an infringer's domestic and 10 foreign sales. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court remanded the case with instructions to award damages calculated based on the infringer's sales in Pennsylvania and Canada, without distinguishing between the domestic and foreign sales. Id.at 256, 258.",
		"citation_value_orig": "105 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "Id.at 256, 258. InDowagiac Manufacturing Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co. , the Court reaffirmed the holding of Goulds' , explaining that damages for sales in Canada were appropriately awarded because \"the defendant made the infringing articles in the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Dowagiac , by contrast, the articles sold abroad were also manufactured outside the United States and therefore were not subject to a damages award. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "The panel majority's decision is also at odds with its own well-settled precedent. For example, in Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co. , the Federal Circuit upheld a damages award calculated on the basis of the defendant's sales of infringing \"carsets\" \"to foreign customers for installation in truck assemblies in foreign countries.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit rejected the 11 defendant's challenge to the damages award, holding that \"[w]hen it made the 1,671 carsets in this country, it infringed claim 10. Whether those carsets were sold in the U.S. or elsewhere is therefore irrelevant , and no error occurred in including those carsets among the infringing products on which royalty was due.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "727 F.2d 1506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "(emphasis added). InKori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc. , the Federal Circuit upheld a damages award \"on the basis of profits lost because of defendants' sales of infringing units for use outside the United States and profits lost on rental of infringing units within the United States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd,761 F.2d 649, cert. denied474 U.S. 902. InSchneider (Eur.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "761 F.2d 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Bar to Recovery of Foreign Damages Is at Odds with Settled Precedent",
		"context": "(emphasis added). InKori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc. , the Federal Circuit upheld a damages award \"on the basis of profits lost because of defendants' sales of infringing units for use outside the United States and profits lost on rental of infringing units within the United States.\" 761 F.2d 649, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied474 U.S. 902. InSchneider (Eur.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "761 F.2d 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Apple's Single-Plaintiff Argument Lacks Merit",
		"context": ". necessarily an endeavor to find one appropriate plai ntiff group among the categories of possible plaintiffs, thus elim- inating any potential risk of duplicative recover ies.\" See, e.g., Blue Shield of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consumers commonly have standing in monop o- lization cases to challenge anticom petitive restrai nts affecting rivals or suppliers, which result in higher market prices. See, e.g., In re585 F.3d 677 (where a drug manufa cturer's exclusive dealing contracts with its input su ppliers here and in respondents' brief, the majority analysis in Campos is unsound.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Apple's Single-Plaintiff Argument Lacks Merit",
		"context": "See, e.g., Blue Shield of 457 U.S. 465. Consumers commonly have standing in monop o- lization cases to challenge anticom petitive restrai nts affecting rivals or suppliers, which result in higher market prices. See, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (where a drug manufa cturer's exclusive dealing contracts with its input su ppliers here and in respondents' brief, the majority analysis in Campos is unsound. 18 enabled the manufa cturer to increase its drug prices to customers, those direct -purchaser cu stomers stated a Section 2 claim).10 The fact that excluded firms may be more directly affected than consumers is of no moment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "585 F.3d 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The State Cannot Show the Minimum Connection or Rational Relationship Necessary to Assert Jurisdiction",
		"context": "For the State to satisfy the Due Process Clause , it must establish that there exist minimum contacts, a \"minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax, and that the income attributed to the State for tax purposes [is] rationall y related to [fiscal] values connected with the taxing State.\" Quill, 504 U.S. at [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 215–16. 32 306 (internal quotation marks and citations omi t- ted).8 The North Carolina tax fails this standard. The State's attempt to assert jurisdiction over the trustee based on nothing more than the forum residence of a contingent beneficiary conflicts with settled law that directs the focus on the trustee's own conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The six-month trigger for a bond hearing is improper during a health pandemic",
		"context": "The term \"reasonable \" necessarily includes review of the specific context. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. During the COVID -19 pandemic, the Government may need more time than usual to arrange removal to foreign nations. The pandemic obviously slows governmental response times on both sides of removal transaction s between our Government and the foreign nations that will receive or repatriate the affected aliens.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare decisis does not require the Court to retain Seminole Rock and Auer",
		"context": ". Although the Court \"approach[es] the reconsid- eration of [its] decisions with the utmost caution, stare decisis is not an inexorable command.\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The special justifications necessary to over- come stare decisis are present here—and stare decisis applies with appreciably less force in this unique context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas's restrictions on spiritual advisers' conduct during executions advance compelling interests",
		"context": "In particular, an effective lethal injection requires proper setting and maintenance of the IV lines through which fluids — including the lethal drug —flow into the inmate's body. An effec tive lethal injection likewise requires that prison officials closely monitor the inmate's condition throughout the procedure. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing the current federal protocol , including an addendum adop ted in 2019 ), cert. denied,141 S. Ct. 180 ∗; see 2021 Execution Procedure. Any disruption to those carefully prescribed procedures —such as intentional or acci- dental interference with the IV lines, inmate restraints, or monitoring equipment —could cause serious prob- lems, including ineffective lethal -drug delivery or pain for the inmate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Texas's restrictions on spiritual advisers' conduct during executions advance compelling interests",
		"context": "Finally, the State has an interest in maintaining the privacy of personnel involved in the execution proce- dure. As courts and state legislatures have recognized, \"any actions leading to the disclosure of members of th e execution team \" could cause those members to decline to participate in future executions. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see , e.g., Tex. Code Crim. Pro c. Ann.",
		"citation_value_orig": "885 F.3d 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioner's further exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative procedures would be futile",
		"context": "1415(i)(2)(C)(i) —do not contemplate that courts will decide case s based on an administrative rec- ord. Furthermore, an ADA discrimination claim rests on substantive requirements different from those im- posed by the IDEA . See p p. 5-6, supra (discussing ADA); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,571 U.S. 1237 . Requiring a student to forgo a favorable IDEA set- tlement in order to pursue a non -IDEA claim would also be inconsistent with other aspects of the IDEA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 1088",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": "That ar gument is wrong: Courts have required plaintiffs to prove they bought shares registered under the challenged registration state- ment in all Section 11 cases, not just those involving multiple registration statements. In Krim v. 3 pcOrder.com, Inc. , the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dis- missal of a Section 11 claim asserted by a plaintiff who had bought shares when there was only one registra- tion statement in effect. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as in this case, the \"intermin- gling\" of registered shares and unregistered \"insider shares\" made it impossible fo r that plaintiff to prove that he bought re gistered shares. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.3d 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": "Id. at 492; see also id. at 497 (explaining that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary, because there \"all shares in the market\" were regis- tered). More generally, as Krim conclusively demon- strates, \"nothing in the reasoning\" of other Section 11 cases \"suggests that the distinction\" between succes-sive-registration cases and single-registration cases \"should matter.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 854",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": "18. He instea d interpreted \"such secu- rit[ies]\" to mean \"newly regi stered shares.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Othe r courts of appeals all adopted the same interpretation of the statute—until this case. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.2d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": ". that whatever might appear to further the statute's primary objective must be the law.\" Hen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Ot her courts of appeals, starting with the Second Circuit, did not follow that mistaken approach and adopt respondent's theory. The Ninth Circuit did.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": "II. T HE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT 'S DECISIONS . In Herman & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court explained the architecture of the securities laws. Section 11 of the Securities Act limits the class of those wh o can sue (only those who bought \"a registered security\"), but gives that group the benefit of \"virtually absolute\" liability, \"even for innocent misstatements.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW ALSO CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT'S DECISIONS",
		"context": "402 F.3d at 495 & n.26; con- tra Opp. 27 (\"none of the cl assic tracing cases relied on Herman & MacLean to interpret the phrase\" \"such security\"). 8 The decision below is also inconsistent with Gus- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court held that Section 12 applies only in cases where the issuer was required to issue a prospectus—that is, only in connection with registered shares. Id. at 570- 71.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Generalized \"Informational Interest\" Propounded by the Lower Courts Lacks Factual Support and Persuasive Force",
		"context": "As enunciated by the Ninth Circuit (in thecontext of ballot measure effort s), it consists of the idea that Knowing which interested parties back oroppose a ballot measure is critical, especiallywhen one considers that ballot-measurelanguage is typically confusing, and the long-term policy ramifications of the ballot measureare often unknown. At least by knowing whobacks or opposes a given initiative, voters willhave a pretty good idea of who stands to benefitfrom the legislation. California Pro-Life Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At least three flaws,however, afflict this reasoning. First, the notion that compelled disclosure qualitatively enhances electoral deliberation anddecision-making finds limited sustenance in thepolitical science literature.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 F.3d 1088",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The expropriation exception does not cover Respondents' claims",
		"context": "If that were so, the ex- ception would provide jurisdiction over any taking al-legedly connected to the violation of a human-rights or law-of-war norm. Instead, the exception asks one question: Does a claim place at issue a \"property right taken in viola- tion of international law \"? Bolivarian Republic of 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the text, context, and leg- islative history confirm, Congress understood \"rights in property taken in violation of international law\" to mean violations of the international law of expropria- tion. This narrow doctrine of international law, well- established by 1976 and unchang ed since, is limited to states' takings of foreign nationals' property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE MUST BE HEARD TO CORRECT A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ANALYSIS THREATENING COUNTLESS HISTORICAL DISPLAYS WITH RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS",
		"context": "The Fourth Circuit's opinion in this case, and the flawed logic it employs, contribute to a sweeping effort to banish all religious imag ery, themes, and substance from the public sphere. But despite what may beinferred from the Fourth Circuit's decision, the purposeof the Establishment Clause is not to prevent mereoffense from individuals who are exposed to ideas withwhich they disagree. Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The real objective of the[First] Amendment was . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE MUST BE HEARD TO CORRECT A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ANALYSIS THREATENING COUNTLESS HISTORICAL DISPLAYS WITH RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS",
		"context": ". to prevent any nationalecclesiastical establishment, which should give to anhierarchy the exclusive patronage of the nationalgovernment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The\"basic purposes\" of the First Amendment's ReligionClauses include seeking \"to 'assure the fullest possiblescope of religious liberty and tolerance for all.'\" Van 545 U.S. 677.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE MUST BE HEARD TO CORRECT A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ANALYSIS THREATENING COUNTLESS HISTORICAL DISPLAYS WITH RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS",
		"context": "465 U.S. 668. The\"basic purposes\" of the First Amendment's ReligionClauses include seeking \"to 'assure the fullest possiblescope of religious liberty and tolerance for all.'\" Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reviewing the constitutionality of adisplay under the Establishment Clause, context andhistory are of paramount importance. The legaljudgment employed \"must reflect and remain faithfulto the underlying purposes of the Clauses, and it must take account of context and consequences measured in 6 light of those purposes.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE MUST BE HEARD TO CORRECT A FUNDAMENTALLY FLAWED ANALYSIS THREATENING COUNTLESS HISTORICAL DISPLAYS WITH RELIGIOUS IMPLICATIONS",
		"context": "Incredibly, despite this precedent, the Fourth Circuit found that the history of the Bladensburgmemorial cross \"does not clearly support one party overthe other\" even though it is \"true that the Cross hasstood unchallenged for 90 years.\" Am. Humanist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contrary to the analysis supplied by Justice Breyer in Van Orden , the Fourth Circuit rejected as \"too simplistic\" the argument that the unchallenged 90-year history ofthe cross \"reinforces its secular effect.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.3d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Brecht-only approach changed the outcome here, making this case an \"ideal vehicle\" for review",
		"context": "But other than general denials, he does not expand on his arguments and instead reiterates ones that are unavailing . 11 For instance , Davenport attempts to downplay the Sixth Circuit's reliance on circuit precedent by claim- ing that the Sixth Circuit relied on the general law from Deck . But the court also relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 172 F.3d 633 , for the proposition that a shackling error is harmless in a close case and where the crucial issue is the de- fendant's \"violent nature. \" See App. at 38a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 F.3d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Brecht-only approach changed the outcome here, making this case an \"ideal vehicle\" for review",
		"context": "But other than general denials, he does not expand on his arguments and instead reiterates ones that are unavailing . 11 For instance , Davenport attempts to downplay the Sixth Circuit's reliance on circuit precedent by claim- ing that the Sixth Circuit relied on the general law from Deck . But the court also relied on 404 F.3d 1006 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for the proposition that a shackling error is harmless in a close case and where the crucial issue is the de- fendant's \"violent nature. \" See App. at 38a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "172 F.3d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOOD-FAITH DEFENSE FOR DOCTORS ACCUSED OF MISPRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN PART OF FEDERAL LAW FOR OVER 100 YEARS",
		"context": "The Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 was a tax and registration act that regulated opiates and cocaine. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Act created a registration requirement for those authorized to dispense opiates , and it contained an explicit exemption for medical practice: \" Nothing contained in this section shall ap ply . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOOD-FAITH DEFENSE FOR DOCTORS ACCUSED OF MISPRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN PART OF FEDERAL LAW FOR OVER 100 YEARS",
		"context": "The question in- stead was wheth er prescribing maintenance doses to compulsive opiate users qualified as a medical pur- pose \"in the course of professional practice\" under the statute. In Webb v. United States, the Court held maintenance doses did not qualify as a medical pur- pose. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Yet the Court was also explicit in stating that Dr. Webb and his co -defendant were not issuing prescriptions in good faith: \"It was the intent of Webb and Goldbaum that morphine should thus be furnished to the habitual users thereof by Goldbaum and without any physician 's prescrip- tion issued in the course of a good faith attempt to cure the morphine habit. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 U.S. 96",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE GOOD-FAITH DEFENSE FOR DOCTORS ACCUSED OF MISPRESCRIBING CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN PART OF FEDERAL LAW FOR OVER 100 YEARS",
		"context": "… It seems to me impossible to construe the statute as tacitly making such acts, howe ver foolish, crimes, by saying that what is in form a prescription and is given honestly in the course of a doctor's practice, and therefore, so far as the words of the statute go, is allowed in terms, is not within the words, is not a prescription 7 and is not given in the course of practice, if the Court deems the doctor's faith in his patient manifestly unwarranted. It seems to me wrong to construe the statute as creating a crime in this way without a word of warning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Linder , the trial court gave jury instructions believed to be in line with the deci sion in Behrman . The instructions allowed for a good -faith defense but did not allow that defense to be raised if Dr. Linder \" knew that this woman was addicted to the use of narcotics, and if he dispensed these drugs to her for the purpose of catering to h er appetite or satisfying her cravings for the drug [.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International trade in stolen cultural property is illicit",
		"context": "23 (1978). 14 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 333 F.3d 393; Mark B. Feldman, Reform of U.S. Cultural Property Policy , Cult Prop. News (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 F.2d 988",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. International trade in stolen cultural property is illicit",
		"context": "23 (1978). 14 See, e.g. , 545 F.2d 988; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mark B. Feldman, Reform of U.S. Cultural Property Policy , Cult Prop. News (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Showing Bias Toward an Agency Litigant Violates Due Process",
		"context": "This Court has held that even the appearance of po- tential bias toward a litigant violates the Due Process Clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Y et Auer institutionalizes a regime of system- atic judicial bias by requiring courts to \"defer\" to agency litigants whenever the parties dispute the meaning of an agency regulation. Rather than exercise their own judg-ment about what the law is, judges under Auer con- sciously defer to the judgment of one of the litigants be- fore them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Case Concerns the Proper Frame for the EPA's Derivation of Emission Limits",
		"context": "That threshold question (how the limits may be set) does not control the subsequent one (how states may comply). Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And only the EPA's authority is at issue here. 4 Section 7411 contemplates two regulatory steps.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Government Is Right About The Need For Review",
		"context": "Indeed, there is no realistic prospect that the disagreement will resolve itself: The D.C. and Eleventh Circuits have rejected petitions for en banc review seeking to overturn those courts' settled positions, and the Government has no procedural vehicle for obtaining judicial review of adverse EEOC and MSPB determinations. As the Seventh Circuit has emphasized, the \"need for an authoritative decision on this issue\" is clear. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a decision can only be delivered by this Court. This case is an ideal vehicle to address the questions presented.",
		"citation_value_orig": "737 F.3d 1093",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should take care not to implicitly endorse the Fifth Circuit's aggressive application of Regents to the initial agency action in this case",
		"context": "This Court should therefore take care to ensure that its opinion in this case cannot be seen as implicitly credit ing or acquies cing in the premise that there was actually any violation of the reasoned explana- tion requirement for Secretary Mayorkas to correct here. Indeed , some have already taken this Court's sum- mary order denying a stay in this case— and broadly citing the entire merits discussion in Regents in support— as rat- ifying an unduly aggressive conception of arbitrariness re- view. Whereas this Court has long underscored the APA's \"narrow standard of review,\" e.g., Regents , 190 S. Ct. at 1905 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2009 ), the Fifth Circuit has read that summary order as demonstr ating that, \" after Regents ,\" arbitrariness re- view \" has serious bite.\" Wages & White Lion Invs., 16 F.4th 1130; accord Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 F.3d 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 F.3d 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ............. 19 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: Brooke Grp. 509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., 816 F.2d 9 ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "509 U.S. 209 ............................................ 13, 14 Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148 ...................................................................................... 5 II Cases —Continued: Page Eastman Kodak 504 U.S. 451 ........................................................ 3, 4, 5 476 U.S. 447 ...................................................................... 4, 8, 10, 18 4 F.3d 682 .......... 5 Fortner Enters., 394 U.S. 495 .............................................................. 17 423 F.3d 184, cert. denied,547 U.S. 1092 .......................... 14 Interface Grp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................... 11 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "816 F.2d 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 F.3d 1049",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 1369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "275 F.3d 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F.3d 928",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 19 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 563",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "No. 466 U.S. 2 ........................................................... 10, 11 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., 551 U.S. 877 ....................................... 10, 11, 13, 16, 20 468 U.S. 85 ............................................................... 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 13 NYNEX 525 U.S. 128 ....... 9, 11 802 F.3d 1049, cert. denied,137 S. Ct. 277 .............................. 11, 12 Thurman Indus., 875 F.2d 1369 ............................................. 14 275 F.3d 191 ............... 5 Toys \"R\" Us, 221 F.3d 928 ..................... 5 5 F.3d 658 ......................................................................... 5 384 U.S. 563 ........ 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Cir.) , cert. denied,534 U.S. 952 ................. 5, 7 III Case s—Continued: Page [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................................. 19 344 F.3d 229, cert. denied,543 U.S. 811 ............................. 7 Miscellaneous: 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anti- trust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust P rinciples and Their Application (4th ed. 2014) ........................... 7, 18 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Cir.) , cert. denied,534 U.S. 952 ................. 5, 7 III Case s—Continued: Page 374 U.S. 321 ............................................................................. 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,543 U.S. 811 ............................. 7 Miscellaneous: 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anti- trust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust P rinciples and Their Application (4th ed. 2014) ........................... 7, 18 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": ", cert. denied,534 U.S. 952 ................. 5, 7 III Case s—Continued: Page 374 U.S. 321 ............................................................................. 19 344 F.3d 229, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 7 Miscellaneous: 2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Anti- trust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust P rinciples and Their Application (4th ed. 2014) ........................... 7, 18 (1) In the Supreme Court of the United States No. 16-1454 STATE OF OHIO, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY , ET AL .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Separate evidence of market power is unnecessary when a plaintiff proves actual adverse effects on competition Amex correctly observes (Br. 30) that a vertical re- straint imposed by a defendant that lacks market power cannot unreasonably restrain trade. Market power is the power \"to force a purchaser to do something that he would not do in a competitive market, \" Eastman Kodak [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By definition, a defendant that lacks such power cannot raise prices, reduce output, exclude competitors, or otherwise harm competition in the mar- ket as a whole unless it engages in horizontal collusion. 4 Although Amex's premise is sound, it does not support a rule requiring indirect evidence of market power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "6. \"[T]he purpose of the inquir[y] into market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although Indiana Dentists involved a horizontal agreement ( Amex Br. 33), this Court's logic a pplies equally here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "And numerous decisions —including decisions by the same courts —confirm that market power may be shown through \"direct proof \" of anticompetitive effects. E.g. , 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir.) , cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": ", cert. denied,534 U.S. 952.1 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has rejected as \"backwards\" the asser- tion \"that anticompetitive effects in a market cannot be shown unless the plaintiff first proves that [the defend ant] has a large market share. \" Toys \"R\" Us, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the United States and the States failed to offer sufficient separate evi- dence of its market power. This Court need not address that question in light of the ample proof that the anti - steering rules adversely affect competition. See Part B, infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 F.3d 928",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "The district court correctly found (Pet. App. 148a - 191a) that Amex has \"the power 'to force [merchants] to do something that [they] would not do in a competitive market,' \" Kodak , 504 U.S. at 464 (citation omitted), and \"to raise prices ,\" NCAA , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at 109 n.38. Amex has that power because, \"[f ]or all but some of the small- est merchants, accepting Amex cards is a requirement of doing business. \" Wal -Mart Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "App. 156a - 157a. That insistence \"effectively prevents merchants 1 See, e.g., Conwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148; 275 F.3d 191. 6 from dropping American Express\" —as numerous mer- chants confirmed at trial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 F.3d 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "156a - 157a. That insistence \"effectively prevents merchants 1 See, e.g., Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 275 F.3d 191. 6 from dropping American Express\" —as numerous mer- chants confirmed at trial. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "156a - 157a. That insistence \"effectively prevents merchants 1 See, e.g., Conwood 290 F.3d 768, cert. denied,537 U.S. 1148; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 from dropping American Express\" —as numerous mer- chants confirmed at trial. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "275 F.3d 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "2B Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application ¶ 501, at 111 (4th ed. 2014) 2 At Amex's urging, the Second Circuit previously held that MasterCard had market power when it had a 26% market share. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court correctly found that Amex's market power is durable because it has persisted for decades and because it is protected by stable market conditions including \"sustained high bar- riers to entry.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.3d 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "NCAA , 468 U.S. at 104. The plaintiff 's burden is to \"allege and prove harm to the competitive process, i.e., to competition itself.\" NYN EX [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A plaintiff can carry that burden by proving that a re- straint has rendered price and output \"unresponsive to 3 Amex asserts in a single sentence (Br. 56) that Discover's low - fee strategy failed for other reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "NCAA , 468 U.S. at 104. Ver tical restraints require more careful analysis because they are less likely to harm interbrand competition. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has cautioned, however, that in applying the rule of reason, \"the potential anticom- petitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When sellers are \"numerous and mobile, and the number of buyers is large, exclusive- dealing ar- rangements of narrow scope pose no threat\" because they do not affect competition in the market as a whole. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 2",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Ibid. Such a foreclo- sure requires some procompetitive justification because it is \"an impairment of the competitive structure of the market.\" Stop & Shop Supermarket [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The anti -steering rules are not exclusive- dealing contracts, but their \"impairmen t of the competitive structure of the market,\" Stop & Shop , 373 F.3d at 66, is even clearer. The rules do not prohibit merchants from accepting rival cards, but they have effectively prevented price competition by eliminating any mean- ingful economic incen tive for other networks to lower their merchant fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.3d 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "Even pr oof of \"rising prices\" across the mar- ket may simply reflect \"growing product demand.\" Brooke Grp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Amex Br. 39- 40.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "App. 160a. Using that 5 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 method, Amex \"targeted\" merchants \"with relatively high rates of cardholder insistence\" for \"multiple rounds of price hikes,\" and the Value Recapture rate in- creases ultimately yielded \"$1.3 billion in incremental pre-tax income.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.3d 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Amex's asserted justifications for the anti-steering rules are irrelevant to the question presented and are foreclosed by the district court's factual findings",
		"context": "1, 3, 22, 39 -40, 42- 43) that the dollar volume of credit -card transactions has been in- creasing. But \"a 'reduction in output is not the only measure of anticompetitive effect.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For two reasons, the growth in transaction volume does not un-dermine the",
		"citation_value_orig": "802 F.3d 1049",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "859 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 1). The Dictionary Act \"is generally applicable to any Act of Congress,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and its definition of \"person\" con-trols here. As this Court recently observed, \"unless there is something about the [statutory] context that 'indicates otherwise,' the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer\" to the defini-tional scope of \"person.\" 134 S. Ct. 2751.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 695",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "The Dictionary Act \"is generally applicable to any Act of Congress,\" 514 U.S. 695, and its definition of \"person\" con-trols here. As this Court recently observed, \"unless there is something about the [statutory] context that 'indicates otherwise,' the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer\" to the defini-tional scope of \"person.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Dictionary Act was designed for this very purpose. The Act's \"whole point .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "431, 431. Congress then substituted \"partner- ships and corporations\" for \"bodies politic and corporate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],\" but not non-corporate sov- ereign entities. 491 U.S. 58; accord 436 U.S. 658; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia e Supporting Respondents at 18 n.15, 495 U.S. 182. 22 background principles that will promote effective com- munication between Congress and the courts.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "Congress then substituted \"partner- ships and corporations\" for \"bodies politic and corporate.\" 495 U.S. 182,\" but not non-corporate sov- ereign entities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 436 U.S. 658; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia e Supporting Respondents at 18 n.15, 495 U.S. 182. 22 background principles that will promote effective com- munication between Congress and the courts.\" 567 U.S. 260.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "Congress then substituted \"partner- ships and corporations\" for \"bodies politic and corporate.\" 495 U.S. 182,\" but not non-corporate sov- ereign entities. 491 U.S. 58; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia e Supporting Respondents at 18 n.15, 495 U.S. 182. 22 background principles that will promote effective com- munication between Congress and the courts.\" 567 U.S. 260.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "Congress then substituted \"partner- ships and corporations\" for \"bodies politic and corporate.\" 495 U.S. 182,\" but not non-corporate sov- ereign entities. 491 U.S. 58; accord 436 U.S. 658; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia e Supporting Respondents at 18 n.15, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 background principles that will promote effective com- munication between Congress and the courts.\" 567 U.S. 260.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "491 U.S. 58; accord 436 U.S. 658; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curia e Supporting Respondents at 18 n.15, 495 U.S. 182. 22 background principles that will promote effective com- munication between Congress and the courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. This Court has consistently turned to the Dic- tionary Act, includ ing with respect to \"person,\" when interpreting a term that is not defined separately in the specific statute at issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "This Court has consistently turned to the Dic- tionary Act, includ ing with respect to \"person,\" when interpreting a term that is not defined separately in the specific statute at issue. More than seventy years ago, this Court relied on the Dictionary Act when con- struing \"persons\" for purposes of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which did not separately define the term. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court noted that through the Dictionary Act, \"Congr ess made express provision for the term ['persons'] to extend to partnerships and corporations,\" but had omitted \"any comparable pro-vision extending the term to sovereign governments.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": ", Hobby Lobby , 134 S. Ct. at 2768; Vermont Agency , 529 U.S. at 782. Notably, among opinions cit- ing the Dictionary Act where the applicability of \"person\" to the government was at issue, the Court has repeatedly excluded the government from the reach of that term. See Will , 491 U.S. at 69–70; Wil- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 This is unsurprising. The Dictionary Act's \"per- son\" definition \"confirms that insofar as this word is concerned, Congress speaks English like the rest of us.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 653",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "23 This is unsurprising. The Dictionary Act's \"per- son\" definition \"confirms that insofar as this word is concerned, Congress speaks English like the rest of us.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], few would use the word \"person\" to describe the government. 3. The AIA is no exception from the Dictionary Act's directive that it is to be consulted \"[i]n determin-ing the meaning of any Act of Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "4. The context of Congress's use of the term \"per- son\" in the AIA review provisions may explain why this Court has twice described AIA reviews as permit- ting validity challenges brought by \"private parties.\" SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. 1365. Similarly, in briefing before this Court, the Solici- tor General has repeatedly employed a similar choice 24 of words when referring to the persons who can peti- tion for AIA reviews. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "4. The context of Congress's use of the term \"per- son\" in the AIA review provisions may explain why this Court has twice described AIA reviews as permit- ting validity challenges brought by \"private parties.\" SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348; Oil States Energy Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, in briefing before this Court, the Solici- tor General has repeatedly employed a similar choice 24 of words when referring to the persons who can peti- tion for AIA reviews. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": "Similarly, in briefing before this Court, the Solici- tor General has repeatedly employed a similar choice 24 of words when referring to the persons who can peti- tion for AIA reviews. See, e.g. , Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11–13, 15, 19, 25, 26, Oil States Energy Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16-712) (referring to persons who can petition for IPR as \"private challeng er[s],\" \"private part[ies],\" and \"priva te petitioner[s]\"); id. at 11, 24 (observing that AIA review mechanisms allow the Pa- tent and Trademark Office to \"leverage knowledge possessed by persons outside the government\"); Brief for the Respondent at 30, Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Has Long Defined \"Person\" in the Dictionary Act to Exclude the Government and That Definition Controls Here",
		"context": ", Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11–13, 15, 19, 25, 26, Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16-712) (referring to persons who can petition for IPR as \"private challeng er[s],\" \"private part[ies],\" and \"priva te petitioner[s]\"); id. at 11, 24 (observing that AIA review mechanisms allow the Pa- tent and Trademark Office to \"leverage knowledge possessed by persons outside the government\"); Brief for the Respondent at 30, Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 15-446 (noting \"the presence of contesting private parties\" as a \"distin- guish[ing]\" feature of IPRs).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Reconstruction Framers Openly Discussed Racially Polarized Voting during the Fifteenth Amendment's Drafting and Ratification.",
		"context": "Moreover, one does not need modern statistical tools to uncover racial bloc voting during Reco nstruction. That is because \"[v]oting was public until 1888 when the States began to adopt the Australian secret ballot.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the Reconstruted South, Black men helped rat- ify the Fourteenth Amendment and elected the first Black politicians to office. See Crum, Reconstructing , supra at 303-04; see also Crum, Lawfulness , supra , at 1606 -07 (discussing Black voters' role in ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agencies' conscience exemptions are not arbitrary or capricious",
		"context": "But self-evidently, the final rules are the agencies' good-faith effort to bring peace to a fractured society. All the APA demands is \"good reasons for the new policy\" and the agencies' belief it is better than the old one. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 \u0003Here, the Third Circuit held that the final rules were likely arbitrary and capricious by ignoring this history and substituting the States' policy \"judgment for that of the agenc[ies].\" Motor Vehicle Mfrs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The agencies' conscience exemptions are not arbitrary or capricious",
		"context": "Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the agencies \"need not demonstrate to a court's satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.\" Fox Television , 556 U.S. at 515.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Record Does Not Indicate the Reasons for the District Court's Decision",
		"context": ". The government notes, (BIO at 19 –20), that there is no need for additional explanation in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings when the reason for the decision can readily be gleaned from the record. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But this case is nothing like Zayas -Ortiz . In that case, both the government and Probation oppose d the sentence reduction on specific and particularized public safety grounds —namely , that the defendant had, inter alia , held an \"enforcer\" role in a drug trafficking organization and controlled \"drug points\" where drugs were sold.",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.3d 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Record Does Not Indicate the Reasons for the District Court's Decision",
		"context": "Probation's memorandum outlining Mr. Chavez -Meza's post- sentencing conduct noted numerous positive achievements and one misconduct report, (BIO at 6), so the significance of that post- sentencing conduct on the district court's decision, if any,2 2 While a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors when deciding motions brought pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) , it need not consider a defendant's post- 7 is indeterminable . Thus, unlike Zayas -Ortiz , the record does not indicate that the district court simply adopted a party's recommendation. The government also cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for the proposition that \"the reasons for the district court's action may be obvious from the history of the case.\" (BIO at 19.) But Christie is helpful to Mr. Chavez -Meza, not the government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.3d 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Record Does Not Indicate the Reasons for the District Court's Decision",
		"context": "Id. at 194, 198. When pointing out that the reasons for a reduction may be \"obvious\" in some cases, it cited as an example [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As Christie explained, the reduction in Batista was proportional to the original sentence: both the original and the modified sentence were 31.5% below the low end of the applicable guidelines range. Christie , 736 F.3d at 196.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F. App'x 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. History shows the States relinquished sovereignty in military matters.",
		"context": "IX. Apart from these few enumerated exceptions allowing States to act pursuant to an emergency or congressional consent, war powers belonged exclusively to the federal government. By ratifying the Articles of Confederation, the States thus relinquished any sovereignty they previously held in war -related matter s. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The concentration of war powers in the federal government under the Articles is striking — especially considering the federal government's weakness in virtually every other area. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, War Powers Abrogation , 89 GEO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
		"context": "Accordingly, this Court should add a question pre- sented on the logically antecedent issue of whether the ATS permi ts aiding -and-abetting liability at all. Although petitioners have not sought review of that question, the issue was both \"pressed\" and \"passed upon below.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and t he district court rejected that ar- gument , see Doe 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057 . On the first appeal, petitioners argued that the court could \"affirm on the alternative ground that an aiding and abetting cause of action un- der the ATS is contrary to Sosa .\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
		"context": "Accordingly, this Court should add a question pre- sented on the logically antecedent issue of whether the ATS permi ts aiding -and-abetting liability at all. Although petitioners have not sought review of that question, the issue was both \"pressed\" and \"passed upon below.\" 504 U.S. 36 , and t he district court rejected that ar- gument , see Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . On the first appeal, petitioners argued that the court could \"affirm on the alternative ground that an aiding and abetting cause of action un- der the ATS is contrary to Sosa .\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "748 F. Supp. 2d 1057",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
		"context": "54 (No. 10 -56739) (capitalization and emphasis omit- ted). The Ninth Circuit declined that invitation , citing a prior case permitting aiding -and-abetting liability , see Doe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 798, cert. granted,569 U.S. 945) , and the fact that the issue was resolved in a previous appeal in the same litigation allows this Court to consider it here, s ee Major League Baseball Players Ass 532 U.S. 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit declined that invitation , citing a prior case permitting aiding -and-abetting liability , see Doe 766 F.3d 1013 , cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 798, cert. granted,569 U.S. 945) , and the fact that the issue was resolved in a previous appeal in the same litigation allows this Court to consider it here, s ee Major League Baseball Players Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That analysis is untenable after Jesner , which makes clear that Sosa 's second step precludes an aiding - and-abetting claim under the ATS. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should add the question of whether the ATS imposes aiding-and-abetting liability.",
		"context": "The issue is ripe for review: it has percolated thor- oughly in the courts of appeals , which have unanimously, but erroneously, recognized aiding -and-abetting liabil- ity. See Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc. , 658 F .3d 388, 395-3 96 (4th Cir. 2011) ; Presbyterian Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. de- nied, 562 U.S. 946 ; Khulumani , 504 F.3d at 260; Drummond Co. , 552 F .3d at 1315; see also Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 28-32. The absence of a conflict is not alone sufficient to counsel against certiorari on this question , given its logical connection to the extraterri- toriality issue, its practical importance, and the numer- ous judges who have dissented from , or criticized, hold- ings recognizing aiding -and-abetting liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.3d 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An inflexible viability standard conflicts with this Court's recognition that States have legitimate interests throughout pregnancy",
		"context": ". Mississippi's Gestational Age Act exposes the incon- sistencies between the Court's suggestion that States cannot prohibit pre-viability abortions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the Court's recogni-tion that states have legitimate interests \" from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting [1] the health of the mother and [2] the life of the fetus that may become a child,\" Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 125 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. 505 U.S. 833. Indeed, this Court has underscored that it could \"not see why the State's interest in protecting human life should come into existence only at the poin t of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An inflexible viability standard conflicts with this Court's recognition that States have legitimate interests throughout pregnancy",
		"context": ". Mississippi's Gestational Age Act exposes the incon- sistencies between the Court's suggestion that States cannot prohibit pre-viability abortions, 410 U.S. 113, and the Court's recogni-tion that states have legitimate interests \" from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting [1] the health of the mother and [2] the life of the fetus that may become a child,\" Gonzales , 550 U.S. at 125 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, this Court has underscored that it could \"not see why the State's interest in protecting human life should come into existence only at the poin t of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability.\" Webster , 492 U.S. at 580.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An inflexible viability standard conflicts with this Court's recognition that States have legitimate interests throughout pregnancy",
		"context": "Webster , 492 U.S. at 580. The viability line that Roe articulated was always, as Justice O'Connor recogniz ed, on a collision course with itself for it failed to give full credence to the fact \"that the State's interest in protecting potential human life exists throughout the pregnancy.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What's more, the issue was not briefed or argued in Roe, Pet. 15–16, the Court in Roe did not grapple with the risk to a mother's health when an abortion is performed later in a pregnancy, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
		"context": "at 285 (plurality op.). The framers thus not only textually delegated federal oversight of claims of excessive partisanship to Congress, but recognized that such a role would be affirmatively inappropriate for Article III courts that depend on their independence from partisan politics to discharge their core function. Plaintiffs' principal responses to this argument are to deem it novel and (somewhat paradoxically) \"definitively rejected\" in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . CC.Br.35; LWV.Br.41 -42. But there is nothing novel about recognizing that the framers adopted a structural solution to the inherently political problem of partisan gerrymandering.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
		"context": "Id. Similarly, in Nixon v. United States, this Court found a textual commitment to th e Senate in the Impeachment Clause for a complaint about the Senate's use of a committee in conducting an impeachment trial, but did not suggest that a complaint about the Senate's failure to follow the Clause's \"quite precise\" requirements that Senators b e under oath and conviction occur by a two -thirds vote would be nonjusticiable. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The central lesson of Baker and Nixon is that the existence of a textual commitment depends on the precise nature of the claim asserted . Plaintiffs' hyperbolic claims that finding a textual commitment in this context would render nonjusticiable every case involving federal elections therefore ring hollow.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
		"context": "Partisan gerrymandering claims are fundamentally different from racial gerrymandering and malap portionment claims, on both the textual - commitment question and the bottom- line issue of justiciability. In the racial gerrymandering context, 9 the textual commitment in the Elections Clause must be reconciled with the Equal Protection Clause's clear command \" to eliminate racial discrimination emanating from official sources in the States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In the malapportionment context, the Elections Clause must be weighed against \"the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise—equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people.\" We 376 U.S. 1 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
		"context": "379 U.S. 184 . In the malapportionment context, the Elections Clause must be weighed against \"the principle solemnly embodied in the Great Compromise—equal representation in the House for equal numbers of people.\" We [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Again, Nixon is instructive. Nixon distinguished 395 U.S. 486 , on the basis that judicial intervention was necessary there to vindicate the Qualifications Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Textually Committed to Congress Federal Oversight Over Excessive Partisanship in Districting",
		"context": "We 376 U.S. 1 . Again, Nixon is instructive. Nixon distinguished [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , on the basis that judicial intervention was necessary there to vindicate the Qualifications Clause. 506 U.S. at 240. Here, by contrast, as in Nixon , \"there is no separate provision of the Constitution that could be defeated,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": "In particular, to the extent that a party wishes to bring a federal constitutional challenge to a change in law by a state court at present, that complaint generally sounds in either due process or equal protection. 24 And, unsurprisingly, federal courts have made clear that 24 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]68 F.3d 404570 F.2d 1065. Cf. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673; B 378 U.S. 347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": "In particular, to the extent that a party wishes to bring a federal constitutional challenge to a change in law by a state court at present, that complaint generally sounds in either due process or equal protection. 24 And, unsurprisingly, federal courts have made clear that 24 See, e.g. , 531 U.S. 98[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]570 F.2d 1065. Cf. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673; B 378 U.S. 347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": "In particular, to the extent that a party wishes to bring a federal constitutional challenge to a change in law by a state court at present, that complaint generally sounds in either due process or equal protection. 24 And, unsurprisingly, federal courts have made clear that 24 See, e.g. , 531 U.S. 9868 F.3d 404[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cf. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673; B 378 U.S. 347.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 F.2d 1065",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": ", 531 U.S. 9868 F.3d 404570 F.2d 1065. Cf. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; B 378 U.S. 347. 20 such chall enges to state court decisions must show more than just an error of interpretation by a state court in order to cabin the role of the federal courts and avoid federalizing the entirety of state law.25 But the ISL theory advanced by Petitioners —which goes far beyond unadopted prior versions of the theory positing a potential constitutional violation only when courts interpret statutes after voting has been completed in a way in which \"no reasonable person\" could support and \"step[s] away from . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": ", 531 U.S. 9868 F.3d 404570 F.2d 1065. Cf. Brinkerhoff -Faris Trust & Savings 281 U.S. 673; B [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 such chall enges to state court decisions must show more than just an error of interpretation by a state court in order to cabin the role of the federal courts and avoid federalizing the entirety of state law.25 But the ISL theory advanced by Petitioners —which goes far beyond unadopted prior versions of the theory positing a potential constitutional violation only when courts interpret statutes after voting has been completed in a way in which \"no reasonable person\" could support and \"step[s] away from . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": ". establis hed practice,\" Bush , 531 U.S. at 119– 20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 26—lacks the safeguards 25 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 369 U.S. 541; see also Roe, 43 F.3d at 580 ( \"Not every state election dispute, however, implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus leads to possible federal court intervention. Generally, federal courts do not involve themselves in garden variety election disputes.\") (quotation omitted); Griffin , 570 F.2d at 1077 (\"The federal court is not equipped nor empowered to supervise the administration of a local election.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The doubt created by the uncertainty related to the content of federal and state election law would lead to an explosion in strategic election season litigation—particularly litigation in federal courts",
		"context": ". establis hed practice,\" Bush , 531 U.S. at 119– 20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 26—lacks the safeguards 25 See, e.g. , 456 U.S. 107; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Roe, 43 F.3d at 580 ( \"Not every state election dispute, however, implicates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus leads to possible federal court intervention. Generally, federal courts do not involve themselves in garden variety election disputes.\") (quotation omitted); Griffin , 570 F.2d at 1077 (\"The federal court is not equipped nor empowered to supervise the administration of a local election.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "For much of its history, this Court has rejected efforts to \"search for motive in testing constitu- tionality.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court continued to abstain from inquiries into legislative motive throughout the early part of the Twentieth Century. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "The Court continued to abstain from inquiries into legislative motive throughout the early part of the Twentieth Century. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Not until the 1960s—in cases such as 393 U.S. 97 (tracing the Court's changing use of motivation). The Court now considers motivation, to various extents, in First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection cases, among others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "See, e.g. , 283 U.S. 423. Not until the 1960s—in cases such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (tracing the Court's changing use of motivation). The Court now considers motivation, to various extents, in First Amendment, Due Process, and Equal Protection cases, among others. Brandon L. Garrett, Unconstitutionally Illegitimate Discrimination , 104 Va. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "1784, 1853 (2008). In United States v. Windsor , this Court engaged in a comprehensive consideration of the legislative purpose underlying § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the course of invalidating the Act, the Court considered the Act's deviation from normal principles of federalism, as well as the law's stated purpose, \"to promote an interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in hetero- sexual-only marriage laws.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "Similarly, this Court has considered legislative motivation in Free Exercise challenges. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah , this Court 5 facially invalidated a group of ordinances, that targeted a particular religious group—the local Santeria church. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Law- makers there, reacting to anti-Santeria sentiments in the community, imposed criminal penalties for animal sacrifice, an important tenant of the Santeria faith. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "at 533. This Court also cited a broad, and invalid, legislative motivation when it found Louisiana's Creationism Act facially invalid. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, Louisiana's attempt to \"restructure the science curric- ulum to conform with a particular religious viewpoint\" violated the Establishment Clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "at 593. Other laws that this Court invalidated based on impermissible purpose resulted from facial challenges by the targets of the discriminatory legislative intent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In contrast, this Court has avoided legislative motive considerations during as-applied challenges. In United States v. O'Brien , for instance, this Court rejected O'Brien's legislative motive argument in part because the statute was constitutional on its face.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Broad legislative motivation is only considered in facial challenges",
		"context": "In contrast, this Court has avoided legislative motive considerations during as-applied challenges. In United States v. O'Brien , for instance, this Court rejected O'Brien's legislative motive argument in part because the statute was constitutional on its face. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are good reasons to avoid delving into legislative intent in as-applied challenges. In addition to the conceptual incongruence, an improperly discrim-inatory law should be wholly invalid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims",
		"context": "1. Congress enacted the FAA to \"reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agree- ments,\" \"to place [these] agreements upon the same footing as other contracts,\" and to \"manifest a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.\" 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just two Terms ago, this Court made clear that the Act \"envision[s]\" an \"individualized form of arbi- tration.\" Lamps Plus , 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (citing Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1622-23; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349; Stolt-Nielsen 559 U.S. 662).",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims",
		"context": "13 534 U.S. 279. Just two Terms ago, this Court made clear that the Act \"envision[s]\" an \"individualized form of arbi- tration.\" Lamps Plus , 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (citing Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1622-23; Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349; Stolt-Nielsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"In individual arbitration, 'par- ties forgo the procedural rigor and appellate review of the courts in order to realize the benefits of private dispute resolution,'\" including \"'lower costs'\" and \"'greater efficiency and speed.'\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims",
		"context": "at 446-47. The California Supreme Court has confirmed as much, holding that California public policy \"sup- port[s] extending PAGA discovery as broadly as class action discovery has been extended .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court has already held that class-wide dis- covery is incompatible with arbitration \"as envisioned by the FAA.\" Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 P.3d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA forbids California from refusing to enforce bilateral arbitration agreements with respect to representative PAGA claims",
		"context": "The civil penalties available in a representative PAGA action may total many millions of dollars when sought by reference to hundreds or thousands of po- tentially affected employees for pay periods extending over multiple years. \"Even a conservative estimate would put the potential penalties in [PAGA] cases in the tens of millions of dollars.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In- deed, in some PAGA cases, the potential fines that an employer faces are substantially higher than the ac- tual damages that would have been awarded had the suit been brought as a class action. See Goodman, su- pra, at 415.",
		"citation_value_orig": "739 F.3d 1192",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Petitioner's policy arguments are unsound and could not justify ignoring the text and Strang",
		"context": "BP 141 S. Ct. 1532. \"[N]othing in the generalized statutory pur-pose of protecting [certain parties] can overcome the spe- cific manner of that protection which the text … con- tains,\" as \"t he pros and cons of [any particular rule] are for the consideration of Congress, not the courts.\" 44 RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"The Bankruptcy Code stand- ardizes an expansive (and sometimes unruly) area of law, and it is [the Court's] obligation to interpret the Code clearly and predictably using well established principles of statutory construction.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The term \"confidential\" in Exemption 4 carries its ordinary meaning",
		"context": "FOIA does not define the term \"confidential .\" In the absence of a statutory definition, \"[i]t is a 'fundamental canon of statutory construction' \" that \" 'words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained , or (2) was communi cated in confidence to the government . That plain -language interpretation of \"confidential\" is confirmed by FOIA's statutory context and legislative history.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. WHEN THE FDA REJECTS A MANUFACTURER'S PROPOSAL TO WARN ABOUT A DISCLOSED RISK, THE MANUFACTURER CANNOT BE PENALIZED FOR FAILING TO WARN OF THAT RISK",
		"context": "2. Simply put, \"wher e state and federal law directly conflict, state law must give way.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And federal law \"directly conflicts\" with state law when it is \"impossible for a private party to comply with both state and fed eral requirements.\" 496 U.S. 72; see also Levine, 555 U.S. at 589– 90 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. WHEN THE FDA REJECTS A MANUFACTURER'S PROPOSAL TO WARN ABOUT A DISCLOSED RISK, THE MANUFACTURER CANNOT BE PENALIZED FOR FAILING TO WARN OF THAT RISK",
		"context": "568 U.S. 627. And federal law \"directly conflicts\" with state law when it is \"impossible for a private party to comply with both state and fed eral requirements.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Levine, 555 U.S. at 589– 90 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Consequently, courts may not enforce state laws that require what federal law forbids, or forbid what federal law requires. As explained below, a state may not impose tort liability on a drug manufacturer for failing to warn of a risk that the FDA would not have permitted the manufacturer to warn about.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner's \"property interest\" theory is unsupported",
		"context": "Petitioner does not own and has never owned any property interest in respondent's trademarks. (d) Finally, petitioner's heavy reliance (Br. 24-29, 37) on this Court's 1924 decision in Board of Trade of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is misplaced. To begin, Board of Trade was not decided under the Bankruptcy Code. Nor did it address \"rejection\" of executory con- tracts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Requiring Intent With Initial Trespass Furthers Congress's Purpose Of Reserving ACCA's Harsh Penalties For Violent Career Criminals",
		"context": "Individuals with criminal designs at the trespass's outset are more likely to have brought weapons to assist in achieving their objectives. And individuals with histories of carrying out pre-planned burglaries are more likely to be the type of hardened criminals who would use a weapon \"deliberately to harm a victim\"—i.e., the dangerous offenders at which ACCA is aimed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 The government shifts focus from the intruder's cul- pability and dangerousness to the possibility that a third party \"will defend himself\" or property \"through violent force.\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "As we have suggested, underlying the Williamson County Court's reasoning is a confusion between the just compensation owed by government and a money damages remedy awarded by courts. These are not the same, and a fortiori neither are government's refusal to pay just compensation and a state court's denial of a money damages remedy to a property owner on a takings claim. Once these distinctions 7 Transcript of Oral Argument, San Remo Hotel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16become blurred, all \"post-deprivation\" state procedures that involve money start to look a lot alike, as they apparently did to the Williamson County Court.8See J. David Breemer, Dying on the Vine: How a Rethinking of \"Without Just Compensation\" and Takings Remedies Undercuts Williamson County's Ripeness Doctrine , 42 Vt. L. Rev. 61, 66 (Fall 2017).",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "As its language indicates, and as the Court has frequently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of private property, but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power. 8 But the Court also found support in a post-deprivation due process case where the issue did not center on a failed obligation to pay money. 473 U.S. at 195 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Admitting in a footnote that the analogy was an \"imperfect\" one, the Court sought refuge once again, see supra n.6, in the \"special nature\" of just compensation, see 473 U.S. at 195 n.14. 9 The Fifth Amendment applies to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "9 The Fifth Amendment applies to state governments through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Penn Central Transp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "323 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]109 U.S. 51332 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 U.S. 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]32 U.S. 243; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "See Penn Central Transp. 438 U.S. 104.10 It follows that when the condition of paying just compensation is fulfilled, the taking is lawful and inflicts no injury. See Williamson County , 473 U.S. 10See also 137 S. Ct. 1933545 U.S. 469323 U.S. 373261 U.S. 581261 U.S. 299166 U.S. 226133 U.S. 553109 U.S. 513[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Monterey , 526 U.S. at 710, 718 (\"The constitutional injury alleged, therefore, is not that property was taken but that it was taken without just compensation. . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "We first glimpse the Williamson County Court's confusion on this point in the following sentence: 19Nor does the Fifth Amendment require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that a \"'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation'\" exist at the time of the taking. 473 U.S. at 194. The quoted phrase is drawn the from Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There the post-deprivation \"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation\" described the kind of procedures we have just mentioned, i.e., those regulating the constitutionally permissible manner of paying post- deprivation just compensation for an acknowledged taking, when the taker stands ready, willing, and able to pay it once the amount is fixed. See Cherokee Nation , 419 U.S. at 643–44 (where land was taken by eminent domain, prescribed post-deprivation procedures for obtaining just compensation are \"amicable\" negotiations or mandatory \"appraisement of three disinterested referees,\" with right of review by court of amount appraised).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "Just as the Court had to squeeze Monsanto to make it fit into Williamson County , the Court did the same when it applied to state litigation the expression \"reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining compensation.\" These terms may describe accurately Cherokee Nation's procedures for determining the amount of just compensation to be paid for the property taken, but when has liability litigation for money damages, with all its attendant risks, ever merited being called a \"certain\" method for obtaining compensation\"? This point is confirmed by another much-cited case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which there was also an acknowledged, undisputed taking authorized by legislative act, with just compensation being paid afterwards. In Sweet , which originated in Massachusetts, the question was what counted as a constitutionally permissible provision for being paid just compensation when it is paid post-deprivation. 159 U.S. at 400.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "Id. at 402, 407. See also Albert Hanson Lumber [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2 John Lewis, A Treatise on the Eminent Domain in the United States § 678 at 1163 & n.50 (3rd ed. 1909) (citing numerous cases, including Cherokee Nation and Sweet ) (emphasis added) (just compensation need not precede entry, provided \"some definite provision is made whereby the owner will certainly obtain compensation\").11 11 \"It has long been settled that the taking of property for public use by a state or one of its municipalities need not be accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement ofjust compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment , and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge . \"Joslin Mfg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Williamson County's Reasoning Stems From A Confusion That Has Developed In Takings Law",
		"context": "1909) (citing numerous cases, including Cherokee Nation and Sweet ) (emphasis added) (just compensation need not precede entry, provided \"some definite provision is made whereby the owner will certainly obtain compensation\").11 11 \"It has long been settled that the taking of property for public use by a state or one of its municipalities need not be accompanied or preceded by payment, but that the requirement ofjust compensation is satisfied when the public faith and credit are pledged to a reasonably prompt ascertainment and payment , and there is adequate provision for enforcing the pledge . \"Joslin Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 677 —continued on next page — 22Clearly, a statute permitting an owner to litigate liability in the hope of winning money damages for an uncompensated taking is not the kind of \"provision\" that could be reasonably described by any of the terms quoted approvingly in Sweet (\"certain,\" \"no risk,\" \"prompt,\" etc. ), as the history of modern regulatory takings cases bears out only too well. Unfortunately, just as an earlier rule that payment of just compensation should precede or coincide with a taking yielded to the more practical rule that there must at least be in place at the time of the taking an \"adequate provision\" for later ascertaining and obtaining just compensation promptly and with certainty, so toward the end of the 19th Century courts laxly came to view laws allowing for recovery of a money damages remedy through post-deprivation suit as \"provision[s]\" of the same kind as that described in Cherokee Nation .See J. David Breemer, Overcoming Williamson County's Troubling State Procedures Rule: How the England Reservation, Issue Preclusion Exceptions, and the Inadequacy Exception Open the Federal Courthouse Door to Ripe Takings Claims , 18 J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "899 F.3d at 745 (footnotes omitted) ; see also Pet App. 35 (Prado, J., dissenting) ( \"[T]his case more closely resembles ordinary civil litigation against a federal agent than a case involving a true inquiry into sensitive national security and military affairs. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Implicitly conceding that its categorical a pproach was too broad, the Court of Appeals responded that \"national security\" would not be a \"special factor\" if Hernández had been standing on U.S. soil when Respondent shot him . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "These are often delicate diplomatic matters, and, as such, they 'are rarely proper subjects for judicial intervention.'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This cursory analysis confuses the presence of a foreign fact for the existence of genuine foreign affairs concerns. The claim here has nothing to do with the substance or conduct of U.S. foreign (or even immigration) policy; it has to do with the allegedly unconstitutional actions of a single, rogue federal law enforcement officer acting in violation of the only government policy squarely on point —CBP's excessive -force regulation , 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 280",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "Awarding civil damages to the victims of a government officer 's misconduct hardly undermines the \"validity\" of the government's decisions to not criminally prosecute or extradite the officer . And in any event, if the broader concern is that Bivens claims 30 might \"interfere[] with foreign affairs and diplomacy,\" that has been true in this case only insofar as there has been no remedy for Hernández's killing —as the Mexican government has made clear in its amicus filings both in this Court and below . See, e.g., Brief of the Government of the United Mexican States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Hernández I , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"When agents of the United States government violate fundamental rights of Mexican nationals and others within Mexico' s jurisdiction, it is a priority t o Mexico to see that the United States has provided adequate means to hold the agents accountable and to compensate the victims. \" (emphasis added) ). Ultimately, \"t he only [foreign] policy interest that the United States has put forward —maintaining dialogu e with the Mexican government —shows that our government wants to reduce the number of cross - border shootings. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "App. 37 (Prado, J., dissenting) (quoting Def. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Extraterritorality.",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.3d 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "21. This Court has identified two reasons why courts generally presume that , absent clear indication of legislative intent to the contrary, federal statutes only apply domestically. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Neither applies here. First, the presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes \"avoid[s] the international discord that can result when U.S. law is applied to conduct in foreign countries.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "In addition, the defendants in such cases must necessarily be officers or agents of the federal government. Thus, s o long as th e relevant constitutional provisions apply extraterritorially (and so long as their application does not portend undue 32 judicial interference with foreign policy or national security ), extraterritoriality, by itself, is no reason to deny judicial recognitio n of a constitutional remedy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In any event, even if this Court were inclined to map the statutory presumption onto constitutional claims, that presumption would be overcome here because Respondent's allegedly unconstitutional actions \"touch and concern the territory of the United State s . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": ". with sufficient force to displace the presumption.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As the Rodriguez court explained, where a CBP agent is sued for allegedly unconstitutional conduct undertaken within the scope of his employment on U.S. soil, the claim independently satisfies Kiobel 's \"touch and concern\" test. See 899 F.3d at 747 –48; see also Al 758 F.3d 516.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No \"Special Factors\" Counsel Hesitation",
		"context": "569 U.S. 108 . As the Rodriguez court explained, where a CBP agent is sued for allegedly unconstitutional conduct undertaken within the scope of his employment on U.S. soil, the claim independently satisfies Kiobel 's \"touch and concern\" test. See 899 F.3d at 747 –48; see also Al [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. Congressional Inaction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.3d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The other clauses of the Eighth Amendment are applied to the states",
		"context": ". The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was held applicable to the states in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is difficult to get a clear Supreme Court ruling on whether the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the states, because bail issues are commonly moot by the time a defendant's case reaches the Supreme Court. But the Excessive Bail Clause appears to apply to the states; in 404 U.S. 357 (1 971), this Court said in dicta, \"Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendments' proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The other clauses of the Eighth Amendment are applied to the states",
		"context": "The Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was held applicable to the states in 370 U.S. 660. It is difficult to get a clear Supreme Court ruling on whether the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the states, because bail issues are commonly moot by the time a defendant's case reaches the Supreme Court. But the Excessive Bail Clause appears to apply to the states; in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 971), this Court said in dicta, \"Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendments' proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.\" The Eighth Circuit held the cl ause applicable to the states in 648 F.2d 1148, but the decision was vacated for mootness, 455 U.S. 478. Bail definitely acts as a punishment, whether or not it is called punishment, because the criminal 2 English Bill of Rights (1689); reprinted in 3 John Eidsmoe, Historical and Theological Foundations of Law 1085 (Nordskog 2016).",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 357",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The other clauses of the Eighth Amendment are applied to the states",
		"context": "It is difficult to get a clear Supreme Court ruling on whether the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the states, because bail issues are commonly moot by the time a defendant's case reaches the Supreme Court. But the Excessive Bail Clause appears to apply to the states; in 404 U.S. 357 (1 971), this Court said in dicta, \"Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendments' proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.\" The Eighth Circuit held the cl ause applicable to the states in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the decision was vacated for mootness, 455 U.S. 478. Bail definitely acts as a punishment, whether or not it is called punishment, because the criminal 2 English Bill of Rights (1689); reprinted in 3 John Eidsmoe, Historical and Theological Foundations of Law 1085 (Nordskog 2016). 12 defendant must either pay a substantial sum of money (which he may receive back in part) or lose his liberty prior to being convicted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "648 F.2d 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The other clauses of the Eighth Amendment are applied to the states",
		"context": "It is difficult to get a clear Supreme Court ruling on whether the Excessive Bail Clause applies to the states, because bail issues are commonly moot by the time a defendant's case reaches the Supreme Court. But the Excessive Bail Clause appears to apply to the states; in 404 U.S. 357 (1 971), this Court said in dicta, \"Bail, of course, is basic to our system of law, and the Eighth Amendments' proscription of excessive bail has been assumed to have application to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.\" The Eighth Circuit held the cl ause applicable to the states in 648 F.2d 1148, but the decision was vacated for mootness, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bail definitely acts as a punishment, whether or not it is called punishment, because the criminal 2 English Bill of Rights (1689); reprinted in 3 John Eidsmoe, Historical and Theological Foundations of Law 1085 (Nordskog 2016). 12 defendant must either pay a substantial sum of money (which he may receive back in part) or lose his liberty prior to being convicted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations",
		"context": "It is now well-settled that, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations but in stead must assert well- pleaded allegations of fact. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Bell Atl. 550 U.S. 544. The plaintiffs in Iqbal and Twombly failed to meet this st andard because they re- lied on conclusory allegations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations",
		"context": "It is now well-settled that, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory allegations but in stead must assert well- pleaded allegations of fact. 556 U.S. 662; Bell Atl. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiffs in Iqbal and Twombly failed to meet this st andard because they re- lied on conclusory allegations. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 669, 682-83; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 564-65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations",
		"context": "58- 62a, ¶¶ 72-81. These are well-pleaded allegations of circumstan- tial facts which give rise to plausible inferences of 14 racial discrimination. See Desert Palace, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]411 U.S. 792; cf. Desert Palace , 539 U.S. at 100 (explaining that circumstantial evidence \" 'is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evi-dence' \" (quoting 352 U.S. 500)). In fact, Comcast does not even mention these alle- gations in its petition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations",
		"context": "58- 62a, ¶¶ 72-81. These are well-pleaded allegations of circumstan- tial facts which give rise to plausible inferences of 14 racial discrimination. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Desert Palace , 539 U.S. at 100 (explaining that circumstantial evidence \" 'is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evi-dence' \" (quoting 352 U.S. 500)). In fact, Comcast does not even mention these alle- gations in its petition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Do Not Rely On Conclusory Allegations",
		"context": "These are well-pleaded allegations of circumstan- tial facts which give rise to plausible inferences of 14 racial discrimination. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90411 U.S. 792; cf. Desert Palace , 539 U.S. at 100 (explaining that circumstantial evidence \" 'is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evi-dence' \" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). In fact, Comcast does not even mention these alle- gations in its petition. Rather, Comcast resorts to mis- characterizing Respondents' claim as resting solely on a \"vast conspiracy\" betw een Comcast, the FCC and civil rights organizations and leaders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "3 § 1 et seq. (\"CIPA\"), \"'establishes procedures for handling classified infor- mation\" that \"harmonize a defendant's right to a fair trial with the government's right to protect classified information.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Where the government moves to limit disclosure of classified information to the defendant on the ground th at disclosure would harm 31 national security, the court upon request by the gov- ernment \"shall examine\" th e information \"in camera and ex parte\" to resolve the government's motion. 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "728 F.3d 885",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "And CIPA imposes other requirements to ensure that classified infor- mation that is \"helpful or material to the defense\" may be available to the defendant within limits that protect the government's interests. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What CIPA does not contemplate, and courts have not authorized in any comparable situation, is any in camera, ex parte adjudi- cation of guilt based on the classified information. See, e.g., 448 F.3d 436.",
		"citation_value_orig": "590 F.3d 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": ", 590 F.3d 93. What CIPA does not contemplate, and courts have not authorized in any comparable situation, is any in camera, ex parte adjudi- cation of guilt based on the classified information. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the civil context, courts similarly hold that if privileged information is not discoverable, it must be withheld, even if relevant, and should form no part of the litigation. See 876 F.3d 690.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 F.3d 436",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "See, e.g., 448 F.3d 436. In the civil context, courts similarly hold that if privileged information is not discoverable, it must be withheld, even if relevant, and should form no part of the litigation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"[ o]ur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil litigation,\" a court commits reversible er- ror when it \"relie[s] on documents which it had previ- ously determined to be privileged and as to which it had denied [the other party's] discovery motion.\" As- sociation for Reduction of 734 F.2d 63; accord In re796 F.3d 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "876 F.3d 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "See 876 F.3d 690. Because \"[ o]ur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil litigation,\" a court commits reversible er- ror when it \"relie[s] on documents which it had previ- ously determined to be privileged and as to which it had denied [the other party's] discovery motion.\" As- sociation for Reduction of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord In re796 F.3d 137. Courts may assess questions of admissibility in camera and ex parte, see, e.g., In re607 F.3d 923, but not the merits. There is no reason to think that Congress in FISA intended to establish such an aberrant scheme as the court of appeals envisioned, particularly in a statutory section dealing only with the \"[u]se of information,\" not with liability, 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "734 F.2d 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "See 876 F.3d 690. Because \"[ o]ur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil litigation,\" a court commits reversible er- ror when it \"relie[s] on documents which it had previ- ously determined to be privileged and as to which it had denied [the other party's] discovery motion.\" As- sociation for Reduction of 734 F.2d 63; accord In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts may assess questions of admissibility in camera and ex parte, see, e.g., In re607 F.3d 923, but not the merits. There is no reason to think that Congress in FISA intended to establish such an aberrant scheme as the court of appeals envisioned, particularly in a statutory section dealing only with the \"[u]se of information,\" not with liability, 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. That Courts Do Not Use In Camera, Ex Parte Procedures To Resolve Disputes On The Merits In Comparable Contexts Underscores The Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "Because \"[ o]ur system of justice does not encompass ex parte determinations on the merits of cases in civil litigation,\" a court commits reversible er- ror when it \"relie[s] on documents which it had previ- ously determined to be privileged and as to which it had denied [the other party's] discovery motion.\" As- sociation for Reduction of 734 F.2d 63; accord In re796 F.3d 137. Courts may assess questions of admissibility in camera and ex parte, see, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but not the merits. There is no reason to think that Congress in FISA intended to establish such an aberrant scheme as the court of appeals envisioned, particularly in a statutory section dealing only with the \"[u]se of information,\" not with liability, 50 U.S.C. § 1806.",
		"citation_value_orig": "607 F.3d 923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Prized The Bureau's Independence Over Its Single-Director Leadership",
		"context": "When Congress decreed that the Bureau must be \"independent,\" it meant that the Bureau must not be subject to direct presidential control . That is how this Court has consistently used the word \"independent\" in the context of agency structure. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court referred to that definition shortly before Congress enacted Title X. See Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Prized The Bureau's Independence Over Its Single-Director Leadership",
		"context": "Fund , 561 U.S. at 483 (\"Congress can, under certain circumstances, create independent agencies run by principal officers appointed by the President, whom the President may not remove at will but only for good cause.\") . Because Congress is presumed to be familiar with this C ourt's precedents —especially the \"unusually important\" ones, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —Congress was necessarily referring to protection from at -will removal by the President when, in 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a), it tied the Bureau's independence to its very existence. See PHH, 881 F.3d at 161 (Henderson, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Challenged Districts Utilized Odd, Non-Contiguous Shapes and Divided Neighborhoods to Enact a Racial Gerrymander",
		"context": "The shape of District 80 provides an egregious example of the lengths the Legislature went to pack minority voters. A simple glance at the district clearl y indicates that it is the product of racial gerrymandering. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Described by the District Court as the \"lynchpin of the redistricting of South Hampton Roads,\" race - based contortions produced a district whose shape is 12 \"bizarre on i ts face, resembling a sideways 'S.'\" Bethune -Hill, 326 F. Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. When the Focus of a Provision Is Something Other Than Conduct, a Domestic-Conduct Requirement Would Frustrate Congressional Intent",
		"context": "Because conduct in one country frequently causes effects in another, the application of domestic legislation to foreign conduct is routine. Indeed, such application follows naturally from one of the fundamental reason s for the presumption—the \"'commonsense notion that Congress generally legis-lates with domestic concerns in mind.'\" RJR Nabisco , 579 U.S. at 336 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Wh en the domestic focus of a provision can be implicated by conduct abroad, it is logical to conclude that Congress intends to cover the foreign conduct to achieve its domestic aims. Put another way, the legislature has already balanced the relevant interests and has prioritized protection of domestic intersts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. ALJ Proceedings Are As Non-Adversarial As Appeals Council Proceedings",
		"context": "1289, 1303- 04 (1997). At every step, \"the agency operates essentially, and is intended so to do, as an adjudicator, and not as an advocate or adversary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whereas courts task the pa rties with identifying is- sues, both ALJs and Appeal s Council judges lead the charge in issue-spotting. \"It is the ALJ's duty to investi- gate the facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits,\" and the Appeals Council's am- bit is \"similarly broad.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. ALJ Proceedings Are As Non-Adversarial As Appeals Council Proceedings",
		"context": "§ 404.946(b); HALLEX §§ I-2-2-1, I-2-2-10. In court, forcing parties to raise and test arguments through the adversarial proces s permits the other side to respond. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But no adversary exists in SSA proceedings. \"The Commissioner has no representa tive before the ALJ\" or Appeals Council \"to oppose the claim for benefits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. ALJ Proceedings Are As Non-Adversarial As Appeals Council Proceedings",
		"context": "§§ 404.900(b), 4 04.970(b), 404.976. Be- cause the SSA has assigned the task of \"discover[ing] and correct[ing] its own errors\" to its adjudicators, notions of \"administrative autonomy\" requ ire courts to respect the SSA's choice and not to shift that burden to claimants. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Requiring claimants to have raised Appointments Clause challenges is particularly inconsistent with the in- quisitorial nature of ALJ proc eedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. As Beggerly confirms, Block and Mottaz did not apply a different, pre-Irwin governing law about how to interpret statutes of limitations",
		"context": "Br. 30–42; Section I-A, supra. 11 The government also cites [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in support of its different- governing-law argument. Resp. 26–27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. As Beggerly confirms, Block and Mottaz did not apply a different, pre-Irwin governing law about how to interpret statutes of limitations",
		"context": "26–27. The reliance on Dalm is misplaced because the Court's later, post- Irwin treatment of Dalm further demonstrates that the use of the word \"jurisdi ction\" in decades-old cases does not necessarily mean \"subject-matter jurisdiction.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Dalm , the Court quoted Block and Mottaz — along with several other cases—for the proposition that a waiver of sovereign immunity \"define[s] that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.\" Dalm , 494 U.S. at 608 (quoting 424 U.S. 392.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. As Beggerly confirms, Block and Mottaz did not apply a different, pre-Irwin governing law about how to interpret statutes of limitations",
		"context": "See 519 U.S. 347. In Dalm , the Court quoted Block and Mottaz — along with several other cases—for the proposition that a waiver of sovereign immunity \"define[s] that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit.\" Dalm , 494 U.S. at 608 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like in many other instances, Dalm and the cases it quotes predate this Court's effort to bring discipline to the use of the term \"jurisdictional.\" To understand what the Court meant by \"jurisdiction\" in Dalm , one must look to later cases that interpreted the same provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. As Beggerly confirms, Block and Mottaz did not apply a different, pre-Irwin governing law about how to interpret statutes of limitations",
		"context": "Id. at 351–53.3 Indeed, the government in Brockamp made the same Irwin arguments it made in Beggerly: that (1) Irwin only applied when there was equal treatment of government and private remedies in the statute and, (2) even if Irwin applied, the presumption was rebutted. Brief for the United States at 27–39, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a footnote, the government argued that \"[c]ompliance with the prompt filing requirement is a condition of the gove rnment's waiver of its sovereign immunity and is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a refund suit in district court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Relevant Historical Context",
		"context": "Not shortly after, this Court held that any state -based regulation of interstate pipelines was unconstitutional , see, e.g. , State of Missouri ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 262 U.S. 553, because the Commerce Clause grants that power exclusively to Congress. Wartime demands for energy in the 1940s sparked an e xplosion of interstate pipeline construction, most commonly linking natural gas reserves in the Gulf Coast states to the northeastern war industry. Klass & Meinhardt, supra , at 996.",
		"citation_value_orig": "265 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Relevant Historical Context",
		"context": "Without objection and for almost 80 years, the natural gas industry, States, and Congress relied on the fact that the Natural Gas Act, as written, protects 20 a certificate -holder's use of the §7 17(h) eminent domain power against obstruction by hold -out State s. Petr.Br.29 -30. Normally, years of \"consensus\" regarding a statutory interpretation and \"congressional silence\" are \"enough to rule out any serious claim of ambiguity\" in that statute. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, the model for §717(h) —the then- in-effect §814 of the Federal Power Act (\"FPA\") , see Petr.Br.27 —had long been applied and interpreted as granting license -holders eminent domain authority to condemn State- owned lands. And this Court has long held that , when statutory terms are \"obviously transplanted\" from another statute, they bring \"the old soil\" with them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Relevant Historical Context",
		"context": "Moreover, the model for §717(h) —the then- in-effect §814 of the Federal Power Act (\"FPA\") , see Petr.Br.27 —had long been applied and interpreted as granting license -holders eminent domain authority to condemn State- owned lands. And this Court has long held that , when statutory terms are \"obviously transplanted\" from another statute, they bring \"the old soil\" with them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]] contains no limiting language concerning state land; the legislative history . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Relevant Historical Context",
		"context": "Private entities' use of the FPA's eminent domain power typically involves construction of large scale hydroelectric projects, which can necessitate the 21 taking of property in fee simple. See, e.g. , Marseilles Hydro Power, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Natural Gas Act's eminent domain power, in contrast, is far less invasive. Typically, certificate holders operating under the Natural Gas Act utilize their eminent domain power to procure merely a right -of-way through a parcel over which the pipeline will run.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 F.3d 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rule of Reason Requires the Factfinder to Weigh All of the Circumstances of a Case",
		"context": ". Both courts below examined the practices at issue in this case under the rule of reason, which \"is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1\" of the Sherman Act. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"design and function\" of the rule of reason is to \"distinguish[ ] between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rule of Reason Requires the Factfinder to Weigh All of the Circumstances of a Case",
		"context": "See Part II, below. Courts must therefore take great care in applying the rule of reason, lest these restraints become the source of market distortion and consumer harm. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 That is particularly true where, as here, courts are asked to apply antitrust principles in complex markets to practices that have received little judicial or scholarly scrutiny. This Court's precedents make clear that when courts are asked to break new ground under the Sherman Act, they should favor judicial standards that permit the broadest consideration of facts and circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rule of Reason Requires the Factfinder to Weigh All of the Circumstances of a Case",
		"context": "See Leegin ,551 U.S. at 886 (noting that a per se rule \"is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue\"). For these reasons, this Court has mandated that courts applying the rule of reason must \" weigh[ ] all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.\" Cont'l T.V., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the court of appeals below explained, among other things, that requires the plaintiffs to show that \"defendant's challenged behavior 'had an actual adverse effect on competition as a whole in the relevant market.'\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Rule of Reason Requires the Factfinder to Weigh All of the Circumstances of a Case",
		"context": "27a (citation omitted). See Atl. Richfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The anti-lien clause bars liens against a recipient's settlement or judgment, except as authorized by the third-party liability provisions",
		"context": "42 U.S.C. 1396p(a)(1). As this Court explained in Ar- kansas Department of Health and Human [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a Medicaid recipient's judgm ent or settlement qualifies as \"property\" to which the anti -lien clause applies. Id. at 284- 285.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission",
		"context": "It asks whether the defendant \"use[d]\" the means of identification\" without lawful authority .\" Put another way, \"lawful\" is an adjective, and \"[a]djectives modify nouns .\" Weyerhaeuser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (201 8). In the aggravated identity theft statute, the pertinent noun is \"authority .\" So the question under the statute is whether the defendant had lawful authority to use another person's name.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission",
		"context": "§ 21 -5807(b)(1)(A ). Courts have repeatedly held in this setting that \"authority\" refers to whether the defendant had permission to enter the building, not whether the defendant had \"authority\" to commit a crime therein. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is illust rative. There, an employee who entered his employer's building to steal documents was charged with burglary . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 P.2d 1341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission",
		"context": "But b ecause the employer had given the employee permission to enter the building , the court held that the employee did not act \"without authority .\" Id. at 1348 -49; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 267 So. 2d 193; 420 P.2d 820 . 26 So too here. It is undisputed that Dubin had permission to use Patient L's Medicaid number to bill Medicaid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 A.2d 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission",
		"context": "But b ecause the employer had given the employee permission to enter the building , the court held that the employee did not act \"without authority .\" Id. at 1348 -49; see also 402 A.2d 445; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 420 P.2d 820 . 26 So too here. It is undisputed that Dubin had permission to use Patient L's Medicaid number to bill Medicaid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 So. 2d 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1028A requires the use of the other person's name to be without lawful permission",
		"context": "But b ecause the employer had given the employee permission to enter the building , the court held that the employee did not act \"without authority .\" Id. at 1348 -49; see also 402 A.2d 445; 267 So. 2d 193; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 26 So too here. It is undisputed that Dubin had permission to use Patient L's Medicaid number to bill Medicaid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 P.2d 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Warranty Interpretation Results In Inconsistent Standards Of Care For Wharfingers And Charterers",
		"context": "If anything, the wharfinger's knowledge of th e conditions of the berth, exclusive control of the facility, and invitation to users suggest that, if a higher standard of care were to apply, it should logically fall on the wharfinger. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The imposition of two drastically different standards of care is particularly irrational because the wharfinger and the charterer are often the same entity, as in this case. It is the height of arbitrariness for the same party in the same incident to face strict liability in its role as the charterer, but be subject to a due diligence standard in its role as the wharfinger.",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 F.2d 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Will Chill Companies from Making Positive Statements of Principle That Promote Progress in Areas Such as Corporate Governance, Diversity, the Environment, and Other Social Issues",
		"context": "As the Petition explains, defense claims of non-ma- teriality often fail at the pleadings stage because they are perceived as presenting mixed questions of law and fact. See Pet. 29; see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One empirical study found that only about a third of all securities class actions are terminated via motions to dismiss, and that, even in cases that are dismissed, materiality is seldom the reason why. Instead, the plaintiff's fail- ure to satisfy the other elements of a securities-fraud claim—primarily scienter and falsity—is the predom- inant reason for dismissals at the pleadings stage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "592 F.3d 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
		"context": "In this case, however, the CFPB repeated ly told the Ninth Circuit that the Acting Director ratified every relevant action taken during Director Cordray's tenure . CFPB.CA9.Br.1; Seila.CA9.Reply.8 .4 From that point forward, there was no longer any colorable basis to trace petitioner's injury from this enforcement action to the constitutional issue petitioner invites the Court to resolve. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That traceability problem was only magnified when the President appointed Director Kraninger , who has continued this enforcement proceeding and is on record as understanding herself to serve at the pleasure of the President. See supra p.17.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
		"context": "Such cases provide a 5 Petitioner's severability argument does not cure this traceability problem. M ultinational pharmaceutical companies aggrieved by the Affordable Care Act's bio -similars provisions cannot challenge the individual mandate with or without a severability argum ent. This Court did allow challenges to the legislative veto by parties aggrieved by closely related provisions, see, e.g., Alaska Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but that is no precedent for this action, as the legislators insisted on the veto's validity. Given the current Director's twin views that she serves at the President's pleasure and that this enforcement action should conti nue, traceability is absent. 25 concrete set of facts and eliminate any doubts about traceability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
		"context": "The dispute was long -simmering precisely because the courts did not rush to resolve it. Although the Act \"was a thorn in the side\" of the executive for decades, the federal courts never \" entertained an action to adjudicate [its] constitutionality \" for the first 50 -some years of its existence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It never \"occurred\" to President Johnson, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur, or Cleveland that he \"might challenge the Act in an Article III court\" \"before he ever thought about firing a cabinet member .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
		"context": "But those cases involved Appointments Clause or other separation -of-powers issues that did not raise comparable ripeness concerns . 6 Moreover, while prudential concerns may 6 Both Morrison and Free Enterprise Fund involved Appointments Clause problems. That likewise explains Northern Pipeline Construction [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which set aside an exercise of Article III authority by a bankruptcy judge who lacked life tenure and was not appointed or confirmed consistent with Article III. Id. at 87- 88.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner Suffers No Injury Traceable To Any Limitation On The President's Removal Authority, And Prudential Factors Counsel Against Deciding The Question Presented Without A Contested Removal",
		"context": "This case simply does not present a proper occasion for thi s Court to resolve the undoubtedly important question petitioner asks it to decide. branch .\" 478 U.S. at 727 n.5; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 28",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 F. Supp. 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers",
		"context": "Am. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The war and foreign affairs powers were placed in the national government to prevent the states from provoking war 38 with foreign nations by carry ing out their own conflicting foreign policy. Additionally, causes of ac tion against the states pursuant to the war powers are ancillary to the primary purpose of raising and supportin g armies and waging war.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court's precedents support a finding of a plan of the Convention waiver for the war powers",
		"context": ". . cases is far broader than the holdings,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an d thus is \"dicta\" that the Court is \"not bound to follow,\" Katz , 546 U.S. at 363. In Allen , the Court described these cases as stating a \"general rule,\" not an absolute rule. 140 S. Ct. at 1002.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. An Alien Described in Paragraph (1) Means All of Paragraph (1)",
		"context": ". to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.\" See TRW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As several courts have noted : 22 To read the statute in a manner that allows [DHS ] to take a criminal alien into custody without regard to the timing of the alien's release from custody wo uld render the 'when the alien is released' clause redundant and therefore null. 697 F. Supp. 2d 774 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "i. An Alien Described in Paragraph (1) Means All of Paragraph (1)",
		"context": "See TRW 534 U.S. 19. As several courts have noted : 22 To read the statute in a manner that allows [DHS ] to take a criminal alien into custody without regard to the timing of the alien's release from custody wo uld render the 'when the alien is released' clause redundant and therefore null. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government argues that the \"when . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "697 F. Supp. 2d 774",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No circuit split justifies this Court's review",
		"context": "rt's re- view Indiana suggests that this Court's review of the tissue disposal provision is necessitated because a sin- gle court of appeals, nearly 30 years ago in Planned Parenthood of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], upheld a tiss ue disposal statute. There is, in fact, no circuit split because, as the court of ap- peals properly held, Minnesota is easily distinguisha- ble from this case. First, whereas in Minnesota the statute regulated the disposal of fetal tissue following all abortions or miscarriages occurring at a health facility, see 910 F.2d at 481 & n.2, here women may elect to assume control over the tissue and may then dispose of it in any man- ner whatsoever.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.2d 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No circuit split justifies this Court's review",
		"context": "See 267 F. Supp. 3d 1024, appeal pending , No. 17-2879 (8th Cir.). In Hop- kins, a district court recently invalidated another tis- sue disposal statute, and determined that Minnesota is \"not controlling\" insofar as it was decided prior to Ca- sey and Whole Woman's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hopkins, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 1098.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. As a Matter of Sound Administration, Review Should Be De Novo",
		"context": "De novo review also tends to \"unify precedent\" and supply district courts with a \"set of rules\" to apply to intervention questions. Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Intervention of right is principally a matter of the rights of the prospective intervenor, not of docket management. Thus, Rule 24 lists trial management - type considerations only under subsection (b), permissive intervention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the CFPB survives the Court's precedents, then stare decisis cannot save Humphrey's Executor",
		"context": "51 , at 321 (Madison). See, e.g. , Commodity Fu- tures Trading Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Through this \"workable\" standard, the Administrative State's \"slight encroachments create new boundaries from which [its] legions of power [] seek new territory to capture [,]\" 564 U.S. 462. Finally, no reliance interest justifies the continued concentration of powers in unaccountable, fourth branches of government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the CFPB survives the Court's precedents, then stare decisis cannot save Humphrey's Executor",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Commodity Fu- tures Trading Comm 478 U.S. 833. Through this \"workable\" standard, the Administrative State's \"slight encroachments create new boundaries from which [its] legions of power [] seek new territory to capture [,]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, no reliance interest justifies the continued concentration of powers in unaccountable, fourth branches of government. Indeed, the only reliance inter- ests that will be harmed are those of the independent agencies themselves.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights",
		"context": ". The \"right to exclude others\" is \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has long been understood as the most fundamental element of property rights . In 1766, William Blackstone wrote, \"[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the imagi nation, and engages the affections of mankind, as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights",
		"context": "And this Court has emphasized that the \"hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.\" College Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 Today, t he right to exclude remains \"an essential element of modern property rights.\" 448 U.S. 98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights",
		"context": "527 U.S. 666. 4 Today, t he right to exclude remains \"an essential element of modern property rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, \"it is difficult to conceive of any property as private if the right to exclude is rejected.\" Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: T he Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. Chi.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights",
		"context": "L. Rev. 21, 22 (1997). Though state law generally determines which \"sticks\" a property owner will have in his \"bundle,\" see e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"there are limits on a state 's abili ty to alter traditional understandings of property through legislation.\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The right to exclude is fundamental to property rights",
		"context": "Kaiser, 444 U.S. at 17 9-80. And t his Court has \"long considered a physical intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious character for purposes of the Takings Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And for good reason. After all, the \"great and chief end\" of government is \"the preservation of ...",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "15a. In doing so, 41 the Eleventh Circuit relied on two court of appeals decisions, neither of which considered the historical and constitutional underpinnings of the constitutional venue right in determining the appropriate remedy, and neither of which justifies the Eleventh Circuit's exclusive vacatur remedy. First , the Eleventh Circuit cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but there, the court granted vacatur without any discussion of the appropriate remedy. See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.2d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "That deci sion provides no support for the Eleventh Circuit's holding. To the contrary, it exemplifies the unreasoned approach that many courts have taken to this constitutional question. Second , the Eleventh Circuit cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but that case did not even consider the Article III and Sixth Amendment venue provisions. In Haney , a defendant whose Alabama state-court conviction was reversed for improper venue was reindicted, prompting him to file a federal habeas petition arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred a second prosecution. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.2d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "Haney 's rationale affords the government a second bite at the apple when it fails to make out its case and subjects a defendant to the uncertainty and stress of a second prosecution. Those concerns are why this Court has consistently emphasized that \"questions of venue\" are of fundamental, substantive importance, not \"matters of mere procedure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Palma-Ruedas , 121 F.3d at 861 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (venue right serves \"important substantive ends\"). Because Haney is both inapposite and wrong, 15 This Court has not yet decided whether the Sixth Amendment venue right is incorporated against the States. See 384 F.3d 1069, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 631",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "364 U.S. 631; see also Palma-Ruedas , 121 F.3d at 861 (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (venue right serves \"important substantive ends\"). Because Haney is both inapposite and wrong, 15 This Court has not yet decided whether the Sixth Amendment venue right is incorporated against the States. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,543 U.S. 1191. 43 it cannot support the Eleven th Circuit's decision in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 F.3d 1069",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "Because Haney is both inapposite and wrong, 15 This Court has not yet decided whether the Sixth Amendment venue right is incorporated against the States. See 384 F.3d 1069, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 it cannot support the Eleven th Circuit's decision in this case. In short, the Eleventh Circuit imposed a draconian rule that allows defendants to be subject to unlimited serial retrials without any serious engagement with the text, purposes, and history of the Constitution's venue provisions, and withou t even the most cursory assessment of the practical implications of its rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 1191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "First , the government contended that because venue \"plays no role in defining what conduct constitutes a crime,\" failure to prove venue does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause, and thus, the government's failure to prove venue at trial should 16 The decisions of other circuits that have adopted a vacatur remedy likewise fail to provide any basis for that rule. They do little more than cite each other and reiterate the same double-jeopardy rationale articulated in Haney , without any analysis of the constitutional venue provisions. See, e.g., Petlechkov , 922 F.3d at 771 (citing Haney , 799 F.2d at 663-64; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Kaytso , 868 F.2d at 1021 (finding no double-jeopardy bar because venue \"is wholly neutral; it is a question of procedure\" (citing 655 F.2d 1007, cert. denied454 U.S. 1142)); Wilkett , 655 F.2d at 1011 (same). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has permitted reindictment even in the same district in which the government first failed to bear its burden of proof, without any recognition of the extraordinary potential for abuse from such a rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "868 F.2d 1020",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "First , the government contended that because venue \"plays no role in defining what conduct constitutes a crime,\" failure to prove venue does not trigger the Double Jeopardy Clause, and thus, the government's failure to prove venue at trial should 16 The decisions of other circuits that have adopted a vacatur remedy likewise fail to provide any basis for that rule. They do little more than cite each other and reiterate the same double-jeopardy rationale articulated in Haney , without any analysis of the constitutional venue provisions. See, e.g., Petlechkov , 922 F.3d at 771 (citing Haney , 799 F.2d at 663-64; 868 F.2d 1020); Kaytso , 868 F.2d at 1021 (finding no double-jeopardy bar because venue \"is wholly neutral; it is a question of procedure\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied454 U.S. 1142)); Wilkett , 655 F.2d at 1011 (same). In fact, the Ninth Circuit has permitted reindictment even in the same district in which the government first failed to bear its burden of proof, without any recognition of the extraordinary potential for abuse from such a rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "655 F.2d 1007",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "Kaytso , 868 F.2d at 1021. 44 not result in acquittal. BIO 11-12, 15 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Like the Eleventh Circuit's rationale, that argument conflates the question of the proper remedy for a violation of the Article III and Sixth Amendment venue provisions with a separate substantive question under the Fifth Amendment. But Article III and the Sixth Amendment provide independent constitutional rights that must be separately vindicated, regardless of whether the Double Jeopardy Clause would, standing alone, bar reprosecution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "In any event, the government's constrained view of the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause lacks merit. Proof of proper venue is constitutionally required to obtain a valid conviction, and this Court has long recognized that where \"the Government's evidence\" is \"legally insufficient to sustain a conviction,\" double-jeopardy protection attaches. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just as fe deral courts routinely instruct the jury to acquit if the government's venue evidence cannot sustain a conviction, see supra 36-38, a court's determination that the government's proof was insufficient should likewise constitute an acquittal. Evans , 568 U.S. at 328-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "Broad substantive venue rules often offer federal prosecutors a range of lo cations with a facially plausible claim to venue. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Romans , for example, the government was permitted to try \"members of a large-scale Indianapolis drug ring, with life sentences on the line, in Sherman, Texas,\" because two members of the conspiracy had driven through the Eastern District of Texas (along with six 46 other districts). 823 F.3d at 325 (Costa, J., concurring specially); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "225 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Rule Is Misguided",
		"context": "Because defendants are required to 17 Venue case law reflects that the government often elects to prosecute in a place where the claim for venue is tenuous on its face. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Davis , 666 F.2d at 200 (finding insufficient evidence of venue for possession of drugs where defendants did not \"actually or constructively\" possess the drugs in the Middle District of Georgia and drugs \"never physically entered\" that district). 47 raise the issue of venue before and at trial in order to preserve a venue objection, see, e.g. , 2 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 306 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 1200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "And that seems to be precisely what Hardison intended. For \"a standard less difficult to satisfy than the 'de minimus' standard for demonstrating undue hardship … is difficult to imagine.\" 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 Hardison set the stage for denying nearly all Title VII religious- accommodation requests. Yet some courts have gone even further than Hardison and its progeny allow.",
		"citation_value_orig": "602 F.2d 904",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "4 Hardison set the stage for denying nearly all Title VII religious- accommodation requests. Yet some courts have gone even further than Hardison and its progeny allow. For instance, this 15 Take [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for instance. Kimberlie Webb risked life and limb to serve Philadelphia as a police officer for eight years. A practici ng Muslim, Webb requested permission to wear a headscarf on the job that \"would cover neither her face nor her ears, but would cover her head and the back of her neck.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 F.3d 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "In effect, the court treated Webb's de sire to wear a headscarf not as a sign of personal devotion but as a declaration Court recognized that an accommodation must \" eliminate[ ] the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.\" Ansonia Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]512 F.3d 1024. 16 that she would only protect and serve other Muslims. That troubling notion had no basis in fact: Webb was the same officer that she had always been, with or without a headscarf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "In effect, the court treated Webb's de sire to wear a headscarf not as a sign of personal devotion but as a declaration Court recognized that an accommodation must \" eliminate[ ] the conflict between employment requirements and religious practices.\" Ansonia Bd. of 479 U.S. 60[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 that she would only protect and serve other Muslims. That troubling notion had no basis in fact: Webb was the same officer that she had always been, with or without a headscarf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 F.3d 1024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "That troubling notion had no basis in fact: Webb was the same officer that she had always been, with or without a headscarf. Yet Hardison led the court to deny Webb a reasonable accommodation based on Philadelphia residents' presumed anti-religious bias. Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the rejection was the same. Kawaljeet Tagore worked as an IRS agent in a Houston feder al building. After her initiation in the faith, Tagore began wearing the five articles associated with Sikhism, including a kirpan with a three-inch, dulled blade.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.2d 882",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "Ibid. Congress' goal of religious accommodation lost again. Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A Hardison -based refusal to give quarter to people of faith is also evident in 2013 WL 6049066. Fishel Litzman \"ranked in the top 1.3% of his Police Academy class.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 F. Supp. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "Petitioner is correct that \" Hardison 's de minimis test has evolved into a per se rule that virtually any cost to an employer counts as undu e hardship.\" Op.Br.13. Another exemplar of this trend is [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Bobby Brown worked as a lube technician at a Hadley Jiffy Lube where he serviced cars, greeted customers, and discussed products or services with them. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 F. Supp. 2d 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Hardison's demolition of Title VII's religious-accommodation mandate harms Muslim, Sikhs, Jews, and Rastafarians, not just Christians like Mr. Kluge.",
		"context": "Under Hardison and related First Circuit precedent, the district cour t held that any \"blanket exemption from the grooming policy\" would impose more than a de minimis cost, id. at 17, because it would \"'adversely affect the employer's public image,'\" 19 id. at 15 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Yet this conclusion gave the court \"a sense of uneasiness.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 F.3d 126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A Reasonable Fair Use Standard Is Particularly Significant for Individual Creators, Small Businesses, and Developing Industries.",
		"context": "Apple's iTunes store, the first com- mercially successful digital retailer, was not founded un- til four years later, in 2003. And copyright owners con- tinued to fight infringing digital music services. E.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The legitimate digital music market in the U.S. did not outpace the physical market for an- other nine years after that, in 2012.4 It took another three years for the streaming of music to replace digital downloads as the majority of the music market.5 Now, in the first half of 2019 alone, U.S. music industry reve- nue from streaming platform s rose to $5.4 billion (a 26% increase over the first half of 2018), accounting for 80% of total industry revenues. 6 Critically, had Google's analysis in this case governed when digital music first became popular, it would sug-gest that services like Napster \"transformed\" sound re- cordings by making them available online in digital audio files, rather than on compact discs, and did not affect the original market for CDs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A Reasonable Fair Use Standard Is Particularly Significant for Individual Creators, Small Businesses, and Developing Industries.",
		"context": "The result was a market for digital music that benefited both the recording industry through continued incentives to create and the public through continued access to new music. Lyric Websites . Although song lyrics have long been recognized as elements of copyrighted musical works, see Leadsinger, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for many years they were not generally commercially exploited inde- 31 pendently of the musical notes. In recent years, how- ever, websites and mobile application developers found that offering textual lyrics online or via download draws a significant amount of traffic, which may be monetized through advertising. Music publishers therefore began to license these sites and applications and threaten legal action against those who fa iled to acquire licenses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 F.3d 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES",
		"context": "Indian tribes have a \"unique legal status\" under federal law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are \"'domestic dependent nations' that exercise 'inherent sovereign authority.'\" 572 U.S. 782.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES",
		"context": "417 U.S. 535. They are \"'domestic dependent nations' that exercise 'inherent sovereign authority.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"the constitutional recognition of tribes as sovereigns in a government-to-government relationship with the United States has remained a constant in federal Indi- an law.\" Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01 (2019) ( Cohen's ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. CONGRESS HAS LONG RECOGNIZED A UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP WITH INDIAN TRIBES",
		"context": "Mancari , 417 U.S. at 551. And it is \"federally recognized I ndian tribes,\" and federally recognized tribes alone, that the U.S. government treats as sovereign entities and that enjoy a govern- ment-to-government relationship with the United States. See California Valley Miwok [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that \"[t]o qualify for federal benefits\" tribes must have \"federal recognition, which is 'a formal political act con- firming the tribe's existence as a distinct political socie- ty, and institutionalizing the government-to- government relationship between the tribe and the federal government'\"). Federal recognition is the keystone of the federal government's relationships with Indian tribes. \"'Rec-ognized' is more than a simple adjective; it is a legal 4 term of art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 F.3d 1262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. REED'S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS FAIL UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT",
		"context": "To demonstrate constitutional infirmity, a convicted individual must show that the postconviction procedures \"are fundamentally inadequate to vindicate the substantive righ ts provided,\" such that the procedures \"offend[] some 33 principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.\" Id. (quot ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Osborne \"left slim room for the prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him procedura l due process.\" Skinner , 562 U.S. at 525.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. REED'S CLAIMS ON THE MERITS FAIL UNDER THIS COURT'S PRECEDENT",
		"context": "It also allows for a materiality component that focuses on the evi dence presented at trial . Indeed, in Osborne, this Court overturned the Ninth Circuit when it critiqued the Alaska Supreme Court's materiality review \"focusing only on the st ate of the evidence as it 34 existed at trial.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And then the Court confirmed that requiring that evidence to be DNA tested must be \"sufficiently material\" does not offend principles of fundamental fairness. Osborne, 557 U.S. at 70.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 F.3d 1118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Non-literal Infringement",
		"context": "Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of increasing generality will fit 16 equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer pro- tected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his \"ideas,\" to which, apart from their expression, his property is never extended. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Filtering was necessary, even though the entire play was copyrightable: \"We assume that the plaintiff 's play is altogether original. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 F.2d 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Non-literal Infringement",
		"context": "Other cases have followed the same pattern: con- sider the whole work's copyrightability, and then com- pare the accused work against the non-literal elements asserted to determine whether protectable expression, rather than ideas, have been copied. See, e.g., Computer Assocs. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "; Cal. Gov't Code § 3543.2; Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 II. The History Of Labor-Management Cooperation In Public Education Illustrates How Collective Bargaining Is An Essential Part Of State Agencies' Internal Process For Contracting With Teachers And Improving Education.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 P.2d 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "; Cal. Gov't Code § 3543.2; Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 II. The History Of Labor-Management Cooperation In Public Education Illustrates How Collective Bargaining Is An Essential Part Of State Agencies' Internal Process For Contracting With Teachers And Improving Education.",
		"citation_value_orig": "914 P.2d 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.myfreedomfoundation.com/blogs/liberty-live/our- battle-with-seiu-gets-a-thumbs-up-in-wall-street-journal; see also Friedrichs et al. Amicus Br. 11 (\"After Harris, the [Freedom] Foundation launched an ongoing outreach program to inform 29 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court accepted the premise that removing an obligation to purchase health insurance could dramatically reduce the number of insured. Id . at 2493.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "(Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.myfreedomfoundation.com/blogs/liberty-live/our- battle-with-seiu-gets-a-thumbs-up-in-wall-street-journal; see also Friedrichs et al. Amicus Br. 11 (\"After Harris, the [Freedom] Foundation launched an ongoing outreach program to inform 29 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court accepted the premise that removing an obligation to purchase health insurance could dramatically reduce the number of insured. Id . at 2493.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Eliminating fair share fees also predictably strains workplace relations and undermines effective management of schools. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court noted that the Government generally has no weighty interest in preventing the general public from free riding on the benefits obtained from general advocacy. Id. at 310-12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Eliminating fair share fees also predictably strains workplace relations and undermines effective management of schools. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court noted that the Government generally has no weighty interest in preventing the general public from free riding on the benefits obtained from general advocacy. Id. at 310-12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Under any standard of constitutional review, the Court must consider the nature of the First Amendment infringement and the Government's countervailing interests. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When the challenge is to the extraction of money, the analysis turns critically on what the money is spent on. Here, as discussed, unions spend money on many different things.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "33 Nor are significant First Amendment interests implicated when a union represents an individual teacher in most disciplinary and grievance proceedings. The subject of discipline and grievances can run the gamut, but vast numbers concern the mundane stuff of ordinary personnel administration that this Court has repeatedly held outside the purview of the First Amendment. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This includes disputes over whether:  a teacher's particular absences should be excused;  a teacher had accrued a certain number of days of sick leave;  a particular classroom has been too hot or too cold;  the staff bathroom is b eing adequately cleaned and maintained;  the school has been forcing an employee to supervise the lunchroom during her planning or lunch hour;  administrators have failed to provide adequate accommodations for a disability;  the physical education teacher has been given adequate equipment or a classroom teacher's books are in need of replacement;  the union has been given adequate space to hold meetings;  a particular teacher was being actionably disrespectful to a supervisor, or simply firmly expressing a view;  the school is taking adequate steps to protect employee property from theft or vandalism;  a specific teacher qualifies for any of a number of employment benefits ( e.g., tuition assistance, training, time off for professional development or to attend a conference, etc. ); 32 A. Petitioner's Bare-Record Facial Challenge Ignores The Substantial Variation In The Uses Of Fair Share Fees And The Resulting First Amendment And Government Interests At Stake.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Under any standard of constitutional review, the Court must consider the nature of the First Amendment infringement and the Government's countervailing interests. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When the challenge is to the extraction of money, the analysis turns critically on what the money is spent on. Here, as discussed, unions spend money on many different things.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "33 Nor are significant First Amendment interests implicated when a union represents an individual teacher in most disciplinary and grievance proceedings. The subject of discipline and grievances can run the gamut, but vast numbers concern the mundane stuff of ordinary personnel administration that this Court has repeatedly held outside the purview of the First Amendment. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This includes disputes over whether:  a teacher's particular absences should be excused;  a teacher had accrued a certain number of days of sick leave;  a particular classroom has been too hot or too cold;  the staff bathroom is b eing adequately cleaned and maintained;  the school has been forcing an employee to supervise the lunchroom during her planning or lunch hour;  administrators have failed to provide adequate accommodations for a disability;  the physical education teacher has been given adequate equipment or a classroom teacher's books are in need of replacement;  the union has been given adequate space to hold meetings;  a particular teacher was being actionably disrespectful to a supervisor, or simply firmly expressing a view;  the school is taking adequate steps to protect employee property from theft or vandalism;  a specific teacher qualifies for any of a number of employment benefits ( e.g., tuition assistance, training, time off for professional development or to attend a conference, etc. ); 34  a particular classroom has adequate supplies;  a given teacher should have been granted a request for a personal leave without pay;  a particular teacher should be assigned to teach American history instead of global studies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Because this variation is relevant under any standard of review, the Court has never considered the constitutionality of fair share fees as an all-or-nothing proposition; instead, it has determined constitutional challenges to classes of expenditures. See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U.S. 507; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 529 U.S. 217, the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Because this variation is relevant under any standard of review, the Court has never considered the constitutionality of fair share fees as an all-or-nothing proposition; instead, it has determined constitutional challenges to classes of expenditures. See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; 466 U.S. 435; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 529 U.S. 217, the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; 466 U.S. 435; 500 U.S. 507; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee. It noted that a large portion of the fee funded activities like health services and sports that had little First Amendment implication. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Id. ; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is the same approach this Court has taken with respect to fair share fees. That only makes sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Because this variation is relevant under any standard of review, the Court has never considered the constitutionality of fair share fees as an all-or-nothing proposition; instead, it has determined constitutional challenges to classes of expenditures. See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U.S. 507; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 529 U.S. 217, the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "2. Because this variation is relevant under any standard of review, the Court has never considered the constitutionality of fair share fees as an all-or-nothing proposition; instead, it has determined constitutional challenges to classes of expenditures. See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; 466 U.S. 435; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin 529 U.S. 217, the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "See Abood , 431 U.S. at 235-36; 466 U.S. 435; 500 U.S. 507; 500 U.S. at 556-58 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 35 and dissenting in part).31 And petitioner cannot show why that aspect of Abood and its progeny is not entitled to stare decisis effect. In fact, the Court has proceeded on the same understanding in other compelled subsidization cases, never doubting that regardless of the Court's First Amendment ruling, States could still impose any portion of a fee used for purposes consistent with the First Amendment. For example, in Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered a challenge to a student activity fee. It noted that a large portion of the fee funded activities like health services and sports that had little First Amendment implication. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Id. ; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is the same approach this Court has taken with respect to fair share fees. That only makes sense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "In asking this Court nonetheless to declare that all fair share fees are always unconstitutional, petitioner brings a facial challenge of the most disfavored kind. Even in the First Amendment context, \"[f]acial challenges are disfavored.\" Wash. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For one thing, while some facial challenges may arise on appropriately developed records, \"[c]laims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Although his argument depends on multiple highly contested assertions of fact 37 regarding complex questions – e.g., predicting the extent to which adopting their free-rider protection will diminish union revenues and membership, how the reduction in resources will affect the exclusive bargaining system, and how a fundamental alteration in States' management of their schools will affect the education of millions of schoolchildren – petitioner established no record below. Compare, e.g. , Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with Keller , 496 U.S. at 17 (declining to rule on First Amendment challenge to method for segregating chargeable and non-chargeable portions of bar du es because of lack of a \"fully developed record\"). Second, abandoning any pretense of respect for judicial restraint, petitioner urges the Court to overrule a longstanding precedent in order to hold that no union may ever charge an unwilling nonmember a penny for any kind of activity benefiting her, no matter how weak the First Amendment implications of the charge or how strong the Government's countervailing interests. Third, petitioner gives the democratic process in the States that provide fair share fees – which have been open and responsive to anti-union complaints and initiatives 32 – no opportunity to fine-tune public 32 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "In asking this Court nonetheless to declare that all fair share fees are always unconstitutional, petitioner brings a facial challenge of the most disfavored kind. Even in the First Amendment context, \"[f]acial challenges are disfavored.\" Wash. State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For one thing, while some facial challenges may arise on appropriately developed records, \"[c]laims of facial invalidity often rest on speculation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "Although his argument depends on multiple highly contested assertions of fact 37 regarding complex questions – e.g., predicting the extent to which adopting their free-rider protection will diminish union revenues and membership, how the reduction in resources will affect the exclusive bargaining system, and how a fundamental alteration in States' management of their schools will affect the education of millions of schoolchildren – petitioner established no record below. Compare, e.g. , Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with Keller , 496 U.S. at 17 (declining to rule on First Amendment challenge to method for segregating chargeable and non-chargeable portions of bar du es because of lack of a \"fully developed record\"). Second, abandoning any pretense of respect for judicial restraint, petitioner urges the Court to overrule a longstanding precedent in order to hold that no union may ever charge an unwilling nonmember a penny for any kind of activity benefiting her, no matter how weak the First Amendment implications of the charge or how strong the Government's countervailing interests. Third, petitioner gives the democratic process in the States that provide fair share fees – which have been open and responsive to anti-union complaints and initiatives 32 – no opportunity to fine-tune public 32 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "That, he cannot do. And that should be the end of the case. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether public sector union s are good or bad for public institutions is a matter of deep, partisan divide in this country. Adherenc e to the usual rules of constitutional adjudication and judicial restraint is particularly important when the Court confronts a question as politically charged as this one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "At the very least, even if this Court determines that the First Amendment bars charging fair share fees in the context presented by this case, it should expressly hold open whether that result applies to other States or other contexts – particularly to the 39 education context – where the balance of state and individual interests may be different. Cf. Harris, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (deciding only constitutionality of charging fare share fees to class of workers represented in the litigation). CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the court of appeals should be affirmed. Respectfully submitted, Rhonda Weingarten David J. Strom Mark Richard A MERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 555 New Jersey Ave. NW Washington, DC 20001 (202) 393-7472 Kevin K. Russell Counsel of Record Erica Oleszczuk Evans G OLDSTEIN & RUSSELL , P.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "That, he cannot do. And that should be the end of the case. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whether public sector union s are good or bad for public institutions is a matter of deep, partisan divide in this country. Adherenc e to the usual rules of constitutional adjudication and judicial restraint is particularly important when the Court confronts a question as politically charged as this one.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Collective Bargaining Is Another Means Of Soliciting Employee Input Into Employment Contracts",
		"context": "At the very least, even if this Court determines that the First Amendment bars charging fair share fees in the context presented by this case, it should expressly hold open whether that result applies to other States or other contexts – particularly to the 39 education context – where the balance of state and individual interests may be different. Cf. Harris, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (deciding only constitutionality of charging fare share fees to class of workers represented in the litigation).",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Rogers Test Decreases Litigation Costs",
		"context": "The threat of high litigation costs is exacerbated by courts' reluctance to decide likelihood of confusion before discovery or even on post-discovery summary judgment motions. Indeed, courts around the country have instructed district judges that summary dismissals based on likelihood of confusion are \"generally disfavored\" due to the test's \"intensely factual nature.\" Interstellar Starship Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Country Floors, Inc. v. P'ship Composed of Gepner & Ford , 930 F .2d 1056, 1062–63 (3d Cir. 1991) (characterizing summary judgment as \"the exception\" in trademark cases); AHP Subsidiary Holding 1 F.3d 611. For many activists, those costs alone act as an effective bar to defending their rights: Many non-competitive users of trademarks in artistic, cultural, and political speech have finally prevailed in court only after incurring massive costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 F.3d 1107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Rogers Test Decreases Litigation Costs",
		"context": "Indeed, courts around the country have instructed district judges that summary dismissals based on likelihood of confusion are \"generally disfavored\" due to the test's \"intensely factual nature.\" Interstellar Starship Servs., 184 F.3d 1107; see also Country Floors, Inc. v. P'ship Composed of Gepner & Ford , 930 F .2d 1056, 1062–63 (3d Cir. 1991) (characterizing summary judgment as \"the exception\" in trademark cases); AHP Subsidiary Holding [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For many activists, those costs alone act as an effective bar to defending their rights: Many non-competitive users of trademarks in artistic, cultural, and political speech have finally prevailed in court only after incurring massive costs. Such costs, including attorney's fees, the costs of expert witnesses, lost time, and uncertainty can deter both lawful and unlawful conduct—indeed, the \"specter of such expenses\" is part of traditional deterrence analysis.",
		"citation_value_orig": "1 F.3d 611",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Rogers Test Decreases Litigation Costs",
		"context": "Id. at 6. On the other end of the spectrum is [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Smith , Wal-Mart claimed that a critic of the company had infringed and diluted its trademarks by 18. See Corynne McSherry, Mr. Peabody's Coal Train Tries To Run Down Free Speech , Elec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F. Supp. 2d 1302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A customer's message about their wedding is not attributed to the Company",
		"context": "B ut since the Com- pany has not actually offered wedding website design service s to anyone and provides no examples of any websites developed with client input , it is impossible to discern the client's role in providing the expressive content of such a website. A company's services, even if they include expressive elements, do not automati- cally become messages attributable to the company because there is little likelihood that others will iden- tify the resulting product as co mmunicating the views of the company. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A state \"may adopt reasonable restrictions \" on \"a business estab- lishment that is open to the public,\" including requir-ing the business to host the speech of others. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A customer's message about their wedding is not attributed to the Company",
		"context": "\"Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit —or blame —for what is ultimately said.\" Janus Capital Grp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Simi- larly, a customer's message will likely not be attribut- able to the ancillary business when it \"lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the ed-itorial page of a newspaper.\" 547 U.S. 47 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A customer's message about their wedding is not attributed to the Company",
		"context": "Janus Capital Grp., 564 U.S. 135 . Simi- larly, a customer's message will likely not be attribut- able to the ancillary business when it \"lack[s] the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter, or the ed-itorial page of a newspaper.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As the Rumsfeld Court noted when it rejected a First Amendment challenge to a law requiring that universities include military recruiters, a law school sending messages facilitating military recruitment is not reasonably viewed as condoning or approving the military recruiters' own expression Id. at 64– 65.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
		"context": ". For reasons already given, the soundest way to re- solve this case is to reject heigh tened scrutiny for abortion restrictions and reverse the judgment below under rational -basis review. Supra Part I; see Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court rejects a viability rule but is not prepared 46 to reject heightened scrutiny, however, it should still reverse the court of appeals' judgment. Two chief al-ternative s are addressed below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court Should Reject The Judgment Below",
		"context": "at 899- 900 (joint opinion) (upholding pa- rental -consent provision, which would prohibit abor- tions for minors who could not secure consent or a ju- dicial bypass) . Casey upheld those provisions on the ground that they did not \"constitute an undue bur- den.\" June Medical Services [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying that approach here, this Court could hold that a State may prohibit elective abortions before vi- ability if it does not impose a substantial obstacle to \"a significant number of women\" seeking abortions. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case is not about the \"automobile exception\" to the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". Officer David Rhodes wanted to find a stolen or-ange-and-black Suzuki motorcycle that had been used to elude the police in two traffic incidents. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Officer Rhodes' investigation led him to the home of Ryan Austin Collins (Petitioner), where Rhodes could see from the street \"what appeared to be a motorcycle covered with a white tarp\" parked in Collins' driveway . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 S.E.2d 611",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress removed jurisdictional distinctions in the Territory between Indians and non-Indians",
		"context": "S. Rep. 53-377, at 7 (1894). As non-Indians began overwhelming the Indian population, federal courts were ill-equipped to handle the influx. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; S. Rep. 52-1079, at 4-5, 8, 14 (1892). The Indian Territory quickly became \"the ref- uge of criminals and desperadoes from all parts of the country.\" H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress removed jurisdictional distinctions in the Territory between Indians and non-Indians",
		"context": "14-23. By statehood, members of the Five Tribes were \"citi- zens of the State with little to distinguish them from all other citizens except for their limited property re- strictions and their tax exemptions.\" Okla. Tax Comm'n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress quickly undid even those limited civil-law distinctions; it lifted restrictions and subjected Indian property \"to taxa- tion and all other civil burdens as though it were the prop- erty of other persons than allottees of the Five Civilized Tribes.\" Act of May 27, 1908, §§ 1, 4, 35 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress removed jurisdictional distinctions in the Territory between Indians and non-Indians",
		"context": "This \"con- temporaneous construction\" that the Major Crimes Act did not apply, as determined by those who \"set[ ] its ma- chinery in motion,\" confirms that Congress gave the new State jurisdiction over all crimes committed in eastern Oklahoma. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26",
		"citation_value_orig": "288 U.S. 294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. North Carolina cannot base jurisdiction over the trustee on the North Carolina domicile of the beneficiary",
		"context": ". In the case at hand, North Carolina's problem lies in the fact that it wants to substitute the contacts of the beneficiary for the contacts of the trustee. This Court explained the reasons for not allowing such a substitution in the landmark case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Hanson , the strategy of simply shifting focus to individuals more amenable to jurisdiction was rejected. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioners' argument concerning a limited public forum is not preserved, but is inapposite in any event",
		"context": "39-40) the City flagpole is a \"limited public forum,\" but that argument appears no- where in the Petition and thus is waived. See Sup. Ct. R. 14.1(a); see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if the argument were preserved, it is inapposite. The City did not argue before the court of appeals or in its oppositi on brief that it had a suffi- 49 ciently compelling interest to exclude private speech on a religious topic if the flag-raising program were deemed a designated public fo rum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The traffic stop in this case was lawfully based on reasonable suspicion that a vehicle was being driven by its registered owner whose license had been revoked",
		"context": "Because the Fourth Amendment protects \"against unreasonable searches and seizures,\" U.S. Const. Amend. IV, the \"central inquiry\" is \"the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental 7 invasion of a citizen's personal security,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case concerns the reasona- bleness of a police officer's brief stop of a vehicle based on information that the vehicle's registered owner has a revoked driver's license. As most state and federal courts to consider th e issue have recognized , officers can reasonably rely on the inference, derived from experience and common sense, that it is at least fairly possible that a vehicle on the road is being driven by its regist ered owner.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "Schlagenhauf , 379 U.S. at 110 . The writ \"has traditionally been used in the federal courts only to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A writ \"appropriately\" issues \"when there is 'usurpation of judicial power' or a clear abuse of discretion.\" Schlagenhauf , 379 U.S. at 110.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "Schlagenhauf , 379 U.S. at 110. 40 To ensure these requisites are met, the Court has identified three \"conditions\" that must be satisfied for issuance of a writ—that \"(1) 'no other adequate means [exist] to attain the relief he desires,' (2) the party's 'right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,' and (3) 'the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"These hurdles, however demanding, are not insuperable.\" Cheney , 542 U.S. at 381.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "Cheney , 542 U.S. at 380-81. The government's suggestion simply cannot be squared with cases where the Court has issued and denied the writ. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Kerr, 426 U.S. at 404-06 (affirming the denial of a writ because an alternative challenge to the district court's order could have been made in the same proceedings). The right to the issuance of the writ was \"clear and indisputable.\" The Government also asserts that Respondents \"cannot show that their 'right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,'\" Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "The Government also asserts that Respondents \"cannot show that their 'right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,'\" Pet'r Br. 29 (quoting Cheney , 542 U.S. at 381), becaus e \"'the most that can be claimed on this record is that [the district court] may have erred in ruling on matters within [its] jurisdiction,'\" Pet'r Br. 30 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Government's argument misconstrues the meaning of \"jurisdiction\" in the ma ndamus context. The Court has \"not limite d the use of mandamus by an unduly narrow and technical understanding of what constitutes a matter of 'jurisdiction.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "(quotati ons omitted). A district court's \"jurisdiction\" in the mandamus context is better understood as acting within the \"appropriate\" legal \"criteria\" as decided by the appellate court. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Platt , the Court explained that the \"function of the Court of Appeals\" in the mandamus context is to \"determine the appropriate criteria\" for a decision and \"then leave their application to the trial judge on remand.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "Id. at 104 (quoting Bankers Life & Cas. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Here, however, the record fully supports the conclusion that the District adopted a policy of indiscriminate shackling outside the sphere of its discretionary power. The Government's suggestion that the answer to the underlying legal question must be \"clear and indisputable\" ignores that mandamus jurisdiction includes the power to resolv e \"undecided question[s].\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "346 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "at 309. Once the Court decided that § 1915(d) did not authorize coercive appointments of counsel, the right to issuance of the writ was \"clear and indisputable,\" 45 because the district court acted outside of the scope of its discretion or jurisdiction. See also Hollingsworth , 558 U.S. at 190 (granting stay pending disposition of a writ of mandamus where the district court \"likely violated a federal statute in revising its local rules\"); Cheney , 542 U.S. at 389-91 (remanding for further consideration of issuing a writ of mandamus where the district court and court of appeals had misinterpreted the Court's cases by requiring the Vice President to assert exec utive privilege before considering separation-of-power concerns); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Properly understood, the right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable in this case. The Court of Appeals correctly determined that the common law and due process require that \"if the government seeks to shackle a defendant, it must first justify the infringement with specific security needs as to that particular defend ant.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "Instead, mandamus requires an independent determination of the relevant legal standard and whether the district court a pplied that standard. For example, in Atlantic Marine Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court granted certiorari and reversed the denial of the writ of mandamus because \"both the District Court and the Court of Appeals misunderstood the standards to be applied in adjudicating a § 1404(a) motion in a case involving a forum-selection clause.\" Id. at 575 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "at 575 (emphasis added). Whether or not the district or appellate court made a good faith effort to follow circuit case law played no part in the Court's unanimous decision. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cheney , 542 U.S. at 383-88 (discussing 48 whether the district court and Court of Appeals correctly interpreted this Court's precedent, not whether they interpreted the precedent in good faith); 413 U.S. 149. In sum, the use of mandamus jurisdiction, but withholding issuance of a formal writ, was appropriate in the unique circumstances of this case. Respondents presented an important, yet unresolved, constitutional question involving the district court's power to shackle without individualized determinations of need.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In the alternative, the All Writs Act provided jurisdiction to review the District's policy of indiscriminately shackling all pretrial detainees",
		"context": "at 575 (emphasis added). Whether or not the district or appellate court made a good faith effort to follow circuit case law played no part in the Court's unanimous decision. See also 564 U.S. 162; Cheney , 542 U.S. at 383-88 (discussing 48 whether the district court and Court of Appeals correctly interpreted this Court's precedent, not whether they interpreted the precedent in good faith); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, the use of mandamus jurisdiction, but withholding issuance of a formal writ, was appropriate in the unique circumstances of this case. Respondents presented an important, yet unresolved, constitutional question involving the district court's power to shackle without individualized determinations of need.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Bill of Rights Secures Pre-Existing Individual Rights of the American People.",
		"context": "The Bill of Rights was added to the Constitution to more effectively achieve its underlying purpose o f securing the endowed rights of the people. As Justice Harlan explained it, the \"Bill of Rights, designed to protect personal liberties, was directed at rights against governmental authority.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Arnett , this Court recognized two significant aspects of the Bill of Rights, which clearly attest to that document's direct correlation to the 6 purpose for which American government was founded. First, the Bill of Rights was designed to secure rights , and as such, was intended to protect rights that pre -dated the Founding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 745",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Bill of Rights Secures Pre-Existing Individual Rights of the American People.",
		"context": "In Arnett , this Court recognized two significant aspects of the Bill of Rights, which clearly attest to that document's direct correlation to the 6 purpose for which American government was founded. First, the Bill of Rights was designed to secure rights , and as such, was intended to protect rights that pre -dated the Founding. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second, the rights secured by the Bill of Rights were both personal and individual to the American peo ple. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": ". The Fourth Amendment secures \"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-zures.\" In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court reinvigorated the importance of consulting the common law of trespass in applying this guarantee. Id. at 409.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). And this limit matters now more than ever before given the pace at which new technology is enabling the police \"to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.\" 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, a focus on history reminds all courts of their duty to uphold \"that degree of privacy 3 See, e.g. , Kashmir Hill, The Secretive Company That Might End Privacy as We Know It , N.Y. T IMES, Jan. 18, 2020, https:// nyti.ms/2NEbiJZ (secret use of new facial recognition software by over 600 law enforcement agencies); Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Police Snap Up Cheap Cellphone Trackers , W ALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2015, http://on.wsj.com/2ux3Ep0.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "at 1265, 1274–76. In reaching this conclusion, the court made no ef- fort to review \"the common law when the [Fourth] Amendment was framed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court instead assumed that this tradition only concerned physical intrusions. See LMP Servs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "2004). 6 physical one. To appreciate this point, one must begin with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At issue was whether certain police conduct was an \"ar-rest\"—i.e., a seizure of the person governed by the Fourth Amendment. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "at 625. The Court thus recog- nized—consistent with its later analysis in Jones — that \"[t]he Fourth Amendment is supposed to protect the people at least as much now as it did when adopted, its ancient protections still in force whatever our cur-rent intuitions or preferences might be.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To stop Roxanne Torres from leav- ing the site of a police raid, officers shot Torres twice— i.e., an intentional use of physical force to restrain movement. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "818 F.3d 988",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "Less obvious—but no less important— is how such neglect also erodes the common law's own achievement in limiting the power of search and seizure. This is especially true here, with the Tenth Circuit's decision in Torres serving to unravel the 5 Later decisions of this Court do not detract from this point (contrary to the Tenth Circuit's view). In County of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment \"only when there is a governmen-tal termination of freedom of movement through means intention- ally applied .\" Id. at 844 (emphasis in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This case exemplifies a bigger problem: lower court neglect of common-law history in gauging searches and seizures",
		"context": "Id. at 844 (emphasis in original). And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held \"there is no sei- zure without actual submission\" when the police attempt to arrest \"by a show of authority and without the use of physical force.\" Id. at 254.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cy Pres Settlements Promote Prompt Dispute Resolution, And Decrease The Likelihood That Costly Class Procedures Will Be Necessary",
		"context": "Indeed, it is at the certification stage that the playing field begins to tilt in the plaintiffs' favor. As this Court has observed, class actions can entail \"the risk of 'in terrorem' settlements.\" AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Coopers & 437 U.S. 463, as recognized in Microsoft 137 S. Ct. 1702; Fede ral Rule Civil Procedure 23 advisory committee's note to 1998 Amendment, 28 21 U.S.C. app.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cy Pres Settlements Promote Prompt Dispute Resolution, And Decrease The Likelihood That Costly Class Procedures Will Be Necessary",
		"context": "As this Court has observed, class actions can entail \"the risk of 'in terrorem' settlements.\" AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333. See also Coopers & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as recognized in Microsoft 137 S. Ct. 1702; Fede ral Rule Civil Procedure 23 advisory committee's note to 1998 Amendment, 28 21 U.S.C. app. Subdivision (f) (\"An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the ri sk of potentially ruinous liability\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Cy Pres Settlements Promote Prompt Dispute Resolution, And Decrease The Likelihood That Costly Class Procedures Will Be Necessary",
		"context": "As this Court has observed, class actions can entail \"the risk of 'in terrorem' settlements.\" AT&T Mobility 563 U.S. 333. See also Coopers & 437 U.S. 463, as recognized in Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fede ral Rule Civil Procedure 23 advisory committee's note to 1998 Amendment, 28 21 U.S.C. app. Subdivision (f) (\"An order granting certification, on the other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the ri sk of potentially ruinous liability\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unchecked Legislative Power Over Elections Would Cripple the Rule of Law",
		"context": "Law The ISLT would remove state courts' ability to en- force state constitutional provisions in cases involving federal elections, making those provisions nullities. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the fundamen- tal rule-of-law principle that \"the government shall be 13 ruled by the law and subject to it,\" Raz, supra , at 212. The ISLT's concentration of all power over federal elections in the state legislature is precisely the \"ac- cumulation of all powers legislative, executive and ju- diciary in the same hands\" that the Framers viewed as the \"definition of tyranny.\" The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unchecked Legislative Power Over Elections Would Cripple the Rule of Law",
		"context": "The ISLT posits that, despite the Framers' belief in the separation of powers as a critical safeguard against tyranny, they opted to prohibit state constitu- tional checks on legislative power . This position is grossly inconsistent with the Framers' writings. It is particularly absurd to posit that the Framers would impose this anomalous prohibition and hand state leg- islatures plenary power solely when legislatur es deal with \"the fundamental right\" to vote in federal elec- tions, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This theory is irreconcilable with the Framers' in- tent to limit legislative power. The Framers singled out legislatures as the branch of government most in need of restraint: \"The legislative department is every where extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex….",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Unchecked Legislative Power Over Elections Would Cripple the Rule of Law",
		"context": "This Court long ago re- jected such an approach. In Smiley v. Holm , this Court concluded that state legislative action under the Elec- tions Clause is \"the making of laws\" and thus \"must be in accordance with the method which the state has prescribed for legislative enactments\" —including the state constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Smiley confirms that the ac- tions of state legislatur es under the Elections Clause are legislation subject to the state constitution, id., hence subject to judicial review, Marbury , 5 U.S. at 177-78. The ISLT also would create an unacceptable dis- parity between the rule-of-law constraints on Con- gress and those on state legislatures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail",
		"context": "Br. 37. The judiciary has no free-floating power to \"improve upon\" the statutes Congress enacts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But if it did, there would be no warrant for its exercise here. \"[L]ike most apocalyptic warnings, [petitioner's] proves a false alarm.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioner's non-textual arguments for narrowing the statute also fail",
		"context": "\"[L]ike most apocalyptic warnings, [petitioner's] proves a false alarm.\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor does constitutional avoidance do the trick.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In Founding-Era Common Law, An Arrest Included Any Use of Physical Force to Subdue or Detain, Whether or Not the Subject Was Ultimately Captured",
		"context": "21 In sum, English and American common law —be- fore, during, and after the Founding era —consistently regarded an arrest as having occurred when physical force was used to capture a person , even if that force did not re sult in the person's apprehension . The Fourth Amendment, at a minimum, should \"preserve [] for our citizens the traditional protections against un- lawful arrest afforded by the common law.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the Framers added a Bill of Rights the Constitution, they \" secur [ed] to the American people, among other things, those safe- guards which had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures.\" 232 U.S. 383 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. In Founding-Era Common Law, An Arrest Included Any Use of Physical Force to Subdue or Detain, Whether or Not the Subject Was Ultimately Captured",
		"context": "City of 500 U.S. 44. When the Framers added a Bill of Rights the Constitution, they \" secur [ed] to the American people, among other things, those safe- guards which had grown up in England to protect the people from unreasonable searches and seizures.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 U.S. 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Correct Because HHS's Interpretation Conflicts With the Plain Language of the Statute",
		"context": "Even if this Co urt overlooks this significant procedural flaw, HHS's argument fares no better when cons idered on the merits. HHS's contention that the Ninth Circuit's straightforward application of a basic canon of statutory interpretation —that different words have diff erent meanings (especially when, as here, used within the same statutory provision) — requ ires this Court's clarification is implausible on its face. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). This Court recently emphasized the corollary of this canon in considering, and rejecting, HHS's attempt to interpret \"entitled to benefits under part A\" as encompassing patients who had enrolled in a Medicare managed care plan under Medicare Part C without proper notice and comment rulemaking. 139 S. Ct. 1804.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Correct Because HHS's Interpretation Conflicts With the Plain Language of the Statute",
		"context": "See 542 U.S. 692 ). This Court recently emphasized the corollary of this canon in considering, and rejecting, HHS's attempt to interpret \"entitled to benefits under part A\" as encompassing patients who had enrolled in a Medicare managed care plan under Medicare Part C without proper notice and comment rulemaking. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. HHS tries to get around this by contending that when Congress used the te rms \"entitled\" and \"eligible\" in the DSH provision, it was merely \"borrowing these terms from elsewhere in the statute,\" where they are used differently, and that those different meanings should be imported into this particular provision. Pet.30 (quoting Ne.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Is Correct Because HHS's Interpretation Conflicts With the Plain Language of the Statute",
		"context": "Pet.30 (quoting Ne. Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and citing Cabell Huntington, 101 F.3d at 992 (Luttig, J., dissenting)). But fo ur different circuit courts rejected similar arguments that the statute allowed HHS to equate \"eligible\" and \"entitled,\" citing the canon that different words have different meanings. See,101 F.3d 987- 88 (refusing to \"violate … a clear canon of statutory construction, and the plain meaning of the two terms\" by equating eligible and entitled).",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel",
		"context": "l Around the same time that the endorsement test was developing , a separate line of this Court's cases was grappl ing with the distinct but related question of how (if at all) the Establishment Clause appl ies to private religious speech occurring in a government - provided forum. One of the earliest of these was Widmar v. Vin- cent, which address ed whether the Establishment Clause justified a state university's policy of making its facilities \"generally available\" to registered stu-dent groups , but not \"for purposes of religious wor- ship or religious teaching.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because the school had created a forum gen- erally open for use by student groups, the Court ex-plained , the Free Speech Clause required strict scru- 8 tiny of discrimination agains t religious speech. Id., at 270–2 71.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Establishment Clause as a Speech-Regulation Defense: Widmar and Lamb's Chapel",
		"context": "Id., at 275. Similarly, the Court in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches School District found that the Establish- ment Clause did not ju stify barring a church from showing a Christian -themed film series on school property after- hours . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Echoing Widmar, the Court held unanimously that \"the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject. \" Id., at 394.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Valley Forge",
		"context": "e In Valley Forge Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] this Court fully preserv ed its prior holding that 6 The undersigned was lead plaint iff counsel in both cases. 25 direct contact with government religious speech in one's own community \"surely suffice[s] to give the par- ties standing.\" (quoting Schempp , 374 U.S. at 224 n.9).",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Valley Forge",
		"context": "at 487 n.22 (emphasis added). 4. Lee In Lee, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court expressly ruled that a father had standing to enjoin a single Rabbi's prayer slated for his daughter's future gradu-ation (i.e. it was completely avoidable and would be de- livered by a man of their own Jewish faith): We find it unnecessary to address Daniel Weisman's taxpayer standing, for a live and justiciable controversy is before us. Deborah Weisman is enrolled as a student at Classical High School in Providence and from the rec- ord it appears likely, if not certain, that an in-vocation and benediction will be conducted at her high school graduation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. First Amendment",
		"context": "That is not so much a test for identifying partisan gerry mandering as it is an effort to eradicate all consideration of politics from districting. After all, any map drawn with any partisan considerations in mind (which is to say, virtually any map drawn, as the Constitution contemplates, by a legislature) is \"intended to favor or disfavor individuals or entities that support a particular candidate or political party\" in some sense. Take the map this Court upheld in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The legislature \"'wiggle[d] and 53 joggle[d]' boundary lines\" to try to ensure that candidates associated with particular political parties would win. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. First Amendment",
		"context": "\"Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem with\" the district court's First Amendment theory \"is the lack of historical precedent\" for it. Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Partisan gerrymandering is as old as the Republic, yet it has never been treated as a First Amendment problem. And with good reason, as the majority's boundless test proves the wisdom of the Vieth plurality 's observation \"that a First Amendment claim, if it were sustained, would render unlawful all consideration of political affiliation in districting.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. First Amendment",
		"context": "), does not explain how a practice that the framers not only tolerated but encouraged (by assigning responsibility for districting to political actors) has suddenly become an abridgment of free speech. The First Amendment, moreover, does not draw any distinction between \"benign\" and \"invidious\" viewpoint discrimination or retaliation. \"What cases such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1976) , require is not merely that Republicans be given a decent share of the jobs in a Democratic adminis tration, but that political affiliation be disregarded .\" Id. at 294 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Standing as a Check on Abuse of Power",
		"context": "\"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws whenever he r eceives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that 4 protection… [I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law whenever that right is invaded.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Constitutional rights and the protections of the laws become a dead letter if standing law raises artificially high parchment barriers to the courts. If the executive branch can shield itself from legal challenges by arguing for high thresholds for standing after reverse - engineering and gerrymandering its policies to make sure no one has standing, it would be above the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Standing as a Check on Abuse of Power",
		"context": "The Biden administration asks for a new barrier against the public's access to justice, with unpredictable negative effects on other areas of law, including civil rights, civil liberties, regulatory and environmental claims, and anti -corruption litigation. It is worth noting that, during the Trump administration, its opponents (and indeed, the allies of this administration) litigated the abuse of executive power based on standing from indirect injuries and indirect causation. See, e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 140 S.Ct. 1891. It is all too convenient for those recent opponents of the last administration's abuses to argue for a new directness rule against standing now that they are in power. The parties here each show an injury -in-fact, a causal connection, and a remedy to redre ss the injury, as required by long -standing precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Standing as a Check on Abuse of Power",
		"context": "The Biden administration asks for a new barrier against the public's access to justice, with unpredictable negative effects on other areas of law, including civil rights, civil liberties, regulatory and environmental claims, and anti -corruption litigation. It is worth noting that, during the Trump administration, its opponents (and indeed, the allies of this administration) litigated the abuse of executive power based on standing from indirect injuries and indirect causation. See, e.g ., 138 S.Ct. 2392 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is all too convenient for those recent opponents of the last administration's abuses to argue for a new directness rule against standing now that they are in power. The parties here each show an injury -in-fact, a causal connection, and a remedy to redre ss the injury, as required by long -standing precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S.Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners have failed to show that the government's position is not entitled to deference",
		"context": "Even if this Court found the regulatory text itself ambiguous, the INS's explanatory comment explicitly describes the reasons for the gov ernment's statutory construction. That explanation too warrants Chevron deference, because it is \"the fruit[ ] of notice -and- comment rulemaking.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158. At a minimum, the agency's formally de- scribed, contemporaneous understanding of its own regulation s warrants deference under 139 S. Ct. 2400. b. Petitioners also acknowledge (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners have failed to show that the government's position is not entitled to deference",
		"context": "Even if this Court found the regulatory text itself ambiguous, the INS's explanatory comment explicitly describes the reasons for the gov ernment's statutory construction. That explanation too warrants Chevron deference, because it is \"the fruit[ ] of notice -and- comment rulemaking.\" 533 U.S. 218 ; see Long Island Care at Home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At a minimum, the agency's formally de- scribed, contemporaneous understanding of its own regulation s warrants deference under 139 S. Ct. 2400. b. Petitioners also acknowledge (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners have failed to show that the government's position is not entitled to deference",
		"context": "That explanation too warrants Chevron deference, because it is \"the fruit[ ] of notice -and- comment rulemaking.\" 533 U.S. 218 ; see Long Island Care at Home, 551 U.S. 158. At a minimum, the agency's formally de- scribed, contemporaneous understanding of its own regulation s warrants deference under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Petitioners also acknowledge (Br. 44, 47- 48) that the Board's published decisions are generally entitled to deference; they merely claim that the Board's analy- sis in Padilla Rodriguez was dicta.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioners have failed to show that the government's position is not entitled to deference",
		"context": "That would be a particularly odd inference to draw given that the AAO adopted the same basic interpreta- tion of Section 1254a(f )(4) as the INS had in its 1991 rulemaking and as the Department of Justice had 49 advanced in every court of appeals to consider the ques- tion, going back to 655 F.3d 1260 in a single sen- tence that this Court should \"overrule Chevron \" rather than defer to the government's longstanding, formally promulgated statutory interpretation. T hat does not come close to the \"special justification \" that this Court would require for overturning its multiple precedents in this area, which the Court has now repeatedly reaf- firmed over decades. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And pe- titioners' attack is esp ecially inadequate in light of the \"enhanced force\" of stare decisis here, where \"Congress can correct any mistake it sees\" in the Court's decisions deferring to the Executive Branch's reasonable con- structions of the INA. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(B). In doing so, Congress codified this Court's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that an asylum applicant who \"seeks to ob-tain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination\" that he is ineligible for asylu m or not entitled to withholding of removal \"must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution,\" id . at 483 - 484. See 140 S. Ct. 1683.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "In doing so, Congress codified this Court's holding in 502 U.S. 478, that an asylum applicant who \"seeks to ob-tain judicial reversal of the BIA's determination\" that he is ineligible for asylu m or not entitled to withholding of removal \"must show that the evidence he presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution,\" id . at 483 - 484. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 That standard is, to state the obvious, \"highly defer- ential.\" Nasrallah , 140 S. Ct. at 1692.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "706(2)(E) (allowing a reviewing court to set aside agency action that is \"unsupported by substantial evi- dence\"). And as with the application of the substantial - evidence standard in other contexts, application of the substantial -evidence standard to removal proceedings means that it is the agency —not a reviewing court — that has responsibility to choose from among the com- peting factual narratives the record before it could plau- sibly support. Congress's choice in this regard reflects the fact that IJs and the Board have \" examined more of these cases than any court ever has or ever can,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2 Accordingly, while neither the IJ nor the Board may \"arbitrarily disbelieve credible evidence\" offered in support of an alien's claim, they may decline to find that evidence persuasive (and thus find the alien ineligible for relief ) if the r ecord contains \"contrary evidence\" of the \"kind and quality\" that makes such a decision rea- sonable. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation 2 Further reflecting the expertise that IJs develop through their experience hearing large numbers of removal cases, the Board has directed that even within the agency, IJs' factual determinations are reviewed under a clear- error standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "See 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(d)(3). 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is likewise \"within the prov- ince of the\" IJ or the Board \"to credit part of [a] witness' testimony without accepting it all,\" 390 U.S. 459, and thus to conclude that the portions of an alien's testi- mony that undermine his eligibility for relief outweigh those portions that support such eligibility. So long as \"on [the agency] record it would have been possible for a reasonabl e jury to reach the Board 's conclusion,\" Al- lentown Mack Sales & Service, 522 U.S. 359, a review- ing court may not set the Board's determination aside.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "1003.1(d)(3). 22 512 U.S. 267. It is likewise \"within the prov- ince of the\" IJ or the Board \"to credit part of [a] witness' testimony without accepting it all,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and thus to conclude that the portions of an alien's testi- mony that undermine his eligibility for relief outweigh those portions that support such eligibility. So long as \"on [the agency] record it would have been possible for a reasonabl e jury to reach the Board 's conclusion,\" Al- lentown Mack Sales & Service, 522 U.S. 359, a review- ing court may not set the Board's determination aside. See 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The INA requires a court of appeals to sustain the Board's determination that an alien has not proven his eligibility for relief, so long as that determination is supported by substantial evidence",
		"context": "22 512 U.S. 267. It is likewise \"within the prov- ince of the\" IJ or the Board \"to credit part of [a] witness' testimony without accepting it all,\" 390 U.S. 459, and thus to conclude that the portions of an alien's testi- mony that undermine his eligibility for relief outweigh those portions that support such eligibility. So long as \"on [the agency] record it would have been possible for a reasonabl e jury to reach the Board 's conclusion,\" Al- lentown Mack Sales & Service, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a review- ing court may not set the Board's determination aside. See 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(4)(B); Elias -Zacarias , 502 U .S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Contrary to common sense",
		"context": "People face compuls ory fees all the time – airline baggage fees, environmental disposal fees forcar maintenance, cance llation fees for hotel reservations, etc. That the fees are mandatory makesno difference to the identity of the payor or size of thedent in the wallet (or, in this case, the dent in the First Amendment). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, car owners objected to being forced to display the state motto, \"L ive Free or Die,\" on their auto license plates, id. at 706-07. This Court held that by requiring the car owners to \"use their privateproperty as a 'mobile billboard' for the State'sideological message – or suffer a penalty,\" thegovernment had unconstitutionally compelled speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Contrary to common sense",
		"context": "§ 3402. That such ex tractions take a short trip from the employer's bank account to the IRS does notmean they are not wages attributable to the employee(and taxed as such!). 5 Likewise, portions of a paycheck can be garnished for payment of debts, but thegarnished amount was still the employee's money.Indeed, the premise of this Court's ruling that dueprocess requires notice and a hearing before wages may be garnished, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is that garnished wages are theproperty of the employee. The involuntary nature ofthe payment does not negate the reality that, as withagency fee deductions, the employee is being forced to pay money to a third party. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Contrary to common sense",
		"context": "That is like saying an extortion victimforced to yield a portion of his salary did not lose property because the extraction was involuntary; theextorter was simply redirecting the payment to himself or his bag man. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 F. Supp. 2d 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. RRTA Taxation of FELA Awards Will Impede Fair Settlement Negotiations and Reduce Funding for Railroad Retirement Benefits",
		"context": "In that instance, the parties can agree on how much of the settlement, if any, is allocated to lost past in- come. \"Where there is an express allocation in the settlement agreement between the parties, it will generally be followed in determining the allocation for Federal income tax purposes .\" Healthpoint, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 35 Under the rule sought by Petitioner, the rail- road can use the prospect of RRTA tax liability to pressure the plaintiff into foregoing a jury trial and agreeing to accept a lower settlement offer. If the plaintiff is willing to accept a lower settlement, the railroad may agree to designate only a small amount of the settlement as payment for past lost wag es, re- ducing or eliminating the tax liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "102 T.C.M. (CCH) 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "at 576. As the Court has ex- plained, \"an alien is surely a 'person' in any ordinary sense of that term,\" \"[w]hatever his status under the immigration laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Defendants do not dispute that undocumented im- migrants are \"persons.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "See 25 Webster's Complete Dict ionary of the English Lan- guage 692 (1864) (\"Within, inside of, surrounded by\"). The Framers employed sim ple, straightforward lan- guage in the Fourteenth Amendment . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. U ndoc- umented persons living in each State are covered by that plain language. The \"gloss given the constitutional phra se 'in each State'\" has consistently been \"usual residence.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "FAIR , 486 F. Supp. at 576 ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Every federal judge to consider the questio n has agreed that \"the federal go vernment [must] endeavor to count every single person residing in the United States, whether citizen or noncitizen, whether living here with legal status or without,\" and must \"appor- tion Representatives among the states\" on that basis. New 351 F. Supp. 3d 502 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "Both the Founders and the Fourteenth Amendment's Framers debated the proper basis for apportionment , and concluded that it must be the to- tal population, including noncitizens, residing in the United States. \"At the time of the founding, the Framers con- fronted the question\" of how to allocate seats in the 27 new Government to the States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Their compromise was to \"provide each State the same number of seats in the Senate, and to allocate House seats based on States' total popula tion,\" that is, \"' according to their respec- tive Numbers .'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "at 473 ( A. Hamilton). They insisted that a ll people would \"be included in the cen- sus by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives,\" even though most were \"deprived of [the] right\" to vote , The Federalist No. 54 (Madison) , at 368 (N.Y. Heritage Press ed., 1945) (\"The Federal- ist\"), including \" women, children, bo und servants, con- victs, the insane, and … aliens ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Fourteenth Amendment's Framers reaffirmed the \"basic constitutional standard\" contemplating \"equal representation for equal numbers of people .\" 377 U.S. 533 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 F.2d 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "54 (Madison) , at 368 (N.Y. Heritage Press ed., 1945) (\"The Federal- ist\"), including \" women, children, bo und servants, con- victs, the insane, and … aliens ,\" 918 F.2d 763 . The Fourteenth Amendment's Framers reaffirmed the \"basic constitutional standard\" contemplating \"equal representation for equal numbers of people .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . They con- sider ed and reject ed proposals to base the apportion- ment on other metrics , but retain ed total population to ensure that all immigrants, as well as formerly en- slaved persons, would be included. \"Concerned that Southern States would not will- ingly enfranchise freed slaves,\" the Framers \"consid- ered at length the possibility of allocating House seats 28 to states on the basis of voter [s]\" or citizen s, but ulti- mately rejected th ose option s. Evenwel , 136 S. Ct. at 1127 (quotations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitution Requires Including Undocumented Immigrants Residing in Each State in the Apportionment Base",
		"context": "35, is irrele- vant. It is also incorrect. Congress is presumed to un- derstand the \"contemporary legal context\" in which it acts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and as the Justice Department explained in opposing a 1988 bill to excise undocumented immi- grants from the census, \"[i]t was … possible to be an illegal alien in 1866 ,\" because \"[t]he United States has had a statute since 1798 govern ing arrest and exclu- sion of aliens from hostile countries,\" which \"had been exercised prior to 1866. \"11 Various State laws simi- 10 See, e.g. , Cong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "In \"a series of important cases\" over the last few decades , this Court has recognized that \"major agency rules\" require \" clear congressional authorization\" to be lawful . U.S. Telecom [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; UARG , 573 U.S. at 302; Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489; accord 531 U.S. 457 ; Indus. Union Dep't, AFL 448 U.S. 607; accord Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489 . \"If a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful\" without any further inquiry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "In \"a series of important cases\" over the last few decades , this Court has recognized that \"major agency rules\" require \" clear congressional authorization\" to be lawful . U.S. Telecom 855 F.3d 381 ; UARG , 573 U.S. at 302; Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Indus. Union Dep't, AFL 448 U.S. 607; accord Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489 . \"If a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful\" without any further inquiry.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "In \"a series of important cases\" over the last few decades , this Court has recognized that \"major agency rules\" require \" clear congressional authorization\" to be lawful . U.S. Telecom 855 F.3d 381 ; UARG , 573 U.S. at 302; Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489; accord 531 U.S. 457 ; Indus. Union Dep't, AFL [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Ala. Ass'n of Realtors , 141 S. Ct. at 2489 . \"If a statute only ambiguously supplies authority for the major rule, the rule is unlawful\" without any further inquiry. U.S. Telecom Ass'n , 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see, e.g., Brown & Williamson , 529 U.S. at 132 –33, 161.",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "U.S. Telecom Ass'n , 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); see, e.g., Brown & Williamson , 529 U.S. at 132 –33, 161. Thus, an agency may only \" exercise regulatory authority over a major policy question \" if Congress has either: \" (i) expressly and specifically decide [d] the major policy question itself and delegate [d] to the agency the authority to regulate and enforce; or (ii) expressly and specifically delegate [d] to the agency the authority both to decide the major policy question and to regulate and enforce. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Two \"overlapping and reinforcing presumptions\" provide the legal foundation and justification for the major questions d octrine. U.S. Telecom Ass'n , 855 F.3d at 419 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "1181, 1201 –02 (2018) . The s econd is the \"presumption that Congress intends to make major policy decisions itself, not leave those decisions to agencies.\" U.S. Telecom Ass'n , 855 F.3d at 41 9 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); accord K [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy , 38 Admin. L. Rev. 363, 370 (1986 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "363, 370 (1986 ). Under the \"democratic values\" embodied in our Constitution, \"a major policy change should be made by the most democratically accountable process —Article I, Section 7 legislati on[.]\" U.S. Telecom Ass'n , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (quoting William N. Eskridge , Jr., Interpreting Law: A Primer on How to Read Statutes and the Constitution 289 (2016) ). This constitutional process requires \"Congress [to] deliberate[ ] about\" any \"change in [ ] major policies,\" forcing it to remain accountable to the people for the policy choices it makes for the entire Nation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "This Court has applied the major questions doctrine at different stages of the statutory analysis . Sometimes this Court appears to invoke the doctrine at Chevron step one, where it counsels \"hesitat[ion] before concluding that Congress has intended\" the \"implicit delegation\" of a major question to an agency via statutory \"ambiguity.\" Brown & Williamson , 529 U.S. at 159 –60; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other times this Court considers this doctrine at Chevron step two, concluding that an agency's \"interpretation\" of a statute is \"unreasonable\" —and therefore undeserving of deference —where that interpr etation would allow the agency to answer a major question. UARG , 573 U.S. at 321, 323 –24; see also MCI , 512 U.S. at 229 –31.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "Paul , 140 S. Ct. at 342 (Kavanaugh, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) ; see 139 S. Ct. 2116 ; Sunstein , supra , at 1198 –1200. Given that \"the people ha[ve] vested the power to prescribe rules lim iting their liberties in Congress alone,\" Congress may not \"alter that arrangement\" by delegating its \"responsibility of adopting legislation\" to any other body. Gundy , 139 S. Ct. at 2133 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like the major questions d octrine, the nondelegation doctrine ensures that lawmaking proceeds through the Article I lawmaking process. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Major Questions Doctrine",
		"context": "Third, Congress may assign another branch \"certain non-legislative responsibilities \" without causing nondelegation concerns. Id. at 2137; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So, if Congress by statute delegates certain matters to another branch that are already \"'within the scope '\" of that branch's \" 'power, '\" that raise s no nondelegation concern . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Language of the Second Amendment Places \"Keep\" and \"Bear\" on Equal Footing",
		"context": "The text does not differentiate between the two, nor does it impose a hierarchical structure. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 ( \"Putting all of [the Second Amendment's] textual elements together, we find they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation.\") (emphasis added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Despite the plain language, some courts, including thos e below, have relegated the right to bear arms to a tier below that of the right to keep arms. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "702 F.3d 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Plain Language of the Second Amendment Places \"Keep\" and \"Bear\" on Equal Footing",
		"context": "(citation omitted ); 992 F.3d 765. If the Framers and Ratifiers of the Bill of Rights had inte nded such a hierarchy, they would have worded the Second Amendment differently. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. A valid Title VII claim is established when the discrimination would not have occurred but for the worker's sex",
		"context": ". This Court's decision in Manhart sets forth that liability under Title VII attaches when \"the evidence shows 'treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different.'\" City of L.A. Dep't of Water & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 In determinin g whether discrimination would not have occurred but for the worker's sex, all other variables remain constant; the only variable that changes is the individual's sex. Specifically, when we \"evaluat[e] a comparator for a gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintif f\" to determine whether sex discrimination has occurred, \"we must hold every fact except the sex of the plaintiff constant —changing the sex of both the plaintiff and his or her partner would no longer be a 'but –for–the– 7 While but -for causation is not required , see, e.g., 135 S. Ct. 2028 , it is unquestionably sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. A valid Title VII claim is established when the discrimination would not have occurred but for the worker's sex",
		"context": "City of L.A. Dep't of Water & 435 U.S. 702. 7 In determinin g whether discrimination would not have occurred but for the worker's sex, all other variables remain constant; the only variable that changes is the individual's sex. Specifically, when we \"evaluat[e] a comparator for a gay, lesbian, or bisexual plaintif f\" to determine whether sex discrimination has occurred, \"we must hold every fact except the sex of the plaintiff constant —changing the sex of both the plaintiff and his or her partner would no longer be a 'but –for–the– 7 While but -for causation is not required , see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it is unquestionably sufficient to establish a violation of Title VII. 15 sex–of–the–plaintiff' test.\" Christia 852 F.3d 195 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2028",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. ARBITRATION PROVIDES BOTH PARTIES WITH A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEIR DAY IN COURT",
		"context": "Trial courts would then focus on the nature of the contract and credit the intent of the parties, as memorialized in the written agreement. It has long been the rule of this Court that \" in deciding whether the parties have agreed to submit a particular grievance to arbitration, a court is not to rule on the potential merits of the underlying claims. \" AT & T Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The reasoning behind this rule is to respect the agreement of the parties to have the arbitrator decide the ultimate issue. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 643",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. ARBITRATION PROVIDES BOTH PARTIES WITH A FAIR OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE THEIR DAY IN COURT",
		"context": "In re Swift Transportation Co. Inc. , 830 F.3d at 920 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). Additionally, many misclassification cases presen t factual scenarios \" where it is difficult to determine whether a party is an employee or an independent contractor. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This difficulty would inevitably lead to unpredictable and inconsistent out comes if courts are required to resolve the questions on limited evidence. Even cases involving the same contracts and similar facts could result in different outcomes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rule 32.1(g) requires a retroactivity analysis only if a claim is first determined to be based on a significant change in the law",
		"context": "See Shrum , 203 P.3d at 1180, ¶ 23 (relief sought in successive post -conviction relief proceeding \"precluded under Rule 32.2(a )\" where decision that was basis of claim was not a significant change in the law). Only if an Arizona court determines that a claim under Rule 32.1(g) is based on a significant change in the law does the court then go the next step—assessing whether a ne w decision that forms the basis for the claim is retroactively applicable. See Valencia, 386 P.3d at 394–96, ¶¶ 9 –15 (assessing whether the significant change in the law created by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , applied retroactively); Towery , 64 P.3d at 832–35, ¶¶ 10 –25 (assessing whether the significant change in the law created by Ring , 536 U.S. 584 , applied retroactively); Werderman , 350 P.3d at 847, ¶ 6 (no need to address retroactivity where claim failed because it was not based on significant change in law ); Poblete , 260 P.3d at 1105, ¶ 11 (addressing whether significant change in the law was retroactively applicable). 32 The threshold question below— whether Cruz's claim was based on a \"significant change in the law\"—is a matter of state procedural law gover ning whether Cruz's claim was reviewable in the first place. Because Cruz's claim failed that requirement , it was not reviewable in a successive collateral post - conviction proceeding as a matter of Arizona procedural law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rule 32.1(g) requires a retroactivity analysis only if a claim is first determined to be based on a significant change in the law",
		"context": "See Shrum , 203 P.3d at 1180, ¶ 23 (relief sought in successive post -conviction relief proceeding \"precluded under Rule 32.2(a )\" where decision that was basis of claim was not a significant change in the law). Only if an Arizona court determines that a claim under Rule 32.1(g) is based on a significant change in the law does the court then go the next step—assessing whether a ne w decision that forms the basis for the claim is retroactively applicable. See Valencia, 386 P.3d at 394–96, ¶¶ 9 –15 (assessing whether the significant change in the law created by 567 U.S. 460 , applied retroactively); Towery , 64 P.3d at 832–35, ¶¶ 10 –25 (assessing whether the significant change in the law created by Ring , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , applied retroactively); Werderman , 350 P.3d at 847, ¶ 6 (no need to address retroactivity where claim failed because it was not based on significant change in law ); Poblete , 260 P.3d at 1105, ¶ 11 (addressing whether significant change in the law was retroactively applicable). 32 The threshold question below— whether Cruz's claim was based on a \"significant change in the law\"—is a matter of state procedural law gover ning whether Cruz's claim was reviewable in the first place. Because Cruz's claim failed that requirement , it was not reviewable in a successive collateral post - conviction proceeding as a matter of Arizona procedural law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "15 USCIS acted \"in accordance with law \" in petitioners ' cases, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A), when it construed the term \"admitted\" in Section 1255 in accordance with the stat- utory definition. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that they must have been admitted to th e United States to be per- mitted to adjust to LPR status . Section 1254a(f )(4) pro- vides that, \"[d]uring a period in which an alien is granted [TPS ], for purposes of adjustment of sta- tus under section 1255 , the alien shall be consid- ered as being in, and maintain ing, lawful status as a nonimmigrant.\" 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "See 16 The Oxford English Dictionary 573 (defining \"status \" as \"[t]he legal standing or position of a person as determined by his membership of some class of per-sons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain limitations \"). Though not defined in the INA, the term naturally refers to \"permission to be present in the United States. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see In re23 I. & N. Dec. 458 (defining types of \"lawful immigration status \" for pur- poses of Section 1255(c)(2)). Because \"admission\" and \"lawful status\" refer to dis- tinct concepts, establishing one does not automatically 17 establish the other. A noncitizen can be admitted but not in lawful status —as with a nonimmigrant student who stay s more than 60 days after graduation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "See 16 The Oxford English Dictionary 573 (defining \"status \" as \"[t]he legal standing or position of a person as determined by his membership of some class of per-sons legally enjoying certain rights or subject to certain limitations \"). Though not defined in the INA, the term naturally refers to \"permission to be present in the United States. \" 831 F.3d 652; see In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (defining types of \"lawful immigration status \" for pur- poses of Section 1255(c)(2)). Because \"admission\" and \"lawful status\" refer to dis- tinct concepts, establishing one does not automatically 17 establish the other. A noncitizen can be admitted but not in lawful status —as with a nonimmigrant student who stay s more than 60 days after graduation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 I. & N. Dec. 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "The converse is also true: a person who en- tered unlawfully can acquire lawful status without being admitted . That happens whe n, for example , a person applies for and obtains asylum during removal proceed-ings following unlawful entry. See , e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A grant of TPS is similar, in th at respect, to a grant of asylum: a noncitizen need not have been admitted to the United States to receive TPS, see p. 5, supra, but neither does the grant of TPS require USCIS to treat the person as having been admitted. Unlike provisions that apply to other classes of noncitizens , the INA does not say that TPS recipients are \" admitted into the United States under section 1254a,\" similar to how Con- gress has specified that certain victims of severe human trafficking are \"admitted into the United States under [8 U.S.C.]",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 I. & N. Dec. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. USCIS's decision was consistent with the statutory text",
		"context": "Section 1254a(f )(4) con- fers a time -limited benefit —one that is available only \"[d]uring a period\" of TPS, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(f )—which suggests that it addresses Section 12 55's requirement to demonstrate l awful status on an ongoing basis, but does not necessarily \"eliminate [ ] the effects of any prior disqualifying acts\" such as entry without inspection, un- authorized employment , or a prior failure to maintain lawful status. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 561.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.3d 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CAT relief conveys unique rights and limitations",
		"context": "Recipients of CAT are ordered removed; indeed, a removal order is a condition precedent for obtaining CAT relief. 8 C.F.R . 208.16(f); 1208.16(f); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Having been ordered remove d, they are often subject to conditions when released from detention, 20 like placement on an \"Order of Supervision.\" 8 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 I. & N. Dec. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "This Court has often co nfronted a broad, content- neutral speech restriction coupled with a content-based exemption. Every time, it has done what the lower courts would not: strike down the challenged prohibition, not the speech-permitting exemption. Take Police Department of the City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 408 U.S. 104, deci ded the same day. Two municipalities banned picketing near schools, but exempted \"the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.\" Mosley , 408 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted); Grayned , 408 U.S. at 107.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 92",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "This Court has often co nfronted a broad, content- neutral speech restriction coupled with a content-based exemption. Every time, it has done what the lower courts would not: strike down the challenged prohibition, not the speech-permitting exemption. Take Police Department of the City of 408 U.S. 92, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], deci ded the same day. Two municipalities banned picketing near schools, but exempted \"the peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.\" Mosley , 408 U.S. at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted); Grayned , 408 U.S. at 107.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "Mosley , 408 U.S. at 94; see Grayned, 408 U.S. at 107. But rather than do what the Ninth Circuit did here, this Court then held that the content-neutral ordinances , not the content-based exemption, had to go. See Mosley , 408 U.S. at 102; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reversing Grayned's conviction because it came \"under [an] invalid ordinance\"). Indeed, in Grayned , the municipality had already \"delete[d] the labor picketing proviso\" by the time the case reached this Court. 408 U.S. at 107 n.2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g. , Ark. Writers' Project, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] These cases are not outliers or relics. Rather, the Court recently deployed precisely the same approach in its seminal decision in Reed , 135 S. Ct. 2218. There, the Town of Gilbert's Land Development Code \"prohibit[ed] the display of outdoor signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but … exempt[ed] 23 categories of signs from that requirement,\" subjecting those signs to varying requirements depending on the sign in question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": ", Ark. Writers' Project, 481 U.S. 221 These cases are not outliers or relics. Rather, the Court recently deployed precisely the same approach in its seminal decision in Reed , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Town of Gilbert's Land Development Code \"prohibit[ed] the display of outdoor signs anywhere within the Town without a permit, but … exempt[ed] 23 categories of signs from that requirement,\" subjecting those signs to varying requirements depending on the sign in question. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "at 2227, 2231. It then held that the Sign Code's \"content-based restrictions \" had to go, id. at 2231 (emphasis added); it did not even consider the possibility of invalidating the Sign Code's exemptions, even though the ordinance had a capacious severability clause, see Joint App'x in 2014 WL 4631244[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]460 U.S. 575. 2. Striking the prohibition rather than severing the exemption also makes sense as a practical matter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "at 2227, 2231. It then held that the Sign Code's \"content-based restrictions \" had to go, id. at 2231 (emphasis added); it did not even consider the possibility of invalidating the Sign Code's exemptions, even though the ordinance had a capacious severability clause, see Joint App'x in 2014 WL 4631244507 U.S. 410[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Striking the prohibition rather than severing the exemption also makes sense as a practical matter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "Striking the prohibition rather than severing the exemption also makes sense as a practical matter. To begin, courts generally deploy remedies that \"create incentives to raise [constitutional] challenges.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Government's approach, the prize for successfully challenging an unjustified content-based scheme is, well, nothing. In fact, it's worse than that.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Precedent and Policy Require Striking the Ban, Not Severing the Exemption",
		"context": "Given speech's special place in our constitutional regime, legislatures themselves should impose any speech restrictions that may be warranted. At the least, courts should demand \"quite specific evidence of a legislative preference for elimination of the exception\" before taking that route. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 22 Once courts get into the business of blue-penciling speech codes, it will be difficult to divine any principled place to stop. The ATDS provision offers a great example. In addition to adding a content-based exemption directly into the statute, Congress empowered the FCC to exempt speech it preferred.",
		"citation_value_orig": "18 F.3d 1043",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. HARDISON'S UNDUE HARDSHIP STANDARD SHOULD BE DISAPPROVED",
		"context": "While Hardison's holding is entitled to stare decisis effect, its construction of \"undue hardship\" is not a hold- ing with regard to the meaning of § 2000e(j). United Gas Improvement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is because Hardison construed a defunct EEOC guide- line, not Title VII as amende d, when it equated undue hardship with \"more than a de minimis cost.\" There is thus no need for this Court to evaluate the various \"fac- tors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision\" and no decision has to be overruled for this Court to endorse a more protec- tive reading of \"undue hardship\" under Title VII as amended.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. HARDISON'S UNDUE HARDSHIP STANDARD SHOULD BE DISAPPROVED",
		"context": "That is because Hardison construed a defunct EEOC guide- line, not Title VII as amende d, when it equated undue hardship with \"more than a de minimis cost.\" There is thus no need for this Court to evaluate the various \"fac- tors that should be taken into account in deciding whether to overrule a past decision\" and no decision has to be overruled for this Court to endorse a more protec- tive reading of \"undue hardship\" under Title VII as amended. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exacting review advances the First Amendment's purposes",
		"context": "The basic purposes of the First Amendment rein- force all of these points. First , the First Amendment is \"premised on mis- trust of governmental power.\" Cit izens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It denies government power to regulate speech, because governments (and allied interest groups) tend to abuse that power to \"coerce uniformity of sentiment\" in society. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Exacting review advances the First Amendment's purposes",
		"context": "16 The school cases illustrate this principle. On the one hand, public schools have broad power to prohibit the utterance of a disruptive message, say by disci- plining a student for unfurling a banner urging drug use. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (200 7). On the other hand, public schools lack similar power to compel the support of a favored message, say by disci- plining a student for failing to salute the flag. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is a 2-1 circuit split over who qualifies as an exempt \"transportation worker\" under Section 1 of the FAA.",
		"context": "Opp. 20. After this Court's decision in New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], she says, surely the Fifth Circuit will get the message. Opp. 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is a 2-1 circuit split over who qualifies as an exempt \"transportation worker\" under Section 1 of the FAA.",
		"context": "But the Fifth Circuit decided Eastus more than a year after New Prime . And it relied on this Court's decision in Circuit City and this Court's precedent establishing that \"seamen do not include land-based workers.\" Eastus , 960 F.3d at 212 (quoting McDermott Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 7 Then there's the Eleventh Circuit's inconvenient decision in Hamrick , decided more than two years after New Prime . In Hamrick , the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Section 1 exemption as applying only to classes of workers that actually \"move goods in interstate commerce\" by physically \"transport[ing] [them] across state lines.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "14-15, 17-18. As other courts have acknowledged, that amounts to a clear \"circuit conflict\" on the question presented. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]982 F.3d 648; see also Pet. 20. The government's sole basis for distinguishing the Fifth Circuit's decision in 3 F.3d 379, is that it applied a \"rehearing standard.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "920 F.3d 1231",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "A published opinion resolving a rehearing petition is no less precedential than any other published opinion. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Strain , the Fifth Circuit held that when the government fails to prove venue at trial, it is \"not entitle[d] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "960 F.2d 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "15a. The government also suggests (at 21-22) the Fifth Circuit retreated from Strain in United States v. Niamatali , which \"decline[d] to decide whether a judgment of acquittal is the only proper remedy\" for improper venue because the defendant conceded that vacatur and retrial were permissible. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That unpublished decision, premised on a concessi on, does not undercut Strain . 5 F.4th 615.",
		"citation_value_orig": "712 F. App'x 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "15a (emphasis added). Either way, this Court's review is needed. 1 The government's attempt to downplay [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], similarly fails. The governme nt suggests (at 22) it is \"unclear\" whether a future panel would \"consider itself bound\" by Greene, but it points to nothing suggesting the Eighth Circuit has abandoned Greene . An opinion does not need to have extensive reasoning to be binding, and the result in Greene is flatly incompatible with the Eleventh Circuit's rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "995 F.2d 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "An opinion does not need to have extensive reasoning to be binding, and the result in Greene is flatly incompatible with the Eleventh Circuit's rule. A district court in the Eighth Circuit would certainly not be free to permit a re-trial, in light of Greene . And the result is that a constitu tional right of first-order 1 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; contra BIO 21. The Fifth Circuit's decision in Strain clearly supersedes Davis. The Strain panel was well aware of Davis when it observed that the Fifth Circuit \"ha[d] never squarely addressed\" the \"appropriate remedy for failure to prove venue.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "666 F.2d 195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Question Presented Has Divided The Courts of Appeals",
		"context": "BIO 23 n.6 (c itation omitted). That perfunctory response displays no solicitude for defendants' constitutional rights and asks this Court to abdicate its role in ensuring consistent application of the law in the lower courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's guidance is needed to resolve the circuit conflict and dispel the significant confusion surrounding the consequences of the government's failure to prove venue. 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "The utter confusion illustrated above demonstrates the urgency of adopting an objective test that better fits the Founders' intentions for the Establishment Clause. An 36 objective test would properly differentiate between permissible public acknowledgment and impermissible public endorsement of religion, which would comport with this Court's concern that the country continues to honor \"the religious history that gave birth to our founding principles of liberty.\" Elk Grove Unified School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Scalia said, \"I would prefer to reach the same result by adopting an Establishment Clause jurisprudence that is in accord with our Nation's past and present practices, and that can be consistently applied−the central relevant feature of which is that there is nothing unconstitutional in a State's favoring religion generally, honoring God through public prayer and acknowledgment, or, in a nonproselytizing manner, venerating the Ten Commandments.\" Van Orden 545 U.S. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause. There is, after all, only one Establis hment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause. There is, after all, only one Establis hment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]97 S.Ct. 45150 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976 ) (Stevens, J., concurring). But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause. There is, after all, only one Establis hment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause. See 429 U.S. 190[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976 ) (Stevens, J., concurring). But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "97 S.Ct. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular Clause. There is, after all, only one Establis hment Clause, one Free Speech Clause, one Fourth Amendment, one Equal Protection Clause. See 429 U.S. 19097 S.Ct. 451[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1976 ) (Stevens, J., concurring). But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in different contexts. We have, for instance, no one Free Speech Clause test.",
		"citation_value_orig": "50 L.Ed.2d 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY ABANDON THE UNWORKABLE LEMON TEST IN FAVOR OF AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD",
		"context": "This case is the latest example of the truth of Justice O'Connor's conclusion. The various patches applied to Lemon, including the \"endorsement\" test, have only added to the confusion that has left this Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence \"in hopeless disarray.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not objectively coerce participation in a 40 religious exercise or activity, then it is a permissible acknowledgment of religion, not a violation of the Establishment Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
		"context": ". would constitute cause under this standard.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] proceedings, the factual basis for his claim that Barney Gattie's death - 13 penalty vote was tainted by racial bias could not have been known at the time of trial and direct appeal and, accordingly, it was properly raised in state habeas procee dings. See Dkt. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
		"context": "See BIO at 8, 36 -38. But there is no exhaustion requirement for a non -constitutional, record -based ground for finding cause. Although this Court has held that a habeas petitioner must exhaust a claim that counsel's ine ffective representation constituted cause for failing to raise a defaulted claim, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the rationale supporting that holding is that \"effective assistance adequate to establish cause of the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim\" and, as such, \" that constitutional claim, like others, [must] first be raised in state court.\" Id. at 451 -42 (citing 477 U.S. 478 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
		"context": "Although this Court has held that a habeas petitioner must exhaust a claim that counsel's ine ffective representation constituted cause for failing to raise a defaulted claim, see 529 U.S. 446 , the rationale supporting that holding is that \"effective assistance adequate to establish cause of the procedural default of some other constitutional claim is itself an independent constitutional claim\" and, as such, \" that constitutional claim, like others, [must] first be raised in state court.\" Id. at 451 -42 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). That non -constitutional grounds for showing cause to excuse a procedural default do not have to be exhausted is demonstrated by the fact that the Court, in Carpenter , invited the lower court to explore other grounds to excuse the default upon remand. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
		"context": "at 453. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (emphasis added). Because Mr. Tharpe had no basis to suspect that Juror Gattie held racially biased views, trial and appellate counsel had no reason to investigate whether he did. See 268 Ga. 820.",
		"citation_value_orig": "592 F.3d 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Mr. Tharpe's Racist-Juror Claim Is Not Procedurally Defaulted.",
		"context": ", 592 F.3d 1144 (emphasis added). Because Mr. Tharpe had no basis to suspect that Juror Gattie held racially biased views, trial and appellate counsel had no reason to investigate whether he did. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 individual voir dire, Mr. Gattie advised that he had read about the case in the paper and heard people talk about it, but knew nothing about it ; he said he could set aside what he had heard and it would not influence him. Dkt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 Ga. 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "Whether the patent's \"concise\" disclo- sure is sufficiently \"full, clear, and exact\" to ena- ble a skilled artisan to make and use the claimed in- vention will of course vary with the level of ordinary skill in the art, the art itself, and the types of tests and experimentation that such artisans routinely perform. Thus, during the nineteenth century—including before Congress adopted the Patent Act of 1870, and well before the 1952 Act—this Court required patent- ees to describe their inventions in a manner that ena- bled \"skilled\" artisans to make and use them, while ac- knowledging that the statute required courts to assess the extent to which the artisan needed to conduct \"ex- periments of his own\" to \"compound and use\" the in- vention. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see126 U.S. 1; 56 U.S. 62. As 12 the Court put it in Mowry v. Whitney , \"[a]ddressed as it is to those skilled in the art, [the specification] may leave something to their skill in applying the inven- tion\"—\"to the judgment of the operator.\" 81 U.S. 620.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "Whether the patent's \"concise\" disclo- sure is sufficiently \"full, clear, and exact\" to ena- ble a skilled artisan to make and use the claimed in- vention will of course vary with the level of ordinary skill in the art, the art itself, and the types of tests and experimentation that such artisans routinely perform. Thus, during the nineteenth century—including before Congress adopted the Patent Act of 1870, and well before the 1952 Act—this Court required patent- ees to describe their inventions in a manner that ena- bled \"skilled\" artisans to make and use them, while ac- knowledging that the statute required courts to assess the extent to which the artisan needed to conduct \"ex- periments of his own\" to \"compound and use\" the in- vention. 46 U.S. 1; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 56 U.S. 62. As 12 the Court put it in Mowry v. Whitney , \"[a]ddressed as it is to those skilled in the art, [the specification] may leave something to their skill in applying the inven- tion\"—\"to the judgment of the operator.\" 81 U.S. 620.",
		"citation_value_orig": "126 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "Whether the patent's \"concise\" disclo- sure is sufficiently \"full, clear, and exact\" to ena- ble a skilled artisan to make and use the claimed in- vention will of course vary with the level of ordinary skill in the art, the art itself, and the types of tests and experimentation that such artisans routinely perform. Thus, during the nineteenth century—including before Congress adopted the Patent Act of 1870, and well before the 1952 Act—this Court required patent- ees to describe their inventions in a manner that ena- bled \"skilled\" artisans to make and use them, while ac- knowledging that the statute required courts to assess the extent to which the artisan needed to conduct \"ex- periments of his own\" to \"compound and use\" the in- vention. 46 U.S. 1; see126 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As 12 the Court put it in Mowry v. Whitney , \"[a]ddressed as it is to those skilled in the art, [the specification] may leave something to their skill in applying the inven- tion\"—\"to the judgment of the operator.\" 81 U.S. 620.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "46 U.S. 1; see126 U.S. 1; 56 U.S. 62. As 12 the Court put it in Mowry v. Whitney , \"[a]ddressed as it is to those skilled in the art, [the specification] may leave something to their skill in applying the inven- tion\"—\"to the judgment of the operator.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the same time, other nineteenth century and early twentieth century decisions of this Court invali- dated patents on the ground that they required the skilled artisan to conduct excessive experiments to make and use the claimed invention. In Consolidated Electric Light 159 U.S. 465, for example, the Court struck down a pa- tent that claimed filaments composed of any \"carbon- ized fibrous or textile material.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "81 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "81 U.S. 620. At the same time, other nineteenth century and early twentieth century decisions of this Court invali- dated patents on the ground that they required the skilled artisan to conduct excessive experiments to make and use the claimed invention. In Consolidated Electric Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court struck down a pa- tent that claimed filaments composed of any \"carbon- ized fibrous or textile material.\" Id. at 468, 472-473.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "Id. at 475. Likewise, the Court in Holland Furniture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], invalidated a pa- tent that recited \"a particular starch glue\" that served a specific function, explaining that \"[o]ne attempting to use or avoid the use of [the] discovery as so claimed and described functionally could do so only after elab- orate experimentation.\" Id. at 256, 257.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "Repli- cating an invention necessarily requires some sort of testing or experimentation known in the prior art. It 13 logically follows that courts should ask whether an or- dinarily skilled artisan can replicate the invention us- ing such testing, together with the scientific advance disclosed by the patent, or whether, instead, making and using the invention requires something more—in- ventive activity or \"undue\" experimentation. See also, e.g., Halliburton , 329 U.S. at 12; Minerals Separation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. 78 U.S. 516. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "It 13 logically follows that courts should ask whether an or- dinarily skilled artisan can replicate the invention us- ing such testing, together with the scientific advance disclosed by the patent, or whether, instead, making and using the invention requires something more—in- ventive activity or \"undue\" experimentation. See also, e.g., Halliburton , 329 U.S. at 12; Minerals Separation, 242 U.S. 261; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. If any doubt remained, it would be dispelled by Congress's own actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "78 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"undue experimentation\" element of enablement law is likewise grounded in the Patent Act's text, this Court's precedents, and Congress's actions.",
		"context": "E.g., Mowry , 81 U.S. at 644-645; Con- sol. Elec. , 159 U.S. at 472-475; Holland Furniture , 277 U.S. at 256-257; Wands , 858 F.2d at 737; see also Mi- crosoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].4 In sum, although \"[t]he term 'undue experimenta- tion' does not appear in the statute,\" it is for good rea- son \"well established that enablement requires that the specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation.\" Wands , 858 F.2d at 737.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": ". Revocation-on-divorce statutes are constitutional under the standard of Home Building & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and its progeny. The Court should decline Respondent's invitation to overrule those cases. Blaisdell was correctly decided.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "Even if Blaisdell was wrongly decided, it should not be overruled. Respondent proposes overruling not only Blaisdell , but this Court's entire body of Contracts Clause jurisprudence for the past 84 years. Respondent would overrule the New Deal-era cases that relied on Blaisdell ; 5 City of El [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which reaffirmed Blaisdell ; and at least three Contracts Clause cases from the 1980s. Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "Br. 27-31. \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 5 See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; East N.Y. Sav. 326 U.S. 230. 23 Rarely has the Court overruled so many cases, dating back so long, in one fell swoop.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "27-31. \u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003\u0003 5 See,310 U.S. 32; East N.Y. Sav. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 Rarely has the Court overruled so many cases, dating back so long, in one fell swoop. Respondent identifies no pressing need for this extraordinary step.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 230",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "23 Rarely has the Court overruled so many cases, dating back so long, in one fell swoop. Respondent identifies no pressing need for this extraordinary step. Respondent's assertion that Blaisdell has yielded oppressive results is belied by the fact that this Court has not heard a Contracts Clause case since General Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Blaisdell 's deferential standard may have deterred some litigation, but Americans are not shy about litigating under deferential standards of review. More realistically, the dearth of Contracts Clause cases shows that statutes that could even arguably implicate the Clause are rare.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "Even before Blaisdell , this Court held that not \"every statute which affects the value of a contract impair its obligation. It is one of the contingencies to which parties look now in making a large class of contracts, that they may be affected in many ways by State and National legislation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And this Court routinely inspected the policy justifications for statutes in Contracts Clause cases. It did so, for instance, in all of the nineteenth-century cases rejecting Contracts Clause challenges to paperwork burdens.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Blaisdell Should Not Be Overruled",
		"context": "It did so, for instance, in all of the nineteenth-century cases rejecting Contracts Clause challenges to paperwork burdens. To the extent Respondent advocates a standard in which any statute retroactively affecting contracts is unconstitutional, she advocates a standard this Court has never applied. Indeed, the Court 24 rejected this standard as far back as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which upheld a statute freeing an imprisoned debtor against a Contracts Clause challenge. This would be a particularly inappropriate vehicle to overrule Blaisdell . As Petitioners explained, this case implicates none of the political-process concerns underlying the Contracts Clause: State legislatures were clearly not bowing to lobbying efforts of insurers (who are indifferent) or disfavoring policyholders (who retain the option to change their beneficiary).",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The statute's history unambiguously demonstrates that section 1229(a) requires a specific notice document.",
		"context": "b. Interpreting \"a 'notice to ap pear'\" as a collec- tion of i nformation would also nullify Congress's de- cision to make time -and-place information a re- quired, not optional, part o f the \"notice to appear. \" Under the government's inter preta tion, that amendment did not actually change the govern- ment 's notice requireme nts at all . That flies in the face of the presumption that Congress 's amendments have \"real a nd substantial effec t.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The government recognized as much in Pereira. In discussing the statute 's history, the gov ernment did not dispute that IIRIRA \"abandoned the previous flexibil ity of allowing the gover nment to use multi ple notices to co nvey all the required information .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In presiding over proceedings of the Commission, an ALJ serves a role comparable to that of a trial judge",
		"context": "Congress thus made clear the importance of hearing examiners by classifying them, along with the agency heads them- selves, as the only individuals authorized to hold such hearings under the APA . Congress also took steps to preserve the independ- ence of the new hearing examiners, in response to the criticism that hearing examiners had previously been \"mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient to the agency heads in making their proposed f indings of fact and recommendations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Sec- tion 7(b) of the APA, Congress adopted the recommen-dation of the Attorney General's task force, which had advocated \"fully empower[ing]\" h earing examiners \"by statute to preside at hearings, issue subpoenas, admin-ister oaths, rule upon motions, carry out other duties incident to the proper conduct of hearings, and make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and orders for the disposition of m atters coming before them.\" Attorney General's Report 50; see APA § 7, 60 S tat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In presiding over proceedings of the Commission, an ALJ serves a role comparable to that of a trial judge",
		"context": "b. This Court has recognized, in two related con- texts, the similarity of the role played by ALJs in pre- siding over administrative hearings to the role per- formed by district judges in judicial pr oceedings. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that ALJs are entitled to absolute immunity from dam- ages actions, rather than the qualified immunity nor- mally available to Executive Branch officials. The Court reached that conclusion b ased on its view \"that adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares characteristics of the judicial process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. In presiding over proceedings of the Commission, an ALJ serves a role comparable to that of a trial judge",
		"context": "at 514 (\"When conducting a hearing a hearing exami ner is not responsible to, or subject to the super- vision or direction of, employees or agents engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecution func- tions for the agency . \"). This Court also relied upon the parallel between agency adjudications a nd court proceedings in Federal Maritime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in holding that a State could assert sovereign immunity in a proceeding of the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), just as it could in a judici al proceeding. In so ruling, the Court found \"the similarities between FMC proceedings and civil lit-igation [to be] overwhelming,\" explaining that \"the role of the ALJ, the impartial officer designated to hear a case, is similar to that of an Article III judge.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "The decision below identifies no act of Congress that clearly and expressly abrogates the Tribe's off- reservation treaty hunting right, because there is no such act of Congress. \"A treaty, including one between the United States and an Indian tribe, is essentially a contract between two sovereign nations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And once an Indian tribe reserves by treaty a right for itself, only Congress may abrogate that right, and Congress must clearly express its intent to do so. Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202; see also 476 U.S. 734; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "443 U.S. 658. And once an Indian tribe reserves by treaty a right for itself, only Congress may abrogate that right, and Congress must clearly express its intent to do so. Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Me- nominee Tribe of 391 U.S. 404. 9 Moreover, \"[t]here must be 'clear evidence that Con-gress actually considered the conflict between its in- tended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abro-gating the treaty.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 734",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "And once an Indian tribe reserves by treaty a right for itself, only Congress may abrogate that right, and Congress must clearly express its intent to do so. Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202; see also 476 U.S. 734; cf. Me- nominee Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Moreover, \"[t]here must be 'clear evidence that Con-gress actually considered the conflict between its in- tended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abro-gating the treaty.' \" Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202-03 (quoting Dion , 476 U.S. at 740).",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "9 Moreover, \"[t]here must be 'clear evidence that Con-gress actually considered the conflict between its in- tended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abro-gating the treaty.' \" Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202-03 (quoting Dion , 476 U.S. at 740). 10 9 Although each of the precedin g cases concerned tribal hunt- ing and fishing rights, this Court has applied this \"clear intent\" standard to any number of contexts, including reservation dimin-ishment, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and tribal sovereign immunity, 134 S. Ct. 2024. 10 The cases cited are consistent with current international legal standards on indigenous peoples' rights, including treaty rights. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1072",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "9 Moreover, \"[t]here must be 'clear evidence that Con-gress actually considered the conflict between its in- tended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abro-gating the treaty.' \" Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 202-03 (quoting Dion , 476 U.S. at 740). 10 9 Although each of the precedin g cases concerned tribal hunt- ing and fishing rights, this Court has applied this \"clear intent\" standard to any number of contexts, including reservation dimin-ishment, 136 S. Ct. 1072; and tribal sovereign immunity, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 The cases cited are consistent with current international legal standards on indigenous peoples' rights, including treaty rights. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "App. B 22 (quoting Repsis , 73 F.3d at 992). Repsis , in turn, identified no provision of the act admitting Wyoming in which Congress \"clearly expressed its intent\" to ab- rogate the Tribe's off-reservation hunting right, but in-stead relied only upon th is Court's decision in Race Horse , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that the eq ual footing doctrine cre- ated an \"irreconcilable\" conflict between the Tribe's off-reservation hunting right and the \"power of a State to control and regulate the taking of game.\" Repsis , 73 F.3d at 990 (quoting Race Horse , 163 U.S. at 507, 514). In Mille Lacs , this court expressly repudiated that as- pect of Race Horse (and, necessarily, of Repsis ): But Race Horse rested on a false premise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Not Abrogated the Tribe's Off-Reservation Hunting Right",
		"context": "See U.S. Dep't of State, Announcement of United States Support for the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Jan. 12, 2011), https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/srgia/ 154553.htm. 23 treaty rights can coexist with state manage- ment of natural resources. Mille Lacs , 526 U.S. at 204 (internal citations omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "978 P.2d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit failed to conduct the sort of \"careful examination\" required to establish that judicial review is precluded under section 701(a)(2)",
		"context": "failed to engage in the type of \"careful examination\" of the language of 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) and overall structure of the ESA required by Overton Park and its progeny. To support its determination that judicial review was preclud ed, the panel erroneously relied on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bear Valley Mutual Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as well as the opinions of several district courts. See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.3d 977",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit failed to conduct the sort of \"careful examination\" required to establish that judicial review is precluded under section 701(a)(2)",
		"context": "to determine whether the agency exceeded its statutory powers.' \" Bear Valley Mut. Wa- ter Co. , 790 F.3d at 989 (quoting Heckler , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (ellipses in the original). This turns Heckler on its head. Consideration of the facts of a case and the lan- guage and structure of laws is necessary to create con- text for a court's analyses and decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit failed to conduct the sort of \"careful examination\" required to establish that judicial review is precluded under section 701(a)(2)",
		"context": "See Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of the Bay [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff 'g No. C 11- 4118 (stating that any consideration of the dual objec- tives identified in Bennett was simply \"foreclosed\" by the Ninth Circuit's earlier decision in Bear Valley Mut. Water Co. ); Aina Nui 52 F. Supp. 3d 11102006 WL 3190518.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.3d 1027",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
		"context": "Thus, whether that canon should be retained is a question of sufficient practical importance to warrant granting certiorari. Lower courts routinely invoke the narrow- construction canon in decisions ordering disclosure of documents, including in cases involving documents related to law enforcement and national security. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]852 F.3d 541756 F.3d 100543 F.3d 59, provides an illustrative example of the canon's practical impact. In that case, the requestor sought disclosure of photographs depicting treatment of detainees by United States soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "880 F.3d 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
		"context": "Thus, whether that canon should be retained is a question of sufficient practical importance to warrant granting certiorari. Lower courts routinely invoke the narrow- construction canon in decisions ordering disclosure of documents, including in cases involving documents related to law enforcement and national security. See, e.g., 880 F.3d 473[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]756 F.3d 100543 F.3d 59, provides an illustrative example of the canon's practical impact. In that case, the requestor sought disclosure of photographs depicting treatment of detainees by United States soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
		"context": "Thus, whether that canon should be retained is a question of sufficient practical importance to warrant granting certiorari. Lower courts routinely invoke the narrow- construction canon in decisions ordering disclosure of documents, including in cases involving documents related to law enforcement and national security. See, e.g., 880 F.3d 473852 F.3d 541[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]543 F.3d 59, provides an illustrative example of the canon's practical impact. In that case, the requestor sought disclosure of photographs depicting treatment of detainees by United States soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "756 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because The Narrow-Construction Canon Has A Significant Impact In Lower Courts",
		"context": "Thus, whether that canon should be retained is a question of sufficient practical importance to warrant granting certiorari. Lower courts routinely invoke the narrow- construction canon in decisions ordering disclosure of documents, including in cases involving documents related to law enforcement and national security. See, e.g., 880 F.3d 473852 F.3d 541756 F.3d 100[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], provides an illustrative example of the canon's practical impact. In that case, the requestor sought disclosure of photographs depicting treatment of detainees by United States soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 F.3d 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Ninth Circuit Correctly Concluded that Equitable Tolling Is Warranted Here",
		"context": "Br. 38- 39), the Ninth Circuit correctly applied the equitable-tolling factors. Nutraceutical misplaces reliance onMenominee Indian Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which found that equitable tollingwas unwarranted \"where the [Menominee Tribe] hadmistakenly relied on a district court's order in anothercase.\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. On-Premises/Off-Premises Distinctions Are The Most Effective And Workable Content-Neutral Means Of Regulating Signs",
		"context": "But this regulatory scheme backfired as billboard companies began to size their signs just under the regulations' size limits, causing Chicago to be cluttered with digital billboards smaller than 100 square feet.10 Chicago's experience demonstrates that jurisdictions across the country have chosen to rely on the traditional on-premises/off- premises distinctions – as opposed to other content- neutral means – for sound, practical reasons. This Court should defer to the City of Austin's policy choice to rely on those workable distinctions – distinctions that the U.S. Congress, the States, and numerous municipalities across the United States have favored in their sound legislative judgments over the years. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/ scott-waguespack-unregulated-led-billboards-stalled-ordinance/ Content?oid=10853242; Paul Merrion, Digital ad signs a turnoff for City Hall , Crain's Chi. Bus. (July 23, 2013).",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 146",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arguments Advanced Against the Decision Below Fail to Address the Products Liability Issue Before This Court",
		"context": "40 -41. See also ATRA Br. 7 18 (\"Respondents and the Third Circuit justify their theory based on foreseeability,\" but \"foreseeability, like light, travels indefinitely in a v acuum,\" quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It is clear from the Third Circuit's holding , quoted above, that the court carefully limited its duty to warn of foreseeable harm to the narrow cir- cumstance where asbestos is so integral to the oper- ation of defendant's machine as to be a component part. Nevertheless, Petitioners insist that on a ship, \"most things are connected to other things\" so that affirming \"would risk imposing liability on everyone who made or sold a product incorporat ed into a ship's (or a building's, or a car's) asbestos -containing systems.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "48 Cal. 3d 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Arguments Advanced Against the Decision Below Fail to Address the Products Liability Issue Before This Court",
		"context": "It comes with ill grace that Petitioners seek to shift attention in this way to the Navy's responsibil- ity for the deaths of its sailors who ultimately per- ished not in wartime, but due to their service time on toxic ships. The government is itself immune from suit with respect to any negligence on its part. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is an immunity that is overdue to be cast aside. See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Association for Justice in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 571 U.S. 1095498 U.S. 1067.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Contraceptive and abortion mandates.",
		"context": "See 573 U.S. 682 . This requirement created a grave and immediate conflict of conscience for religious people and institutions who believe that human life begins at conception. See Little Sisters of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2020 ). But it also was perceived to help President Obama politically. When then -Vice President Biden \"objected\" to this religious burden on \"Catholic hospitals and other institutions,\" \"[s]ome of Obama's political advisers concluded that Biden's political rada r was out of date .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Contraceptive and abortion mandates.",
		"context": "at 75:1 -5, 19 -23. Indeed, that same year, California began to apply its abortion mandate to all managed health care plans in the state, ending its longstanding practice of exempting group 6 Jo Becker, The Other Power in the West Wing , N.Y. Times , Sept. 1, 2012 , https ://perma.cc/6RND -NTC3 . 7 See Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, HHS Case Database, https:/ /www.becketlaw.org/research -central/hhs -info- central/hhs -case-database/ (listing cases); Hobby Lobby , 573 U.S. 682; Little Sisters of the Poor , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Judge Kleinfeld observed, even in the most recent cases nearly a decade after the dispute arose, \"[n]o woman sued for an injunction\" and \"no affidavits have been submitted from any women establishing any question in this case about whether they will be deprived of reproductive services or harmed in any wa y by the modification of the regulation.\" 941 F.3d 410.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Contraceptive and abortion mandates.",
		"context": "Surely the federal government has many ways to distribute contraceptives to American women without dragooning the Little Sisters of the Poor or other religious nonprofi ts. Cf. Zubik , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And surely state governments have many ways to ensure access to abortion without involving churches. But the shadow of Roe and Casey prompted these governments to deny exemptions to religious groups, or to eliminate religiou s exemptions that had existed for decades.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Affirmance Would Have Far-Reaching Consequences",
		"context": "But as several st ate supreme courts have concluded, treaty language like \"open and unclaimed lands\" is essentially synonymous with \"unoccupied lands,\" in part because that is what those treaties' negotiators intended. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]262 F. Supp. 871. Affirmance would thus adversely affect tribes across the American West. Against all of this, Wyoming concedes that even if the Court reverses, it will retain authority to enforce its game laws under the well-established \"conservation necessity\" standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "978 P.2d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Affirmance Would Have Far-Reaching Consequences",
		"context": "But as several st ate supreme courts have concluded, treaty language like \"open and unclaimed lands\" is essentially synonymous with \"unoccupied lands,\" in part because that is what those treaties' negotiators intended. See, e.g. , 978 P.2d 1070[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Affirmance would thus adversely affect tribes across the American West. Against all of this, Wyoming concedes that even if the Court reverses, it will retain authority to enforce its game laws under the well-established \"conservation necessity\" standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 F. Supp. 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Reed's accrual rule promotes due process purposes and values.",
		"context": "Thus , a due process violation \"is not complete when the deprivation occurs\" but when the state \"fails to provide due process.\" Id. at 126; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That's because due 31 process \"prote ct[s] persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.\" Carey , 435 U.S. at 259.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Reed's accrual rule promotes due process purposes and values.",
		"context": "Carey , 435 U.S. at 259. In the criminal context, due process promotes ad- judicative accuracy to guard against the \"dire\" \"consequences of an erroneous determination.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Due process require s the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the accused or undermining witness credibility. 577 U.S. 385.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Reed's accrual rule promotes due process purposes and values.",
		"context": "577 U.S. 385. And, of course , it requires pro of of each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Those fundamental constitutional purposes and values confirm that due process claim s like Reed's must accrue at the end of state -court litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. Reed's accrual rule promotes due process purposes and values.",
		"context": "That's all the more true because a state court of last resort could reverse the trial court or, at the very least, provide the missing justification. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 Second , a later accrual d ate advance s adjudicative accuracy by promoting DNA testing . As this Court has explained , DNA testing offer s an \"unparalleled abil- ity\" to identify wrongful convictions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 S.W.3d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT HAS THE LEGITIMATE POWER TO GRANT CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT",
		"context": "4 Since the Constitution only grants \"appellate\" jurisdiction, and not \"original\" jurisdiction, the Court is wholly without power to act as the district court or to grant certiorari in a case in the district court and not in a court of appeals.4 When the Court grants certiorari before judgment, the Court is essentially acting as the court of appeals, though its decision cannot in any real sense be appealed. The Court's rule on certiorari before judgment provides in full (including the citation at the end) as follows: A petition for a writ of certiorari to review a case pending in a United States court of appeals, before judgment is entered in that court, will be granted only upon a showing that the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify deviation from normal appellate practice and to 4 This Court has said it has \"supervisory authority\" over all federal courts. ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) But the Court appears to limit that power to enacting rules of procedure and evidence pursuant to Acts of Congress. ( Id.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially",
		"context": "But the sign code does not provide for either possibility . Whether with regard t o the speech respondent has displayed or the speech it intends to display, therefore, petitioner's sign code \"applies without distinction to signs bearing com- mercial and noncommercial messages.\" Solantic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, \"the Central Hudson test [for commercial speech] has no application here,\" ibid., and petitioner cannot avail itself of that test in connection with respondent's as -applied challenge. Petitioner's reliance on City of 507 U.S. 410, is misplaced .",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 F.3d 1250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially",
		"context": "Solantic 410 F.3d 1250. For that reason, \"the Central Hudson test [for commercial speech] has no application here,\" ibid., and petitioner cannot avail itself of that test in connection with respondent's as -applied challenge. Petitioner's reliance on City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is misplaced . See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially",
		"context": "In every case, a billboard operator with a sign deemed to be \"off - premises\" cannot digitize its sign , without regard to whether the operator has dis played or intends to display commercial or noncommercial speech . This Court recog- nizes that when commercial and noncommercial speech are \"inextricably intertwined,\" it is \"artificial and imprac- tical\" to \"parcel out the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same logic applies when a regula- tion's application to commercial and noncommercial speech cannot be disaggregated. Because that is the case here, the digitization ban cannot operate constitutionally and is invalid both as applied and facially.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Petitioner's ban on digitizing off-premises signs is unconstitutional as applied and facially",
		"context": "See pp. 42 -45, supra . Applying the digitization ban to commercial speech would thus not con- stitute a circumsta nce \"under which the Act would be valid,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and would not provide a basis for rejecting respondent's facial challenge. 3. The court of appeals remanded to the district court for further proceedings on the r emedy , which have been stayed pending this Court's disposition of the case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "6. The anti-discrimination rights that plaintiffs claim under section 1152(a)(1)(A) do not redress plaintiffs' injuries",
		"context": "This fatal 11 flaw in a court 's authority to redress plaintiffs ' injury is perhaps a merits issue, see Section II.A.3 , infra , but it is equally fatal as a merits issue. When standing and the merits \"intertwine, \" federal courts must resolve the jurisdictional and merits issues together. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Only A Public Official Or Person Authorized To Exercise Governmental Authority Can Take \"Official Action\" Under section 1346",
		"context": "§ 201(a)(1) (empha- sis added). Accordingly, this Court has held that § 201 applies to anyone \"with official federal responsibili- ties\" for the federal government. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The defendants in Dixson —private individuals who were formally desig- nated as the City of Peoria 's subgrantee to administer federal funds—were thus covered, because they were formally \"charged with abidi ng by federal guidelines\" and had \"official federal responsibilities\" to \"allocat[e] federal resources, pursuant to complex statutory and regulatory guidelines.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. Helsinn's policy arguments do not support review",
		"context": "But Congress's purpose in amending a ground of in- validity applied primarily by courts and examiners was not driven by what would be most convenient for post-grant proceedings, and courts are not \"simplisti- cally to assume that what ever furthers\" one \"[statu- 4 https://www.helsinn.com/news-and-events/helsinn- pharmaceuticals-beijing-co-l td-opens-office-in-shanghai- china/. 34 tory] objective must be the law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4. Nor will the decision below thwart Congress's goal of \"harmoniz[ing]\" prior-art rules with interna- tional practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "Whatever their merit, these arguments provide no basis to de- viate from the IOIA's plain text. \"The role of this Court is to apply the statute as it is written—even if [it] think[s] some other approach might accord with good policy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But even on their own terms, none of the IFC's argu- ments is persuasive. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "The FSIA's commercial ac- tivity exception requires commercial conduct at issue to have a sufficient nexus to the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605(a)(2); OBB Personenverkehr [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also U.S. Br. 32-33. This limitation and others explain why the \"flood\" of litigation the IFC imagines, Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "Emps.' Ret. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. c. The IFC falls back on the assertion that \"[e]ven one such suit\" would irreparably chill its lending activities. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 2042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "Br. 9; see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Oliver Res. 62 F.3d 128. And yet the IFC continues to operate effectively.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F.3d 836",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "9; see also, e.g. , 24 F.3d 836; Oliver Res. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And yet the IFC continues to operate effectively. Moreover, other lending insti- tutions—private and public—are able to perform their core functions despite the fact that they are subject to suit for commercial malfeasance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "62 F.3d 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "55-57. But provided the defendant has sufficient contacts to the United States, there is nothing necessarily ille- gitimate about claims \"based on activities and events elsewhere.\" J. McIntyre Mach., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similar principles apply in 25 breach-of-contract cases. See, e.g., Republic of Argen- 504 U.S. 607.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 873",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE IFC'S POLICY ARGUMENTS ARE UNAVAILING.",
		"context": "J. McIntyre Mach., 564 U.S. 873. Similar principles apply in 25 breach-of-contract cases. See, e.g., Republic of Argen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Lest there be any doubt, in the Tate Letter and the FSIA, the Executive Branch and Congress de- termined that it is appr opriate in circumstances equivalent to those here fo r U.S. courts to sit in judgment of foreign sovereigns. If that is tolerable, then surely allowing lawsuits involving the commer- cial activities of international organizations is ac-ceptable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Halberstam Standard Encompasses Aiding and Abetting By Assisting A Wrongful Enterprise",
		"context": "The defendants and the govern- ment argue at length for those narrow interpretations of the common law of civil aiding and abetting. If any 52 See Pet. 26-27 (\"helps another to complete its commission \" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 of them are correct, then perhaps Halberstam was incorrectly decided, but regardless of whether Hal- berstam was rightly or wrongly decided, and even if Halberstam were to one day be reversed, the statute at issue in the instant case provides that Halberstam sets out \"the proper legal fram ework\" which Congress di- rected the courts to apply in JASTA cases. Twitter and Facebook point out that Halberstam held that an aider and abetto r must have assisted \"the principal violation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "26 Service has made clear that a species' \"habitat\" is no t limited to areas that simultaneously provide optimal con- ditions for every stage of a species' life cycle . First, an area may qualify as \"habitat\" even if it does not contain every single element necessary for a species' survival. For example, a wetland area may serve as \"habitat for migratory birds,\" Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook C [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], even if they spend only part of their lives there . Even species that do not migrate great distances may nonetheless require several distinct \"habitat[s]\" during their life; many amphibians, for example, require aquatic habitat as juveniles and ter- restrial habitat as adults . The Service thus understands the ph rase \"any habitat\" to encompass each of the vari- ous habitat s required by a species during its life cycle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "69,312, 69,323 (2014) (identifying \"seasonally specific PCEs\" for Gun- nison sage -grouse and noting \"few areas would contain all\" PCEs); accord J.A. 125 (referring to \"breeding hab- itat\" of dusky gopher frog); cf. Home Builders [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Second , an area may be \"habitat \" even if it is poor qual- ity or \"degraded.\" See 73 Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 983",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "Third , in appropriate circumstances, a species' \"habi- tat\" may include no t only the area where a species is found, but also parts of the surrounding area that pro- vide elements necessary to maintain the species . See, e.g., Bear Valley Mut. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Pet. C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.3d 977",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "\" Merit Mgmt. Grp. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, \"habitat\" must be interpreted in light of the closely related term \"critical habitat .\" Critical habitat is a sub- set of habitat and is statutorily defined to include both \"areas within the geographic al area occupied by the spe- cies\" and \"areas outside the geographic al area occupied by the species.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "1533(a)(3)(A) (i) (emphasis added). \"Read nat- urally, the word 'any' has an expansive meaning, that is, 29 'one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The phrase \"a ny habitat\" thus supports the conclusion that a species may have multiple types of \"habitat,\" and an area may constitute \"habitat\" even if it does not meet all of the species' needs across its entire life cycle. That a species may require multiple \"habitat[s]\" or types of \"habitat\" also accords with common usage.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "That a species may require multiple \"habitat[s]\" or types of \"habitat\" also accords with common usage. For example, this Court and other courts have frequently used the term \"habitat\" to describe areas that a species uses only seasonally or for one purpose, even though it does not contain e very feature necessary for a species' existence. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]476 F.3d 1031. Similarly, Congress has used the term \"habitat\" in other conservation statutes to refer to areas that may not include all elements neces- sary for survival throughout all life stages. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "That a species may require multiple \"habitat[s]\" or types of \"habitat\" also accords with common usage. For example, this Court and other courts have frequently used the term \"habitat\" to describe areas that a species uses only seasonally or for one purpose, even though it does not contain e very feature necessary for a species' existence. See, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 1933[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, Congress has used the term \"habitat\" in other conservation statutes to refer to areas that may not include all elements neces- sary for survival throughout all life stages. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 F.3d 1031",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "As a result, many salmon now access their spawning habitat using fish ladders, and juveniles may then be transported downstream on barges or trucks. See, e.g. , Wild Fish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These usages show that the term \"habitat\" is not inherently confined to areas \"accessible to the species\" without any human intervention. Markle Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.3d 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "c. At a minimum, the Service's interpretation of \"hab- itat\" is reasonable and entitled to deference. \" When it en- acted the ESA, Congress delegated broad administrative and interpretive power to the Secretary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has recognized, the protection of endangered and threatened species \"requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress,\" ibid. , and the proper interpretation of its terms presents \"complex pol-icy choice [s],\" ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "As this Court has recognized, the protection of endangered and threatened species \"requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress,\" ibid. , and the proper interpretation of its terms presents \"complex pol-icy choice [s],\" ibid. Accordingly, this Court has recog- nized that the Service's interpretation of the Act is enti-tled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], so long as it \"rests on a permissible construction of the 515 U.S. 687. 32 ESA.\" Sweet Hom e, 515 U.S. at 704.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "As this Court has recognized, the protection of endangered and threatened species \"requires an expertise and attention to detail that exceeds the normal province of Congress,\" ibid. , and the proper interpretation of its terms presents \"complex pol-icy choice [s],\" ibid. Accordingly, this Court has recog- nized that the Service's interpretation of the Act is enti-tled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. 467 U.S. 837, so long as it \"rests on a permissible construction of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 ESA.\" Sweet Hom e, 515 U.S. at 704.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Service's understanding that Unit 1 is \"habitat\" reflects the best reading of the statute and, at a minimum, warrants deference",
		"context": "See, e.g., American Heritage Dictionary 586 (2d ed. 1982) (\"area or type of environment in which an organism or biological population normally lives or oc- curs\"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1017 (1976) (Webster's Third ) (\"place where a plant or animal species naturally lives and grows\" ). But this Court has recognized that \"[w]hether a statutory term is unambiguous does not turn solely on dictionary definition s,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in part because they fail to account for \"the spe- cific context in which that language is used,\" id. at 1082 (quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 341). Here, the Act ex- pressly provides that an area may fo rm part of a species' \"critical habitat\" (and therefore necessarily part of its \"habitat\") even though it is \"outside the geographical area occupied by the species.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1074",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Many of us do not know the names of our next-door neighbors. Because of this, tasks that neighbors, friends or relatives may have performed in the past now fall to the police.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rhode Island has long recognized that many police functions and responsibilities are non-investigatory in nature. In rejecting a narrow interpretation of the \"duty\" of a police officer to \"playing such games as 'cops and robbers,' \" Rhode Island's Supreme Court in 1982 noted that: Any police officer at any given time may per- form the responsibilities of the office by acting as a domestic-relations counselor in an at-tempt to reconcile two belligerent spouses who at some prior time had solemnly prom- ised to love and honor each other, or as a mid-wife to a newcomer to this planet who cannot delay his or her appearance until the cruiser makes it to the hospital, or as a sympathetic emissary who has the unpleasant task of in- forming some citizen of the loss of a loved one, or even as a taker of measurements or the pre- parer of accident reports that may prove of value solely to some insurance adjuster.",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 P.2d 928",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rhode Island has long recognized that many police functions and responsibilities are non-investigatory in nature. In rejecting a narrow interpretation of the \"duty\" of a police officer to \"playing such games as 'cops and robbers,' \" Rhode Island's Supreme Court in 1982 noted that: Any police officer at any given time may per- form the responsibilities of the office by acting as a domestic-relations counselor in an at-tempt to reconcile two belligerent spouses who at some prior time had solemnly prom- ised to love and honor each other, or as a mid-wife to a newcomer to this planet who cannot delay his or her appearance until the cruiser makes it to the hospital, or as a sympathetic emissary who has the unpleasant task of in- forming some citizen of the loss of a loved one, or even as a taker of measurements or the pre- parer of accident reports that may prove of value solely to some insurance adjuster. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer, firefighter, child protective services worker, or any 32 number of officials charged with protecting and serv- ing their community may enter a residence without a warrant when it is reasonable to do so. In Terry , this Court encouraged responsible community policing ef-forts, allowing an officer to perform a \"pat down\" frisk based on specific and articulable facts not rising to the level of probable cause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 A.2d 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "at 540. 34 Just this term the Court declined to review a com- munity caretaking case where a dozen firearms were seized from a home. Rodriguez , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Apply- ing the community caretaking doctrine to this home search, the Ninth Circuit wrote that \"[a] seizure of a firearm in the possession or co ntrol of a person who has been detained because of an acute mental health epi-sode likewise responds to an immediate threat to com- munity safety.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "930 F.3d 1123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": ".\" Id. at 517 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 35 Six Circuit Courts have recognized that certain circumstances allow entry into the home without a warrant for bona fide community caretaking purposes. See infra notes 1-6.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 F. App'x 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "See infra notes 1-6. Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931.",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.3d 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "See infra notes 1-6. Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 F.3d 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 F.3d 871",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "949 F.2d 718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "969 F.2d 1572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Petitioner warns that allowing caretaking home entries will result in widespread abuses, but he has presented nothing in the way of sup- port. Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "747 F.3d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts. There is no reason they cannot continue to review and decide these cases, if called upon, applying guidance from this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.2d 1288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts. There is no reason they cannot continue to review and decide these cases, if called upon, applying guidance from this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "776 F.3d 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts. There is no reason they cannot continue to review and decide these cases, if called upon, applying guidance from this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "775 N.W. 2d 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, 626 N.W.2d 777; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts. There is no reason they cannot continue to review and decide these cases, if called upon, applying guidance from this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 N.W.2d 592",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Situations Demanding Caretaking Functions Are Not Limited To The Automobile, And The Legitimate And Significant Government Interest In Public Safety Counsels In Favor Of Allowing These Functions To Extend Into The Home",
		"context": "Rather than allowing officers to ride roughshod through the community, courts have applied the com- munity caretaking doctrine outside the automobile set- ting as follows: assisting a houseguest gather family's belongings from the home of their drunk and belliger- ent host, York, 895 F.2d at 1030 (cited with approval by Petitioner); entering a home to investigate noise com- plaints, Rohrig , 98 F.3d at 1522; serving court papers, Quezada , 448 F.3d at 1008; performing \"wellness checks,\" 820 F.3d 356; checking on a home when a neighbor called, worried because the door was open and she thought the owner was away, MacDonald , 745 F.3d at 14; same, 570 F.3d 546, cert. denied559 U.S. 938; transport-ing an unwilling homeowner to a psychiatric hospital after he appeared to be hallucinating on paint fumes, 455 F.3d 871; stopping an apparently intoxicated in- dividual in dark clothes wandering in traffic, 949 F.2d 718, va- cated on other grounds , 969 F.2d 1572 36 (en banc); seizure of a gun seen fa lling out of the pocket of a man asleep at a bus station, 747 F.3d 1013, cert. denied574 U.S. 910; checking on a drunken man, 586 F.2d 1288; checking on a disorien ted person in a parking lot, 776 F.3d 765; calls of an attempted suicide, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059; entry into a home to check for possible gas leak, 775 N.W. 2d 221; checking on an intoxicated and possibly injured motor- ist, 826 N.W. 2d 87; checking on possible overdose victims, 785 N.W.2d 592; stopping a young girl suspected of being a runaway, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and \"helping stranded motorists, returning lost children to anxious parents, [and] assisting and pro-tecting citizens in need,\" Ray, 981 P.2d at 931. The totality of the circumstances presented in each case was found reasonable by th e reviewing courts. There is no reason they cannot continue to review and decide these cases, if called upon, applying guidance from this Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "626 N.W.2d 777",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": ". Even if Amgen's first question presented otherwise warranted review, this case would be a very poor vehicle for numerous reasons. First , the question whether enablement is a \"question of fact \" or a \"question of law \" was not briefed on the merits below, 959 F.3d at 1099; Vasudevan Software, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 699 F.3d 1340 . Indeed, Amgen cites Martek Biosciences 520 F. Supp.2d 557, as an example of a cou rt supposedly substituting its judgment for the jury, see Pet.20, but Amgen fails to note that the Federal Circuit actually reversed the district court's judgment of no enablement in that case on some claims because \"the evidence support[ed] the jury's implicit finding that one need not perform undue experimentation to practice\" those claims. Martek Biosciences 579 F.3d 1363 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "782 F.3d 671",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": ". Even if Amgen's first question presented otherwise warranted review, this case would be a very poor vehicle for numerous reasons. First , the question whether enablement is a \"question of fact \" or a \"question of law \" was not briefed on the merits below, 959 F.3d at 1099; Vasudevan Software, 782 F.3d 671 ; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, Amgen cites Martek Biosciences 520 F. Supp.2d 557, as an example of a cou rt supposedly substituting its judgment for the jury, see Pet.20, but Amgen fails to note that the Federal Circuit actually reversed the district court's judgment of no enablement in that case on some claims because \"the evidence support[ed] the jury's implicit finding that one need not perform undue experimentation to practice\" those claims. Martek Biosciences 579 F.3d 1363 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "699 F.3d 1340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "Even if Amgen's first question presented otherwise warranted review, this case would be a very poor vehicle for numerous reasons. First , the question whether enablement is a \"question of fact \" or a \"question of law \" was not briefed on the merits below, 959 F.3d at 1099; Vasudevan Software, 782 F.3d 671 ; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 699 F.3d 1340 . Indeed, Amgen cites Martek Biosciences [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as an example of a cou rt supposedly substituting its judgment for the jury, see Pet.20, but Amgen fails to note that the Federal Circuit actually reversed the district court's judgment of no enablement in that case on some claims because \"the evidence support[ed] the jury's implicit finding that one need not perform undue experimentation to practice\" those claims. Martek Biosciences 579 F.3d 1363 . The Federal Circuit thus respects the role of juries to decide underlying factual issues and will not hesitate to reverse district court decisions that invade the province of the jury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 F. Supp.2d 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "First , the question whether enablement is a \"question of fact \" or a \"question of law \" was not briefed on the merits below, 959 F.3d at 1099; Vasudevan Software, 782 F.3d 671 ; Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, 699 F.3d 1340 . Indeed, Amgen cites Martek Biosciences 520 F. Supp.2d 557, as an example of a cou rt supposedly substituting its judgment for the jury, see Pet.20, but Amgen fails to note that the Federal Circuit actually reversed the district court's judgment of no enablement in that case on some claims because \"the evidence support[ed] the jury's implicit finding that one need not perform undue experimentation to practice\" those claims. Martek Biosciences [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Federal Circuit thus respects the role of juries to decide underlying factual issues and will not hesitate to reverse district court decisions that invade the province of the jury. 25 not addressed at oral argument, and not addressed in a merits opinion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.3d 1363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "This Court , however, prefers \"the benefit of thorough lower court opinions to guide [its] analysis of the merits.\" Zivotofsky ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And while the Court occasionally grants review of unpublished or summary decisions with little analysis, see Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S.Ct. 1365 (explaining in seeking certiorari that \"this Court now has the benefit of [the Federal Circuit's] analysis on both sides of the issue ,\" and citing other Federal Circuit decisions ); see also, e.g. , 551 U.S. 338 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "Zivotofsky ex rel. 566 U.S. 189 . And while the Court occasionally grants review of unpublished or summary decisions with little analysis, see Oil States Energy Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining in seeking certiorari that \"this Court now has the benefit of [the Federal Circuit's] analysis on both sides of the issue ,\" and citing other Federal Circuit decisions ); see also, e.g. , 551 U.S. 338 . But by Amgen's own telling, the decisions giving rise to the Federal Circuit's purported rule provided \"no analysis.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "566 U.S. 189 . And while the Court occasionally grants review of unpublished or summary decisions with little analysis, see Oil States Energy Servs., 138 S.Ct. 1365 (explaining in seeking certiorari that \"this Court now has the benefit of [the Federal Circuit's] analysis on both sides of the issue ,\" and citing other Federal Circuit decisions ); see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But by Amgen's own telling, the decisions giving rise to the Federal Circuit's purported rule provided \"no analysis.\" Pet.1 7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "Nor does Amgen identify any other opinions to help \"guide\" this Court's \"analysis of the merits .\" The Court would thus be writing on a completely blank slate —which is always suboptimal, but especially here, since \" [t]he 26 distinction between law and fac t is one of the most perplexing concepts in all of law .\" Gugliuzza , supra, at 609; see Pullman [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Were the Court ever inclined to review the first question presented, therefore, it should do so in a case where the issue was more thoroughly ventilated below . Second , even if enablement were purely a factual question, it would not change the outcome below as to whether Amgen's patents are enabled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. This Case Is an Exceptionally Poor Vehicle to Address the Question Presented",
		"context": "27 In short, assuming arguendo that enablement is a purely factual question, a reasonable jury could still only conclude —based on the undisputed , relevant evidence here—that Amgen's narrow disclosure failed to enable Amgen's broad claims. Amgen's question presented would be \"better resolved in other litigation where … it would be solely dispositive of the case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Third , even if this Court granted certiorari, held that e nablement is purely a question of fact, and reversed the Federal Circuit's decision holding that Amgen's claims are invalid for lack of enablement based on the present record , that still would not be \"dispositive of the case.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 24 U.S. 59. The law of the case doctrine provides that \"when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\" 460 U.S. 605.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 U.S. 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "74 U.S. 107; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The law of the case doctrine provides that \"when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\" 460 U.S. 605.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "74 U.S. 107; 24 U.S. 59. The law of the case doctrine provides that \"when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The law of the case doctrine \"promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process.\" 486 U.S. 800.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "460 U.S. 605. The law of the case doctrine \"promotes the finality and efficiency of the judicial process.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's decision in Hyatt II , reaffirming Nevada v. Hall , is the law of the case for this litiga- tion. After the Board did not ask the Court to recon- sider Nevada v. Hall in Hyatt I , Hyatt tried the case and litigated the appeal in reliance on that precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 800",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "The Board could have done so then. By failing to do this in the Supreme Court, the Board should be 14 deemed to have waived the ability to ask for Nevada v. Hall to be overruled. See, e.g., Granite Rock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hyatt chose to litigate this case in the Nevada courts, at huge expense, in reliance on this Court's rul- ing—and reaffirmation—that state governments may be sued in the courts of other states. Simply put, the Board should be bound by its own choices in this litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "Nevada v. Hall should not be overruled On the merits, the central issue in this case is whether the Constitution prohibits a state court from exercising its sovereign power to provide a forum to its citizens when they are injured by another state. In Ne- vada v. Hall , the Court concluded that a state may ex- ercise its sovereignty to permit such suits and thus the question is whether there is a \"compelling justifica- tion\" for overruling this almost 40-year-old precedent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], undermine Nevada v. Hall . The Board, though, misses a crucial distinction: Alden v. Maine is about whether a state court is re- quired to hear cases against its state government. Ne- vada v. Hall is about whether the Constitution forbids a state from choosing to hear suits by its own citizens against another state government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "Ne- vada v. Hall is about whether the Constitution forbids a state from choosing to hear suits by its own citizens against another state government. The Tenth Amend-ment creates a huge difference between compelling a state to do something, wh ich is impermissible com- mandeering, as opposed to finding that a state is con- stitutionally prohibited from doing something. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; New 505 U.S. 144. No case after Nevada v. Hall ever suggested that the Constitution imposes a li mit on a state's sovereign power to define the jurisdiction of its courts and to provide a remedy for its citizens, including when they are injured by another state. This Court's decisions about the Eleventh Amendment are inapposite be- cause they are about a constitutional limit on federal court power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1461",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "Ne- vada v. Hall is about whether the Constitution forbids a state from choosing to hear suits by its own citizens against another state government. The Tenth Amend-ment creates a huge difference between compelling a state to do something, wh ich is impermissible com- mandeering, as opposed to finding that a state is con- stitutionally prohibited from doing something. See, e.g., 138 S.Ct. 1461; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No case after Nevada v. Hall ever suggested that the Constitution imposes a li mit on a state's sovereign power to define the jurisdiction of its courts and to provide a remedy for its citizens, including when they are injured by another state. This Court's decisions about the Eleventh Amendment are inapposite be- cause they are about a constitutional limit on federal court power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "No case after Nevada v. Hall ever suggested that the Constitution imposes a li mit on a state's sovereign power to define the jurisdiction of its courts and to provide a remedy for its citizens, including when they are injured by another state. This Court's decisions about the Eleventh Amendment are inapposite be- cause they are about a constitutional limit on federal court power. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alden v. Maine dealt solely with whether a state court is constitutionally required to hear a federal claim against its state government by its own citizens. In Alden v. Maine , this Court expressly drew a \"distinc- tion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "There is nothing in the text of the Constitution which justifies such a limit on state power. Nevada v. Hall reflects that states have a vital sov- ereign interest in providing a remedy for their citizens when they suffer injuries. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court stated in Nevada v. Hall , history \"supports the conclusion that no sovereign may be sued in its own courts without its consent, but it affords no support for a claim of immunity in another sovereign's courts. Such a claim necessarily implicates the power and au-thority of a second sove reign.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. An affirmance by an evenly divided Court is a decision on the merits",
		"context": "Nor is there anything in the Constitution or its hist ory that establishes a limit on the sovereign power of a state to provide a remedy for its citizens when they are injured by another state. As Justice Thomas declared , \"immunity does not apply of its own force in the courts of another sovereign.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This, though, does not mean that state govern- ments are without protection when they are sued in other states. This Court ruled in Hyatt II that the Full Faith and Credit Clause me ans that a state court can- not hold another state liable for more than the liability that would be allowed for the forum state in its own courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Individual Mandate is not a Proper Exercise of the Taxing Power",
		"context": "§ 5000A(c). Prior to the amendment's effective removal of the tax penalty, the individual mandate's constitutionality was addressed by a divided Court in a fractured opin- ion in Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With the support of four dissenting justices, the Chief Justice determined in Part III A. that the individual mandate was not a valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Individual Mandate is not a Proper Exercise of the Taxing Power",
		"context": "at 564. The Court proceeded to use a \"functional approach\" to determine its true nature. Relying heavily on Child Labor Tax Case , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court noted that the payment is not so prohibitively high that there is no choice but to buy health insurance; the payment has no scienter requirement; and the IRS col-lects the payment through the normal means of taxa- tion. NFIB , 567 U.S. at 565-66. Thus, these factors \"support the conclusion that what is called a 'penalty' here may be viewed as a tax.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Maintaining Order is a Legitimate Government Interest, But the Minnesota Ban Does not Appropriately Serve that Interest",
		"context": "The gov-ernment bears the burden of providing some evidence that the restriction here is necessary. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied137 S. Ct. 1435. Yet the court below made no effort to determine whether there was any basis for believing that an absolute prohibition on speech that might be construed by polling place work ers as \"political\" is nec- essary to preserve order.",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.3d 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Arguments Concerning Abood's Vitality Depend On Assertions Of Contested (And Incorrect) Facts, And This Case Lacks A Factual Record",
		"context": "Petitioner asks this Court to overrule Abood and its progeny and hold that any fair-share fees collected without affirmative consent by any public-employee union in any State for any purpose are unconstitu- tional. Petitioner's challe nge exemplifies the kind of facial challenge \"disfavored\" by this Court. Washing- ton State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As even Justice Pow- ell's Abood opinion recognized, for some collective- bargaining topics an individual's First Amendment in- 54 terests are \"comparatively weak\" and the State's in- terests \"strong.\" 431 U.S. at 263 n.16 (Powell, J., con- curring in the judgment).",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Arguments Concerning Abood's Vitality Depend On Assertions Of Contested (And Incorrect) Facts, And This Case Lacks A Factual Record",
		"context": "431 U.S. at 263 n.16 (Powell, J., con- curring in the judgment). Moreover, petitioner raises his sweeping challenge without any evidentiary record and without having specified the issues on which he purportedly disagrees with the Union. Given the \"fact-poor record[]\" before this Court, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it should be particularly unwilling to announce a sweeping new constitutional right. Instead, the Court should \"proceed with caution and restraint,\" 422 U.S. 205, and reject petitioner's blanket challenge to all fair-share fees. A more fulsome record, for example, would provide further evidence concerning the rout ine nature of grievance procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Arguments Concerning Abood's Vitality Depend On Assertions Of Contested (And Incorrect) Facts, And This Case Lacks A Factual Record",
		"context": "Moreover, petitioner raises his sweeping challenge without any evidentiary record and without having specified the issues on which he purportedly disagrees with the Union. Given the \"fact-poor record[]\" before this Court, 541 U.S. 600, it should be particularly unwilling to announce a sweeping new constitutional right. Instead, the Court should \"proceed with caution and restraint,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and reject petitioner's blanket challenge to all fair-share fees. A more fulsome record, for example, would provide further evidence concerning the rout ine nature of grievance procedures. As the IPLRA requires, AFSCME pursues grievances on behalf of non- members – at those employees' elections – literally hundreds of times per year, and it generates many positive outcomes, including reinstatement, backpay, and expungement of incorrect written reprimands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's Arguments Concerning Abood's Vitality Depend On Assertions Of Contested (And Incorrect) Facts, And This Case Lacks A Factual Record",
		"context": "567 U.S. at 319 n.8. But \"mounting a challenge is for all practical intents and purposes free,\" as \"to file a challenge costs only a postage stamp plus a small 55 amount of time to supply the tiny amount of infor- mation that the challenge must set forth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A record would allow the lower courts to test petitioner's claim and the correctness of Harris 's footnote. Finally, nothing in this lawsuit – no assertion in petitioner's brief or allega tion in his intervenor com- plaint – identifies a single view that petitioner takes in opposition to his union representative.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 1310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. All nine Justices in Town of Greece employed a history-based approach instead of Lemon",
		"context": ". This Court's most recent Establishment Clause precedent, Town of Greece , sets forth a far better mode of analysis—one that displaces Lemon and pro- vides the objective criteria lower courts need to eval- uate whether a challenged government practice es- tablishes a religion. Town of Greece rejected the idea that the allowance of legislative prayer in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"carv[es] out an exception\" to general Establishment Clause jurispru- dence. Town of Greece , 134 S. Ct. at 1818. Instead, the Establishment Clause \"must\" be interpreted \"'by reference to historical practices and understand- ings.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. All nine Justices in Town of Greece employed a history-based approach instead of Lemon",
		"context": "Id. at 1819 (quoting Cty. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Importantly, this focus on history was the approach also adopted by the principal dissent in Town of Greece . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. All nine Justices in Town of Greece employed a history-based approach instead of Lemon",
		"context": "Town of Greece starts from the premise that an \"establishment of religion\" had a defined meaning at the time of the founding, and that history is an im- portant guide to interpreting what that means to courts today. Historical an alysis has long played an important role in Establishment Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor , 565 U.S. at 181-87 (sum- marizing historical view of Establishment Clause); Van Orden , 545 U.S. at 686 (citing history); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Eric Rassbach, Town of Greece v. Galloway: The Establishment Clause and the Rediscovery of History , 2014 Cato S. Ct. Rev. 71 (2014). When courts objectively assess whether modern government actions mirror the establishments the Founders rejected, Establishment Clause jurisprudence will be clearer and more predictable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. All nine Justices in Town of Greece employed a history-based approach instead of Lemon",
		"context": "& Mary L. Rev. 2105 (2003). Judge Kelly and Chief Judge Tymkovich employed those features in their dissenting opinion 11 in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They are: \"(1) [s tate] control over doctrine, governance, and personnel of the church; (2) compul- sory church attendance; (3) financial support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church institutions fo r public functions; and (6) restriction of political participation to members of the established church.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "847 F.3d 1214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Internet Has Exacerbated The Harms To Disclosure",
		"context": "See Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political Anonymity , at 3. When it comes to disclosure requirements, the proliferation of the Internet presents both a blessing and a curse. See Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Thomas, J., dissenting) (observing that some opponents of California's Proposition 8 that amended California's Constitution to provide \"that 29 only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California\" compiled campaign finance reports \"and created Web sites with maps showing the locations of homes or businesses of Proposition 8 supporters.\"). In the wake of the Proposition 8 campaign, nonprofit groups formed with the plan to \"confront donors to conservative groups, hoping to create a chilling effect that will dry up contributions.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Internet Has Exacerbated The Harms To Disclosure",
		"context": "Elected officials have also misused campaign finance reports. Disclosure reports \"make[] it easier to see who has not done his bit for the incumbents, so that arms may be twisted and pockets tapped.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Between 1995 and 2006, congressional and senate Republicans executed the infamous \"K Street Proj ect\" and used disclosure reports to \"compile a list of the 400 largest political action committees and their giving patterns.\" Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political Anonymity , City Journal at 5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "361 F.3d 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
		"context": "These considerations provide additional reason to hew to established tort-law and maritime principles. 1. In Eastern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court considered a statute that required certain coal mining employers to retroactively provide significant benefits to workers it had employed decades earlier. While the plurality disagreed over the appropriate analytical fr amework, a majority of Justices agreed that the substantial retroactive imposition of liability, \" based on the employers' conduct far in the past,\" when they \"could not have anticipated the liability,\" implicates \"fundamental principles of fairness\" th at rendered the statute unconstitutional under either the Takings or Due Process Clause. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Decision Below Raises Substantial Fairness Concerns",
		"context": "William P. Shelley et al., The Need for Further Transparency Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 2014 Update—Judici al and Legislative 43 Developments and Other Ch anges in the Landscape Since 2008 , 23 Widener L.J. 675, 675-76 (2014).9 3. To be sure, plaintiffs have no claim against the Navy directly, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but they may seek compensation for asbestos- related injuries arising as a result of Navy service. Specifically, plaintiffs may seek recovery from the Department of Veterans Affairs \"[f]or disability resulting from personal in jury suffered or disease contracted in [the] line of duty.\" 38 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "Barnett's article was written before any significant attention was paid to the idea of using corpus lin-guistics in legal interpretation, and he wasn't aware at the time that what he was advocating was, in effect, corpus lin- guistics. 45. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 dinarily used. \"46 The way an expression is ordinarily used is by definition the way it is most often used.47 The same is true with respect to other formulations the Court has invoked, such as \"normal and usual mean- ing\" 48 and \"normally means.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "First, the cases cited above must be read in light of the \"fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used.\" 51 There- 46. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wisconsin Cent. 138 S. Ct. 2067; 566 U.S. 449; 524 U.S. 51; 510 U.S. 471; 490 U.S. 296. 47.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1094",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "51 There- 46. E.g., 139 S. Ct. 1094; Wisconsin Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 566 U.S. 449; 524 U.S. 51; 510 U.S. 471; 490 U.S. 296. 47. E.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "51 There- 46. E.g., 139 S. Ct. 1094; Wisconsin Cent. 138 S. Ct. 2067; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 524 U.S. 51; 510 U.S. 471; 490 U.S. 296. 47. E.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "51 There- 46. E.g., 139 S. Ct. 1094; Wisconsin Cent. 138 S. Ct. 2067; 566 U.S. 449; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 510 U.S. 471; 490 U.S. 296. 47. E.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "51 There- 46. E.g., 139 S. Ct. 1094; Wisconsin Cent. 138 S. Ct. 2067; 566 U.S. 449; 524 U.S. 51; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 490 U.S. 296. 47. E.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "51 There- 46. E.g., 139 S. Ct. 1094; Wisconsin Cent. 138 S. Ct. 2067; 566 U.S. 449; 524 U.S. 51; 510 U.S. 471; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 47. E.g., American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1238 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "371 U.S. 505. 49. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 50. Mallard , 490 U.S. at 301.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "56. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd ., 138 S. Ct. at 2071-72; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 549 U.S. 47. See The Use of Corpus Linguistics in Legal Interpretation , supra n. 52; Varieties of Ordinary Meaning , supra note 54 at 6-8. 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "56. Wisconsin Cent. Ltd ., 138 S. Ct. at 2071-72; 522 U.S. 74; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See The Use of Corpus Linguistics in Legal Interpretation , supra n. 52; Varieties of Ordinary Meaning , supra note 54 at 6-8. 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Frequency analysis is an appropriate methodology for legal interpretation generally",
		"context": "See The Use of Corpus Linguistics in Legal Interpretation , supra n. 52; Varieties of Ordinary Meaning , supra note 54 at 6-8. 57. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 58. Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 B.Y.U.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA grants extraordinary power and jurisdiction to tribal courts",
		"context": "25 U.S.C. § 1911(b); cf. Gila River Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. After in- tervening below , the Tribe moved to transfer the entire custody proceeding to its tribal court in Arizona. The Ohio juvenile court held a hearing, where C.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 Ariz. 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Showing Bias Against a Litigant Opposed to an Agency's Position Denies Due Process",
		"context": "13 an impartial magistrate of the rightness of the litigant's cause, that litigant is forced to try to overcome the gov-ernment's thumb on the scale for her opponent. Such fa- voritism may happen even when the government's posi-tion is created in the course of that very litigation. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Master- piece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (agreeing that the Constitution forbids agency or judicial proceedings that are \"infected by . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Showing Bias Against a Litigant Opposed to an Agency's Position Denies Due Process",
		"context": "13 an impartial magistrate of the rightness of the litigant's cause, that litigant is forced to try to overcome the gov-ernment's thumb on the scale for her opponent. Such fa- voritism may happen even when the government's posi-tion is created in the course of that very litigation. See, e.g., United Student Aid Funds, 136 S. Ct. 1607; see also Master- piece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (agreeing that the Constitution forbids agency or judicial proceedings that are \"infected by . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The FTC's Abuse of Section 13(b) Threatens Constitutional Rights",
		"context": ". \"[T]he love of money is the root of all evil[.]\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in pursuit of headline - grabbi ng monetary judgments undermine s defendants' constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "730 F.3d 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": "41 Because Section 922(g) does not itself specify any mens rea , petitioner also cannot rely (Br. 14 -17) on de- cisions interpreting criminal statutes \"that introduce[ ] the elements of a crime with the word 'knowingly.' \" Flores [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such decisions reflect the principle that \"where a transitive verb has an object,\" it may be proper to \"assume that an adverb (such as knowingly) that modifies the transi- tive verb tells the listener how the subject performed the entire action, including the object as set forth in the sentence.\" Flores -Figueroa , 556 U.S. at 650.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": "The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), prescribes a minimum sentence of 15 years of imprisonment and a maximum sentence of life for \"a person who violates section 922(g)\" and also has three prior convictions for a \"violent felony \" or \"serious drug 42 offense. \" The ACCA provide s a sentencing enhance- ment for certain recidivists who commit the same crime that is defined in Section 924(a)(2 ), see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But unlike Section 924(a)(2), the ACCA's reference to a defendant who \"violates\" Section 922(g) contains no express mens rea requirement. That is unremarkable so long as Sec- tion 924(a)(2 )'s \"knowingly\" requirement is understood simply to codify the preexisting and long -held judicial understandi ng that knowledge of the act is sufficient in this context \" to separate wrongful conduct from other- wise innocent conduct,\" Elonis , 135 S. Ct. at 2010 (cita- tions and internal quotation marks omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": "10, 21) , do not show otherwise . As an initial matter, \"floor statements by individual legisla- tors rank among the least illuminating forms of legisla- tive history.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, p etitioner misconstrues Sena- tor Hatch' s comments. As petitioner notes, Senator Hatch observed that \"[t]he lack of any criminal state of mind requirements\" had \"resulted in severe penalties for unintentional missteps.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": "at 437 -438 (collecting cases upholding strict -liability offenses). And petitioner's due-process theory ( which he does not squarely raise ) could imply the constitutional invalidity of many prior con victions that require proof of knowledge only as to possession , including convictions that this Court has upheld. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (up- holding conviction for possession of unregistered hand grenades, despite defen dant's argument that the gov- ernment failed to prove his knowledge that the gre-nades were unregistered, because \"t he only knowledge required to be proved was knowledge that the instru-ment possessed was a firearm \"). Petitioner next points to this Court's dec ision in Staples v. United States, supra, to argue that the \"long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by priv ate individuals in this country \" requires proof that he knew about the immigration status that rendered his particu-lar firearm possession unlawful. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": "28) that if the Court finds \"any ambiguity\" regarding the statute's meaning, his proposed reading must be adopted under the \"rule of lenity.\" But that rule applies only when a criminal statute contains a \" grievous ambiguity or uncertainty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], nor the \"existence of some statutory ambiguity\" is \"suf-ficient to warrant application of that rule,\" Muscarello , 524 U.S. at 138; see Abramski , 573 U.S. at 188 n.10 (\"The dissent would apply the rule of lenity here be- cause the statute's text, taken alone, permits a nar- rower construction, but we have repeatedly emphasized that is not the appropriate test.\") . Instead, the rule ap- plies \"only if, aft er seizing everything from which aid can be derived,\" the Court \"can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 125",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioner's arguments lack merit",
		"context": ". Instead, the rule ap- plies \"only if, aft er seizing everything from which aid can be derived,\" the Court \"can make no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.\" Muscarello , 524 46 U.S. at 138 (citation s and internal quotation marks omitted) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2014) (rule applies only where \" the Court must simply guess as to what Congress intended \") (citation omitted). For the reasons stated above —in light of the statutory text , context, judicial interpretation , and his- tory of enactment —the Court need not \"gues s as to what Congress intended\" here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. SECTION THREE'S DISQUALIFICATION CAN (AND LIKELY MUST) BE GIVEN EFFECT IN STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.",
		"context": "That the dissent believes this statement is consistent with the characterization of Section Three as non -self-executing shows how that label confuses matters. 22 stated, that language \"charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce [federal] law according to their regular modes of procedure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . State legislatures may provide mechanisms to enforce federal rights. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "Pet. App. 20a (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Government has followed suit. BIO 15 - 16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 86",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "BIO 15 - 16. But d efault judicial rules of \"res judicata\" may be \"displaced\" by statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 545 U.S. 524. That is the case here. The \"whole purpose\" of the CUE statutes \"is to make an exception to finality.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "BIO 15 - 16. But d efault judicial rules of \"res judicata\" may be \"displaced\" by statute. 390 U.S. 459; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is the case here. The \"whole purpose\" of the CUE statutes \"is to make an exception to finality.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "That is the case here. The \"whole purpose\" of the CUE statutes \"is to make an exception to finality.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is why this Court has previously recog- nized that \"a denial of [veterans'] benefits has no for- mal res judicata effect.\" Walters, 473 U.S. at 311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "Pet. App. 20a (quoting James B. Beam Distilling [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Congress deliberately k ept the door open here. The Government's appeal to finality differs slightly from the Federal Circuit's reasoning, but it fares no better.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "See id. There is no risk that CUE's \"exception to finality would swallow the rule\" absent the further narrowing the Government advocates. United Student Aid Funds, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Contrary to the Government's suggestion, an agency 's application of a regulation that conflicts with an un- ambiguous statute is not a \"garden -variety error.\" BIO 15 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The CUE statutes expressly displace default finality principles",
		"context": "For that reason, there would be no war- rant to disregard the text of the CUE statutes and adopt the Government's position even if this kind of error were commonplace. \"[T]he magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. VA cannot \"force [this Court] to ignore a statutory promise\" by making 48 obvious errors of statutory interpretation so often that CUE infects many agency decisions. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm",
		"context": "Con- versely, it is almost impo ssible for a plaintiff to demon- strate anticompetitive effects in the face of increased output. As this Court explained in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamso n Tobacco Corp. , when \"output is ex- panding at the same time prices are increasing, rising prices are equally consistent with growing product de- mand\" as with competitive harm. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, \"a jury may not infer competi- tive injury from [this kind of] price and output data ab- sent some evidence that tends to prove that output was restricted or prices were above a competitive level.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. It is settled law that demonstrating reduced output is a virtual requirement of showing competitive harm",
		"context": "See, e.g., Am. Steel Erectors v. Local Union No. 7, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Reinforcing 8 Iron Workers , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Professors Areeda and Hove nkamp confirm the criti- cal role of output in demonstrating competitive harm: \"In a rule of reason case the plaintiff must first allege and show that the challenged restraint is of a type rea-sonably calculated to have anticompetitive effects, ordi- narily measured by reduced output in a properly de- fined market .\" 7 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1504b, at 415 (4th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "815 F.3d 43",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hardison was haunted by Lemon.",
		"context": "As Justices Marshall and Brennan observed at the time, the Court's decision in Hardison dealt \"a fatal blow\" to Title VII's protections for religious employees by \"effectively nullifying\" the statute . Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That nullification was not random or accidental ; rather , it had the \"singular ad- vantage\" of avoiding an alleged Establishment Clause concern . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Hardison was haunted by Lemon.",
		"context": "). In Hardison , the Lemon \"ghoul \" was stalk ing the Court itself. Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court's task, 6 then, is to determine how the term \"undue hardship\" should be interpreted unencumbered by these now-su- perseded Establishment Clause concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts of Appeals Have Not Applied a Per Se Rule to Marks Having a Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD",
		"context": "None of these circuits, however, has adopted a categorical rule that a mark containing a generic term with a generic TLD is generic per se . 6 Indeed, the Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have explicitly stated that adding a \".com\" to a generic second- level domain is not per se unprotectable as a trademark. See Advertise.com, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit both looked at evidence of distinctiveness, even though each found \"generic.com\" names generic. Booking.com B.V., 915 F. 3d at 186.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 974",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts of Appeals Have Not Applied a Per Se Rule to Marks Having a Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD",
		"context": "Advertise.com, Inc. , 616 F.3d at 982. Similarly, in finding HOTELS.COM generic, the Federal Circuit considered a consumer survey regarding the public's understanding of HOTELS.COM. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As such, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Booking. com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trademark Office is not necessarily inconsistent with decisions in the other circuits that have declined to create a bright line rule against registering generic terms combined with generic TLDs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 1300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Courts of Appeals Have Not Applied a Per Se Rule to Marks Having a Generic Term Added to a Generic TLD",
		"context": "As such, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Booking. com B.V. v. United States Patent & Trademark Office is not necessarily inconsistent with decisions in the other circuits that have declined to create a bright line rule against registering generic terms combined with generic TLDs. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We therefore decline to adopt a per se rule and conclude that when '.com' is combined with an SLD, even a generic SLD, the 7 resulting composite may be non-generic where evidence demonstrates that the mark's primary significance to th e p u b li c as a w h o l e is th e s o urce, n o t th e p ro d u ct. \") . Therefore, this case does not create a need for this Court to resolve a conflict among the courts of appeals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "915 F.3d 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "The Court's Eighth Amendment analysis also re- lies on \"objective indicia that reflect the public atti- tude toward a given sanction.\" Gregg , 428 U.S at 173. Indeed, Eighth Amendment cases \"should be in- formed by objective factors to the maximum possible extent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is not a shred of legislative evidence that Madison's execution would flout contemporary \"standards of decency.\" In the death penalty context, the \"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values\" are the laws passed by the people's elected representatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "433 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "There is not a shred of legislative evidence that Madison's execution would flout contemporary \"standards of decency.\" In the death penalty context, the \"clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary values\" are the laws passed by the people's elected representatives. Atkins , 536 U.S. at 312 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But not one State has proscribed the use of capital punishment against prisoners with dementia- induced memory loss. This legislative silence is all the more striking given the recent, highly-publicized claims of death-row inmates with medical conditions 33 like Madison's in Ohio,6Missouri,7and Mississippi.8 Were the public widely opposed to execution in such cases, one would expect a swift legislative response— a groundswell like the ones that preceded Atkins and Roper .See Atkins , 536 U.S. at 313-18; Roper , 543 U.S. at 564-67.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 F.3d 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 F.3d 1110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 S.W.3d 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 S.W.3d 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "27 So.3d 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 S.E.2d 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "207 S.W.3d 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Nor has it persuaded any lower court.10Because there is no ba- sis in the evolving standards of decency to hold that any mental illness precludes execution, neither Mad- ison nor his amici expressly argue for such a rule. C. The State has valid penological interests in punishing a murderer who cannot re- member committing a crime. Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" 554 U.S. 407.",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 N.E.2d 454",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "Finally, a prisoner's ability to recall his crime is irrelevant to whether his execution would advance the penological interests the Court has singled out as 10SeeIn re440 F.3d 220; ; 388 F.3d 1110; 320 S.W.3d 284; 318 S.W.3d 368; 27 So.3d 11; 670 S.E.2d 87; 855 N.E.2d 48; 207 S.W.3d 24; 833 N.E.2d 454; 293 P.3d 198. 35 \"the two distinct social purposes served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The retributive value of punishment depends on an offender's culpability at the time of the offense , not at the time when his sentence will be executed. There is likewise no reason to believe that Madison's execution will not have the same deterrent effect as any other execution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "From a retributive perspective, amnesia developed after the commission of a capital offense has no bearing on whether the offender de- serves to be executed for his crime. Retributive jus- tice requires the punishment of offenders because they have engaged in culpable wrongdoing and thus deserve to be punished. SeeAtkins , 536 U.S. at 319; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Michael S. Moore, Justifying Retributivism , 27 Isr. L. Rev. 15, 30 (1993).",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "15, 30 (1993). The object of retributive justice is the can- cellation of a wrong committed against an individual and the State through the elimination \"of the moral imbalance caused by the offense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This imbalance arises when an offender engages in culpable wrongdoing and cannot be corrected until he receives the pun- ishment he deserves. Put otherwise, retributive justice is backward- looking and concerned only with the offender's cul- pability at the time when he committed the offense in question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "at 26. 39 calculus that precedes the decision\" to commit a capital crime. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike the intellectually disabled or juveniles, offenders like Madison do not form a class of persons who are \"less likely to consider potential punishment\" when deciding whether to commit a capital offense. 567 U.S. 460.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Madison's position finds no support in state legislation or sentencing practice",
		"context": "428 U.S. 153. Unlike the intellectually disabled or juveniles, offenders like Madison do not form a class of persons who are \"less likely to consider potential punishment\" when deciding whether to commit a capital offense. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If anything, extending the doctrine of Ford and Panetti to Madison's amnesia claim would diminish the general deterrent value of capital punishment by interposing between conviction and execution a requirement that a prisoner independently remember committing their crime. This would make it less likely that any given offender will be executed for his crime, since there is a nontrivial chance that anyone can develop a memory-impairing health condition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm",
		"context": "That is because a company with- out market power cannot unilaterally restrict industry- wide output sufficient to rais e prices. The courts of ap- peals have embraced that maxim, declaring that \"[t]he first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Rea- son is market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries that matter under the federal antitrust laws.\" Menasha [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See, e.g., Buccaneer Energy, 846 F.3d 1297. Statements from this Court support that principle as well.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm",
		"context": "The courts of ap- peals have embraced that maxim, declaring that \"[t]he first requirement in every suit based on the Rule of Rea- son is market power, without which the practice cannot cause those injuries that matter under the federal antitrust laws.\" Menasha 354 F.3d 661. See, e.g., Buccaneer Energy, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Statements from this Court support that principle as well. See Lee- 9 gin, 551 U.S. at 885-886 (\"Whet her the businesses in- volved have market power is a further, significant con-sideration.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 1297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. It is settled law that a company must have market power to cause competitive harm",
		"context": "See Lee- 9 gin, 551 U.S. at 885-886 (\"Whet her the businesses in- volved have market power is a further, significant con-sideration. \"); Cal. Dental , 526 U.S. at 78 2 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asking whether defendant had \"sufficient market power to make a difference\"); Copperweld [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These three principles have become increasingly en- trenched in recent years. Businesses rely upon these ax-ioms to guide their behavior.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights",
		"context": "Allowing defendants to excuse themselves from liability for specific kinds of claims or particular forms of relief is not the FAA's ob- jective. This Court's decisions en forcing arbitration agree- ments thus repeatedly emphasize that arbitration in-volves choice of forum, not waiver of claims: \"By agree- ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resoluti on in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\" Mitsubishi Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Waffle House , 534 U.S. at 295, n.10; 500 U.S. 20; Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 477; Shearson/Am. 18 Express, 482 U.S. 220. An agreement to arbitrate is thus not \"a prospec- tive waiver of the substantive right.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights",
		"context": "Allowing defendants to excuse themselves from liability for specific kinds of claims or particular forms of relief is not the FAA's ob- jective. This Court's decisions en forcing arbitration agree- ments thus repeatedly emphasize that arbitration in-volves choice of forum, not waiver of claims: \"By agree- ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resoluti on in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\" Mitsubishi Motors 473 U.S. 614; accord Waffle House , 534 U.S. at 295, n.10; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 477; Shearson/Am. 18 Express, 482 U.S. 220. An agreement to arbitrate is thus not \"a prospec- tive waiver of the substantive right.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights",
		"context": "Allowing defendants to excuse themselves from liability for specific kinds of claims or particular forms of relief is not the FAA's ob- jective. This Court's decisions en forcing arbitration agree- ments thus repeatedly emphasize that arbitration in-volves choice of forum, not waiver of claims: \"By agree- ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resoluti on in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\" Mitsubishi Motors 473 U.S. 614; accord Waffle House , 534 U.S. at 295, n.10; 500 U.S. 20; Rodriguez de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Shearson/Am. 18 Express, 482 U.S. 220. An agreement to arbitrate is thus not \"a prospec- tive waiver of the substantive right.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights",
		"context": "This Court's decisions en forcing arbitration agree- ments thus repeatedly emphasize that arbitration in-volves choice of forum, not waiver of claims: \"By agree- ing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resoluti on in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.\" Mitsubishi Motors 473 U.S. 614; accord Waffle House , 534 U.S. at 295, n.10; 500 U.S. 20; Rodriguez de 490 U.S. 477; Shearson/Am. 18 Express, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An agreement to arbitrate is thus not \"a prospec- tive waiver of the substantive right.\" 14 Penn Plaza 556 U.S. 247.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's FAA decisions do not require enforcement of agreements that bar assertion of statutory rights",
		"context": "18 Express, 482 U.S. 220. An agreement to arbitrate is thus not \"a prospec- tive waiver of the substantive right.\" 14 Penn Plaza [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, this Court has agreed that an arbitration clause contain- ing \"a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies\" would be \"against public policy,\" Mitsubishi , 473 U.S. at 637, n.19—precisely Is- kanian 's rationale. In American Express , this Court held that a class- action ban in an arbitration agreement was enforcea-ble despite its practical effect of making antitrust claims too costly for the plaintiffs, 570 U.S. at 238–39, but reiterated that the FAA does not require enforce- ment of arbitration agreements that expressly waive statutory claims and remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' arguments do not support a categorical rule against inclusion of outside-the-fenceline measures in the BSER",
		"context": "7410(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The \"term 'including' connotes simply an illustrative appli- cation of the general principle.\" Federal L and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 7410(a)(2)(A)'s language thus demonstrates that Con- gress viewed \"economic incentives\" as \"control measures, means, or techniques\" within the meaning of that provi- sion. Section 7410 accordi ngly provides no sound basis to read the comparably broad term \"system of emission reduction\" to exclude market -based trading regimes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 U.S. 95",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Hardison has neither proved unworkable nor foreclosed religious-accommodation claims",
		"context": "To ask whether a precedent is \"workable\" is to ask \"whether it can be understood and applied in a con- sistent and predictable manner.\" 142 S. Ct. 2228. A precedent may be unworkable if it leads to \"uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication,\" 576 U.S. 591, \"embroil[s] courts in technical and arbitrary disp utes,\" South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or causes un- foreseen practical problems in application, 139 S. Ct. 2162. Petitioner does not contend that Hardison has yielded any such diffi culties. Instead, petitioner asserts (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Hardison has neither proved unworkable nor foreclosed religious-accommodation claims",
		"context": "To ask whether a precedent is \"workable\" is to ask \"whether it can be understood and applied in a con- sistent and predictable manner.\" 142 S. Ct. 2228. A precedent may be unworkable if it leads to \"uncertainty and arbitrariness of adjudication,\" 576 U.S. 591, \"embroil[s] courts in technical and arbitrary disp utes,\" South 138 S. Ct. 2080, or causes un- foreseen practical problems in application, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner does not contend that Hardison has yielded any such diffi culties. Instead, petitioner asserts (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "Properly construed, Sections 11 and 12 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought regis- tered shares, not shares exempt from the registration requirement that the '33 Act imposes . That conclu- sion flows from the statutory text and structure , which links the right to sue under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) to the purchase of securities registered under the Act . It ensures \"a symmetrical and coherent reg- ulatory scheme,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by respecting and preserving the tex- tual and structural differences between Sections 11 and 12 of the '33 Act , on the one hand , and Section 17 of the '33 Act and Section 10(b) of the '34 Act , on the other . And it has been consistently endorsed by courts and the SEC and ratified by Congress. The Ninth Cir- cuit's contrary conclusion —under which Sections 11 and 12 would apply to all shares of the same class, registered or exempt, that under the rules of a partic- ular exchange can be traded only after a statement has been filed for the registered shares —has no basis in the text, context, or history.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) . The question here is whether \"such security\" means (as this Court has suggested ) \"a registered se- curity\" issued under the supposedly misleading state- ment , Herman & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , or instead (as the Ninth Circuit held) any security, registered or exempt from the registra- tion requirement, so long as that security could not be traded on a public exchange without the filing of a reg- istration state ment, Pet. App. 15a -18a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "1722, 1723 (1986), reached precisely this conclu- sion more than 50 years ago. As he explained, because the '33 Act requires \"only individual shares [to be] reg- istered,\" it is \"unlikely that the section developed to insure proper disclosure in the registration statement was meant to provide a remedy for other than the par- ticular shares registered.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The more \"natural\" read- ing, Judge Friendly explained, is that Section 11 ap- plies only to plaintiffs who buy \"a security issued pur-suant to the registration statement\" —i.e. , the \"regis- tered shares.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.2d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "Judge Friendly reached that conclusion after can- vassing the views of courts, scholars, and regulators. The Second Circui t had already observed that the '33 Act's liability provisions could be invoked \"only by one who comes within a narrow class of persons,\" namely, \"those who purchase securities that are the 24 direct subject of the prospectus and registration state- ment.\" Fis [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fischman was authored by Judge Frank, \"a leading member of the SEC in its early days,\" and the interpretation it endorsed soon made its way into the \"leading treatise\" on securities law. Barne s, 373 F.2d at 273.",
		"citation_value_orig": "188 F.2d 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "11(C)(2) (Supp. 2023) (claim \"may be brought by any person who acquired a registered security\"). Judge Friendly also drew from the analysis in Co- lonial Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the court emphasized the textual link between Section 6, which deems registra- tion statements \"effective only as to the securities specified therein,\" and Section 11, which gives the right to sue only to a person \"acquiring such security.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 F. Supp. 875",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "373 25 F.2d at 273. The SEC's brief explained that the phrase \"such security\" \"is clearly a limitation\" indicat-ing that Section 11's cause of action must \"be coexten- sive with the scope of the reg istration provisions.\" Brief for the SEC at 3 -4, Barnes , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Nos. 30867- 30869) [hereinafter Barnes SEC Br.]. 1 The SEC grounded that view in the statutory text.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.2d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "17. But \"'[a]mbiguity is a creature not of defini- tional possibilities but of statutory context ' \"; it does not arise merely from reading a provision \" in isola- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the text of S ec- tions 11 and 12, surrounding provisions of the '33 Act, broader statutory context, and a long history of uni- form interpretation confirm that plaintiffs suing un- der Sections 11 and 12 must plead and prove they bought shares registered under the challenged regis- tration statement. 4 A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "29. C ourts have consistently reject ed that view, holding that the \"natural\" way to read \"such se- curity\" in Section 11 is as referring to the \"newly reg- istered shares\" that are \"issued pursuant to the regis- tration statement\" being challenged. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Slack Br. 23-25, 31-33; Pet. 15-21.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.2d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "Sec- tion 11 thus caps an underwriter's liability at the total 6 proceeds received from the sale of shares registered under the misleading registrat ion statement. That cap would make no sense if, as respondent contends , purchasers of unregistered shares could also sue. Barnes , 373 F.2d at 272; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Nos. 30867- 30869). 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 F.2d 269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "That is what it means to read statutes \"in context ,\" not \"in isolation .\" Brown & Williamson , 529 U.S. at 132. That approach has a long lineage, e.g., Sims' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and cer- tainly has more merit than abandoning text and structur e in favor of supposed purpose. 1 Elsewhere, respondent concedes that \" 'such secu- rit[y]' refers to the registration statement previously mentioned\" in the Act. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 425",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. SECTIONS 11 AND 12 REQUIRE PLAINTIFFS TO PROVE THEY BOUGHT REGISTERED SHARES",
		"context": "But the SEC has never said anything of the kind —and notably de- clined to do so here. In fact, t he SEC's own conduct refutes respond- ent's argument. Registration statements \"must be ap- proved by the SEC\" before any shares are sold, Mad- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and here the SEC approved Slack's registration statement even though Slack made clear that not all shares would be registered , C.A. ECF 11-2 at 49 ( not- ing registration of 118,429,640 shares and registra- tion fee based on those shares); id. at 225 ( identifying shareholders with only some shares \"being Regis- tered\"); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 F.3d 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "The constitutional violation in this case is especially egregious because it involves the education of children . The right of a parent to determine the role of religion in his child's education is one of the most important ele- ments of religious liberty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 268 U.S. 510. Some parents believe that schools should \"inculcate all needed temporal know - ledge\" but should \"maintain a strict and lo fty neutrality as to religion \"—so that the child can receive his reli- gious instruction at home or in church, or so that \"after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion\" on his own. Everson , 330 U.S. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "The constitutional violation in this case is especially egregious because it involves the education of children . The right of a parent to determine the role of religion in his child's education is one of the most important ele- ments of religious liberty. See 406 U.S. 205; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some parents believe that schools should \"inculcate all needed temporal know - ledge\" but should \"maintain a strict and lo fty neutrality as to religion \"—so that the child can receive his reli- gious instruction at home or in church, or so that \"after the individual has been instructed in worldly wisdom he will be better fitted to choose his religion\" on his own. Everson , 330 U.S. at 24 (Jackson, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "15 -24) that pro- cedural obstacles preclude this Court from reaching the merits . \"In granting certiorari, [the Court] necessarily considered and rejected that contention as a basis for denying review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Montana nevertheless argues (Br. in Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "34, 39 & n. 30) that the Free Exercise Clause prohibit s \"disc rimination against all religion, \" that the Department of Reve nue's reading of the no -aid provision placed that provision \" on a collision course with t he U.S. Constitution, \" and that the invalidation of the whole program still \" fails to harmonize [the no -aid provision] with the Religion Clauses.\" In any event , \"[i]t is irrelevant to this Court's juris- diction whether a party raised below and argued a federal -law issue that the state supreme court actually considered and decided.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Montana Supreme Court explicitly decided that the no -aid provision complies with the Free Exercise Clause, stating that, although \"there may be a case\" where an \"overly broad\" applicat ion of the no -aid provision \"could implicate free exercise con- cerns,\" \"this is not one of those cases.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "That , too, is incorrect. The doctrine of inde- pendent and adequate state grounds has no application where the \"ruling under state law implicates an under- lying question of federal law\" —for instance, where the challenger contends that the state court had no author-ity to apply the state law in the first place, because the state law itself violates federal law. International Long-shoremen's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 18 state court's ruling under the no -aid provision \"impli- cates an underlying question of federal law,\" ibid. — namely, whether the no -aid provision violates the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S. Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Because the no -aid provision contravenes the U.S. Constitution, the state court had no authority to enforce it, and certainly no authority to award a remedy for its violation . In general, \"[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A court faced with a n unconstitutional law must thus decide the case \"conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law.\" 5 U.S. 137.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Ex parte100 U.S. 371. A court faced with a n unconstitutional law must thus decide the case \"conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Montana Supreme Court violated that obligation when, instead of disregarding the unconstitutional no -aid provision, it applied that provision to terminate the tax -credit program. 19 That conclusion is not contrary to 403 U.S. 217, and 396 U.S. 435, where this Court held that a S tate does not violate the Equal Protection Clause's prohibi- tion on racial discrimination by closing a public facility (such as a swimming pool or a public park) to black and white citizens al ike.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "5 U.S. 137. The Montana Supreme Court violated that obligation when, instead of disregarding the unconstitutional no -aid provision, it applied that provision to terminate the tax -credit program. 19 That conclusion is not contrary to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 396 U.S. 435, where this Court held that a S tate does not violate the Equal Protection Clause's prohibi- tion on racial discrimination by closing a public facility (such as a swimming pool or a public park) to black and white citizens al ike. Neither Palmer nor Evans in- volved a state law that discriminated o n its face on the basis of race in the way that the no -aid provision dis- criminates on its face on the basis of religion. To the contrary, in Evans , the Court emphasized that the clo- sure of the park resulted from \"the operation of neutral and nondiscriminatory state trust laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "5 U.S. 137. The Montana Supreme Court violated that obligation when, instead of disregarding the unconstitutional no -aid provision, it applied that provision to terminate the tax -credit program. 19 That conclusion is not contrary to 403 U.S. 217, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where this Court held that a S tate does not violate the Equal Protection Clause's prohibi- tion on racial discrimination by closing a public facility (such as a swimming pool or a public park) to black and white citizens al ike. Neither Palmer nor Evans in- volved a state law that discriminated o n its face on the basis of race in the way that the no -aid provision dis- criminates on its face on the basis of religion. To the contrary, in Evans , the Court emphasized that the clo- sure of the park resulted from \"the operation of neutral and nondiscriminatory state trust laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "403 U.S. at 221 n.6, 225. The conclusion that Montana has violated the Free Exercise Clause is also consistent with the principle that a S tate may cure a denial of equal treatment either by leveling up (extending the benefit to all) or leveling down (withholding the benefit from all). See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The state court's invalidation of the tax -credit program may have cured the discrimination in the Department of Revenue's regulation excluding religious groups from the program, but it has not cured the discrimination in the no-aid provision itself. The S tate has neither lev- eled that provision up (allowing both religious and sec-ular private s chools to receive public funds ) nor leveled that provision down (prohibiting all private schools 20 from receiving public funds ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Id. at 22-23 (citing State ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Disqualifying a school from receiving any public funds because it is \"religiously affiliated,\" even if the school provides \"standard, non -religious instruction,\" is discrimination on the basis of religious status, not reli- gious use. 4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 P.2d 1013",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Board of 392 U.S. 236, 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Montana's no-aid provision impermissibly denies benefits on the basis of religious status",
		"context": "Time and again, this Court h as rejected con- tentions that a State has violated the Establishment Clause by allowing religious groups to benefit from neu- tral government al programs that are generally open to broad classes of participants. \"If a program offers per- missible aid to the religious (including the pervasively sectarian), the areligious, and the irreligious, it is a mys- tery which view of religion the government has estab- lished, and thus a mystery what th e constitutional vio- lation would be.\" Mitchell , 530 U.S. at 827 (plurality opinion ); see 536 U.S. 639; Good News 533 U.S. 98; 521 U.S. 203; 515 U.S. 819; Capitol Square Review & Advisory 515 U.S. 753 ; 509 U.S. 1; Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ; 474 U.S. 481; 463 U.S. 388 ; 454 U.S. 263 ; Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 243 -244 (1 968); Ever- son, 330 U.S. at 17 -18. Unable to argue that the no -aid provision is neces- sary to comply with the Establishment Clause, Montana asserts an interest in pursuing an even greater degree of separation between religion and government than the Establis hment Clause requires. T his Court has repeat- edly determined, however, that such an interest , stand- ing alone, is insufficient to justify discrimination against religion .",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Wetlands and streams contribute significantly to the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of traditional navigable waters",
		"context": "E.g., Charles R. Lane et al., Vulnerable Waters Are Essential to Watershed Resilience , Ecosystems (Feb. 7, 2022), https:// link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10021-021-00737-2; Kelly Addy et al., Connectivity and Nitrate Uptake Potential of Intermittent Streams in the Northeast USA , 7 Frontiers Ecology & Evolution (June 19, 2019), https:// www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fevo.2019.00225/ full; Leibowitz et al., supra . The EPA's Office of Research and Development analyzed the peer-reviewed scientific literature since the Connectivity Report 's publication and found that it supported the Connectivity Report 's conclusions and \"expanded scientific understanding and and biological contaminants, it would not apply to the discharge of dredged or fill material because those pollutants largely remain in place. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 quantification of functions that ephemeral streams and non-floodplain waters perform that affect the integrity of larger downstream [waters], particularly in the aggregate.\" EPA & U.S. Dep't of Army, Technical Support Document for the Proposed \"Revised Definition of 'Waters of the United States'\" Rule 62 (2021).",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Recognizing a Chilling Effect Is Necessary To Protect the Right to Anonymous Association",
		"context": "Engaging in anonymous speech and association was common at the time of the First Amendment' s ratification. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with this tradition, the First and Fourteenth Amendments contain an inherent right to remain anonymous when exercising one's freedom of association. See 428 U.S. 106.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Recognizing a Chilling Effect Is Necessary To Protect the Right to Anonymous Association",
		"context": "514 U.S. 334. Consistent with this tradition, the First and Fourteenth Amendments contain an inherent right to remain anonymous when exercising one's freedom of association. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Anonymous speech and association produce valuable social outcomes. Götz Bachmann, Michi Knecht , & Andreas Wittel, The S ocial Productivity of Anonymity , 17 Ephemera 241 (May 2017).",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The term \"extension\" in Section 7545(o)(9)(B)(i) does not encompass a resumption of an exemption that had previously lapsed",
		"context": "Tanigu- chi, 566 U.S. at 568. More relevant is the word's usage \"in everyday parlance.\" Mohamad , 566 U.S. at 454; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 35 An ordinary speaker would not use the word \"exten- sion\" to describe petitioners' request , especially given the statutory context . A hotel guest seeking to book a favorite room, for ex- ample, would not ask to \"extend\" a stay that had oc- curred years earlier.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 1. a. i. In Section 1395l (t)(14)(A)(iii), Congress laid out alternative reimbursement -rate methodolo- gies for outpatient drugs and made the agency's choice between th em dependent on the availability of certain statutorily defined data.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "1395l (t)(14)(D)(iii)—is rendered a dead letter. This is therefore as clear a case as can be im agined of an agency \"constru [ing] the statute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit\" the agency's \"discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"What- ever effect may be accorded\" the ag ency's adjustment authority under subclause (II), that authority \"cannot be thought to render\" the statute's \"carefully designed restrictions on [the agency's] discretion utterly nuga-tory.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "1395l (t)(14)(A)(iii)(II). First, \"adjust\" carries a \"connotation of increment or limitation.\" MCI Telecomm s. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. D ictionary 37 definitions of \"adjust\" from the relevant time state that to ad just something is to make only a slight change. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "at 68,386 -68,387. It affects large numbers of 340B hospitals, including major aca- demic medical centers, public and not -for-profit hospi- tals, and small community hospitals , as well as the communities those hospitals serve. See Astra USA, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; OIG Report 2. And it cuts the drug -reimbursement amount received by 340B hospitals by $1.6 billion or more for each year the cuts are in effect, Pet.App.6a, 40 which represents a crushing blow to providers that were already operating on razor -thin or negative mar- gins and to the vulnerable populations they serve, s ee, e.g., Allen Dobson et al. , The Role of 340B Hospitals in Serving Medicaid an d Low -income Medicare Patients 3-4 (July 10, 2020) , https://www.340bhealth.org/ files/ 340B_ and_ Medicaid_ and_Low_Income_Medicare_ Pa- tients_Report_7.10.2020_FINAL_ .pdf; Tom Nickels, Report Misrepresents 340B Program to Deflect from Sky High Drug P rices, AHA Stat: An American Hospi- tal Association Blog (Nov. 22, 2019) , https:// www.aha.org/news/blog/2019- 11-22-report -misrepre- sents -340b- program -deflect -sky-high-drug -prices .",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "As this Court has repeat- edly found in other contexts, it is highly unlikely that Congress would use \"such a subtle device\" to authorize the agency to remake Medicare reimbursement . MCI , 512 U.S. at 231; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Whitman , 531 U.S. at 468; 529 U.S. 120 . 2. The panel majority below gave several reasons for rejecting the conclusion that the statutory lan- guage unambiguously forecloses the rate change.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "As this Court has repeat- edly found in other contexts, it is highly unlikely that Congress would use \"such a subtle device\" to authorize the agency to remake Medicare reimbursement . MCI , 512 U.S. at 231; see, e.g. , 546 U.S. 243; Whitman , 531 U.S. at 468; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2. The panel majority below gave several reasons for rejecting the conclusion that the statutory lan- guage unambiguously forecloses the rate change.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "13 And given that Congress for- bade reimbursement based on acquisition cost unless the agency collected and used that cost -survey data, it cannot be s aid that Congress had some overarching purpose to encourage reimbursement based on acqui-sition cost when —as here —that data is not available. Congress \"wrote the statute it wrote— meaning, a stat- ute going so far and no further.\" Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A statute that makes it harder to set cost- based rates than to set price -based rates does not express a policy favoring the former across the board. In fact, given the emphasis Congress placed on the required data, the primary purpose of paragraph (14) is best understood as ensuring accuracy in carrying out Congress's specific reimbursement -rate instruc- tions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "Overlap may simply indi-cate that Congress intended to remove any doubt about the propriety of taking overhead and related ex- penses into account. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More fundamen- tally , there is no equivalence between a \"little overlap\" in the \"complex statutory scheme\" governing Medi- care, Pet.App.37a (dissent) (citation omitted), and the gutted statute that would result from the agency 's in- terpretation —an interpretation that would wipe away an express precondition that Congress placed on use of any acquisition -cost-based rate, and render mean- ingless \"nearly a full column in the U.S. Code\" govern-ing how the agency is to gather cost data. Pet.App.39a (dissent); see p p. 35- 36, supra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 214",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "Pet.App.24a. But that is precisely what the text of the statute prohibits, see p p. 31- 41, supra , and \" policy considerations cannot create an ambiguity when the words on the page are clear.\" SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whatever the agency's \"bureaucratic policy goals,\" the agency \"has 46 no power to 'tailor' legislation\" to those goals \"by re- writing unambiguous statutory terms.\" Util.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "Chevron deference cannot save the agency's rate-setting decision because paragraph (14) is not genuinely ambiguous with respect to whether the agency may set reimbursement rates for outpatient drugs based on acquisition cost without conducting the statutorily pres cribed cost study. A court may not even consider whether to afford Chevron deference un- less a statutory provision is \" genuinely ambiguous\" as to the question at issue, \"even after a court has re-sorted to all the standard tools of interpretation.\" Ki- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g. , Epic, 138 S. Ct. at 1630; SAS Inst. , 138 S. Ct. at 1358.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "See Kisor , 139 S. Ct. at 2415. 48 agency's action is within the scope o f the delegation. See, e.g., City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] sets forth for cost-based rates. The majority acknowledged the \"force\" of petitioners' argument that, under the agency's interpretation, the entirety of subclause (I) would be rendered \"meaningless.\" Pet.App.23a -24a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "I t is not necessary to be able to say with absolute certainty what does fall within the scope of the agency's sub- clause (II) adjustment authority in order to rule that the agency's actions here do not constitute a permissi- ble subclause (II) adjustment. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The agency's use of its adjustment authority was, at bottom, an act of legislation, not interpretation. It cannot be justified on the basis of Chevron .",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 511",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Section 1395l(t)(14) Unambiguously Bars The Agency's Change In Reimbursement Rates",
		"context": "Upholding the agency's action on the basis of Chevron would \"raise[] serious separation -of-powers questions.\" 576 U.S. 743. When a court rushes to declare a statute ambiguous while leaving interpre-tive tools on the shelf, and while assuming that the slightest lack of clarity in the statute's language nec- essarily leaves the a gency free to \"dictate the outcome\" through an \"erroneous interpretation[],\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], then that court has abdicated its duty to say what the law is. No def- erence doctrine should endorse that untenable ap- proach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. ERISA Preemption Is Intended To Encourage Employers To Provide Employee Benefit Plans But Permitting The Act To Stand Will Lead to Increased Administrative Costs and Loss of Prescription Drug Coverage",
		"context": "ERISA \"represents a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair claims settlement procedures against the public interest in encouraging the formation of 9 Greg Goth, Negotiating Price Transparency with PBMs Pays Off, Society for Human Resource Management (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/benefits/pages/ negotiating-drug-prices-pbms.aspx. 10 employee benefit plans .\" Aetna Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].10 In other words, in enacting ERISA, Congress recognized that employers would be better able to provide employee benefits plans if they were guaran- teed that such plans would be governed by federal law. Employers would thus avoid the administrative burden of having to comply with 50 different regulatory regimes. The Act endangers this bargain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "T he gist of petitioners' argument is, unfortunately, not novel. But it has consistently been rejected by this Court and others. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 899 F.2d 1389. The principle that the free exercise of religion by petitioner and others can be subject to regulation, notwithstanding the sincerity with which they hold their religious belief, is well -established as both a point of history and by this Court's precedent. Writing in 1822, James Madison lauded \"the immunity of Religion from Civil Jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or public peace.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "T he gist of petitioners' argument is, unfortunately, not novel. But it has consistently been rejected by this Court and others. See , e.g., 390 U.S. 400; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle that the free exercise of religion by petitioner and others can be subject to regulation, notwithstanding the sincerity with which they hold their religious belief, is well -established as both a point of history and by this Court's precedent. Writing in 1822, James Madison lauded \"the immunity of Religion from Civil Jurisdiction, in every case where it does not trespass on private rights or public peace.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.2d 1389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (J uly 10, 1822), in 9 The Writings of James Madison 98, 100 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) [hereinafter \" Madison Letter\"] (emphasis added). In her dissent in City of Boerne v. Flores, Justice O'Connor expounded on the historical background which supports the rule that free exercise of religion is subject to regulation where, as noted by Madison, \"under color of religion[,] the preservation of equal liberty, and the existence of the State be manifestly endangered.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, this Court recently acknowledged in Masterpiece Cakeshop, a precursor to this case, that \"[t]he Court's precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws.\" 128 S. Ct. at 1724– 25.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "128 S. Ct. at 1724– 25. This Court has consistently adhered to this principle. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 321 U.S. 158. To decide this case in favor of petitioners would undermine this Court's extensive Free Exercise Clause precedent, including its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop a mere four years ago. Indeed, in other contexts, this Court and lower courts have specifically rejected the idea that exercising one's religious beliefs is a justification for discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "128 S. Ct. at 1724– 25. This Court has consistently adhered to this principle. 455 U.S. 252 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To decide this case in favor of petitioners would undermine this Court's extensive Free Exercise Clause precedent, including its decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop a mere four years ago. Indeed, in other contexts, this Court and lower courts have specifically rejected the idea that exercising one's religious beliefs is a justification for discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "For example, this Court characterized an effort to rely on religious liberty to justify racial discrimination as \"patently frivolous.\" See Newman , 390 U.S . at 402, n. 5; see also Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd in part on other grounds , 377 F.2d 433, aff'd390 U.S. 400. Likewise, sex -based discrimination justified on religious liberty grounds has also been squarely rejected. See Dole, 899 F.2d at 1392 (ho lding that there is no free exercise exemption from a federal statute requiring equal pay for men and women); 781 F.2d 1362.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "For example, this Court characterized an effort to rely on religious liberty to justify racial discrimination as \"patently frivolous.\" See Newman , 390 U.S . at 402, n. 5; see also Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574, rev'd in part on other grounds , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd390 U.S. 400. Likewise, sex -based discrimination justified on religious liberty grounds has also been squarely rejected. See Dole, 899 F.2d at 1392 (ho lding that there is no free exercise exemption from a federal statute requiring equal pay for men and women); 781 F.2d 1362.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 F.2d 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "For example, this Court characterized an effort to rely on religious liberty to justify racial discrimination as \"patently frivolous.\" See Newman , 390 U.S . at 402, n. 5; see also Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574, rev'd in part on other grounds , 377 F.2d 433, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, sex -based discrimination justified on religious liberty grounds has also been squarely rejected. See Dole, 899 F.2d at 1392 (ho lding that there is no free exercise exemption from a federal statute requiring equal pay for men and women); 781 F.2d 1362.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "at 402, n. 5; see also Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574, rev'd in part on other grounds , 377 F.2d 433, aff'd390 U.S. 400. Likewise, sex -based discrimination justified on religious liberty grounds has also been squarely rejected. See Dole, 899 F.2d at 1392 (ho lding that there is no free exercise exemption from a federal statute requiring equal pay for men and women); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While some of the amici supporting petitioners' position suggest there is a difference between race and sexual orientation in light of the historical suffering of racial minorities, it is that history which teaches us that harm to a person's individual dignity and the stigmatization of individuals as second -class citizens is unquestionably incompatible with the promise of equality for all enshrined in our Constitution. As such, the goal of laws protecting people based on eac h of the identities delineated in CADA and similar anti -discrimination laws, is the same: to promote equality and eliminate indignities and stigmatization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.2d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Religious Liberty, Even Ostensibly Analyzed Under Free Speech, Is Not a License to Discriminate Against Others in the Public Sphere",
		"context": "While some of the amici supporting petitioners' position suggest there is a difference between race and sexual orientation in light of the historical suffering of racial minorities, it is that history which teaches us that harm to a person's individual dignity and the stigmatization of individuals as second -class citizens is unquestionably incompatible with the promise of equality for all enshrined in our Constitution. As such, the goal of laws protecting people based on eac h of the identities delineated in CADA and similar anti -discrimination laws, is the same: to promote equality and eliminate indignities and stigmatization. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No , 38 H ARV. J. L. & GENDER 177, 184 (2015). The fact that our civil society has advanced a step forward in 22 recent decades does not excuse taking two giant steps back.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "As the Court observed, although Congress expected courts to \"develop a federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA -regulated plans , the scope of permissible judicial innovation is narrower in areas where other federal actors are en- gaged.\" Ibid. (quoting Black & Decker Disability [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). T he Court noted that the view of the SEC \"may well be relevant\" on that question. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "And the Department of Labor concurs in the conclusion that ERISA does not impose a duty to disclose in tho se circumstances. This Court has recognized that the Exchange Act \"substitute[d] a philosophy of full disclosure for the phi- losophy of caveat emptor.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And 19 this principle has animated securities laws ever since. See 137 S. Ct. 1635 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1094",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "See 137 S. Ct. 1635 . Nevertheless, the securities la ws \"do not create an affirmative duty to disclose any and all\" material non- public information. Matrixx Initiatives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Even with respect to information that a reasonable investor might consider material, companies can control what they have to dis- close under [§ 10(b) and Rule 10b -5] by controlling what they say to the market.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": ". statements made not misle ading. ' \") (citation omitted) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2012 & Supp. V 2017) ; 17 C.F.R. 240.13a -1–240.13a-20, 249.306 -249.447. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "240.13a -1–240.13a-20, 249.306 -249.447. \" Ex- cept for [such] specific periodic reporting requirements (primarily the requirements to file quarterly and annual reports), \" however, \"there is no general duty on the part of a company to provide the public with all material information. \" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]910 F.2d 10. The disclosure of such information in an efficient mar- 20 ket may well change the stock price, but neither the cor- poratio n nor its insiders who possess s uch information necessarily have a duty under the securities laws to dis- close it.2 And a lthough it would not violate the securi- ties laws to make a full and fair public disclo sure of such information in the absence of any securities -laws duty, to construe ERISA to require disclos ure of confidential information that the securities laws do not (or do not yet) require to be disclosed could have significant market -distortive effects. The premature disclosure of confidential information during a potential acquisition or disposition, for example, could easily scuttle a deal that, if permitted to proceed, could add real value (or prevent greater loss) to the company, benefitting all shareholders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "114 F.3d 1410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "240.13a -1–240.13a-20, 249.306 -249.447. \" Ex- cept for [such] specific periodic reporting requirements (primarily the requirements to file quarterly and annual reports), \" however, \"there is no general duty on the part of a company to provide the public with all material information. \" In re114 F.3d 1410[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The disclosure of such information in an efficient mar- 20 ket may well change the stock price, but neither the cor- poratio n nor its insiders who possess s uch information necessarily have a duty under the securities laws to dis- close it.2 And a lthough it would not violate the securi- ties laws to make a full and fair public disclo sure of such information in the absence of any securities -laws duty, to construe ERISA to require disclos ure of confidential information that the securities laws do not (or do not yet) require to be disclosed could have significant market -distortive effects. The premature disclosure of confidential information during a potential acquisition or disposition, for example, could easily scuttle a deal that, if permitted to proceed, could add real value (or prevent greater loss) to the company, benefitting all shareholders.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.2d 10",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "The disclosure of such information in an efficient mar- 20 ket may well change the stock price, but neither the cor- poratio n nor its insiders who possess s uch information necessarily have a duty under the securities laws to dis- close it.2 And a lthough it would not violate the securi- ties laws to make a full and fair public disclo sure of such information in the absence of any securities -laws duty, to construe ERISA to require disclos ure of confidential information that the securities laws do not (or do not yet) require to be disclosed could have significant market -distortive effects. The premature disclosure of confidential information during a potential acquisition or disposition, for example, could easily scuttle a deal that, if permitted to proceed, could add real value (or prevent greater loss) to the company, benefitting all shareholders. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2015 WL 5172974. The securities laws afford companies discretion around the timing of public disclosures , to permit com- panies to pursue strategic initiatives in a manner that maximizes value for their shareholders while en- suring that no one purchaser or seller of stock has an 2 In many cases, absent an affirmative legal duty to disclose, such perso ns may have contractual, employment, fiduciary , or other ob- ligations to keep such information confidential. See O'Hagan , 521 U.S. at 651-6 54, 663; 17 C.F.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "745 F.2d 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "An individual on whom the securities laws do not impose such a duty may be less likely to have the familiarity with both the facts and the law to accurately determine w hat those obliga- tions are. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Prudent manag- ers conduct inquiries rather than jump the gun with half-formed stories as soon as a problem comes to their attention. [The company] might more plausibly have been accused of deceiving investors had managers called a press conference before completing the steps neces-sary to determine just what had happened.\") .",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 F.3d 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. An ERISA-based duty to disclose exceeding the securities laws' requirements would generally be inconsistent with the objectives of those laws",
		"context": "See 15 U.S.C. 78j- 1(b), 7245; 17 C.F.R. 205.3; Digital Realty Tr ust, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ERISA shoul d not be construed to impose a duty on an ERISA fiduciary to make a public disclosure in similar circumstances . The risk of harm to a well- functioning market posed by the unilateral disclosure by a well- intentioned, but non -fully informed , ERISA fiduciary would conflict with the objectives of the secu- rities laws' reticulated reporting and disclosure regime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 767",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "As Justice Scalia explained, Justice Frankfurter's \"old soil\" comment \"colorfully\" expresses the familiar canon of statutory construction that when Congress employs \"terms of art\" with \"well-settled meaning,\" it \"intends to incorporate\" that meaning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That 5 principle applies both to terms that have an estab- lished common-law meaning and to statutory terms that have acquired a settled meaning through judicial construction or, in some cases, administrative use. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Judicial Texts 320–33 (2012) (de- scribing \"canon of imputed common-law meaning\" and \"prior-construction canon\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "This interpretive principle has inherent limits. To begin with, as this Court has emphasized in its most recent decisions discussing the subject, \"[a]lthough statutory language 'obviously transplanted from an- other legal source' will often 'bring the old soil with it,' that principle applies only when a term's meaning was 'well-settled' before the transplantation.\" 596 U.S. None[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 141 S. Ct. 2434. Moreover, even when a st atutory word or phrase had a settled meaning at common law or in a prior statute, the language, struct ure, or context of a newer statute using the same word or phrase may reveal a different meaning. The principle calling for giving a statutory word or phrase an established legal meaning gives way \"when the applicat ion of other sound rules of interpretation overcomes this canon.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "Thus, if express language in a more recent statute is incompatible with giving a statutory term an establis hed meaning from a prior statute, the basic principle that the plain meaning of a statute's text is controlling, see Yellen , 141 S. Ct. at 2441, will foreclose importation of the interpretation given to the prior statute. Statutory context and structure may also weigh de- cisively against treating a statutory phrase as a term of art incorporating the meaning given to other stat- utes using the same phrase. See Yellen , 141 S. Ct. at 2443–44; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 546 U.S. 243. 7 The relevant context incl udes statutory purposes expressly stated in or inferable from the text, as \"[t]he evident purpose of what a te xt seeks to achieve is an essential element of context that gives meaning to words.\" Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "Thus, if express language in a more recent statute is incompatible with giving a statutory term an establis hed meaning from a prior statute, the basic principle that the plain meaning of a statute's text is controlling, see Yellen , 141 S. Ct. at 2441, will foreclose importation of the interpretation given to the prior statute. Statutory context and structure may also weigh de- cisively against treating a statutory phrase as a term of art incorporating the meaning given to other stat- utes using the same phrase. See Yellen , 141 S. Ct. at 2443–44; 559 U.S. 133; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 The relevant context incl udes statutory purposes expressly stated in or inferable from the text, as \"[t]he evident purpose of what a te xt seeks to achieve is an essential element of context that gives meaning to words.\" Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 20. And where it is evident that statutes use the same lan-guage to address different subjects or achieve differ- ent ends, the construction given them in the earlier statute is not dispositive. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 532 U.S. 200. The inference that Congress intended to adopt the settled meaning of language used in an earlier statute is more likely to be appropriate \"when Cong ress uses the same lan- guage in two statutes having similar purposes.\" 544 U.S. 228412 U.S. 427.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 20. And where it is evident that statutes use the same lan-guage to address different subjects or achieve differ- ent ends, the construction given them in the earlier statute is not dispositive. See , e.g., 510 U.S. 517; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The inference that Congress intended to adopt the settled meaning of language used in an earlier statute is more likely to be appropriate \"when Cong ress uses the same lan- guage in two statutes having similar purposes.\" 544 U.S. 228412 U.S. 427.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "See , e.g., 510 U.S. 517; see also 532 U.S. 200. The inference that Congress intended to adopt the settled meaning of language used in an earlier statute is more likely to be appropriate \"when Cong ress uses the same lan- guage in two statutes having similar purposes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]412 U.S. 427. 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The interpretive principle that petitioners invoke applies only when context indicates that Congress adopted the well-settled meaning of a term of art.",
		"context": "See , e.g., 510 U.S. 517; see also 532 U.S. 200. The inference that Congress intended to adopt the settled meaning of language used in an earlier statute is more likely to be appropriate \"when Cong ress uses the same lan- guage in two statutes having similar purposes.\" 544 U.S. 228[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 271(f) was Enacted to Extend Patent Protection Covering United States Exports",
		"context": ". may be said not to exist .\" Von [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 377 U.S. 184. Although the Federal Circuit's holding did not deprive the petitioner in this case of all remedy, t he consequence of the per se rule created by the decision below is to deny an effective remedy and therefore to undermine the incentives for innovation Congress created . See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Finding \"Lost\" Profits: An Equilibrium Analysis o f Patent Infringement Damages , 23 J.L., ECON., & ORGANIZ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "71 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 271(f) was Enacted to Extend Patent Protection Covering United States Exports",
		"context": ". may be said not to exist .\" Von 71 U.S. 535; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the Federal Circuit's holding did not deprive the petitioner in this case of all remedy, t he consequence of the per se rule created by the decision below is to deny an effective remedy and therefore to undermine the incentives for innovation Congress created . See James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Finding \"Lost\" Profits: An Equilibrium Analysis o f Patent Infringement Damages , 23 J.L., ECON., & ORGANIZ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Even If The Continuing Violation Doctrine Did Apply, Petitioner's Claim Would Still Not Be Timely",
		"context": "Even where the doctrine applies, the continuing violation doctrine renders a claim timely only if \"an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period.\" Nat'l R.R. Passenger [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner's surviving claim is for violation of his 34 \"Constitutional Right Not to be Deprived of Liberty as a Result of Fabrication of Evidence.\" J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 101",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The President's Inherent Authority Over Foreign Affairs and National Security Should Resolve Any Legislative Conflict in His Favor",
		"context": "Because Section 1182 (f) clearly authorizes the Presidential Proclamation at issue here, resort ing to the President's independent powers directly under Ar- ticle II of the Constitutio n should not be necessary. See, e.g. , DeBartolo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But those powers, standing alo ne—even without Section 1182(f), and ar- guably even in the face of a statutory prohibition — support the President's action. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Because Railroads Cannot Choose To Shut Down In States Where They Now Operate, Registration-Jurisdiction Has Nothing To Do With \"Consent\"",
		"context": ". can be taken elsewhere and put to use at other places and under other circumstances.\" Southern [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1910 ). Congress too has recognized that railroads are \"easy prey\" for state and local authorities, because \"they are nonvoting, often nonresident, targets\" and \"cannot easily remove them- selves from the locality.\" Dep't of Revenue of 510 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "216 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Because Railroads Cannot Choose To Shut Down In States Where They Now Operate, Registration-Jurisdiction Has Nothing To Do With \"Consent\"",
		"context": "Southern 216 U.S. 400 (1910 ). Congress too has recognized that railroads are \"easy prey\" for state and local authorities, because \"they are nonvoting, often nonresident, targets\" and \"cannot easily remove them- selves from the locality.\" Dep't of Revenue of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Holding t hat Norfolk Southern \"vol- untarily\" subjected itself to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania because it has \"chosen\" not to exit the Commonwealth is the purest legal fiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Federal Government Is Not Responsible For Washington's Treaty Violations",
		"context": "52 estoppel by silence there must be something more than an opportunity to speak. There must be an obligation. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Washington identifies none. Nor did the federal govern ment require Washington to use any particular culvert design.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The decision below plainly split with the Ninth Circuit",
		"context": "Respondents wave away the Sixth Circuit's split from the Ninth as based on factual differences. But any differences favor the Attorney General, only highlighting how the panel below broke from the Ninth Circuit's approach. Take [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the case in which the Ninth Circuit allowed Hawaii to intervene to petition for rehearing en banc. Respondents contend that Day is different because, unlike here, Hawaii participated as an amicus before moving to intervene. Yet that cuts against 8 Respondents' position.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 963",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
		"context": "Michael Dimock & Richard Wike, America is exceptional in the nature of its political divide, Pew Research Center, Nov. 13, 2020 (last visited Feb. 23, 2021). 9 For these reasons, protection from public disclosure is just as important now as it was in the 1950s and 60s. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], NAACP members identities were protected from public disclo-sure because of showing a likelihood of \"economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.\" Id. at 463.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
		"context": "Id. at 463. This principle was again recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the Court found that \"[i]t is undoubtedly true th at public disclosure of contributions . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
		"context": "at 68. See also Brown 9 https://www.pewresearch.org/f act-tank/2020/11/13/america-is- exceptional-in-the-nature-of-its-political-divide/. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court found that disclosure would be unc onstitutional if a group's members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed. Id. at 201 (quoting Citizens 558 U.S. 310).",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
		"context": "459 U.S. 87, this Court found that disclosure would be unc onstitutional if a group's members would face threats, harassment, or reprisals if their names were disclosed. Id. at 201 (quoting Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The threats facing individuals in the above cases are even more likely now, when a govern-ment worker's sloppy handling of sensitive records, or a few keystrokes by a talen ted computer hacker, are sufficient to render Schedule B donor information public, and open those individuals to professional and personal attack. Concerns over public disclosure in the modern era are not cabined only to organizations like the Foundation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. MODERN TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION MAKE DISCLOSURE PROTECTIONS MORE IMPORTANT THAN EVER",
		"context": ". .\" California Bankers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). No one understood the need to keep prin-cipled financial supporters of potentially controversial positions anonymous better than the late Justice Ginsberg, who spent the better part of her career as an attorney fighting on behalf of women's rights. See Daniel Suhr, Justice Ginsburg and the Value of Anonymity , WSJ, Oct 15, 2020 (last visited Feb. 23, 2021).",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Article X, section 6(1) as applied also fails the Lemon test",
		"context": "Moreover, when this Court has considered reli- gious exclusions in the co ntext of the Free Speech Clause, it has agreed that they are unconstitutional. For example, the Court invalidated a regulation pro-hibiting the \"use\" of univers ity facilities \"for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, the Court held it unconstitutional for government to exclude groups from receiving student activity funds simply because the funds would be \"used . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Article X, section 6(1) as applied also fails the Lemon test",
		"context": ". for sectarian pur-poses\" or \"religious activities.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court also held that government unconsti- tutionally \"discriminate[d] on the basis of viewpoint\" when it \"permit[ted] school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child- rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint.\" Lamb's Chapel , 508 U.S. at 393.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": ". To the extent the Hobbs Act and APA leave any am- biguity, the \"strong presumption that Congress in- tends judicial review of administrative action\" coun-sels against construing the Act to preclude a defendant from obtaining review of the FCC's interpretation of the TCPA in an enforcement action. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Without that ability, many defendants will have no op- portunity for judicial review of the orders being en-forced against them because, in most cases, the 60-day window for direct review under the Hobbs Act will have long since closed. To address this problem, so me courts that have read the Hobbs Act as the Fourth Circuit did here have sug- gested that TCPA defendants may pursue judicial re-view by (1) filing a petition for reconsideration or rule- making with the FCC and th en (2) appealing any ad- verse decision by the FCC to a court of appeals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": "Without that ability, many defendants will have no op- portunity for judicial review of the orders being en-forced against them because, in most cases, the 60-day window for direct review under the Hobbs Act will have long since closed. To address this problem, so me courts that have read the Hobbs Act as the Fourth Circuit did here have sug- gested that TCPA defendants may pursue judicial re-view by (1) filing a petition for reconsideration or rule- making with the FCC and th en (2) appealing any ad- verse decision by the FCC to a court of appeals. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nack , 715 F.3d at 682. This suggestion, however, ignores that section 703 pre-serves the right to review in enforcement actions un- less another route is \"prior, adequate and exclusive,\" 36 and that the option of filing a petition with the agency after a suit commences is none of the above. Neither the petitions nor the eventual court of appeals proceed- ing would be prior to the enforcemen t suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 F. App'x 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": "Act of 1991 , 29 FCC Rcd. 13998, 14006 (2014), vacated sub nom. Bais Yaakov of Spring [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied138 S. Ct. 1043. In other words, the FCC generally rejects the premise that a declaratory ruling may be used as a substitute for the direct review available under the Hobbs Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "852 F.3d 1078",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": "37 Petitions for new rulemakings pose a different but equally fundamental problem. \"[A] statutory grant of legislative rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is con- veyed by Congress in express terms.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No such language appears in the TCPA. Thus, any new rules would be prospective, and a new prospective rule will not do anything to protect a defendant from liabil-ity for past conduct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Bais Yaakov , 852 F.3d at 1081 (hold- ing, in 2017, that the FCC lacked authority to issue TCPA regulation concerning solicited faxes and vacat- ing a 2014 FCC order denying a petition for a declara- tory ruling filed in 2010); cf. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court presiding over the TCPA suit can, of course, grant a discretionary stay of the action while the defendant pursues matters with the agency. But courts in TCPA suits have denied requests for such stays, viewing the route to Hobbs Act review as long and the outcome, uncertain.",
		"citation_value_orig": "798 F.3d 809",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Presumption Of Reviewability Of Agency Action Supports Construing The Hobbs Act Narrowly",
		"context": "Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note to 1998 amendment; see AT&T Mobility [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the fact rema ins that in cases that are not stayed, defendants risk losing the opportunity for any meaningful judicial review. 39 at 693 (noting a \"surge in TCPA lawsuits (including class actions) in recent years\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient",
		"context": "It also has no bas is in t he rec ord. So in addi tion to being wrong, the argument is waived. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State also hypothesizes th at trial counsel stra- tegically p icked Dr. Ronan over Dr. Goff during the mitigation phase because , as \"a neutral expert em- ployed by the State,\" Dr. Ronan's presentation of mit- igation eviden ce may hav e seemed \"more trustwor thy 26 than evidence from an expert h ired by the defense team.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Trial Counsel's Performance Was Constitutionally Deficient",
		"context": "36a, so that they could \"mak[e] an informed choice among possible defenses,\" id. at 36a– 37a (quot- ing Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 525). See Strickla nd, 466 U.S. a t 690– 91 (\"[S]trategic choices made after less than comp lete investi gation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments suppo rt the limitations on investiga tion\"); Wiggins , 539 U.S. at 524 (stating that the fa ilure to hire a fo- rensic social worker when \" funds [were] available\" amounted to deficient performance); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holdin g that the failure to use available funds to secure vital expert testimony was deficient performance). Counsel never learned anything that wou ld have made refus- ing ev en to contact Dr. Go ff rea sonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court should clarify that abortion regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Servs., 250 F. Supp. 3d 27. The result is that States are left to guess whether their chal- lenged abortion regulations must survive strict, or at least enhanced, scrutiny to be upheld, i.e., that they must prove that the regulation is necessary to advance a legitimate State interest. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has not retreated from its prior recog- nition that \"the State has legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child .\" Casey , 505 U.S. at 846 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court should clarify that abortion regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "To require such is a regres-sion to the standard rejected in Casey , particularly where the State's interest at issue is to protect the life of a fetus that may become a child. 29 If the Court intended state abortion regulations to be subject to strict or ev en intermediate scrutiny, it should say so. If not, the Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the be nefit advanced by Louisiana 29 The following cases followed the Court's decision in Roe: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled by Casey , 505 U.S. at 882 (invalidating various informed consent and reporting requirements); Akron , 462 U.S. 416 (in- validating parental consent, in formed consent, 24-hour waiting period, and disposal of fetal remains requirements); 443 U.S. 622; Danforth , 428 U.S. at 71, 74, 83 (invali- dating spousal consent, parental consent, and preservation of fe-tal life no matter the stage of pregnancy requirements); Bolton , 410 U.S. at 194, 198-200 (invalidating accreditation, hospital committee approval, two-doctor concurrence, and residency re- quirements). 23 in this case and make clea r that when an abortion reg- ulation is challenged as an undue burden, States are not required to prove that the abortion regulation at issue is necessary to adv ance a legitimate state inter- est. See June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court should clarify that abortion regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "To require such is a regres-sion to the standard rejected in Casey , particularly where the State's interest at issue is to protect the life of a fetus that may become a child. 29 If the Court intended state abortion regulations to be subject to strict or ev en intermediate scrutiny, it should say so. If not, the Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the be nefit advanced by Louisiana 29 The following cases followed the Court's decision in Roe: 497 U.S. 417, overruled by Casey , 505 U.S. at 882 (invalidating various informed consent and reporting requirements); Akron , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (in- validating parental consent, in formed consent, 24-hour waiting period, and disposal of fetal remains requirements); 443 U.S. 622; Danforth , 428 U.S. at 71, 74, 83 (invali- dating spousal consent, parental consent, and preservation of fe-tal life no matter the stage of pregnancy requirements); Bolton , 410 U.S. at 194, 198-200 (invalidating accreditation, hospital committee approval, two-doctor concurrence, and residency re- quirements). 23 in this case and make clea r that when an abortion reg- ulation is challenged as an undue burden, States are not required to prove that the abortion regulation at issue is necessary to adv ance a legitimate state inter- est. See June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Court should clarify that abortion regulations are not subject to strict scrutiny",
		"context": "To require such is a regres-sion to the standard rejected in Casey , particularly where the State's interest at issue is to protect the life of a fetus that may become a child. 29 If the Court intended state abortion regulations to be subject to strict or ev en intermediate scrutiny, it should say so. If not, the Court should affirm the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the be nefit advanced by Louisiana 29 The following cases followed the Court's decision in Roe: 497 U.S. 417, overruled by Casey , 505 U.S. at 882 (invalidating various informed consent and reporting requirements); Akron , 462 U.S. 416 (in- validating parental consent, in formed consent, 24-hour waiting period, and disposal of fetal remains requirements); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Danforth , 428 U.S. at 71, 74, 83 (invali- dating spousal consent, parental consent, and preservation of fe-tal life no matter the stage of pregnancy requirements); Bolton , 410 U.S. at 194, 198-200 (invalidating accreditation, hospital committee approval, two-doctor concurrence, and residency re- quirements). 23 in this case and make clea r that when an abortion reg- ulation is challenged as an undue burden, States are not required to prove that the abortion regulation at issue is necessary to adv ance a legitimate state inter- est. See June Med.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly recognized the significance of trademarks and trademark licenses to the United States economy. See, e.g., Am. Needle, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]388 U.S. 350. Given that recognition, this case has partic ular importance because the Court can establish a sound rule that both confirms the stability of the trademark regime in the context 14 of a bankruptcy and harmonizes trademark interests with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Trademark licenses are implicated in a variety of litigation contexts that illustrate the myriad ways in which trademarks are critical to both licensors and licensees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy",
		"context": "This Court has repeatedly recognized the significance of trademarks and trademark licenses to the United States economy. See, e.g., Am. Needle, 560 U.S. 183[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given that recognition, this case has partic ular importance because the Court can establish a sound rule that both confirms the stability of the trademark regime in the context 14 of a bankruptcy and harmonizes trademark interests with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Trademark licenses are implicated in a variety of litigation contexts that illustrate the myriad ways in which trademarks are critical to both licensors and licensees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy",
		"context": "Given that recognition, this case has partic ular importance because the Court can establish a sound rule that both confirms the stability of the trademark regime in the context 14 of a bankruptcy and harmonizes trademark interests with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Trademark licenses are implicated in a variety of litigation contexts that illustrate the myriad ways in which trademarks are critical to both licensors and licensees. To cite just a few examples, both recent and historic: • Me Renee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; • State of Idaho Potato 425 F.3d 708; • Pannell Kerr Forster Int'l 5 F. App'x 574. Further examples are legion.5 Trademark licenses undoubtedly are omnipresent; the rights they convey 5 See, e.g., Visual Dynamics, 309 F. Supp. 3d 609, and the other of which was a licensing agreement permitting the use of a different —but similar —mark for the purpose of advertising, sale, and promotion of Kroma makeup products); UHS of Del., 227 F. Supp. 3d 381 (addressing an exclusive license \"to use and exploit the Hard Rock Hotel and Hard Rock 16 to licensees are of enormous economic significance; and substantial investments are made in reliance on these rights. In 2014, trademarks accounted for $6.1 trillion in value added to the U.S. gross domestic product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "674 F. App'x 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy",
		"context": "Given that recognition, this case has partic ular importance because the Court can establish a sound rule that both confirms the stability of the trademark regime in the context 14 of a bankruptcy and harmonizes trademark interests with the goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Trademark licenses are implicated in a variety of litigation contexts that illustrate the myriad ways in which trademarks are critical to both licensors and licensees. To cite just a few examples, both recent and historic: • Me Renee 674 F. App'x 620; • State of Idaho Potato [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; • Pannell Kerr Forster Int'l 5 F. App'x 574. Further examples are legion.5 Trademark licenses undoubtedly are omnipresent; the rights they convey 5 See, e.g., Visual Dynamics, 309 F. Supp. 3d 609, and the other of which was a licensing agreement permitting the use of a different —but similar —mark for the purpose of advertising, sale, and promotion of Kroma makeup products); UHS of Del., 227 F. Supp. 3d 381 (addressing an exclusive license \"to use and exploit the Hard Rock Hotel and Hard Rock 16 to licensees are of enormous economic significance; and substantial investments are made in reliance on these rights. In 2014, trademarks accounted for $6.1 trillion in value added to the U.S. gross domestic product.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 F.3d 708",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Significance of Trademark Licenses to the U.S. Economy",
		"context": "Economics and Statistics Administration & United States Patent and Trademark Office, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY : 2016 UPDATE 22 (2016). In the United States alone, trademark licensors generated $7.3 billion in royalty revenue from the licensing of goods and services in 2014. Licensin g Industry Merchandisers' Association, Casino trademarks in areas west of the Mississippi River, solely in conn ection with development, operation, ownership, management, operation of and promotion of Hard Rock Hotel/Casinos and Hard Rock Casinos\"); Trace Minerals Research, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd sub nom. McGraw Hill Cos., 27 F. App'x 23; Helpful Hound, 2018 WL 3743817. This translates into an estimated $133.3 billion in retail sales of licensed goods and services.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F. Supp. 2d 1233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Cannot Reconcile Courts Of Appeals' Divergent Knowledge Standards",
		"context": "The assurances Plaintiffs cite instead come from earlier decisions in the litigat ions, Opp. 15, and even then Plaintiffs omit the key context: In Weiss, the Second Cir- cuit was criticizing the district court for giving too much \"weight to the British authorities' decisions\" in deter- mining whether the defendant \"exhibit[ed] deliberate indifference\" to its counterparty's terrorist ties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An earlier decision in the Strauss litiga- tion applied similar reasoning. See925 F. Supp. 2d 414 the defendants in Weiss and Strauss lacked knowledge because, unlike Defend- ants here, they had \"'repeatedly investigated' the par-ties with which they were dealing,\" the Ninth Circuit 6 observed that here too Defendants sought to identify content from terrorist supporters through a reporting system, \"review[ed]\" it, and \"regularly removed ISIS content and ISIS-affiliated a ccounts\" as a result of those investigations, Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Cannot Reconcile Courts Of Appeals' Divergent Knowledge Standards",
		"context": "20-22—have long required a heightened showing of scienter when the alleged assis- tance is mere failure to act. \"[W]here the secondary de-fendant's conduct is nothing more than inaction,\" a plain- tiff must demonstrate \"that the aider-abettor [c]on- sciously intended to assist in the perpetration of a wrongful act.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a heightened showing is doubly necessary in cases, like this one, in- volving \"nothing more than routine business transac-tions.\" 948 F.2d 455.",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.2d 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Cannot Reconcile Courts Of Appeals' Divergent Knowledge Standards",
		"context": "579 F.2d 793. Such a heightened showing is doubly necessary in cases, like this one, in- volving \"nothing more than routine business transac-tions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 705 F.2d 472, stands for the same proposition, emphasizing the need for additional indicia of knowledge—there the defend- ant's \"intent and desire to make the [illegal] venture suc- ceed,\" id. at 488; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "948 F.2d 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Plaintiffs Cannot Reconcile Courts Of Appeals' Divergent Knowledge Standards",
		"context": "Such a heightened showing is doubly necessary in cases, like this one, in- volving \"nothing more than routine business transac-tions.\" 948 F.2d 455. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], stands for the same proposition, emphasizing the need for additional indicia of knowledge—there the defend- ant's \"intent and desire to make the [illegal] venture suc- ceed,\" id. at 488; see id. at 484 (cautioning against infer- ring intent from \"normal activities\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.2d 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "The CONTU Report has been viewed by courts as the au- thoritative guide to Congressional intent with respect to the scope of copyright protection for software. See Computer Assocs. Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sega Enters. 977 F.2d 1510; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240. By implementing the recommendations contained in the CONTU Report, Congress made an intentional policy decision to give software the same status under copyright law as other \"literary works\" despite its functional aspects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "982 F.2d 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "See Computer Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d 693; Sega Enters. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240. By implementing the recommendations contained in the CONTU Report, Congress made an intentional policy decision to give software the same status under copyright law as other \"literary works\" despite its functional aspects. As the Commission explained, the \"history of copyright legislation and the interpreta- tions courts have given to the Copyright Clause all demonstrate that there is no basis for the impo- sition of a standard of literary or artistic merit for de- termining copyrightability.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "977 F.2d 1510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "See Computer Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d 693; Sega Enters. 977 F.2d 1510; Apple Computer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By implementing the recommendations contained in the CONTU Report, Congress made an intentional policy decision to give software the same status under copyright law as other \"literary works\" despite its functional aspects. As the Commission explained, the \"history of copyright legislation and the interpreta- tions courts have given to the Copyright Clause all demonstrate that there is no basis for the impo- sition of a standard of literary or artistic merit for de- termining copyrightability.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F.2d 1240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "at 27. Following the Commission's lead, courts have con- cluded that the functional aspects of software should not affect the threshold question of copyrightability. For example, in Apple Computer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Third Circuit confronted the question of whether op- erating systems are copyrightable. Franklin argued that operating systems are categorically excluded from copyright protection under Section 102(b) and 101 U.S. 99, because they are \"purely utilitarian works.\" Apple, 714 F.2d at 1250– 1252.",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F.2d 1240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "Following the Commission's lead, courts have con- cluded that the functional aspects of software should not affect the threshold question of copyrightability. For example, in Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240, the Third Circuit confronted the question of whether op- erating systems are copyrightable. Franklin argued that operating systems are categorically excluded from copyright protection under Section 102(b) and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because they are \"purely utilitarian works.\" Apple, 714 F.2d at 1250– 1252. The Third Circuit disagreed and distinguished between \"the method which instructs the computer to perform its operating functions\" and \"the instructions themselves.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "Id. at 1251. The Third Circuit relied on this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], concluding that there is \"nothing in the copy- right statute to support the argument that the in- tended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.\" See Apple, 714 F.2d at 1252 (quoting Mazer , 347 U.S. at 218).",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "The court further expressed agreement with the statement that \"[t]here is nothing in any of the statutory terms which suggest a different result for different types of computer programs based upon the function they serve within the machine.\" Ibid. (quot- ing Apple Computer, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Similarly, in Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Struc- tural Software, Inc. , the Fifth Circuit held that input and output formats in a computer program could 11 qualify as copyrightable subject matter, even though they are only \"quasi-textual.\" 26 F.3d 1335, modified , 46 F.3d 408.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 F. Supp. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "(quot- ing Apple Computer, 562 F. Supp. 775). Similarly, in Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Struc- tural Software, Inc. , the Fifth Circuit held that input and output formats in a computer program could 11 qualify as copyrightable subject matter, even though they are only \"quasi-textual.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], modified , 46 F.3d 408. De- spite the \"utilitarian function of the input formats, which ultimately act like switches in the electrical circuits of the program,\" the court found that the in- put and output formats were copyrightable because they conveyed substantial information about the se- lection, sequencing, and coordination of the inputs. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "26 F.3d 1335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "(quot- ing Apple Computer, 562 F. Supp. 775). Similarly, in Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Struc- tural Software, Inc. , the Fifth Circuit held that input and output formats in a computer program could 11 qualify as copyrightable subject matter, even though they are only \"quasi-textual.\" 26 F.3d 1335, modified , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. De- spite the \"utilitarian function of the input formats, which ultimately act like switches in the electrical circuits of the program,\" the court found that the in- put and output formats were copyrightable because they conveyed substantial information about the se- lection, sequencing, and coordination of the inputs. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "46 F.3d 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Software Is Expressly Copyrightable Under Section 102(a)",
		"context": "And courts have similarly held that copy- right protections for software should not be diluted because of its functional nature. 3While functional works are copyrightable, courts have held that only near-verbatim copying may constitute infringement. See Atari Games [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[I]f the only original aspect of a work lies in its literal expression, then only a very close similarity, verging on the identical, will suffice to constitute an infringing copy.\"). 12 For these reasons, \"functionality\" considerations should not drive the determination that a piece of software is non-copyrightable, as such an analysis threatens the well-settled copyrightability of software itself. What is more, a holding that courts must consider the functional nature of a work in analyzing copy- rightability could dramatically limit overall intellec- tual property protections for software.",
		"citation_value_orig": "975 F.2d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "at 19 (emphasis added); see ibid. (relying on Neder's inability to dispute the materiality element in holding that denial of appellate relief did \"not fundamentally undermine the purposes of the jury trial guarantee\"). Similarly , in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court addressed an error that occurred when two witnesses appeared before the grand jury simultaneously, in clear violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d). The Court explained that Rule 6(d) \"protects against th e danger that a defendant will be required to defend against a charge for which there is no probable cause to believe him guilty.\" 475 18 U.S. at 70.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "I nstead, it looked to the record as a whole, including \"the evidence produced by the Government at trial ,\" to confirm that the charges were supported by probable cause. Ibid. The engrained nature of the whole -record inquiry is also evident from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a state case that did not directly involve Rule 52 , but instead relied on more general harmless -error prin- ciples. In discussing whether a defendant had been prejudiced by a state court's unconstitutional limita- tions on his cross -examination of a prosecution witness, the Court described the harmless -error analysis as call- ing for examination of \"the whole record .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 673",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "If appellate courts were required to disregard evidence in the portions of the record other than the trial itself, it would provide defendants with a considerable incen- tive to instead \"s[i]t silent at trial,\" Vonn , 535 U.S. a t 63, and thereby leave the trial portion of the record bare of adverse facts. This Court's plain -error precedents accordingly il- lustrate that entire -record review is just as appropriate — if not even more appropriate— for errors that a defend- ant failed to preserve as for ones that he did. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in United States v. Vonn , supra , the defendant alleged that the district court committed plain error in conducting a deficient plea colloquy. 535 U.S. at 58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 597",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "And far from limiting that whole -record approach to cases in- volving plea -colloquy errors , the Court instead specifi- cally reasoned that those were \"subjects that courts are accustomed to cons idering in\" other settings. Ibid. (cit- ing analyses required by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 373 U.S. 83). Contrary to petitioner's contention (Br. 18), the ad- visory notes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs guilty pleas, are consistent with the view that Vonn and Dominguez Benitez reflect a broader principle that applies equally to cases that went to trial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "And far from limiting that whole -record approach to cases in- volving plea -colloquy errors , the Court instead specifi- cally reasoned that those were \"subjects that courts are accustomed to cons idering in\" other settings. Ibid. (cit- ing analyses required by 466 U.S. 668, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Contrary to petitioner's contention (Br. 18), the ad- visory notes to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, which governs guilty pleas, are consistent with the view that Vonn and Dominguez Benitez reflect a broader principle that applies equally to cases that went to trial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A reviewing court may look to the whole record to assess whether an error affected a defendant's substantial rights",
		"context": "Such a blinkered approach could not logically be rec- onciled with Neder and other cases that do not involve a guilty plea. The Court's decisions in both the plain - error and harmless -error context s rest on an under- standing that courts should not set aside convictions based on \" errors or defects that ha [d] little, if any, like- lihood of having changed the result of the trial .\" Chap- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Even where a defendant ra ised his objection in a timely fashion — and especially where he did not —an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court determines , on the whole record, that the error did not prejudice the defendant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Should this Court choose to extend the local feeling exception to arguably protected conduct, it still would not apply here",
		"context": "Under this Court's precedent , petitioner's claim can proceed in state court only if the NLRB first determines the challenged conduct is not protected. Respondent's conduct was at least arguably protected by the NLRA and does not fall within this Court's narrow \"local feeling\" exception. This Court should thus affirm the decision to impose a \"jurisdictional hiatus,\" Sears, Roebuck & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], on petitioner's state lawsuit pending the outcome of the parallel NLRB proceeding. If the Board concludes respondent's conduct was protected, petitioner may appeal that decision, including to this Court. And if the Board concludes that respondent's 16 conduct was not protected, Garmon imposes no bar to petitioner's state tort suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Rules and Relevant Statutes Do Not Prohibit Cy Pres Settlements",
		"context": "The Federal Rules are construed using \" 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' \" Beech Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]— i.e., their \"text, struc- ture, and history,\" Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 135 S. Ct. 1970. Petitioners appear to argue that cy pres cannot be \"per- mitted at all\" in class-action litigation. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Rules and Relevant Statutes Do Not Prohibit Cy Pres Settlements",
		"context": "The Federal Rules are construed using \" 'traditional tools of statutory construction,' \" Beech Aircraft 488 U.S. 153— i.e., their \"text, struc- ture, and history,\" Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners appear to argue that cy pres cannot be \"per- mitted at all\" in class-action litigation. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1970",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Viability Is an Arbitrary Line for Measuring Abortion Rights",
		"context": "Viabilit y is also influenced by irrelevant behavioral and environmental factors like the mother's altitude during gestation and whether she smokes during pregnancy, either of which can 5 impact the rate of fetal growth and thus the point at which a particular fetus becomes viable. The Court's stare decisis case law does not require adherence to a rule established in dictum without briefing or argument, especial ly when the legal rationale for the rule has never been \"squarely addressed,\" considered \"in depth,\" or \"fully explore[d].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Copperweld 467 U.S. 752; 415 U.S. 651. In a series of cases including Casey and Gonzales, the Court has gradually diminished the significance attributed to viability, making it appropriate to revisit whether the viability line should retain any continu- ing vitality. The viability rule is a relic of a time when the Court recognized only two state interests warranting regula- tion of abortion: maternal health and protection of what the Roe Court inaccurately described as \"potential\" life.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 619",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Viability Is an Arbitrary Line for Measuring Abortion Rights",
		"context": "Viabilit y is also influenced by irrelevant behavioral and environmental factors like the mother's altitude during gestation and whether she smokes during pregnancy, either of which can 5 impact the rate of fetal growth and thus the point at which a particular fetus becomes viable. The Court's stare decisis case law does not require adherence to a rule established in dictum without briefing or argument, especial ly when the legal rationale for the rule has never been \"squarely addressed,\" considered \"in depth,\" or \"fully explore[d].\" 507 U.S. 619; Copperweld [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 415 U.S. 651. In a series of cases including Casey and Gonzales, the Court has gradually diminished the significance attributed to viability, making it appropriate to revisit whether the viability line should retain any continu- ing vitality. The viability rule is a relic of a time when the Court recognized only two state interests warranting regula- tion of abortion: maternal health and protection of what the Roe Court inaccurately described as \"potential\" life.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Viability Is an Arbitrary Line for Measuring Abortion Rights",
		"context": "Viabilit y is also influenced by irrelevant behavioral and environmental factors like the mother's altitude during gestation and whether she smokes during pregnancy, either of which can 5 impact the rate of fetal growth and thus the point at which a particular fetus becomes viable. The Court's stare decisis case law does not require adherence to a rule established in dictum without briefing or argument, especial ly when the legal rationale for the rule has never been \"squarely addressed,\" considered \"in depth,\" or \"fully explore[d].\" 507 U.S. 619; Copperweld 467 U.S. 752; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a series of cases including Casey and Gonzales, the Court has gradually diminished the significance attributed to viability, making it appropriate to revisit whether the viability line should retain any continu- ing vitality. The viability rule is a relic of a time when the Court recognized only two state interests warranting regula- tion of abortion: maternal health and protection of what the Roe Court inaccurately described as \"potential\" life.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Agent Defendants' Speculative Due Process and Seventh Amendment Concerns Do Not Support Their Interpretation",
		"context": "22 Nor do the Agent Defendants' arguments support application of avoidance doctrine. Br. of Resp'ts Tidwell and Walls 21–22 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), Br. of Resp'ts Allen, Armstrong, and Rose 15–16. As explained above, because Section 1806(g) requires the district court to act \"in accordance with the requirements of law\" when granting any relief, the statute prohibits relief that violates the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Agent Defendants' Speculative Due Process and Seventh Amendment Concerns Do Not Support Their Interpretation",
		"context": "The Agent Defendants also overstate the constitutional problems. No court has ever held that 22 Plaintiffs argued below that they could prove their religion claims by showing merely that (1) their religion was a factor in Defendants' decision to surveil them, and (2) Defendants could not show that using religion as a factor warranting suspicion was narrowly tailored. Emp't [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, if Plaintiffs' legal theory proves correct, the only information about these investigations relevant to establishing liability may be the fact that religion was a factor in opening them, which may not require consideration of any secret information at all. See Dep't of Justice Civil Rights Division, \"Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement Authorities,\" at 7–8 (June 2003), available at https://www.scribd.com/document/22092319/ DOJ-Guidance-Regarding-the-Use-of-Race-by-Federal-Law-Enforce ment-Agencies-June-2003 (permi tting racial and religious profiling in national security or border integrity investigations).",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 872",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "1582, 1589-1603 (2020). The presumption originally developed to avoid violation of international-law rules governing jurisdic-tion to prescribe. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When international law evolved to permit greater extraterritorial regula- tion, the Court retooled the presumption as an instru- ment of international comity, explaining in American Banana 213 U.S. 347, that for a nation to treat a defendant \"according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "The presumption originally developed to avoid violation of international-law rules governing jurisdic-tion to prescribe. See22 U.S. 362. When international law evolved to permit greater extraterritorial regula- tion, the Court retooled the presumption as an instru- ment of international comity, explaining in American Banana [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that for a nation to treat a defendant \"according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "Id. at 356. 2 In Foley [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court added another rationale for the presumption: \"the assumption that Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.\" Id. at 285.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "Cent. R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]274 U.S. 268. In 1946, during this period of inconsistent applica- tion, Congress passed the Lanham Act. Steele then applied the Act to foreign sales of infringing items based in significant part on the harmful effects of the defendant's infringement in the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "Cent. R.R. 268 U.S. 29[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1946, during this period of inconsistent applica- tion, Congress passed the Lanham Act. Steele then applied the Act to foreign sales of infringing items based in significant part on the harmful effects of the defendant's infringement in the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 268",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "Then, for ne arly four decades, the pre- sumption fell into disuse. See Dodge, New Presump- tion, at 1595-97. In 1991, the Court resurrected the presumption in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Like American Banana 's version of the presumption, Aramco 's version turned on the location of the conduct and was applied in- consistently between 1991 and 2010. See Dodge, New Presumption , at 1597-1603.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "See Dodge, New Presumption , at 1597-1603. 8 2. In 2010, the Court adopted a new approach to the presumption against extraterritoriality in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2016, building on Morrison , the Court articulated a \"two-step framework\" in RJR Nabisco, 579 U.S. at 337; see also Restatement (Fourth) § 404 (restating presumption against extrat erritoriality). Step one asks whether there is a \"clear\" indication of a provi- sion's geographic scope.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "149, 149 (2001) (\"[T]he Court has changed its practice, and sometimes the formally stated rules, wi th remarkable frequency.\"). For example, the Court changed the interpretive rule for determining whether statutory limitations should be considered jurisdictional in 2006 by requiring a clear statement to that effect. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Nina A. Mendelson, Change, Creation, and Unpredictability in Statutory Interpretation: Interpretive Canon Use in the Roberts Court's First Decade , 117 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 110-23 (2018) (discussing this and other examples). When the Court changes a canon of interpretation or articulates a new one, it routinely applies the new canon retroactively to earlier enacted statutes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "10 In RJR Nabisco , the Court acknowledged that it had \"honed [its] extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Morri- son,\" 579 U.S. at 353, yet a pplied its \"current extra- territoriality doctrine,\" id. at 354, to RICO, a statute passed in 1970 at a time when (as noted above) the Court had stopped using the presumption. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Aramco , 499 U.S. 244. Some have found retroactive application of changed canons problematic. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "10 In RJR Nabisco , the Court acknowledged that it had \"honed [its] extraterritoriality jurisprudence in Morri- son,\" 579 U.S. at 353, yet a pplied its \"current extra- territoriality doctrine,\" id. at 354, to RICO, a statute passed in 1970 at a time when (as noted above) the Court had stopped using the presumption. See561 U.S. 247; Aramco , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some have found retroactive application of changed canons problematic. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Nature of the Judicial Process Justifies Applying the Current Presumption Retroactively to Earlier Enacted Statutes",
		"context": "But to announce new canons for prospective application only would be \"incompatible with the judicial role, which is to say what the law is, not to prescribe what it shall be.\" Am. Trucking Ass'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying a changed canon retroactively may sometimes run counter to the prevailing interpretive background when Congress acted. The version of the presumption against extraterritoriality supposedly in effect when the Lanham Act was passed in 1946 was American Banana 's limitation of statutes to conduct in the United States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "Intel, 542 U.S. at 247. By its terms, Section 1782 authorizes \"[t]he district court of the district in which a person 11 operative under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.\" Intel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed , \"no aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the Un ited States has given rise to so much friction as the request for documents associated with investigation and litigation in the United States.\" Societe Nationale , 482 U.S. at 549 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part) (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "Brandi-Dohrn, 673 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, courts have held that an \"interested person\" need not, before filing a Section 1782 petition, first make a discovery request to the foreign tribunal in which the underlying proceeding is pending. Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have also held that a \"proceeding\" does not have to be \"pending\" or even \"imminent\" —it just has to be \"within reasonable contemplation,\" meaning \"more than a twinkle in counsel's eye.\" Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "964 F.2d 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "Courts have also held that a \"proceeding\" does not have to be \"pending\" or even \"imminent\" —it just has to be \"within reasonable contemplation,\" meaning \"more than a twinkle in counsel's eye.\" Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 resides or is found\" to \"order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal\" on the application of that tribunal or an \"interested person.\" 28 U. S.C. § 1782(a).",
		"citation_value_orig": "798 F.3d 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "Brandi-Dohrn , 673 F.3d at 80 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, courts have held that an \"interested person\" need not, before filing a Section 1782 petition, first make a discovery request to the foreign tribunal in which the underlying proceeding is pending. Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have also held that a \"proceeding\" does not have to be \"pending\" or even \"imminent\"—it just has to be \"within reasonable contemplation,\" meaning \"more than a twinkle in counsel's eye.\" Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "964 F.2d 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "Courts have also held that a \"proceeding\" does not have to be \"pending\" or even \"imminent\"—it just has to be \"within reasonable contemplation,\" meaning \"more than a twinkle in counsel's eye.\" Certain Funds, Accounts and/or Inv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 Most recently, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 1782, thereby permitting discovery of documents located abroad. del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; 834 F.3d 1194.",
		"citation_value_orig": "798 F.3d 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "798 F.3d 113. 13 Most recently, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 1782, thereby permitting discovery of documents located abroad. del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" 561 U.S. 247, the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108).",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "13 Most recently, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 1782, thereby permitting discovery of documents located abroad. del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; 834 F.3d 1194. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108). But see Kestrel Coal Pty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; 834 F.3d 1194. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" 561 U.S. 247, the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 532 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But see Kestrel Coal Pty. 362 F.3d 401.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108). But see Kestrel Coal Pty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The judicial expansion of Section 1782's reach has corresponded with an increase in the number of petitions seeking discovery under that statute. In the past year alone, district courts ruled on over 65 petitions, more than four times the number decided ten years ago.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F.3d 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "See Appendix 1 (listing cases). And even more so than domestic third-party discovery, discovery under Section 1782 disproportionately 13 Most recently, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 1782, thereby permitting discovery of documents located abroad. del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" 561 U.S. 247, the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz , 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108).",
		"citation_value_orig": "834 F.3d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "And even more so than domestic third-party discovery, discovery under Section 1782 disproportionately 13 Most recently, the Second and Eleventh Circuits have declined to apply the presumption against extraterritoriality to Section 1782, thereby permitting discovery of documents located abroad. del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; 834 F.3d 1194. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz , 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108). But see Kestrel Coal Pty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "del Valle Ruiz, 939 F.3d at 533; 834 F.3d 1194. Although this Court has directed that the presumption applies \"in all cases,\" 561 U.S. 247, the Second Circuit saw \"no reason\" to apply it \"to a strictly jurisdictional statute not otherwise tethered to regulating conduct or providing a cause of action.\" del Valle Ruiz , 939 F.3d at 532 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But see Kestrel Coal Pty. 362 F.3d 401.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Broad Relatedness Standard Would Dramatically Expand Discovery in Aid of Foreign Proceedings under 28 U.S.C. section 1782.",
		"context": "del Valle Ruiz , 939 F.3d at 532 (citing 569 U.S. 108). But see Kestrel Coal Pty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The judicial expansion of Section 1782's reach has corresponded with an increase in the number of petitions seeking discovery und er that statute. In the past year alone, district courts ruled on over 65 petitions, more than four times the number decided ten years ago.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F.3d 401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No implied license authorized the officer's acts",
		"context": "Jones , 565 U.S. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) . It is a trespass e ven if the police aim merely to check a serial number. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even more than nosy neighbors walking metal detectors along the front path or march ing their bloodhounds into a garden, stripping a cover from someo ne else's motorcycle suggests a crime is about to occur. That \"would inspire most of us to —well, call the police.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
		"context": "This Court has carefully placed limits on each of those doctrines, limits that would effectively become i rrelevant if this Court were to endorse the doctrine of abstention that the Second Circuit applied. This Court has recognized the doctrine of foreign sovereign compulsion in the context of U.S. court orders for the production of evidence. See Societe Inter nationale pour Participation Industrielles et Commerciales, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rogers held that dismissal of a complaint was too harsh a sanction for noncompliance with a pretrial production order \"when it has been established that failur e to comply has been due to inability, and not to willfulness, bad faith, or any fault of petitioner.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
		"context": "This Court has not found it necessary to decide whether 18 foreign sovereign compulsion is a valid defense to antitrust claims, see Hartford Fir e, 509 U.S. at 799 (noting that compliance with both U.S. and foreign law was not \"impossible\"); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but lower courts have recognized the doctrine as a defense in antitrust cases. See, e.g. , Mannington Mills , 595 F.2d at 1293- 94; Trugman -Nash, 954 F. Supp. 733; Interamerican Refining 307 F. Supp. 1291; see also Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation § 4.2.2 (2017) (recognizing foreign sovereign compulsion defense to antitrust claims).",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
		"context": "Co., 475 U.S. 574, but lower courts have recognized the doctrine as a defense in antitrust cases. See, e.g. , Mannington Mills , 595 F.2d at 1293- 94; Trugman -Nash, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Interamerican Refining 307 F. Supp. 1291; see also Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation § 4.2.2 (2017) (recognizing foreign sovereign compulsion defense to antitrust claims). Where courts have recognized the doctrine of foreig n sovereign compulsion, they have generally imposed two requirements: (1) that \"the person in question appears likely to suffer severe sanctions for failing to comply with foreign law\"; and (2) that \"the person in question has acted in good faith to avoid the conflict.\" Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Jurisdiction § 222 (Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "954 F. Supp. 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
		"context": "Co., 475 U.S. 574, but lower courts have recognized the doctrine as a defense in antitrust cases. See, e.g. , Mannington Mills , 595 F.2d at 1293- 94; Trugman -Nash, 954 F. Supp. 733; Interamerican Refining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Department of Justice & Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines for International Enforcement and Cooperation § 4.2.2 (2017) (recognizing foreign sovereign compulsion defense to antitrust claims). Where courts have recognized the doctrine of foreig n sovereign compulsion, they have generally imposed two requirements: (1) that \"the person in question appears likely to suffer severe sanctions for failing to comply with foreign law\"; and (2) that \"the person in question has acted in good faith to avoid the conflict.\" Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States: Jurisdiction § 222 (Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 F. Supp. 1291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S ABSTENTION DOCTRINE THREATENS TO SUPPLANT MORE NARROWLY TAILORED DOCTRINES OF INTERNATIONAL COMITY",
		"context": "2, 2016). This Court unanimously held in Kirkpat rick that the act of state doctrine applies only when a suit \"requires the Court to declare invalid, and thus ineffective as 'a rule of decision for the courts of this country,' the official act of a foreign sovereign.\" 493 U.S. at 405 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Kirkpatrick emphasized that \"[t]he act of state doctrine is not some vague doctrine of abstention.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "246 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. NON-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF MANY FAITH-BASED FOSTER AGENCIES",
		"context": "In fact, the erosion of non-discrimination policie s would lead to more discrimination, including religious discrimination. If petitioners were correct that foster agencies are free to 18 discriminate against prospective parents if that discrimination is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, then there would be, for example, nothing to stop an agency from refusing to work with Catholic parents, or interracial couples. See Meg Kinnard, Associated Press, Lawsuit claims discrimination by foster agency (Feb. 15, 2019) (describing lawsuit alleging religious discrimination against a Catholic mother by a Protestant foster care agency); 15 Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most importantly, non-discrimination is necessary to the effective provision of foster care. It is thus also central to amicus's religious mission of serving and protecting all God's children.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Original Understanding Versus Living Constitution",
		"context": "\"At the first step, the government may justify its regulation by 'establish[ing] that the chal- lenged law regulates activity falling outside the scope of the right as originally understood.' \" Id., 142 S. Ct., at 2126, 213 L. Ed. 2d, at 405 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). If so, \" 'the analysis can stop there.' \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "919 F. 3d 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Original Understanding Versus Living Constitution",
		"context": "If so, \" 'the analysis can stop there.' \" Ibid. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). If not, the courts of appeals went on to a second step, asking about narrow tailoring and compelling government interests. Id., 142 S. Ct., at 2126, 213 L. Ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "679 F. 3d 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Original Understanding Versus Living Constitution",
		"context": "The Court would have to say that the text as originally understood is controlling for some provi- sions of the Constitution but can yield to postenactment history or perceived policy imperatives in the present for other provisions. To be sure, there is some support in this Court's cases for cafeteria originalism. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was candid in declaring the Court's decisions under the Eighth Amendment free of the inconvenient \"historical prism.\" But see id., at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (line of cases on which Miller is based \"finds 'no support in the text and history of the Eighth Amendment' \"). 17 But candor, however commendable, does not make principle.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U. S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "BIO.15. Racial preferences began with Harvard, Pet.4 , Brandeis -Center- Br.5-13; they were perpetu- ated by Harvard, Regents of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and they should end with Harvard. Grutter is wrong in every way —historically, le- gally, factually, practically, and mo rally. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "6 S. Ct. 2162. And this Court has held that Title VI imposes \"the same standards that th e Equal Protection Clause imposes upon state actors.\" App.235; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Harvard does not argue oth-erwise. O verruling Grutter thus would not affect the meaning of Title VI at all : the statute would continue to prohibit any use of race that is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "O verruling Grutter thus would not affect the meaning of Title VI at all : the statute would continue to prohibit any use of race that is prohibited under the Equal Protection Clause. Even if overruling Grutter somehow \"changed\" Ti- tle VI, n o \"superspecial justification\" would be needed for that change. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By writing Title VI to incorporate the Equal Protection Clause, Congress fully intended Ti-tle VI to \"be shaped by experience\" and to \"evolve with the [Court's] interpretation of the commands of the Constitution ,\" Bakke , 438 U.S. at 337-40 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); accord id. at 286-87 (Powell, J.).",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "A strong ma- jority of Americans (73%), including \"majorities across racial and ethnic groups,\" believe that universities \"should not consider race or ethnicity when making decisions abou t student admissions.\" Graf, Most Americans Say Colleges Should Not Consider Race or Ethnicity in Admissions , Pew (Feb. 25, 2019), pewrsr.ch/2Xq43K0. Nor does the \"First Amendment,\" BIO.28, give Harvard the right to racially discrimi- nate while accepting federal funds , see Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 500 U.S. 173. Harvard is wrong to suggest that SFFA \"de- faulted\" its right to challenge Grutter's diversity ra- tionale. BIO.34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "A strong ma- jority of Americans (73%), including \"majorities across racial and ethnic groups,\" believe that universities \"should not consider race or ethnicity when making decisions abou t student admissions.\" Graf, Most Americans Say Colleges Should Not Consider Race or Ethnicity in Admissions , Pew (Feb. 25, 2019), pewrsr.ch/2Xq43K0. Nor does the \"First Amendment,\" BIO.28, give Harvard the right to racially discrimi- nate while accepting federal funds , see Bob Jones 461 U.S. 574; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Harvard is wrong to suggest that SFFA \"de- faulted\" its right to challenge Grutter's diversity ra- tionale. BIO.34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Whether Grutter should be overruled is a question of exceptional importance",
		"context": "BIO.27. Harvard \"talk[s] the talk of multiculturalism and racial diver- sity in the courts but walk[s] the walk of tribalism and racial segregation on [its] campus[].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[N]o one can reasonably rely on [a legal regime] that is non -existent in practice,\" and \"no reliance interests can be affected by forthrightly acknowledging reality.\" 593 U.S. None.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Free Exercise Clause authorizes the exemptions that the Trump administration created and the Little Sisters claimed in this case",
		"context": "In this case, one cannot seriously contend that the President and the Little Sisters are breaching the public peace. Moreover, this Court has rejected the 9 argument that people accrue private rights as beneficiaries of programs where changes are frequent and flexibility is required. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such is the case here. Frequent changes to healthcare laws and programs make it difficult for any \"right\" to accrue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 603",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. National Bellas Hess and Quill Set Forth Long-Enduring and Still Valid Constitutional Principles Protecting All Remote Retailers From Unjustified Local Entanglement",
		"context": "7, 11 (A. Hamilton). It is in this light that we have interpreted the negative implication of the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimina- tion against interstate commerce, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and bars state re gulations that unduly burden interstate commerce, see, e.g., 450 U.S. 662.\" Quill at 312. The Quill Court thereafter fully endorsed Na- tional Bellas Hess 's bright-line rule requiring retailers to have physical presence in a state before those retail- ers can be subjected to the burdens of the state's sales tax compliance system: \"Such a [bright-line] rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. National Bellas Hess and Quill Set Forth Long-Enduring and Still Valid Constitutional Principles Protecting All Remote Retailers From Unjustified Local Entanglement",
		"context": "7, 11 (A. Hamilton). It is in this light that we have interpreted the negative implication of the Commerce Clause. Accordingly, we have ruled that that Clause prohibits discrimina- tion against interstate commerce, see, e.g., 437 U.S. 617, and bars state re gulations that unduly burden interstate commerce, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Quill at 312. The Quill Court thereafter fully endorsed Na- tional Bellas Hess 's bright-line rule requiring retailers to have physical presence in a state before those retail- ers can be subjected to the burdens of the state's sales tax compliance system: \"Such a [bright-line] rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "450 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. National Bellas Hess and Quill Set Forth Long-Enduring and Still Valid Constitutional Principles Protecting All Remote Retailers From Unjustified Local Entanglement",
		"context": "The Quill Court thereafter fully endorsed Na- tional Bellas Hess 's bright-line rule requiring retailers to have physical presence in a state before those retail- ers can be subjected to the burdens of the state's sales tax compliance system: \"Such a [bright-line] rule firmly establishes the boundaries of legitimate state authority to impose a duty to collect sales and use taxes and reduces litigation concerning those taxes. This benefit is important, for as we have so frequently noted, our law in this area is some- thing of a 'quagmire' and the 'application of constitutional principles to specific state stat- utes leaves much room for controversy and confusion and little in the way of precise guides to the States in the exercise of their 8 indispensable power of taxation.' Northwest- ern States Portland Cement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Quill at 315-316. Furthermore, the Court credited the barriers and boundaries of National Bellas Hess and Quill with nothing less than the growth of an industry: Moreover, a bright-line rule in the area of sales and use taxes also encourages settled expectations and, in doing so, fosters invest- ment by businesses and individuals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Insofar As FICA Has Any Relevance, Congress Has Similarly Excluded Nonmonetary Remuneration For Domestic Service And Agricultural Workers",
		"context": "§ 3402(j), which allows employers to exempt noncash remuneration from income tax withholding for co mmissioned salespe ople). These statutory an d regulatory exclusions still exist today and parallel RRTA's limitation to \"money remuneration.\" In Rowan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court re cognized that, in the tax context, \"[c]ontradictory i nterpretations of su b- stantially identical definitions do not serve\" the in-terest of \"promot[ing] simplicity and ease of admi n- istration.\" Id. at 257.",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "See Ry. Labor Execs.' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s sparse legislative history that Congress intended to provide the FTC broad authority to obtain \"equitable monetary relief\" or even considered the possibility. See Beales & Muris, supra, at 4 (\"[T]here is no hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to grant the FTC broad authority to seek monetary relief when 5 But see City of 569 U.S. 290. The watchdog of congressional intent didn't bark here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "29 F.3d 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "Labor Execs.' 29 F.3d 655's sparse legislative history that Congress intended to provide the FTC broad authority to obtain \"equitable monetary relief\" or even considered the possibility. See Beales & Muris, supra, at 4 (\"[T]here is no hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to grant the FTC broad authority to seek monetary relief when 5 But see City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The watchdog of congressional intent didn't bark here. See 456 U.S. 431.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "See Beales & Muris, supra, at 4 (\"[T]here is no hint in the legislative history that Congress intended to grant the FTC broad authority to seek monetary relief when 5 But see City of 569 U.S. 290. The watchdog of congressional intent didn't bark here. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Otherwise, there would have been no reason to enact Section 19, a more specific statute, only two years later. A contrary result renders Section 19 a nullity and does violence to the statutory scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 431",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "Otherwise, there would have been no reason to enact Section 19, a more specific statute, only two years later. A contrary result renders Section 19 a nullity and does violence to the statutory scheme. See Food & Drug [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 396 F.3d 1190. Undeterred, the FTC uncovered elephantine new powers hidden in the mousehole of Section 13(b)'s permanent-injunction proviso. But see 531 U.S. 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "Otherwise, there would have been no reason to enact Section 19, a more specific statute, only two years later. A contrary result renders Section 19 a nullity and does violence to the statutory scheme. See Food & Drug 529 U.S. 120; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Undeterred, the FTC uncovered elephantine new powers hidden in the mousehole of Section 13(b)'s permanent-injunction proviso. But see 531 U.S. 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 1190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "See Food & Drug 529 U.S. 120; see also 396 F.3d 1190. Undeterred, the FTC uncovered elephantine new powers hidden in the mousehole of Section 13(b)'s permanent-injunction proviso. But see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The vehicle the FTC used was judicial precedent interpreting other statutes enforced by other agencies (in particular, a seventy-year-old Supreme Court case, 328 U.S. 395).6 It effectively admits this. See, e.g., FTC Opp'n to Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "Undeterred, the FTC uncovered elephantine new powers hidden in the mousehole of Section 13(b)'s permanent-injunction proviso. But see 531 U.S. 457. The vehicle the FTC used was judicial precedent interpreting other statutes enforced by other agencies (in particular, a seventy-year-old Supreme Court case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).6 It effectively admits this. See, e.g., FTC Opp'n to Pet. for Reh'g En Banc at 10–11, Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Inapposite Precedent Cannot Override a Statute's Plain Language.",
		"context": "fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\" Fed. Trade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 13 Administrator in Porter did not have this limitation; and thus when the Court in Porter said that it could grant monetary relief as either: (1) \"complete relief even though the decree includes that which might be conferred by a court of law;\" or (2) \"an order appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance with the Act,\" 328 U.S. at 399–400, neither theory was limited to prospective relief as imposed by Section 13(b). Nevertheless, Porter has been used to justify essentially unrestricted ancillary relief—whether equitable or legal in nature.",
		"citation_value_orig": "917 F.3d 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has approved a narrowing interpretation that applies here",
		"context": "Contrary to the Ninth Circuit 's fanciful hypo - theticals on protected speech that §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) restricts or might restrict , this Court long ago upheld similar language in a predecessor immigration statute as being confined to encouraging or inducing illegal conduct . See Gov't Br. at 23-24 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Under Lees, the power of Congress to exclude aliens includes the power \"to make that exclusion effective by punishing those who assist in introducing, or attempting to introduce, aliens in violation of its prohibition. \" Lees, 150 U.S. at 480.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court has approved a narrowing interpretation that applies here",
		"context": "The same analysis should apply here, either directly under Lees or by analogy to Lees. Significantly, even if Lees did not control directly, it would suffice for this Court to apply the same narrowing construction to §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) now: Our cases indicate that once an acceptable limiting construction is obtained, it may be applied to conduct occurring prior to the 11 construction, provided such application affords fair warning to the defendants. Dombrowski , 380 U.S. at 491 n.7 (citations omitted) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 's effect on protected third -party speech until the Ninth",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Are \"Potentially Responsible Parties\"",
		"context": "Although CERCLA does not define \"potentially re- sponsible parties,\" this Court has recognized that the term signifies the \"[c]overed persons\" that § 107 identifies for possible responsibility for addressing contamination. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); see Burlington , 556 U.S. at 608-09 (describing \"four broad classes of PRPs\" corresponding to the four types of \"cove red persons\" under § 107); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Burlington , 556 U.S. at 609 (explaining that parties undisputedly \"qualif[ied] as PRPs . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents Are \"Potentially Responsible Parties\"",
		"context": "Id. § 9607(b); see, e.g. , Carson Harbor Vill., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' interpretation would also warp the over- all statutory design. As § 122(e)(6) illustrates, EPA must be able to regulate all PRPs to maintain its control over Superfund sites, even if many PRPs never face actual lia- bility.",
		"citation_value_orig": "270 F.3d 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Google Fails To Show That Its Copying Of The Heart Of Oracle's Software For Lucrative Commercial Purposes Constitutes \"Fair Use.\"",
		"context": "Id. Google's argument , however, wrongly presumes that the commercial conduct of competitors, rather than established law or the Constitution, should determine the meaning of \"fair use.\" Yet in accordance with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and cases dating back to Wheaton v. Peters , 33 U.S. (8 Pet. ), 591 660 (1834) and Evans v. Jordan , 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 199 (1815) , this Court has reiterated that it is for Con gress, not competitors, to make this determina tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Church Autonomy Doctrine Prohibits the State from Restructuring a Church's Relationship with Its Employees",
		"context": "The state's jurisdiction under the Ninth Circuit 's approach is essentially all encompassing, except for a 14 small carve -out around the pulpit. And in several cases, even that line of separation between the church and state ceases to exist de pending on the claim or de- fense by the church. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This result is the opposite of church -state separation . The First Amendment guar- antees more than enclaves of protection within the church.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Discrimination Against LGBTQ Parents Deprives All Children In Foster Care Of Opportunities For Stable Homes",
		"context": "4 https://imprintnews.org/wp-c ontent/uploads/2017/10/The- Foster-Care-Housing-Crisis-10-31.pdf. 6 that foster agencies have access to a significant pool of qualified prospective parents when seeking homes for vulnerable children. As this Court recognized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the \"overwhelming scholarly consensus\" of peer-reviewed research demonstrates that children of same-sex parents do just as well as other children. See Center for the Study of Inequality at Cornell University, What does the scholarly research say about the well-being of children with gay or lesbian parents?",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Discrimination Against LGBTQ Parents Deprives All Children In Foster Care Of Opportunities For Stable Homes",
		"context": "See Br. of Amici Curiae Massachusetts et al. Supporting Philadelphia at 24-25, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor can the harm caused by allowing some foster agencies to discriminate be ameliorated by forcing LGBTQ parents to seek services from other agencies. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "922 F.3d 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Williamson County controls this case",
		"context": "This Court held in Williamson County that a plaintiff in her situation cannot prevail on the claim that she pleaded . Petitioner opted to proceed solely under Sec- tion 1983 , and this Court should not countenance her at- tempt (and that of the Solicitor General) to smuggle in novel and unmeritorious claims that were \"not pleaded in the complaint, argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the District Court, or raised in the petition for certiorari.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.",
		"context": "That argument gained very little foothold in the lower courts, which largely rejected the idea that the plain text reading of § 3553(f)(1) was absurd as a legal matter. 60 F.4th 230; 54 F.4th 127448 F.4th 74148 F.4th 755. Indeed, the government has never identified \"rare and exceptional circumstances,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that ju stify discarding the plain meaning of the statutory text. Section 3553(f)(1) identifies three \"different type[s] of behavior suggestive of future dangerousness\": (1) recidivism; (2) commission of serious crimes warranting long sentences; and (3) a history of violence. Garcon , 54 F.4th at 1283.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.",
		"context": "This argument fails because hypothetical unexpected results cannot undermine the plain meaning of a statute. \"'[I]n the context of an unambiguous statutory text,' whether a specific application was anticipated by Congress 'is irrelevant.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] see this problem as nonexistent, as they conclude a \"2-point violent offense\" means \"violent offenses scoring two or more points.\" See Lopez , 998 F.3d at 440; Pace , 48 F.4th at 765 (Wood, J., dissenting). Garcon recognized this position but did not decide the question, as that case did not present it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.",
		"context": "Such \"imperfection\" is a normal and often unavoidable result of legislating 'at the macro level, not on a micro scale.'\" Id. (quoting CBS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Moreover, the government's examples are not actually troubling. It makes sense that the amended Safety Valve statute is overinclusive at the margin.",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 F.3d 1217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.",
		"context": "It makes sense that the amended Safety Valve statute is overinclusive at the margin. The First Step Act expanded the Safety Valve provision to avoid arbitrary sentences based on drug weight that \"'fail[] to account for the unique circumstances of offender s who warrant a lesser penalty.'\" Garcon , 54 F.4th at 1283 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Congress chose a scheme that would make more defendants eligible for relief, even if th e cost of that expansion was eligibility for some undeserving defendants. Eligibility, after all, does not guarantee a sentence under the mandatory minimum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Conjunctive Reading of section 3553(f)(1) Does Not Lead to Surplusage.",
		"context": "As an initial matter, the canon against surplusage is inapplicable because the text of § 3553(f)(1) is unambiguously conjunctive. \"Surplusage does not always produce ambiguity and [the Court's] preference for avoiding surplusage constructions is not absolute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Where there are two ways to read the text—either [a term] is 10 surplusage, in which case the text is plain; or [the term] is nonsurplusage [], in which case the text is ambiguous—applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other indications, inappropriate.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON It is black letter constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the government can adopt one position or the other. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That theory, however, assumes a situation in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty especially one found in the Bill of Rights. Thus, while some people might disagree about whether the flag should be saluted or disagree about the proposition that it may not be defiled, the Supreme Court has ruled that a State may not compel or enforce one view or the other under the first amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U. S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "That theory, however, assumes a situation in which the choice does not intrude upon a protected liberty especially one found in the Bill of Rights. Thus, while some people might disagree about whether the flag should be saluted or disagree about the proposition that it may not be defiled, the Supreme Court has ruled that a State may not compel or enforce one view or the other under the first amendment. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, despite petitioner's arguments to the contrary, an unreasonable physical restraint which hinders the securing of their person is protected within the text of the Constitution and some aspects of abortion regulation must remain outside the realm of legislatures and executives. The Fourth Amendment protects \"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U. S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "The Fourth Amendment protects \"[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\" The \"basic purpose of this Amendment,\" cases have recognized, \"is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The interpretation is guided by the historical understandings 11 \"of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\" 267 U. S. 132.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U. S. 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "387 U. S. 523. The interpretation is guided by the historical understandings 11 \"of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On this, cases have recognized some basic reference points. It has been recognized that the Amendment seeks to secure \"the privacies of life\" against \"arbitrary power.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U. S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "On this, cases have recognized some basic reference points. It has been recognized that the Amendment seeks to secure \"the privacies of life\" against \"arbitrary power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the seminal Fourth Amendment case of 116 U.S. 616 the Court wrote, in frequently quoted language, that the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions apply: \"to all invasions on the part of the government and its employés of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U. S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "It has been recognized that the Amendment seeks to secure \"the privacies of life\" against \"arbitrary power.\" 116 U. S. 616. In the seminal Fourth Amendment case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the Court wrote, in frequently quoted language, that the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions apply: \"to all invasions on the part of the government and its employés of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.\" Id., at 630.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.\" Id., at 630. Perhaps the most eloquent statement of the principle of liberty underlying these aspects of the fourth amendment was given by Justice Brandeis, dissenting in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"The protection guaranteed by the [Fourth and Fifth] Amendments is much broader in scope. The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U. S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": ". ..\" Id. at 478 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court noted in determining whether a seizure had occurred determined that \"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.\" citing Union Pac. R. 141 U. S. 250.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "at 478 In 392 U.S. 1, the Court noted in determining whether a seizure had occurred determined that \"No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.\" citing Union Pac. R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 389 U.S. 347 the Court observed that the fourth amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. That observation is certainly correct in that fourth amendment also protects from unreasonable seizures or physical restraints.",
		"citation_value_orig": "141 U. S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "citing Union Pac. R. 141 U. S. 250. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the Court observed that the fourth amendment protects individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusion, but its protections go further, and often have nothing to do with privacy at all. That observation is certainly correct in that fourth amendment also protects from unreasonable seizures or physical restraints. The above language shows the broad purpose behind the fourth amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "Searches and seizures are the key activities discussed in the fourth amendment. The word search has in its ordinary meaning was the same as it is today: \"`[t]o look over or through for the purpose of finding something; to explore; to examine by inspection; as, to search the house for a book; to search the wood for a thief. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] However, if someone exposes something to the public, there can be no search as it is not hidden. A seizure is also protected in the amendment. A seizure is defined as the act of seizing; the act of laying hold on suddenly; as the seizure of a thief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "Secure is defined as to guard effectively from danger; to make safe. N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 66 (1828) (reprint 6th ed. 1989) Looking at the language used, the amendment protects people from unreasonable inspections, examination, or control of hidden (private) aspects of their persons, homes (and offices or commercial buildings) papers (digital information on phones protected in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and effects (personal property such a vehicles). When one considers the itemized aspects worthy of protection in the fourth amendment, it does have broad coverage for places and things a person may expect to be protected as private. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment , 58 Minn. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S.Ct. 2473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": ". in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] I would submit that as the Court did Soldal v. Cook County , that it need not apply the technical rules regarding seizures that involve probable cause and arrests as done in criminal cases. 499 U.S. 621 In the civil context, the Court simply determined whether there was some 16 meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests. Unlike Soldal, the fourth amendment protection is requested for a person.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.'\" 490 U.S. 386 I would submit that as the Court did Soldal v. Cook County , that it need not apply the technical rules regarding seizures that involve probable cause and arrests as done in criminal cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] In the civil context, the Court simply determined whether there was some 16 meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests. Unlike Soldal, the fourth amendment protection is requested for a person. Applying the logic of Soldal, possession means control or ownership.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 621",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "Unlike Soldal, the fourth amendment protection is requested for a person. Applying the logic of Soldal, possession means control or ownership. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] So, the fourth amendment interest here involves the control over a woman's body. 5 The fourth amendment has also been applied in a medical setting. A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be \"unreasonable\" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U. S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "5 The fourth amendment has also been applied in a medical setting. A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be \"unreasonable\" even if likely to produce evidence of a crime. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1966 ) Labor and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands. In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts. See 470 U. S. 753 (invalidating a search 5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U. S. 757",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "384 U. S. 757 (1966 ) Labor and delivery pose additional health risks and physical demands. In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to endure physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has held to violate the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (invalidating a search 5. It goes without saying that under this approach that an argument could be made that any statute which places a physical restraint on the movement or liberty of a person such as statutes preventing homicides, thefts, battery, or sexual assault could be considered seizures. However, those activities have been proscribed nearly since the beginning of time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U. S. 753",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "Under petitioner's analysis, that would change and go back to woman utilizing the self-help remedies that existed prior to Roe. A few misconceptions should be discussed regarding privacy and fourth amendment. Justice Rehnquist in his dissent in Roe states that \"privacy\" that the Court finds is not a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the fourth amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Als o , J us ti ce Re hn q uis t f o un d tha t a physicians work in abortions could not be considered private. Sometimes however, it is difficult to see the forest through the trees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U. S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "This approach is distinguished from the approach of Justice Thomas in his dissent in Carpenter . There Justice Thomas was attempted to divine the original intent of the fourth amendment and not the original meaning of the words in the fourth amendment itself in determining its application. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] While there is agreement with that statement, the language and places used in the fourth 19 amendment is quite extensive given the items offered protection. In determining whether an event or activity is protected, the Court has looked historical understanding of those events. In a historical context, it is noted that in Roe, there was a discussion of whether abortion or \"quickening\" was a crime.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "In this country, the law in effect in all but a few States until mid-19th century was the pre-existing English common la w … It is thus apparent that at common law, at the time of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major portion of the 19th century, abortion was viewed with less disfavor than under most American statutes currently in effect. Phrasing it another way, a woman enjoyed a substantially broader right to terminate a pregnancy than she does in most States today. At least with respect to the early stage of pregnancy, and very possibly without such a limitation, the opportunity to make this choice was present in this country well into the 19th century… [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] The above analysis reveals that when the fourth amendment was adopted in 1791, that quickening was not 20 considered a crime. As such it is not outside the realm of the protections of the fourth amendment. As with most documents drafted to cover a wide variety of subjects, certain language is used that is subject to interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "Justice Thomas corrected pointed out in his dissent in Indianapolis v. Edmonds in a different context that: Taken together, our decisions in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 4 96 U . S. 444 (1990), and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], stand for the proposition that suspicionless roadblock seizures are constitutionally permissible if conducted according to a plan that limits the discretion of the officers conducting the stops. I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided. Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered \"reasonable \" a p ro gram of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U. S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTS WOMEN AGAINST UNREASONABLE PHYSICAL RESTRAINTS THAT PREVENT THEM FROM SECURING THEIR PERSON",
		"context": "I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte were correctly decided. Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered \"reasonable \" a p ro gram of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing. City of Indianapolis 21 et [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Dissent of Thomas J. Justice Thomas correctly observed in that historical analysis that roadblock stops of those not suspected of a crime would not have been favored. In fact, I would suspect that a statute requiring a woman to strip naked, spread her legs and submit to a probe inserted into her vagina for the purpose of determining age of the fetus she was carrying would not be reasonable by the framers as well.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 32",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory text lends no support to petitioner's contention that \"applicable\" should be interpreted to require a gap in federal law before state law applies",
		"context": "For example, the Assimilated Crimes Act (\"ACA\") applies state criminal law to federal enclaves only when an act or omission is not already made punishable \"by any enactment of Congre ss.\" 18 U.S.C. § 13(a); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 authorizes courts to borrow state common law where \"the laws of the United States . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory text lends no support to petitioner's contention that \"applicable\" should be interpreted to require a gap in federal law before state law applies",
		"context": "Br. 26), however, none of the more protective federal, state, and local laws would ever apply, because, as petitioner asserts, the FLSA leaves no such gap. c. The Court's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not support petitioner's interpretation. In Ransom , the Court interpreted \"applicable monthly expense amounts\" – undefined in the Bankruptcy Code – by looking \"to the ordinary meaning\" of \"applicable.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 61",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The statutory text lends no support to petitioner's contention that \"applicable\" should be interpreted to require a gap in federal law before state law applies",
		"context": "Petitioner (at 41 n.8) and the government (at 25) recognize this flaw in their argument, but neither can articulate a scenario where a state law can be \"applicable,\" because there is a gap in federal law, an d yet \"inconsistent with\" federal law. To accept petitioner's interpretation of \"applicable\" as \"necessary\" would make \"not inconsistent\" superfluous and, therefore, violate the \"cardinal principle of statutory construc- tion that [courts] must give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Colorado Supreme Court Did Not Violate the Electors Clause.",
		"context": "Relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2023) , Pe- titioner Trump asks this Court to second -guess the Colorado Supreme Court's conclusion that Colorado's Election Code authorizes it to order the Secretary not to certify a candidate who is ineligible to hold office to the presidential primary ballot. Nothing in this Court's jurisprudence authorizes such extraordinary",
		"citation_value_orig": "600 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "§ 1. The statute \"re- flects a legislative judgment that ultimately competi- tion will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services.\" Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For many years, this Court has recognized that \"the phrase 're- straint of trade' is best read to mean 'undue restraint '\" and has \"thus understood § 1 to outlaw only unreason- able restraints.\" 138 S.Ct. 2274.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "Nat'l Soc'y of Prof' l 435 U.S. 679 . For many years, this Court has recognized that \"the phrase 're- straint of trade' is best read to mean 'undue restraint '\" and has \"thus understood § 1 to outlaw only unreason- able restraints.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When an exemption to the Sherman Act is appro- priate, Congress has created one. For example, Section 6 of the Clayton Antitrust Act exempts certain labor activities from antitrust scrutiny.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "Where Congress has not adopted an exemption, this Court has been loathe to create one. As the Court explained in 1962, \"[i]mmunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even where Congress has conferred an exemption, this Court's precedents \"consistently hold that exemptions from the antitrust laws must be construed narrowly.\" Union Lab.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "Union Lab. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Nat'l Broiler Mktg. 436 U.S. 816; Fed. Maritime 411 U.S. 726.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "Life Ins. 458 U.S. 119; accord Nat'l Broiler Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fed. Maritime 411 U.S. 726. Fifty years later, however, the Court recognized this decision as an \"ex- ception and anomaly\" that had \"become an aberration confined to baseball.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "458 U.S. 119; accord Nat'l Broiler Mktg. 436 U.S. 816; Fed. Maritime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Fifty years later, however, the Court recognized this decision as an \"ex- ception and anomaly\" that had \"become an aberration confined to baseball.\" 407 U.S. 258.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 726",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "Maritime 411 U.S. 726. Fifty years later, however, the Court recognized this decision as an \"ex- ception and anomaly\" that had \"become an aberration confined to baseball.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Congress' consideration (and rejection) of ex emptions for other professional sports led this 25 Court to limit the baseball exemption accordingly. Ra- 352 U.S. 445—this Court has refused to allow litigants to justify a restraint of trade based on social policy or any other non-competition- enhancing justification.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "407 U.S. 258. Indeed, Congress' consideration (and rejection) of ex emptions for other professional sports led this 25 Court to limit the baseball exemption accordingly. Ra- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—this Court has refused to allow litigants to justify a restraint of trade based on social policy or any other non-competition- enhancing justification. In Professional Engineers , the Court condemned a trade association's prohibition on its member-engineers bid- ding for projects based on price —a practice that the associati on claimed could jeopardize public safety. 435 U.S. at 679– 680.",
		"citation_value_orig": "352 U.S. 445",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Petitioners' position defies the plain language of the Sherman Act, which contains no exemption for the NCAA",
		"context": "The Court rejected this justification out of hand: \"the argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and commerce than competition is properly addressed to Con- gress.\" Id. at 689; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"'orderly way'\" to deal with non-competition -based arguments for special antitrust treatment \"'is by legislation and not by court decision. '\" Flood , 407 U.S. at 279 (quoting Radovich , 352 U.S. at 452).",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Five circuits have not answered the question presented",
		"context": "2016) (Smith, J., concurring dubitante). A D.C. Cir- cuit panel has also expressed skepticism. See People for 15 Ethical Treatment of Animals, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The First and Federal Circuits do not appear to have addressed the question at all. Despite petitioners' assertion to the contrary, the Seventh Circuit has not decided the question either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Five circuits have not answered the question presented",
		"context": "The two Seventh Circuit cases petitioners cite did not present the question at issu e here because the nominal- damages claims in each traveled to the end of the case with other live claims. Pet. 14 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 370 F.3d 668480 F.3d 460133 F. Supp. 3d 1154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 F.3d 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Five circuits have not answered the question presented",
		"context": "The two Seventh Circuit cases petitioners cite did not present the question at issu e here because the nominal- damages claims in each traveled to the end of the case with other live claims. Pet. 14 (citing 523 F.3d 789; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]480 F.3d 460133 F. Supp. 3d 1154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 F.3d 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Five circuits have not answered the question presented",
		"context": "The two Seventh Circuit cases petitioners cite did not present the question at issu e here because the nominal- damages claims in each traveled to the end of the case with other live claims. Pet. 14 (citing 523 F.3d 789; 370 F.3d 668[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]133 F. Supp. 3d 1154.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "at 30a, and Petitioners do not dispute, the FCC set forth no data about female ownership. That fails basic requirements of administrative decisionmaking; \"deference cannot fill the lack of an evidentiary foundation\" for agency action . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To be sure , when \"available data do not settle a regulatory issue, \" an agency \" must then exercise its judgment in moving from the facts and probabilities on the record to a policy conclusion. \" State Farm , 463 U.S. at 52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "But that the underlying data were know n to be faulty only makes the situation worse. The APA does not permit an agency to skip reasoned analysis because its data is faulty; on the contrary, known faulty data requires the agency to do more analysis to correct for known errors . See New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Third Circuit correctly found that the agency failed to attempt such corrections here, App. 31a—even though commenters submitted analyses demonstrating how the data could be corrected to provide a more meaningful evaluati on, see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "969 F.2d 1163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "The Third Circuit acknowledged, App. 33a, that the APA \"imposes no general obligation on agencies to produce empirical evidence. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But when agencies do rely on data, they \"do not have free rein to use inaccurate data ,\" Dist. Hosp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 F.3d 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "But when agencies do rely on data, they \"do not have free rein to use inaccurate data ,\" Dist. Hosp. Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which is what the Commission did here. What's worse, the FCC's conclusion in the Reconsideration Order that this faulty data justified relaxing the ownership rules was a wholly unexplained about -face from its judgment in the 2016 Order that precisely the same data did not justify relaxing the o wnership rules. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "When an agency changes positions, it \" must … show that there are good reasons for the new policy .\" Encino Motorcars, 136 S. Ct . at 2126 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . The Third Circuit's ruling leaves the Commission free to set policy as it wants. But \"[i]f [the FCC] finds that a proposed rule change would likely have an adverse effect on ownership diversity but nonetheless believes that rule is in the public interest all things considered, it must say so and explain its reasoning.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "Besides being arbitrary, the FCC's \" analysis\" of ownership diversity would fail for lack of adequate notice. To comply with the APA's procedural requirements, an agency must subject the \"most 35 critical factual material\" used by the agency to \"informed comment\" in order \"to afford affected parties an opportunity to present comment and evidence to support their positions.\" Chamber of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Prometheus II , 652 F.3d at 445– 46. Such notic e of the grounds of agency action fosters transparency an d dialogue, and se rves \"important values of administrative law,\" by allowing the public to \"respond fully and in a timely manner to an agency's exercise of authority.\" DHS , 140 S Ct. at 1909.",
		"citation_value_orig": "443 F.3d 890",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Third Circuit's Decision Is Correct.",
		"context": "The FCC gave no hint of its intent to rely on or compare the NTIA 's 1990s -era data and the FCC's more recent ownership data. Perhaps if the Commission had done so, commenters could have helped raise its Statistics grade by \"point[ing] out where th at information is erroneous or where the agency may be drawing improper conclusions .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents raised th is lack-of-notice issue in the Third Circuit , Op. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "737 F.2d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Statutory \"Make and Use\" Standard Should Govern",
		"context": "Id. at 270; cf. Nautilus, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The specification thus may \"leav[e] something to the skill of persons applying the invention.\" Minerals Separation , 242 U.S. at 271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. District courts routinely impose sentences below or within the applicable guideline range, and otherwise base sentences on that range, in cases like those of petitioners",
		"context": "To determine whether district courts in fact base sentences on the applicable guideline ran ge when such range is below a mandatory minimum following substantial assistance motions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) , amicus surveyed 89 Federal Defender offices across the nation.12 In all, 88 offices responded. circumstances and seriousness of offense, and sentence that would have been imposed absent motion in deciding \"to what extent a defendant's sentence should be reduced for substantial assistance\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 Defenders have offices in 91 of the 94 federal judicial districts. The Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, headed by the Federal Defender on the merits brief, were not surveyed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. District courts routinely impose sentences below or within the applicable guideline range, and otherwise base sentences on that range, in cases like those of petitioners",
		"context": "Koons , 850 F.3d at 974. And the Eighth Circuit is not alone in maintaining that sentences were not \"based on\" the applicable guideline range in the face of record evidence demonstrating that the district court in fact relied on the guideline range. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 595 F.3d 575 . In contrast, the Third and D.C. Circuits, which reject a categorical bar, recognize that the applicable guideline range in fact plays a role.",
		"citation_value_orig": "607 F.3d 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. District courts routinely impose sentences below or within the applicable guideline range, and otherwise base sentences on that range, in cases like those of petitioners",
		"context": "Koons , 850 F.3d at 974. And the Eighth Circuit is not alone in maintaining that sentences were not \"based on\" the applicable guideline range in the face of record evidence demonstrating that the district court in fact relied on the guideline range. See, e.g., 607 F.3d 255 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In contrast, the Third and D.C. Circuits, which reject a categorical bar, recognize that the applicable guideline range in fact plays a role.",
		"citation_value_orig": "595 F.3d 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejection Is A Breach, Not An Avoidance Power",
		"context": "Rejection does not affect rights that breach outside bankruptcy would not affect. 1 One important facet of that principle is that rejec- tion is not an avoidance powe r. If a debtor transfers an interest in its property—such as a lien, lease, or li-cense—to a counterparty before bankruptcy, the debt-or's property enters the estate subject to the counter-party's interest. Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. 1 City Bank Farmers Trust [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary. It simply holds that a debtor- tenant's unpaid future rent under a rejected lease is a pre-petition claim that can be discharged. 6 Johnson , 264 U.S. 1.2 Rejection cannot undo the transfer and take back the interest in property.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejection Is A Breach, Not An Avoidance Power",
		"context": "Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. 1 City Bank Farmers Trust 299 U.S. 433, is not to the contrary. It simply holds that a debtor- tenant's unpaid future rent under a rejected lease is a pre-petition claim that can be discharged. 6 Johnson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].2 Rejection cannot undo the transfer and take back the interest in property. That can be accomplished only through a fraudulent-transfer, preference, or other avoidance action under §§541-550 of the Code. And such actions can be brought only in narrow circumstances—such as when the debtor, while insolvent, transferred its property for less than reasonably equivalent value, reducing the as-sets available to pay creditors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejection Is A Breach, Not An Avoidance Power",
		"context": "7 the Bankruptcy Code in general—works. Simply put, the Code respects non-bankruptcy property rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pet. Br. 19-29.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Rejection Is A Breach, Not An Avoidance Power",
		"context": "19-29. 2. Lacking a stronger basis for its novel view, Tempnology relies (at 28-30) on a misreading of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It seizes on Bildisco 's statement that the collective bargaining agreement at issue in that case was \"not an enforceable contract,\" id. at 532.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. History and this Court's Precedent Demonstrate Congress's Power to Require State Actors to Perform Certain Tasks that Supplement the Adjudicative Process, Including Keeping Records and Sharing Information with the Federal Government",
		"context": ". . on behalf of the state\" against contrac- tors); State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Act's requirements for the treatment of debtors also affected the many states that agreed to \"receive and keep safe\" federal prisoners in their jails. 27 F. Cas. 176 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reed v. Town of Gilbert mandates that courts apply strict scrutiny when examining any content-based speech laws",
		"context": ". Content-based speech laws are subject to strict scrutiny review. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] The Act allows any other unlicensed facility offering health- related services or collecting health-related information but not \"providing pregnancy-related services\" to refrain from notifying clients when they are using a facility that has not satisfied licensing standards set by the state. C AL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 123471(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 13",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Reed v. Town of Gilbert mandates that courts apply strict scrutiny when examining any content-based speech laws",
		"context": "Thus, a speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content based even if it does not discriminate among viewpoints within that subject matter. Id. at 2230 (internal citations omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this matter, the Ninth Circuit correctly found that the Act was a content-based speech regulation. Pet.App.22a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ".. 51 CONCLUSION ................................ .......................... 53 iiiiii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Anheuser -Busch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .................. 45 Bd. of Governors of Univ. of 714 F. Supp. 167 ................................ 47 Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F.3d 769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ".. 51 CONCLUSION ................................ .......................... 53 iiiiii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Anheuser -Busch, 28 F.3d 769 ................................ .................. 45 Bd. of Governors of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 47 Bd. Of Trs. of State Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F. Supp. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Of Trs. of State Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ . 31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of State Univ. of 492 U.S. 469 ................................ ................................ . 31 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of State Univ. of 492 U.S. 469 ................................ ................................ . 31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of 492 U.S. 469 ................................ ................................ . 31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst. For 2015 WL 7758845 ................................ ................................ ......... 49 Instructure, 2022 WL 43829 ..... 49 James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266 ................................ .......... 44 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 ................................ ................................ ............ 29, 36 Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ................................ ....... 35 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 ................................ ........................... 48 137 S. Ct. 1744 ................................ ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of 492 U.S. 469 ................................ ................................ . 31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst. For 2015 WL 7758845 ................................ ................................ ......... 49 Instructure, 2022 WL 43829 ..... 49 James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266 ................................ .......... 44 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 ................................ ................................ ............ 29, 36 Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ................................ ....... 35 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 ................................ ........................... 48 137 S. Ct. 1744 ................................ ................................ .",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst. For 2015 WL 7758845 ................................ ................................ ......... 49 Instructure, 2022 WL 43829 ..... 49 James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266 ................................ .......... 44 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 ................................ ................................ ............ 29, 36 Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ................................ ....... 35 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 ................................ ........................... 48 137 S. Ct. 1744 ................................ ................................ . 41 Minn.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, 164 F.3d 806 ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst. For 2015 WL 7758845 ................................ ................................ ......... 49 Instructure, 2022 WL 43829 ..... 49 James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266 ................................ .......... 44 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 ................................ ................................ ............ 29, 36 Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ................................ ....... 35 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 ................................ ........................... 48 137 S. Ct. 1744 ................................ ................................ . 41 Minn.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "31 564 U.S. 786 ... 36 510 U.S. 569 ................................ ................................ ........ 42 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. 447 U.S. 557 .............. 51, 52 Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 ................................ . 32, 53 403 U.S. 15 ................... 36 Dastar 539 U.S. 23 ................................ .......47, 51, 53 Exxon 628 F.2d 5 ................................ ......................... 44 Harley -Davidson, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........................... 31 515 U.S. 557 ................................ .. 35, 42 Hustler Mag., 485 U.S. 46 ... 25, 44, 52 iv Inst. For 2015 WL 7758845 ................................ ................................ ......... 49 Instructure, 2022 WL 43829 ..... 49 James Burrough, 540 F.2d 266 ................................ .......... 44 Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 ................................ ................................ ............ 29, 36 Lamb's 508 U.S. 384 ................................ ....... 35 184 Cal. App. 2d 553 ................................ ........................... 48 137 S. Ct. 1744 ................................ ................................ . 41 Minn.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
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		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
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		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "1 (2004) .... 7 ......28 43 40 43 30 27 40 40 41 28 2830......7 ......34 viv 487 U.S. 781 ................................ .................. 29, 32 RJR Foods, 603 F.2d 1058 ................................ ........................... 44 875 F.2d 994 ..... 41 RXC Media, 986 F.3d 361 ................................ .......... 44 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 ............................. 31 418 U.S. 405 ............. 28 393 U.S. 503 ................................ .................... 7, 36 529 U.S. 803 ................................ ................................ ............ 35, 42 Univ. of Ala. Bd. Of 683 F.3d 1266 ................................ ..... 41 Va. Pharmacy 425 U.S. 748 ................................ ........ 31 Westchester 214 F.3d 658 ................................ .......... 41 Yankee Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 42 Statutes \u0003 15 U.S.C. § 1115 ................................ ......................... 29 15 U.S.C. § 1127 ................................ ......................... 29 Academic Articles vi Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement , 94 C AL.",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F. Supp. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ". [ W]e do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. We communicate using symbols found around us. By taking what you found and adding your own expression to the canvases in the appendix , you just participated in one of our most cherished traditions: Freedom of Speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ". [ W]e do not confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . We communicate using symbols found around us. By taking what you found and adding your own expression to the canvases in the appendix , you just participated in one of our most cherished traditions: Freedom of Speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "After all , a free flow of ideas forms the \"heart of the First Amendment.\" Hustler Mag. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, in contrast to the unflattering critique of musicians, Jack Daniel's promotes itself as a drink crafted by wholesome, authentic people. While discussing his legendary \"Postcards from Lynchburg\" campaign, ad man Ted Simmons explained, \"Jack Daniel's country is… a magical, mythical place that beckons American men.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "After all, a free flow of ideas forms the \"heart of the First Amendment.\" Hustler Mag. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in contrast to the unflattering critique of musicians, Jack Daniel's promotes itself as a drink crafted by wholesome, authentic people. While discussing his legendary \"Postcards from Lynchburg\" campaign, ad man Ted Simmons explained, \"Jack Daniel's country is… a magical, mythical place that beckons American men.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 U.S. 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "The difference between a cowboy selling a mythic version of the West and a cowboy selling cigarettes is the difference between noncommercial speech and commercial speech. Trademarks , like the American cow boy, can embody both noncommercial and commercial speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. We distinguish betwee n these two embodiments of the c owboy by how the embodiment is used. After all, \"the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "We distinguish betwee n these two embodiments of the c owboy by how the embodiment is used. After all, \"the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If a symbol 28 is used to sell goods or services, then it is commercial speech and falls within the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "§ 1127 (limiting scope to goods and services) . Speech, however, does not lose its First Amendment protections when the speech itself is sold. Joseph Burstyn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When a trademark intertwines with the speech that is being sold, the speech does not lose its noncommercial status . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "When a trademark intertwines with the speech that is being sold, the speech does not lose its noncommercial status . Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Lanham Act does not concern noncommercial speech. Infringement under the Lanham Act only concerns the sale of goods and services, not speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "The difference between a cowboy selling a mythic version of the West and a cowboy selling cigarettes is the difference between noncommercial speech and commercial speech. Trademarks , like the American cow boy, can embody both noncommercial and commercial speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . We distinguish betwee n these two embodiments of the c owboy by how the embodiment is used. After all, \"the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "We distinguish betwee n these two embodiments of the c owboy by how the embodiment is used. After all, \"the context in which a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If a symbol 28 is used to sell goods or services, then it is commercial speech and falls within the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "§ 1127 (limiting scope to goods and services) . Speech, however, does not lose its First Amendment protections when the speech itself is sold. Joseph Burstyn, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When a trademark intertwines with the speech that is being sold, the speech does not lose its noncommercial status . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "When a trademark intertwines with the speech that is being sold, the speech does not lose its noncommercial status . Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Lanham Act does not concern noncommercial speech. Infringement under the Lanham Act only concerns the sale of goods and services, not speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of State 14 USA Dog Collar , OFFICIAL GOP STORE , http://bit.ly/3Km2SVX (last visited Feb. 7, 2023) ; Ice Cream Scoop , STORE .DEMOCRATS .ORG, http://bit.ly/3lDqydP (last visited Feb. 7, 2023) . 30 Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This test allows a court to adjudicate the defense of noncommercial expression at the early stages of litigation by quickly determining if the use of a symbol even concerns the sale of goods and services. This Court demonstrated this principled difference between selling speech and selling goods and services in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of 492 U.S. 469. This test allows a court to adjudicate the defense of noncommercial expression at the early stages of litigation by quickly determining if the use of a symbol even concerns the sale of goods and services. This Court demonstrated this principled difference between selling speech and selling goods and services in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . San Francisco Arts & Athletics (SFAA) sought to promote an event called the \"Gay Olympic Games.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Lower courts are adept at distinguishing between the sale of speech and the sale of goods and services . The Second Circuit refused to apply the First Amendmen t to a humorous use of t he Harley - Davidson trademark to sell motorcycle repair services. Harley -Davidson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Second 3029 14 This principle – that there is a difference between selling speech and selling goods and services – matches this Court's guidance in Fox that whether or not the speech at issue does more than propose a commercial transaction is \"the test identifying commer cial speech.\" Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of State 14 USA Dog Collar , OFFICIAL GOP STORE , http://bit.ly/3Km2SVX (last visited Feb. 7, 2023) ; Ice Cream Scoop , STORE .DEMOCRATS .ORG, http://bit.ly/3lDqydP (last visited Feb. 7, 2023) . 30 Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This test allows a court to adjudicate the defense of noncommercial expression at the early stages of litigation by quickly determining if the use of a symbol even concerns the sale of goods and services. This Court demonstrated this principled difference between selling speech and selling goods and services in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, 483 U.S. 522 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "of 492 U.S. 469. This test allows a court to adjudicate the defense of noncommercial expression at the early stages of litigation by quickly determining if the use of a symbol even concerns the sale of goods and services. This Court demonstrated this principled difference between selling speech and selling goods and services in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . San Francisco Arts & Athletics (SFAA) sought to promote an event called the \"Gay Olympic Games.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Lower courts are adept at distinguishing between the sale of speech and the sale of goods and services . The Second Circuit refused to apply the First Amendment to a humorous use of t he Harley - Davidson trademark to sell motorcycle repair services. Harley -Davidson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Second 3131 Circuit properly applied heightened First Amendment protections when a parodist emulated Cliffs Notes ' trademarks to sell its own jokes. Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d 490 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 F.3d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Harley -Davidson , 164 F.3d 806 . But the Second 3131 Circuit properly applied heightened First Amendment protections when a parodist emulated Cliffs Notes ' trademarks to sell its own jokes. Cliffs Notes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Protecting the sale of speech, even when attached to goods , complies with First Amendment precedent that protected speech inextricably intertwined with a commercial good is noncommercial speech. See Riley , 487 U.S. at 796.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Jack Daniel's and their amici' s suggestion otherwise contradicts both this Court's precedent and how Americans express themselves . 3231 Circuit properly applied heightened First Amendment protections when a parodist emulated Cliffs Notes ' trademarks to sell its own jokes. Cliffs Notes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Protecting the sale of speech, even when attached to goods , complies with First Amendment precedent that protected speech inextricably intertwined with a commercial good is noncommercial speech. See Riley , 487 U.S. at 796.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.2d 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "at 169 . A limitation that only permits licensed commentary about trademark holders also violates the bedrock First Amendment principle that government may not \"regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. \" Matal , 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (quoting Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1993 )). Restricting the types of speech that may appear on commercial goods favors corporate ideals over others. As this Court observed, there is \"no more certain antit hesis\" to freedom of speech than \"a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Restricting the types of speech that may appear on commercial goods favors corporate ideals over others. As this Court observed, there is \"no more certain antit hesis\" to freedom of speech than \"a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That artistic expression may still appear in movies or on white -walled galleries is of no consolation, because \"the distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.\" 529 U.S. 803 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "515 U.S. 557 . That artistic expression may still appear in movies or on white -walled galleries is of no consolation, because \"the distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Unsurprisingly, this Court routinely rejects limits to the First Amendment based on medium . See e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "See e.g. , Minn. Voters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 564 U.S. 786, 790 -98 3433 i. Jack Daniel's Proposes an Unconstitutional Content -Based Regulation. Jack Daniel's and its amici propose that freedom of speech should be curtailed when placed on \"commercial \" or \"utilitarian\" products . The proposed rule suppresses protected speech like the Republican P arty's expressive beverage coolers : 16 Jack Daniel's suggested rule is a textbook example of an impermissible content -based regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "See e.g. , Minn. Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 790 -98 3433 i. Jack Daniel's Proposes an Unconstitutional Content -Based Regulation. Jack Daniel's and its amici propose that freedom of speech should be curtailed when placed on \"commercial \" or \"utilitarian\" products . The proposed rule suppresses protected speech like the Republican P arty's expressive beverage coolers : 16 Jack Daniel's suggested rule is a textbook example of an impermissible content -based regulation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "at 169 . A limitation that only permits licensed commentary about trademark holders also violates the bedrock First Amendment principle that government may not \"regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. \" Matal , 137 S. Ct. at 1757 (quoting Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1993 )). Restricting the types of speech that may appear on commercial goods favors corporate ideals over others. As this Court observed, there is \"no more certain antit hesis\" to freedom of speech than \"a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Restricting the types of speech that may appear on commercial goods favors corporate ideals over others. As this Court observed, there is \"no more certain antit hesis\" to freedom of speech than \"a proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That artistic expression may still appear in movies or on white -walled galleries is of no consolation, because \"the distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.\" 529 U.S. 803.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "515 U.S. 557 . That artistic expression may still appear in movies or on white -walled galleries is of no consolation, because \"the distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unsurprisingly, this Court routinely rejects limits to the First Amendment based on medium . See e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 803",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "See e.g. , Minn. Voters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Confining artistic and political speech to pre-approved corporate messages or specified safe havens is an impermissible content -based restriction , and the proposal should be rejected . ii.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "This practice continues to the modern day. As shown throughout this brief , political parties sell all manner of utilitarian objects loaded with polit ical expression. 3635 (2011) (video games); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Confining artistic and political speech to pre-approved corporate messages or specified safe havens is an impermissible content -based restriction , and the proposal should be rejected . ii.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Had courts applied t he likelihood of confusion test anti-abortion ads, calendars for University of Alabama football, Aqua's song \" Barbie Girl, \" Polo Magazine, and the Fellini film \" Ginger and Fred\" would all be banned. See Radiance Found. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 ; 875 F.2d 994 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 ; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 ; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Had courts applied t he likelihood of confusion test anti-abortion ads, calendars for University of Alabama football, Aqua's song \" Barbie Girl, \" Polo Magazine, and the Fellini film \" Ginger and Fred\" would all be banned. See Radiance Found. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658; 875 F.2d 994 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 875 F.2d 994 . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", 786 F.3d 316 ; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266 ; Mattel, 296 F.3d 894 ; Westchester 214 F.3d 658; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Our own experience demons trates the problem . Twice court s entered a preliminary injunction finding that our artwork would likely confuse customers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569. Indeed, \"First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the First Amendment protects confusing speech, the likelihood of confusion test prohibits it. The purpose of protecting noncommercial speech in art and literature is to permit people to form and test expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Hurley , 515 U.S. at 569. Indeed, \"First Amendment protections do not apply only to those who speak clearly, whose jokes are funny, and whose parodies succeed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the First Amendment protects confusing speech, the likelihood of confusion test prohibits it. The purpose of protecting noncommercial speech in art and literature is to permit people to form and test expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Inc, 485 U.S. at 52. Second, surveys consistently find seventeen to eighteen percent of Americans believe the sun revolves around the Earth .21 A minority of 20 Ten to fifteen percent is the generally accepted s tandard. See e.g., RXC Media, 986 F.3d 361[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]540 F.2d 266, http://bit.ly/3I6oDGt ; Steve Crabtree, New Poll Gauges Americans' General Knowledge Levels , GALLUP (July 6, 1999), http://bit.ly/3KhfKwh . 44 Americans – smaller than the number confused by Copernican Theory – should not determine our First Amendment freedoms . Further undermining Jack Daniel's proposal is that it bans speech when survey respondents fail to understand the intricacies of trademark law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.2d 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Inc, 485 U.S. at 52. Second, surveys consistently find seventeen to eighteen percent of Americans believe the sun revolves around the Earth .21 A minority of 20 Ten to fifteen percent is the generally accepted s tandard. See e.g., RXC Media, 986 F.3d 361628 F.2d 500[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], http://bit.ly/3I6oDGt ; Steve Crabtree, New Poll Gauges Americans' General Knowledge Levels , GALLUP (July 6, 1999), http://bit.ly/3KhfKwh . 44 Americans – smaller than the number confused by Copernican Theory – should not determine our First Amendment freedoms . Further undermining Jack Daniel's proposal is that it bans speech when survey respondents fail to understand the intricacies of trademark law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 F.2d 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Unfortunately, failure to understand the limits of trademark and licensing rights has led directly to censorship. The Eighth Circuit suppressed a comedic advertisement for Michelob Oily in a humor magazine because \"over half of those surveyed thought [the artist] needed Anheuser - Busch's approval to publish the ad.\" Anheuser - Busch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The belief that a license is necessary to create a parody tilted the balance . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F.3d 769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Inc, 485 U.S. at 52. Second, surveys consistently find seventeen to eighteen percent of Americans believe the sun revolves around the Earth .21 A minority of 20 Ten to fifteen percent is the generally accepted s tandard. See e.g., RXC Media, 986 F.3d 361[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]540 F.2d 266, http://bit.ly/3I6oDGt ; Steve Crabtree, New Poll Gauges Americans' General Knowledge Levels , GALLUP (July 6, 1999), http://bit.ly/3KhfKwh . 44 Americans – smaller than the number confused by Copernican Theory – should not determine our First Amendment freedoms . Further undermining Jack Daniel's proposal is that it bans speech when survey respondents fail to understand the intricacies of trademark law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "628 F.2d 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Inc, 485 U.S. at 52. Second, surveys consistently find seventeen to eighteen percent of Americans believe the sun revolves around the Earth .21 A minority of 20 Ten to fifteen percent is the generally accepted s tandard. See e.g., RXC Media, 986 F.3d 361628 F.2d 500[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], http://bit.ly/3I6oDGt ; Steve Crabtree, New Poll Gauges Americans' General Knowledge Levels , GALLUP (July 6, 1999), http://bit.ly/3KhfKwh . 44 Americans – smaller than the number confused by Copernican Theory – should not determine our First Amendment freedoms . Further undermining Jack Daniel's proposal is that it bans speech when survey respondents fail to understand the intricacies of trademark law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 F.2d 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Unfortunately, failure to understand the limits of trademark and licensing rights has led directly to censorship. The Eighth Circuit suppressed a comedic advertisement for Michelob Oily in a humor magazine because \"over half of those surveyed thought [the artist] needed Anheuser - Busch's approval to publish the ad.\" Anheuser - Busch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The belief that a license is necessary to create a parody tilted the balance . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F.3d 769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Differences exist between trademark and copyright law, particularly with regard to derivative works . And these differences must be respected. See Dastar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A copyright owner has the right to prevent the copying of their work in any medium, while trademark law prevents the use of a similar mark on goods or services that would probably cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the origin of the good s or services. J. Thomas McCarthy , McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition , §§ 6:14, 6:6 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Bd. of Governors of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (plaintiff had not 4645 Similarly, Jack Daniel's survey results demonstrate confusion about licensing rules, not source of origin . J.A. 123 -146.",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F. Supp. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Differences exist between trademark and copyright law, particularly with regard to derivative works . And these differences must be respected. See Dastar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A copyright owner has the right to prevent the copying of their work in any medium, while trademark law prevents the use of a similar mark on goods or services that would probably cause a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the origin of the good s or services. J. Thomas McCarthy , McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition, §§ 6:14, 6:6 (5th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": ", Bd. of Governors of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even i f a survey respondent understands the nuance, questions about affiliation are nonsensical when applied to expressive uses of trademarks. Again, an expressive use should remind the viewer of the trademark holder .",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F. Supp. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "See e.g. Instructure, Inc. v. Canvas Techs. Inc. , established the \"requisite likelihood of confusion that is the hallmark of copyright infringement\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]339 F. Supp. 3d 3612015 WL 7758845 . Returning to the political expression in the \"Let's Go Brandon!\" slogan, we quickly found tweets believing th is expression comes f rom NASCAR.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 Cal. App. 2d 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "See e.g. Instructure, Inc. v. Canvas Techs. Inc. , established the \"requisite likelihood of confusion that is the hallmark of copyright infringement\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]339 F. Supp. 3d 3612015 WL 7758845 . Returning to the political expression in the \"Let's Go Brandon!\" slogan, we quickly found tweets believing th is expression comes f rom NASCAR.",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 Cal. App. 2d 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Application of the likelihood of confusion test to speech is constitutionally problematic . See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The likelihood of confusion test is not just overbroad, but applied to noncommercial expression it lacks any substantial interest . When a trademark does not function to identify the source of goods or services, there is no consumer understanding to protect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. VIP Engaged in Noncommercial Speech.",
		"context": "Application of the likelihood of confusion test to speech is constitutionally problematic . See generally Central Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The likelihood of confusion test is not just overbroad, but applied to noncommercial expression it lacks any substantial interest . When a trademark does not function to identify the source of goods or services, there is no consumer understanding to protect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "IV. As originally inter- preted, the Fourth Amendment's protections were tied to common-law trespass, and were limited to those ar- eas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment itself. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Silver- man v. United States , for example, the Court rejected as violating the Fourth Amendment the government's use of a \"spike mike\" – wh ich was inserted \"several inches into a party wall\" until it touched a heating duct – to eavesdrop on the conversations of the premises' occupants. 365 U.S. 505.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "See 533 U.S. 27. In Silver- man v. United States , for example, the Court rejected as violating the Fourth Amendment the government's use of a \"spike mike\" – wh ich was inserted \"several inches into a party wall\" until it touched a heating duct – to eavesdrop on the conversations of the premises' occupants. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, for many years, the trespass the- ory was the \"exclusive basis\" for obtaining Fourth Amendment protection. Jardines , 569 U.S. at 5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "In so holding, Katz expanded the reach of Fourth Amend- ment protections to include warrantless police investi-gation that intruded upon a person's \"constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy.\" See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For dec- ades after Katz , the Court determined whether a place or a person's possessions or activities received Fourth Amendment protection based upon the reasonableness of the person's privacy expectation in that place, thing, or activity. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "For dec- ades after Katz , the Court determined whether a place or a person's possessions or activities received Fourth Amendment protection based upon the reasonableness of the person's privacy expectation in that place, thing, or activity. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, the Katz test produced its own set of chal- lenges. Katz 's privacy-expectations test was criticized for its lack of an objective yardstick by which to meas- ure whether a person's privacy expectations were rea- sonable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "\"); see also Jones , 565 U.S. at 427 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (\"[J]udges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks.\"). Further, Katz 's adoption of a per se warrant requirement 8 led the Court to develop thereafter an \"intricate body of law regarding 'reason-able expectation of privacy' \" as a means of defining the Fourth Amendment's various warrant exceptions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 See Katz , 389 U.S. at 357 (\"[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment – subject only to a few specifically estab lished and well delineated excep- tions.\") (footnote omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A Fourth Amendment \"Search\" Occurs When the Government's Warrantless Conduct Either Infringes On a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Or Involves a Physical Intrusion (a Trespass) On a Constitutionally Protected Area to Perform an Investigation",
		"context": "Id. In Jardines , the Court elaborated on the trespass basis of Fourth Amendment protection. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, and without a warrant, police brought a drug-detection dog onto a home's curtilage – specifi- cally, the home's front porc h – in order to perform a drug-detection sniff of the air at the base of the front door. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "28a -29a. 1. This Court confirmed in Safeco , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that a regulated party is not warned away from an ob- jectively reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous legal provision without an agency's or a court of ap- peals' contrary authoritative guidance. Although this Court rejected the defendant's statutory interpreta- tion, it observed that the interpretation was suffi- ciently grounded in statutory text that, although that interpretation was \"erroneous,\" it \"was not objectively unreasonable ,\" and the defendant did not act reck- lessly. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "For decades, this Court has refused to treat non- authoritative agency interpretation s as binding . Pol- icy manuals and informal guidance from agencies do not control the meaning of ambiguous statutes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 529 U.S. 576. Agency guidance not issued through \"vehi- cles[] understood to make authoritative policy\" also do not determine the meaning of ambiguous regulations. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (plurality op.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "For decades, this Court has refused to treat non- authoritative agency interpretation s as binding . Pol- icy manuals and informal guidance from agencies do not control the meaning of ambiguous statutes. 533 U.S. 218; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Agency guidance not issued through \"vehi- cles[] understood to make authoritative policy\" also do not determine the meaning of ambiguous regulations. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416 (plurality op.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "at 2434 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in the judgment) . And it is black -letter law that \"[a] decision of a federal district court judge is not binding precedent in either a differ- ent judicial district, the same judicial district, or even upon the same judge in a different case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners do not contend that informal interpre- tations should receive controlling legal deference. But the practical effect is much the same .",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "Moreover, this ap- proach would exacerbate the notice problems inherent in requiring contractors to conform their conduct to agencies' sometimes shifting informal interpretations of ambiguous l egal provisions . \"[T]hese days it some- times seems agencies change their statutory interpre-tations almost as often as elections change administrations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Treating each iteration of an agency's non- au- thoritative interpretation of an ambiguous legal provision as sufficient to \"warn off\" a contractor from following other reasonable interpretations would cre- ate havoc for businesses that would be required to abide by these flip -flopping positions for fear of treble- damages liability. Moreover, petitioners' standard would raise challenging questions about how a con-tractor is supposed to conduct its business when vari- ous non-authoritative sources —agency staffers, district courts, other private contractors , private law- yers—issue conflicting interpretations of the same le- gal provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Only Guidance Carrying the Force of Law Can \"Warn Away\" a Contractor From an Objectively Reasonable Interpretation of an Ambiguous Legal Provision.",
		"context": "It al- leviate s notice problems stemming from having to sort out conflicting informal guidance. And it increase s the likelihood that the agency's interpretation is rea- sonable and persuasive, because that interpretation 32 result s from a notice -and-comment process that \"gives affected parties fair warning of potential changes in the law and an opportunity to be heard on those changes\" and \"affords the agency a chance to avoid er-rors and make a more informed decision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Treating only precedential court of appeals deci- sions as sufficiently authoritative has similar bene- fits. Stability in government contracting rules that contractors must follow is enhanced because appellate courts typically follow the preceden tial decisions of prior panels .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Overruling Abood Would Unnecessarily Disrupt California's Longstanding System of Labor Relations",
		"context": "Under California law, w hen a provision of a collective bargai ning agree- ment is declared unla wful, the State must notify the exclusive representative and then meet and confer re- garding the change . See Cal. Gov't Code § 3516.5; see also Claremont Police Officers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State's collective bargaining agreements also include savin gs clause s that require the parties to meet and confer when a prov ision of the contract is held unlawful , and to renegotiate the inval- idated provision. E.g., Agreement Between State of California and SEIU – Local 1000 covering Bargaining 26 Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21, http://www.calhr.ca.gov/labor -relations/Documents/ mou-20160702- 20200101- master.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "39 Cal. 4th 623",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "Texas is correct. Congress since the 1790 Act has legislated for individual Indians, and Holliday held that \"commerce with the Indian tribes[] means commerce with the individuals composing those tribes.\" 70 U.S. at 417; see Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey , 93 U.S. at 194- 95; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, Plaintiffs argue that the Indian Commerce Clause is limited to trade and the like, analogizing to the Interstate Commerce Clause. Brackeen Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "Cotton Petroleum ,490 U.S. at 192. And in particular, \"the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government.\" Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Japan Line, 441 U.S. 434—on which Plaintiffs rely for the proposition that Congress's commerce powers cannot reach \"child-custody\" proceedings, Brackeen Br. 17, 50—illustrates why Plaintiffs' wooden equivalence goes wrong. Morrison was about the edges of Congress's interstate commerce power: intrastate activity that, though not literally commerce \"among the several States,\" \"substantially affect[s]\" such commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "Cotton Petroleum ,490 U.S. at 192. And in particular, \"the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of power from the States to the Federal Government.\" Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44; accord Japan Line, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—on which Plaintiffs rely for the proposition that Congress's commerce powers cannot reach \"child-custody\" proceedings, Brackeen Br. 17, 50—illustrates why Plaintiffs' wooden equivalence goes wrong. Morrison was about the edges of Congress's interstate commerce power: intrastate activity that, though not literally commerce \"among the several States,\" \"substantially affect[s]\" such commerce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "46, §16, 1 Stat. 743 (requiring state courts to \"take proper bail\" for individuals detained by federal officials within Indian country). And this Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that Congress acted within its \"plenary\" power in directing \"Oklahoma state courts\" to hear \"partition proceeding[s]\" concerning Indian lands. The Individual Plaintiffs fare no better distinguishing Congress's criminal statutes as \"appl[ying] only in Indian country.\" Brackeen Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 363",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "49. This Court has held that \"Congress possesses the broad power of legislating for the protection of the Indians wherever they may be.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That has to be right: \"Indian country\" is what Congress has by statute defined , and 36 many Indians reside outside Indian country because Congress encouraged or forced Indians to leave (or even disestablished) reservations. Supra 11; see 522 U.S. 520; Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey , 93 U.S. at 196.",
		"citation_value_orig": "302 U.S. 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "302 U.S. 535. That has to be right: \"Indian country\" is what Congress has by statute defined , and 36 many Indians reside outside Indian country because Congress encouraged or forced Indians to leave (or even disestablished) reservations. Supra 11; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey , 93 U.S. at 196. The first Congress had no doubt on that point when it protected Indians both within and outside Indian country. Supra 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "25-26. All that was true when Kagama relied on these powers to uphold the Major Crimes Act. And this Court has since reaffirmed that Congress may recognize \"the necessity of giving uniform protection to\" Tribes, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and has \"discretion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of [Indians] to serving the broader class of all Indians nationwide,\" Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 182. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress may conclude that treating Tribes equally is more \"appropriate,\" Neely , 180 U.S. at 121, than withholding protection from Tribes lacking treaties specifically promising it. Likewise, in regulating \"intercourse\" with Tribes, Congress may decline to create two classes of Tribes, one entitled to protection and the other not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "§71. And this Court has held that \"[t]hi[s] change in no way affected Congress' plenary powers to legislate on problems of Indians.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Lara , 541 U.S. at 200. Congress has thus continued to enter non-treaty agreements with Tribes, Antoine , 420 U.S. at 203, and to legislate to fulfill its \"general trust relationship\" with \"all Indians,\" Jicarilla Apache , 564 U.S. at 182. Any other rule would turn historical happenstance into a sea change and hamstring the federal government's ability to protect 38 the more than 340 Tribes lacking ratified treaties, including every Tribe in California and Alaska.34 c. Plaintiffs' arguments are bad piecemeal and worse together.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "18 U.S. 153. The Define and Punish Clause reaches all conduct that would \"give just ground of complaint\" under the law of nations and \"disturb that harmony between the governments which each is bound to cultivate and promote.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress thus may \"derive from the often broadly phrased principles of international law a more precise code, as it determined that to be necessary.\" 798 F.2d 1450.",
		"citation_value_orig": "120 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plaintiffs' Arguments Lack Merit",
		"context": "120 U.S. 479. Congress thus may \"derive from the often broadly phrased principles of international law a more precise code, as it determined that to be necessary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is what ICWA does. ICWA addresses a core area of inter-sovereign concern under the Founding-era law of nations: the security of citizens of one sovereign in another's territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "798 F.2d 1450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims has important implications for racial gerrymandering claims",
		"context": "States have a long and unfortunate history of di- luting the voting strength of racial minorities through gerrymandering. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Despite efforts to eliminate it, racial gerrymandering remains a problem today. See,137 S. Ct. 1455.",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims has important implications for racial gerrymandering claims",
		"context": ", 364 U.S. 339. Despite efforts to eliminate it, racial gerrymandering remains a problem today. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Partisan gerrymandering can equally dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. Because, in many jurisdictions, \"racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,\" a district gerrymandered on partisan grounds can look the same as a district ger- rymandered on racial grounds.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The justiciability of partisan gerrymandering claims has important implications for racial gerrymandering claims",
		"context": "Partisan gerrymandering can equally dilute the voting strength of racial minorities. Because, in many jurisdictions, \"racial identification is highly correlated with political affiliation,\" a district gerrymandered on partisan grounds can look the same as a district ger- rymandered on racial grounds. Cooper , 137 S. Ct. at 1473 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Thus, in districts with racially polarized vot- ing patterns and substantial minority populations, partisan gerrymandering can be the functional equiv- alent of—and inflict the same harm as—racial gerry- mandering. States nevertheless assert partisan gerrymander- ing as a defense to racial gerrymandering claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "17 A. The court of appeals characterized the October 29 decision as a post hoc rationalization for the June 1 decision, rather than a new decision. That conclusion conflicts with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which reaffirm ed that, when a court finds an agency's explanation for a n action inadequate, the agency may either elaborate on its prior reasons or issue a new decision. Here, the Secretary considered t he matter afresh and expressly issued a new decision terminating MPP, offering extensive rea- soning apart from that of the June 1 memorandum. B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "B. The court of appeals suggested that DHS had not really reconsidered the matter, and that the October 29 memor andum was simply pretextual cover for a deci- sion made months before. But a finding of pretext re- quires a showing that the agency decision- maker acted in \"bad faith,\" Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —a stand- ard that the court failed to acknowledge and that plainly is not satisfied. The court instead invoked the D.C. Circuit's reopening doctrine for resolving statute -of- limitations questions, which has no application here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]3 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 I. & N. Dec. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................................................... 19 533 U.S. 678 .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ........ 17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 2022 WL 1090176 ............................................. 9, 10, 11 567 U.S. 387 ................... 11 139 S. Ct. 1804 .............. 11 Cruz 650 F.3d 189 .......... 17 140 S. Ct. 1891 .................... 7 Delgado 625 F.3d 782 ................................................ 1 3 II Cases —Continued: Page Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 ....................................... 10 556 U.S. 502 ....................................................... 18 141 S. Ct. 1150 ....................... 21, 22 Innovation Law 924 F.3d 503 ............................................... 10 138 S. Ct. 830 .................. 11 Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .............. 13 Mission Prod uct Holdings, 139 S. Ct. 16523 I. & N. Dec. 45 ............................. 12 Sanchez -Avila, In re21 I. & N. Dec. 444 ......................................... 5 Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49 ............................................................... 14 Town of Castle 545 U.S. 748 .......................................................... 9, 11 517 U.S. 456 ....................................................... 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 12 Zivotofsky ex rel. 576 U.S. 1 ............................................................... 6, 7 III Statutes , regulations, and rule: Page Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "at 8—a nother fact that respondents do not dispute and that gives the lie to their suggestion that contiguous -territory return was intended to or could be a simple fix for insufficient detention space. Respondents ' account also \"treats as a neat, reticu- lated scheme of 'narrowly tailored' \" options \"what his- tory reveals to be anything but.\" Mission Product Hold-ings, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] emerged in 1903. Gov't Br. 32.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "As to historical context , respondents proffer no evidence that Congress enacted Section 1225(b)(2)(C) to constrain the Executive Branch rather than empower it. Respondents say (Br. 24) that In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \" confirms the Executive has long known that the contiguous - territory authority may be required .\" That is not accu- rate. Before IIRIRA, the Immigration and Naturaliza- tion Service argued to the Board that it could return some noncitizens to Mexico or Canada to advance the INA's objectives, not that it w as required to do so re- gardless of practical experience or foreign -policy rami- fications .",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 I. & N. Dec. 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "at 7, 31- 32 (majority opinion). The point , rather, is that to the extent there is any ambiguit y about whether Section 1225(b)(2)(C) is discretionary, the court of appeals failed to heed this Court's admonitions against construing the statue to inhibit the President's conduct of foreign policy , especially amid a \"history of acquiescence\" to the Exec utive's contrary reading. Dames & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondents argue (Br. 27) that the government failed to demonstrate MPP's foreign -policy effects , but those were described in the Secretary's June 1 memo- randum, Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "App. 115a. That disregard s this Court's teaching in Town of Castle [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that \"seemingly mandatory\" language like \" 'shall' \" does not erase \"deep- rooted\" principles of \"law -enforcement discretion.\" Id. at 761 (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "As this Court has recognized, executive discretion extends not just to whether but 11 also how to enforce the law. Gov't Br. 31 -32; see Ari- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A llocating limited detention capacity based on factors such as security and flight risk is a quintessential —and commonsense — exercise of enforcement discretion. See Castle Rock , 545 U.S. at 760- 761 ( observing that discretion must account for \"insufficient resources\" and \"sheer physical impossibility\") (citation omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "18 (citation omitted). That misses the point: After en- actment of the \"shall be detained \" language in 1903, the Executive Branch administratively released some ar-riving noncitizens from detention for decades before the parole provision was added in 1952. See Leng May [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re14 I. & N. Dec. 278. That histo ry confirms that the \"shall be detained\" directive has always been under- stood against a backdrop of enforcement discretion. c. Respondents err in asserting (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "18 (citation omitted). That misses the point: After en- actment of the \"shall be detained \" language in 1903, the Executive Branch administratively released some ar-riving noncitizens from detention for decades before the parole provision was added in 1952. See Leng May 357 U.S. 185; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That histo ry confirms that the \"shall be detained\" directive has always been under- stood against a backdrop of enforcement discretion. c. Respondents err in asserting (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 I. & N. Dec. 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "That histo ry confirms that the \"shall be detained\" directive has always been under- stood against a backdrop of enforcement discretion. c. Respondents err in asserting (Br. 15 -17) that Jen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], resolved the question presented here by observing that, \"[r]ead most naturally,\" Section 1225(b)(2)(A) \"mandate[s] deten- tion.\" Id. at 842; see also Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "In rejecting the Jen- nings plaintiffs' claimed statutory entitlement to bond hearing s, neither this Court nor the government had occasion to address the extent of the enforcement dis- cretion that Section 1225 preserves. Respondents point (Br. 16 -17) to the Jennings Court's discussion of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which had found an implicit limit on detention under 8 U.S.C. 1231(a)(6). In distinguishing Zadvydas , Jennings observed that Section 1231(a)(6) provides that the government \"may\" detain certain noncitizens, whereas Section 1225(b)(2)(A) states that it \"shall\" detain others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "34. But as plaintiffs, they \"b[ore] the burden of per- suasion\" to prove —not merely allege —every \"essential aspect[ ]\" of their claim, Schaffer ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], including their assertion that, without MPP, DHS would \"unlawfully prioritize alternatives to detention ,\" J.A. 123 . Instead, respond- ents told the district court that they were \"not challeng-ing\" DHS's parole policies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "2, 19, 32 -34) to legislative history . But that history ca nnot justify im- posing limitations on parole beyond those in the statu- tory text. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, respondents' account is misleading . The y rely on the IIRIRA House Report , which objected that parole \"ha[d] been used increas- ingly to admit entire categories of [ noncitizens ]\"—for example, \"Cuban nationals\" —\"with the intent that they will remain permanently in the United States.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "469, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 1, at 140 (1996) 17 (emphasis added) (cited in Cruz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Parole for that pur- pose is not at issue here : Inadmissible applicants for admission in removal proceedings are paroled to com- plete those proceedings . Moreover , the House Report is a dubious guide to interpreting Section 1182(d)(5)(A) because Congress did not enact the House's proposed constraints on parole authority , which would have tightly limited the substantive grounds for release .",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 29 TERMINATION DECISION HAS NO LEGAL EFFECT Respondents fail to defend the court of appeals' hold- ing that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision lacks legal effect. Respondents barely contest that the October 29 decision was a new agency decision under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Their assertions of pretext are fa- cially implausible . And their arguments about proce- dure are irrelevant a nd incorrect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1891",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "See Br. 44 (arguing that the Secretary must \"approach MPP with fresh eyes\"). While the APA requires \"reasoned decisionmaking ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , neither it nor Regents countenances a vague, ill -defined inquiry into the degree of an agency decisionmaker's open - mindedness. Indeed, t his Court has refused to graft an \"open -mindedness test\" onto the APA's procedural requirements. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 140 S. Ct. 2367 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "While the APA requires \"reasoned decisionmaking ,\" 556 U.S. 502 , neither it nor Regents countenances a vague, ill -defined inquiry into the degree of an agency decisionmaker's open - mindedness. Indeed, t his Court has refused to graft an \"open -mindedness test\" onto the APA's procedural requirements. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After all, \"[i] t is hardly improper for an agency head to come into office with policy preferences and ideas, discuss them with affected parties, sound out other agencies for support, and work with s taff attor- neys to substantiate the legal basis for a preferred pol-icy.\" Department of 139 S. Ct. 19 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that the Secretary's October 29 termination decision has no legal effect",
		"context": "App. 259a -260a. The Secretary's account of his own decision -making process is entitled to a \"presumption of regularity,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the Secretary of deceit, asserting that this Court should reject his \"say -so.\" But respondents themselves previously acknowledged DHS's reconsideration, opposing a stay of the injunction in this Court based on press reports that DHS had recently \"discussed revivin g\" a contiguous -territory -return pro- gram in some form. Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Campaign finance statutes , and the rulings of this Court interpreting them, are relatively recent innovations. For most of the nation's history , regul ation of political spending was modest , and judicial review often proceeded without reliance on the First Amendment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 290 U.S. 534; 313 U.S. 299. It was not until the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, that Congress enacted a comprehensive regime of contribution and expenditure limits, registration requirements, donor disclosure , and —to oversee this vast federal apparatus —a \"[ u]nique\" body \"among federal administrative agencies, the Federal Election Commission,\" which \"has as its sole purpose the regulation of core constitutionally protected activity — 'the behavior of individuals and groups only insofar as they act, speak[,] and associate for political purposes.'\" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Campaign finance statutes , and the rulings of this Court interpreting them, are relatively recent innovations. For most of the nation's history , regul ation of political spending was modest , and judicial review often proceeded without reliance on the First Amendment. 256 U.S. 232; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 313 U.S. 299. It was not until the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, that Congress enacted a comprehensive regime of contribution and expenditure limits, registration requirements, donor disclosure , and —to oversee this vast federal apparatus —a \"[ u]nique\" body \"among federal administrative agencies, the Federal Election Commission,\" which \"has as its sole purpose the regulation of core constitutionally protected activity — 'the behavior of individuals and groups only insofar as they act, speak[,] and associate for political purposes.'\" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "290 U.S. 534",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Campaign finance statutes , and the rulings of this Court interpreting them, are relatively recent innovations. For most of the nation's history , regul ation of political spending was modest , and judicial review often proceeded without reliance on the First Amendment. 256 U.S. 232; 290 U.S. 534; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was not until the 1970s, in the aftermath of the Watergate scandal, that Congress enacted a comprehensive regime of contribution and expenditure limits, registration requirements, donor disclosure , and —to oversee this vast federal apparatus —a \"[ u]nique\" body \"among federal administrative agencies, the Federal Election Commission,\" which \"has as its sole purpose the regulation of core constitutionally protected activity — 'the behavior of individuals and groups only insofar as they act, speak[,] and associate for political purposes.'\" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Am. Fed'n of Labor- Congress of Indus. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]564 U.S. 721. It was also the precedent the court of appeals regularly relied upon below. While Buckley kept some of the structure of Congress's speech and association regulations intact, it clipped the wings of federal authority and laid down a series of standards for judicial review of future efforts to regulate the giving and spending of money in contested political campaigns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.3d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Am. Fed'n of Labor- Congress of Indus. 333 F.3d 168[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was also the precedent the court of appeals regularly relied upon below. While Buckley kept some of the structure of Congress's speech and association regulations intact, it clipped the wings of federal authority and laid down a series of standards for judicial review of future efforts to regulate the giving and spending of money in contested political campaigns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "at 466, is longstanding. Whil e the context s varied , this Court's precedents consistently preserved the freedom to associate in private for public purposes . The Court has protected associational privacy whether disclosure was public or not: It has voided a production order requiring financial supporters to be produced to a government in discovery, id., struck down an effort to force similar disclosure in a legislative proceeding, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 5 facially prohibited the private disclosure of association al information directly to the s tate as a condition of employment . 364 U.S. 479. And the Court has protected associational privacy regardless of whether there was evidence of threats or reprisals: it has both invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring financial disclosures on the face of written materials despite \"neither allegation nor proof that…any group sponsoring [the petitioner] would suffer economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion or other manifestations of public hostility,\" 362 U.S. 60.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Whil e the context s varied , this Court's precedents consistently preserved the freedom to associate in private for public purposes . The Court has protected associational privacy whether disclosure was public or not: It has voided a production order requiring financial supporters to be produced to a government in discovery, id., struck down an effort to force similar disclosure in a legislative proceeding, 372 U.S. 539, and 5 facially prohibited the private disclosure of association al information directly to the s tate as a condition of employment . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court has protected associational privacy regardless of whether there was evidence of threats or reprisals: it has both invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring financial disclosures on the face of written materials despite \"neither allegation nor proof that…any group sponsoring [the petitioner] would suffer economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion or other manifestations of public hostility,\" 362 U.S. 60. In sum, before Buckle y, the C ourt had repeatedly affirmed the constitutional principle of associational liberty and held that \"all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of [its] protections.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "364 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "The Court has protected associational privacy whether disclosure was public or not: It has voided a production order requiring financial supporters to be produced to a government in discovery, id., struck down an effort to force similar disclosure in a legislative proceeding, 372 U.S. 539, and 5 facially prohibited the private disclosure of association al information directly to the s tate as a condition of employment . 364 U.S. 479. And the Court has protected associational privacy regardless of whether there was evidence of threats or reprisals: it has both invalidated a Los Angeles ordinance requiring financial disclosures on the face of written materials despite \"neither allegation nor proof that…any group sponsoring [the petitioner] would suffer economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion or other manifestations of public hostility,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, before Buckle y, the C ourt had repeatedly affirmed the constitutional principle of associational liberty and held that \"all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of [its] protections.\" Gibson , 372 U.S. at 556; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "In sum, before Buckle y, the C ourt had repeatedly affirmed the constitutional principle of associational liberty and held that \"all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of [its] protections.\" Gibson , 372 U.S. at 556; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Buckley did not disturb those rulings .2 Rather, the Buckley Court accepted limited donor disclosure in the campaign context only after it was presented with a substantial record that suggested that such disclosure was essential to preventing official corruption and providing the electorate with information about the financial constituencies of candidates for office, so that voters could use this information when casting ballots. Buckley , 424 U.S at 79- 81.",
		"citation_value_orig": "419 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Buckley , 424 U.S. at 27, n.28; Buckley , 519 F.2d at 838 (\"Contributions to both parties were made in 1972 by 2 In fact, a cting on those precedents, the D.C. Circuit in the Buckley case facially struck a sep arate disclosure requirement that sought \"to compel disclosure by groups that do no more than discuss issues of public importance on a wholly nonpartisan basis,\" reasoning that \"the terms of th[at] statute inhibit the free and robust discussion of issues.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, that portion of the D.C. Circuit opinion in Buckley remains good law today.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.2d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's campaign finance decisions concerning donor disclosure are a narrowly-drawn exception to this Court's longstanding and unwavering defense of the First Amendment right to associational privacy",
		"context": "Indeed, that portion of the D.C. Circuit opinion in Buckley remains good law today. 7 Gulf Oil (illegal contributions - to President Nixon, Senator Jackson, and Congressman Mills), and by American Milk Producers, Inc., a large dairy cooperative whose legal and illegal contributions were made to Nixon, Mills, and Humphrey\") (par entheses in original);3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (summarizing findings of the 1998 Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs into \"elected officials' practice of granting special access in return for political contributions ,\" such as \"the courtesies extended to an international businessman named Roger T amraz, who candidly acknowledged that his donations of about $300,000 to the DNC and to state parties were motivated by his interest in gaining the Federal Government's support for an oil - line project in the Caucasus\"). 3 During the period from April 1973 to August 1974 alone : a former Republican congressman from Pennsylvania was convicted of federal mail fraud, the president of the Newark city council pled guilty to income tax fraud, a sitting Democratic congressman from New York was indicted for helping a Mafia figure obtain government contracts, one Republican member of the Senate Watergate committee gave up re- election to fight an indictment for bribery, the mayor of Camden, New Jersey was indicted for corruption and perjury, the lieutenant governor of California was indicted for perjury. David Frum, How We Got Here 29 ( Basic Books 1st ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 93",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Many Federal and State Statutory Schemes Do Not Distinguish Between Common Law Employees and Independent Contractors",
		"context": ". The First Circuit held that the FAA does not draw lines based on common law conceptions of 4 employees and independent contractors, finding that Congress, through the FAA's exemption for transportation workers,2 \"'demonstrated concern with transportation workers and their necessary role in the free flow of g oods' at the time when it enacted the FAA.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court concluded that a \"distinction . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 F.3d 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Many Federal and State Statutory Schemes Do Not Distinguish Between Common Law Employees and Independent Contractors",
		"context": "§ 723-6:6001 (\"'Driver' means any person driving a motor vehicle, including an independent contractor\"). The reason that these laws do not differentiate between employees and independent contractors is because \"[m]otor carriers had attempted to immunize themselves from the negligence of the drivers who operated their vehicles by making them all nominally 'independent contractors.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In order to prot ect the public from the tortious conduct of the often judgment-proof truck- lessor operators, Congress . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F.2d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Many Federal and State Statutory Schemes Do Not Distinguish Between Common Law Employees and Independent Contractors",
		"context": ". require[d] interstate motor carriers to assume full direction and control of the vehicles that they leased as if they were the owners of such vehicles.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, in federal and state statutes and regulations governing commercial trucking, there is no meaningful 6 distinction between independent contractors and common law employees. Provisions regulating the trucking industry are not the only laws that do not distinguish between common law employees and independent contractors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "78 S.W.3d 28",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules",
		"context": "a. The APA generally \"prescribes a three -step pro- cedure\" for rulemaki ng. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. 5 U.S.C. 553(c), 556- 557 (separate procedures for formal rulemaking).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules",
		"context": "Ibid. \"Rules issued through th e notice -and-comment process are often referred to as 'legislative rules' be-cause they have the 'force and effect of law.' \" Mortgage Bankers , 135 S. Ct. at 1203 (quoting Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The APA, however, exempts some rules fr om notice - and-comment requirements —including \"interpretative rules.\" 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules",
		"context": "But a \"critical feature of inter- pretive rules\" is that, unlike legislative rules , interpre- tive rules \" 'do not have the force and effect of law. ' \" Id. at 1204 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Their purpose is to \"advise the public of the agency's construction of the statute s and rules which it administer s.\" Ibid. (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Thomas Jefferson Univ. , 512 U.S. at 510- 511, 512; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Deferring to an agency's interpretation in those circumstances does not give any interpretive rule the effect of a legislative rule, but it presents the related concern that the agency may adopt an i nterpretation different from what a court would conclude is the best interpretation, without going through notice -and-comment procedures to amend the regulation . Accord- ingly, although th e choice between adjudication and rulemaking is commit ted to the agen cy's discretion , see 416 U.S. 267 , the limits that the government urges the Court to impose or reinforce on Seminole Rock deference should apply generally to adjudications as well as to interpretive rules.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Seminole Rock deference is in tension with the APA's distinction between legislative and interpretive rules",
		"context": ", 512 U.S. at 510- 511, 512; 490 U.S. 332. Deferring to an agency's interpretation in those circumstances does not give any interpretive rule the effect of a legislative rule, but it presents the related concern that the agency may adopt an i nterpretation different from what a court would conclude is the best interpretation, without going through notice -and-comment procedures to amend the regulation . Accord- ingly, although th e choice between adjudication and rulemaking is commit ted to the agen cy's discretion , see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the limits that the government urges the Court to impose or reinforce on Seminole Rock deference should apply generally to adjudications as well as to interpretive rules. 26 135 S. Ct. at 1206 . The statements are also difficult to square with the logic of Mead Corp. , which held that whether Congress intended a given agency action \"to carry the force of law\" should be the guiding considera- tion in whether Chevron deference applies to the agency action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The growth in state secrets assertions threatens Americans' civil liberties.",
		"context": "The Government uses it to search and seize people without probable cause of sufficient reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. There is even an ad mit- ted exception to the \"reasonable suspicion\" standard. 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government claims that exception is a state secret. The TSDB also violates due process because a per- son has no idea what can land the m on the list and there is no clear way off .",
		"citation_value_orig": "912 F.3d 1147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents an important question on which the courts of appeals are divided.",
		"context": "at 572 (\"The [summary plan descriptions] and othe r Plan communications thus gave the Plaintiffs ac tual knowledge. \"); cf. Surefoot [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondent's characterizations aside, it is clear that other courts have understood Brown as announcing a 8 rule that governs the meaning of \"actual knowledge\" un- der Section 1113(2). District courts in the Sixth Circuit have applied Brown 's rule as binding precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 F.3d 1236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This case presents an important question on which the courts of appeals are divided.",
		"context": "By creating disuniformity and ad opting a fact-specific, unpredicta- ble rule that incentivizes claims of ignor ance, the Ninth Circuit's decision is sure to have a significant disruptive effect on the ERISA landscape. This Court should grant review to protect the \"efficiency, predictability, and uni-formity\" that ERISA requires for the effective admin-istration of the employee benefit plans. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Respondent attempts to minimize (Opp. 12) the im- portance of the question pres ented by asserting that it has not arisen with any frequency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents misconceive the purpose of the PLRA, which is best served by discretion regarding the apportionment of fees",
		"context": "But respondents misconceive the PLRA' s purpose . The purpose of the PLRA was \"to reduce the quantity and improve the quality of prisoner suits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The goal was to empower district courts to shed the frivolous cases so they could spend more time ensurin g that prisoners obtained appropriate relief in meritorious cases. \"To that end, Congress enacted a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad claims and fa- cilitate consideration of the good.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents misconceive the purpose of the PLRA, which is best served by discretion regarding the apportionment of fees",
		"context": "The goal was to empower district courts to shed the frivolous cases so they could spend more time ensurin g that prisoners obtained appropriate relief in meritorious cases. \"To that end, Congress enacted a variety of reforms designed to filter out the bad claims and fa- cilitate consideration of the good.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1997e(d )(2) was one of these reforms. It comes into play only in meritorious cases, after the prisoner has already prevailed at tri-al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Respondents misconceive the purpose of the PLRA, which is best served by discretion regarding the apportionment of fees",
		"context": "It should ha rdly need stating that, ordinarily, liability in damages for unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct has the very desirable effect of deterring such conduct. Indeed, this was precis ely the proposition upon which § 1983 was en- acted. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents protest (Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment would abrogate the reasonable expectation of privacy that homeowners maintain in regard to containers on their property",
		"context": ". a car,\" then the police may also search containers in the car without needing to show \"individualized probable cause for each one.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What about a container located in a home—a place where Fourth Amendment protection is at its peak? The same principle applies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment would abrogate the reasonable expectation of privacy that homeowners maintain in regard to containers on their property",
		"context": "For the home, those terms are as fol-lows: \"Belief, however well founded, that an article sought is concealed in a dwelling house furnishes no justification for a search of that place without a war-rant. And such searches are held unlawful notwith- standing facts unquestionably showing probable cause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see id. at 32 (\"[I]t has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein.\"). No search of a container located in a home (or within its curtilage) may therefore rest on probable 21 cause alone—a warrant for the home or the container is required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "269 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A \"garage exception\" to the Fourth Amendment would abrogate the reasonable expectation of privacy that homeowners maintain in regard to containers on their property",
		"context": "Officer Rhodes' warrantless tarp search must then fail under the Fourth Amendment. 15 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The only way for the Court to reach the opposite conclusion is by recognizing a new exception to the Fourth Amendment that fits the contours of Officer Rhodes' conduct—i.e., the \"garage exception.\" This would then result in a house divided under the Fourth Amendment, with the containers of a home receiving less constitutional protection than the home itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "19 U.S. 868. At the same time, the Clause was intended \"to inaugurate a new system of government\" and provide \"for the more convenient exercise of [executive] power.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similar to the Patent Clause in Article I, therefore, the Appointments Clause aims to balance two competing goals: ensuring accountability and separation of powers, while allowing for the reality that government must be flexible and responsive to the needs of the moment. Congress heeded both of those goals when it gave APJs the responsibility to hear and resolve claims in inter partes review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "1. APJs fit comfortably into the framework this Court generally uses to identify government officials who are \"inferior\" officers for purposes of Article II . Although this Court has not \"set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers,\" Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it has described \"inferior officers\" as officers whose work \"is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" 520 U.S. 651. And it is indisputable that the Director of the PTO has broad supervisory authority over APJs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "APJs fit comfortably into the framework this Court generally uses to identify government officials who are \"inferior\" officers for purposes of Article II . Although this Court has not \"set forth an exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principal and inferior officers,\" Seila Law 140 S. Ct. 2183, it has described \"inferior officers\" as officers whose work \"is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it is indisputable that the Director of the PTO has broad supervisory authority over APJs. As a general matter, the Director is tasked with providing policy direction and management supervision for the PTO, providing broad authority to regulate the manner in which the Board operates.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "That conclusion is supported by comparing the Director's supervision of APJs to his supervision of patent examiners. There can be no dispute that examiners decide whether to issue a patent—the Director's authority to withdraw an application allowed for issuance is virtually never exercised. See BlackLight Power, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If that theoretical authority (which the Director has no practical means of exercising given the 350,000 patents issued each year) is sufficient to support a determination that patent contempt proceedings. 138 S. Ct. 2044.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 F.3d 1269",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "See BlackLight Power, 295 F.3d 1269. If that theoretical authority (which the Director has no practical means of exercising given the 350,000 patents issued each year) is sufficient to support a determination that patent contempt proceedings. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Court explained, although \"the power to toss malefactors in jail is an especially muscular means of enforcement,\" contempt authority was not necessary so long as the officials were able to \"exclud[e] the wrongdoer (whether party or lawyer) from the proceedings— a powerful disincentive to resist a court order.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "2. Moreover, classifying APJs as inferior officers accords proper respect to the determinations of the political branches. Because \"[t]he line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the judgments of the other branches deserve significant weight. See 510 U.S. 163. There are two strong indications that Congress properly determined that APJs are validly appointed under the Appointments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Moreover, classifying APJs as inferior officers accords proper respect to the determinations of the political branches. Because \"[t]he line between 'inferior' and 'principal' officers is one that is far from clear,\" 487 U.S. 654, the judgments of the other branches deserve significant weight. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There are two strong indications that Congress properly determined that APJs are validly appointed under the Appointments Clause. First , just a few years before Congress passed the AIA, Congress modified the patent laws to vest APJ- appointment authority in the Secretary of Commerce in response to criticism that appointment by the Director raised Appointments Clause issues.6 Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. APJs Are Validly Appointed Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Prior to this amendment, the Commissioner acted on petitions for rehearing of adverse Board decisions. Through this amendment, Congress effectively eliminated the onerous burden placed on the Commissioner regarding reviewing such appeals, instead steering applicants to the Board with such requests. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 1927 Congress specifically dismissed concerns that by giving the Board sole power to grant \"rehearings,\" it was \"lessen[ing] the present 25 supervisory power of the commissioner\"; \"the supervisory power of the commissioner, as it has existed for a number of decades, remains unchanged by the bill.\" Alappat , 33 F.3d at 1534 (quoting S. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "33 F.3d 1526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture",
		"context": "The claims and remedies contemplated in section 1252(f) (1) run against the federal government alone , and thus they require a waiver of sovereign immunity —as 14 relevant here, the waiver provided by the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 702; Match -E-Be-Nash -She-Wish Band of Potta- watomi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Ab- sent some other statutory limitation, s ection 702 of the APA waives sovereign immunity in the federal courts \"for relief other than m oney damages.\" 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture",
		"context": "Section 1252(f)(1) , which applies \" [r]egardless of the na- ture of the action ,\" limits th e waiver the APA provides . Sovereign immunity sounds in personal jurisdiction. Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also PennEast Pipeline Co., 141 S. Ct. 2244456 U.S. 694 as a limit on the lower courts' subject -matter jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to resolve that provision's scope. To be sure, this Court has recognized that ques- tions that go to a court's subject -matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point. E.g., Ruhrgas , 526 U.S. at 583-84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture",
		"context": "Section 1252(f)(1) , which applies \" [r]egardless of the na- ture of the action ,\" limits th e waiver the APA provides . Sovereign immunity sounds in personal jurisdiction. Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485 ; see also PennEast Pipeline Co., 141 S. Ct. 2244[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] as a limit on the lower courts' subject -matter jurisdiction, this Court is not obligated to resolve that provision's scope. To be sure, this Court has recognized that ques- tions that go to a court's subject -matter jurisdiction may be raised at any point. E.g., Ruhrgas , 526 U.S. at 583-84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture",
		"context": "E.g., Ruhrgas , 526 U.S. at 583-84. But a lack of subject -matter jurisdiction only prohibits this Court from reaching the merits of the questions pre- sented . Sinochem Int 'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It does not prohibit this Court from dismissing a case f rom its discretionary docket due to a party's failure to raise or brief a disposi- tive issue . Party -presentation requirements protect both the Court and litigants from the costs associated with a party 15 sandbagging their jurisdictional arguments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Even if section 1252(f)(1) were jurisdictional, it would still be subject to forfeiture",
		"context": "Party -presentation requirements protect both the Court and litigants from the costs associated with a party 15 sandbagging their jurisdictional arguments. This Court has recognized that the need for finality precludes a party from collaterally challeng ing subject -matter juris- diction upon resolution of jurisdictional facts and entry of final judgment. E.g., 311 U.S. 494 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The same concerns manifest when a petitioner strategically choose s not to challenge multiple jurisdic- tional ruling s by a lower court. If thi s Court concludes that section 1252(f)(1) restricts the lower courts' subject - matter jurisdiction, it should dismiss the writ of certio- rari as improvidently granted rather than reward peti- tioners' questionable litigation choices.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "J.A.719 (emphasis added). For many Jews, the Latin cross not only symbol- izes Christianity, but also the \"outright oppression and persecution of Jewish people.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 39 The Council on American Islamic Relations, the nation's largest Muslim civil rights organization, sub- mitted a motion to oppose the Bladensburg Cross on the grounds that \"Christian symbols do not represent Muslim service members.\" J.A.1596-98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "781 F.2d 777",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "\"); C.A.App.3262 (\"I'm a veteran and an Atheist. How does this show reapect [sic] for my ser- vice in any way?\"). Well before the Fourth Circuit concluded that a memorial cross \"only holds value as a symbol of death and resurrection because of its affiliation with the cru-cifixion of Jesus Christ\" (Pet.App.20a-21a), the Cir- cuits were already in firm agreement that the Latin cross \"transcend[s] mere commemoration\" and pro-motes the \"Christian faith\" alone ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); that the Latin cross \"does not possess an ancillary meaning as a secular or non-sectarian war memorial\" ( 629 F.3d 1099); and that because the cross is \"not a generic symbol of death\" but rather \"a Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian ,\" American Atheists, 616 F.3d 1145; the govern ment's use of the Latin cross to honor veterans sends a strong message of \"ex- clusion.\" Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1124-25. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the point in 371 F.3d 543, citing Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in Eugene , supra , when it recognized that despite a sign designating the cross as a war memorial, and \"indeed perhaps because of it,\" a government war memorial cross communicates 41 the objective message that it has \" 'chosen to honor only Christian veterans.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "927 F.2d 1401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "\"); C.A.App.3262 (\"I'm a veteran and an Atheist. How does this show reapect [sic] for my ser- vice in any way?\"). Well before the Fourth Circuit concluded that a memorial cross \"only holds value as a symbol of death and resurrection because of its affiliation with the cru-cifixion of Jesus Christ\" (Pet.App.20a-21a), the Cir- cuits were already in firm agreement that the Latin cross \"transcend[s] mere commemoration\" and pro-motes the \"Christian faith\" alone ( 927 F.2d 1401); that the Latin cross \"does not possess an ancillary meaning as a secular or non-sectarian war memorial\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); and that because the cross is \"not a generic symbol of death\" but rather \"a Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian ,\" American Atheists, 616 F.3d 1145; the govern ment's use of the Latin cross to honor veterans sends a strong message of \"ex- clusion.\" Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1124-25. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the point in 371 F.3d 543, citing Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in Eugene , supra , when it recognized that despite a sign designating the cross as a war memorial, and \"indeed perhaps because of it,\" a government war memorial cross communicates 41 the objective message that it has \" 'chosen to honor only Christian veterans.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "629 F.3d 1099",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "\"); C.A.App.3262 (\"I'm a veteran and an Atheist. How does this show reapect [sic] for my ser- vice in any way?\"). Well before the Fourth Circuit concluded that a memorial cross \"only holds value as a symbol of death and resurrection because of its affiliation with the cru-cifixion of Jesus Christ\" (Pet.App.20a-21a), the Cir- cuits were already in firm agreement that the Latin cross \"transcend[s] mere commemoration\" and pro-motes the \"Christian faith\" alone ( 927 F.2d 1401); that the Latin cross \"does not possess an ancillary meaning as a secular or non-sectarian war memorial\" ( 629 F.3d 1099); and that because the cross is \"not a generic symbol of death\" but rather \"a Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian ,\" American Atheists, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; the govern ment's use of the Latin cross to honor veterans sends a strong message of \"ex- clusion.\" Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1124-25. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the point in 371 F.3d 543, citing Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in Eugene , supra , when it recognized that despite a sign designating the cross as a war memorial, and \"indeed perhaps because of it,\" a government war memorial cross communicates 41 the objective message that it has \" 'chosen to honor only Christian veterans.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "Well before the Fourth Circuit concluded that a memorial cross \"only holds value as a symbol of death and resurrection because of its affiliation with the cru-cifixion of Jesus Christ\" (Pet.App.20a-21a), the Cir- cuits were already in firm agreement that the Latin cross \"transcend[s] mere commemoration\" and pro-motes the \"Christian faith\" alone ( 927 F.2d 1401); that the Latin cross \"does not possess an ancillary meaning as a secular or non-sectarian war memorial\" ( 629 F.3d 1099); and that because the cross is \"not a generic symbol of death\" but rather \"a Christian symbol of death that signifies or memorializes the death of a Christian ,\" American Atheists, 616 F.3d 1145; the govern ment's use of the Latin cross to honor veterans sends a strong message of \"ex- clusion.\" Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1124-25. The Ninth Circuit reiterated the point in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing Judge O'Scannlain's concurrence in Eugene , supra , when it recognized that despite a sign designating the cross as a war memorial, and \"indeed perhaps because of it,\" a government war memorial cross communicates 41 the objective message that it has \" 'chosen to honor only Christian veterans.' \" (emphasis added). Indeed, the lower courts have decided 33 cross cases (18 of which are Circuit decisions) (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 F.3d 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "Indeed, the lower courts have decided 33 cross cases (18 of which are Circuit decisions) (Br. in Opp.15- 18 (17-1717))—and every case involving a cross dis- played as a government memorial held the display un-constitutional. Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1123; Duncan , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Gonza- les, 4 F.3d 1412; Jewish War Veterans , 695 F. Supp. 3. This Court, too, has acknowledged the obvious: A government-sponsored Latin cross war memorial fa- vors Christians while \"discriminating against the be- liefs of patriotic soldiers who [are not] Christian.\" Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 615 n.61 (citing Eckels , supra ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "Indeed, the lower courts have decided 33 cross cases (18 of which are Circuit decisions) (Br. in Opp.15- 18 (17-1717))—and every case involving a cross dis- played as a government memorial held the display un-constitutional. Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1123; Duncan , 616 F.3d 1145; Gonza- les, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jewish War Veterans , 695 F. Supp. 3. This Court, too, has acknowledged the obvious: A government-sponsored Latin cross war memorial fa- vors Christians while \"discriminating against the be- liefs of patriotic soldiers who [are not] Christian.\" Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 615 n.61 (citing Eckels , supra ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 F.3d 1412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Neither the Latin cross generally, nor this Cross in particular, commemorates, honors, or respects non-Christian veterans",
		"context": "Indeed, the lower courts have decided 33 cross cases (18 of which are Circuit decisions) (Br. in Opp.15- 18 (17-1717))—and every case involving a cross dis- played as a government memorial held the display un-constitutional. Trunk , 629 F.3d at 1123; Duncan , 616 F.3d 1145; Gonza- les, 4 F.3d 1412; Jewish War Veterans , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court, too, has acknowledged the obvious: A government-sponsored Latin cross war memorial fa- vors Christians while \"discriminating against the be- liefs of patriotic soldiers who [are not] Christian.\" Allegheny , 492 U.S. at 615 n.61 (citing Eckels , supra ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "695 F. Supp. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "5 Congress first enacted section 158 as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, incorporating into section 158 the finality requirement in section 1291. Congress's election to borrow this concept properly brings with it more than 200 years of jurisprudence, and the Court's construction of section 158 in this matter is thus properly informed by reference to how finality under section 1291 has been construed. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1801 5. Section 1291 by itself has a role to play in the bankruptcy appellate context in cases in which the district court exercises its original bankruptcy jurisdiction and appeals are taken from the court's orders as such. See 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1795",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "Critically, the general finality concept does not traditionally encompass orders denying motions that simply resolve a dispute over where to litigate. Although the finality analysis in bankruptcy is \"different\" from the analysis in ordinary civil litigation, Bullard , 135 S. Ct. at 1692, the relevant difference pertains to discerning the boundaries of discrete proceedings within a bankruptcy case for purposes of determining whether orders concluding such proceedings are immediately appealable. See Howard Delivery Serv., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[U]nder section 158, litigants in bankruptcy court do not have to wait until the final order resolving the entire bankruptcy case is entered, but may appeal from the order that \"finally dispose[s] of [the] discrete dispute\" between the parties within the larger umbrella of the bankruptcy case.\" (quoting In re711 F.2d 441. The critical point is that an order denying relief that merely determines where the parties will litigate is not an order that conclusively terminates anything.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "Although the finality analysis in bankruptcy is \"different\" from the analysis in ordinary civil litigation, Bullard , 135 S. Ct. at 1692, the relevant difference pertains to discerning the boundaries of discrete proceedings within a bankruptcy case for purposes of determining whether orders concluding such proceedings are immediately appealable. See Howard Delivery Serv., 547 U.S. 651 (\"[U]nder section 158, litigants in bankruptcy court do not have to wait until the final order resolving the entire bankruptcy case is entered, but may appeal from the order that \"finally dispose[s] of [the] discrete dispute\" between the parties within the larger umbrella of the bankruptcy case.\" (quoting In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The critical point is that an order denying relief that merely determines where the parties will litigate is not an order that conclusively terminates anything. Under the former Bankruptcy Act of 1898, replaced in 1979 with the current Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy appeals were governed by sections 24a, 24b, and 25a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "711 F.2d 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "544, 553 (as amended) (repealed 1979) (the \"Bankruptcy Act\"). Under these provisions, the ability to take an immediate appeal rested on whether the particular order had been entered in either a bankruptcy \"proceeding\" or a 37 \"controvers[y] arising in bankruptcy proceedings.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].6 In turn, appeals of \"proceedings\" were governed by section 24b.7 \"Proceedings\" encompassed \"those matters of an administrative character, including questions between the bankrupt and his creditors, which are presented in the ordinary course of the administration of the bankrupt's estate.\" Id. at 181.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "at 181. Parties to a bankruptcy action had an immediate right to appeal interlocutory or final orders entered in \"controversies,\" but leave to appeal was required for an order entered in a \"proceeding,\" other than with respect to three discrete categories of orders delineated in section 25a, for which an immediate right of appeal was provided. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Under these provisions, orders regarding 6. Section 24a vested \"appellate jurisdiction of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings from the courts of bankruptcy from which they have appellate jurisdiction in other cases.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "145, 150–51 (2010). As adopted, the wording of section 1293 was \"nearly incomprehensible.\" Moxley v. Comer (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10. Section 158 also vested the courts of appeals with jurisdiction over the final orders of bankruptcy appellate panels established in certain circuits to review the decisions of bankruptcy judges in lieu of the district courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F.2d 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The History of Section 158 Demonstrates That Congress Did Not Intend Orders Denying Stay Relief That Determine Where the Parties Would Litigate Their Dispute To Be Final and Immediately Appealable",
		"context": "1233(a), § 158, 119 Stat. 23, 202–04 (2005). This amendment was added after this Court's decision in Connecticut National [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Germain , this Court held that, although Congress had failed to include in section 158(d) explicit appellate jurisdiction of the courts of appeal over interlocutory orders of the district courts in bankruptcy matters, the circuit courts still possess jurisdiction over such orders under section 1292. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. State regulation of plan administration is preempted even where the state law is incident to permissible rate regulation",
		"context": "25-26 (quoting Gobeille, 136 S. Ct at 946). What the Court actually said, responding to Vermont's citation of the St ate's traditional power to regulate public health, was that the \"analysis may be different when applied to a state law, such as a tax on hospitals,\" that necessitates incidental reporting by ERISA plans, but \"that [wa]s not the law before the Court.\" Gobeille , 136 S. Ct. at 946 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added). 41 As the Court's citation to De Buono confirms, the quoted sentence simply acknowledged the principle that \"generally applicable laws regulating 'areas where ERISA has nothing to say'\" may sometimes be upheld \"notwithstanding their incidental effect on ERISA plans.\" Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-148; see De Buono , 520 U.S. at 815-816.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Injunction Implements The Constitutional Prohibition Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "While AOSI alone would suffice to sustain the per- manent injunction, the injunction finds further support in the fundamental principle that private parties have a right to control their speech and thought, free from government intrusion. The injunction implements the \"cardinal constitutional command\" that in a democracy the government may not \"' force [its] citizens '\" \"to mouth support for views they find objectionable.\" Ja- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[A]t the heart of the First Amend- ment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.\" 431 U.S. 209, overruled on other grounds by Janus , 138 S. Ct. 2448.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Injunction Implements The Constitutional Prohibition Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "Ja- 138 S. Ct. 2448. \"[A]t the heart of the First Amend- ment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], overruled on other grounds by Janus , 138 S. Ct. 2448. 31 Compared to laws or funding conditions that mere- ly restrict certain speech, government compulsion of speech inflicts \"additional damage.\" Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2464.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Injunction Implements The Constitutional Prohibition Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "Ja- 138 S. Ct. 2448. \"[A]t the heart of the First Amend- ment is the notion that an individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.\" 431 U.S. 209, overruled on other grounds by Janus , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 31 Compared to laws or funding conditions that mere- ly restrict certain speech, government compulsion of speech inflicts \"additional damage.\" Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2464.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Injunction Implements The Constitutional Prohibition Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "By speaking its own message freely through a separately organized affiliate, an organization can comply with the conditions of the federal program while its freedom of speech remains otherwise unfettered. In FCC v. League of Women Voters of California , the Court thus invalidated a fund- ing condition that barred broadcasters receiving feder-al grants from \"absolutely … all editorializing,\" even with private funds. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Court noted that it would \"plainly\" pass muster under Regan to limit the ban to fede ral funds while allowing grantees to \"establish 'affiliate' organizations which could then use the station's facilities to editorialize with nonfederal funds.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 112(a) aligns with the Patent Act's purpose",
		"context": "Disclosure is at the core of the patent bargain. The patent is granted \"[i]n consid- eration of [the invention's] disclosure and the conse- quent benefit to the community.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.\" Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Federal Circuit's interpretation of Section 112(a) aligns with the Patent Act's purpose",
		"context": "289 U.S. 178. And \"the ultimate goal of the patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain through disclosure.\" Bonito Boats, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It therefore stands to reason that a patentee may ob- tain a monopoly only on what has actually been dis- closed. Requiring a specification to enable the full scope of what is claimed advances that purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "489 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Would Unduly Impair Constitutional Protections for Religious Students",
		"context": "As this Court has observed, the Equal Access Act was \"intended to address perceived widespread discrimination against religious speech in public schools.\" Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Discrimination against religious student groups on public university campuses also occurs. See 454 U.S. 263; 515 U.S. 819; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Would Unduly Impair Constitutional Protections for Religious Students",
		"context": "of 496 U.S. 226. Discrimination against religious student groups on public university campuses also occurs. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 515 U.S. 819; cf. Good News 533 U.S. 98. The problem of discrimi natory treatment of reli- gious students on public university campuses is ongo- ing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Would Unduly Impair Constitutional Protections for Religious Students",
		"context": "of 496 U.S. 226. Discrimination against religious student groups on public university campuses also occurs. See 454 U.S. 263; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; cf. Good News 533 U.S. 98. The problem of discrimi natory treatment of reli- gious students on public university campuses is ongo- ing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 819",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eleventh Circuit's Holding Would Unduly Impair Constitutional Protections for Religious Students",
		"context": "Discrimination against religious student groups on public university campuses also occurs. See 454 U.S. 263; 515 U.S. 819; cf. Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The problem of discrimi natory treatment of reli- gious students on public university campuses is ongo- ing. Last year, the Equal Campus Access Act of 2019 was introduced in the Senate to address ongoing dis-crimination against religious students in higher edu- cation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Deference to Agencies Harms Individual Liberty",
		"context": "Instead, the executive branch official making critical judgments of law is often an interested party that desires a particular outcome. Deference to executive agencies also thwarts important structural limits on government power, such as the requirements of bicameralism and presentment, that ordinarily protect individual liberty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The legislative process is designed to carry high hurdles so as to protect individuals from 15 oppressive government action. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Deference to Agencies Harms Individual Liberty",
		"context": "But when an agency can expand its power through creative statutory interpretation that need only be found \"not unreasonable,\" the agency bypasses one of the primary checks on its power, and the difficulty of reversing that interpretation through legislation instead becomes a shield for the agency. Moreover, as Justice Gorsuch recently argued, deference also harms individual liberty by frustrating citizens' ability to accurately know what the law means and to \"fully conform their behavior to the text of the law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case illustrates the liberty-curtailing and government-expanding tendencies of deference. The decision to reimburse 340B hospitals based on acquisition costs rather than the sticker price of a medicine may seem like a dry and technical debate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "a. In determin ing whether a rule announc ed by this Court was new, a court \"must ascertain the 'legal land- scape ' \" at the time that \"the defendant's conviction be- came final,\" and \" ask whether the Constitution, as in- terpreted by the precedent then existing , compel[led] the rule.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to classify Ramos as simply re- flecting the application of \"well -settled principles .\" Even assuming that the law could have been re- garded as clear at some earlier time, Apodaca itself un- settled it. As noted above, six Justices in Ramos would have given stare decisis effect to Apodaca, and even the three Justices who questioned Apodaca's precedential value described it as a \"strange turn\" in \" the Sixth Amendment' s otherwise simple story .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "The state courts in petitioner's case were thus not \"act[ ing] objectively unreasonably ,\" O'Dell , 521 U.S. at 156, by relying on it . Furthermore , even before Apodaca, the Court had sent mixed signals about whether the Sixth Amendment require s jury unanimity. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for example, the Court \"intimat e[d] no 15 view whether or not the requirement of unanimity is an indispensable element of the Sixth Amendment jury trial\" while concluding that the common -law requi re- ment for 12 jurors is not. Id. at 101 n.46.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "And until Ra- mos, the Court had never held that a unanimous -jury requirement is incorporated against the States. Indeed, just a year earlier, the Court acknowledged the anom-aly that \"t he Sixth Amendment requi res jury unanimity in federal, but not state, criminal proceedings .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see McDon- ald, 561 U.S. at 766 n.14 (similar). b. This Court has rejected petitioner's suggestion that a rule is not \"new\" simply because this Court relies on constitutional firs t principles in announcing it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "Br. 13-14 (citation omitted). In Whorton v. Bockting , supra , the Court held that its interpretation of the Confronta-tion Clause in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was a new rule, notwithstanding that \"the Fram- ers' understanding of the meaning of the Confrontation Clause\" was \"the basis for the Crawford decision .\" Whorton , 549 U.S. at 417. And t his is an even clearer case of a new rule than Whorton .",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "Petitioner identifies no precedent for granting col- lateral relief under the Teague fram ework in circum- stances like these. He attempts (Br. 12 -13) to analogize this case to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the analogy is unsound. Stringer determined that 486 U.S. 356, and 494 U.S. 738, which in- validated state capital -sentencing schemes, did not an- nounce new rules because their holdings \" follow[ed] a 16 fortiori \" from 446 U.S. 420, which invalidated a similarly worded scheme. Stringer , 503 U.S. at 229.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "He attempts (Br. 12 -13) to analogize this case to 503 U.S. 222, but the analogy is unsound. Stringer determined that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 494 U.S. 738, which in- validated state capital -sentencing schemes, did not an- nounce new rules because their holdings \" follow[ed] a 16 fortiori \" from 446 U.S. 420, which invalidated a similarly worded scheme. Stringer , 503 U.S. at 229. No such clear precedent dictated the result in Ramos .",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "He attempts (Br. 12 -13) to analogize this case to 503 U.S. 222, but the analogy is unsound. Stringer determined that 486 U.S. 356, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which in- validated state capital -sentencing schemes, did not an- nounce new rules because their holdings \" follow[ed] a 16 fortiori \" from 446 U.S. 420, which invalidated a similarly worded scheme. Stringer , 503 U.S. at 229. No such clear precedent dictated the result in Ramos .",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "He attempts (Br. 12 -13) to analogize this case to 503 U.S. 222, but the analogy is unsound. Stringer determined that 486 U.S. 356, and 494 U.S. 738, which in- validated state capital -sentencing schemes, did not an- nounce new rules because their holdings \" follow[ed] a 16 fortiori \" from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which invalidated a similarly worded scheme. Stringer , 503 U.S. at 229. No such clear precedent dictated the result in Ramos .",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "If his position were accepted, criminal -procedu re decision s would routinely apply retroactively on federal collateral review . That approach cannot be squared with Teague , which consciously adopted a stricter standard for the retroactiv e application of criminal -pro- cedure rules in order to provide grea ter assurance that final criminal judgment s would in fact remain final. See 489 U.S. at 300- 310 (plurality opinion); see also , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Stringer , 503 U.S. at 228. Even before Teague , this Court \"never h a[d] defined the scope of [collateral review] simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual accused of crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.\" Teague , 489 U.S. at 308 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 264",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Petitioner errs in characterizing Ramos as a settled rule",
		"context": "But the \"threat of habeas\" is designed as an \"incentive\" for lower courts to decide cases \"consistent with established constitutional stand- ards,\" Teague , 489 U.S. at 306 (plurality opinion) (em- phasis added ; citation omitted) —not to decide for them- selves that this Court got something wrong. Even if a state court could have applied constitu- tional first principles to reach the result that the Court ultimately reached in Ramos , \"[t]he 'new rule' principle validates reasonable, good -faith interpretations of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions.\" But- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because the uniform interpretation of Apodaca in the state courts was at least \"reasonable\" and undertaken in \"good - faith,\" the contrary rule of Ramos is new.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 407",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "EO-3 subjects Respondents' relatives and associates to an immediate ban on entry, and pres- ently hampers the University's recruitment and retention efforts. The prospect that a government official might decide, in his unreviewable discretion, to waive that ban in an individual case does not eliminate the harm. SeeGratz v.Bollinger , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in the short time since the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion, the mother of one of the John Does has had her visa denied, demonstrating that Respondents' asserted harms are far from speculative.4 2. Respondents' statutory claims are reviewable through two well-established routes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Respondents' statutory claims are reviewable through two well-established routes. First, this Court has equitable authority to enjoin \"violations of federal law by federal officials,\" including the Presi- dent. Armstrong v.Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chamber of 74 F.3d 1322. Both routes are available to Respondents: They allege that the President violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") by promulgating EO-3, and they seek to enjoin agency officials from carrying out the President's unlawful command. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1378",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Respondents' statutory claims are reviewable through two well-established routes. First, this Court has equitable authority to enjoin \"violations of federal law by federal officials,\" including the Presi- dent. Armstrong v.Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc. , 135 S. Ct. 1378; Chamber of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Both routes are available to Respondents: They allege that the President violated the Immigration and Nationality Act (\"INA\") by promulgating EO-3, and they seek to enjoin agency officials from carrying out the President's unlawful command. a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 F.3d 1322",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "\"U.S. ex rel. Knauff v.Shaughnessy , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no question, however, that courts may review whether executive officials have exceeded their authority under the immigration laws, particularly when setting sweeping policies. In Sale v.Haitian Centers Council, Inc. , 509 U.S. 155, for example, the Court reviewed whether \"[t]he President violate[d]\" various INA and treaty provisions by invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Knauff v.Shaughnessy , 338 U.S. 537. There is no question, however, that courts may review whether executive officials have exceeded their authority under the immigration laws, particularly when setting sweeping policies. In Sale v.Haitian Centers Council, Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court reviewed whether \"[t]he President violate[d]\" various INA and treaty provisions by invoking his authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f) to \"suspend[] the entry of undocumented aliens from the high seas.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "§ 1252(a) (emphasis added). The statutes say nothing to prevent courts from reviewing whether sweeping immigration policies violate the immigration laws—still less do they satisfy the \"heavy burden\" of \"show[ing] that Congress 'prohibit[ed] all judicial review' of the [Executive]'s compliance with a legislative mandate.\" Mach Mining, LLC v.EEOC , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government asserts (at 18) that \"permitting review of the President's decision\" would \"invert the constitutional structure.\" But the Constitution gives Congress \"exclusive[]\" authority to set immigration policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1645",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "II, § 3. The notion that the Judiciary cannot prevent the President from transgressing the limits of his authority—no matter how brazen the statutory violation—contravenes our Constitution's fundamental separation of powers. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The Government offers three additional reasons (at 19-20) why it believes APA review is unavailable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Pet. 12.6The fact that the agencies have not yet denied waivers to some of the plaintiffs or their family members is immaterial; a policy is \"final\" if it \"give[s] notice\" of the agency's enforcement plans, even if no \"particular action [has been] brought against a particular [entity].\" U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v.Hawkes Co. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any event, the President has made the final decision to promulgate EO-3; although the President is not an \"agency,\" the Court retains equitable authority to enjoin actions taken by the President in excess of his statutory authority. Chamber of Commerce , 74 F.3d at 1327-28; see,453 U.S. 654.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs v.Hawkes Co. , 136 S. Ct. 1807. In any event, the President has made the final decision to promulgate EO-3; although the President is not an \"agency,\" the Court retains equitable authority to enjoin actions taken by the President in excess of his statutory authority. Chamber of Commerce , 74 F.3d at 1327-28; see,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Third, the Government asserts that Respondents fall outside the INA's zone of interests. The INA, however, contains numerous provisions designed to facilitate the admission of students and scholars, see 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Dep't of State, New Court Orders on Presidential Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2017), https://goo.gl/JAGjXd; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: The President's Proclamation (Sept. 24, 2017), https://goo.gl/gaiEpi. 13 those interests. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.Patchak , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers (\"LAVAS 45 F.3d 469.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents' Challenge Is Reviewable",
		"context": "Dep't of State, New Court Orders on Presidential Proclamation (Dec. 4, 2017), https://goo.gl/JAGjXd; U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Fact Sheet: The President's Proclamation (Sept. 24, 2017), https://goo.gl/gaiEpi. 13 those interests. Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.Patchak , 567 U.S. 209; see Legal Assistance for Vietnamese Asylum Seekers (\"LAVAS [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 F.3d 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
		"context": "For starters, nothing in the Constitution's text or this Court's precedent distinguishes between closed - ended and open -ended constitutional provisions or suggests that courts cease to act as courts when they interpret and enforce prov isions of the latter type. As Chief Justice John Marshall famously opined , in words equally applicable to the North Carolina Constitution : \"we must never forget that it is a C onstitution we are expounding .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 20 Moreover , this Court routinely discern s the mean- ing of general constitutional language —such as \"un- reasonable searches,\" \"due process of law,\" \"cruel and unusual punishments,\" and \"equal protection of the laws.\" To do so, it applies traditional judicial tools , such as precedent, drafting history, original public meaning, and historical practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "17 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
		"context": "Harper , 868 S.E.2d at 540; Ross, supra, at 288. A s the North Carolina Free Elections Clause's textual simi- larity to the English clause and the statements of the North Carolina clause's framers make clear, this anti - manipulation principle was carried forward in the North Carolina clause. Harper , 868 S.E.2d at 540–42 & n.13 (discussing the frequent references of the North Carolina framers to the reforms of the Glorious Revo- lution) ; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Historians in Support of Appellees at 12, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 16 -1161) , (noting that \"Free Elec- tions\" provisions like North Carolina's were a \"re- sponse\" to \"concerns\" about \"'unfair, partial, and cor- rupt'\" el ections in England (quoting John Adams, Thoughts on Government (1776)) ). Thus , despite its terse wording , the Free Elections Clause is not a tabula rasa.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1916",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
		"context": "Perhaps this Court, reading the same historica l sources de novo , would come to a dif- ferent conclusion about the meaning of the Free Elec- tions Clause —or perhaps not. Regardless, such disa- greement has never been a basis for federal courts to impugn a state court's interpretation s of its own con- stitution. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].23 23 The same goes for the North Carolina Supreme Court's in- terpretation of its constitution's Equal Protection Clause, Free Speech Clause, and Freedom of Assembly Clause to prohibit par- tisan gerrymandering. Although those clauses —unlike the Free Elections Clause —do have analogues in the federal Constitution, it is well- settled that state courts may depart from this Court's construction of constitutional language when interpreting their own constitutions, even when the relevant provisions are worded identically. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
		"context": "Although those clauses —unlike the Free Elections Clause —do have analogues in the federal Constitution, it is well- settled that state courts may depart from this Court's construction of constitutional language when interpreting their own constitutions, even when the relevant provisions are worded identically. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Jeffrey S. Sutton et al., 51 Imperfect Solu- tions: State and Federal Judg es Consider the Role of State Consti- tutions in Rights Innovation, 103 J UDICATURE 33, 45 (2019). Here, moreover, usurping the North Carolina Supreme Court's role as the ultimate authority on the meaning of these state constitu- tional provisions would be part icularly inappropriate, as ample state -court precedent supported —even required —the conclusions reached below. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 N.W.2d 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioners' Argument That The Provisions At Issue Are Too \"Open-Ended\" Lacks Any Basis And Is Unworkable.",
		"context": "Here, moreover, usurping the North Carolina Supreme Court's role as the ultimate authority on the meaning of these state constitu- tional provisions would be part icularly inappropriate, as ample state -court precedent supported —even required —the conclusions reached below. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Harper v. Lewis, 2019 N.C. Super. LEXIS 122, at 9– 11 (N.C. Super. Ct. Oct. 28, 2019) (unanimously 24 Finally, Petitioners' proposed dichotomy of \" open - ended \" and \"specific\" constitutional provisions is ut- terly unworkable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 N.C. 354",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The meager reasoning offered by the Ninth Circuit in justification of its universal injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem , Harvard Law Review Blog (Jan. 25, 2018), https://goo.gl/AZHg CX . 19 In the previous iteration of this case, t he Ninth Circuit quoted the Fourth Circuit for the proposition that not extending the injunction to nonparties would allow the statutory or constitutional violations, as the case may be, to endure in all applications. State of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . True enough. But the remedy is not for the district court to exercise power not bestowed by the Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "859 F.3d 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The meager reasoning offered by the Ninth Circuit in justification of its universal injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "Other affected persons may file suit for 19 Disagreement between circuits provides the Supreme Court with a salutary vetting of the law. \"We have in many instances recognized that when frontier legal problems are presented, periods of 'percolation' in, and diverse opinions from, state and federal ap pellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement by this Court.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 28 their own benefit and argue that the reasoning in a similar case in another distri ct court should be adopted in their own case. They may not, however, receive the judicial gift of a judgment without an adjudication.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The meager reasoning offered by the Ninth Circuit in justification of its universal injunction is unpersuasive",
		"context": "App. 62a. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F. 2d 1163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Constitution Forbids a State from Cutting Off a Person's Right to Carry Arms for Self-Defense, and Therefore Laws Like New York's Concealed Carry Law Can Be Unconstitutional",
		"context": "In Heller , the Court noted that \"the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.\" District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court then noted that \"th e majority of the 19th - century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard",
		"context": "The Seventh Circuit held that the foregoing legal principles —honed over centuries of common law and codified into the FCA by Congress —are irrelevant. I n- stead, the court of appeals held that under Safeco In- surance Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], courts must apply a special rule when the falsity of a defendant's claim arises because of noncompliance with a legal requirement. In that situation, the court of appeals held that the defendant's subjective under- standing and beliefs are categorically \"irrelevant\" to the scienter inquiry. Schutte Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard",
		"context": "First, Safeco 's holding, which is a judicial gloss on the recklessness standard applicable to torts relat- ing to physical safety, does not govern the FCA's cause of action for fraud. This Court has taken care \"to con- strue such words\" as \"knowing,\" \"intentional,\" and \"willf ul\" \"in their particular statutory context\"—as op- posed to ascribing a one -size-fits-all meaning to them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, i n Safeco itself, this Court recognized that \"the term recklessness is not self -defining,\" and takes different meanings de- pending on context. 551 U.S. at 68 (quoting 511 U.S. 825 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard",
		"context": "559 U.S. 573 . Indeed, i n Safeco itself, this Court recognized that \"the term recklessness is not self -defining,\" and takes different meanings de- pending on context. 551 U.S. at 68 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Consistent with that admonition, this Court has recognized that in some contexts, a defendant who commits a wrongful act \"in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law \" is acting recklessly. 527 U.S. 526 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard",
		"context": "551 U.S. at 68 (quoting 511 U.S. 825 ). Consistent with that admonition, this Court has recognized that in some contexts, a defendant who commits a wrongful act \"in the face of a perceived risk that its actions will violate federal law \" is acting recklessly. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And in other contexts, the Court has held that \"subjective wi llful- ness . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Seventh Circuit Erroneously Created a Novel and Unfounded Exception to the False Claims Act's Scienter Standard",
		"context": ". has its greatest force when a private party seeks to spend the Government's money. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Protection of the public fisc requires that those who seek public funds act with scrupulous re- gard for the requirements of law ,\" and sho uld \" expect no less than to be held to the most demanding stand- ards in [their] quest for public funds. This is consistent with the general rule that those who deal with the Government are expected to know the law .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "The foregoing principles may come into play in either a facial or as-applied First Amendment challenge. When plaintiffs allege that a statute is unconstitutional on its face, they generally must show that the l aw lacks a \"plainly legitimate sweep,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, the First Amendment \"overbreadth doctrine \" permits a second type of facial challenge. It allows \"an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited \" to \"challenge a statute on its face ' because it threatens [the free speech rights of] others.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "However, the First Amendment \"overbreadth doctrine \" permits a second type of facial challenge. It allows \"an individual whose own speech or conduct may be prohibited \" to \"challenge a statute on its face ' because it threatens [the free speech rights of] others.'\" Jews for Jesus , 482 U.S. at 574; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The overbreadth doctrine responds to \"the threat [that] enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.\" 539 U.S. 113 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "Jews for Jesus , 482 U.S. at 574; 472 U.S. 491 . The overbreadth doctrine responds to \"the threat [that] enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Many persons, rather than undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case- by-case litigation, will choose simply to abstain from protected 22 speech, harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "By allowing a plaintiff to challenge a law because it endangers the free speech rights of others, the overbreadth doctrine ensures that the First Amendment has \"' breathing space to survive. '\" WRTL , 551 U.S. at 468- 69 (quoting NAACP v. Button , 371 U.S. at 433). Because the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is \"strong medicine,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is generally employed to facially invalidate a statute only (1) when its overbreadth is \"substantial\" in \"relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,\" and (2) where the law is not readily susceptible to a limiting construction. Washington State 552 U.S. 442 ; Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 613, 615. This understanding derives from the doctrine 's purpose .",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 601",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "WRTL , 551 U.S. at 468- 69 (quoting NAACP v. Button , 371 U.S. at 433). Because the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine is \"strong medicine,\" 413 U.S. 601, it is generally employed to facially invalidate a statute only (1) when its overbreadth is \"substantial\" in \"relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep,\" and (2) where the law is not readily susceptible to a limiting construction. Washington State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Broadrick , 413 U.S. at 613, 615. This understanding derives from the doctrine 's purpose . \"While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of th e regulation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "This understanding derives from the doctrine 's purpose . \"While a sweeping statute, or one incapable of limitation, has the potential to repeatedly chill the exercise of expressive activity by many individuals, the extent of deterrence of protected speech can be expected to decrease with the declining reach of th e regulation.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In applying this framework, the Court may consider the extent to which a law \"delegates overly broad discretion to the decisi onmaker.\" Forsyth County, Ga. 505 U.S. 123 ; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth , 100 Yale L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Facial Challenges Under the Overbreadth Doctrine",
		"context": "New 458 U.S. 747. In applying this framework, the Court may consider the extent to which a law \"delegates overly broad discretion to the decisi onmaker.\" Forsyth County, Ga. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth , 100 Yale L.J. 853, 884 (1991) (Overbroad laws raise \"a concern . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "§ 1332. \"Thus, sec- tion 113(h) permits a federal court to hear a challenge to a federal cleanup initiated under CERLCA if the challenge arises as, for instance, a state-law nuisance action.\" Village of DePue, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, Sec- tion 113(h) applies \"only if the challenge arises 23 under federal law\"—not to state-law claims like Land- owners'. Ibid.4 Neither ARCO nor the government attempts to reconcile the theory that CER CLA strips state courts of jurisdiction over state- law actions with the fact that CERCLA's key jurisdiction-stripping provision expressly exempts state-law actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 F.3d 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "§ 9621(d). It is unclear whether such claims constitute a second exception to Section 113(h)'s jurisdiction-stripping man-date (Br. 26) or, more likely, an additional category of prohibited \"challenges\" ( Fort Ord Toxics Project, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Regardless, Landowners' claims invoke no \"applicable or relevant and appropriate\" state law ( infra p. 61 n.12), and Section 113(h)'s reference to \"diversity\" jurisdiction unequivocally delineat es a category of cases federal courts may entertain. 24 did.",
		"citation_value_orig": "189 F.3d 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "And Landowners' claims do not sat-isfy the traditional \"arising under\" requirements rec- ognized in that context—as neither ARCO nor the government disputes. \"Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, a suit 'arises under' federal law 'only when the plaintiff 's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon federal law.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Landowners' state-law complaint does not meet that test. ARCO injected any CERCLA issues as defenses, and \"federal-court jurisdiction cannot be invoked on the basis of a defense or counterclaim.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "at 54; see Metro. Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even setting aside the well-pleaded complaint rule, Landowners' suit woul d not \"arise under\" CERCLA for the simple reason that Landowners do not press CERCLA claims. A case generally \"arises under fed- eral law\" only \"when federal law creates the cause 25 of action asserted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Even setting aside the well-pleaded complaint rule, Landowners' suit woul d not \"arise under\" CERCLA for the simple reason that Landowners do not press CERCLA claims. A case generally \"arises under fed- eral law\" only \"when federal law creates the cause 25 of action asserted.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s scope. Consis tent with the \"demands of [l]inguistic consistency\" and the presumption that Con-gress legislates against the backdrop of the federal-question statute's longstanding interpretation, this Court has generally \"interpreted the phrase 'arising under' identically\" when other statutes repeat it. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257 (28 U.S.C. § 1338); accord, e.g. , Dep't of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] concurrently deprives state courts of jurisdiction provides all the more reason not to stretch its use of \"arising under\" beyond this 5 Neither ARCO nor the government contends this case fits the \"special and small category\" of cases where federal-question jurisdiction lies over state-law claims (assuming the well-pleaded complaint rule is satisfied). Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. It would not (and ARCO never attempted removal on that ground): no federal issue is \"necessarily raised\" because no element of Landowners' claims turns on federal law, ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. It would not (and ARCO never attempted removal on that ground): no federal issue is \"necessarily raised\" because no element of Landowners' claims turns on federal law, ibid. ; any federal issue is insubstan- tial because Landowners' claims are \"fact-bound and situation-specific,\" Empire Healthchoice Assur., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and exercising ju risdiction would sweep \"garden variety state tort law\" ca ses into federal courts, Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 308 ( 2005). 26 settled under standing. See 493 U.S. 455 employs the phrase \"arising under\" to mean something novel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. It would not (and ARCO never attempted removal on that ground): no federal issue is \"necessarily raised\" because no element of Landowners' claims turns on federal law, ibid. ; any federal issue is insubstan- tial because Landowners' claims are \"fact-bound and situation-specific,\" Empire Healthchoice Assur., 547 U.S. 677; and exercising ju risdiction would sweep \"garden variety state tort law\" ca ses into federal courts, Grable & Sons Metal Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2005). 26 settled under standing. See 493 U.S. 455 employs the phrase \"arising under\" to mean something novel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "; any federal issue is insubstan- tial because Landowners' claims are \"fact-bound and situation-specific,\" Empire Healthchoice Assur., 547 U.S. 677; and exercising ju risdiction would sweep \"garden variety state tort law\" ca ses into federal courts, Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 308 ( 2005). 26 settled under standing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] employs the phrase \"arising under\" to mean something novel. It comes up empty. ARCO relies almost entirely on the conclusory assertion that \" 'Congress used language more expansive than would be necessary if it intended to limit exclusive jurisdic-tion [under § 113(b)] solely to those claims created by CERCLA.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Rather, an excep-tion \"derogates from the provision to which it refers,\" rendering the rule inapplicable where the exception's requirements are met. Merit Mgmt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This provision would not mean that all claims barred by the Eleventh Amendment are necessarily \"contro- versies arising under CERCLA,\" but instead that the 28 Eleventh Amendment supersedes the grant of subject- matter jurisdiction when the Amendment also applies. Likewise, Congress clarified in Section 113(b) that Section 113(h)'s elimination of federal-court jurisdic- tion over specified \"challen ges\" supersedes Section 113(b)'s general grant of federal-court jurisdiction when both provisions otherwis e apply.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "Likewise, Congress clarified in Section 113(b) that Section 113(h)'s elimination of federal-court jurisdic- tion over specified \"challen ges\" supersedes Section 113(b)'s general grant of federal-court jurisdiction when both provisions otherwis e apply. Nothing in this familiar structure suggests Congress further intended to establish that all Section 113(h) \"challenges\" are also Section 113(b) \"controversies arising under\" CERCLA. See Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. In any event, even if ARCO and the govern- ment were right that Section 113(b) gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over all Section 113(h)- prohibited \"challenges,\" it would not apply here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "28,410 (Oct. 3, 1986). These statements from the Conference Report and the bill's sponsors leave little doubt as to Congress' intent. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Perhaps for this reason, ARCO never suggests the legislative history supports its far broader reading of Section 113. The government attempts the argument, but the snippets of legislative histor y on which it relies provide no support.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1066",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. CERCLA Permits State-Court, State-Law Claims",
		"context": "26. Such \"[i ]solated statements are not impressive legislative history,\" particularly in com- parison to the far \"more authoritative\" Conference Committee Report. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] itself provides. To the extent these individual members of Congress suggested Section 113 might pre- clude state-law actions, the bill's sponsors refuted that interpretation. As Senator Mitchell explained, \"the original text\" of Section 113(h) (referring to \"No court\") might have \"extinguish[ed] the jurisdiction of any court to review any challenge .",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The State's argument that McElrath is procedurally barred from raising the double jeopardy argument is wrong and contrary to the Georgia Supreme Court's decision.",
		"context": "This assertion misses the point. As this Court has recognized, the prohibition on double jeopardy protects \"t wo vitally important interests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]690 F.3d 1195. First, it prohibits retrial on acquitted charges. Green , 355 U.S at 187–88 (declaring double jeopardy prohibits \"repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Case Does Not Involve Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law",
		"context": "1, 1889, arts. I, II, VIII, 26 U.S.T.1512. As this Court held in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.\" Id.at 764. In Boumediene , the Court 16 recognized that Cuba, not the United States, had formal sovereignty over the land under the U.S. military base at Guantánamo Bay.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Case Does Not Involve Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law",
		"context": "The area is within range of ordinary gunfire from the U.S. side of the river: Agent Mesa was standing on the U.S. bank when he fired the fatal shot. In other words, this case involved action taken in the United States by a U.S. government official against a nearby individual in an area under effective U.S. control. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this case did not involve U.S. government operations in a foreign country. Thus, there are no \"special factors\" that require this case to be treated any differently than if Sergio Hernández had been standing a few feet away on the U.S. side of the boundary linewhen Agent Mesa killedhim.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Norfolk Southern's Compliance With Pennsylvania's Registration Requirement Constitutes a Voluntary, Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of the Due Process Right To Be Sued \"At Home.\"",
		"context": "Stat. § 5301(a)(2)(i) so pro- vides, and a line of state and federal court decisions applying this statute and its predecessor make clear that completing the steps to register to do business in Pennsylvania constitutes consent to the general juris-diction of its courts. See, e.g., Webb- Benjamin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 925 F.2d 637 . Norfolk Southern's consent was voluntary as well. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) offers a foreign corporation the benefits enjoyed by Pennsylvania -incorporated corpo- rations if they agree to be subject to suit as if they were domestic corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "192 A.3d 1133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Norfolk Southern's Compliance With Pennsylvania's Registration Requirement Constitutes a Voluntary, Knowing and Intelligent Waiver of the Due Process Right To Be Sued \"At Home.\"",
		"context": "Stat. § 5301(a)(2)(i) so pro- vides, and a line of state and federal court decisions applying this statute and its predecessor make clear that completing the steps to register to do business in Pennsylvania constitutes consent to the general juris-diction of its courts. See, e.g., Webb- Benjamin 192 A.3d 1133 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Norfolk Southern's consent was voluntary as well. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) offers a foreign corporation the benefits enjoyed by Pennsylvania -incorporated corpo- rations if they agree to be subject to suit as if they were domestic corporations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.2d 637",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent repeats the First Circuit's misstep of relying on dictionary definitions of component words.",
		"context": "39. The reason to guard against blind adherence to component definitions is that \"two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court confronted such a case just last Term in determining whether \"foreign tribunal\" reached private adjudicative bodies: Standing alone, the word \"tribunal\" casts little light on the question. This is where context comes in.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent repeats the First Circuit's misstep of relying on dictionary definitions of component words.",
		"context": "Cf. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the time Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, this Court was \"continu[ing] to stress that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over their territory,\" such that \"reservation lands are insulated in some respects.\" New 462 U.S. 324.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent repeats the First Circuit's misstep of relying on dictionary definitions of component words.",
		"context": "Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1881. At the time Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, this Court was \"continu[ing] to stress that Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over their territory,\" such that \"reservation lands are insulated in some respects.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At bottom, those examples reflect the long- acknowledged reality that \"[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.\" Cherokee 30 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 324",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Respondent repeats the First Circuit's misstep of relying on dictionary definitions of component words.",
		"context": "New 462 U.S. 324. At bottom, those examples reflect the long- acknowledged reality that \"[t]he condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.\" Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, it is not enough to show that tribes could fall within a generic definition of \"domestic.\" 12 Second ,even assuming tribes can be clearly characterized as \"domestic,\" Respondent still needs to show that \"other domestic government\" unequivocally reaches tribes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "30 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit disregards the impact its decision will have on Arizona's precinct-based voting system",
		"context": "Hobbs , 948 F.3d at 1030. An \"unbroken practice\" followed \"openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction, is not something to be lightly cast aside.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Hobbs , 948 F.3d at 1062–64 14 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (describing widespread use of precinct-based voting systems). Taken at face value, the Ninth Circuit's decision disregards the effect that \"partially counting\" out-of-pre cinct ballots will have on these benefits—it eliminates them. No longer will Maricopa County elections o fficials be able to predict how many voters will use a particular voting location based on geography, beca use voters who are most interested in voting for top-of-the-ticket races (like president) will be able to vote anywhere.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "NFIB , 567 U.S. at 574. When Congress amends a statute 9 that this Court previously construed, the presumption is that Congress acted \"with full cognizance\" of that construction. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Congress was more than presump- tively aware of the NFIB construct ion when it consid- ered the TCJA: i ts Members expressly relied on that construction . See Health Care Policy Scholars Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 689",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "Tex. Br. 31 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But \"[w]hen Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provisions .\" TC Heartland 137 S. Ct. 1514.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "31 (quoting 135 S. Ct. 2401). But \"[w]hen Congress intends to effect a change of that kind, it ordinarily provides a relatively clear indication of its intent in the text of the amended provisions .\" TC Heartland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, r espondents cannot identify any thing in the changes made by the TCJA suggest ing any intent to transform Section 5000A into a command. The TCJA did not alte r the statutory structure that NFIB con- strued as creating a choice between buying health insurance and paying a tax .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "Everyone agrees that \"'[t]he word \"shall\" usually connotes a requirement, '\" e.g., id. at 33, but in some circumstances it does not, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; New 505 U.S. 144. Respondents have no persuasive response to these authorities .4 And while they assert that \"[n]othing in Section 5000A(a) indi- cates that Congress diverged from [the] ordinary understanding of the term ,\" U.S. Br. 34, they ignore that an explicit and essential premise of NFIB was that the \"shall\" in Section 5000A(a) did not impose a legal requirement, s ee 567 U.S. at 568- 570.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "Everyone agrees that \"'[t]he word \"shall\" usually connotes a requirement, '\" e.g., id. at 33, but in some circumstances it does not, see, e.g. , 135 S. Ct. 2480 ; New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents have no persuasive response to these authorities .4 And while they assert that \"[n]othing in Section 5000A(a) indi- cates that Congress diverged from [the] ordinary understanding of the term ,\" U.S. Br. 34, they ignore that an explicit and essential premise of NFIB was that the \"shall\" in Section 5000A(a) did not impose a legal requirement, s ee 567 U.S. at 568- 570.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "Respondents' position that Congress transformed Section 5000A into the very \"command\" t hat \"this Court held in NFIB ... is unconstitutional\" ( U.S. Br. 30) would be remarkable in any context , in light of the presumption that Congress \" legislates in the light of constitutional limitations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. B ut it is astonishing in this one — where we know for sure that leading legislators under- stood that \"the Supreme Court would have nullified\" Section 5000A if it were read as a command. Sen. Fin .",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Setting the alternative tax to zero did not transform a constitutional choice into an unconstitutional command",
		"context": "Indeed, dozens of the TCJA's congressional supporters filed a brief in NFIB arguing that \"requiring [individuals] to purchase health insurance ... exceeds the authority given to the federal government in the Commerce Clause.\" Senat ors Br. 8, NFIB , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Re- spondents' merits theory rests on the untenable prem- ise that in 2017 th ose Senators intentionally voted to create a \"command\" that NFIB forbade and that they personally believed was unconstitutional —all while telling the public they were doing just the opposite.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "7 of statutes in pari materia . Specifically, the principle is not applicable here as between Title VII and the stat- utes cited by Clayton County, which deal with sexual orientation \"in entirely differe nt fields,\" and there is no indication that Title VII was intended to be read in pari materia with them. Fort Stewart [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Clayton County also offers the argument from the dissenters in Zarda and Hively that the term \"sex\" meant \"biologically male or female\" when Title VII was passed in 1964, and therefore cannot be read to include sexual orientation. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "Br., pp. 26-28. Clayton County again misses the point by arguing that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which recognized that same-sex harassment is actionable under Title VII, did nothing to recognize sexual orientation discrimination claims. Resp. Br., pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 75",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "Clayton County simply begs the question. Clayton County also makes much of the fact that Congress has many times declined to amend Title VII to specifically include \"sexual orientation\" as a Wisconsin Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 protected class. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "22-24. However, the EEOC interpreted Title VII to prohibit sexual orienta-tion discrimination in 2015 WL 4397641, and the construction of a statute \"by those charged with its en-forcement combined with congressional acquiescence 'creates a presumption in favo r of the administrative interpretation, to which [the Court] should give great weight[.]' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And congressional \"failure to repeal or revise in the face of such administrative interpretation has been held to constitute persuasive evidence that the inter- pretation is the one intended by Congress.\" 381 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "\" 287 U.S. 341. And congressional \"failure to repeal or revise in the face of such administrative interpretation has been held to constitute persuasive evidence that the inter- pretation is the one intended by Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 That Congress approves of the EEOC's construction of Title 6 Clayton County's argument that the EEOC's position has changed, Resp. Br., at p. 23, rings hollow because the agency ex-plained the evolution of its interpretation in Baldwin , 2015 WL 4397641, and \"[a]n initial agency in terpretation is not instantly carved in stone,\" because an agen cy \"must consider varying inter- pretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,\" Nat'l Cable & Telecomm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "6 That Congress approves of the EEOC's construction of Title 6 Clayton County's argument that the EEOC's position has changed, Resp. Br., at p. 23, rings hollow because the agency ex-plained the evolution of its interpretation in Baldwin , 2015 WL 4397641, and \"[a]n initial agency in terpretation is not instantly carved in stone,\" because an agen cy \"must consider varying inter- pretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis,\" Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Thomas, J.) (reversing the Ninth Circuit for failure to accord deference to the Fede ral Communication s Commission's changed interpretation of whether cable companies providing broadband internet access provided \"telecommunications service\" within the meaning of the Communications Act of 1934). 10 VII is surely a better explanation for its silence than that it disfavors inclusion of gay and lesbian employees under the umbrella of Title VII, but regardless, the lat- ter conclusion is unwarranted because \"[c]ongressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupa- tion, or paralysis,\" 396 U.S. 168.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONCLUDE THAT DISCRIMINATION BECAUSE OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION IS DISCRIMINATION \"BECAUSE OF SEX\" IN VIOLATION OF TITLE VII",
		"context": "545 U.S. 967 (Thomas, J.) (reversing the Ninth Circuit for failure to accord deference to the Fede ral Communication s Commission's changed interpretation of whether cable companies providing broadband internet access provided \"telecommunications service\" within the meaning of the Communications Act of 1934). 10 VII is surely a better explanation for its silence than that it disfavors inclusion of gay and lesbian employees under the umbrella of Title VII, but regardless, the lat- ter conclusion is unwarranted because \"[c]ongressional inaction frequently betokens unawareness, preoccupa- tion, or paralysis,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is especially so when \"unawareness\" is also a compelling explanation – that is, Congress has not passed an amendment to Title VII to specifically forbid discrimination based on \"sexual orientation\" because it is unaware that one is necessary, since most Americans believe it is already illegal. See Katy Steinmetz, Law- makers to Introduce Historic LGBT Non-Discrimination Bills, T IME, July 23, 2015 (noting the \"vast misconcep- tion\" on the part of as much as 87% of the country \"that it is already illegal to di scriminate against gay peo- ple\"), available at http://time.com/3968995/equality- act-congress-lgbt/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2018); Alex Lundry, Voters in both parties back workplace equality for gays, CNN.Com, Oct. 22, 2013, available at https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362, cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 848 F.3d 305 ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 F.2d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 848 F.3d 305 ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362, cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 848 F.3d 305 ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362, cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.2d 755",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 848 F.3d 305 ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362, cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "................................ .. 21 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 848 F.3d 305 ............................. 8 Alfred A. Knopf, 509 F.2d 1362, cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "806 F.3d 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 F.3d 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 F.3d 857",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 454 U.S. 139 ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "denied,421 U.S. 908 ............................... 13 471 U.S. 159 ................................ ....... 6, 7 911 F.2d 755 ......... 13, 14 690 F.2d 977 ................. 14 Intel 542 U.S. 241 .............................................................. 21 Knight First Am dt. 2021 WL 3821864 .............................. 13 554 U.S. 491 ............................... 19 806 F.3d 568 ..................... 13 II Cases —Continued: Page National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 ..................................................................... 6 New York 965 F.3d 109 ................................................ 13 655 F.2d 1325 ................ 14 Public 11 F.3d 198 ................................................. 6 316 F.3d 857 ...................................................................... 22 Schlich , In re893 F.3d 40 ............................. 3 553 U.S. 880 ................................ 19 418 U.S. 683 ......................... 7 345 U.S. 1 ... 7, 8, 9, 10, 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................... 8 Treaty, statutes, regulation , and rule : Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, arts. 19, 46, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, as amended, https://www.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "at 31a (dissent). Indeed, if the requested evidence were not relevant to those Polish proceedings, there would be no basis for allowing discovery. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that Mitchell and Jessen have testified about the treatment of CIA detainees in other contexts . But that only un- derscores the problem: In those proceedings, the testi- mony did not reveal anything about the information the government seeks to protect here —the location s of for- mer CIA detention facilities and the involvement of its foreign partners. The Salim plaintiffs , for instance, asserted federal damage s claims against the CIA contractors based on the contractors' own actions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.3d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "Compelling Mitchell and Jessen to produce the priv- ileged evidence because of the government's prior de- classification of other information would effectively pe- nalize the government for its earlier declassification de- cision . In so doing, it would create \" a strong disincen- tive [for the government] ever to provide its citizenry with [information] of any kind on sensitive topics .\" Pub- lic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; cf. National Sec. 752 F.3d 460 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 F.3d 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "Pub- lic 11 F.3d 198 ; cf. National Sec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . B. The State -Secrets Privilege Bars Respondents' Discov- ery Request Because respondents' discovery request s would in- evitably confirm or deny whether a CIA detention facil- ity existed in Poland and their allegations about Abu Zubaydah's treatment there, their case depends on the Ninth Circuit's holding that the state -secrets privilege does not cover that informat ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "752 F.3d 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "The State -Secrets Privilege Bars Respondents' Discov- ery Request Because respondents' discovery request s would in- evitably confirm or deny whether a CIA detention facil- ity existed in Poland and their allegations about Abu Zubaydah's treatment there, their case depends on the Ninth Circuit's holding that the state -secrets privilege does not cover that informat ion. But that holding was badly flawed. As the CIA Director explained, a court order requiring CIA contractors to produce CIA loca- tion evidence would significantly undermine the United States' ability to provide our clandestine intelligence partners \"an assurance of confidentiality that is as ab- solute as possible\" and would significantly prejudice the government's \" 'compelling interest in protecting the appearance of confidentiality so essential to the ef-fective operation of our foreign intelligenc e service ,' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit's decision flouts that fundamental principle . 7 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "22 -26. Th is Court has long emphasized the \"high degree of deference\" that should be afforded to such judgments . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see U.S. Br. 22 -25. And the need for defer- ence is even greater here because respondents seek ev- idence to furnish to foreign prosecutors for use in a for- eign criminal investigation probing alleged clandestine CIA intelligence activity abroad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "That is not so. No one denies that a court presented with an assertion of the state -secrets privilege must \"determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the court must make that determination \"without forcing a disclosure of th e very thing the priv- ilege is designed to protect\" or substituting its judg-ment for the Executive Branch 's on matters squarely within the Executive Branch's responsibility and exper-tise. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "345 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "In Reynolds , this Court held that the state -secrets privilege applies if there is a \"reasonable danger\" that compelled disclosure would expose matters that, \"in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.\" 345 U.S. at 10; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That governing standard does not include a preliminary assessment by the court to decide whether it believes 2 Respondents err in asserting (Br. 45 -46) that the government previously embraced the approach employed by the Ninth Circuit here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "at 13, 15 , 563 U.S. 1002 , https://go.usa.gov/xM2S8 . As that case illus- trates, judicial use of the word \" 'skeptical ' \" is consistent with the understanding that \"[a]ppropriate judicial oversight\" can include \" 'very careful' \" review of a privilege assertion while still providing \" 'utmost deference' \" to Executive -Branch judgments. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By con- trast, the Ninth Circuit here applied an unprecedented form of re- view that the court itself deemed \"contradictory\" to its prior deci- sions that \" 'acknowledge[d ] the need to defer to the Executive ,' \" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "at 13 -17, 547 U.S. 1123. Whereas a \"stranger['s]\" public reassertion of previ- ously published material \"lends no additional credence to it,\" a former insider's confirmation or denial of the accuracy of such material is \"quite different\" because, having obtained access to this information through prior government service, he would be \"in a position to know of what he spoke .\" Alfred A. Knopf, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir.) , cert. denied,421 U.S. 908 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 F.2d 1362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "37) that unauthor- ized disclosures by former officials and contractors are not in every respect equivalent to an authorized official acknowledgement by a current official. 5 But like the Ninth Circuit's focus on whether Mitchell and Jessen 5 Such disclosures, for example, would not vitiate the govern- ment's ability later to withhold the same information under the Freedom of Information Act's national -security exception. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 are \"agents of the govern ment\" for jurisdictional pur- poses, Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "806 F.3d 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "380, 649 -651. But noth- ing in t hat filing suggest ed that the United States agreed with or would be bound by the ECHR's pur- ported factual findings. The ECHR is a tribunal cre- ated by a treaty to which the United States is not a party , and its judgment binds parties to the treaty only if they were also parties to the particular case.8 Even if a federal court had issued a judgment identical to the ECHR's, no \" 'issue of fact' \" resolved by that judgment would have preclusive effect on a private \"person who was not a party to [the] suit,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the ECHR's factual discussion as authoritative. T he ECHR's judgment was the product of a one -sided factual presen- tation , C.A. E.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "echr.coe.int/ Documents/ Convention_ ENG. pdf; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 political advisor it deemed to be experts, C.A. E.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "The petition accordingly argued that reversal was warranted \"quite aside from the state - secrets privilege,\" Pet. 29, on the \"independent\" ground that granting respondents' discovery request would ex- ceed the permissible scope of Section 1782(a)'s \"discre- tion[ary]\" authority, Pet. 30 -31 (discussing factors in Intel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Section 1782 issue is thus squarely be- fore the Court. See S up.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1782 does not authorize respondents' extraordinary discovery request",
		"context": "60a. Having raised its Section 1782(a) argument at the outset, the govern- ment was entitled to rely on that argument as an alter- native ground for affirmance. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] application . But the district court emphasized that its initial assessment of those factors was preliminary because it would have been \"premature\" to consider the burden on the United States and other privilege- related matters before the government asserted the privilege. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 F.3d 857",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Each pathway refers to a different set of affirmative decisions and choices that the corporation may make. 3 Working backwards, Section 5301(a)(2)(iii) sub- jects a corporation to Pennsylvania's general jurisdic- tion based on the corporation's decision to generally conduct business within the Commonwealth. This Court has described the parameters of this version of general jurisdiction in such cases as Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Daimler 571 U.S. 117, and BNSF Railway 137 S. Ct. 1549. As those cases make clear, general jurisdiction based on a the-ory of \"conducting general business\" is confined to cor- porations who either have incorporated or have their principal place of business in the forum. See Daimler , 471 U.S. at 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Each pathway refers to a different set of affirmative decisions and choices that the corporation may make. 3 Working backwards, Section 5301(a)(2)(iii) sub- jects a corporation to Pennsylvania's general jurisdic- tion based on the corporation's decision to generally conduct business within the Commonwealth. This Court has described the parameters of this version of general jurisdiction in such cases as Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. 915, Daimler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and BNSF Railway 137 S. Ct. 1549. As those cases make clear, general jurisdiction based on a the-ory of \"conducting general business\" is confined to cor- porations who either have incorporated or have their principal place of business in the forum. See Daimler , 471 U.S. at 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Each pathway refers to a different set of affirmative decisions and choices that the corporation may make. 3 Working backwards, Section 5301(a)(2)(iii) sub- jects a corporation to Pennsylvania's general jurisdic- tion based on the corporation's decision to generally conduct business within the Commonwealth. This Court has described the parameters of this version of general jurisdiction in such cases as Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 564 U.S. 915, Daimler 571 U.S. 117, and BNSF Railway [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As those cases make clear, general jurisdiction based on a the-ory of \"conducting general business\" is confined to cor- porations who either have incorporated or have their principal place of business in the forum. See Daimler , 471 U.S. at 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "See \"Consent,\" Merriam-Web- ster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster. 2 Consent may include forum-selection agr eements that bind parties in particular disputes or classes of disputes. Burger King [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 2 Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ consent (last viewed July 6, 2022). 4 Inc., 473 U.S. 614; M/S 407 U.S. 1; Atl. Marine Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 462",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "2 Consent may include forum-selection agr eements that bind parties in particular disputes or classes of disputes. Burger King 471 U.S. 462; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 2 Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ consent (last viewed July 6, 2022). 4 Inc., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; M/S 407 U.S. 1; Atl. Marine Const. 571 U.S. 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "2 Consent may include forum-selection agr eements that bind parties in particular disputes or classes of disputes. Burger King 471 U.S. 462; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 2 Available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ consent (last viewed July 6, 2022). 4 Inc., 473 U.S. 614; M/S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Atl. Marine Const. 571 U.S. 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "4 Inc., 473 U.S. 614; M/S 407 U.S. 1; Atl. Marine Const. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Corporations may also consent to subject themselves to a forum's personal jurisdiction in a par- ticular case based on a variety of affirmative acts. Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 473 n.14; Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Corporations may also consent to subject themselves to a forum's personal jurisdiction in a par- ticular case based on a variety of affirmative acts. Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 473 n.14; Ins. Corp. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 303 U.S. 59; Chicago Life Ins. 244 U.S. 25. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) refers to yet another affirma- tive action that triggers acceptance of Pennsylvania's general jurisdiction: the filing of papers with the Com- monwealth's Department of State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Corporations may also consent to subject themselves to a forum's personal jurisdiction in a par- ticular case based on a variety of affirmative acts. Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 473 n.14; Ins. Corp. of 456 U.S. 694; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Chicago Life Ins. 244 U.S. 25. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) refers to yet another affirma- tive action that triggers acceptance of Pennsylvania's general jurisdiction: the filing of papers with the Com- monwealth's Department of State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "303 U.S. 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "Burger King Corp. , 471 U.S. at 473 n.14; Ins. Corp. of 456 U.S. 694; 303 U.S. 59; Chicago Life Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 5301(a)(2)(i) refers to yet another affirma- tive action that triggers acceptance of Pennsylvania's general jurisdiction: the filing of papers with the Com- monwealth's Department of State. A corporation may file to incorporate as a Pennsylvania corporation un- der 15 Pa.C.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "244 U.S. 25",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "This Court frequently has approved the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on registration or appointme nt of an agent for service under a state statutory sche me. The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Robert Mitchell Furniture 257 U.S. 213106 U.S. 35096 U.S. 36979 U.S. 65; Lafayette Ins. 59 U.S. 404. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "308 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "This Court frequently has approved the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on registration or appointme nt of an agent for service under a state statutory sche me. The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo 308 U.S. 165; Robert Mitchell Furniture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]106 U.S. 35096 U.S. 36979 U.S. 65; Lafayette Ins. 59 U.S. 404. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 U.S. 213",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "This Court frequently has approved the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on registration or appointme nt of an agent for service under a state statutory sche me. The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo 308 U.S. 165; Robert Mitchell Furniture 257 U.S. 213[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]96 U.S. 36979 U.S. 65; Lafayette Ins. 59 U.S. 404. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "This Court frequently has approved the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on registration or appointme nt of an agent for service under a state statutory sche me. The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo 308 U.S. 165; Robert Mitchell Furniture 257 U.S. 213106 U.S. 350[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]79 U.S. 65; Lafayette Ins. 59 U.S. 404. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 U.S. 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "This Court frequently has approved the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on registration or appointme nt of an agent for service under a state statutory sche me. The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo 308 U.S. 165; Robert Mitchell Furniture 257 U.S. 213106 U.S. 35096 U.S. 369[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Lafayette Ins. 59 U.S. 404. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "79 U.S. 65",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. A foreign corporation's choice to submit to the general jurisdiction of Pennsylvania's courts comports with long-standing principles of Due Process",
		"context": "The Court started con- sidering these issues even before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Nierbo 308 U.S. 165; Robert Mitchell Furniture 257 U.S. 213106 U.S. 35096 U.S. 36979 U.S. 65; Lafayette Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has not overruled this important line of cases. To be sure, in Goodyear , Daimler and Tyrrell , this Court addressed general jurisdiction in the con- text of assessing whether a corporation's business op-erations in a forum were so continuous and systematic as to render the corporation at home in that forum—in essence, the landscape of Section 5301(a)(2)(iii).",
		"citation_value_orig": "59 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A range of additional considerations make this case a poor choice for review",
		"context": "A de- cision about how courts should decide whether con- tracts authorize arbitration would be wasted effort if the Court were ultimately to conclude that courts should not decide such issues in the first instance. This case, however, is not the appropriate choice for consideration of that antecedent question because neither the parties nor the courts addressed it below, and this Court does not generally decide issues not raised or decided below. See Bank [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. In the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Varela's argument for affirmance rested in large part on an argument different from the one ultimately decided by the pan-el—namely, that the NLRA renders unenforceable employment agreements that have the effect of ban- ning concerted legal actions by employees, including class actions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A range of additional considerations make this case a poor choice for review",
		"context": "Finally, Lamps Plus's assertion that the issue here is so important that it requires review notwith-standing all the considerations discussed above is untenable. Whether class arbitration is contractually authorized by the terms of a particular arbitration agreement that does not expressly address class pro-ceedings is a question of rapidly diminishing im-portance. In the wake of Concepcion and American Express [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which hold that ex press provisions in ar- bitration agreements banning class actions are en-forceable under the FAA, \"[i]t has become routine … for powerful economic enterprises to write into their form contracts with consumers and employees no-class-action arbitration clauses.\" Imburgia , 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Ginsburg, J., dissen ting). The ubiquity of such provisions renders the question of how to inter-pret agreements that do not include them ever less significant as more time passes and express class ac- tion bans proliferate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Military Chaplaincy Plays a Critical Role in Our National Defense by Fostering Servicemembers' Morale",
		"context": "\"When the Continental Army was formed\" in 1775, the \"chaplains attached to the militia of the 13 colonies be came part of our country's first national army.\" Katcoff , 755 F.2d at 225. The following year , 3 Although the First Amendment applies differently in the military context than in the civilian context, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has emphasized that even \"in the military context\" the First Amendment is not \"entirely nugatory,\" 475 U.S. 503. 4 General George Washington directed the \"Colonels or commanding officers of each [Army] regiment\" to \"procure Chaplains accordingly ,\" noting that \"[t] he blessing and protection of Heaven are at all times necessary but especially so in times of public distress and danger.\" General George Washington, General Orders, 9 July 1776 , National Archives, available at https://bit.ly/3BmJwsr .",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 733",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Military Chaplaincy Plays a Critical Role in Our National Defense by Fostering Servicemembers' Morale",
		"context": "\"When the Continental Army was formed\" in 1775, the \"chaplains attached to the militia of the 13 colonies be came part of our country's first national army.\" Katcoff , 755 F.2d at 225. The following year , 3 Although the First Amendment applies differently in the military context than in the civilian context, see, e.g., 417 U.S. 733, this Court has emphasized that even \"in the military context\" the First Amendment is not \"entirely nugatory,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 General George Washington directed the \"Colonels or commanding officers of each [Army] regiment\" to \"procure Chaplains accordingly ,\" noting that \"[t] he blessing and protection of Heaven are at all times necessary but especially so in times of public distress and danger.\" General George Washington, General Orders, 9 July 1776 , National Archives, available at https://bit.ly/3BmJwsr .",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Military Chaplaincy Plays a Critical Role in Our National Defense by Fostering Servicemembers' Morale",
		"context": "Th at list i ncludes four Army chaplains who, on February 3, 1943, willingly gave their lives to help their fellow servicemembers escape the Dorchester , a U.S. Army transport that had been torpedoed . John Brinsfield, Chaplain Corps History: The Four Chaplains , U.S. A rmy (Jan. 28, 2014), available 4 \"That the First Congress provided for the appointment of chaplains\" soon after \"approving language for the First Amendment \" in 1789 \"demonstrates that the Framers considered\" military chaplains to be \"a benign acknowledgment of religion 's role in society.\" Town of Greece, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also id. at 577 (explaining that the Establishment Clause does not forbid \"a practice that was accepted by the Framers and has withstood the critical scrutiny of time and political change\") . 5 See Press Release, Chaplain Alliance for Religious Liberty (Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Trails Act and the Organic Act Confirm That the Park Service Administers the Trail as an Area of Land",
		"context": "§ 1246(f)(1); and \"the surface estate of any portion of any right-of-way,\" id. § 1248(e)(1). 37 Petitioners err in relying on the statement in § 1246(a)(2) concerning trail rights-of-way that \"run 35 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]353 U.S. 112. 36 Black's Fourth 1489 (\"'Right of way' has a twofold signifi- cance, being sometimes used to mean the mere intangible right to cross . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Trails Act and the Organic Act Confirm That the Park Service Administers the Trail as an Area of Land",
		"context": "§ 1246(f)(1); and \"the surface estate of any portion of any right-of-way,\" id. § 1248(e)(1). 37 Petitioners err in relying on the statement in § 1246(a)(2) concerning trail rights-of-way that \"run 35 See, e.g., 287 U.S. 178[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 36 Black's Fourth 1489 (\"'Right of way' has a twofold signifi- cance, being sometimes used to mean the mere intangible right to cross . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals was incorrect that the October Memorandum had no legal effect.",
		"context": "Because DHS had appealed the district court's judgment, the agency re-tained a n interest in the lawfulness of the June Mem- orandum so long as it embodied and stated the ra- tionale for the agency's latest action with respect to terminating MPP. See Glob al 866 F.3d 397 ; cf. Seila Law [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By rescinding the June Memorandum, the agency has abandoned the action it embodied and the rationale it set forth , electing in- stead to take new action supported by a new explana- tion that \"respond[s] to the [district court's] criti-cisms.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Laws govern an individual's relationship with the government while contracts govern the private in-teractions of individuals with each other. See 1 C ORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2017). Violating a law affects a person's relationship with the government and may 14 See THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 319 F.3d 1126; 504 F. Supp. 2d 1014; 466 S.W.3d 740; 700 N.E.2d 859. 15 Courts have generally held that rental car contracts are adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Phila.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 F. App'x 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Laws govern an individual's relationship with the government while contracts govern the private in-teractions of individuals with each other. See 1 C ORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2017). Violating a law affects a person's relationship with the government and may 14 See THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, 532 F. App'x 813; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 504 F. Supp. 2d 1014; 466 S.W.3d 740; 700 N.E.2d 859. 15 Courts have generally held that rental car contracts are adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Phila.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 F.3d 1126",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Laws govern an individual's relationship with the government while contracts govern the private in-teractions of individuals with each other. See 1 C ORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2017). Violating a law affects a person's relationship with the government and may 14 See THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, 532 F. App'x 813; 319 F.3d 1126; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 466 S.W.3d 740; 700 N.E.2d 859. 15 Courts have generally held that rental car contracts are adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Phila.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 F. Supp. 2d 1014",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Laws govern an individual's relationship with the government while contracts govern the private in-teractions of individuals with each other. See 1 C ORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (2017). Violating a law affects a person's relationship with the government and may 14 See THI of New Mexico at Hobbs Center, 532 F. App'x 813; 319 F.3d 1126; 504 F. Supp. 2d 1014; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 700 N.E.2d 859. 15 Courts have generally held that rental car contracts are adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Phila.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 S.W.3d 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Indem. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 857 N.E.2d 250; Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 727 So.2d 287. Some courts have noted, though, that there may be certain provisions within rental car co ntracts that are not adhesive. See Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 185 F.3d 866.",
		"citation_value_orig": "21 P.3d 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Indem. Ins. 21 P.3d 395; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 727 So.2d 287. Some courts have noted, though, that there may be certain provisions within rental car co ntracts that are not adhesive. See Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 185 F.3d 866.",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 N.E.2d 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Indem. Ins. 21 P.3d 395; 857 N.E.2d 250; Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Some courts have noted, though, that there may be certain provisions within rental car co ntracts that are not adhesive. See Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., 185 F.3d 866.",
		"citation_value_orig": "727 So.2d 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public laws, not private contracts, should control analysis of Fourth Amendment rights",
		"context": "Violating a contract, on the other hand, is rarely a breach of law. The two are analytically distinct, and a breach of con-tract is insufficient on its own to abrogate Fourth Amendment rights. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A breach of contract may sometimes overlap with a breach of law. For example, a renter who never re- turns his rental car is both breaching his contract with the rental company and stealing the car.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 F.3d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court's holding in Shady Grove rests on basic principles of aggregate litigation and the Rules Enabling Act",
		"context": "That is, under China Agritech's view, a plaintiff in an individual action would have a timely claim, but the same plaintiff may 12 not assert the same timely cl aim as part of a class ac- tion. That proposition contrave nes \"the bedrock rule that the sole purpose of cla sswide adjudication is to ag- gregate claims that are individually viable.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A Rule 23 class action is a vehicle that, where the Rule's criteria are satisfied, allows aggregate pursuit of the claims of a class encompassing anyone who could \"bring a freestanding suit asserting his individual claim.\" Shady Grove , 559 U.S. at 408 (plurality).",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 493",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court's holding in Shady Grove rests on basic principles of aggregate litigation and the Rules Enabling Act",
		"context": "They \"neither change plaintiffs' se parate entitlements to re- lief nor abridge defendants' ri ghts; they alter only how the claims are processed.\" Id.5 Thus, a plaintiff's right to recovery cannot depend on whether the plaintiff as- serts it in a class action or an individual action. See Ty- son Foods, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle, recognized by this Court, that the substantive rights of individual plaintiffs are the same whether asserted in a class ac tion or an individual ac- tion flows directly from the Rules Enabling Act's pro-hibition on the promulgation of procedural rules that alter substantive rights. \"In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1036",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court's holding in Shady Grove rests on basic principles of aggregate litigation and the Rules Enabling Act",
		"context": "The principle, recognized by this Court, that the substantive rights of individual plaintiffs are the same whether asserted in a class ac tion or an individual ac- tion flows directly from the Rules Enabling Act's pro-hibition on the promulgation of procedural rules that alter substantive rights. \"In the Rules Enabling Act, Congress authorized this Court to promulgate rules of procedure subject to its review, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), but with the limitation that those rules 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right,' –––––––––––––––––––––––– 5 Although the quoted language above is from the plurality portion of Shady Grove, the point was subsequently endorsed in Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion in Stolt-Nielsen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 § 2072(b).\" Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–07 (plural- ity).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court's holding in Shady Grove rests on basic principles of aggregate litigation and the Rules Enabling Act",
		"context": "Shady Grove, 559 U.S. at 406–07 (plural- ity). As the Court observed in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes , \"the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to 'abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Inclusion in a class action thus neither confers sub- stantive rights on a plaintiff nor takes them away. If a plaintiff could pursue a claim individually but not in a properly certified class, Rule 23 would \" abridge … [a] substantive right\" in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's strike was arguably protected",
		"context": "359 U.S. at 245. To show that conduct is arguably protected, a party need only \"advance an interpretation of the Act that is not plainly contrary to its language and that has not been authoritatively rejected by the courts or the Board,\" and point to \"enough evidence to enable the court to find that the Board reasonably could uphold a claim.\" Int'l Longshoremen's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing 17 legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern .\" Motor Coach 403 U.S. 274.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 380",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's strike was arguably protected",
		"context": "Int'l Longshoremen's 476 U.S. 380. \"It is the conduct being regulated, not the formal description of governing 17 legal standards, that is the proper focus of concern .\" Motor Coach [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The drivers' conduct was arguably protected. First, the General Counsel's issuance of an administrative complaint—representing her office's position that the drivers' conduct was actually protected—dispels any doubt that the conduct was at least arguably protected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Any Judgment\"",
		"context": "7 Fourth , amicus argues (at 25-27) that \"any judg- ment\" must encompass all determinations leading up to the decision whether to gr ant relief. Had Congress wanted to convey amicus's meaning, it could have simp-ly said \"any decision under\" the five provisions, full stop, or barred review of the \"final order of removal\" as it did in subsection 1252(a)(2)(C). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amicus identifies no other statute, much less another provision of the immigration law, that refers to an agency action subsuming all prior or interlocutory actions as a \"judgment.\" To the contrary, amicus relies heavily on a statute that uses the \"final order\" phrasing to describe the ruling that subsumes all underlying issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Any Judgment\"",
		"context": "12, 32, 50, 52 (citing subsection (b)(9)). Moreover, whether the word \"any\" broadens a statute's reach \"necessarily depends on the statutory context.\" National Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the phrase \"any judgment\" is limited by the next five words \"regarding the granting of relief\"—language that narrows the class of covered \"judgments\" to the second-step determina- tions whether to grant relief. See infra pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Any Judgment\"",
		"context": "For example, the transitional rules' bar on ju dicial review would, without the word \"discretionary,\" have reached all \"decision[s] under\" the five forms of relief—a radical expansion of the provision. By contrast, subsection (B)(i) needs no such clarification because the \"judg-ment[s]\" it concerns—second-step decisions \"regarding the grant-ing of relief\"—are themselves discretionary. 9 ed States, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court reversed the court of appeals not because it made a factual error, but because it did not give \"deference to the District Court's reasoned and reasonable decision that the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, on the whole, justified the sentence,\" id. at 59-60; see also id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner's \"functionality\" test is at odds with historical practice",
		"context": "Id. In a similar vein, several early twentieth -century courts upheld the copyright in telegraphy booklets con- taining \"coined words\" with \"no meaning,\" functioning as \"cable code\" \"in accordance with the requirements of the cable companies.\" 276 F. 717; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 60 F.2d 599. Judge Learned Hand recognized the copyright in one such codebook, remarking that, even if the words \"com- municate nothing,\" they \"may have their uses . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 F.2d 998",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "The decision below also unnecessarily creates a conflict betw een the AIA and APA, even though the language of the two statutes is easily reconciled. The 10 APA contains a \"strong presumption\" in favor of pre - enforcement judicial review of agency action. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1986) . The panel applied the AIA beyond its terms and obliterated the strong presumption of pre - enforcement j udicial review. Congress authorized judicial review under the APA, including judicial review of agency rulemaking, except to the extent precluded by statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "Id. The right to seek judicial review of agency action is so fundamental that \"only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence'\" of congressional intent to withhold judicial review should courts restrict access to such review. Abbott [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Some statutes expressly au- thorize judicial review, bu t that does not mean that Congress intended to exclude from review statutes that lack such authorization. Abbott Labs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "The Internal Revenue Code also doe s not expressly preclude j udicial review of tax regula- tions. Indeed, no statute precludes judicial review of agency rulemaking by Treasury or the IRS. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the court below prohibited pre -enforcemen t judicial review based on an erroneous construction of the AIA's text. That undermines Congress's intent to allow judicial review to ensure that agency action is reasoned, not contrary to statute, and not procedurally defective.",
		"citation_value_orig": "650 F.3d 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "See Conn. Light & Power 673 F.2d 525 . \"In enacting the APA, Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed ad- ministrative decisionmaking require that agency deci- sions be made only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To comply with U.S.C. § 553, an agency generally must publish pro- posed rules in the Federal Register to provide affected persons with n otice of proposed rulemaking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "The APA's judicial rev iew provisions in turn ensure agency compliance with these bedrock notice -and-com- ment rulemaking requirements. \"[C]ourts retain a role, and an important one, in ensuring that agencies have engaged in reasoned decisionmaking.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Courts rely on the materials in the rulemaking record, including 13 the agency's statement of basis and purpose, to deter- mine the rea sonableness of agency decisionmaking. See 332 U.S. 194 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "132 S. Ct. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "132 S. Ct. 476 . Courts rely on the materials in the rulemaking record, including 13 the agency's statement of basis and purpose, to deter- mine the rea sonableness of agency decisionmaking. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, the rulemaking requirements \"enhance the quality of judicial review\" by testing agency action through exposure to public comment. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of 407 F.3d 1250 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "See 332 U.S. 194 . Indeed, the rulemaking requirements \"enhance the quality of judicial review\" by testing agency action through exposure to public comment. Int'l Union, United Mine Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Judicial review of rulemaking also ensures that businesses and individuals whose inter ests are affected by agency ac- tion have an opportunity to participate in the rulemak- ing process before the rules are applied in an enforce- ment action. The APA's \"procedural requirements are intended to assist judicial review as well as to provide fair trea tment for persons affected by a rule,\" which requires that there be \" an exchange of views, infor- mation, and criticism between interested persons and the agency. '\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 F.3d 1250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "Judicial review of rulemaking also ensures that businesses and individuals whose inter ests are affected by agency ac- tion have an opportunity to participate in the rulemak- ing process before the rules are applied in an enforce- ment action. The APA's \"procedural requirements are intended to assist judicial review as well as to provide fair trea tment for persons affected by a rule,\" which requires that there be \" an exchange of views, infor- mation, and criticism between interested persons and the agency. '\" Home Box Office , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Without pre -enforcement judicial review under the APA, Treasury and the IRS are insulated from the public accountability Congress intended to govern all agencies. If courts treat Treasury regulations differ- ently than the regulations of every other agency, then Treasury and the IRS will continue to promulgate reg- ulations that are manifestly contrary to statute, arbi- trary and capricious, and procedurally defective.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 F.2d 9",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The View That the APA Does Not Allow Pre-Enforcement Judicial Review of Treasury Regulations Conflicts with the Strong Presumption in Favor of Such Review of Agency Action",
		"context": "And the IRS will continue to force business and individuals to apply those defective rules until, years later, in an enforcement action, a taxpayer challenges the rule at great financial risk to itself. Cf. Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The AIA was not intended to insulate Treas- ury and the IRS from reasonable judicial review or to foster defective rulemaking. Contrary to the opinion below, the AIA does not abrogate the right of taxpayers to challenge such guidance before enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "209 U. S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The States' Consent to Suits Under the War Powers is Further Supported by Strong Historical Evidence that They Consented to Treaty-Based Suits",
		"context": "41 , supra, at 252 (Madison), the Framers created a federal judiciary with the power to hear suits that were essential to preserving the fed- eral government's authority over war, peace, and in- ternational affairs, including suits against the states. When they convened to reform the Articles of Con- federation, the Framers were deeply concerned about noncompliance with international treaties—a persis- tent issue under the Articles. See JPMorgan Chase [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Af- ter the Revolutionary War, American debtors owed al- most $28 million—two years' worth of imports—to British merchants. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinter- pretation , 83 Colum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The States' Consent to Suits Under the War Powers is Further Supported by Strong Historical Evidence that They Consented to Treaty-Based Suits",
		"context": "[was] classed among the just causes of war.\" The Federalist No. 80 , supra, at 476 (Hamilton); see also Lee, supra, at 1089-90 (describing the international law doctrine of \"espousal,\" which \"recognized the right of nations to go to war to vindi- cate just claims\" of individual citizens); New Hamp- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Framers wanted to demonstrate to their sister nations that under the new constitutional order, the federal judicial power was ready and able to compel and punish states that did not uphold their obligations to foreign powers. In other words, the new nation needed to ensure that states could be sued under trea- ties in order to \"show the world that we make the faith of treaties a constitutional part of the character of the United States,\" 2 Elliot's Debates , at 490 (James Wil- son), and preserve the \"security of the public tranquil- ity,\" The Federalist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "108 U.S. 76",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION BELOW DISRUPTS EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES ADOPTED IN REASONABLE RELIANCE ON CASE LAW INTERPRETING OCSLA",
		"context": "Review is warranted to determine wh ether such disruption of employment relationships is consistent with Congress'smandate that drilling platforms should be governedsolely by federal law. This Court has cautioned that \"it is the duty of the federal courts to assure that the importation ofstate law [into federal law] will not frustrate orinterfere with the implementation of national policies.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress adopted OCSLA because it determined that the Outer Continental Shelf should be subject to exclusive federal control and that it should be up to the federalgovernment to determine the extent to which naturalresources under the OCS should be exploited. Thefederal government has authorized the current,moderate level of off-shore development.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 778",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 F.3d 1058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "696 F.3d 997",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................... 4 634 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "................................ ....... 20 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 570 U.S. 99 .......... 6, 8, 9 , 21 530 U.S. 466 ......... 3, 6, 9 , 21 411 U.S. 778 .............................. 3 533 U.S. 289 ................................ ...... 12 II Cases —Continued: Page 529 U.S. 694 ................................................................. 2, 5, 12, 18, 19 526 U.S. 227 ........................ 12 408 U.S. 471 .................. passim 555 U.S. 160 ................................ 4, 9, 21 Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 ...................................................................................... 4 543 U.S. 220 ........... 6, 22, 23 630 F.3d 699 (7th Cir.) , cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 ....................... 7 444 F.3d 1173 ...................................................................... 1 8 Unite d 866 F.3d 8 ...................................................................... 18 481 U.S. 739 .................... 17 485 F.3d 1058 ...................................................................... 19 413 F.3d 824 ........ 18 696 F.3d 997 ........ 18 299 U.S. 123 .......................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (3d Cir. ), cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ................................. 18, 19 Constitution, statutes, guidelines, and rule: U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Yet he identifies no logical distinction between Section 3583(k) and the supervised - release provisions whose constitutionality he recog- nizes. He cannot explain why those parallel provisions of the same statute should be viewed as a constitutional baselin e that Section 3583(k) \"enhance[s], \" Br. 12 ; why any such \"enhancement \" would trigger a jury -trial right in a proceeding that \"arises after the end of the criminal prosecut ion,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] as punishing a new criminal 2 offense, rather than the one for which supervised release was imposed, runs counter to 529 U.S. 694, and relies on the specter of unre- alistically exce ssive reimprisonment terms that the law would not allow. And his insistence that it would make no sense to remedy the asserted violation of his jury - trial right by actually providing him with a jury trial serves only to illustrate that no such violation occurred . The court of appeals' judgment should be reversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Yet he identifies no logical distinction between Section 3583(k) and the supervised - release provisions whose constitutionality he recog- nizes. He cannot explain why those parallel provisions of the same statute should be viewed as a constitutional baselin e that Section 3583(k) \"enhance[s], \" Br. 12 ; why any such \"enhancement \" would trigger a jury -trial right in a proceeding that \"arises after the end of the criminal prosecut ion,\" 408 U.S. 471 as punishing a new criminal 2 offense, rather than the one for which supervised release was imposed, runs counter to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and relies on the specter of unre- alistically exce ssive reimprisonment terms that the law would not allow. And his insistence that it would make no sense to remedy the asserted violation of his jury - trial right by actually providing him with a jury trial serves only to illustrate that no such violation occurred . The court of appeals' judgment should be reversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "16 -17 (emphasis added). And r espondent rec- ognizes (Br. 19) that such revocation and reimprison- ment would not violate the jury -trial right as inter- preted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent's acknowledgment of those points —which are the crux of this case —accords with this Court's longstanding precedent. The Court has repeatedly held that the jury -trial right does not extend to postjudg- ment proceedings —even when they result in new or ad- ditional imprisonment —because such proceedings are \"not part of a criminal prosecution.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Respondent's acknowledgment of those points —which are the crux of this case —accords with this Court's longstanding precedent. The Court has repeatedly held that the jury -trial right does not extend to postjudg- ment proceedings —even when they result in new or ad- ditional imprisonment —because such proceedings are \"not part of a criminal prosecution.\" Morrissey , 408 U.S. at 480; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent may dispute whether the relevant decisions , which addressed p robation and parole, are directly con- trolling in the analogous context of supervised release . But, at bottom, he accepts the basic principle that revo- cation of super vised release and reimprisonment do not generally require a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 778",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "And Article III's jury -trial right, which respondent mentions in passing (Br. 16 n.2), reaches no further than the Sixth Amendment's. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1936 ). The history of the jury -trial right likewise under- mines respondent's position . See Southern Union 567 U.S. 343 (2012 ) (\"[T]he scope of the constitutional jury right must be informed by the historical role of the jury at common law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "See, e.g., 299 U.S. 123 (1936 ). The history of the jury -trial right likewise under- mines respondent's position . See Southern Union [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2012 ) (\"[T]he scope of the constitutional jury right must be informed by the historical role of the jury at common law.\" ) (citation omitted). Respondent identifies no precedent for post - judgment jury trials to determine a defendant's compli- ance with the conditions of a sentence .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "at 480, 484, 489 . This Court has refused to \"cut the [ Apprendi ] rule loose from its moorings\" by extending it to matters that \"ha[ve] not traditionally belonged to the jury. \" Oregon [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It should similar ly re- fuse to do so here. Although respondent observes (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "See 530 U.S. at 476 -478. Under that rule, any fact, other than the fact of a prior conviction, \"that, by law, inc reases the penalty for a crime is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see, e.g. , United States v. Booker , 543 U.S . 220, 231 (2005) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Facts found by a district court in a revocation pro- ceeding do not \"increase the penalty ,\" Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103, to which a defendant is exposed by the jury's verdict. Instead, \"supervised release, and the subse- quent possibility of reimprisonment after a violation of that release, is a part of the original sentence imposed 7 by the sentencing court following a defendant's convic- tion by a jury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir.) (emphasis added), cert. denied,563 U.S. 951 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "630 F.3d 699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "at 700. Respondent would invert the constitutional -avoidance principle by interpreting Section 3583(k) to invite a con- stitutional problem . See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 526 U.S. 227 . Indeed, his express goal is to invalidate most of that provision . Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "at 700. Respondent would invert the constitutional -avoidance principle by interpreting Section 3583(k) to invite a con- stitutional problem . See , e.g., 533 U.S. 289 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, his express goal is to invalidate most of that provision . Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 227",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "But respondent, who received a five -year reim- prisonment term, is not such a defendant. And if Sec- tion 3583(k) is not unconstitutional as applied to him, then it is not fac ially unconstitutional either. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. In any event, e xcessive terms of reimprisonment —such as the specter of life imprisonment that respond- ent frequently invokes (see Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Appellate review provides an additional safeguard against excessive reimprisonment . An offender who ob- jects to the term of reimprisonment or dered by the dis- trict court may appeal, and the court of appeals will re- view it for procedural or substantive unreasonableness. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]634 F.3d 233, cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ; see also 444 F.3d 1173. But courts of appeals can and should vacate inappropriate reim- 19 prisonment terms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 F.3d 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "Appellate review provides an additional safeguard against excessive reimprisonment . An offender who ob- jects to the term of reimprisonment or dered by the dis- trict court may appeal, and the court of appeals will re- view it for procedural or substantive unreasonableness. See, e.g., 413 F.3d 824[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,565 U.S. 863 ; see also 444 F.3d 1173. But courts of appeals can and should vacate inappropriate reim- 19 prisonment terms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "634 F.3d 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. At a minimum, Section 3583(k) can be enforced if a jury finds the relevant facts",
		"context": "But courts of appeals can and should vacate inappropriate reim- 19 prisonment terms. See, e.g., Young , 634 F.3d at 241 (ex- plaining that reimprisonment t erm would be unreason- able if district court \"place[d] undue weight on the s eri- ousness of the violation\"); see also, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That includes unduly harsh terms that appear to sanc- tion a new offense, rather than the breach of trust i n violating supervi sed release o n the original one, and thereby violate th e basic premise of revocation , see Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700. The courts of appeals have apparently not needed to vacate excessive reimprisonment terms of the kind re- spondent posits because the situation has not ar isen.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 F.3d 1058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "c. The government twice inserts \"does not have\" into section 3553(f)(1).",
		"context": "); Palomares , 52 F.4th at 653-54 (Willett, J., dissenting). Congress did not enact the italicized words, and courts cannot \"add\" them to the statute. 62 Cases of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Apart from invoking a \"far-fetched and quixotic em-dash theory,\" 998 F.3d 431—more on that below—the government does not justify its amendment with prin- ciples. It instead cites two examples—an authority- vesting provision, U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "340 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The number of declarations that Google reused does not change the merger analysis",
		"context": "Oracle stresses the enormous effort that Sun put into developing the Java SE libraries. But copyright does not reward effort. Feist , 499 U.S. at 359-360; Meshwerks, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir. 2008 ). It rewards creative expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 F.3d 1258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The number of declarations that Google reused does not change the merger analysis",
		"context": "A ruling by this Court that copyright prohibits that reimplementation would allow the authors of older software to hold th eir users hostage, lest the skills that the users have built up over long periods of time become worthless when they move to a new envi-ronment. Lotus Dev. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because new entrants would have difficulty attracting users, they would be less likely to create innovative applications. That is the opposite of what copyright intends.",
		"citation_value_orig": "49 F.3d 807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "..................................................... 7 CONCLUSION………………………………… ..………. 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "..................................................... 7 CONCLUSION………………………………… ..………. 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bd. of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "..................................................... 7 CONCLUSION………………………………… ..………. 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bd. of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 97",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "..................................................... 7 CONCLUSION………………………………… ..………. 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bd. of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "..................................................... 7 CONCLUSION………………………………… ..………. 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases Bd. of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 503 ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J. 1196 (1982) ................................ ... 4 1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Family Institute advocates for educators, parents, and students in Pennsylvania 's public schools. Amicus writes to give its perspective on the treatment of religious speech and other forms of controversial speech in school.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "of 496 U.S. 226 ................................ ................. 6 370 U.S. 421 ................................ ................. 2 393 U.S. 97 ................................ ................... 2 547 U.S. 410 ................................ ................. 6 869 F.3d 813 ................................ ... 8 991 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2021 ) ................................ . 8 McCreary 545 U.S. 844 ................................ ................. 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ................. 6 Other Authorities The Establishment Clause, Secondary Religious Effects, and Humanistic Education , 91 Y ALE LAW J. 1196 (1982) ................................ ... 4 1 INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE1 Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania Family Institute advocates for educators, parents, and students in Pennsylvania 's public schools. Amicus writes to give its perspective on the treatment of religious speech and other forms of controversial speech in school.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "Conversely, many schools like Bremerton immediately treat a f aculty member 's religious devotion as attributable to the school. As a result, traditional religious beliefs are uniquely targeted for censure, while a host of comparable, religious -like beliefs receive a free pass or even endorsement. Rather than creati ng \"neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion, \"3 a reasonable observer would comprehend that traditional religion alone is being treated as poisonous and inappropriate 2 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 McCreary 545 U.S. 844. 3 in society.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "As a result, traditional religious beliefs are uniquely targeted for censure, while a host of comparable, religious -like beliefs receive a free pass or even endorsement. Rather than creati ng \"neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion, \"3 a reasonable observer would comprehend that traditional religion alone is being treated as poisonous and inappropriate 2 See, e.g., 370 U.S. 421. 3 McCreary [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 in society. The solution to this problem, quite si mply, is to give additional room for individual expression that, like Kennedy 's, is not attributable to a school.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "Amicus is not asking this Court to read new meaning into the Establishment Clause so as to apply its prohibitions to other belief systems (although the comparison here is instructive). Instead, this Court 6 should reiterate a more rational and historic understandi ng of the clause, one that is friendlier to individual liberties as a whole. Indeed, teachers ought not \"shed \" their First Amendment rights \"at the schoolhouse gate, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , because \"a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen, \" 547 U.S. 410 . It is, of course, appropriate for schools to limit coercive speech, such as controversial flags and stickers placed by teacher s in their classroom. Some schools limit such displays in order to foster impartiality and neutrality, not unlike a teacher who puts a cross sticker on the door or a Christian flag on the wall.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "Amicus is not asking this Court to read new meaning into the Establishment Clause so as to apply its prohibitions to other belief systems (although the comparison here is instructive). Instead, this Court 6 should reiterate a more rational and historic understandi ng of the clause, one that is friendlier to individual liberties as a whole. Indeed, teachers ought not \"shed \" their First Amendment rights \"at the schoolhouse gate, \" 393 U.S. 503 , because \"a citizen who works for the government is nonetheless a citizen, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is, of course, appropriate for schools to limit coercive speech, such as controversial flags and stickers placed by teacher s in their classroom. Some schools limit such displays in order to foster impartiality and neutrality, not unlike a teacher who puts a cross sticker on the door or a Christian flag on the wall.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "\"The proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to censor is not complicated. \" Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Nobody could have assumed that the district endorsed Coach Kennedy 's speech after it went to 7 great lengths to distance itself from it. Conversely, when the mere hint of religious practice brings the consequences imposed on Kennedy, it is easy to surmise not only that the school is not neutral, but that it highly disfavors belief systems merely because they are viewed as \"religious. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Government Neutrality Toward Religion Requires More Tolerance for the Religiously Motivated Individual Speech at Issue Here",
		"context": "Nor is this shaming merely implicit. As the Ninth Circuit stated earlier in this case, Kennedy 's duties included \"communicating the District 's perspective on appropriate behavior \" whenever \"in the presence of students and spectators. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Likewise, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that Kennedy was to be a \"role model. \" 991 F.3d 1004 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "869 F.3d 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. The Civil Rights Act of 1866",
		"context": "Critically, the phrase \"by reason of \" does not ap- pear in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. This shows that Congress knew how to use language that connotes but-for causation, but made a deliberate choice to use broader language in defining the rights protected by section 1981. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that the \"usual rule [is] that 'when the legislature uses cer- tain language in one part of the statute and different language in another, the court assumes different meanings were intended' \" (quoting 2A N. Singer, Stat- utes and Statutory Construction § 46:06, p. 194 (6th rev.ed 2000))). 5 5 Comcast argues that the criminal enforcement provision in section 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 sets the limits on the ju- dicially implied cause of action under section 1981 based on the 36 The United States also argues that the Court should find it significant that a prior version of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 used the phrase \"on account of \" to describe the ri ghts provided in the stat- ute. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Arizona law's discarding of out-of-precinct ballots provides an equal opportunity to all voters and protects the precinct system",
		"context": "But, that system, which is well-established: caps the number of voters attempting to vote in the same place on election day; it allows each precinct ballot to list all of the votes a citizen 19 may cast for all pertinent, federal, state, and local elections, referenda, initiatives, and levies; it allows each precinct ballot to list only those votes a citizen may cast, making ballots less confusing; it makes it easier for election officials to monitor votes and prevent election fraud; and generally puts polling places in closer proximity to voter residences. Sandusky Cty. Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Democratic National 329 F. Supp. 3d 824. The precinct system also assists in the allocation of voting machines; already, in some elections where turnout is unexpectedly high, the hours for voting have had to be extended by court order. But that should be the exception, not the rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F. 3d 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "The D.C. Circuit, t he Seventh Circuit, and the Eighth Circuit have all held that the mere storage of consumer information, without dissemination, does not inflict an Article III injury on the consumer under Spokeo , even when that storage is unlawful. In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the D.C. Circuit held that the \"mere existence of inaccurate [safety] information\" about certain truck drivers in a database maintained by the Department of Transportation did not impose an Article III injury under Spokeo , given that the information was not \"disseminat[ed]\" to any \"potential employer.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "at 345. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits reached the same Article III conclusion with respect to personally - identifying consumer information unlawfully held, but not disseminated, by cable companies. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 836 F.3d 925 . Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit have held that FCRA plaintiffs' failure to establish actual harm from an 8 \"informational injury\" defeats Article III standing under Spokeo . The Seventh Circuit reached this holding when considerin g a prospective employer's provision of a disclosure to a job applicant, informing him that it may access his consumer report, which disclosure contained \"extraneous information\" in (technical) violation of the FCRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "at 345. The Seventh and Eighth Circuits reached the same Article III conclusion with respect to personally - identifying consumer information unlawfully held, but not disseminated, by cable companies. 846 F.3d 909 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit have held that FCRA plaintiffs' failure to establish actual harm from an 8 \"informational injury\" defeats Article III standing under Spokeo . The Seventh Circuit reached this holding when considerin g a prospective employer's provision of a disclosure to a job applicant, informing him that it may access his consumer report, which disclosure contained \"extraneous information\" in (technical) violation of the FCRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "836 F.3d 925",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, the Fourth Circuit, and the Sixth Circuit have held that FCRA plaintiffs' failure to establish actual harm from an 8 \"informational injury\" defeats Article III standing under Spokeo . The Seventh Circuit reached this holding when considerin g a prospective employer's provision of a disclosure to a job applicant, informing him that it may access his consumer report, which disclosure contained \"extraneous information\" in (technical) violation of the FCRA. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case where a consumer reporting agency erroneously listed a \"defunct cre dit card company\" as a source of information in a consumer report, rather than \"the name of [that company's] servicer.\" 856 F.3d 337 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "865 F.3d 884",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "865 F.3d 884 . The Fourth Circuit came to the same conclusion in a case where a consumer reporting agency erroneously listed a \"defunct cre dit card company\" as a source of information in a consumer report, rather than \"the name of [that company's] servicer.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the Sixth Circuit reached the same result in a case where a check -verification company sent a consumer his own file, which omitted transactions from accounts linked to him. 923 F.3d 458 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Ninth Circuit's Decision Creates Conflicts With Other Courts Of Appeals",
		"context": "856 F.3d 337 . And the Sixth Circuit reached the same result in a case where a check -verification company sent a consumer his own file, which omitted transactions from accounts linked to him. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . All of these decisions conflict with the Ninth Circuit's holding in the present case. Here, the Ninth Circuit held that the m ere existence of a line of inaccurate information in a credit file imposes an Article III injury and permits participation in an FCRA class, App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court Recognizes A Distinction Between \"Expenses\" And \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "A distinction between expenses and attorneys' fees has lo ng been observed by t he jurisprudence of this Court. In Arlington Central School District Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , this Court declined to award expert -witness fees under a statute that allowed only for \"reasonable attorneys' fees.\" Id. at 298 (noting that the relevant statute \"does not authorize an award of any additional expert fees\" ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This Court Recognizes A Distinction Between \"Expenses\" And \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Id. at 302 ; see also Casey , 499 U.S. at 96–97. Indeed, Congress responded to this Court's refusal to award expenses under the latter statu te by amending the statute to 3 See also Synthon IP, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd, 281 F ed. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 F. Supp. 2d 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Petitioner's Arguments About The FAA's History And Purpose Are Not Accurate",
		"context": "However, Peti- tioner's arguments regarding the FAA's history and purpose are flawed. 2 2 Under normal circumstances, it is challenging to attribute an intent to Congress. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"congressional 6",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Assurances Do Not Save The Statute",
		"context": "at 49. But the reason for invalidating overbroad laws is not to prevent prosecution of those who may later prevail on the merits, but \"out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 405 U.S. 518 (reasoning that the value of protected expression necessitates striking down overbroad statutes because \"persons whose expres sion is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression\" (citations omitted)). Here, the chilling effect of Subsection (iv) will harm immigrants, their families, and their communities. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Assurances Do Not Save The Statute",
		"context": "at 49. But the reason for invalidating overbroad laws is not to prevent prosecution of those who may later prevail on the merits, but \"out of concern that the threat of enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or 'chill' constitutionally protected speech—especially when the overbroad statute imposes criminal sanctions.\" 539 U.S. 113; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (reasoning that the value of protected expression necessitates striking down overbroad statutes because \"persons whose expres sion is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to protected expression\" (citations omitted)). Here, the chilling effect of Subsection (iv) will harm immigrants, their families, and their communities. See id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Assurances Do Not Save The Statute",
		"context": "And in its brief here, the government cites the Third Circuit's construction of Subsection (iv), which requires \"substantial[]\" encouragement or inducement, to argue that \"facilitation and solicitation have traditionally required more than [] abstract or de minimis encouragements\" to violate a criminal statute. Pet'r Br. at 33 (citing and quoting DelRio- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The First Amendment's protections against facially overbroad statutes stymie such arbitrary applications of the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 F.3d 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Developments Since 2010 Confirm That The BPCIA Stands On Its Own, Independent Of The Individual Mandate",
		"context": "That is clear evid ence of the legislature's desire to retain the BPCIA without the mandate. In- deed, the Congress that eliminated the mandate was well-aware of this Court's decision in NFIB v. Sebelius striking down a component of the Medicaid expansion but severing the unlawful portion from the remainder of the Act. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It thus knew that the elimination of a central piece of the ACA would not doom the entire law. 16 The Court should not lightly impute to Congress an intent to void the BPCIA in the event the individual mandate and other insurance reforms are held uncon- stitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Union Favored Majoritarian Interests at Groff's Expense",
		"context": "Title VII is necessary —perhaps especially necessar y—for unionized employees. 6 In at least this sense, G roff's experience bears a strong resemblan ce to Lar ry Hardison 's. In Trans World Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , as here, union -negotiated seniority provisions stood in the way of an accommodation for the employee . Unfor- tunately, this Court concluded : Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy , and seniority provisions are universally included in these contracts. Without a clear and express indication from Congress, we cannot agree with Hardison and the EEOC that an agreed -upon s eniority sys- tem must give way when necessary to accom- modate religious observances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented",
		"context": "The Board next attempts to obscure the division between the panel opinion below and the Federal Circuit's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the conflict is clear. The Hendler court considered two discrete potential takings, both under the \"[t]raditional [p]hysical [o]ccupation [t]heory.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "952 F.2d 1364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented",
		"context": "See App. E -21–22 & n.8 (dissen t from denial of rehearing en banc) . In its attempt to minimize the import of Hendler and the resulting circuit split, the Board cites the Federal Circuit's later decision in Boise Cascade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Boise Cascade involved \"extremely limited and transient\" incursions of spotted owl surveyors, see id. at 1357, precisely the type of \"transient and relatively inconsequential\" invasions the Hendler court qualified as \"temporary\" be cause they amount to \"no more than a common law trespass.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented",
		"context": "A trespass, on the other hand, is not the taking of a property interest. Hendler and Boise Cascade simply fall on opposite sides of the line between an easement and a trespass. See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, the lesson of Hendler is that if incursions rise to the level of an easement, the easement need not permit continuous access to qualify as a per se taking. See 862 F.3d 310, rev'd on other grounds by 139 S. Ct. 2162 (citing Hendler for the proposition that the appropriation of a limited easement constitutes a physical occupation).",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented",
		"context": "See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel 260 U.S. 327. In short, the lesson of Hendler is that if incursions rise to the level of an easement, the easement need not permit continuous access to qualify as a per se taking. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rev'd on other grounds by 139 S. Ct. 2162 (citing Hendler for the proposition that the appropriation of a limited easement constitutes a physical occupation). Boise Cascade invo lved a disparate factual scenario, invasions so limited that they could hardly be characterized as an implied easement. It casts no doubt on the existence of a circuit split between the Ninth and Federal Circuits in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "862 F.3d 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Panel Decision Created a Clear Circuit Split on the Question Presented",
		"context": "See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel 260 U.S. 327. In short, the lesson of Hendler is that if incursions rise to the level of an easement, the easement need not permit continuous access to qualify as a per se taking. See 862 F.3d 310, rev'd on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (citing Hendler for the proposition that the appropriation of a limited easement constitutes a physical occupation). Boise Cascade invo lved a disparate factual scenario, invasions so limited that they could hardly be characterized as an implied easement. It casts no doubt on the existence of a circuit split between the Ninth and Federal Circuits in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Plainly Meant What It Said When It Expressly \"Includ[ed]\" ANCs in ISDEAA's Definition of \"Indian Tribe\"",
		"context": "§1601(b) ; see also Am. Fed'n of Gov't Emps. (AFL [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, the idea that ANCs have not been recognized as eligible for special -federal -Indian programs blinks reality and ignores ANCSA. ANCSA even uses the language of \"eligibility.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 F.Supp.2d 4",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Congress Plainly Meant What It Said When It Expressly \"Includ[ed]\" ANCs in ISDEAA's Definition of \"Indian Tribe\"",
		"context": "See JA.44- 48. It also draws support from principles of statutory construction that warn against combinations of nouns and modifying phra ses that create \"'a contradiction in terms'\" or a \"linguistically impossible\" result. Encino Motorcars, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If the eligibility clause is, in fact, a term -of-art reference to the List -Act process for sovereign recognition, then it creates just such an impossibility. There is n o such thing as an ANC established pursuant to ANCSA, which is also eligible for List -Act recognition as a sovereign.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": ". except such single definite questions as shall actually arise and become the subject of disagreeme nt in the Court below, and be duly certified here for decision.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]376 U.S. 689 38 U.S.C. § 7292. Congress has narrowly circumscribed the scope of the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction and review of decisions of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Clai ms (the \"Veterans Court\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "§ 7292(d)(1)–(2) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit construes these statutes to limit its review of a Veterans Court decision only to questions of law unless the case presents a constitutional issue. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress also has circumscribed the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction to review certain tariff-rel ated findings by the Secretary of Commerce. In that context—and unlike in other contexts specified in t he same statute 3—the Federal Circuit's jurisdiction is limited to reviewing \"questions of law only.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 1369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "See Cal. Med. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 717 F.3d 1007; Fed. Election 616 F.2d 45 42 U.S.C. § 8514.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "See Cal. Med. 453 U.S. 182; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fed. Election 616 F.2d 45 42 U.S.C. § 8514.",
		"citation_value_orig": "717 F.3d 1007",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "Med. 453 U.S. 182; 717 F.3d 1007; Fed. Election [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 42 U.S.C. § 8514. A similar expedited review procedure exists under the Emergency Energy Conservation Act of 1979, which allows states to challenge certain actions ta ken by the President or the Secretary of Energy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.2d 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "There is good r eason to think that Congress originally enacted the prohibition on appellate review of remand orders to relieve this Court's docket 4 following the Reconstruction-era expansion of federal jurisdictio n. See Wasserman, supra , at 100–02 (discussing background to the enactment of the predecessor to § 1447(d)). Nonetheless, the modern understanding i s that Congress enacted the prohibition \"to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.\" Thermtron Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], abrogated in part on other grounds by 517 U.S. 706. Regardless, there is no evidence that Congress enacted § 1447(d ) because it thought remand orders were categorically undeserving of appellate review. Plenary review in cases removed in part under the civil-rights or fed eral- officer removal statutes therefore does not upset Congress's policy in enacting the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "There is good r eason to think that Congress originally enacted the prohibition on appellate review of remand orders to relieve this Court's docket 4 following the Reconstruction-era expansion of federal jurisdictio n. See Wasserman, supra , at 100–02 (discussing background to the enactment of the predecessor to § 1447(d)). Nonetheless, the modern understanding i s that Congress enacted the prohibition \"to prevent delay in the trial of remanded cases by protracted litigation of jurisdictional issues.\" Thermtron Prods., 423 U.S. 336, abrogated in part on other grounds by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless, there is no evidence that Congress enacted § 1447(d ) because it thought remand orders were categorically undeserving of appellate review. Plenary review in cases removed in part under the civil-rights or fed eral- officer removal statutes therefore does not upset Congress's policy in enacting the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "To start, declining to review all grounds for removal would yield few, if any, practical benefits . As courts and commentators recognize, \"[t]he marginal delay from adding an extra issue to a case where th e time for briefing, argument, and decision has alrea dy been accepted is likely to be small.\" Lu [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.11 (2d ed.) (same). One circuit worries that \"adding more complex federal jurisdictional issues to the appellate docket\" may cause delay.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.3d 805",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "Cf. Edwardsville Nat'l Bank & Tr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On the other hand, there is much to be gained by plenary review and the concomitant correction of erroneous jurisdictional rulings. \"[A] federal cour t's 'obligation' to hear and decide a case\" within its jurisdiction \"is 'virtually unflagging.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "808 F.2d 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "And it goes without saying that weighty federal interests undergird federal jurisdiction even outside the civil-rights and federal-officer removal contexts. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]559 U.S. 77. Indeed, plenary review is consistent with Congress's policy in enacting the exceptions for ci vil- rights and federal-officer cases. Congress enacted those provisions to ensure that such cases were not stuck in an inhospitable state forum hostile to fed eral rights and interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "And it goes without saying that weighty federal interests undergird federal jurisdiction even outside the civil-rights and federal-officer removal contexts. See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. 478 U.S. 804[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, plenary review is consistent with Congress's policy in enacting the exceptions for ci vil- rights and federal-officer cases. Congress enacted those provisions to ensure that such cases were not stuck in an inhospitable state forum hostile to fed eral rights and interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "In that period, defendants in the Seventh Circuit have filed zero notices of removal citing the civil-rights removal statute and only six notices of removal citing the federal-officer removal statute.5 Only three of those cases resulted in appeals from remand orders. Notably, all of them addressed only the federal-off icer removal statute and concluded that the defendant validly asserted it . 962 F.3d 937; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 905 F.3d 517. The available sanctions for frivolous assertions of the federal-officer and civil-rights removal statut es suggest that this pattern is likely to continue. Lu Junhong , 792 F.3d at 813.",
		"citation_value_orig": "910 F.3d 1010",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. When Congress intends to limit review to particular questions, it says so explicitly",
		"context": "In that period, defendants in the Seventh Circuit have filed zero notices of removal citing the civil-rights removal statute and only six notices of removal citing the federal-officer removal statute.5 Only three of those cases resulted in appeals from remand orders. Notably, all of them addressed only the federal-off icer removal statute and concluded that the defendant validly asserted it . 962 F.3d 937; 910 F.3d 1010; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The available sanctions for frivolous assertions of the federal-officer and civil-rights removal statut es suggest that this pattern is likely to continue. Lu Junhong , 792 F.3d at 813.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Since Shelby County, Section 2 is the Primary Provision Used to Challenge Election Laws that Have a Discriminatory Result",
		"context": ". The VRA \"had a dramatic effect in increasing the participation of black citizens in the elec toral process, both as voters and elected officials.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Shelby Cty. , 570 U.S. at 547– 48 (showing that Black voter registration in Alabama climbed from 19 percent to 73 percent between 1965 and 2004). Its passage represented a significant, though delayed, step forward in the long - fought and ongoing struggle to achieve racial equality in access to the ballot box and political representation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "432 U.S. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Requirements Imposed on Medically Licensed Centers Fail Strict Scrutiny",
		"context": "Turner , 512 U.S. at 664. Second, the requirements applicable to medically licensed centers are woefully under- inclusive for addressing the purported problem the State identifies —which \"raise[s] doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or viewpoint.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For one thing, the Act 's requirements do not apply to a wide variety of facilities where women go for pregnancy testing and pregnancy-related information, such as the offices of primary care physicians or obstetrician-gynecologists in private practice, student health centers, or clinics run by employers or operating as outpatient divisions of hospitals. ( See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The district court erred by employing a race-based benchmark and disregarding the State's legitimate, race-neutral interests",
		"context": "What's more, the district court deliberately over- rode the State's interest in retaining the cores of ex- isting districts. See, e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that this \"common practice … honors settled expectations and … minimizes the risk that the new plan will be overturned\"). The district court first declared that \"[t]he Legislature's redistricting guidelines do not es- tablish that core retention must be the (or even a) pri- ority.\" MSA182.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The district court erred by employing a race-based benchmark and disregarding the State's legitimate, race-neutral interests",
		"context": "But, of course, the Legislature's plan indisputably made core retention a priority. The en- acted plan was the best evidence of \"the policies and preferences of the State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court then held that core retention is a dispen- sable principle because \"a significant level of core dis- ruption … is to be expected when the entire reason for the remedial map is to draw a second majority-minor- ity district that was not there before.\" MSA182.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Michigan Supreme Court decision was contrary to Deck and Chapman",
		"context": "Moreover, if this Court were to hold that a separate, formal application of AEDPA is required, a remand to the lower court may be warranted. Formal application of AEDPA/ Chapman raises a number of legal issues not previously considered or resolved by the courts below, including whether the Michigan Supreme Court's or- der denying review constitutes an adjudication on the merits for purposes of Section 2254(d)(1) and, if not, whether a federal habeas court owes deference to an intermediate state-court decision when that court's rationale was explicitly rejected by the state supreme court in a discretionary denial of review. 38 States Supreme Court decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the error was harmless under the facts of this case. Given the substantial evidence of guilt pre- sented at trial, we cannot conclude that there was an acceptable risk of impermissible factors coming into play. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 US 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Home's Unique Sanctity in the Eyes of the Framers",
		"context": ". As described above, the Fourth Amendment incor- porated and extended the common law's special solici- tude for personal privacy and security within the home. Guarding against the sort of unbridled discre- tion exercised by British officers under the writs-of-as- sistance regime, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fourth Amendment requires a particularized warrant to search a person's home absent exigent circumstances, see, e.g., Payton, 445 U.S. at 586; Carloss , 818 F.3d at 1004-05 (Gor- such, J., dissenting) (\"The founders understood, too, that a 'search' of a constitutionally protected space generally qualifies as 'unreasonable' when undertaken without a warrant, consent, or an emergency.\"). Con- sistent with this history, this Court has repeatedly rec- ognized that \"the Fourth Amendment protects the in- dividual's privacy in a variety of settings[,] [but] [i]n none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimen- sions of an individual's home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms.\" Pay- ton, 445 U.S. at 589.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Home's Unique Sanctity in the Eyes of the Framers",
		"context": "These distinctions matter. The repeated invoca- tion in Founding-era debates of the analogy of the home as a castle—a sturdy and guarded refuge where any person may retreat from government abuse—does not readily transfer to the motor vehicle context, at least in most cases. Moreover, the historical sanctity of the home embodied in the Fourth Amendment is 18 premised largely on the idea that security and privacy interests are \"most heightened\" there, Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213, a principle \"with roots deep in the common law,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Michael, supra, at 908-09 (describing the \"overarching theme[] that would become the bedrock of the move- ment against excessive search and seizure power: . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Home's Unique Sanctity in the Eyes of the Framers",
		"context": ". Privilege of House'—the principle that a person's home is especially private\" (footnote omitted)). The same might not be said of motor vehicles, which, \"unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in- cluding periodic inspection and licensing require- ments,\" Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (quoting South Da- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and where many items may be visible to any passerby, see 417 U.S. 583. Thus, as this Court has explained, to allow a police officer \"to rely on the automobile exception to gain entry into a house\" would \"unmoor the exception from its justifica- tions, render hollow the core Fourth Amendment pro- tection the Constitution extends to the house,\" and \"transform what was meant to be an exception into a tool with far broader application.\" Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1672-73.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Decision Below Ignores the Home's Unique Sanctity in the Eyes of the Framers",
		"context": ". Privilege of House'—the principle that a person's home is especially private\" (footnote omitted)). The same might not be said of motor vehicles, which, \"unlike homes, are subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation and controls, in- cluding periodic inspection and licensing require- ments,\" Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1670 (quoting South Da- 428 U.S. 364), and where many items may be visible to any passerby, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, as this Court has explained, to allow a police officer \"to rely on the automobile exception to gain entry into a house\" would \"unmoor the exception from its justifica- tions, render hollow the core Fourth Amendment pro- tection the Constitution extends to the house,\" and \"transform what was meant to be an exception into a tool with far broader application.\" Collins, 138 S. Ct. at 1672-73.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Legislative History Demonstrates the Service Exceeded Its Authority When It Designated Unit 1 as Critical Habitat",
		"context": "If there is any question about what qualifies as unoccupied critical habitat under the ESA, ostensibly requiring a resort to Chevron step 2, legislative history makes clear that Congress intended it to be more limited than proposed by the Service here. See Tennessee Valley [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ESA initially did not define \"critical habitat.\" See generally Endangered Species Act of 1973 , Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Legislative History Demonstrates the Service Exceeded Its Authority When It Designated Unit 1 as Critical Habitat",
		"context": "The interpretative regulations at th at time provided that 7 To be sure, if the Government believes Unit 1 important enough to sustain the frog despite the fact that conditions do not allow its survival without substantial changes, the Government has a different option provided for by the ESA: it can buy it. 16 U.S .C. § 1534(a)(2) (authorizing the Secretary \"to acquire by purchase, donation, or otherwise, lands, waters, or interest therein\" to conserve fish, wildlife, and plants); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 the Service list crit ical habitat \"solely on the basis of biological factors.\" H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 687",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Legislative History Demonstrates the Service Exceeded Its Authority When It Designated Unit 1 as Critical Habitat",
		"context": "Id. at 731 -32 (emphasis added). After Tennessee Valley Authority , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], interpreted the ESA as broadly prioritizing the conservation of species above human interests, no matter the cost, Congress responded by amending the ESA to better protect human interests. See H.R. Rep. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Copyright",
		"context": "It has been a very long time since copyright law was used to police morality. By the 1970s, such deci- sions had long been deemed \"vestiges of a bygo ne era.\" Mitchell Bros. Film [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \" [I]t is inap- propriate for a court,\" the Fifth Circuit concluded, to use copyright law \"to interpose its moral v iews be- tween an author and his willing audience.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "604 F.2d 852",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Copyright",
		"context": "Id. In stark contrast to the prim censoriousness of the Vic- 6 torians, we have come to recognize the wisdom of Justice Holmes's remark that it is \" a dangerous un- dertaking for persons trained only to the law to con- stitute themselves final judges of the worth of picto- rial illustrations \" or indeed any other form of expres- sion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "188 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. THE ORDER ONLY REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO MODIFY THE ENACTED MAP TO CONFORM WITH TRADITIONAL CRITERIA, NOT TO MAKE GREATER CHANGES TO ACHIEVE PARTISAN PARITY",
		"context": "Thus even under that reading, the order clearly imposes no du ty on the legislature or on a trial court to depart from those criteria, such as by splitting a city to spread out its Democratic voters, regardless of the partisan score.3 If a trial court finds that an enacted map meets neither the traditional criteria nor metrics showing no vote dilution, then the proper remedy is to make the minimal changes needed to make the map fully compliant with the traditional criteria, but no changes to explicitly impr ove its partisan score. See N.C. Gen Stat. § 120-2.4(a1); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3 Splitting a city can invidiously dilute its influence rather than extend it. The structure of North Carolina's many counties with highly Democratic (and often highly minority) centers makes the state vulnerable to vote dilution within seemingly compact districts when such towns and counties are unduly split.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 388",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated — and No More",
		"context": "Such an appropriation is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner's property interests. To borrow a metaphor, cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the government does not simply take a single 'strand' from the 'bundle' of property rights: it chops through the bundle, taking a 9 has been sliced, then there has been no permanent physical invasion.7 That backwards proposition does not apply where, for example, a right-of-way8 does not preclude the landowner from traversing the same land but still works a physical invasion as recognized in the myriad of cases that support the proposition that \"even if the Government physically invades only an easement in property, it must nonetheless pay compensation,\" id. at 433 (collecting cases). The Ninth Circuit's logical fallacy does not apply here either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated — and No More",
		"context": "147 Fed.Cl. 505. The right-of-way was established in 1857 through condemnation slice of every strand.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 At its most basic level, a physical invasion is concrete action that takes place in the material world—which is not dependent on whether a legal doctrine applies to it. It would make no sense, for example, to claim that the person reading this brief does not exist because there is no legal doctrine that explains the reader's existence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated — and No More",
		"context": "In addition to usage restrictions, a taking may be limited to only certain rights relative to real property, including intangible rights. For example, in Hodel v. Irving, the right to pass property to one's heirs was recognized as a constitutionally protected property right. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Manhattan Cmty. Access 139 S. Ct. 1921166 U.S. 185 (treating \"privileges, 9 The process of \"railbanking\" would provide a mechanism for staying abandonment of the railway easement, thus extending the temporal limits on the easement and essentially making the limited easement permanent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated — and No More",
		"context": "481 U.S. 704. See also Manhattan Cmty. Access [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]166 U.S. 185 (treating \"privileges, 9 The process of \"railbanking\" would provide a mechanism for staying abandonment of the railway easement, thus extending the temporal limits on the easement and essentially making the limited easement permanent. Id. at 510 (\"When the trail agreement is reached, the Fifth Amendment taking becomes permanent since the abandonment procedures are effectively blocked.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Taking is Limited to the Property Right Compensated — and No More",
		"context": "481 U.S. 704. See also Manhattan Cmty. Access 139 S. Ct. 1921[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (treating \"privileges, 9 The process of \"railbanking\" would provide a mechanism for staying abandonment of the railway easement, thus extending the temporal limits on the easement and essentially making the limited easement permanent. Id. at 510 (\"When the trail agreement is reached, the Fifth Amendment taking becomes permanent since the abandonment procedures are effectively blocked.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. For Decades, Gerrymandering by Both Democrats and Republicans Diluted Floridians' Votes.",
		"context": "5 Id. 6 Id. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 8 Devon Ombres, The Recent History of Gerrymandering in Florida: Revitalizing Davis v. Bandemer and Florida's Constitu- tional Requirements on Redistricting , 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS.",
		"citation_value_orig": "794 F. Supp. 1076",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. For Decades, Gerrymandering by Both Democrats and Republicans Diluted Floridians' Votes.",
		"context": "JUST. 297, 31 6-17 (2014). 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 To gain a majority in the c ongressional delegation , Democrats would have had to win all \"their\" districts, the only swing district, two Republican- leaning dis- tricts, and a safe Republican district—an all -but-im- possible task in a closely divided state.10 In federal litigation challenging the 2002 congres- sional map, a three -judge panel determined that the Florida Legislature's \"overriding g oal with respect to congressional reapportionment was to … maximize the number of districts likely to perform for Republi- cans.\" 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 F. Supp. 2d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. For Decades, Gerrymandering by Both Democrats and Republicans Diluted Floridians' Votes.",
		"context": "9 234 F. Supp. 2d 1275. 6 To gain a majority in the c ongressional delegation , Democrats would have had to win all \"their\" districts, the only swing district, two Republican- leaning dis- tricts, and a safe Republican district—an all -but-im- possible task in a closely divided state.10 In federal litigation challenging the 2002 congres- sional map, a three -judge panel determined that the Florida Legislature's \"overriding g oal with respect to congressional reapportionment was to … maximize the number of districts likely to perform for Republi- cans.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the court reluctantly up- held the congressional map, it lamented that \" [t]his raw exercise of majority legislative power does not seem to be the best way of conducting a critical task like redistricting.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 F. Supp. 2d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme",
		"context": "Axon's beef is not that it must pay an invalid fine or should not lose a job on an unconstitutional basis. Cf. Thunder Basin, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Elgin , 567 U.S. 1 . In cases like that, there is no harm if the agency proceedings vindicate the challenger's arguments , and vacatur of a fine or reversal of a discharge on appeal can provide meaningful relief. Axon's beef is being subjected to unaccountable office rs and an unconstitutional process .",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Axon's Constitutional Claims Are a Misfit for the FTC Act's Administrative Review Scheme",
		"context": "Axon's beef is not that it must pay an invalid fine or should not lose a job on an unconstitutional basis. Cf. Thunder Basin, 510 U.S. 200; Elgin , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In cases like that, there is no harm if the agency proceedings vindicate the challenger's arguments , and vacatur of a fine or reversal of a discharge on appeal can provide meaningful relief. Axon's beef is being subjected to unaccountable office rs and an unconstitutional process .",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because religious bodies must control religious functions, the ministerial exception prohibits government interference where a plaintiff performs important religious functions",
		"context": "\"). The Ninth Circuit's approach would thus \"threaten to embroil the government in line -drawing and second - guessing regarding matters about which it has neither competence nor legitimacy.\" Colorado Christian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and state supreme courts continued to follow the functional approach. For instance, i n Cannata v. Catholic Diocese of Austin , the Fifth Circuit held it was \"enough\" to conclude that an employee \"played an integral role\" in worship services and thereby \"furthered the mission of the church and helped convey its message.\" 700 F.3d 169 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 F.3d 1245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because religious bodies must control religious functions, the ministerial exception prohibits government interference where a plaintiff performs important religious functions",
		"context": "StJ.App. 67a (emphasis in original). 9 See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 777 F.3d 829426 S.W.3d 597. 41 Similarly, t he Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's function -plus-more standard in favor of focusing on religious functions. See 934 F.3d 568 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because religious bodies must control religious functions, the ministerial exception prohibits government interference where a plaintiff performs important religious functions",
		"context": "StJ.App. 67a (emphasis in original). 9 See also 903 F.3d 113; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]426 S.W.3d 597. 41 Similarly, t he Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's function -plus-more standard in favor of focusing on religious functions. See 934 F.3d 568 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 829",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Because religious bodies must control religious functions, the ministerial exception prohibits government interference where a plaintiff performs important religious functions",
		"context": "9 See also 903 F.3d 113; 777 F.3d 829426 S.W.3d 597. 41 Similarly, t he Seventh Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's function -plus-more standard in favor of focusing on religious functions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Seventh Circuit rested its holding on function alone. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "934 F.3d 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The court of appeals wrongly construed the statute to prohibit abstract advocacy",
		"context": "Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), like other solicitation and comp licity laws, does not criminalize abstract advocacy . Solicitation and complicity laws are ordinarily under- stood not to prohibit abstract or generalized advocacy of illegality, even when the literal language of those pro- hibitions might in other contexts enc ompass such advo- cacy. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]553 U.S. 298 contains no indication that Congress intended to break from that mold and prohibit mere advocacy, notwithstanding the constitutional questions that doing so would invite. To the contrary, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) uses the same operative language —\"encourage\" or \"induce\" — that this Court itself used in Williams and other deci- sions to describe prohibitions that are constitutional. See 553 U.S. at 298 (describing restriction on speech \"intended to induce or commence illegal activities\" as 33 constitutional) (emphasis added); 379 U.S. 559.",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 P.3d 1123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The court of appeals wrongly construed the statute to prohibit abstract advocacy",
		"context": "See, e.g., 262 P.3d 1123553 U.S. 298 contains no indication that Congress intended to break from that mold and prohibit mere advocacy, notwithstanding the constitutional questions that doing so would invite. To the contrary, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) uses the same operative language —\"encourage\" or \"induce\" — that this Court itself used in Williams and other deci- sions to describe prohibitions that are constitutional. See 553 U.S. at 298 (describing restriction on speech \"intended to induce or commence illegal activities\" as 33 constitutional) (emphasis added); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the statutory r e- quirement that any inducement or encouragement be directed to a particular identifiable noncitizen or noncit- izens , see p p. 26-27, supra , reinforces that the statute cannot sensibly be read to reach general advocacy in the public sphere about immigration law . Just as a teenager does not aid, abet, or solicit mari- juana possession merely by saying to a friend, \"I en- courage you to try smoking pot,\" a person does not vio- late Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) mere ly by saying to a noncitizen , \"I encourage you to reside in the United States .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The court of appeals wrongly construed the statute to prohibit abstract advocacy",
		"context": "See, e.g., 2 LaFave § 11.1(c), at 275 (\"[T]he crime of solicitation should not be extended to persons who merely express general approval of criminal acts[. ]\"); id. § 13.2(a), at 464 n.55 (noting additional safe- guards imposed by courts in accomplice -liability \"cases involving, at best, encouragement of the crime\"); c f. DelRio [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (3d Cir.) (construing Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) to pro- hibit \"an affirmative act that substantially encourages or induces an alien lacking lawful imm igration status to come to, enter, or reside in the United States where the undocumented person otherwise might not have done so\"), cert. denied,568 U.S. 821.",
		"citation_value_orig": "672 F.3d 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "b. The court of appeals wrongly construed the statute to prohibit abstract advocacy",
		"context": "That in- terim presence , countenanced by the government , is not fairly understood to be residence \"in violation of law\" within the meaning of Section 1324(a) (1)(A)(iv) . Cf. Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (adopting a narrow reading of bankruptcy provision requiring lawyers and other pro- fessi onals \"to avoid instructing or encouraging assisted persons to take on more debt,\" where a broader reading inhibiting \"frank discussion serves no conceivable pur- pose within the statutory scheme\" and \"would seriously undermine the attorney -client relationsh ip\"). 35",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner misconstrues the EEOC's regulations and adjudications, which are not in any event entitled to deference",
		"context": "41 (emphasis added). And even though pe- titioner does not ask this Court to impose the regula- tions' remedial limitations or burden -shifting scheme, she contends (Br. 40) that if this Court concludes that the statutory language is ambiguous, it should defer to the agency's interpretation in the regulations and in ad- judications under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Re-[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is incorrect. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner misconstrues the EEOC's regulations and adjudications, which are not in any event entitled to deference",
		"context": "45 -47, infra —the Court would have no reason to consult them or to determine the level of deference, if any, that ap- plies. Instead, the Court should resolve this case in the government's favor at Chevron 's first step. See General Dynamics Land Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , because \"regular interpretive method le[ft] no serious question\" that the EEOC's in- terpretation was incorrect). b. Second, even if Section 633a(a) were ambiguous as to the causation standard for liability, the EEOC reg- ulations on which petitioner relies do not address that issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Consideration Of Race As One Of Many Factors Is Necessary To Evaluate Candidates As Individuals",
		"context": "As this Court has observed, race \"still matters.\" Grutter , 539 U.S. at 333; accord Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It makes lit- tle sense to hold that admissions officers categorically cannot consider race, alone among al l factors that might shed light on a n individual candidate's upbringing, expe- rience, accomplishments, and prospects. Fostering the promise of individualism in admissions sometimes requires, rather than forbids, thoughtful at- tention to facts about race.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Why Overbroad Claims Are Especially Problematic in the \"Unpredictable Arts\"",
		"context": "And are we pre-pared to say that molecules are molecules when our 65 Id. (citation omitted). 66 See Spectra-Physics, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 67 See id. 25 knowledge of why and how particular molecules fit into the body's processes is limited?",
		"citation_value_orig": "827 F.2d 1524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A.M.T. WAS NOT HABITUALLY RESIDENT IN ITALY UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW OR HABITUAL-RESIDENCE TEST",
		"context": "The Court should reverse the district court's judgment and direct the entry of a re-return order. 7 7 At a minimum, the court of appeals' decision must be vacated because it failed to recognize that the \"district court's finding rest[ed] on an erroneous view of the law,\" which is a sufficient \"basis\" for \"set[ting] aside\" that finding. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court imposed— and the Sixth Circuit condoned as \"the correct legal standard,\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A.M.T. WAS NOT HABITUALLY RESIDENT IN ITALY UNDER ANY STANDARD OF REVIEW OR HABITUAL-RESIDENCE TEST",
		"context": "It should also order that \"the District Court undo what it has done\" by ordering A.M.T. 's immediate return to the United States. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a \"'re-return'\" order is the \"typical appellate relief\" where a Hague Convention petition has been errone-ously granted. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Formulaic Approach Disfavors Religious Groups Whose Organization And Practices Differ From The Evangelical Lutheran Tradition",
		"context": "3). Jewish religious schools, similarly, do not rely on teachers who are ordained or commissioned like the one in Hosanna-Tabor . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (7th Cir. ), cert. denied,139 S. Ct. 456 (concluding that an elementary school teacher at a Jewish Day School qualified under the ministerial exception due to the importance of her role as a \"teacher of the faith,\" not- withstanding her \"lay title\" and absence of university- level formal training).",
		"citation_value_orig": "882 F.3d 655",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Formulaic Approach Disfavors Religious Groups Whose Organization And Practices Differ From The Evangelical Lutheran Tradition",
		"context": "The formulaic approach impermissibly favors religions that have a formal ordination process and ministerial structure over those that do not. That re- sult violates \"[t]he clearest command of the Establish- ment Clause\": \"that one religious denomination can- not be officially preferred over another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Administrative Procedure Act Itself Does Not Answer the Question Presented; the Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Both Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Adjudications",
		"context": "How- ever, Petitioners and Respondent incorrectly assume or imply that any ALJ who conducts a hearing pursuant to or consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act conducts an adversarial hearing. The Administrative Procedure Act does not require an adversarial hearing. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. An ALJ hearing under 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) to determine whether an individual is entitled to Social Security benefits is non-adversarial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Administrative Procedure Act Itself Does Not Answer the Question Presented; the Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Both Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Adjudications",
		"context": "See 20 C.F.R. § 404.900(b) (\"we conduct th e administrative review process in an informal, non-adversarial manner\"). In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court recognized that proceedings before an SSA ALJ are \"inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ's duty to investigate the facts and develop the argu- ments both for and against granting benefits.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Administrative Procedure Act Itself Does Not Answer the Question Presented; the Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Both Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Adjudications",
		"context": "See 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b). 11 554 of this title in which the position of the United States is represented by counsel or otherwise\"); Sulli- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The SEC ALJ who sanctioned Petitioners presided over an \"adversary adjudication\" for the purpose of 5 U.S.C. § 504.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Administrative Procedure Act Itself Does Not Answer the Question Presented; the Administrative Procedure Act Applies to Both Adversarial and Non-Adversarial Adjudications",
		"context": ". important functions\" for the purpose of Freytag should depend in part on 15 Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 whether the ALJ carries out those functions as part of an adversarial or a non-adversarial adjudication. Even if an SEC ALJ is an inferior Officer, an SSA ALJ who presides over a non-adversarial hearing concerning an individual's claim for Social Security benefits is not an inferior Officer but merely an agent of a principal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 F.2d 535",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "But that argument has been rejected by the Court both before and after Apodaca. 9 Nearly 90 years ago, the Court stated it was \"not open to question\" that the Sixth Amendment mandates unanimous criminal jury verdicts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Patton traced this Court's jurisprudence to 1897 to confirm that jury una- nimity is \"embedded\" in the Sixth Amendment, \"be-yond the authority of the legislative department to de-stroy or abridge.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "Patton traced this Court's jurisprudence to 1897 to confirm that jury una- nimity is \"embedded\" in the Sixth Amendment, \"be-yond the authority of the legislative department to de-stroy or abridge.\" Id. at 289-290 (citing American Publ'g [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 166 U.S. 707; 176 U.S. 581); see also 170 U.S. 343 And the requirement of unanimity dates to long before the nation's founding. See Johnson , 406 U.S. at 382 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing requirement of unanimity to 1367). The Court has reaffirmed the requirement of una- nimity several times.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "Patton traced this Court's jurisprudence to 1897 to confirm that jury una- nimity is \"embedded\" in the Sixth Amendment, \"be-yond the authority of the legislative department to de-stroy or abridge.\" Id. at 289-290 (citing American Publ'g 166 U.S. 464; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 176 U.S. 581); see also 170 U.S. 343 And the requirement of unanimity dates to long before the nation's founding. See Johnson , 406 U.S. at 382 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing requirement of unanimity to 1367). The Court has reaffirmed the requirement of una- nimity several times.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 707",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "Patton traced this Court's jurisprudence to 1897 to confirm that jury una- nimity is \"embedded\" in the Sixth Amendment, \"be-yond the authority of the legislative department to de-stroy or abridge.\" Id. at 289-290 (citing American Publ'g 166 U.S. 464; 166 U.S. 707; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 170 U.S. 343 And the requirement of unanimity dates to long before the nation's founding. See Johnson , 406 U.S. at 382 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing requirement of unanimity to 1367). The Court has reaffirmed the requirement of una- nimity several times.",
		"citation_value_orig": "176 U.S. 581",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "Patton traced this Court's jurisprudence to 1897 to confirm that jury una- nimity is \"embedded\" in the Sixth Amendment, \"be-yond the authority of the legislative department to de-stroy or abridge.\" Id. at 289-290 (citing American Publ'g 166 U.S. 464; 166 U.S. 707; 176 U.S. 581); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] And the requirement of unanimity dates to long before the nation's founding. See Johnson , 406 U.S. at 382 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing requirement of unanimity to 1367). The Court has reaffirmed the requirement of una- nimity several times.",
		"citation_value_orig": "170 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "See Johnson , 406 U.S. at 382 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (tracing requirement of unanimity to 1367). The Court has reaffirmed the requirement of una- nimity several times. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court stated without qualification: \"Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.\" And the Court cited with approval Justice Powell's Apodaca /Johnson concurrence in Richardson , 526 U.S. at 817, where it stated: \"[A] jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds the Government has proved each element.\" See also 530 U.S. 466.",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "In 333 U.S. 740, for example, the Court stated without qualification: \"Unanimity in jury verdicts is required where the Sixth and Seventh Amendments apply.\" And the Court cited with approval Justice Powell's Apodaca /Johnson concurrence in Richardson , 526 U.S. at 817, where it stated: \"[A] jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds the Government has proved each element.\" See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Given this unbroken case law, it must be regarded as settled that the Sixth Amendment requires unani- mous jury verdicts. Although the Apodaca plurality suggested otherwise, that position has never com-manded a majority of the Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 466",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Sixth Amendment Guarantees Jury Unanimity",
		"context": "Although the Apodaca plurality suggested otherwise, that position has never com-manded a majority of the Court. Respondent seeks to draw an analogy (Opp. 7-8, 11-12) to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but Williams does not permit split criminal verdicts. Rather, at issue in Williams was the constitutional propriety of a six-person jury in a non-capital criminal case. This Court determined that Florida's six-person jury did not offend the Sixth Amendment, reasoning that \"the fact that the jury at common law was composed of precisely 12 is a histori-cal accident, unnecessary to effect the purposes of the jury system.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Nguyen , 539 U.S. at 77. But this ancient doctrine was never meant to excuse structural constitutional wrongs. Because the Framers had a \"less frivolous purpose in mind\" than \"etiquette or protocol\" in how the Appointment s Clause treats \" Officers of the United States,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the de facto officer doctrine cannot be used to deny relief here. The de facto officer doctrine has feudal roots dating to fourteenth -century England . See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Hobbesian Constitution , 95 Nw.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Albert Constantineau, Treatise on the De Facto Doctrine 9-10 (1910) (noting doctrine's origin in challenge to validity of abbey's bond issued by abbot who unlawfully occupied his office). Because \"public offices were similar to a form of property right\" in feudal times, \"a quo warranto action was like an action [for] ejectment\" brought by another party with a competing claim to the office . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court first applied the doctrine as a limitation on collateral challenges to the validity of acts by federal officers in the late 19th century . In a trio of cases, the Court held that the doctrine barred a collat eral challenge by a criminal defendant to a conviction where the basis for the challenge was an alleged legal defect in the assignment or appointment of the judge who presided over the conviction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "729 F.2d 1475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "This Court first applied the doctrine as a limitation on collateral challenges to the validity of acts by federal officers in the late 19th century . In a trio of cases, the Court held that the doctrine barred a collat eral challenge by a criminal defendant to a conviction where the basis for the challenge was an alleged legal defect in the assignment or appointment of the judge who presided over the conviction . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 159 U.S. 596; Ex parte173 U.S. 452 with a district judge from the Western District of Louisiana , who presided over the conviction and sentence. Id. at 119- 120.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "This Court first applied the doctrine as a limitation on collateral challenges to the validity of acts by federal officers in the late 19th century . In a trio of cases, the Court held that the doctrine barred a collat eral challenge by a criminal defendant to a conviction where the basis for the challenge was an alleged legal defect in the assignment or appointment of the judge who presided over the conviction . See 140 U.S. 118; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ex parte173 U.S. 452 with a district judge from the Western District of Louisiana , who presided over the conviction and sentence. Id. at 119- 120.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "This Court first applied the doctrine as a limitation on collateral challenges to the validity of acts by federal officers in the late 19th century . In a trio of cases, the Court held that the doctrine barred a collat eral challenge by a criminal defendant to a conviction where the basis for the challenge was an alleged legal defect in the assignment or appointment of the judge who presided over the conviction . See 140 U.S. 118; 159 U.S. 596; Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with a district judge from the Western District of Louisiana , who presided over the conviction and sentence. Id. at 119- 120.",
		"citation_value_orig": "173 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "McDowell , 159 U.S. at 598. Collateral attacks on the actions of a de facto officer who is \"in unobstructed possession of an office\" and discharges duties in public without \"present[ing] the appearance of being an intruder or usurper,\" are not allowed. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . So \"third person s . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "184 U.S. 302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Even w here disruption concerns have caused the Court to carefully shape the remedy for separation -of- powers violations, it has still granted relief to the prevailing party . In Buckley , 424 U.S. at 117, the Court's ruling provided prevailing parties everything that they requested , because \"appellants' claim [was] of impending future rulings and determinations by the Commission.\" And in Northern Pipeline Construction [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court affirmed the district court judgmen t dismissing the common law claims made in bankruptcy court before a non -article III judge, again 13 affording the prevailing challengers precisely the relief they requested. Id. at 57, 88.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "In noting that \"there is no indication but that the Board Members acted in good faith in moving to initiate [Title III] proceedings ,\" Pet. App. 43a, the First Circuit referenced [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But Leary involved \"little more than a ministerial act\" of a judicial substitution to which the pa rties knowingly consented . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "268 F.2d 623",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Id. at 628 . Even if Leary remains good law after Glidden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Ryder , and Nguyen , the challengers here never consented to the exercise of the Board's authority , instead moving to dismiss the proceedings at the earliest opportunity . And the constitutional safeguards of Article II are far from ministerial . Rather, the \"checks and balances\" that provisions like the Appointments Clause safeguard are \"the foundation of a structure of go vernment that would protect liberty.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 530",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "And the constitutional safeguards of Article II are far from ministerial . Rather, the \"checks and balances\" that provisions like the Appointments Clause safeguard are \"the foundation of a structure of go vernment that would protect liberty.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 14 This Court's cases show that the de facto officer doctrine poses no bar to voiding an unlawful proceeding where an affected party timely challenges the constitutional valid ity of their adjudicator's appointment . On the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "\"[C]ourts cannot avoid their responsibility merely 'because the issues have political implications. '\" Zivotofsky ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in the rationale or history of the de facto officer doctrine, or in the cases themselves, suggests that it can be more freely applied to executive branch officer s. Rather, the doctrine is off the table, and a remedy required, when there is a 15 structural constitutional breach that injures the litigant . Courts cannot de facto legitimize actions challenged on direct review by the injured party where the \"the alleged defect of authority … relates to basic constitutional protections designed in part for the benefit of litigants .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Such litigant -benefiting protections include the constitutional safeguard that a government official initiating government litigation be appointed in conformance with Article II . Here, whether acting as adjudicator or enforcer, if the Court concludes that the Board members are appointed in violation of Article II, the litigants involved have suffered a structural injury, and are entitled to relief.3 The D.C. Circuit thus had little difficulty i n concluding that the de facto officer defense was unavailable in SW General , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , aff'd137 S. Ct. 929 , a case where t he petitioner argued that the former Acting Gene ral Counsel of the NLRB served in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act . The challenge was raised \"as a defense to an ongoing enforcement proceeding .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The De Facto Officer Doctrine Does Not Permit the Courts to Paper Over Structural Constitutional Errors",
		"context": "Such litigant -benefiting protections include the constitutional safeguard that a government official initiating government litigation be appointed in conformance with Article II . Here, whether acting as adjudicator or enforcer, if the Court concludes that the Board members are appointed in violation of Article II, the litigants involved have suffered a structural injury, and are entitled to relief.3 The D.C. Circuit thus had little difficulty i n concluding that the de facto officer defense was unavailable in SW General , 796 F.3d 67 , aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , a case where t he petitioner argued that the former Acting Gene ral Counsel of the NLRB served in violation of the Federal Vacancies Reform Act . The challenge was raised \"as a defense to an ongoing enforcement proceeding .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "23 exist. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], rejected the argument that the plaintiffs \"suf-fer[ed] concrete harm from the mere fact that the De- partment, in violation of its statutory obligations, has allowed inaccurate safety information to remain in the database.\" Id. at 344.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "at 346. The other cases cited by the petition are similarly consistent with the court of appeals' decision. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the plaintiff alleged a cable operator unlaw- fully retained his personal information in its internal database. But the plaintiff there offered \"no allegation 24 or evidence that in the de cade since he subscribed to Time Warner's residential services any of the personal information that he supplied to the company when he subscribed had leaked and caused financial or other in-jury to him or had even been at risk of being leaked .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "846 F.3d 909",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "Id. at 910-11 (emphasis added). And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the plaintiff also \"allege[d] only that Char- ter violated a duty to destroy personally identifiable information by retaining certain information longer than the company should have kept it.\" Id. at 930.",
		"citation_value_orig": "836 F.3d 925",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "946 F.3d at 765. 25 contrast, every class member here affirmatively re- quested her credit report and received TransUnion's uniformly incomplete and inaccurate disclosures in re- sponse—a very different situation in which a consumer is unlikely, contrary to TransUnion's speculation (at 25), to have \"ignored [it] as junk mail.\" In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Seventh Circuit held that a plaintiff lacked standing to sue for the violation of a disclosure requirement because it did \"not seek to pro- tect [him] from the kind of harm he claims he has suf- fered, i.e., receipt of a non-compliant disclosure.\" Id. at 888.",
		"citation_value_orig": "865 F.3d 884",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "App. 32. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a plaintiff alleged an FCRA violation for failing to include the name of the servicer for the debts of a defunct creditor listed on a credit report. The Fourth Circuit held he lacked standing because he was \"still able to receive a fair and accurate credit report, 26 obtain the information he needed to cure his credit is- sues, and ultimately resolve those issues,\" and there- fore \"failed to demonstrate how viewing [one] name . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "856 F.3d 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "Id. at 347. And in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a credit report \"omitt[ed] . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.3d 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "Auto. Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has also made clear that the \"precise award in any case, of course, must be based upon the facts and ci rcumstances of the defend- ant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 408",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "Finally, even though it does not allege a circuit split, TransUnion notes two circuit cases in which the court did \"not hesitate to find much lower awards suf- ficiently 'substantial' to dem and a 1:1 ceiling.\" Pet. 30- 31 (citing 818 F.3d 1041; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Such results are not sur- prising. In the fact-bound inquiry into the appropriate-ness of a punitive damages award, there are many cases that do not warrant a higher ratio—or even any punitive damages at all.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 F.3d 790",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "31 (emphasis added). That suggestion is contrary to the law of the two circuits whose decisions TransUnion references. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (8th 5 Contrary to Petitioner's asse rtion (at 30), the court below explicitly acknowledged and reje cted TransUnion's argument that punitive damages were dupl icative of the statutory damages award. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "698 F.3d 1020",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "44. 30 Cir. 2012) (\"[T]he punitive damages [on the facts of this case] should not exceed a 4:1 ratio to maintain the no- tions of fundamental fairness and due process\" in case \"imposing $12 million in punitive damages for each plaintiff \"); Continental Trend Resources, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it is belied by the count- less other multimillion-dollar cases upholding ratios at or above 4:1 in other circuits. See, e.g., 941 F.3d 243481 F.3d 130252 F. App'x 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "101 F.3d 634",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no conflict between the court of appeals' decision and the decision of any other court",
		"context": "2012) (\"[T]he punitive damages [on the facts of this case] should not exceed a 4:1 ratio to maintain the no- tions of fundamental fairness and due process\" in case \"imposing $12 million in punitive damages for each plaintiff \"); Continental Trend Resources, 101 F.3d 634. And it is belied by the count- less other multimillion-dollar cases upholding ratios at or above 4:1 in other circuits. See, e.g., 941 F.3d 243[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]52 F. App'x 20. Pointing to no conflict among the lower courts or inconsistency with this Court's cases, the petition 31 presents no reason to review the well-justified punitive damages award in this case. --------------------------------- ♦ ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 F.3d 1302",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Demonstrable Consensus Has Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies Ever Since",
		"context": "26, 2021); Schuette v. Coal. to De- fend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 See n. 23, supra. 26 Most Americans Say Colleges Should Not Consider Race or Ethnicity in Admissions , Pew Res.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Demonstrable Consensus Has Opposed Race-Based Admissions Policies Ever Since",
		"context": "Pew's previous parallel poll in 2019 showed the same pattern – 73% of Americans agreeing that race or ethnicity should play no role in admissions, including supermajorities 20 See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN) , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 See n. 19, supra. 22 U.S. Public Continues to View Grades, Test Scores as Top Factors in College Admissions, Vianney Gomez, Pew Res.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 291",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Grutter has generated no legitimate reliance interests.",
		"context": "The answer is that race \"is not just another competing consideration.\" Vill. of Ar-lington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Classifying citizens by race \" both \"threatens special harms,\" 509 U.S. 630, and \"implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns ,\" Peña- Ro- 137 S.Ct. 855. Title VI says nothing about discrimination based on \"home 18 state,\" \"family circumstances ,\" or \" academic inter- ests.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Grutter has generated no legitimate reliance interests.",
		"context": "Vill. of Ar-lington 429 U.S. 252. \"Classifying citizens by race \" both \"threatens special harms,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns ,\" Peña- Ro- 137 S.Ct. 855. Title VI says nothing about discrimination based on \"home 18 state,\" \"family circumstances ,\" or \" academic inter- ests.\" Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 630",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Grutter has generated no legitimate reliance interests.",
		"context": "Vill. of Ar-lington 429 U.S. 252. \"Classifying citizens by race \" both \"threatens special harms,\" 509 U.S. 630, and \"implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns ,\" Peña- Ro- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Title VI says nothing about discrimination based on \"home 18 state,\" \"family circumstances ,\" or \" academic inter- ests.\" Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 855",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's review would be premature",
		"context": "A S tate \" may of course 2 Although the Texas Supreme Court requested briefs on the mer- its in this case, Pet. App. 44a -45a, its denial of review \"is not evi- dence that the Court agrees with the law as decided by the court of appeals ,\" Loram Maint enance of Way, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Tex. R. App. P. 56.1(a) -(c).",
		"citation_value_orig": "210 S.W.3d 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's review would be premature",
		"context": "19 consent to suit \" under a particular statute, PennEast , 141 S. Ct. at 2258, and the question presented here wil l accordingly have no salience in States that waive sover- eign immunity to USERRA suits. In Tennessee, for ex- ample, an interme diate appellate court held that sover- eign immunity bars USERRA claims against state em- ployers, see Pet. 7 n.1 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. de- nied, 568 U.S. 1195 ), but the legislature then \"en- acted a statute waiving Tennessee's sovereign immun- ity for USERRA claims,\" 551 S.W.3d 702 (Tenn.), cert. denied,139 S. Ct. 354 ; see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 S.W.3d 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's review would be premature",
		"context": "In Tennessee, for ex- ample, an interme diate appellate court held that sover- eign immunity bars USERRA claims against state em- ployers, see Pet. 7 n.1 (citing 387 S.W.3d 570 , cert. de- nied, 568 U.S. 1195 ), but the legislature then \"en- acted a statute waiving Tennessee's sovereign immun- ity for USERRA claims,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Tenn.), cert. denied,139 S. Ct. 354 ; see id. at 520- 524 (concluding that sovereign im- munity would have barred suit before that waiver ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 S.W.3d 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's review would be premature",
		"context": "at 520- 524 (concluding that sovereign im- munity would have barred suit before that waiver ). And in at least one recent case, Mississippi did not assert sovereign immunity in the appeal of a USERRA suit that affirmed a damages award against a state em- ployer . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Texas intermediate appellate court in this case did not determine whether the State has waived its sov-ereign immunity with respect to USERRA claims. The court instead held that it did not have to address that question beca use (1) petitioner had not exhausted his administrative remedies, which the court understood as a prerequisite to any potential waiver of sovereign im- munity under chapter 437 of the Texas G overnment Code, see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 So. 3d 277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "As a result, consumer standing to recover for an overcharge paid directly to an illegal cartel or monopoly is seldom doubted.\" IIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., Antitrust Law: An Anal y- sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appl ication , ¶ 345, at 179 (4th ed. 2014); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, in Illinois Brick , 431 U.S. 720, this Court limited consumer standing when consumers are indirect pu rchasers in a chain of distribution, but the circu mstances here are quite unlike those that prompted the Illinois Brick rule and that are reflec t- ed in the Court's other cases involving direct and i n- direct purchasers, Hanover Shoe , 392 U.S. 481, and UtiliCorp ., 497 U.S. 199. Hanover Shoe refused to allow the monopolist to es cape overcharges that its own customer pa id by arguing that the over charges moved down the distribution chain to others.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "IIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., Antitrust Law: An Anal y- sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appl ication , ¶ 345, at 179 (4th ed. 2014); see 442 U.S. 330. To be sure, in Illinois Brick , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court limited consumer standing when consumers are indirect pu rchasers in a chain of distribution, but the circu mstances here are quite unlike those that prompted the Illinois Brick rule and that are reflec t- ed in the Court's other cases involving direct and i n- direct purchasers, Hanover Shoe , 392 U.S. 481, and UtiliCorp ., 497 U.S. 199. Hanover Shoe refused to allow the monopolist to es cape overcharges that its own customer pa id by arguing that the over charges moved down the distribution chain to others. Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp similarly refused to permit per- sons down the distribution chain, who did not pu r- chase from the antitrust violator, to claim dama ges from the violat ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 720",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "IIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., Antitrust Law: An Anal y- sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appl ication , ¶ 345, at 179 (4th ed. 2014); see 442 U.S. 330. To be sure, in Illinois Brick , 431 U.S. 720, this Court limited consumer standing when consumers are indirect pu rchasers in a chain of distribution, but the circu mstances here are quite unlike those that prompted the Illinois Brick rule and that are reflec t- ed in the Court's other cases involving direct and i n- direct purchasers, Hanover Shoe , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and UtiliCorp ., 497 U.S. 199. Hanover Shoe refused to allow the monopolist to es cape overcharges that its own customer pa id by arguing that the over charges moved down the distribution chain to others. Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp similarly refused to permit per- sons down the distribution chain, who did not pu r- chase from the antitrust violator, to claim dama ges from the violat ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "IIA Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, et al., Antitrust Law: An Anal y- sis of Antitrust Principles and Their Appl ication , ¶ 345, at 179 (4th ed. 2014); see 442 U.S. 330. To be sure, in Illinois Brick , 431 U.S. 720, this Court limited consumer standing when consumers are indirect pu rchasers in a chain of distribution, but the circu mstances here are quite unlike those that prompted the Illinois Brick rule and that are reflec t- ed in the Court's other cases involving direct and i n- direct purchasers, Hanover Shoe , 392 U.S. 481, and UtiliCorp ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hanover Shoe refused to allow the monopolist to es cape overcharges that its own customer pa id by arguing that the over charges moved down the distribution chain to others. Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp similarly refused to permit per- sons down the distribution chain, who did not pu r- chase from the antitrust violator, to claim dama ges from the violat ion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "Illinois Brick and UtiliCorp similarly refused to permit per- sons down the distribution chain, who did not pu r- chase from the antitrust violator, to claim dama ges from the violat ion. The Court was concerned about the \"'massive evidence and complicated theories'\" i n- 11 volved in \"trac[ing] the effect of the overcharge through each step in the distribution chain from the direct purchaser to the ultimate consumer.\" Illinois Brick , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (quoting Hanover Shoe , 392 U.S. at 493) (emphasis added). Here, the alleged antitrust violator is not an u p- stream firm in a chain of distribution. Rather, Apple admittedly sells apps directly to iPhone owners through the App Store, and ow ners pay A pple directly before app developers receive any compens ation, i.e., iPhone owners are the \"immed iate buyers from the alleged antitrust violator[].\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 741",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. ILLINOIS BRICK'S PROHIBITION OF INDIRECT PURCHASER DAMAGE ACTIONS DOES NOT EXTEND TO RESPONDENTS' PURCHASES FROM APPLE",
		"context": "Here, the alleged antitrust violator is not an u p- stream firm in a chain of distribution. Rather, Apple admittedly sells apps directly to iPhone owners through the App Store, and ow ners pay A pple directly before app developers receive any compens ation, i.e., iPhone owners are the \"immed iate buyers from the alleged antitrust violator[].\" UtiliCorp , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nevertheless, Apple argues that iPhone owners are not \"direct purchasers,\" primari ly because Apple partially outsources the pricing of apps to app devel-opers. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State criminal law doctrines afford additional protection to those with mental health conditions who make threats subject to criminal prosecution",
		"context": "31, 36. Or he could have offered evidence of his mental health or disability without pleading insanit y if such evidence was relevant to other defenses, so long as the evidence did not tend to prove insanity (in which case, an insanity plea would have been required). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But Counterman did not do that, either, even after the trial court noted it would allow the defense to intro- duce testimony about what others observed about Counterman's behavior and invited further briefi ng from the parties. J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "272 P.3d 1078",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. State criminal law doctrines afford additional protection to those with mental health conditions who make threats subject to criminal prosecution",
		"context": "88 –92. 44 \"Within broad [constitutional] limits,\" this Court has explained, judgments about how mental illness af- fects criminal responsibility \"must remain 'the prov- ince of the States,'\" because they involve \"balancing and rebalanci ng over time complex and oft -competing ideas about 'social policy' and 'moral culpability.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"uncertainties about the human mind loom large,\" states have wide latitude in formulating \"the many 'in-terlocking and overlapping concepts' that the law us es to assess when a person should be held criminally ac- countable for 'his antisocial deeds'\" —including how and when such considerations should mitigate crimi- nal sentencing. 9 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1021",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
		"context": "at 11, but this Court has considered the employer-employee relationsh ip between a religious school and its teachers as quintessentially religious 23 in nature. See, e.g. , Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church a nd [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the same wa y, the broader distinc- tion between secular contracts and religious activity is far murkier than the opinion below would care to acknowledge. Indeed, the \"[ d]etermination of whose voice speaks for the church\"—the very determination the court below conducted—\"is per se a religious mat- ter.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
		"context": "In the same wa y, the broader distinc- tion between secular contracts and religious activity is far murkier than the opinion below would care to acknowledge. Indeed, the \"[ d]etermination of whose voice speaks for the church\"—the very determination the court below conducted—\"is per se a religious mat- ter.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Furthermore, the logic of the decision below boils down to an argument this Court has repeatedly re-jected—that religious freedo m ends where the market- place begins. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 F.3d 698",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
		"context": "Furthermore, the logic of the decision below boils down to an argument this Court has repeatedly re-jected—that religious freedo m ends where the market- place begins. See, e.g. , Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 374 U.S. 398; see also 134 S. Ct. 2751 physical acts that are engaged in for religious reasons. Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a reli- gious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition.\") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
		"context": "Furthermore, the logic of the decision below boils down to an argument this Court has repeatedly re-jected—that religious freedo m ends where the market- place begins. See, e.g. , Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 134 S. Ct. 2751 physical acts that are engaged in for religious reasons. Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a reli- gious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition.\") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The decision below's \"secular contract\" exception revokes a church's autonomy if it dares to step outside its doors",
		"context": "Furthermore, the logic of the decision below boils down to an argument this Court has repeatedly re-jected—that religious freedo m ends where the market- place begins. See, e.g. , Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719; 374 U.S. 398; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] physical acts that are engaged in for religious reasons. Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a reli- gious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition.\") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text of Article 4 of the Crow Treaty demonstrates that the Tribe's hunting right is limited to areas of wilderness before the arrival of non-Indians",
		"context": "The \"unoccupied lands of the United States\" have a more common description: lands in \"the public domain.\" \"The public domain was the land owned by the Government, mostly in the West, that was available for sale, entry, and settlement under the homestead laws, or other disposition under the general body of land laws.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Public domain land could be settled by private parties, but \"[f ]rom an early period in the history of the government it was the practice of the President to order, from time to time, pa rcels of land belonging to the United States to be reserved from sale and set apart for public uses.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The text of Article 4 of the Crow Treaty demonstrates that the Tribe's hunting right is limited to areas of wilderness before the arrival of non-Indians",
		"context": "Id. at 553. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Tribes \"do not hereby aban don or prejudice any rights of claims they may have to other land s; and further, that they do not surrender the privilege of hunting, fishing, or passing over any of the tracts of country heretofore described\"). 44 \"Hunting districts\" were not simply \"places where game was to be found,\" but reflected territory \"beyond the borders of the white settlements.\" Race Horse , 163 U.S. at 508.",
		"citation_value_orig": "311 U.S. 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because ANCs Are \"Indian Tribes\" Under ISDEAA, They Are Eligible For Relief Funds Under Title V Of The CARES Act",
		"context": "corporate) officers or persons having ultimate control.\" Governing Body , Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Far from excluding ANCs, that definition fits their boards of directors to a tee. The ANCs' board s of directors are recognized as their governing bodies by shareholders, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Public college and university administrators routinely suppress and punish faculty and student speakers for threats that the administrators deem to be threatening, though the speakers had no intention of causing fear. While most \" true threats \" cases arise in the context of criminal prosecutions, FIRE's experie nce in the public college and university settings demonstrates the prevalence of state officials administratively punishing speech that they deem to be threatening, even though the speaker s had no intent to make a threat. It is well established that the F irst Amendment protects the expressive rights of students2 and faculty 2 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The decision made clear that \"state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First Amendment.\" Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "at 180. 6 at public college s and universit ies.3 Indeed, this Court has consistently protected the \"expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The application of \"true threats\" doctrine should be no different. See 454 U.S. 263.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "539 U.S. 306 . The application of \"true threats\" doctrine should be no different. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nevertheless, in FIRE's experience, public universities and their administrators continue to brazenly assert an unfounded authority to punish First Amendment -protected expression based on a general- intent test for threats . Meredith Miller's example is instructive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Meredith Miller's example is instructive. She commented : \"[I]f we don't win today, I'm detonating the nuclear reactor on campus.\" Letter from Alex Morey, Director, FIRE, to Sim Gill, District Attorney, Salt Lake County (Sept. 23, 2022) , available at https: 3 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 385 U.S. 589 . Employees of government institutions do not \"relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment.\" 461 U.S. 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Meredith Miller's example is instructive. She commented : \"[I]f we don't win today, I'm detonating the nuclear reactor on campus.\" Letter from Alex Morey, Director, FIRE, to Sim Gill, District Attorney, Salt Lake County (Sept. 23, 2022) , available at https: 3 See 354 U.S. 234 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Employees of government institutions do not \"relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment.\" 461 U.S. 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 589",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Letter from Alex Morey, Director, FIRE, to Sim Gill, District Attorney, Salt Lake County (Sept. 23, 2022) , available at https: 3 See 354 U.S. 234 ; see also 385 U.S. 589 . Employees of government institutions do not \"relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest by virtue of government employment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Instead, faculty members retain a First Amendment right to speak as private citizens on matters of public concern. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Instead, faculty members retain a First Amendment right to speak as private citizens on matters of public concern. Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Because \" expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests ,\" this Court has reserved the question of whether its holding in 547 U.S. 410 . 7 //www.thefire.org/research -learn/fire -letter -salt-lake- county -district -attorney -september -23-2022 [perma.c c/4J8H -G9QE ].",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 563",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "Id. ; see also 391 U.S. 563 . Because \" expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional constitutional interests ,\" this Court has reserved the question of whether its holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 7 //www.thefire.org/research -learn/fire -letter -salt-lake- county -district -attorney -september -23-2022 [perma.c c/4J8H -G9QE ]. University police characterized the h yperbole as a \"veiled threat,\" and charged Meredith with making a \"threat of terrorism\" under Utah Code § 76-5-107.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "This was idle, albeit darkly humorous, chatter. The First Amendment protects the \"freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Regardless, the remark was not a statement of intent to commit future violence . Indeed, Bettinger used the past - conditional tense.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 665",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. FIRE's Experience Defending Campus Speech Makes Clear That a General-Intent Standard Punishes Protected Expression",
		"context": "5 These examples demonstrate the real -world censorship that result s from using a general -intent standard. That standard punishes hyperbole — whether the sports -fan talk of Meredith Miller, the caustic speech of Morgan Bettinger, or the po litical speech of people like Kevin Allred or Jeff Klinzman. To protect the \"breathing space\" necessary for \"free debate,\" New York Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and prevent the unnecessary silencing and punishing of individuals speaking their minds across the nation, this Court should definitively rule that a \"true threat\" is only that expression which is communicated with the specific intent to cause fear in another. 5 FIRE represented Klinzman, who settled the matter with the College. FIRE, VICTORY: College settles with 'antifa' professor fired for criticizing President Trump on Facebook, avoids First Amendment lawsuit from FIRE (Apr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. FCRA's cause of action is sufficient to waive federal sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "USDA sees things differently. Because sovereign - immunity waivers and causes of action are \" analy - tically distinct,\" USDA Br. 13 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), USDA argues that \" a cause of action [that] merely cross -references a general definition that includes sovereigns and non- sovereigns\" will not waive immunity . Id. at 22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. FCRA's cause of action is sufficient to waive federal sovereign immunity.",
		"context": "at 22. That argument is inconsistent with precedent and conceptually unsound . The only case whose outcome would arguably be consistent with the rule that USDA now advances —Employees, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —does not rest on such a rule, and that decision's approach to statutory interpretation has not survive d this Court's subsequent teachings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "Un der section 355(f), the \"claim- ant or other party\" seeking j u d i c i a l r e v i e w m u s t h a v e 3 been a party to that decision in administrative proceed- ings. Further, Article III in dependently forecloses suits by non-aggrieved parties. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Section 231g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1615",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "Section 231g parallels the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), under which \"final agency action\" o ccurs when \"rights or obliga- tions have been determined, or … legal consequences will flow\" from the decision. Br. 21, 23; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Denials of reopening determine rights or liabilities under the RRA by denying claimants further opportunity to vindi-cate their legal entitlement to benefits. Denials of reopening thus are also \"final decisions of the Board\" un- der section 355(f).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "The government (at 30) unconvincingly argues that denials of reopening do not \"determin[e] rights or liabili- ties\" because they \"leave the Board's original decision intact.\" But requesting reopening does seek a legal ben- efit, and the agency's denial of that benefit is reviewable even though the agency did not change its answer. See U.S. Army Corps of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government elsewhere (at 33) seemingly acknowledges that denials of reopening carry legal conse- quences; why those denials do not also determine legal rights is not apparent. For in stance, the denial here bars petitioner from raising newl y available evidence showing 4 his statutory entitlem ent to benefits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "For in stance, the denial here bars petitioner from raising newl y available evidence showing 4 his statutory entitlem ent to benefits. Co urts have consid- ered similar denials of reopening to be decisions determining rights or liabilities. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—that reopening denials do not deter mine rights or liabilities \"under [the RRA]\" because the RRA confers no \"right\" to reopening—misreads section 231g. The relevant \"right\" is a claimant's entitlement to benefits, which the Board \"determin[es]\" against him by refusing to consider new grounds potentially demonstrating that entitlement. See Berry , 832 F.3d at 633-34.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "Contrary to the government's claim (at 31-32), this Court's precedents do not tr eat reopening denials as un- reviewable legal nullities. De nials of reopening of Social Security benefits determinations are \"final decision[s]\" under the Social Security Act. Under [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Smith , those denials are nonetheless unreviewable because the Act's text subjects only final decisions \"made af ter a hearing\" to review—a limitation not present here. Br. 40-41; Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1774-75.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "40-41; Smith , 139 S. Ct. at 1774-75. Nor did this Cour t deem denials of reopening categorically unreviewable in the Medicare context. Your Home Visiting Nurse Serv ices, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], deferred under Chevron to the government's view that certain denials of reopening are not \"final deter- mination[s] … as to the amount [of] reimbursement\" under the Medicare statute fo r purposes of determining 5 whether one agency body had jurisdiction over a different adjudicator's decisions. Id. at 453 (quoting 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "32), does not help the government. The Court held that a reviewable \"order made under\" section 11(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act did not include decisions denying reopening. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] de lineated types of \"orders\" the agency could make, and reopening denials were not one of them. Id. at 371-72.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 U.S. 368",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "24. And the Court applied the presump- tion to discretionary denials of reopening in immigration proceedings, noting that reo pening had no statutory basis for decades and that courts reviewed denials of reopening all the while. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no reason to treat Board reopening deni-als differently. The government (at 41-42) emphasizes that Your Home , Sanders , and 482 U.S. 270, did not ment ion the presumption.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "558 U.S. 233. There is no reason to treat Board reopening deni-als differently. The government (at 41-42) emphasizes that Your Home , Sanders , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], did not ment ion the presumption. But Your Home and Sanders are significantly distinguishable. Supra p. 4-5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 270",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Congress Authorized Judicial Review Of Reopening Denials",
		"context": "Making all fi- nal Board decisions reviewab le, including denials of reopening, serves as a critic al check on the wide powers Congress delegated to the Board. Judicial review also en- sures the \"accuracy and fairness\" of decisions that carry momentous consequences for railroad employees and their families. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Br. 26-29. The government (at 14, 16, 36- 37) calls judicial review of reopening denials a gratuitous \"second bite at the ap- ple.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "826 F.3d 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners cannot show that other intervening decisions of this Court warrant overruling North Dakota and Mottaz",
		"context": "App. D4 (observing that in resolving 7 The Ninth Circuit has held that \" Rule 12(b)(1) is a proper vehicle for invoking sovereign immunity from suit,\" even where that defense is characterized only as \"quasi -jurisdictional in nature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See Brown- 141 S. Ct. 740. If this Court were to revisit its prior determinations that the 12-year bar is jurisdictional, it would accordingly be necessary for the court of appeals on remand to determine whether proceeding under Rule 12(b)(1) was nevertheless appropriate because of Sec- tion 2409a(g)'s status as a condition on the waiver of sovereign im- munity and, if so, whether the district court's decision could be af- firmed on that alternative basis .",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners cannot show that other intervening decisions of this Court warrant overruling North Dakota and Mottaz",
		"context": "Br. 15 n.5, 39 n.8 . 37 factual disputes under Rule 12(b)(1), \"no presumption of truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff 's allegations, a court may freely consider extrinsic evidence, and it may resolve factual disputes with or without a hearing\" ) (cit- ing, inter alia , Kingman Reef Atoll Investments, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Pet. Br. 26; see also Wright & Miller § 1350, at 244 n.68 (collecting authorities on district courts ' broad flexibil- ity under Rule 12(b)(1) to consider relevant evidence).",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 F.3d 1189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Petitioners cannot show that other intervening decisions of this Court warrant overruling North Dakota and Mottaz",
		"context": "Lower courts would then be faced with the difficult task of determining which of this Court's jurisdictional precedents they are bound to follow and which they are free to ignore. Rather than invite such substa ntial jurisprudential disruption for such minimal practical benefit, the Court should accord precedential respect to its interpretation of the Quiet Title Act's 12 -year bar in North Dakota and Mottaz again here, just as it has done before. See Kim- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 446",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Standard Defies Text, Precedent, and Policy",
		"context": "Consol. Elec. Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in each case Sanofi-Regeneron cites, the statutory standard was not met—the patent's disclosures did not \" 'enable any person skilled in the art to make and use' \" the invention at all. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Standard Defies Text, Precedent, and Policy",
		"context": "at 474 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 4888); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Holland Furni- ture 277 U.S. 245. This Court has never suggested that patents are invalid, when skilled artisans can easily make embodiments within the claims, simply because \" 'substantial time and effort' would be required\" for skilled artisans \"to reach the full scope\" by making all embodiments. Pet.App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "129 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Standard Defies Text, Precedent, and Policy",
		"context": "at 474 (quoting Rev. Stat. § 4888); 129 U.S. 683; Holland Furni- ture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has never suggested that patents are invalid, when skilled artisans can easily make embodiments within the claims, simply because \" 'substantial time and effort' would be required\" for skilled artisans \"to reach the full scope\" by making all embodiments. Pet.App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Standard Defies Text, Precedent, and Policy",
		"context": "Nor can Sanofi-Regeneron explain why that result makes sense. Sanofi-Regeneron's convoluted effort (Br.in.Opp. 32- 33) to distinguish the facts of this case from the facts in Minerals Separation, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], fails to reconcile the Federal Circuit's legal standard with the standard Minerals Separation announces. The patent in Minerals Separation claimed a process for concentrat- ing metallic ores, but its disclosures left skilled artisans to conduct \"preliminary tests\" to identify the \"precise treat-ment\" for each of the \"infinite[ ]\" ore varieties. 242 U.S. at 270-271.",
		"citation_value_orig": "242 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Lucky's remaining objections are not persuasive",
		"context": "are meritless. A. For two reasons, Lucky is mistaken that this Court foreclosed defense preclusion more than 140 years ago in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, Davis stands for the proposition that a lawsuit on one negotiable instrument involves a different cause of action from a suit on a di fferent negotiable instrument. That says nothing about the question presented here, which is whether defense pre clusion applies when the defendant is engaged in continuing conduct that leads to identical but post-judgment violations of the same legal right established in a prior suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "94 U.S. 423",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Contemporaneous-Intent Requirement Serves Congress's Purpose Of Reserving Enhanced Penalties For Dangerous Career Criminals",
		"context": "Taylor , 495 U.S. at 583. By 22 Noting that the issue was \"one of first impression,\" the Utah Supreme Court in 1998 held that contemporaneous intent is not required, as a defendant's continued unlawful presence in a struc- ture satisfies the unlawful remaining element of burglary. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 52 contrast, it would conflict with Congress's objectives to inflict ACCA's harsh mandatory minimum on individ- uals with prior convictions for committing unplanned crimes of opportunity while trespassing. Congress's use of the word \"career\" in the title of the \"Armed Career Criminal Act\" is meaningful.",
		"citation_value_orig": "970 P.2d 1221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. A Contemporaneous-Intent Requirement Serves Congress's Purpose Of Reserving Enhanced Penalties For Dangerous Career Criminals",
		"context": "App. 7a. Under that rule, a 15-year mandatory mini- mum could apply not only to the homeless person who sleeps in a warehouse and steals a coat on his way out, but also to the \"teenagers who unlawfully enter a house only to party, and only later decide to\" steal from the house, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; the hiker who seeks shelter from the snow in an unoccupied cabin and then takes food; and the defendant who enters a neighbor's home for a glass of water after having been hired to mow her lawn, and then pockets jewelry sitting near the sink, cf. 1995 WL 605442. These defendants may perhaps be fairly pun- ished as thieves.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 F.3d 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Appellants Offer No Colorable Defense Of The Plan On The Merits",
		"context": "That the 2016 Plan may look better than this, at least superficially, is not saying much. Second, and more importantly, compliance with \"traditional redistricting principles\" such as com- pactness and preservation of political subdivisions is no defense to a charge of gerrymandering. Bethune - [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Constitution \"does not prohibit mis- shapen districts. It prohibits unjustified … classific a- 63 tions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Ninth Circuit's version of exacting scrutiny is distorted, free-form, and hazardous to First Amendment rights",
		"context": ". . speech against its societal costs,\" it should reject the Ninth Circuit's \"free-floating test\" for associational freedoms, United 52 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs.\" Stevens , 559 U.S. at 470; accord, e.g., Knox , 567 U.S. at 313–14 (rejecting the Ninth Circuit's balancing test for mandatory association with a union).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. RESPONDENTS' PROPOSED EXPANSION OF LIABILITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NAVY'S PLENARY CONTROL OVER NAVAL SHIPS AND EQUIPMENT",
		"context": "9 . That is irrelevant, since the \"contract specifications\" at issue there were for asbestos itself, not turbines. See GAF Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20 Given that the Navy approved decades' worth of manuals, all of which Resp ondents now claim were non-compliant, the only sensible explanation is that the Navy did not in fact re quire such warnings. See JA 77, 80.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 F.2d 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. RESPONDENTS' PROPOSED EXPANSION OF LIABILITY IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE NAVY'S PLENARY CONTROL OVER NAVAL SHIPS AND EQUIPMENT",
		"context": "See GE Br. 23–24 (describing Navy warnings and procedures for asbes- tos). Respondents attempt to brush aside this point because \"the government contractor defense\" recog- nized in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"is not before this Court,\" Resp. Br. 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The policy arguments of Home Depot and its amici do not warrant review",
		"context": "That not all class claims are removable does not indicate that review by this Court is necessary to ful-fill CAFA's purposes. This Court has emphasized repeatedly that \"it is quite mistaken to assume … that 'whatever' might ap-pear to 'further[] the statute's primary objective must be the law,\" because \"no st atute yet known 'pursues its [stated] purpose[] at all costs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CAFA certainly does not. As the Seventh Cir- cuit pointed out in Tri-State Water , \"CAFA only selec- tively increased federal jurisdic tion over multi-state class actions.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The policy arguments of Home Depot and its amici do not warrant review",
		"context": "Id. Given the lack of statutory language supporting Home Depot's arguments and the specific indications that the statute's purpose was not to grant federal ju- risdiction over all large multistate class actions, Home Depot \"would need some monster arguments on this score to create doubts\" about statutory meaning. Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The arguments of Home Depot and its amici are not monsters, but chimeras. Despite their claims that the approach of the courts of appeals will permit large- scale evasion of CAFA, the re ality is quite different.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Review Should Be Granted Because The Decision Below Calls Into Question The Legality Of Numerous Memorials Throughout The Nation",
		"context": "Review should be granted because the Fourth's Cir- cuit's standard makes it ma ke it well-nigh impossible for municipal attorneys to advise their clients regard- ing this recurring issue. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": ", 2 Journal of the House of Lords, 1578-1614, at 327-28 (1830). \"Ameri- cans at the founding and after understood the power to punish members as a legislative power [as] inher- ent.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"This power . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": "is the primary power by which legislative bodies preserve their 'insti- tutional integrity.'\" Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Therefor e, \"because citizens may not sue legislators for their legislative acts, legislative bodies are left to police their own members\" and \"[a]bsent truly exceptional circumstances, it would be strange to hold that su ch self-policing is itself actionable in a court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": "See U.S. House of Representative List of Individuals Expelled, Cen- sured, or Reprimanded in the U.S. House of Repre- sentatives, History, Arts, & Archives, available at http://history.house.gov/Institution/Discipline/expulsi on-censure-reprimand/ (l ast accessed July 13, 2021); U.S. Senate, About Censure , Powers & Procedures, available at https://www.senate.go v/about/powers- procedures/censure.htm (last accessed July 13, 2021). The \"traditional ways of conducting government\" themselves \"give meaning to the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would be a peculiar outcome if Congress were free to express its condemnation of a member's words or actions through censure, yet the same expression were denied to other governmental bodies. Yet that is precisely what has happened here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit's ruling stands at odds with the decisions of its sister circuits, which have found that a governing board's exercise of its historical censure power against one of its own members, without the imposition of personal penalties, is not actionable under the First Amendment. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 608 F.3d 540; Phelan , 235 F.3d at 1247; 34 F.3d 359. The HCC board is a public body. The decision to censure Respondent was itself the outcome of a public process and public debate, and an exercise of HCC's historical power to self-regulate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "780 F.3d 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit's ruling stands at odds with the decisions of its sister circuits, which have found that a governing board's exercise of its historical censure power against one of its own members, without the imposition of personal penalties, is not actionable under the First Amendment. See, e.g. , 780 F.3d 172; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Phelan , 235 F.3d at 1247; 34 F.3d 359. The HCC board is a public body. The decision to censure Respondent was itself the outcome of a public process and public debate, and an exercise of HCC's historical power to self-regulate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "608 F.3d 540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Allowing a Private Constitutional Claim in Response to Censure is Contrary to the Long History of the Legislative Power to Censure",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit's ruling stands at odds with the decisions of its sister circuits, which have found that a governing board's exercise of its historical censure power against one of its own members, without the imposition of personal penalties, is not actionable under the First Amendment. See, e.g. , 780 F.3d 172; 608 F.3d 540; Phelan , 235 F.3d at 1247; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The HCC board is a public body. The decision to censure Respondent was itself the outcome of a public process and public debate, and an exercise of HCC's historical power to self-regulate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F.3d 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.",
		"context": "First Amendment rights may be \"supremely pre- cious in our society ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1963), but a plaintiff seeking to vindicate them in court must navigate a complex s eries of steps . If he's suffered a past deprivation of rights, sovereign im- 6 munity will bar a claim for damages against state offi- cials unless the officials are properly sued in their per- sonal capacity , 473 U.S. 159 —and even then the plaintiff must avoid qualified immunity by showing not only that the defendant violated his rights but that the right was \"clearly established,\" 573 U.S. 228 ( 2014). If the plaintiff seeks prospective relief , by contrast, officials can be named in their official capac- ities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.",
		"context": "First Amendment rights may be \"supremely pre- cious in our society ,\" 371 U.S. 415 ( 1963), but a plaintiff seeking to vindicate them in court must navigate a complex s eries of steps . If he's suffered a past deprivation of rights, sovereign im- 6 munity will bar a claim for damages against state offi- cials unless the officials are properly sued in their per- sonal capacity , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —and even then the plaintiff must avoid qualified immunity by showing not only that the defendant violated his rights but that the right was \"clearly established,\" 573 U.S. 228 ( 2014). If the plaintiff seeks prospective relief , by contrast, officials can be named in their official capac- ities. 491 U.S. 58 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.",
		"context": "If he's suffered a past deprivation of rights, sovereign im- 6 munity will bar a claim for damages against state offi- cials unless the officials are properly sued in their per- sonal capacity , 473 U.S. 159 —and even then the plaintiff must avoid qualified immunity by showing not only that the defendant violated his rights but that the right was \"clearly established,\" 573 U.S. 228 ( 2014). If the plaintiff seeks prospective relief , by contrast, officials can be named in their official capac- ities. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But then, no matter how far the case has progressed —even to the point of this Court's granting certiorari , see , e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, 140 S. Ct. 1525 —the case is always at risk of being mooted by the defendant's mid-litigation policy change , depriving the plaintiff of judicial recognition that the prior policy violated his rights . Against this background, n ominal damages have long played a vital role in protecting First Amendment rights .",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.",
		"context": "If the plaintiff seeks prospective relief , by contrast, officials can be named in their official capac- ities. 491 U.S. 58 . But then, no matter how far the case has progressed —even to the point of this Court's granting certiorari , see , e.g., New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —the case is always at risk of being mooted by the defendant's mid-litigation policy change , depriving the plaintiff of judicial recognition that the prior policy violated his rights . Against this background, n ominal damages have long played a vital role in protecting First Amendment rights . They provide a mechanism for vindicating past deprivat ions of rights that are difficult to quantify in monetary terms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nominal damages should preclude mootness in free exercise cases.",
		"context": "Against this background, n ominal damages have long played a vital role in protecting First Amendment rights . They provide a mechanism for vindicating past deprivat ions of rights that are difficult to quantify in monetary terms. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And—until the Eleventh Circuit's holding in this case —every circuit that had considered the issue agreed that nominal damages can prevent a plaintif f's case from going moot, even when the defendant's post - 7 litigation changes in conduct eliminate the possibility of prospective relief.2",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": "5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) . To honor \"the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,\" 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 9 The presumption in favor of judicial review applies with equal force in the immi gration context. See, e.g. , 558 U.S. 233 ; 533 U.S. 289 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": "To honor \"the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,\" 9 476 U.S. 667 , 9 The presumption in favor of judicial review applies with equal force in the immi gration context. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 533 U.S. 289 . 23 this Court has \"read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly ,\" Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370. Accord Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": "To honor \"the strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action,\" 9 476 U.S. 667 , 9 The presumption in favor of judicial review applies with equal force in the immi gration context. See, e.g. , 558 U.S. 233 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 23 this Court has \"read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly ,\" Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370. Accord Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": ", 558 U.S. 233 ; 533 U.S. 289 . 23 this Court has \"read the exception in § 701(a)(2) quite narrowly ,\" Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370. Accord Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review only when there is no \"law to apply\" and a court therefore lacks any \"meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.\" 470 U.S. 821 ; accord Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568- 69.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 402",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": "Accord Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 . Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review only when there is no \"law to apply\" and a court therefore lacks any \"meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; accord Department of Commerce, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2568- 69. \"The few cases\" where this Court has applied the exception involve purely discretionary \"agency decisions that courts have traditionally regarded as unreviewable, such as the allocation of funds from a lump -sum appro pria- tion, or a decision not to reconsider a final action.\" Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370 (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The APA Permits Review of an Agency's Conclusion that Its Authorizing Statutes Forbid a Particular Action",
		"context": "Accord Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 . Section 701(a)(2) precludes judicial review only when there is no \"law to apply\" and a court therefore lacks any \"meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.\" 470 U.S. 821 ; accord Department of Commerce, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 2568- 69. \"The few cases\" where this Court has applied the exception involve purely discretionary \"agency decisions that courts have traditionally regarded as unreviewable, such as the allocation of funds from a lump -sum appro pria- tion, or a decision not to reconsider a final action.\" Weyerhaeuser, 139 S. Ct. at 370 (citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "Citing Mescalero Apache [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Chickasaw 534 U.S. 84, the Department claims that a 13 treaty must expressly address preemption of state taxes. Br. 16; see also St ates' Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "Citing Mescalero Apache 411 U.S. 145, and Chickasaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Department claims that a 13 treaty must expressly address preemption of state taxes. Br. 16; see also St ates' Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "The Department's pro-posed canon cannot be squared with this Court's precedent involving Indian treaties. Indian treaties, once ratified, are \"the supreme law of the land.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"State qualific ation of [Indian treaty] rights is therefore precluded by force of the Suprema-cy Clause.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "at 205. The Indian treaty canons have long been used to determine the scope of Indian treaty rights, including \"in tax cases.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, [w]hile in general tax exemptions are not to be presumed and statutes conf erring them are to be strictly construed, the contrary is the rule to be applied to tax exemptions secured to the Indians by agreement between them and the national government. Such provisio ns are to be liberally construed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "224 U.S. 665",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "Carpenter , 280 U.S. at 366-67 (citations omitted). This Court's modern cases have adhered to this an- alytical approach, including in cases where a state sought to tax or regulate activity occurring off the reservation. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; McClanahan , 411 U.S. at 174-75 (treaty liber ally construed in accord- ance with Indian treaty canons precludes application of state income tax); 315 U.S. 681. Chickasaw Nation and Mescalero , on which the De- partment relies (Br. 22), do not support a different approach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Treaty-Interpretation Canons Apply When Deciding Whether A Treaty Exempts Members Of A Tribe From Complying With State Law, Including Off-Reservation State Taxes",
		"context": "Carpenter , 280 U.S. at 366-67 (citations omitted). This Court's modern cases have adhered to this an- alytical approach, including in cases where a state sought to tax or regulate activity occurring off the reservation. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax 515 U.S. 450; McClanahan , 411 U.S. at 174-75 (treaty liber ally construed in accord- ance with Indian treaty canons precludes application of state income tax); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Chickasaw Nation and Mescalero , on which the De- partment relies (Br. 22), do not support a different approach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 681",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Ruling for Cougar Den Would Undermine Critical State and Federal Taxing Authority and Is Unnecessary to Protect Tribal Authority",
		"context": "King Mountain Tobacco, a company incorporated under the laws of the Yakama Nation, has been in litigation with the federal government, the State of Washington, and the City and State of New York regarding its refusal to pay federal, local, and state taxes on cigarettes that it transports by high way, off-reservation. 17 Accepting Cougar Den's argument would not only seriously impair state tax collection, it would also give Yakama businesses an unfair advantage over 17 See, e.g. , King Mountain Tobacc o 996 F. Supp. 2d 1061, vacated , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2015 WL 4523642, appeal docketed , No. 16-35956 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016); 2014 WL 279574, appeal docketed , No 16-35607 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 810",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Ruling for Cougar Den Would Undermine Critical State and Federal Taxing Authority and Is Unnecessary to Protect Tribal Authority",
		"context": "16-35956 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016); 2014 WL 279574, appeal docketed , No 16-35607 (9th Cir. July 29, 2016); King Mountain Tobacco [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied135 S. Ct. 1542; New 953 F. Supp. 2d 385. 43 both non-Indian businesses and businesses owned by members of the twenty-eight other tribes in Washington and other tribes nationwide.",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. A Ruling for Cougar Den Would Undermine Critical State and Federal Taxing Authority and Is Unnecessary to Protect Tribal Authority",
		"context": "43 both non-Indian businesses and businesses owned by members of the twenty-eight other tribes in Washington and other tribes nationwide. The Yakama should not be allo wed to use an untenable treaty interpretation to market a tax exemption throughout the country. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Cougar Den's attack on Washington's fuel tax system is particularly unfortunate given the collaborative relationship Washington has developed in recent years with other tribes as to fuel taxes. Other than the Yakama Nation, every tribe in Washington that has a gas station within its reservation has a fuel tax agreement with the State.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Properly Analyzed Copyright Protection in This Case.",
		"context": "§ 101 (def inition of \"computer pro- gram\"). Thus, Google's argument that a large part of the literal code of Oracle's copyrighted software is itself a method of operation is an exception that easily could swallow the rule that software is expressive and entitled to copyright protection. See, e.g., Atari Games [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If this Court is to respect Congress's judgment that software is innovative and copyrightable, Google's functionality argument cannot be right. Second, Google's application of the narrow and lim- ited merger doctrine is deeply flawed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "975 F.2d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Properly Analyzed Copyright Protection in This Case.",
		"context": "But Google's \"reusing\" was not remotely \"neces-sary\" in the relevant sense. Under a proper application of the merger doctrine, copying is \"necessary\" only in the relatively rare situations where external constraints genuinely leave no other options for the expression of the idea involved. See, e.g., Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 What Google really means is something quite differ- ent. As Google itself conceded, it copied Oracle's code because it wanted \"to allow users to use commands they already know from the legacy product.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F.3d 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Federal Circuit Properly Analyzed Copyright Protection in This Case.",
		"context": "Copyright does not make an exception for convenience. See Am. Geophysical [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Using someone else's work is always more \"convenient\" than starting anew, but such convenience does not ex- cuse copyright infringement. Curtailing copyright protection based on the famili- arity of a work would have a devastating impact on cop-yright, effectively penalizing creators whose works be- come popular and squelching the incentive to innovate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "60 F.3d 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "In a long line of cases that includes [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 304 U.S. 458, and 372 U.S. 335, this Court has recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is ne cessary to protect the funda- 7 mental right to a fair trial. Gideon recognized the \"ob- vious truth\" that \"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.\" 372 U.S. 335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 45",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "In a long line of cases that includes 287 U.S. 45, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 372 U.S. 335, this Court has recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is ne cessary to protect the funda- 7 mental right to a fair trial. Gideon recognized the \"ob- vious truth\" that \"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.\" 372 U.S. 335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "In a long line of cases that includes 287 U.S. 45, 304 U.S. 458, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court has recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is ne cessary to protect the funda- 7 mental right to a fair trial. Gideon recognized the \"ob- vious truth\" that \"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.\" 372 U.S. 335.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "In a long line of cases that includes 287 U.S. 45, 304 U.S. 458, and 372 U.S. 335, this Court has recognized a Sixth Amendment right to counsel that is ne cessary to protect the funda- 7 mental right to a fair trial. Gideon recognized the \"ob- vious truth\" that \"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in Strickland v. Washington , the Court further explained that \"the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel\" because ineffec- tive assistance of counsel may \"so undermine[] the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just re-sult.\" 466 U.S. 668 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "372 U.S. 335. And in Strickland v. Washington , the Court further explained that \"the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel\" because ineffec- tive assistance of counsel may \"so undermine[] the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just re-sult.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court emphasized that the effectiveness inquiry is necessarily a context and fact specific one, instructing courts to consider \"all the circumstances\" and to \"judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particu-lar case.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 668",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "at 690. In Martinez v. Ryan, this Court reiterated that \"[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is \"the foundation of our adversary system,\" for \"[d]efense counsel tests the prosecution's case to ensure that the proceedings serve the function of adjudicating guilt or innocence, while protecting the rights of the person charged.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "§ 2254 if he can show ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel. Id. at 8-14; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Martinez provides a narrow—but critical—pathway for prisoners whose Sixth Amendment rights were violated at trial and whose state post-conviction lawyers failed to raise that claim due to a constituti onally ineffective lack of skill, resources, or gross negligence. As Martinez and its progeny make clear, a defend- ant should be provided \"a meaningful opportunity to present a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "964 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. ), cert. denied141 S. Ct. 196[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Martinez itself relied on this principle, noting that \"[w]hen an attorney errs in initial-review collatera l proceedings, it is likely that no state court at any level will hear the prisoner's claim.\" 566 U.S. at 10.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "10 grounds\" between 2012 and 2017.12 This number shows that the remedy recognized in Martinez is hardly over- whelming the courts with alle gedly defaulted state-law claims being pressed on habeas, but that it is nonethe- less necessary to correct for rare circumstances where a petitioner's counsel on state co llateral proceeding is inef- fective in failing to raise an in effective assist ance of trial counsel claim. Numerous cases prove the wisdom of Martinez in ensuring a fair system of ha beas review and the oppor- tunity for an evidentiary hearin g. To take just one: In 2015, the Northern District of Florida granted Kevin J. Sullivan's habeas petition up on a finding that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective by advising him to reject a plea deal and concede guilt on possession charges, and by defending his case at trial based on the legally impermissible defense of voluntary intoxication, which had been abolished five years prior. See 2015 WL 4756190, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 In large part, this decision turned on whether 12 See Arizona et al. Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "837 F.3d 1195",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "Trevino, 569 U.S. at 424 (quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, \"[a] claim without any evidence to support it might as well be no claim at all.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 It follows that, in pursuing the limited procedural- default exception this Court identified in Martinez and Trevino—which is available only where, inter alia, \"'there was no counsel'\" in state habeas \"'or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective,'\" Trevino, 569 U.S. at 429 (quoting Martinez , 566 U.S. at 17)—federal habeas counsel must investigate to identify \"the information necessary to substantiate the claim\" not effectively pursued below, id. at 424 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING IS NECESSARY TO FULLY VINDICATE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL",
		"context": "at 424 (quotation marks omitted). Indeed, \" Martinez would be a dead le tter if a prisoner's only opportunity to develop the factual record of his state [collateral review] counsel's ineffectiveness had been in state [collateral] proceedings, where the same ineffective counsel represented him.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2017 WL 2021415; Sullivan, 2015 WL 4756190 (\"Like trial couns el, counsel handling state collateral proceedings must undertake a thorough in- vestigation into the facts surrounding all phases of the case.\"). In many such cases, fact development will be necessary to allow prisone rs to raise constitutional claims for the first time.",
		"citation_value_orig": "740 F.3d 1237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "But, of course, they do nothing of the sort. The rules of privilege \" forbid the admission of various sorts of evidence because some consideration extrinsic to the investigation of truth is regarded as more important and overpowering.\" Wigmore § 2 175, at 3 ; see General Dynamics [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A litigant claiming the privilege vindicate s such an interest by invoking the rule of exclusion, not by announcing an intent to unde rmine that rule and use the evidence in the proceeding . The court of appeals' 26 \"upside -down logic \" to the cont rary \"should not stand.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 478",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "128a (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). To be sure, invoking the state -secrets privilege to re- move evidence from a case may resul t, as it did here, in dismissal of a claim if further litigation would threaten to reveal state secrets . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A]s a general principle, public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respect ing which it will not allow the confidence to be violated . \"); see, e.g., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "92 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "To be sure, invoking the state -secrets privilege to re- move evidence from a case may resul t, as it did here, in dismissal of a claim if further litigation would threaten to reveal state secrets . See 92 U.S. 105 (\"[A]s a general principle, public policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and respect ing which it will not allow the confidence to be violated . \"); see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. ), cert. denied,552 U.S. 947 ; 614 F.3d 1070 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 F.3d 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "\"); see, e.g., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 614 F.3d 1070 . But seeking dismissal of certain claims to avoid dis- closing state secrets is not a declaration of the govern- ment's \"inten[t] to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose\" any privileged information \"in any trial, hearing, or other proc eeding .\" 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "\"); see, e.g., 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. ), cert. denied,552 U.S. 947 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But seeking dismissal of certain claims to avoid dis- closing state secrets is not a declaration of the govern- ment's \"inten[t] to enter into evidence or otherwise use or disclose\" any privileged information \"in any trial, hearing, or other proc eeding .\" 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 1070",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "See , e.g., Pet. App. 17 8a-180a (dismissing claims against individual -capacity respondents on state -secrets 27 grounds); Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. , 614 F.3d at 1076 - 1077; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1141- 1144 (5th Cir. 1992 ), cert. denied,507 U.S. 1029 ; 935 F.2d 544 ; 776 F.2d 1236 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "973 F.2d 1138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "17 8a-180a (dismissing claims against individual -capacity respondents on state -secrets 27 grounds); Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. , 614 F.3d at 1076 - 1077; 973 F.2d 1138, 1141- 1144 (5th Cir. 1992 ), cert. denied,507 U.S. 1029 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 776 F.2d 1236 . With respect to such claims, the government would have no ability to introduce evidence or otherwise use or dis- close information in any trial, hearing, or proceeding. At most, a request to dismiss claims on the basis of the state-secrets privilege might reasonably be described as using the privilege with the consequence of prevent- ing a trial; it cannot plausibly be described as declaring an intent to use or disclos e the information in a trial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "935 F.2d 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "17 8a-180a (dismissing claims against individual -capacity respondents on state -secrets 27 grounds); Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. , 614 F.3d at 1076 - 1077; 973 F.2d 1138, 1141- 1144 (5th Cir. 1992 ), cert. denied,507 U.S. 1029 ; 935 F.2d 544 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . With respect to such claims, the government would have no ability to introduce evidence or otherwise use or dis- close information in any trial, hearing, or proceeding. At most, a request to dismiss claims on the basis of the state-secrets privilege might reasonably be described as using the privilege with the consequence of prevent- ing a trial; it cannot plausibly be described as declaring an intent to use or disclos e the information in a trial .",
		"citation_value_orig": "776 F.2d 1236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "General Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 489, 490. It denies a judicial forum to all parties to an action —government or private —depriv ing them of the oppor- tunity to vindicat e their claims or defenses \"in order to protect a greater public value. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. 2005 ) (citation omitted ), cert. denied,546 U.S. 1093 ; see General Dynamics , 563 U.S. at 489 ( noting that \"[n]either side\" may be \"en- tirely happy\" with such a resolution ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 F. 3d 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "A prayer for relief is not a \"motion.\" Although it might be colloquially described as a \"request,\" a word or phrase in a s tatute \"is known by the company it keeps.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 566 U.S. 624 . And a prayer for relief on the merits in a civil complaint is nothing like a motion to suppress or comparable proce- dural motion at which Section 1806 (f ) is aimed . Section 1806(g) confirms that the two words — \"motion\" and \"request\"— should be understood as close synonyms .",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "A prayer for relief is not a \"motion.\" Although it might be colloquially described as a \"request,\" a word or phrase in a s tatute \"is known by the company it keeps.\" 513 U.S. 561 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And a prayer for relief on the merits in a civil complaint is nothing like a motion to suppress or comparable proce- dural motion at which Section 1806 (f ) is aimed . Section 1806(g) confirms that the two words — \"motion\" and \"request\"— should be understood as close synonyms .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "Where, as here, \"general words follow specific words in a s tatutory enumeration, the general words are con- strued to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.\" Washington State Dep't of Soc. & Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It thereby avoids \"giving unintended bre adth to the Acts of Congress.\" 574 U.S. 528, in order to achieve a similar effect of preventing the government from us- ing or disclosing electronic -surveillance evidence against the aggrieved person in a legal proceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1806(f)'s procedures do not provide a means for adjudicating the merits of an action",
		"context": "Various i mpediments, such as standing, sovereign immunity, the state -secrets privilege, or other generally applicable doctrines , may stand in the way of resolving the merits of a statutory or c onstitutional claim in par ticular cases —especially where litigation would threaten the national security . See, e.g. , 568 U.S. 3; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.) ( dismissing claims under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 on state -secrets grounds ), cert. denied,525 U.S. 967 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 1159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "C, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009 -546 to 3009 - 724 (\"IIRIRA\") , changed the nomenclature: \" What was formerly known as 'deportation' is now called 'removal' in IIRIRA.\" Fernandez [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What Demore discusses about detention during deportation is applicable to detention during removal here. 8 at 32; Mezei , 345 U.S. at 212.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 30",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "Far from having formerly been lawfully present like the Zadvydas petitioners, Plaintiffs here were unlawfully present , were removed , and unlawfully reentered . Judicial fiats such as the lower courts ' actions here improperly rely on the Due Process Clause to enact the judges' personal preferences. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The federal courts have the duty to apply the Constit ution, but that duty does not encompass policymaking under the guise of substantive due process. Second, the Zadvydas petitioners began their cases as petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "A habeas proceeding \"authorizes the federal courts to entertain … claim[s] that [ the petitioners] are being held in custody in violation of the Constitution, \" but \"it is not a grant of power to decide constitutional questions not necessarily subsumed within that claim. \" Cty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At most, Zadvydas decided the as-applied claims of former LPRs under detention pending removal with no likely prospect that a nother country would accept them. That holding is quite limited, and it does not apply here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "442 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "Third, because habeas proceedings are as -applied challenges , id., Zadvydas does not necessarily extend 9 to proceeding s with different facts or procedural postures . Prevail ing in an as -applied challenge such as Zadvydas is simply different from prevailing in a facial challenge such as the instant cases. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 502 U.S. 183. Because \"[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication, \" 550 U.S. 124, federal courts should be wary of granting the facial syst emic relief that the Ninth Circuit ordered here. Fourth, differences between facial and as -applied relief undermine not only the Ninth Circuit 's decisions but also the Zadvydas majority 's invocation of the canon of constitutional avoidance in the first pla ce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "Third, because habeas proceedings are as -applied challenges , id., Zadvydas does not necessarily extend 9 to proceeding s with different facts or procedural postures . Prevail ing in an as -applied challenge such as Zadvydas is simply different from prevailing in a facial challenge such as the instant cases. 564 U.S. 552; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication, \" 550 U.S. 124, federal courts should be wary of granting the facial syst emic relief that the Ninth Circuit ordered here. Fourth, differences between facial and as -applied relief undermine not only the Ninth Circuit 's decisions but also the Zadvydas majority 's invocation of the canon of constitutional avoidance in the first pla ce.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "Prevail ing in an as -applied challenge such as Zadvydas is simply different from prevailing in a facial challenge such as the instant cases. 564 U.S. 552; 502 U.S. 183. Because \"[a]s-applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], federal courts should be wary of granting the facial syst emic relief that the Ninth Circuit ordered here. Fourth, differences between facial and as -applied relief undermine not only the Ninth Circuit 's decisions but also the Zadvydas majority 's invocation of the canon of constitutional avoidance in the first pla ce. If § 1231(a)(6) raises constitutional doubt as applied to LPRs under detention pending removal with no likely prospect that a nother country will accept them, that would not justify facial relief if the statute were entirely lawful for aliens such as th e class representatives here: A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "Fourth, differences between facial and as -applied relief undermine not only the Ninth Circuit 's decisions but also the Zadvydas majority 's invocation of the canon of constitutional avoidance in the first pla ce. If § 1231(a)(6) raises constitutional doubt as applied to LPRs under detention pending removal with no likely prospect that a nother country will accept them, that would not justify facial relief if the statute were entirely lawful for aliens such as th e class representatives here: A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United Stat [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is simply inaccurate to say that the statute as seen by the Zadvydas majority raises facial constitutional doubt. Fifth, because non-mutual estoppel is unavailable against the Government, 464 U.S. 154, this Court must consider the INA as it stands today, not as it stood when the Court decided Zadvydas in 2001.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "United Stat 481 U.S. 739. It is simply inaccurate to say that the statute as seen by the Zadvydas majority raises facial constitutional doubt. Fifth, because non-mutual estoppel is unavailable against the Government, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court must consider the INA as it stands today, not as it stood when the Court decided Zadvydas in 2001. In particular, this Court must consider the Government 's post -Zadvydas regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which narrow the ambiguity perceived by the Zadvydas majority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court should reconsider or narrow Zadvydas",
		"context": "In particular, this Court must consider the Government 's post -Zadvydas regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 241.13, which narrow the ambiguity perceived by the Zadvydas majority. See Whole Woman 's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unlike in 2001, the regulations would cabin any perceived constitutional doubt , if indeed the statute were amenable to t he doubt canon .3",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 2292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ARGUMENT",
		"context": "The FOMB has reiterated its position against pub- lic information requests alleging that these requests are inconsistent with PROMESA. The Board rejects abrogation of immunity included in PROMESA based on the Pennhurst doctrine, that divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear suits against a state under its 5 own statutes. Pennhurst State School and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before the lower courts, FOMB also had argued that PROMESA preempted local or federal laws that grant the press access to documents secured, prepared, and held by the government except in the enumerated instances where access to information is mentioned in PROMESA, and that due to their sensitive nature, access to the afore- mentioned public documents could threaten the objec- tives of the Board itself. None of these arguments are meritorious, particu- larly when such preemption would result in a displace-ment of the constitutional and human right of access to information and freedom of press.",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring a Specific-Intent Standard Optimally Balances Safeguarding Protected Expression and Addressing the Harms Caused By True Threats",
		"context": "Protecting our \"profound national commitment\" to uninhibited debate requires a specific -intent standard. \"The hallmark of the protection of free speech is to allow 'free trade in ideas'—even ideas that the overwhelming majority of people might find 17 distasteful or discomforting.\" Black , 538 at 358; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This protection is not absolute, and certain limited categories of speech —in this case true threats —are properly proscribed because of the harm they cause . True threats are beyond the Firs t Amendment's boundary to \"protect[] individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring a Specific-Intent Standard Optimally Balances Safeguarding Protected Expression and Addressing the Harms Caused By True Threats",
		"context": ". [W]e should be particularly wary of adopting such a standard for a statute that regulates pure speech\" because it \"would have substantial costs in discouraging the ' uninhibited, robust, and wide - open ' debate that the First Amendment is intended to protect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the general -intent standard, speakers are accountable for the effect their words will have on listeners regardless of their own intent , and therefore 19 they will steer far clear of the criminal line to avoid the \"possibility\" of prosecution and conviction for lawful speech —be it political hyperbole, religious exhortation, attempts at humor, or biting commentary . Black , 538 U.S. at 365.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring a Specific-Intent Standard Optimally Balances Safeguarding Protected Expression and Addressing the Harms Caused By True Threats",
		"context": "Free debate cannot survive the chilling of t hose who se language is hyperbolic, abusive, inexact, crude, or simply unpopular . Some courts have favored a general -intent standard because , as they say, it \"best satisfies the purposes of \" punishing threatening speech. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 31 F.3d 550. But this rationale fails entirely to do the balancing requir ed by the First Amendment. The general -intent standard \"undervalues the tenet that language which is vituperative, abusive, and inexact may still be protected under the First Amendment\" and is therefore \"over -inclusive when it comes to prohibiting threaten ing speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "951 F.2d 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring a Specific-Intent Standard Optimally Balances Safeguarding Protected Expression and Addressing the Harms Caused By True Threats",
		"context": "Free debate cannot survive the chilling of t hose who se language is hyperbolic, abusive, inexact, crude, or simply unpopular . Some courts have favored a general -intent standard because , as they say, it \"best satisfies the purposes of \" punishing threatening speech. 951 F.2d 549 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this rationale fails entirely to do the balancing requir ed by the First Amendment. The general -intent standard \"undervalues the tenet that language which is vituperative, abusive, and inexact may still be protected under the First Amendment\" and is therefore \"over -inclusive when it comes to prohibiting threaten ing speech.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 F.3d 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)",
		"context": "To the contrary, this Court has made clear in several ways that patent holders are entitled to full recovery for the harm inflicted by acts of infringement. To begin with, this Court has confirmed that damages for patent infringement—as with most 24 torts—should provide a make-whole recovery, i.e., damages should put the patentee in the position that it would have occupied absent the infringement. Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552 (patentee may recover \"the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Aro Mfg. 377 U.S. 476; see also Albemarle Paper 422 U.S. 405. In particular, the Court has recognized that a prevailing patent owner's damages may include, if proved, lost profits the patent owner would have earned if the infringement had not occurred.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)",
		"context": "To begin with, this Court has confirmed that damages for patent infringement—as with most 24 torts—should provide a make-whole recovery, i.e., damages should put the patentee in the position that it would have occupied absent the infringement. Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552 (patentee may recover \"the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred\"); 155 U.S. 565; Aro Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Albemarle Paper 422 U.S. 405. In particular, the Court has recognized that a prevailing patent owner's damages may include, if proved, lost profits the patent owner would have earned if the infringement had not occurred. Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552-53.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)",
		"context": "To begin with, this Court has confirmed that damages for patent infringement—as with most 24 torts—should provide a make-whole recovery, i.e., damages should put the patentee in the position that it would have occupied absent the infringement. Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552 (patentee may recover \"the difference between his pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred\"); 155 U.S. 565; Aro Mfg. 377 U.S. 476; see also Albemarle Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, the Court has recognized that a prevailing patent owner's damages may include, if proved, lost profits the patent owner would have earned if the infringement had not occurred. Yale Lock , 117 U.S. at 552-53.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)",
		"context": "7 To be sure, a patent owner (like any other plaintiff) seeking lost-profits damages must meet stringent eviden tiary burdens and provide specific proof—including proving to a reasonable certainty the amount of the lost profits, and that the defendant's tortious cond uct in fact proximately caused the full amount of lost profits. See, e.g. , Panduit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Rite-Hite 56 F.3d 1538 7 See also, e.g. , Siemens , 637 F.3d at 1287-88; Rite-Hite , 56 F.3d at 1545; Panduit , 575 F.2d at 1156; Am. Safety Table, 415 F.2d at 377-78; McComb , 15 F. Cas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.2d 1152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Plain Text Of section 271(f) And section 284 Makes Clear That WesternGeco Can Recover For The Lost Profits Caused By ION's Infringement Under section 271(f)",
		"context": "7 To be sure, a patent owner (like any other plaintiff) seeking lost-profits damages must meet stringent eviden tiary burdens and provide specific proof—including proving to a reasonable certainty the amount of the lost profits, and that the defendant's tortious cond uct in fact proximately caused the full amount of lost profits. See, e.g. , Panduit 575 F.2d 1152; Rite-Hite [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 7 See also, e.g. , Siemens , 637 F.3d at 1287-88; Rite-Hite , 56 F.3d at 1545; Panduit , 575 F.2d at 1156; Am. Safety Table, 415 F.2d at 377-78; McComb , 15 F. Cas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 F.3d 1538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. An award of compensatory damages for the breach of Title VI or related civil rights statutes may include compensation for emotional distress",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court set out a basic framework for determining the scope of the \"appropriate relief \" for a breach of a funding condi- tion in Spending Clause legislation. Id. at 185.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. An award of compensatory damages for the breach of Title VI or related civil rights statutes may include compensation for emotional distress",
		"context": "Id. at 187 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Court recognized, however, that a remedy need not be enumerated in the statute to put the funding recipient on notice. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. An award of compensatory damages for the breach of Title VI or related civil rights statutes may include compensation for emotional distress",
		"context": "Barnes , 536 U.S. at 187 . Applying th ose principles to Title VI , Section 504, and the other Spending Clause statutes that borrow Ti- tle VI's remedies, Barnes reaffirmed th e Court's pr ior holding s that both \"compensatory damages \" and an \"in- junction\" are available when a federal -funding recipient engages in \" intentional conduct that violates the clear 13 terms of the \" nondiscrimination statutes because both remedies are \"forms of relief tra ditionally available in suits for breach of contract .\" 536 U.S. at 187 (citing in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 441 U.S. 677 ). But t he Court explained that th ose holdings do not permit an award of punitive damages because \"punitive damages, unlike compensatory dam- ages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. An award of compensatory damages for the breach of Title VI or related civil rights statutes may include compensation for emotional distress",
		"context": "Barnes , 536 U.S. at 187 . Applying th ose principles to Title VI , Section 504, and the other Spending Clause statutes that borrow Ti- tle VI's remedies, Barnes reaffirmed th e Court's pr ior holding s that both \"compensatory damages \" and an \"in- junction\" are available when a federal -funding recipient engages in \" intentional conduct that violates the clear 13 terms of the \" nondiscrimination statutes because both remedies are \"forms of relief tra ditionally available in suits for breach of contract .\" 536 U.S. at 187 (citing in 503 U.S. 60 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). But t he Court explained that th ose holdings do not permit an award of punitive damages because \"punitive damages, unlike compensatory dam- ages and injunction, are generally not available for breach of contract.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Service properly determined that Unit 1 is essential for the dusky gopher frog's recovery",
		"context": "37 when an agency's judgment rests on \"scientific determi- nation[s]\" as to matters within its expertise, \"a reviewing court must generally be at its most defere ntial.\" Balti- more Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Petitioner 's various arguments to the contrary are without merit. Petitioner principally argues —contrary to its position below8—that an unoccupied area cannot be \"essential \" to \"conservation\" unless it simultaneously contains all of the \"primary constituent elements\" (PCEs) identified by the Service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Service properly determined that Unit 1 is essential for the dusky gopher frog's recovery",
		"context": "1532(5)(A)(ii) . \"Congress gen- erally acts intentionally when it uses particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another.\" Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This contrast in the definitions of the two types of critical habitat supports the conclusion that an unoccupied area may be \"essential\" even if it currently lacks all features of the species' occupied critical habitat. See, e.g., J.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Service properly determined that Unit 1 is essential for the dusky gopher frog's recovery",
		"context": "1532(5)(A)(ii). Congress thus entrusted to the Service's judgment the task of reasonably interpreting and applying that standard. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioner also suggests (Br. 44 -45) that Unit 1 cannot be deemed essential because, in lig ht of its and other landowners' current opposition, the designation may not yield an immediate conservation benefit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt",
		"context": "amend. V. The \"origin and history of the Double Jeopardy Clause are hardly a matter of dispute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"The constitutional provision had its origin in the three common-law pleas of autre- fois acquit , autrefois convict , and pardon. These three pleas prevented the retrial of a person who had previ- ously been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the 22 same offense.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt",
		"context": "These three pleas prevented the retrial of a person who had previ- ously been acquitted, convicted, or pardoned for the 22 same offense.\" Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Clause's purpose is likewise uncontroversial: avoiding the \"unacceptably high risk that the Govern- ment, with its superior resources,\" could \"wear down\" the defendant over multiple prosecutions. DiFrancesco , 449 U.S. at 130.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt",
		"context": "\"The Double Jeopardy Clause forbids a second trial for the purpose of affording the prosecu- tion another opportunity to supply evidence which it failed to muster in the first proceeding. This is central to the objective of the prohibition against successive trials.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Double Jeopardy Clause is not an absolute bar to retrial. The Clause bars retrial only where an event \"such as an acquittal .",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt",
		"context": ". terminates the original jeopardy.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Clause allows retrial where nothing has in fact terminated jeopardy. For example, where a defendant is convicted but obtains reversal of that conviction on appeal, this Court has explained that ther e is no \"double\" jeopardy because the defendant's jeopardy did not end with the conviction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial only where there has been a final determination of guilt",
		"context": "Likewise, where a defendant's guilt has not been adjudicated, as in the case of a mistrial, retrial is again 23 permissible. As this Court put it two centuries ago, \"[t]he prisoner has not been convicted or acquitted, [so he] may again be put upon his defence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has con- sistently and repeatedly held that \"the failure of the jury to reach a verdict is not an event which terminates jeopardy.\" Richardson , 468 U.S. at 325; see also , e.g., Jo- seph Story, Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States , § 391, at 232 (1840) (no double jeop- ardy concerns if \"the jury ha[s] been discharged with- out giving any verdict\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent",
		"context": "In the specific version in- voked by GE France, U.S. courts have allowed a non- party to force arbitration with a signatory who never consented to arbitrate with the non-party, when the issues in their dispute \"are intertwined with the con- tract providing for arbitration.\" Domke § 13:2, at 13-10; see, e.g. , Grigson , 210 F.3d at 528; J.J. Ryan & Sons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A related theory allows a non-party to force arbitrat ion even of claims wholly unconnected to the agreement, so long as the party to the agreement alleges \"substantially interdepend-ent and concerted misconduct\" between the non- party and the other party to the agreement. MS 46 Dealer Serv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "863 F.2d 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent",
		"context": "A related theory allows a non-party to force arbitrat ion even of claims wholly unconnected to the agreement, so long as the party to the agreement alleges \"substantially interdepend-ent and concerted misconduct\" between the non- party and the other party to the agreement. MS 46 Dealer Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Christopher Driskill, A Danger- ous Doctrine: The Case Against Using Concerted- Misconduct Estoppel To Compel Arbitration , 60 Ala. L. Rev. 443, 453 (2009). Unlike traditional estoppel, these two non- consent-based estoppel th eories do not require det- rimental reliance on acts manifesting consent to ar-bitrate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "177 F.3d 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent",
		"context": "Domke § 13:1, at 13-8. This so- called \"direct benefits\" estoppel theory, too, operates absent consent to the arbitration agreement—the whole point is to force a non-party who received a contract's benefits to arbitrate contract-related dis- putes, even though the non-party by definition never agreed to forgo its right to judicial adjudication of 47 such disputes. See Int'l Paper [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Am. Bureau of 170 F.3d 349; McBro Planning & Dev. 741 F.2d 342.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 F.3d 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent",
		"context": "This so- called \"direct benefits\" estoppel theory, too, operates absent consent to the arbitration agreement—the whole point is to force a non-party who received a contract's benefits to arbitrate contract-related dis- putes, even though the non-party by definition never agreed to forgo its right to judicial adjudication of 47 such disputes. See Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411; Am. Bureau of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; McBro Planning & Dev. 741 F.2d 342. This the- ory confuses \"substantive rights to make a claim on the underlying contract\" with an \"intention to be bound by the imbedded arbitration agreement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "170 F.3d 349",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Equitable Estoppel Theory Invoked By GE France Reflects Neither Privity Nor Consent",
		"context": "See Int'l Paper 206 F.3d 411; Am. Bureau of 170 F.3d 349; McBro Planning & Dev. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This the- ory confuses \"substantive rights to make a claim on the underlying contract\" with an \"intention to be bound by the imbedded arbitration agreement.\" James M. Hosking, The Third Party Non-Signatory's Ability to Compel International Commercial Arbitra-tion: Doing Justice Without Destroying Consent , 4 Pepp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.2d 342",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Pet. App. 125a (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 488 U.S. 204 speaking to whether punitive damages are available for preenactment co nduct. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Pet. App. 125a (quoting 521 U.S. 320); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] speaking to whether punitive damages are available for preenactment co nduct. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Although drafted awkwardly, with the stilted \"be given effect as\" locution and a misplaced comma, the meaning of §1083(c)(2) is apparent by virtue of the \"prior actions\" eligible to invoke the private cause of action under §1605A(c). Specifically, eligible \"prior actions\" are limited to th ose (i) previously brought under §1605(a)(7) or the Flatow Amendment, (ii) relying upon either of those provisions \"as creating a cause of action,\" (iii) \"adversely affected\" on the grounds that those provisions fail to create a cause of action against the fo reign state, and (iv) still before the courts in any form. Section 1083(c)(2) is plainly a legislative response to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which he ld that \"neither 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(7) nor the Flatow Amendment, nor the two considered in tandem, creates a private right of action against a foreign government.\" 353 F.3d at 1033.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 1024",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": "Furthermore, this Court has since questioned whether the language in that 1990 civil rights bill was sufficiently clear to overcome Landgraf 's presumption. While in Landgraf itself this Court seemed to suggest in dictum that the 1990 bill's language would be sufficient (511 U.S. at 263), three years later this Court (with largely the same Justices in the majority) appeared to backtrack, stating that \"Landgraf suggested that the [1990 bill's language] might possibly have qualified as a clear statement for retroactive effect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the D.C. Circuit observed (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": "521 U.S. at 328 n.4 (citing cases). That observation has held true since Lindh . See, e.g., AT&T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in the rare circumstances where the Court found statutory language sufficient to overcome the presumption against retroactivity, that language unmistakably expresses retroactive intent. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Neither section 1605A(c) nor section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA Provides a Clear Statement of Retroactive Intent for Punitive Damages",
		"context": ". . entered before, on, or after' the statute's enactment date\" (citation omitted)); Graham & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At bottom, Congress was enacting a new federal private right of action ag ainst foreign states that 48 included punitive damages for the first time ever; if Congress had wanted punitive damages to apply retroactively, it could have commanded as such directly and clearly, as Landgraf requires. Far from that, the \"highly reticulated\" (U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 32 is the leading case on the application of civil rightsguaranteed by the Constitution and laws of the UnitedStates in the body politic named the Commonwealth ofPuerto Rico through the application of the due processand equal protection clauses of the United StatesConstitution, to \"the inhabitants of Puerto Rico\". The\"inhabitants of Puerto Rico\" ar e thus protected, at least under either the Fifth Amendment or the FourteenthAmendment in their fundamental rights, privileges, orimmunities to due process and equal protection. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "at 581-586 and 599-601. The Court's decisions respecting the rights of theinhabitants of Puerto Rico have been neitherunambiguous nor exactly uniform. The nature of 32 Cited with approval in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in both the opinion of the Court and the dissenting opinion of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor ( Id. at 1883) and by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto 140 S. Ct. 1649. 22 this country's relationship to Puerto Rico was vigorously debated within the Court as well aswithin the Congress.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "The Court's decisions respecting the rights of theinhabitants of Puerto Rico have been neitherunambiguous nor exactly uniform. The nature of 32 Cited with approval in 136 S. Ct. 1863 in both the opinion of the Court and the dissenting opinion of Justices Breyer and Sotomayor ( Id. at 1883) and by Justice Sotomayor in her concurring opinion in Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 this country's relationship to Puerto Rico was vigorously debated within the Court as well aswithin the Congress. … It is clear now, however,that the protections accorded by either the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment or theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment apply to residents ofPuerto Rico.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "22 this country's relationship to Puerto Rico was vigorously debated within the Court as well aswithin the Congress. … It is clear now, however,that the protections accorded by either the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment or theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment apply to residents ofPuerto Rico. The Court recognized theapplicability of these guarantees as long ago asits decisions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 258 U.S. 298. The principle wasreaffirmed and strengthened in 354 U.S. 1416 U.S. 663, where we held thatinhabitants of Puerto Rico are protected, undereither the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth,from the official taking of property without due process of law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "182 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "22 this country's relationship to Puerto Rico was vigorously debated within the Court as well aswithin the Congress. … It is clear now, however,that the protections accorded by either the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment or theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment apply to residents ofPuerto Rico. The Court recognized theapplicability of these guarantees as long ago asits decisions in 182 U.S. 244, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The principle wasreaffirmed and strengthened in 354 U.S. 1416 U.S. 663, where we held thatinhabitants of Puerto Rico are protected, undereither the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth,from the official taking of property without due process of law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "… It is clear now, however,that the protections accorded by either the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment or theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment apply to residents ofPuerto Rico. The Court recognized theapplicability of these guarantees as long ago asits decisions in 182 U.S. 244, and 258 U.S. 298. The principle wasreaffirmed and strengthened in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]416 U.S. 663, where we held thatinhabitants of Puerto Rico are protected, undereither the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth,from the official taking of property without due process of law. Id. at 599-601.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "… It is clear now, however,that the protections accorded by either the DueProcess Clause of the Fifth Amendment or theDue Process and Equal Protection Clauses of theFourteenth Amendment apply to residents ofPuerto Rico. The Court recognized theapplicability of these guarantees as long ago asits decisions in 182 U.S. 244, and 258 U.S. 298. The principle wasreaffirmed and strengthened in 354 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where we held thatinhabitants of Puerto Rico are protected, undereither the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth,from the official taking of property without due process of law. Id. at 599-601.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "TheSupreme Court has held that no such authority is\"plenary\". The Supreme Court held just last year that\"structural constraints, designed in part to ensurepolitical accountability, apply to all exercises of federalpower, including those related to Article IV entities. \"Financial Oversight & Management Board for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 34. Further, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico have a right not to be deprived and divested of life,liberty, or property, particul arly due process and equal protection, Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, supra. We repeat, the Territory Cluse cannot be applied to the inhabitants ofPuerto Rico, persons and United States Citizens, withthe same force and effect as if they were a mere chattel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "VII. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO",
		"context": "Further, the inhabitants of Puerto Rico have a right not to be deprived and divested of life,liberty, or property, particul arly due process and equal protection, Examining Board of Engineers, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, supra. We repeat, the Territory Cluse cannot be applied to the inhabitants ofPuerto Rico, persons and United States Citizens, withthe same force and effect as if they were a mere chattel. 34 In the most recent Supreme Cour t case dealing with Puerto Rico, Financial Oversight & Management Board for Puerto [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Aurelius), the Supreme Court held that the Financial Oversight andManagement Board for Puerto Rico's members have primarilylocal duties, such that their se lection is not subject to the constraints of the Appointments Clause. Because of its temporalnature the Court should not co nsider rulings made regarding PROMESA as binding on any of the issues presented by this case. It is a statute which by its own terms is not permanent as itterminates upon the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico complying withcertain conditions,48 U.S. Code 2149 24 Justice Marshall dissenting in Harris v. Rosario , supra, precisely made the distinction between the discrimination against the government of Puerto Ricoand the discrimination against the inhabitants ofPuerto Rico citizens or not: It is unclear whether the Court's TerritoryClause analysis is intended to apply only wherethe discrimination is against the Government ofPuerto Rico and not against persons residingthere.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Application of Pike Balancing to the Facts Here Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "\"Error correction is 'outside the mainstream of the Court's functions. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is particularly in ap- propriate where, as here, the claimed errors are relev ant only to a n industry that, according to petitioners, is unique. They argue now, as they did below , that burdens allegedly imposed on their operations rest on \" the nature of the in dustry and its prod uct.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Application of Pike Balancing to the Facts Here Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "9a (emphasis added). This Court, however, does not \"sit for the benefit of the particular litigants\" before it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet itioners must show that this case is \" importan[t] to the public,\" and not just \"the parties.\" Layne & Bowler 261 U.S. 387.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Application of Pike Balancing to the Facts Here Does Not Warrant Review",
		"context": "349 U.S. 70. Pet itioners must show that this case is \" importan[t] to the public,\" and not just \"the parties.\" Layne & Bowler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They make no ef - fort to do that here. Even with respect to the allegedly \"unique\" pork industry, their claim of importance falls short.",
		"citation_value_orig": "261 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns",
		"context": "\"Any warrantless entry based on exigent circumstances must, of course, be supported by a genuine exigency\" , Kentucky , 563 U.S. at 470, and \"[t]he government bears the burden of demonstrating that the exception applies .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Facts in the record and inferences drawn therefrom demonstrate that no \"genuine exigency\" existed regarding E dward, which may explain why the CPD only raised the community caretaking exception – it doesn't require either a warrant or an emergency. But, as shown above, the warrant and probable cause requi rements most definitely apply when dealing with mentally ill or suicidal persons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.3d 1170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns",
		"context": "See Machan , 958 F.3d at 1213- 14, 1215. Opposite conclusions obtained in cases where police had no objective evidence of suicidal intent 23 after receiving emergency calls to that effect. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], police arrested an elderly man with a hunting rifle after someone claimed that he tied himself to railroad tracks. Turns out he was merely hunting while sitting in a folding chair. Nevertheless, police officers arrested him without attempting to determine whether he was depressed or actually suicidal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 F.3d 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. CPD officers had no \"probable cause\" to seize Edward or his guns",
		"context": "Id. at 842. 777 F.3d 872, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], involved high school students thought to be suicidal , again based upon claims made by others . Each student appeared normal to the police and denied suicidal intent. In Bruce , police took a girl away for a mental health examination based on her ex-boyfriend's claim that she tried to kill herself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "349 F.3d 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Accommodation is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Providing Free Contraceptives and Abortion Causing Drugs and Devices",
		"context": "§ 2000bb-1(b). The government must use alternatives to achieve its desired end even when those alternatives are more costly or less effective. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The requirement for Respondents to use the least restrictive means is \"exceptionally demanding.\" Hobby Lobby , 134 S. Ct. at 2780.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Accommodation is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Providing Free Contraceptives and Abortion Causing Drugs and Devices",
		"context": "Respondents claim that obtaining access to free contraceptives through a secondary sign up or other means would be an unworkable less restrictive alternative. In many ways, this argument is overblown and unpersuasive. 19 In National Federation of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court required all people who do not receive healthcare through an employer to \"opt in\" or purchase healthcare. This process of obtaining insurance is required under the Affordable Care Act. Claiming the \"opt in\" process itself poses a barrier is similar to asserting that the act of obtaining insurance pursuant to the Affordable Care Act amounts to a barrier.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Accommodation is Not the Least Restrictive Means of Providing Free Contraceptives and Abortion Causing Drugs and Devices",
		"context": "The accommodation is not the least restrictive means of providing free contraceptives and abortifacients. When the government \"has open to it a less drastic way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a [regulatory] scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal liberties.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The narrow exemption allowed by the federal Petitioners' falls squarely under RFRA by exempting religious 21 employers from the substantial burden of directly violating their faith or paying devastating fines to the Internal Revenue Service.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the cour t of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 524 U.S. 236; 457 U.S. 731; 418 U.S. 683. When a court of appeals has de-cided an appeal over which it lacked jurisdiction, this Court likewise lacks jurisdicti on to address the merits and may only vacate the judgment of the court of ap- peals and remand for dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., 546 U.S. 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 547",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the cour t of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 135 S. Ct. 547; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 457 U.S. 731; 418 U.S. 683. When a court of appeals has de-cided an appeal over which it lacked jurisdiction, this Court likewise lacks jurisdicti on to address the merits and may only vacate the judgment of the court of ap- peals and remand for dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., 546 U.S. 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the cour t of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 135 S. Ct. 547; 524 U.S. 236; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 418 U.S. 683. When a court of appeals has de-cided an appeal over which it lacked jurisdiction, this Court likewise lacks jurisdicti on to address the merits and may only vacate the judgment of the court of ap- peals and remand for dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., 546 U.S. 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable",
		"context": "This Court's jurisdiction depends on whether a case was properly \"in\" the cour t of appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254; see, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 135 S. Ct. 547; 524 U.S. 236; 457 U.S. 731; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a court of appeals has de-cided an appeal over which it lacked jurisdiction, this Court likewise lacks jurisdicti on to address the merits and may only vacate the judgment of the court of ap- peals and remand for dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., 546 U.S. 345.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. This Court lacks jurisdiction because the district court's orders were not appealable",
		"context": "§ 1254; see, e.g., Dart Cherokee Basin Operating 135 S. Ct. 547; 524 U.S. 236; 457 U.S. 731; 418 U.S. 683. When a court of appeals has de-cided an appeal over which it lacked jurisdiction, this Court likewise lacks jurisdicti on to address the merits and may only vacate the judgment of the court of ap- peals and remand for dismissal of the appeal. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. First Amendment Principles",
		"context": "Here, the Government will likely urge the Court to utilize the public forum doctrine, and standards associated with the doctrine, in deciding whether Section 211B.11(1) goes too far. See Perry Ed uc. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is not necessary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. No substantive source of law expressly establishes a trust duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's general water needs",
		"context": "In the decision below, the court of appeals identified four possible sources of a judicially enforceable duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's general water needs: (1) the implied -reservation -of-water -rights doc- 35 trine of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; (2) the 1868 Treaty 's farming provisions ; (3) the Project Act and other statutes that grant the Secretary \"con- trol\" over the Lower Colorad o River mainstream; and (4) an environmental impact statement that the Bureau of Reclamation issued in 2007. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "207 U.S. 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": ". The Confrontation Clause guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the rig ht to be confronted with the witnesses against him. After 4 this Court held that the Clause is applicable against the states by virtue of the Fou rteenth Amendment, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it became crucial to distinguish between the role of the Clause and that of ordinary evidentiary law. The Court's first attempt to articulate a theory of the Clause, in 448 U.S. 56, was a failure. It essentially constitutionalized the law of he arsay, with all its bizarre complexities and exceptions, and so it failed to enunciate a principle that was comprehensible or persuasive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": "The Confrontation Clause guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the rig ht to be confronted with the witnesses against him. After 4 this Court held that the Clause is applicable against the states by virtue of the Fou rteenth Amendment, 380 U.S. 400, it became crucial to distinguish between the role of the Clause and that of ordinary evidentiary law. The Court's first attempt to articulate a theory of the Clause, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], was a failure. It essentially constitutionalized the law of he arsay, with all its bizarre complexities and exceptions, and so it failed to enunciate a principle that was comprehensible or persuasive. And as a result, it frequently led to intolerable results .",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 56",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": "It essentially constitutionalized the law of he arsay, with all its bizarre complexities and exceptions, and so it failed to enunciate a principle that was comprehensible or persuasive. And as a result, it frequently led to intolerable results . All that changed with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which the Court rediscovered the meaning of the confrontation right, not only as it is reflected in the text of the Clause but as it had been recognized in the common law for centuries before: The right is not a s ubstantive one against admissi on of evidence deemed unreliable, and it does not extend to all hearsay. R ather , it is a procedural right prescribing how witnesses against an accused give testimony —for giving testimony is what witnesses do —and so is limited in scope to statements deemed testimonial. Witnesses must testify not by, say, speaking to the police in the station -house, Crawford , or at home, 547 U.S. 813, or signing a document, Melendez - Diaz , 557 U.S. 305, but rather by speaking face - to-face with the accused, under oath and subject to cross -examination, and if reasonably possible at trial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 36",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": "All that changed with 541 U.S. 36, in which the Court rediscovered the meaning of the confrontation right, not only as it is reflected in the text of the Clause but as it had been recognized in the common law for centuries before: The right is not a s ubstantive one against admissi on of evidence deemed unreliable, and it does not extend to all hearsay. R ather , it is a procedural right prescribing how witnesses against an accused give testimony —for giving testimony is what witnesses do —and so is limited in scope to statements deemed testimonial. Witnesses must testify not by, say, speaking to the police in the station -house, Crawford , or at home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or signing a document, Melendez - Diaz , 557 U.S. 305, but rather by speaking face - to-face with the accused, under oath and subject to cross -examination, and if reasonably possible at trial. Most of this Court's Confrontation Clause cases concern the question of whether a given statement was testimonial. This one does not: It is a bsolutely clear that Morris's testimony at his allocution hearing was testimonial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 813",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": "All that changed with 541 U.S. 36, in which the Court rediscovered the meaning of the confrontation right, not only as it is reflected in the text of the Clause but as it had been recognized in the common law for centuries before: The right is not a s ubstantive one against admissi on of evidence deemed unreliable, and it does not extend to all hearsay. R ather , it is a procedural right prescribing how witnesses against an accused give testimony —for giving testimony is what witnesses do —and so is limited in scope to statements deemed testimonial. Witnesses must testify not by, say, speaking to the police in the station -house, Crawford , or at home, 547 U.S. 813, or signing a document, Melendez - Diaz , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but rather by speaking face - to-face with the accused, under oath and subject to cross -examination, and if reasonably possible at trial. Most of this Court's Confrontation Clause cases concern the question of whether a given statement was testimonial. This one does not: It is a bsolutely clear that Morris's testimony at his allocution hearing was testimonial.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Morris's allocution falls within the categorical prohibition of the Confrontation Clause because it was testimonial and offered against petitioner for the truth of what it asserted, and petitioner did not have an opportunity for confrontation",
		"context": "Most of this Court's Confrontation Clause cases concern the question of whether a given statement was testimonial. This one does not: It is a bsolutely clear that Morris's testimony at his allocution hearing was testimonial. And it is equally clear that this testimony 5 was offered against Petitioner ,2 to prove the truth of a matter that it asserted, compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (198 5) (no confrontation violation when statement was not offered for the truth of what it asserted) , and that Petitioner never had an opportunity to be confronted with Morris and cross - examine him. It follows that there is a presumptive violation of the Conf rontation Clause. Is there nonetheless a reason why a violation should not be recognized?",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 409",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Decisions Of Other Circuits Establishing That Respondents' Conduct Was Obviously Unconstitutional.",
		"context": "Respondents barely attempt to distinguish [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], wh ich is precisely on point. If anything, Respondents' treatment of Taylor was more severe than the misconduct Hope suffered: Taylor was degraded, humiliated, and put at risk of bodily harm for 20 times as long as Hope was; denied sanitary drinking water and food for days; and simi- larly subjected to extreme temperature conditions, nudity, and mockery. Taylor's experience reflects pre- cisely the kind of cruel and degrading mistreatment Hope identified as obviously unconstitutional and therefore unprotected by qualified immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Decisions Of Other Circuits Establishing That Respondents' Conduct Was Obviously Unconstitutional.",
		"context": "The standard for a condi- tions-of-confinement claim is whether Respondents disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm; if the substantial risk of harm Respondents disregarded was \"especially obvious,\" so was the constitutional vi- olation. No reasonable official could believe that ex- posing Taylor to this \"obvious\" risk was lawful. Respondents suggest that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], precludes th is conclusion. Opp. 29- 30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Decision Below Conflicts With This Court's Precedent And Decisions Of Other Circuits Establishing That Respondents' Conduct Was Obviously Unconstitutional.",
		"context": "32-33. But each decision found the misconduct so obviously unconstitutional as to de- feat qualified immunity regardless of whether on- point circuit precedent existed. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]742 F. App'x 332. Finally, Respondents point to cases from other circuits they claim align with the Fifth Circuit's deci- sion below. Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "800 F.3d 1295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate",
		"context": "1983. Because Bivens judicially implied a federal damages action aga inst federal offic- ers, whereas Congress expressly created such an action against state officers in Section 1983, Congress's ex- press limitation on the reach of Section 1983 should, a fortiori , limit the reach of Bivens . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It would turn separation -of-powers principles on their head to judicially infer liability for federal officers that Congress has expressly rejected for state officers. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate",
		"context": "It would turn separation -of-powers principles on their head to judicially infer liability for federal officers that Congress has expressly rejected for state officers. Cf. Blue Chip [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, although the FTCA waives the United States' sovereign immunity for certain injuries inflicted by federal employees generally , 28 U.S.C. 2674, Con- gress specifically excluded \" [a]ny claim arising in a for- eign country ,\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate",
		"context": "2680(k) . Th e foreign -country exception was motivated in part by Congress 's \"unwill- ingness to subject the United States to liabilities de-pending upon the laws of a foreign power, \" which would have governed FTCA claims arising abroad. S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But avoiding the application of foreign law was not Congress's only goal . Even before DOJ raised concerns about foreign law, the bill that be- came the FTCA excluded \" all claims 'arising in a foreign country in behalf of an alien.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 692",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's consistent decisions not to provide a judicial damages remedy to aliens injured abroad confirm that a Bivens remedy is inappropriate",
		"context": "\"But t he statute exempts U.S. officials, a point that President George H.W. Bush stressed when signing the legislation. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"In confin- ing the coverage of statutes such as the [FTCA] and the [TVPA], Congress has deliberately decided not to fash- ion a cause of actio n\" for aliens injured abroad by federal officials. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "For at least 135 years, this Court has defined a final judgment as a judgment that \"disposes of the whole case on its merits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Most recently, the Court noted that while it gives a \"practical rather than a technical construction\" to the phrase \"final decision\" used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, \"the statute's core application is to rulings that terminate an action.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "Most recently, the Court noted that while it gives a \"practical rather than a technical construction\" to the phrase \"final decision\" used in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, \"the statute's core application is to rulings that terminate an action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While this \"practical construction\" has sometimes expanded the \"core application\" to a limited category of collateral 4 orders, see 337 U.S. 541, the Court has never eroded the core. It has never denied an appeal from a judgment that disposes of a whole case on the merits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 897",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "§ 1291, \"the statute's core application is to rulings that terminate an action.\" 135 S. Ct. 897. While this \"practical construction\" has sometimes expanded the \"core application\" to a limited category of collateral 4 orders, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court has never eroded the core. It has never denied an appeal from a judgment that disposes of a whole case on the merits. The plain language of 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 541",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "§ 1291 constrains the Court from doing so. The \"core\" definition of \"final judgment\" is a judgment that \"ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a final judgment puts a party \"effectively out of court.\" Moses H. Cone Memorial 460 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 U.S. 229",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "324 U.S. 229. Such a final judgment puts a party \"effectively out of court.\" Moses H. Cone Memorial [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. One indicia of a final judgment is that the district court \"disassociates itself from a case.\" 514 U.S. 35.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondents can avoid the final judgment rule only by redefining the Court's firmly-established definition of \"final judgment\"",
		"context": "Moses H. Cone Memorial 460 U.S. 1. One indicia of a final judgment is that the district court \"disassociates itself from a case.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The judgment at issue in this case falls within this core definition of the final judgment rule. The district court \"dismissed\" petitioner's \"action\" \"on the merits.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. No Recent Developments Warrant Review Of The Bakke/Grutter/Fisher Framework",
		"context": "And in Grutter , this Court recognized that \"Justice Powell's opinion announcing the judgment … ha[d] served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-conscious admissions policies,\" and that \"[p]ublic and private universities across the Na- tion ha[d] modeled their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's [opinion].\" 539 U.S. at 323. 27 vard's consideration of race does not overwhelm other factors, Pet.App.68-72; Pet.App.242; Pet.App.250-255— exactly what Bakke and Grutter require and how those decisions understood Harvard's process to operate, Bakke , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]-318; Grutter , 539 U.S. at 321, 335- 339. Both lower courts also found that Harvard does not discriminate against Asian-American applicants. Pet.App.264-265; Pet.App.139; Pet.App.64-65; Pet.App.79-98.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT",
		"context": "Review is also not warranted because the First Circuit's decision was correct. This Court's precedent settles the basic framework for analysis: tribal immunity is subject to Congress's \"plenary authority over tribes,\" but courts will determine that Congress has exercised authority to abrogate only where Con- gress has \"'unequivocally' express[ed] that purpose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That requirement for a clear statutory statement of abrog ation reflects the same legal standard for tribes as for other sovereigns, including the federal and state governments. See Santa Clara 436 U.S. 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 782",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT",
		"context": "572 U.S. 782. That requirement for a clear statutory statement of abrog ation reflects the same legal standard for tribes as for other sovereigns, including the federal and state governments. See Santa Clara [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has described the clear-statement rule for abrogation of immunity as a \"canon of construc- tion\" and \"a tool for interp reting the law\" that does not \"displace[] the other traditional tools of statutory construction.\" Richlin Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT",
		"context": "Richlin Sec. Serv. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It has further instructed that \"Congress need not state its intent in any particular way\" and need not \"use magic words,\" so long as its intent is \"clearly discernable from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools.\" 566 U.S. 284; see also 491 U.S. 223.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT",
		"context": "553 U.S. 571. It has further instructed that \"Congress need not state its intent in any particular way\" and need not \"use magic words,\" so long as its intent is \"clearly discernable from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 491 U.S. 223.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS CORRECT",
		"context": "553 U.S. 571. It has further instructed that \"Congress need not state its intent in any particular way\" and need not \"use magic words,\" so long as its intent is \"clearly discernable from the statutory text in light of traditional interpretive tools.\" 566 U.S. 284; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any risk of fee-shifting under section 4 of SB 8 is entirely speculative",
		"context": "at 409. And standing in this case cannot be based on a possible request for attorneys' fees here . See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court thought the possibility of fee -shift- ing \"chill[s]\" the WWH petitioners' exercise of their First Amendment right to petition , and that \"chill\" qual- ified as an injury -in-fact. WWH.ROA.1506; see WWH.ROA.756.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 512",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any risk of fee-shifting under section 4 of SB 8 is entirely speculative",
		"context": "proscribe[]\" the WWH pe- titioners from filing lawsuits to challenge Texas abortion regulations. Id. at 162; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Having to bear the costs of a lawsuit is not a prohibition on filing it. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any risk of fee-shifting under section 4 of SB 8 is entirely speculative",
		"context": "Premier Elec. Constr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, there is no plausible \"threat of en- forcement ,\" Susan B. Anthony List , 573 U.S. at 161- 64, because executive officials cannot seek fees as prevailing parties in litigation they cannot bring, and any fee -shift- ing for their defense of Texas regulations depends on a chain of contingencies. See Clapper , 568 U.S. at 410- 11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.2d 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "1. This Court's \"usual\" practice is to grant certiorari \"when a lower court has invalidated a federal statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No reason exists to depart from that practice here. The constitutional question in this case is exceptionally important to the Government, to respondents, and indeed to all potential TCPA defendants around the country.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "If certiorari is granted, this Court should affirm that holding on the merits. The automated-call prohibition is a content-based restriction on speech because (1) it \"draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys,\" and (2) whether its prohibitions apply to any given automated call \"depend[s] entirely on the communicative content of the [call].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 573 U.S. 464; Pet. App. 12a-14a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2218",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 asserting that the exception could \"save the federal government $120 million over ten years.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "13. The TCPA's other exemptions likewise undermine any claim that the automated-call ban advances a compelling interest. See Metromedia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For instance, as the Government emphasizes, \"the federal government and its agencies\" are not subject to the TCPA's speech ban. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "Government officials and contractors are thus allowed to make a broad range of automatic calls, from conducting rese arch surveys to scheduling congressional town halls. The wholesale exemption for all government speakers and messages \"undermine[s]\" the statute' s \"ameliorative effect\" and shows that the privacy \"justification\" is \"thin .\" Italian Colors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 534 U.S. 316. The same goes for the statute's other exemptions—as well as its open-ended delegation to the FCC to create still more. See supra at 4-5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 1165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "Government officials and contractors are thus allowed to make a broad range of automatic calls, from conducting rese arch surveys to scheduling congressional town halls. The wholesale exemption for all government speakers and messages \"undermine[s]\" the statute' s \"ameliorative effect\" and shows that the privacy \"justification\" is \"thin .\" Italian Colors 878 F.3d 1165; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The same goes for the statute's other exemptions—as well as its open-ended delegation to the FCC to create still more. See supra at 4-5.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Constitutional Issue Warrants Review",
		"context": "See supra at 4-5. This Court has explained that when a speech restriction \"leaves appreciable damage to [a] supposedly vital interest unprohibited,\" it \"cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order.\" Reed , 135 S. Ct. at 2232 (quoting Republican Party of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). That is the case here. The Fourth Circuit thus correctly held that the automated-call provision is unconstitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability",
		"context": "The \"unoccupied\" clause is \"more demanding.\" Home Builders Ass'n v.U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text focuses not on habitat \"features,\" but habitat \"areas.\" See344 F.Supp.2d 108.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 983",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability",
		"context": "Fish & Wildlife Service , 616 F.3d 983. The text focuses not on habitat \"features,\" but habitat \"areas.\" See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Given the narrower scope of 'feature' than 'area,' it should be easier to prove two or three specific features are essential to a species' conservation (the occupied habitat standard) than an entire area (the unoccupied habitat standard).\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F.Supp.2d 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability",
		"context": "That which is required for the continued existence of a thing.\" B LACK 'SLAWDICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); see W EBSTER 'STHIRD NEWINTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY ,supra (\"necessary or indispensable\"); RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY ,supra (\"absolutely necessary; indispensable\"); see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those definitions do not cover Unit 1, which \"will not support\" the frog. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1080",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The \"Critical Habitat\" Definition Requires Habitability",
		"context": "49a (Owen, J.). The Service's designation of Unit 1 is not \"based on apermissible construction of the statute.\" Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.NRDC , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because it is at odds with the statutory text and \"not in accordance with law,\" it violates the ESA and the APA,",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court provided the CCA with a clear mandate regarding the constitutional standard for diagnosing intellectual disability",
		"context": "As the Court noted, according to contemporary medical understanding , an intellectual disability and a personality disorder are not mutually exclusive diagnoses. Ibid. (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 15 -797)). Finally, this Court addressed t he CCA's reliance on the multi -factor framework for intellectual disability that the CCA first employed in Briseno , 135 S.W.3d 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1039",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court provided the CCA with a clear mandate regarding the constitutional standard for diagnosing intellectual disability",
		"context": "(citing137 S. Ct. 1039 (No. 15 -797)). Finally, this Court addressed t he CCA's reliance on the multi -factor framework for intellectual disability that the CCA first employed in Briseno , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court rightly noted, the Briseno framework \"advance s lay perceptions of intellectual disability.\" Moore I , 137 S. Ct. at 1051 (citing Briseno , 135 S.W.3d at 8).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S.W.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. After Gill v. Whitford, Plaintiffs lack standing to seek facial relief under the large fraction test",
		"context": "Id. They sue as third -party representatives for all Louisiana women seeking abortion. See Sin- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But it is in- disputable that many members of that group never will experience an undue burden. Even under the district court decision, on which Plaintiffs heavily re- ly, up to 45 percent of women seeking abortions nev- er will experience an undue burden.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FELA Litigation Is Plagued By Forum Shopping",
		"context": ". When given leeway on where to file a lawsuit, some plaintiffs will select a forum for the purpose of gaining a litigation advantage, even at apparent inconvenience to themselves. See, e.g., Piper Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interstate railroads are not only uniquely unable to avoid registration-based jurisdiction, but they are also uniquely at risk of forum shopping. Unlike virtually all other employers, there is no state-based workers' compensation regime for interstate railroads.",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FELA Litigation Is Plagued By Forum Shopping",
		"context": "§ 53 (\"[T]he fact that the employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in propor-tion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.\"). That means t hat when FELA claims are not settled, they are more often than not decided by juries, rather than on dispositive motions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the FELA plaintiffs ' bar has its pick of juries in any state or federal court that can exer- cise personal jurisdiction over the railroad defendant. Unsurprisingly, forum shopping has long been a feature of FELA litigation, and Philadelphia's courts in particular have long been a favorite forum for FELA suits having little or no connection to Pennsylvania.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FELA Litigation Is Plagued By Forum Shopping",
		"context": "§ 1201.1-1. Currently, there are seven Class I railroads operating in the United States. 18 Ohio); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]123 F. Supp. 342003 WL 256939. Today, FELA plaintiffs conti nue to file in Pennsylvania courts, hoping to take adv antage of the Commonwealth's jurisdiction-by-registration law. E.g., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118056 (The plaintiff did \"not argue that [the railroad] has sufficient minimum contacts to confer specific or general 'at home' personal jurisdiction .",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 F. Supp. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. FELA Litigation Is Plagued By Forum Shopping",
		"context": "of AAR as Amicus Curiae at 9, BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell (Oct. 28, 2016) (\"AAR's large freight members have advised AAR that at least 170 FELA cases are pending against them in the courts of states that are neither (1) the railroad's state of incorporation; (2) the railroad's principal place of business; nor (3) the state where the alleged injury giving rise to the suit occurred. \"); 987 N.E.2d 3552003 WL 21496879[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 20",
		"citation_value_orig": "79 F. Supp. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
		"context": ". Amendment[].'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, this Co urt has previously held that the First Amendment is implicated only \"to the extent\" that government action \"compels or restrains belief and association . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
		"context": "In the absence of such evidence, Appellants 8 fail to state a claim. See, e.g. , League of Women 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125531; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Appellants contend that they have \"demonstrated an actionable burden . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "809 F. Supp. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
		"context": "at 675. Since there is no constitutional right to 9 electoral success, there is no burden here and therefore no injury. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A]n indi vidual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to be adequately represented by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate as other voters in the district . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
		"context": "Numerous other courts have agreed, both before and after Bandemer . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pope , 809 F.Supp. at 397 (adopting the reasoning from Bandemer that \"the power to influence the political process is not limited to winning elections.\") (quoting Bandemer , 478 U.S. at 132); Badham , 694 F.Supp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "664 F.2d 913",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "a. Partisan Gerrymandering Imposes No Burden on an Individual Citizen's First Amendment Rights and Therefore Does Not Cause Any Injury",
		"context": "(quoting Bandemer , 478 U.S. at 132); Badham , 694 F.Supp. at 669 (\"[A] group's electoral power is not unconstitutionally diminished by the simple fact of an apportionment scheme that makes winning elections more difficult[.]\") (quoting Bandemer , 478 U.S. at 131-132); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 2 Appellants also allege that th ey have been burdened because the alleged gerrymander \"has disrupted and depressed Republican political engagement[.]\" Brief of Appellants at 19, 52.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 F.2d 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare Decisis Principles Support Affirmance",
		"context": "Because Abood 's core principle remains sound, the Court need not reach stare decisis . But, even if the Court would not agree with Abood 's \"reasoning and its resulting rule, were [it] ad dressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Stare decisis \"contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,\" 501 U.S. 808, by ensuring that this Court's decisions are \"founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,\" 474 U.S. 254. Thus, the Court requ ires a \"special justifica- tion\" to overrule a precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare Decisis Principles Support Affirmance",
		"context": "But, even if the Court would not agree with Abood 's \"reasoning and its resulting rule, were [it] ad dressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.\" 530 U.S. 428. Stare decisis \"contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by ensuring that this Court's decisions are \"founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,\" 474 U.S. 254. Thus, the Court requ ires a \"special justifica- tion\" to overrule a precedent. Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 443.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare Decisis Principles Support Affirmance",
		"context": "But, even if the Court would not agree with Abood 's \"reasoning and its resulting rule, were [it] ad dressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.\" 530 U.S. 428. Stare decisis \"contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process,\" 501 U.S. 808, by ensuring that this Court's decisions are \"founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the Court requ ires a \"special justifica- tion\" to overrule a precedent. Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 443.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Stare Decisis Principles Support Affirmance",
		"context": "The agency-shop model has created strong reli- ance interests. And stare decisis \"does not ordinarily bend\" to petitioner's \"'wrong on the merits'-type argu- ments.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In short, petitioner cannot supply the \"special justification\" necessary to displace such a well-entrenched precedent. Dickerson , 530 U.S. at 443.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The FTC's Misuse of Section 13(b) Is Contrary to Values Protected by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments",
		"context": "The FTC's use of Section 13(b) to transfer companies' assets to receivers is in tension with the values protected by the Fifth and Eighth Amendments . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, in the V -Tec matter, no monetary judgment was imposed. Yet of the $670,000 seized by the Receiver, only 5% was returned.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Applied the Wrong Comparison",
		"context": ". The Court of Appeals in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].\" Zarda , 883 F.3d at 116. Such a comparison is misplaced as it does not compare two similarly situated individuals who are identical in all relevant respects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Applied the Wrong Comparison",
		"context": "Had the court stopped here, it would be clear that the trait at issue, same-sex attraction, when shared by both men and women does not result in discriminatory treatment. The court, how- ever, then proceeded to compare two people that did not both exhibit same-sex attraction. The Zarda court's error is highlighted with its misapplication of this Court's holding in City of L.A. Dep't of Water & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Manhart , the City required women to contribute a larger sum to the pension plan because women have a longer life expectancy than men, a policy this Court found to be in violation of Title VII. 5 The Zarda court notes, \"because life expectancy is a sex-dependent trait , changing the sex of th e employee (the independ- ent variable) necessarily a ffected the employee's life expectancy and thereby changed how they were im- pacted by the pension policy (the dependent variable).\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Applied the Wrong Comparison",
		"context": "The issue here is the scope of Title VII, not the legal definition of marriage or societal views on same-sex relationships or the concept of gen- der in the abstract. Under the plain reading of the stat-ute and as consistently interpreted by courts for the first 53 years after its passage, Employees are unable to prove a claim of sex discrimination by claiming they 6 While the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir- cuit did not explicitly identify a comparator for Stephens, it none-theless based its holding on the fact that women were permitted to wear skirts and, therefore, Title VII must allow Stephens, a biological male, to wear skirts as well. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fallacy of this holding and the implication for employers such as Hackney is addressed in Section II, infra. 18 were discriminated against because of their sexual ori- entation and/or gender identity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "884 F.3d 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "A. In evaluating the scope of the Fourth Amend- ment's protections, this Court has said that it \" in- quire [s] first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the Amendment was framed .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court has used that ap- proach in assessing whether a search or seizure is \"un- reasonable ,\" see 514 U.S. 927 , and also in an- swering the prior question of whether a Fourth 7 Amendment \"search\" or \"seizure\" occurred in the first place, see Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 624 -27. This approach is novel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "In evaluating the scope of the Fourth Amend- ment's protections, this Court has said that it \" in- quire [s] first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under common law when the Amendment was framed .\" 526 U.S. 295 . The Court has used that ap- proach in assessing whether a search or seizure is \"un- reasonable ,\" see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and also in an- swering the prior question of whether a Fourth 7 Amendment \"search\" or \"seizure\" occurred in the first place, see Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 624 -27. This approach is novel. Indeed, n ot until the 1990s, two centuries after the Fourth Amendment's ratifica- tion, did this Court squarely embrace it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 927",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable,\" a question that itself was \"relevant\" but not \"disposi- tive.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 267 U.S. 132. Thus, e stablished c ommon law rules were some- times taken into consideration alongside other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a given practice , but they were not mechanically incorporated into the Fourth Amendment . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be reasonable,\" a question that itself was \"relevant\" but not \"disposi- tive.\" 445 U.S. 573 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, e stablished c ommon law rules were some- times taken into consideration alongside other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a given practice , but they were not mechanically incorporated into the Fourth Amendment . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Thus, e stablished c ommon law rules were some- times taken into consideration alongside other factors bearing on the reasonableness of a given practice , but they were not mechanically incorporated into the Fourth Amendment . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, history has always been central to Fourth Amendment analysis. But this Court has tra- ditionally viewed the most relevant history to be the 8 controver sies that prompted the Amendment's adop- tion—in particular, the revolt against general war- rants and writs of assistance on both sides of the At- lantic —and the Court has used that history to identi fy the chief harms at which the Amendment was di- rected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "To be sure, history has always been central to Fourth Amendment analysis. But this Court has tra- ditionally viewed the most relevant history to be the 8 controver sies that prompted the Amendment's adop- tion—in particular, the revolt against general war- rants and writs of assistance on both sides of the At- lantic —and the Court has used that history to identi fy the chief harms at which the Amendment was di- rected. See, e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 573 U.S. 373. This Court has also repeatedly consulted early federal statutes authorizing searches and seizures around the time of the Amendment's ratifica tion as a means of gauging what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "This Court has also repeatedly consulted early federal statutes authorizing searches and seizures around the time of the Amendment's ratifica tion as a means of gauging what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted . See, e.g. , Car- roll, 267 U.S. at 150 -53; Watson , 423 U.S. at 420 -21; United Sta [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Until recently, the Court did not typically evaluate the Fourth Amendment legitimacy of a government prac- tice based on whether or not English common law per- mitted it. This Court should not reflexively construe the Fourth Amendment to match the precise contours of Founding -era common law .",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Payton , 445 U.S. at 59 1 n.33. Had this Court blindly followed that approach in the past , then today it would be constitutionally per- missibl e for police officers to shoot dead an unarmed, non-dangerous felony suspect to prevent his escape . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The common law, after all , \"allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". preservation of 10 that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.\" Carpen- ter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Therefore, th is Court should be careful not to sug- gest that the protections of the Fourth Amendment — ratified by the American public with broad and flexi ble language as a bulwark against unjustified government intrusions on persons and property —are simply coex- tensive with the judge -made rules inherited from Eng- lish common law. B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "In Ho- dari D. , this Court applied that common law rule in a manner that narrowed the meaning of \"seizure\" and hence limited the brea dth of the Amendment. It would be inconsistent f or this Court to depart from that ap- proach here, where application of the common law rule expand s the Amendment's scope and protections. Before Hodari D. , this Court had established that a seizure could occu r \"by means of physical force or show of authority, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , but it did not sharply distinguish these two methods as separate forms of seizure governed by different standards . That distinction was, at most, implicit in some holdings. See Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 628 (noting two examples ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "See Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 628 (noting two examples ). Instead, this Court held that a seizure occurred only if, \"in view of all of the circumstances 11 surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave ,\" and that \"circumstances that might indicate a seizure \" included \"the threatening presence of several officers, the dis- play of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen , or the use of language or tone of voice indic ating that compliance with the of- ficer's request might be compelled. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Hodari D. , however, this Court drew a line of cleavage between situations involving physical force and those involving a show of authority . And it held that where the police d o not physically touch a suspect, there is an additional requirement to establish that a seizure occurred : the suspect must have actually sub- mitted to the officers' show of authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "at 626. \"Thus, in deciding the question presented today,\" this Court will \"write upon a slate that is far from 12 clean.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Whatever else might be said about the relevance of the common law to the Fourth Amendment, this much should be clear: the Court cannot credibly apply one aspect of a common law rule to limit the meaning of \"seizure\" but then abandon another aspect of that same rule which would expand the meaning of \"sei- zure.\" Torres simply asks this Court to apply the same analytical method it employed in Hodari D .",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "And because law enforcement responsibility in the eighteenth cen- tury largely rested with civilians, rather than profes- sional police officers , see infra at 18-19, the basic ins and outs of what constitute d an arrest would not have been a mystery . Even Webster's general -purpose dic- tionary noted that an arrest could be made simply by \"touching the body.\" 1 Webster, supra (defining the noun \"arrest\") ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, when the Fourth Amendment was adopted, as now, an arrest was \"the quintessential 'sei- zure of the person.'\" Hodari D. , 499 U.S. at 624.",
		"citation_value_orig": "322 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "But unless this Court applies the common law rule of arrest here, law enforcement offic- ers who lack a valid justification will be able to shoot or otherwise physically harm individuals with no con- stitutional accountability —so long as those individu- als successfully escape the officers' violence , as Torres did. That result would facilit ate the \" arbitrary and op- pressive interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals\" that the Amendment is designed to prevent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also infra Part I II (discussing how application of the com- mon law 's expansive definition of \"arrest\" will vindi- cate the Framers' understanding that civil damages actions would serve as a deterr ent against unreasona- ble government intrusions on persons and property ). So whi le there are times when applying a common law rule will conflict with the goals of the Fourth Amend- ment, e.g., Garner , 471 U.S. at 13, this is not one of them —quite the opposite. Importantly, applying the common law rule of \" ar- rests\" to the contemporary policing context does not distort the practical implications of that rule in the way this Court discussed in Garner .",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 543",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". when there is some meaningful in- terference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]462 U.S. 696, even though the inter- ference is only temporary, and destroying a small quantity of a person's property will also suffice, 15 Jacobsen , 466 U .S. at 124, even though most of the property remains unharmed. Here , where officers shot bullets into Torres's body, leaving her partly paralyzed and requiring hospitali- zation, see Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": ". when there is some meaningful in- terference with an individual's possessory interests in that property.\" 565 U.S. 400[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], even though the inter- ference is only temporary, and destroying a small quantity of a person's property will also suffice, 15 Jacobsen , 466 U .S. at 124, even though most of the property remains unharmed. Here , where officers shot bullets into Torres's body, leaving her partly paralyzed and requiring hospitali- zation, see Pet'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Common Law's Expansive Definition of \"Arrest\" Should Inform the Meaning of \"Seizure\" Under the Fourth Amendment",
		"context": "Here , where officers shot bullets into Torres's body, leaving her partly paralyzed and requiring hospitali- zation, see Pet'r Br. 2, there has clearly been some meaningful interference with her possessory interest in her own body . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To hold that no seizure occurred simply because the shooting did not completely debilitate her would be tantamount to giving greater Fourth Amendment protection to one's \"effects\" than to one's \"person.\" That cannot be right, especially given \"the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one's person.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 128",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This case is an ideal vehicle to resolve the circuit split",
		"context": "1. This case exemplifies the dangers this Court has warned of in trying to reign in overuse of the term \"ju-risdictional.\" See Arbaugh , 546 U.S. at 502 (a court' s mischaracterizatio n of a statute as jurisdictional can lead to \"unfairness and waste of judicial resources\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The district court was \"ap palled\" by Transform's tactics and observed that \"[a]ll the conditions for appli- cation of judicial estoppel would seem to be met here.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
		"context": "at 7– 18. For fifty -six years, t hey elected to do nothing to confirm their title. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even now, they have a remedy. Washington law recognizes a claim for money had and received and a claim for unjust enrichment, either of which the Lundgrens could bring against the seller of the property who, they claim, sold the property without the right to do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 P.2d 1232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Lundgrens Had and Continue to Have a Means to Seek Redress for Their Claim",
		"context": "Even now, they have a remedy. Washington law recognizes a claim for money had and received and a claim for unjust enrichment, either of which the Lundgrens could bring against the seller of the property who, they claim, sold the property without the right to do so. See Coast Trading Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Washington State legislature also could address the Lundgrens' situation by creating a specific cause of action for money damages against those who , without valid title, purport to dispose of property. 37 Finally , the Lundgrens \"may of course seek appropriate legislation from Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "587 P.2d 1071",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under this Court's Precedents, a Remedial Sanction Falls Within the Ambit of the Excessive Fines Clause so Long as It Also Serves Some Punitive Purpose",
		"context": "B. The fact that a \"fine\" need only be partially pu- nitive stems directly from this Court's recognition that the Clause was codified \"as a bulwark against the abuse of prosecutorial power that may accrue where 2 This discussion was dicta because Bajakajian involved a crim- inal in personam forfeiture, not a civil in rem forfeiture. 524 U.S. at 333; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 22 fines are used 'for the purpose of raising revenue .'\" Beth A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challeng- ing the Modern Debtors' Prison , 65 U CLA L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Under this Court's Precedents, a Remedial Sanction Falls Within the Ambit of the Excessive Fines Clause so Long as It Also Serves Some Punitive Purpose",
		"context": "at 264. Conversely , financial sanctions accruing to the government's benefit should be scrutinized especially closely because they \"are a source of revenue ,\" while other forms of punishment \"cost a State money .\" Har- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To exclude partially reme- dial sanctions from this scrutiny would enable the sort of abuses that led to the adoption of the Excessive 23 Fines Clause and its historical predecessors in the first place . This Court's cases foreclose that result.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 957",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The CFPB Relies on SEC Caselaw to Enlarge Its Already Expansive Power",
		"context": "§§ 5564(a), 5565; see Consumer Fin. Prot. 23 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the CFPA expre ssly allows for equitable monetary relief, the CFPB re lies on SEC cases to fill in the gaps in its own statute. Gordon , 819 F.3d at 1195 (defining disgorgement by citing Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The CFPB Relies on SEC Caselaw to Enlarge Its Already Expansive Power",
		"context": "Gordon , 819 F.3d at 1195 (defining disgorgement by citing Sec. & Exch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (9th Cir.2006)); Consumer Fin. Prot. 2016 WL 7188792.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 F.3d 1109",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Identified Eddings Error Occurred At The Arizona Supreme Court, Not The Trial Court",
		"context": "See 937 F.3d 1230 (\"Though the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed Ramirez's convictions in 1994, during the period that the Arizona Supreme Court was applying a causal nexus requirement, the record here indicates that mitigating evidence was not rejected as a matter of law. In fact, the record compels the opposite conclusion. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We said in McKin- ney that the Arizona courts had 'consistently' applied the 34",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 1094",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "D-23. If the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional, then the burden is on the government to prove that the case is untimely . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Dist rict Court also noted that it could \"resolve factual disputes with or without a hearing.\" Cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 F.3d 1119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "D-4. Yet if the statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, then all disputed facts must be construed in favor of Petitioners at the motion to dismiss stage. See Texas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government argues that the Ninth Circuit, on remand, would still apply th e standards for a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss because of sovereign immunity. Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "685 F.2d 1116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "The government argues that the Ninth Circuit, on remand, would still apply th e standards for a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss because of sovereign immunity. Resp. 36 n.7 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But Pistor and other cases that apply the \"quasi-jurisdictional\" standard deal with waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign immunity, or Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pistor , 791 F.3d at 1110; 708 F.3d 1075; 694 F.3d 1122; 861 F.3d 923.",
		"citation_value_orig": "791 F.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "36 n.7 (citing 791 F.3d 1104). But Pistor and other cases that apply the \"quasi-jurisdictional\" standard deal with waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign immunity, or Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pistor , 791 F.3d at 1110; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 694 F.3d 1122; 861 F.3d 923. To the point, in cases where the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity contingent on complying with a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations—like in the Federal Tort Claims Act—the Ninth Circuit applies the usual 12(b)(6) standards for resolving a motion to dismiss under the 19 statute of limitations. See 921 F.3d 1133.5 Indeed, when two other district courts in the Ninth Circuit held, before this case, that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, they concluded that the limitations issue could not be resolved through a 12(b)(1) motion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 1075",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "36 n.7 (citing 791 F.3d 1104). But Pistor and other cases that apply the \"quasi-jurisdictional\" standard deal with waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign immunity, or Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pistor , 791 F.3d at 1110; 708 F.3d 1075; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 861 F.3d 923. To the point, in cases where the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity contingent on complying with a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations—like in the Federal Tort Claims Act—the Ninth Circuit applies the usual 12(b)(6) standards for resolving a motion to dismiss under the 19 statute of limitations. See 921 F.3d 1133.5 Indeed, when two other district courts in the Ninth Circuit held, before this case, that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, they concluded that the limitations issue could not be resolved through a 12(b)(1) motion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "694 F.3d 1122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "36 n.7 (citing 791 F.3d 1104). But Pistor and other cases that apply the \"quasi-jurisdictional\" standard deal with waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, foreign sovereign immunity, or Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Pistor , 791 F.3d at 1110; 708 F.3d 1075; 694 F.3d 1122; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the point, in cases where the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity contingent on complying with a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations—like in the Federal Tort Claims Act—the Ninth Circuit applies the usual 12(b)(6) standards for resolving a motion to dismiss under the 19 statute of limitations. See 921 F.3d 1133.5 Indeed, when two other district courts in the Ninth Circuit held, before this case, that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, they concluded that the limitations issue could not be resolved through a 12(b)(1) motion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 923",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "See Pistor , 791 F.3d at 1110; 708 F.3d 1075; 694 F.3d 1122; 861 F.3d 923. To the point, in cases where the federal government has waived its sovereign immunity contingent on complying with a nonjurisdictional statute of limitations—like in the Federal Tort Claims Act—the Ninth Circuit applies the usual 12(b)(6) standards for resolving a motion to dismiss under the 19 statute of limitations. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 Indeed, when two other district courts in the Ninth Circuit held, before this case, that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is nonjurisdictional, they concluded that the limitations issue could not be resolved through a 12(b)(1) motion. 2017 WL 6819927; Bar K Ranch, 2019 WL 5328782. Contrary to the government's contention, Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "921 F.3d 1133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "§§ 261.50, 261.51, 261.54 (2005). And the Forest Service Manual says that public roads are a subset of Forest Service Roads, JA 19, which su pports the landowners' contention that one would not know the Forest Service's view of the scope of the easement simply because one knew that the easement was a Forest Service Road. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a word, the maps, regulations, and manual do not necessarily determine the Forest Service's position on what roads are open or reflect the full scope of every Forest Service easement. 6 Under the standards for resolving a 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, however, the District Court did not need to consider this competing evidence, and instead accepted the government's characterization of the 6 Indeed, the Forest Service itself recognized that its maps and regulations did not accurately reflect what roads were open to the public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "65 F.3d 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Distinction Between a Jurisdictional and Nonjurisdictional Statute of Limitation Matters",
		"context": "Boechler , 142 S. Ct. at 1501–02 (remanding to decide whether petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling). Indeed, this Court cannot properly answer that question because the District Court's holding prevented Petitioners from fully developing and presenting an adequate record to dispute the government's contentions that the case is untimely. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Simply put, \"[t]he distinction [between a jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional prescription] matters.\" Boechler , 142 S. Ct. at 1497.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
		"context": "Even if the court of appeals' approach could be rec- onciled with some loose, colloquial reading of Section 1415( l )'s text, th is Court should reject it. \"In statutory drafting, where precision is both important and ex- pected, the sort of colloquial usage [ suggested by the Sixth Circuit] is not customary.\" Allison Engine [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And when Congress addresses legal co ncepts, it uses terms as they are used in legal context s. See 49 U.S. 441. As previously explained, the term \"relief \" in the context of a lawsuit is most naturally 21 read to refer to the remedy or remedies that a tribunal may award as redress for an injury.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
		"context": "\"In statutory drafting, where precision is both important and ex- pected, the sort of colloquial usage [ suggested by the Sixth Circuit] is not customary.\" Allison Engine 553 U.S. 662. And when Congress addresses legal co ncepts, it uses terms as they are used in legal context s. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As previously explained, the term \"relief \" in the context of a lawsuit is most naturally 21 read to refer to the remedy or remedies that a tribunal may award as redress for an injury. See pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "49 U.S. 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
		"context": "The court's interpretation also fundamentally undermines the judgment animating Section 1415 (l )'s text: \"[I]t is not appropriate to require the use of [the IDEA's administrati ve process]\" if an IDEA \"hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought.\" 1985 House Report 7; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1993 ) (explaining that the traditional \"doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies\" applies \"[w] here relief is available from an administrative agency,\" not where the agency has \"no power\" to grant the relief ); 503 U.S. 140 does not require exhaustion of the IDEA's ad- minist rative remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 258",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The court of appeals' decision is incorrect",
		"context": "The court's interpretation also fundamentally undermines the judgment animating Section 1415 (l )'s text: \"[I]t is not appropriate to require the use of [the IDEA's administrati ve process]\" if an IDEA \"hearing officer lacks the authority to grant the relief sought.\" 1985 House Report 7; cf. 507 U.S. 258 (1993 ) (explaining that the traditional \"doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies\" applies \"[w] here relief is available from an administrative agency,\" not where the agency has \"no power\" to grant the relief ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] does not require exhaustion of the IDEA's ad- minist rative remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 140",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Deportation Canon Is, At Minimum, A Relevant Consideration The BIA And The Sixth Circuit Were Required To Weigh.",
		"context": "Judulang , 565 U.S. at 53. Hence, Justices of this Court, circuit courts, and commentators have repeatedly recognized that the canons of construction are relevant at Chevron Step 2. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 93 F. 3d 890118 Yale L.J. 64. Here, however, neither the BIA nor the Sixth Circuit so much as mentioned—let alone analyzed—the deportation canon. This was error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Deportation Canon Is, At Minimum, A Relevant Consideration The BIA And The Sixth Circuit Were Required To Weigh.",
		"context": "Judulang , 565 U.S. at 53. Hence, Justices of this Court, circuit courts, and commentators have repeatedly recognized that the canons of construction are relevant at Chevron Step 2. See 499 U.S. 244; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]118 Yale L.J. 64. Here, however, neither the BIA nor the Sixth Circuit so much as mentioned—let alone analyzed—the deportation canon. This was error.",
		"citation_value_orig": "93 F. 3d 890",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Ninth Circuit Has Misinterpreted the Constitution to Significantly Undermine the Acts of Congress Protecting Trademark and Trade Dress Rights.",
		"context": "20-365) (mem.) [hereinaf- ter (No. 20 -365)] (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . See Twenti- eth Cen tury Fox Television , 875 F.3d at 1196 n. 1 (\"the Rogers test is a limiting constr uction of th e Lanham Act\" informed by First Amendment consid- erations) . The Ninth Ci rcuit has g one even furt her, explaining that it uses Rogers \"to determin e whether the Lanha m Act applies\" in the first place .",
		"citation_value_orig": "909 F. 3d 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "\"A critical habitat d esignation provides protection for threatened and endangered species by triggering what is termed a Section 7 consultation in response to actions proposed by or with a nexus to a federal agency.\" Cape Hatteras Access Pres. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) ), each federal agency must consult with the Service to \"insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency .",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 F. Supp. 2d 108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "The Family Landowners appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed in a 2 -1 split opinion. The panel majority concluded the Service's designation was entitled to Chevron2 deference, despite the Service 's concession that the frog does not occupy Unit 1, that Unit 1 cannot sustain the frog, and that the changes that would have to be made to make Unit 1 habitable 2 Chevron U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Chevron deference holds that courts must defer to an agency's authoritative and reasonable interpretation of ambiguous language found within a statute that it administers. 17 will not be made in the foreseeable future, if ever .",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 837",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "To illustrate this point, Judge Jones us ed two helpful Venn diagrams. In one image, she set out the panel's approach, which failed to account for Section 1533(a)(3)(A)(i) : This Venn diagram highlights the error of the panel decision , which allows \"critical habitat \" for a species to include land that is not habitable for the species. Markle Interests, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , 643 (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).3 The 3 This brief cite s here to the Federal Reporter rather than Petitioner Weyerhaeuser's Appendix because , due to a scrivener's error, that appendix did not reproduce the Venn diagrams that Judge Jones included in her dissent. See Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "848 F.3d 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "House Agreement to Conference Report on S. 2899 in A Legislative History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended in 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980, 97th Co ng., C ongressional Research Service at 1220 -21 (Comm. Print 1978), http://www.eswr.com/lh/ (A Legislative History of the ESA) . See also Home Builders Ass'n of N. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cape Hatteras , 344 F. Supp. 2d at 108, 122 (\"The [Service] may not statutorily cas t a net over tracts of land with the mere hope that they will develop [the physical and biological elements species require to survive] and be subject to designation . \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 983",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "But Heckler itself does not render the Secretary's decision unreviewable, since \"law to apply\" is supplied by the ESA (benefits of exclusion outweigh those of inclusion, where exclusion will not lead to extinction), the APA (arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law), and general principles of administrative law. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of United States, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The decision not to exclude is also subject to judicial review under Bennett v. Spear , which holds that the Secretary's duty to engage in economic analysis of the impacts of critical habitat designation is mandatory and reviewable for abuse of discretion. 520 U.S. 154 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The ESA Requires Critical Habitat Be Habitable and Essential for the Conservation of a Species",
		"context": "Ass'n of United States, 463 U.S. 29. The decision not to exclude is also subject to judicial review under Bennett v. Spear , which holds that the Secretary's duty to engage in economic analysis of the impacts of critical habitat designation is mandatory and reviewable for abuse of discretion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 24 ARGUMENT",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The District Court Did Not Restart the Rule 23(f) Deadline",
		"context": "Nor is Lambert correct. \"A n order that leaves class- action status unchanged from what was determined bya prior order is not an orde r granting or denying class action certification,\" and thus does not trigger a newRule 23(f) deadline. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 523 F.3d 187; 491 F.3d 1288; Nucor Corp., 760 F.3d at 343; In re561 F.3d 494. Because the District Court's order did not recertify the class and instead \"maintain[ed] the status quo,\" theorder did not restart the Rule 23(f) deadline. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 F.3d 1183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The District Court Did Not Restart the Rule 23(f) Deadline",
		"context": "Nor is Lambert correct. \"A n order that leaves class- action status unchanged from what was determined bya prior order is not an orde r granting or denying class action certification,\" and thus does not trigger a newRule 23(f) deadline. 456 F.3d 1183; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 491 F.3d 1288; Nucor Corp., 760 F.3d at 343; In re561 F.3d 494. Because the District Court's order did not recertify the class and instead \"maintain[ed] the status quo,\" theorder did not restart the Rule 23(f) deadline. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 F.3d 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The District Court Did Not Restart the Rule 23(f) Deadline",
		"context": "Nor is Lambert correct. \"A n order that leaves class- action status unchanged from what was determined bya prior order is not an orde r granting or denying class action certification,\" and thus does not trigger a newRule 23(f) deadline. 456 F.3d 1183; 523 F.3d 187; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Nucor Corp., 760 F.3d at 343; In re561 F.3d 494. Because the District Court's order did not recertify the class and instead \"maintain[ed] the status quo,\" theorder did not restart the Rule 23(f) deadline. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 F.3d 1288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The District Court Did Not Restart the Rule 23(f) Deadline",
		"context": "Nor is Lambert correct. \"A n order that leaves class- action status unchanged from what was determined bya prior order is not an orde r granting or denying class action certification,\" and thus does not trigger a newRule 23(f) deadline. 456 F.3d 1183; 523 F.3d 187; 491 F.3d 1288; Nucor Corp., 760 F.3d at 343; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the District Court's order did not recertify the class and instead \"maintain[ed] the status quo,\" theorder did not restart the Rule 23(f) deadline. 7",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 F.3d 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ambulance calls",
		"context": "Counsel, Boston Pub. Health Comm'n (May 14, 2019) (responding to public records request with report of 10 ambulance calls to one particular abortion fa cility over one-year period);3 Planned Parenthood of Greater Tex. Surgical Health [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cheryl Sullenger, \"Court Records Indicate Nearly 1,000 Abortion Patients Likely Hospitalized Annually in Texas,\" Operation Rescue (Apr. 22, 2014), https://tiny url.com/TexasER. Moreover, not all seriou s complications after abortion manifest themselves quickly enough to result in ambulance transport from the abortion facility itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "748 F.3d 583",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Ambulance calls",
		"context": "Moreover, not all seriou s complications after abortion manifest themselves quickly enough to result in ambulance transport from the abortion facility itself. Indeed, the abortion providers in Whole Woman's Health insisted with their expert ev idence that \"in respect to surgical abortion patients who do suffer complications requiring hospitalization, most of these complications occur in the days after the abortion, not on the spot ,\" 136 S. Ct. at 2311 (emphasis added). The abortion providers in June Medical [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], went so far as to charac terize it as a \"universal fact\" that \"complications are mo st likely to occur after 3 https://tinyurl.com/Boston-records. Not one of these incidents had previously been reported, so far as amicus is aware. 5 the patient has left the clinic,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Should Grant Certiorari Because the Circuits Are in Conflict over the Appropriate Standard of Review to Apply to Fetal Remains Statutes",
		"context": ". In Roe v. Wade, this Court expressly acknowledged that States have an \"important and legitimate interest in potential life.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Almost 20 years later, though, the plurality in Casey concluded that Roe and its progeny significantly \"undervalued\" the States' interest in \"promoting\" and \"protecting the life of the unborn.\" Casey , 505 at 873.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. AEDPA gives state courts substantial leeway when applying general principles of constitutional law",
		"context": ". Under AEDPA, habeas courts cannot \"refine or sharpen a general principle of Supreme Court juris-prudence into a specific legal rule that this Court has not announced.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So, when \"eval- uating whether a rule application was unreasonable,\" a court must \"consider[ ] the rule's speci ficity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case -by-case determinations.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. AEDPA gives state courts substantial leeway when applying general principles of constitutional law",
		"context": "So, when \"eval- uating whether a rule application was unreasonable,\" a court must \"consider[ ] the rule's speci ficity. The more general the rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case -by-case determinations.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 31 Brecht does not focus on a state court's reasoning ; it is an independent standard that gives no deference to any other jurist's decision. The leeway required un- der AEDPA is therefore missing when reviewing for harmlessness under Brecht .",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. False or misleading commercial speech",
		"context": "Governments can prohibit false or misleading commercial speech regardless of the speaker's subjec- tive intent because of the harm such speech inflicts on listeners' au tonomous and informed decision -making interests protected by the First Amendment. See Cen- tral Hudson Gas & Elec. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For this reason, the First Amendment protects only commercial speech that is \"neither misleading nor related to unlawful ac-tivity.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. False or misleading commercial speech",
		"context": "For this reason, the First Amendment protects only commercial speech that is \"neither misleading nor related to unlawful ac-tivity.\" Id. at 564; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Many fal se advertising laws have long prohibited false or misleading commercial speech because of the harm such speech poses to consumers -as-listeners no matter what the commercial speaker intended. E.g., Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 626",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. False or misleading commercial speech",
		"context": "Many fal se advertising laws have long prohibited false or misleading commercial speech because of the harm such speech poses to consumers -as-listeners no matter what the commercial speaker intended. E.g., Fed. Trade [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, securities laws protect investors by prohibiting some false or misleading statements regardless of the speakers' subjective in-tent. E.g., Omnicare, 575 U.S. 175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "291 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
		"context": "See Bay Mills , 572 U.S. at 800 (\"[I]t is fundamentally Congress's job, not ours, to determine whether or how to limit tribal immunity.\"). That is no less true in the bankruptcy context, where Congress has already \"balanced the difficult choices,\" adopted a scheme in which there may be \"inequitable results\" in particular cases, and set forth a \"meticulous—not to say mind-numbingly detailed— enumeration of exemptions and exceptions to those exemptions,\" which \"confirms that courts are not authorized to create additional exceptions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].5 Ultimately, the need to weigh immunity-related policy considerations \"counsels some caution by [courts] in this area\" and underscores the need for the clear-statement rule. Kiowa Tribe , 523 U.S. at 759. Simply put, \"[t]he baseline position is tribal 5 To be clear, the Code \"would still apply to Indian tribes, notwithstanding their retention of immunity.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 415",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Weighing competing immunity policies and interests is a job for Congress, not courts",
		"context": "Pet. App. 44a (Barron, C.J., dissenting) (citing Tennessee Student Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In addition, \"equitable relief could provide an avenue for a debtor to enforce certain provisions of the Code against tribal actors\" that otherwise violate the automatic stay. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "Although a defendant can sometimes establish a legitimate expectation of privacy without showing \"a common -law interest in real or personal property,\" Rakas , 439 U.S. at 144 n.12, petitioner has not done so here. The \"person al and societal values protected by the Fourth Amendment ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , do not support petitioner's as- sertion of constitutional rights in Avis 's car . Operation of a rental car in the circumstances here does not serve any \"functions recognized as valuable by society,\" Olson , 495 U.S. at 98, but is instead detrimental to property rights, commerce, and public safety. Any expectation of privacy petitioner may have had was therefore not \"one that society is prep ared to recognize as reasonable. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "L ike any property owner, rental -car companies have an in- terest in ensuring that their property is used responsi- bly. Without the ability to ensure that their cars are being driven by those qua lified to do so, rental -car com- panies face increased risks —not only of accident and in- jury, but also \"of theft, of the car not being returned, of the car being taken to an unauthorized location [,] and of the car being used for unauthorized purpose s.\" Planet Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( Wash Ct. App. ), review denied,889 P.2d 498 . The rental agreement here accordingly restricted operation of the car to the renter and a limited set of persons —a spouse or a co -employee on company business —who would have a marriage or business - based legal connection to the renter, and for whom the renter could vouch and act as the point person.",
		"citation_value_orig": "877 P.2d 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "When petitioner took over Reed's rental car in breach of the rental agreement, without any foundation for be- lieving that the rental -car company ha d consented to the transfer, he could not claim any expect ation of pri- vacy in the car that society would regard as objectively reasonable . Commercial rental cars are typically easy for potential drivers to identify . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]877 N.E.2d 354. Petitioner certainly knew that he was driving a rental car, given that he ac- quired it from Reed in the parking lot outside the rental office and acknowledged to the police that a \"friend\" had rented it. J .A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "638 F.3d 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "No societal interest countenances petitioner's ac- ceptance of a car offered in direct violation of the right- ful owner's instructions. An authorized driver's expec- tation of privacy would, of course, generally be reason- able. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it might well remain so even in the absence of specific property rights —say, in the case of a good -faith renter who is slightly late in re- turning a ca r and has thus allowed the rental agreement to expire for a brief period of time. But whatever lee- way so ciety might give to a n authorized driver who ex- ceeds the terms of his authorization , it would not extend to someone like petitioner, whose actions were never le- gitimate.",
		"citation_value_orig": "821 F.2d 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "But whatever lee- way so ciety might give to a n authorized driver who ex- ceeds the terms of his authorization , it would not extend to someone like petitioner, whose actions were never le- gitimate. See Kennedy , 638 F.3d at 167 (\"[W] e believe 33 that society views authorized drivers who return rental cars a few hours late quite differently from unauthor- ized drivers who borrow rental cars without the rental company's knowledge or permission. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . c. The unauthorized driving of rental cars also frus- trates enforcement of the criminal laws . A criminal like a drug trafficker may well prefer to use a rental car, ra- ther than his own car, to avoid the risk of forfeiture if his illicit actions are discovered.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 F.3d 1394",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "A criminal like a drug trafficker may well prefer to use a rental car, ra- ther than his own car, to avoid the risk of forfeiture if his illicit actions are discovered. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. 881(a)(4) (authorizing the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport controlled substan ces); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And driving a car rented by someone else, thereby obfuscating the iden- tity of the driver, is a common way to provide further protection to a criminal enterprise. S ee, e.g., 619 F.3d 518 (6th Cir.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "85 F.3d 1275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "881(a)(4) (authorizing the forfeiture of vehicles used to transport controlled substan ces); 85 F.3d 1275. And driving a car rented by someone else, thereby obfuscating the iden- tity of the driver, is a common way to provide further protection to a criminal enterprise. S ee, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (6th Cir.) (citing law- enforcement agent's testimony that \"drug traffickers often use rental cars to prevent detection\") , cert. de- nied, 562 U.S. 1110 ; 447 F.3d 1191499 U.S. 975748 F.2d 1371 that denying consti- tutional protection to his conduct would invite a dragnet sweep of rental cars on the roadways .",
		"citation_value_orig": "619 F.3d 518",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "S ee, e.g., 619 F.3d 518 (6th Cir.) (citing law- enforcement agent's testimony that \"drug traffickers often use rental cars to prevent detection\") , cert. de- nied, 562 U.S. 1110 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]499 U.S. 975748 F.2d 1371 that denying consti- tutional protection to his conduct would invite a dragnet sweep of rental cars on the roadways . But \"the reality hardly suggests abuse,\" 460 U.S. 276. Petitioner points to no actual evidence of the practi ces he fears in the jurisdictions where it has been the law for decades that an unauthorized driver lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 F.3d 1191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "S ee, e.g., 619 F.3d 518 (6th Cir.) (citing law- enforcement agent's testimony that \"drug traffickers often use rental cars to prevent detection\") , cert. de- nied, 562 U.S. 1110 ; 447 F.3d 1191499 U.S. 975[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that denying consti- tutional protection to his conduct would invite a dragnet sweep of rental cars on the roadways . But \"the reality hardly suggests abuse,\" 460 U.S. 276. Petitioner points to no actual evidence of the practi ces he fears in the jurisdictions where it has been the law for decades that an unauthorized driver lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car.",
		"citation_value_orig": "748 F.2d 1371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "(citing law- enforcement agent's testimony that \"drug traffickers often use rental cars to prevent detection\") , cert. de- nied, 562 U.S. 1110 ; 447 F.3d 1191499 U.S. 975748 F.2d 1371 that denying consti- tutional protection to his conduct would invite a dragnet sweep of rental cars on the roadways . But \"the reality hardly suggests abuse,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioner points to no actual evidence of the practi ces he fears in the jurisdictions where it has been the law for decades that an unauthorized driver lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car. See, e.g., 32 F.3d 117, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "But \"the reality hardly suggests abuse,\" 460 U.S. 276. Petitioner points to no actual evidence of the practi ces he fears in the jurisdictions where it has been the law for decades that an unauthorized driver lacks a legitimate expectation of privacy in a rental car. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,513 U.S. 1157; Boruff , 909 F.2d at 117 ; Obregon, 748 F.2d at 1374- 1375. That is presumably because powerful legal and practical ob- stacles discourage such a practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "32 F.3d 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 2056. First, the police cannot stop a car simply because it is a rental; they must have \"reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] challenge a stop as a seizure of his or her person for which such suspicion was lack ing, re- gardless of whether he or she has rights with respect to a subsequent search of the car. See 551 U.S. 249. Second, a n unauthorized driver like petitioner could also poten- tially challenge the search dir ectly, to the extent that it infringed on a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to particular effects within the car .",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "First, the police cannot stop a car simply because it is a rental; they must have \"reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. \" 534 U.S. 266 challenge a stop as a seizure of his or her person for which such suspicion was lack ing, re- gardless of whether he or she has rights with respect to a subsequent search of the car. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, a n unauthorized driver like petitioner could also poten- tially challenge the search dir ectly, to the extent that it infringed on a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to particular effects within the car . See Rakas , 35 439 U.S. at 148 (observing that the defendants had not \"asserted an interest in the property seized\") ; cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 249",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. No societal understanding provided petitioner with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his unauthorized operation of Avis's car",
		"context": "Second, a n unauthorized driver like petitioner could also poten- tially challenge the search dir ectly, to the extent that it infringed on a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to particular effects within the car . See Rakas , 35 439 U.S. at 148 (observing that the defendants had not \"asserted an interest in the property seized\") ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 297- 307 (1 999) (considering, but rejecting, car passenger's challenge to sear ch of purse). Third , petitioner's proposal would be an ineffective law-enforcement tactic . Because not every breach of the rental agreement is equivalent to relin- quishing the car to an unpermitted driver, see p. 19, supra, a search would go unchallenged only if the car's occupant turns out to be an unauthorized driver like pe- titioner.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Iran And The Government Cannot Read Subsection 1610(g) Without Deleting The Phrase, \"Property Of A Foreign State\"",
		"context": "28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). In the latter case, § 1610(g) partially abrogates First National City [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] by enabling certain terror- ism judgment creditors of the state to pierce the corpo- rate veil and enforce their judgments against the assets of the state's juridically independent agencies and instrumentalities. But veil-piercing has no appli- cation to enforcement against the property of the state defendant itself. Had Congress enacted subsection 1610(g) with the sole purpose of abrogating Bancec, it would not have subjected the state's own property to execution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 611",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. If The Court Finds The \"Scandalous\" Provision Of Section 2(A) To Be Constitutional, This Court Should Clarify Whether An Applicant Who Has Been Denied Federal Registration On The Basis Of That Provision In Section 2(A) May Nevertheless Invoke Protection Under Section 43(A)",
		"context": "Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act is clear that a plaintiff need not have a registration to bring a civil action based on another's use of a confusingly similar mark. See Wal- 12 Mart Stores, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Specifically, Section 43(a) permits a civil action to be brought by \"any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by\" the actions of another \"who, on or in connection with any goods or services . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. If The Court Finds The \"Scandalous\" Provision Of Section 2(A) To Be Constitutional, This Court Should Clarify Whether An Applicant Who Has Been Denied Federal Registration On The Basis Of That Provision In Section 2(A) May Nevertheless Invoke Protection Under Section 43(A)",
		"context": "§ 1125(a). In the opinion below, the Federal Circuit did not address whether the owner of a mark that has been rejected by the USPTO on scandalous grounds under Section 2(a) is entitled to invoke the protections of Section 43(a). In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit's opinion in Tam suggests that the law is not clear regarding Section 43(a)'s protection of marks deemed unregistrable under Section 2(a). In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1344 n.11 (Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "877 F.3d 1330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. If The Court Finds The \"Scandalous\" Provision Of Section 2(A) To Be Constitutional, This Court Should Clarify Whether An Applicant Who Has Been Denied Federal Registration On The Basis Of That Provision In Section 2(A) May Nevertheless Invoke Protection Under Section 43(A)",
		"context": "Tam , 137 S. Ct. at 1752 n.1. 13 Judge Moore's footnote in the Federal Circuit's Tam decision suggests that the dearth of case law tends to support the conclusion that Section 43(a) is only available for marks that are registrable under Section 2. See 308 F.3d at 1344 n.11 (citing Two [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Yarmuth-Dion, 835 F.2d 990; 88 F. Supp. 3d 310). Thus, Judge Moore's footnote raises a question as to whether registrable matter under Section 2(a) is a prerequisite for Lanham Act protection of an unregistered mark. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 763",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. If The Court Finds The \"Scandalous\" Provision Of Section 2(A) To Be Constitutional, This Court Should Clarify Whether An Applicant Who Has Been Denied Federal Registration On The Basis Of That Provision In Section 2(A) May Nevertheless Invoke Protection Under Section 43(A)",
		"context": "Tam , 137 S. Ct. at 1752 n.1. 13 Judge Moore's footnote in the Federal Circuit's Tam decision suggests that the dearth of case law tends to support the conclusion that Section 43(a) is only available for marks that are registrable under Section 2. See 308 F.3d at 1344 n.11 (citing Two 505 U.S. 763; Yarmuth-Dion, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 88 F. Supp. 3d 310). Thus, Judge Moore's footnote raises a question as to whether registrable matter under Section 2(a) is a prerequisite for Lanham Act protection of an unregistered mark. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "835 F.2d 990",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
		"context": "............................................. 30 ii Table of Authorities Cases 579 U.S. 365 .................................... 2, 15, 16 Regents of the University of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................................ 14 , 15 Other Authorities ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 2021 -2022 ..................... 4 Anthony and Liu, LSAT Technical Report 00 -02, analysis of Differential prediction of Law School Performance by Racial/Ethnic Subgroups (2003) .................................................... 6 Antonovics and Backes, The Effect of Banning Affirmative Action on College Admissions rules and Student Quality , 49 Journal of Human Resources 295 (2014) .. 18, 33 Antonovics and Sander, Affir mative Action Bans and the 'Chilling Effect ', 15 American Law and Economics Review 252 (2013) .................................................................... 32 iii Arcidiacono and Lovenheim, Affirmative Action and the Quality -Fit Tradeoff, 54 Journal of Economic Literature 3 (2016) ........ 28 Arcidiacono, Aucejo, and Hotz, University Differences in the Graduation of Minorities in STEM Fields: Evidence from California, 106 American Economic Review 525 (2016) .. 18, 32 Arcidiacono, Aucejo, Hussey, and Spenner, Racial Segregation Patterns in Selectiv e Universities, 56 Journal of Law and Economics 1039 (2013) ... 25 Arcidiacono, Khan, and Vigdor, Representation versus Assimilation: How Do Preferences in College Admissions Affect Social Interactions? 95 Journal of Public Economics 1 (2011) ............. 26 Arcidiacono, K insler, and Ransom, Asian American Discrimination in Harvard Admissions, European Economic Review 144 (2022) ............... 20 Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, Divergent: the Time Path of Legacy and Athlete Admission at Harvard , Journal of Human Resources (forthcoming, 2022) ...................................................................... 20 Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, Legacy and Athlete Preferences at Harvard , 40 Journal of Labor Economics 133 (2022) .......... 20 iv Arcidiacono, Kinsler, and Ransom, Recruit to Reject? Harvard and African American Applicants, forthcoming, Eco nomics of Education Review (2022) .................................................................... 20 Association of American Medical Colleges, Diversity in Medicine: Facts and Figures 2019 https://www.aamc.org/data - reports/workforce/interactive -data/figure -18- percentage -all-active -physicians - race/ethnicity -2018 ............................................... 30 Campus Ethnic Diversity , US News & World Report bit.ly/38baw4x ..........................................................5 Carrell, Sacerdote, and West, From Natural Variation to Optimal Policy?",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
		"context": "In his dissent in Grutter, Justice Kennedy drew a distinction between deference to universities as to the educational importance of diversity, and the race - based means used to achieve that diversity. In the Fisher decisions, he reiterated that view. 2 Even this 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], at 388 (\"The Court confuses deference to a university's definition of its educational objective with deference to the implementation of this goal\" (Justice Kennedy, dissenting)). \"The University must prove that the means chosen by the University to attain diversity are narrowly tailored to that goal. On this point, the University 3 more limited formulation led to subjective judgments; the dissenters in Fisher II contended that Justice Kennedy's majority opinion had engaged in precisely the sort of deference to university judgments that Justice Kennedy had criticized in his Grutter dissent, and ruled out in his Fisher I opinion.3 Th e logic behind granting any degree of deference to university judgments on the use of racial classifications is based on faulty premises.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
		"context": "B ehind any judicial deference to higher education diversity policie s lies an assumption that universities should have the autonomy to determine when their interest in diversity is sufficiently compelling to justify the extraordinary step of race -conscious admissions. But receives no deference.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at 311. 3 In his Fisher II dissent, Justice Alito wrote, \"The University [of Texas] has still not identified with any degree of specificity the interests that its use of race and ethnicity is supposed to serve. Its primary argument is that merely invoking 'the educational benefits of diversity' is sufficient and that it need not identify any metric that would allow a court to determine whether its plan is needed to serve, or is actually serving, those interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
		"context": "The diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element. Petitioner's special ad missions program, focused solely on ethnic diversity, would hinder rather than further attainment of genuine diversity.\" Regents of the University of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 22 Susan Welch and John Gruel, Affirmative Action and Minority Enrollments in Medical and Law Schools (1998) . 23 As di scussed in the brief amicus submitted on the question of granting certiorari in SFFA v. Harvard , undergraduate admissions at Harvard still follow the functional equivalent of a quota.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Conclusion: the consequences of race-neutrality would be beneficial, especially if the Court can craft its ruling to encourage compliance.",
		"context": "25 Almost no law schools even gathered data on the socioeconomic background of students, and students (including minority applicants) from modest circumstances received no observable preference on those grounds. 26 F. Universities are increas ingly opaque and unwilling to providing data on student admissions and outcomes. Over the twenty years amicus has studied the practice and effects of affirmative action in Ame rican higher education, there has been a precipitous decline in the willingness of co lleges and universities to operate 24 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 Sander, \"Why Strict Scrutiny Requires Transparency: The Practical Effects of Bakke, Gratz, and Grutter,\" in Kevin McGuire, New Directions in Judicial Politics (2012) , pp. 293- 95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "4. The agency's regulation cannot override the statutory text",
		"context": "20 Here, there simply is no ambiguity permitting deference to an agency interpretation. Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even if the text were less clear, the canon of statutory construction establishing a pre- sumption in favor of judicial review provides another basis for upholding the construction supported by the plain text.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "App. 35a (citing Bear Valley Mut. Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Court has rejected that argument. In 520 U.S. 154, the Court held that § 1533(b)(2) decisions are not immune from judicial review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "790 F.3d 977",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "Water 790 F.3d 977. But the Court has rejected that argument. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that § 1533(b)(2) decisions are not immune from judicial review. Bennett involved the Endangered Species Act's citizen-suit provision. Like the Administrative Procedure Act, it precludes challenges to decisions that are \"discretionary with the Secretary.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "(citing Sec. & Exch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also 68 F.3d 1396 (explaining that the use of \"a permissive term such as 'may' rather than a mandatory term such as 'shall,' . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "(citing Sec. & Exch. 318 U.S. 80); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (explaining that the use of \"a permissive term such as 'may' rather than a mandatory term such as 'shall,' . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "68 F.3d 1396",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "In both instances, the Secretary is exercising the coercive power of the government over private property. When the Secretary abuses her discretion, the courts must have the power to correct that overreach. In refusing even to consider whether the Secretary overreached, the panel relied on the Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In finding nonreviewable an agency's decision not to employ its prosecutorial powers, the Heckler Court noted that an agency \"generally does not exercise its coercive power . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's holding that habitat exclusion decisions are nonreviewable contradicts Bennett v. Spear",
		"context": "washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/05/11/western- states-worry-decision-on-birds-fate-could-cost-billions-in- development/. 9 billions of dollars in economic costs in return for a few dollars in health or environmental benefits.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The decision of the Fifth Circuit allows the Secretary to do just that, with no recourse to the courts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals",
		"context": "Section 1915(g)'s use of essentially the same language as Rule 12(b)(6) brings the settled meaning of that phrase under the Rules of Civil Procedure into the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] provides the consequences for an involuntary dismissal, such as a 12(b)(6 ) dismissal. Rule 41(b), in effect in 1996 and now, states that such dismissals include both dismissals with and without prejudice, setting a default rule of dismissal with prejudice but permitting a court to specify otherwise in its order: Unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals",
		"context": "P. 41(b) (1995). \"Adjudication on the merits\" is the opposite of dismissal without prejudice. Semtek Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And a leading treatise makes clear that \"Rule 41(b) expressly provides that the district court may specify that a 16 dismissal is without prejudice.\" 9 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2373 (3d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals",
		"context": "2019). This interaction between Rule 41(b) and Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals was well-settled when Congress passed the PLRA. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Wright & Miller § 2373 (\"Dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief ca n be granted . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 F.3d 1067",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals",
		"context": "Mr. Lomax's argument that this default rule should limit the types of dismissals considered dismissals under § 1915(g) gets the argument backwards—that default presumption was needed only because the Rules permitted both types of dismissals. The Third and Fourth Circuits make this same mistake when they conflate the presumption under 17 the Rules—with prejudice—with the permitted scope of the Rules—both with and without prejudice. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 866 F.3d 152. Put more basically, if A includes Aa and Ab, and is presumed to mean Aa unless otherwise specified, that presumption does not exclude Ab from the meaning of A. The well-settled meaning of \"dismissed for failure to state a claim\" pr ovides further support for the conclusion that dismissals under § 1915(g)—just like dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)—include dismissals with and without prejudice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted\" Has a Distinct Meaning That Includes Both Types of Dismissals",
		"context": "Mr. Lomax's argument that this default rule should limit the types of dismissals considered dismissals under § 1915(g) gets the argument backwards—that default presumption was needed only because the Rules permitted both types of dismissals. The Third and Fourth Circuits make this same mistake when they conflate the presumption under 17 the Rules—with prejudice—with the permitted scope of the Rules—both with and without prejudice. 566 F.3d 391; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put more basically, if A includes Aa and Ab, and is presumed to mean Aa unless otherwise specified, that presumption does not exclude Ab from the meaning of A. The well-settled meaning of \"dismissed for failure to state a claim\" pr ovides further support for the conclusion that dismissals under § 1915(g)—just like dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)—include dismissals with and without prejudice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Regulation That Addresses the Special Problems Presented by Off-Premises Billboards is a Widely-Employed Feature of State and Local Land Use Regulation, and Has Been So For Over a Hundred Years",
		"context": ". Much like Justice Stewart's oft-quoted observation regarding adult material, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], most ob- servers know a billboard when they see it; still, they have difficulty defining a billboard relative to other signs. A sign that is all at once tall, large, bright, and distracting, the typical billboard is designed to attract attention. And in sign regulation parlance, a billboard is a sign that advertises something not available on the sign's premises, such as \"Ominously Cheap Coffee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "378 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The judgment below is consistent with history and tradition and implicates a very narrow range of official censures",
		"context": "25 n.15. Meanwhile, the appendix to this brief identifies (at 1a-2a) the codi-fied policies of 21 municipalities across the Nation speci- fying that it is never appropriate to impose a censure in response to a member's speech. Those are indications that formal legislative cen- sures for speech outside the legislative sphere are anom- alous, objectionable, and not at all part of \"settled and established practice\" ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) among elective assemblies in 25 See Michael Brun, River Falls City Council Censures Member for 'Derogatory and Unprofessional' Comments in Face Mask Debates , RiverTowns (Aug. 11, 2020), perma.cc/HV5V-FY5Z (censure for use of \"deragotory and unprofessional\" language \"at the July 28, 2020 meeting of the River Falls Common Council\"); Jenny Berg, St. Cloud City Council Censures Br andmire for 'Yellow Star' Remark in Mask Debate , St. Cloud Times (Aug. 17, 2020), perma.cc/FTS7- H3XH (censure for offensive statem ents made \"[at a] meeting\" of the council); 750 A.2d 993.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The judgment below is consistent with history and tradition and implicates a very narrow range of official censures",
		"context": "Those are indications that formal legislative cen- sures for speech outside the legislative sphere are anom- alous, objectionable, and not at all part of \"settled and established practice\" ( 140 S. Ct. 2316) among elective assemblies in 25 See Michael Brun, River Falls City Council Censures Member for 'Derogatory and Unprofessional' Comments in Face Mask Debates , RiverTowns (Aug. 11, 2020), perma.cc/HV5V-FY5Z (censure for use of \"deragotory and unprofessional\" language \"at the July 28, 2020 meeting of the River Falls Common Council\"); Jenny Berg, St. Cloud City Council Censures Br andmire for 'Yellow Star' Remark in Mask Debate , St. Cloud Times (Aug. 17, 2020), perma.cc/FTS7- H3XH (censure for offensive statem ents made \"[at a] meeting\" of the council); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45 America. That is not surprising in light of the extensive historical evidence that the Founders intended to reject the English doctrine of contempts and thus to restrain the authority of legislative bodies to punish their mem-bers for protected speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 A.2d 993",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny",
		"context": "And in asking the dispositive question here —whether a particular law falls within \"the traditi onal line of gun regulation,\" Hel- ler II , 670 F.3d at 1270 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) — the Court's consideration of tradition did not end with 12 the fin de siècle in 1899. Federal laws disarming felons and the mentally ill date to the 20th century, yet Helle r described those \"longstanding prohibitions\" as \"pre- sumptively lawful.\" 554 U.S. at 626- 627 & n.26; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,562 U.S. 1303 . b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "614 F.3d 638",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny",
		"context": "But w here specific analogies are un available or do not provide clear guidance , courts will need doctrinal tests. As the author of Heller elsewhere recognized, such tests play an \"essential\" role in reviewing \"new re- strictions .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the 19th cent ury, state courts reviewed regula- tions on carrying arms in public by asking whether the y were \"reasonable.\" See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny",
		"context": "The modern standard of review that corresponds most closely to that traditional approach —and thus is most faithful to the history and tradition of the right to keep and bear arms —is a form of intermediate scrutiny. The Court has articulated intermediate scrutiny using different formulations, but all consider the nature of the burden imposed and demand a fit between that burden and a n important state interest —\"a fit that is not nec- essarily perfect, but reasonable \" or \" 'in proportion to the interest served.' \" Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since Heller , the courts of appeals have consistently applied this form of intermediate scrutiny to most firearms regulations , including public - carry laws. See 907 F.3d 659 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 469",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. A court should uphold an arms regulation if it is validated by text, history, and tradition or if it satisfies intermediate scrutiny",
		"context": "\" Board of 492 U.S. 469. Since Heller , the courts of appeals have consistently applied this form of intermediate scrutiny to most firearms regulations , including public - carry laws. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Intermediate scrutiny reflects the relevant history better than strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny carries with it a strong presumption of unconstitutionality, but that presumption has no place in this context.",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.3d 659",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioners' Position Conflicts with Locke",
		"context": ". Petitioners claim that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], supports their position. They are incorrect: All nine members of the Locke Court would have rejected Petitioners' claim. In Locke , scholarships for secular subjects were funded but theology scholarships were not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Petitioners' Position Conflicts with Locke",
		"context": "Such a distinction has no basis in the constitutional text and would require courts to draw impossible distinctions between different forms of religious education. Moreover, Petitioners' argument overlooks that religious teaching—even to primary and secondary school students—is itself a form of religious ministry. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Joshua Davey—who was studying to become a minister—is more closely comparable to religious school teachers than religious school students . Thus, like Washington's constitution, the No-Aid Clause bars funding of religious ministry —the ministry of religious teachers towards their students.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule",
		"context": "Federal statutes ordinarily should be read \"against a background of common -law adjudicatory prin- ciples,\" Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"Congress expects its stat- utes to be read in conformity with this Court's prece-dents,\" 519 U.S. 482. 16 But petitioner has identified n o decision of this Court ei- ther before 1977, cf. Food Mktg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule",
		"context": "Federal statutes ordinarily should be read \"against a background of common -law adjudicatory prin- ciples,\" Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan 501 U.S. 104, and \"Congress expects its stat- utes to be read in conformity with this Court's prece-dents,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 But petitioner has identified n o decision of this Court ei- ther before 1977, cf. Food Mktg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1692k(d)'s clear text displaces any default presumption in favor of a discovery rule",
		"context": ", 139 S. Ct. at 2365- 2366, or since then that has adopt ed a presumption that federal limitations periods incorporate a delayed - accrual discovery rule . In 2001, the Court observed that, although lower courts had adopted that approach, this Court \"ha[d ] not adopted that position as [its] own.\" TRW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The follow- ing year, the Court noted that it is unremarkable for a plaintiff 's claim to accrue, and the limitations period to start running, \"whether or not [the plaintiff ] is aware of [the claim].\" Young , 535 U.S. at 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 19",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Private enforcement of the FDCA through the FCA is inconsistent with congressional intent, especially when the United States opposes the litigation",
		"context": "For the same reasons articu- lated in Buckman , private civil attempts to leverage the FCA as a method to enforce provisions of the FDCA is improper, partic ularly when the government agency as- signed responsibility to enforce the regulatory regime has not seen fit to take enforcement action itself. See, e.g., Buckman , 531 U.S. at 354 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the outcome might be different if FDA had \"taken the necessary steps to remove the harm -caus- ing product from the market\"). 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], demonstrates this potential for the FCA to be used in a manner that subverts FDA's enforcement discre- tion. There, a relator alleged that the defendants made false statements during the FDA approval process for certain medical devices. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "845 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Private enforcement of the FDCA through the FCA is inconsistent with congressional intent, especially when the United States opposes the litigation",
		"context": "An earlier district court case, United States ex rel. Nowak v. Medtronic, Inc. , reflects a similar attempt to end- run the FDCA's bar agai nst private enforcement, and FDA's policy judgments, by asserting FCA liability based on the premise that the devices in question should not have been cleared. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Nowak , a district court dismissed an FCA claim grounde d on the theory that the defendant device maker \"falsely presented its biliary stents to health care providers as effective for use in the vasculature despite knowing both that the devices were not approved for such a use because they may not be safe and e ffective for such a use.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "806 F. Supp. 2d 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Granting relief would not require a court to modify the Consolidated Decree",
		"context": "The Court has occasionally modified the decree to an- swer reserved questions. For example, in 1978, the United States and state parties successful ly sought additional rights to the mainstream and associated priority dates. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In earlier stages of the litigation, the Court also indicated that certain tribal water rights might be adjusted in the future, after reserva- tion boundary disputes were res olved. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Granting relief would not require a court to modify the Consolidated Decree",
		"context": "The Court later supplemented the decree af- ter those disputes and other tribal c laims were resolved. See id. at 418 -20; 2000 Decree , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has also explained that Article IX was designed mainly to allow the Court to \"adjust[] the [D]ecree in light of unforeseeable changes in circum- stances.\" Arizona II , 460 U.S. at 622.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Granting relief would not require a court to modify the Consolidated Decree",
		"context": "Arizona II , 460 U.S. at 622. In other original - jurisdiction water -rights litigation with similar decree language, the Court has done just that . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court 's decree re- solved \"an action brought to prevent Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago from diverting water from Lake Michigan for the purpose of diluting and carrying away the sewage of Chicago.\" Arizona II , 460 U.S. at 6 24 n.16. More than two decades later , the 46 Court modified the decree when low water levels in the Mississippi River caused a navigation emergency.",
		"citation_value_orig": "278 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Granting relief would not require a court to modify the Consolidated Decree",
		"context": "More than two decades later , the 46 Court modified the decree when low water levels in the Mississippi River caused a navigation emergency. Id. And i n New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court later amended the decree \"with the consent of the parties to take account of changed con- ditions concerning the discharge of sewage.\" Arizona II, 460 U.S. at 6 24 n.16. While the Court retained jurisdiction in Arizona over a narrow category of issues, lower -court adjudi- catio n does not implicate that jurisdiction so long as granting relief wouldn't require modifying the decree.",
		"citation_value_orig": "283 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no certworthy circuit split over whether section 1415(l) excuses exhaustion when plaintiffs settle their IDEA claims.",
		"context": "App. 13a. Finally, although the Tenth Circuit excused ex- haustion as futile even when there was no administrative record in its pre- Ross decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Muskrat doesn't create cer- worthy conflict either. Muskrat is distinguishable because it never suggested that further efforts to ex-haust could have produced a helpful record. And in any event, more recent Tenth Circuit authority (not to mention Ross ) has undermined Muskrat 's logic.",
		"citation_value_orig": "715 F.3d 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "At the very least, the Court should apply an intermediate level of scrutiny requiring the govern-ment to demonstrate an important interest that the exclusionary treatment of Pu erto Rico residents sub- stantially (not just rationally) advances. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's longstanding justifications for applying 37 This Court has also held that the \"right to travel\" between states should not be infringed. See 526 U.S. 489; accord Sup.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": ", 518 U.S. 515. The Court's longstanding justifications for applying 37 This Court has also held that the \"right to travel\" between states should not be infringed. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord Sup. Ct. of N. 470 U.S. 274; see also 314 U.S. 160. This Court has assumed the same right applies to travel between states and territories.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "The Court's longstanding justifications for applying 37 This Court has also held that the \"right to travel\" between states should not be infringed. See 526 U.S. 489; accord Sup. Ct. of N. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 314 U.S. 160. This Court has assumed the same right applies to travel between states and territories. 435 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "The Court's longstanding justifications for applying 37 This Court has also held that the \"right to travel\" between states should not be infringed. See 526 U.S. 489; accord Sup. Ct. of N. 470 U.S. 274; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has assumed the same right applies to travel between states and territories. 435 U.S. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "314 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Ct. of N. 470 U.S. 274; see also 314 U.S. 160. This Court has assumed the same right applies to travel between states and territories. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By penalizing American citizens who move from the states to Puerto Rico by withdrawing elig ibility for SSI benefits, the law also impermissibly infringes on the right to travel. Gautier Torres is not to the contrary.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "28 elevated scrutiny to suspect or quasi-suspect govern- ment classifications apply as forcefully to Congress's discrimination against residen ts of Puerto Rico when denying important government benefits like SSI. This Court has long recognized that heightened scrutiny should be applied to individuals who \"have historically 'been relegated to such a position of polit- ical powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majorita rian political process.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is especially so for individuals with group affiliations that have historically subjected them to intentional unequal treatment, as the govern-ment, too, has recognized. See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Nos.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "The Court need look no further than the Insular Cases, which still loom over the federal territories, to see the historical evidence of racial animus and use thereof to justify the unequal application of constitu- tional protections. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (stating \"in the annexation of outlying and distant possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race, habits, laws, and customs of the peop le . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "195 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": ". which may require action on the part of Congress that would be quite un- necessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race\"). While amicus acknowledges that Congress has tra- ditionally been afforded some deference when legislating in areas touching on the territories, it agrees with respondent that the precedents for such deference (including [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 446 U.S. 651), should not control the issue here. Those cases were short summary orders that did not adequately address the important equal-protection concerns im- plicated by laws that wi thhold key rights from residents of territories. See Rosario , 446 U.S. at 654 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (\"Heightened scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-ment, the Court concludes, is simply unavailable to 30 protect Puerto Rico or the citizens who reside there from discriminatory legislation, as long as Congress acts pursuant to the Territory Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": ". which may require action on the part of Congress that would be quite un- necessary in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race\"). While amicus acknowledges that Congress has tra- ditionally been afforded some deference when legislating in areas touching on the territories, it agrees with respondent that the precedents for such deference (including 435 U.S. 1, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), should not control the issue here. Those cases were short summary orders that did not adequately address the important equal-protection concerns im- plicated by laws that wi thhold key rights from residents of territories. See Rosario , 446 U.S. at 654 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (\"Heightened scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-ment, the Court concludes, is simply unavailable to 30 protect Puerto Rico or the citizens who reside there from discriminatory legislation, as long as Congress acts pursuant to the Territory Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 651",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The denial of SSI benefits to residents of Puerto Rico should be struck down under heightened scrutiny",
		"context": "Such a propo-sition surely warrants the full attention of this Court before it is made part of our constitutional jurispru- dence.\"). These cases also relied on the Insular Cases, which \"should [not] be give n any further expansion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The exclusion of Puerto Rico residents from SSI benefits cannot survive heightened scrutiny. The gov- ernment cannot identify any compelling or substantial government interest advanced by the dis-parate treatment, much less explain how that exclusionary treatment is su bstantially tail ored to ad- vance any such interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "354 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures",
		"context": ". Founding-era in rem f o rf e i tures ha v e bee n tak e n as nearly ipso facto assurance that modern forfeiture practices are constitutional. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 516 U.S. 442; United States v. 92 Beuna Vista Ave., 507 U .S. 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 ( 1 993 ) ( p l urali ty o p ini o n ) ; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 4 1 6 U .S. 663, 682, 684-85 (1974); see also 137 S. Ct. 847.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures",
		"context": ". Founding-era in rem f o rf e i tures ha v e bee n tak e n as nearly ipso facto assurance that modern forfeiture practices are constitutional. See, e.g., 518 U.S. 267; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; United States v. 92 Beuna Vista Ave., 507 U .S. 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 ( 1 993 ) ( p l urali ty o p ini o n ) ; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 4 1 6 U .S. 663, 682, 684-85 (1974); see also 137 S. Ct. 847.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures",
		"context": "See, e.g., 518 U.S. 267; 516 U.S. 442; United States v. 92 Beuna Vista Ave., 507 U .S. 1 1 1 , 1 1 9 ( 1 993 ) ( p l urali ty o p ini o n ) ; Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 4 1 6 U .S. 663, 682, 684-85 (1974); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, \"[s]uch forfeitures sought to vindicate the Government's underlying property right in customs duties, and like other traditional in rem forfeitures, they were not considered at the Founding to be punishment for an offense.\" 524 U.S. 321.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures",
		"context": "663, 682, 684-85 (1974); see also 137 S. Ct. 847. However, \"[s]uch forfeitures sought to vindicate the Government's underlying property right in customs duties, and like other traditional in rem forfeitures, they were not considered at the Founding to be punishment for an offense.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But those early in rem forfeitures (actions \"against a thing\") made sense because the essential element of such a claim, much like the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , was that the defendant property as found and seized 21 carried indisputable evidence of a customs violation, i.e., absence of a duty stamp. The legal fiction underlying in rem cases was jurisdictionally sufficient precisely because the essential evidence underlying the claim was both indisputable and borne by the defendant property itself as found and seized without more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Historical In Rem Practices are No Bar to Enforcing the Excessive Fines Clause Against Modern Forfeitures",
		"context": "17 And none of the other evidence supporting this 17. T he State speculated that the odometer reading was a result of trips to buy and bring home heroin. See Brief of Appellee at 5, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2016 WL 9243717. But the \"mileage accumulated on the vehicle does not substantiate the claim of multiple trips\" to transport heroin for sale, in large part because Timbs \"stated his 22 forfeiture action arose from the property as found and seized.18 Revolutionary era forfeiture is no more the same animal as Indiana's action here than a gecko is a crocodile. In every important way, modern forfeitures such as Indiana seeks here are deprivations which, were it not for overly simplified comparisons to early American in rem practices, would otherwise require prior due process under both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "84 N.E.3d 1179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS ARE INAPPLICABLE WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES FOR THE TERRITORIES",
		"context": "\"The Constitution enumerates and separates the powers of the three branches of [the national] Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this 'very structure' of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"While the boundaries between the three branches are not 'hermetically' sealed [the separation of powers doctrine] prohibits one branch from encroaching on the central prerogatives of another.\" French , 530 U.S. at 341 (internal citations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS ARE INAPPLICABLE WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES FOR THE TERRITORIES",
		"context": "Rather, Petitioner focuses here on certain precedents of this Court and issues that may not otherwise be fully addressed. 10. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 This case, however, does not concern the structure \"of the National Government,\" but rather an agency Congress created for the territorial government of Puerto Rico. It does not turn, then, on Congress's authority to act within the constraints of \"Articles I, II, and III\"; the question presented here is whether the separation of powers structures that so carefully calibrate the responsibilities of each branch of the \" National Government \" also constrain Congress when it acts for the territories under Article IV.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS ARE INAPPLICABLE WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES FOR THE TERRITORIES",
		"context": "The court also dismissed Heinszen because it \"concerned a grant of power by Congress, not a grab for power at the expense of the executive,\" but that is a distinction without a difference. Where it applies, the \"Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 524 U.S. 417;",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT SEPARATION OF POWERS CONCERNS ARE INAPPLICABLE WHEN CONGRESS LEGISLATES FOR THE TERRITORIES",
		"context": "The court also dismissed Heinszen because it \"concerned a grant of power by Congress, not a grab for power at the expense of the executive,\" but that is a distinction without a difference. Where it applies, the \"Constitution's division of power among the three branches is violated where one branch invades the territory of another, whether or not the encroached-upon branch approves the encroachment.\" New 505 U.S. 144; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]];",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Because Washington's tax infringes a preexisting tax exemption, it is preempted",
		"context": "It is a bedrock tenet of federal Indian law that Indians are immune from state tax based on their activity in Indian country. As this Court has explained, this tenet follows from principles of Indian sovereignty that were already well-established at the time of the Yakama Treaty. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And this tenet retains vitality today. Indeed, this Court has specifically held that Indians are immune from fuel excise taxes triggered by on-reservation sales.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Because Washington's tax infringes a preexisting tax exemption, it is preempted",
		"context": "And this tenet retains vitality today. Indeed, this Court has specifically held that Indians are immune from fuel excise taxes triggered by on-reservation sales. See Oklahoma Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, Respondent's travel from the Washington/Oregon state line to the Reservation occurs solely within the Ceded Area. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Framers Understood That a Unanimous Jury Requirement Was an Essential Component of a Fair Jury Trial",
		"context": ". includ[ing] all the es- sential elements as they were recognized in this coun- try and England when the Constitution was adopted'\"—including the requirement \"'that the ver- dict should be unanimous.'\" Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]).",
		"citation_value_orig": "281 U.S. 276",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices",
		"context": "U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 21 So. 290; 2 A. 598; 2 S.W. 417; Ex parte54 Ala. 226; 44 Miss. 352; 5 La. Ann. 155. 15 (18 Wall.) 317, 321 -322 (1873); 501 U.S. 86895 U.S. 90.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2165",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices",
		"context": "I, § 1; see 138 S. Ct. 2165; 21 So. 290; 2 A. 598; 2 S.W. 417; Ex parte54 Ala. 226; 44 Miss. 352; 5 La. Ann. 155. 15 (18 Wall.) 317, 321 -322 (1873); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]95 U.S. 90. Territor ial excises do not provide for the \"general Welfare of the United States\" and thus need not be \"uniform throughout the United States.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices",
		"context": "I, § 1; see 138 S. Ct. 2165; 21 So. 290; 2 A. 598; 2 S.W. 417; Ex parte54 Ala. 226; 44 Miss. 352; 5 La. Ann. 155. 15 (18 Wall.) 317, 321 -322 (1873); 501 U.S. 868[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Territor ial excises do not provide for the \"general Welfare of the United States\" and thus need not be \"uniform throughout the United States.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices",
		"context": "Art. I, § 8, Cl. 1; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1 904). Territorial treasuries do not form part of \"the Treasury of the United States.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Appointments Clause by its terms does not govern territorial offices",
		"context": "I, § 6, Cl. 1 and § 9, Cl. 7; see Cincinnati Soap [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And both the court of appeals and Aurelius admit that \"territorial laws\" are not \"laws of the United States.\" Aurelius Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic",
		"context": "That judicial action ensures the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation; it does not implicate any state sovereign interest not surrendered in the plan of the convention. The oddity of New Jersey' s sovereignty- based objection to the §717f(h) action , but not to the far more serious affront to state dignity worked by FERC's approval of the pipeline route, is underscore d by the possibility that Congress could have forced New Jersey to file an inverse-condemnation action to obtain compensation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) . If Congress had plainly authorized the taking of state property to build a pipeline without providing a specific mechanism for ensuring just compensation, the onus would be on the state to file an inverse -condemnation action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic",
		"context": "There is no such thing as a purel y \"private\" condemnation action. A private party may condemn land if and only if the government empowers it to do so. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] action, it is not acting as a private party ; it is a federal delegee bound by the same strictures as the government: It may condemn land on ly for public use, and it must pay just compensation . See153 U.S. 525 ; Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "127 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic",
		"context": "A private party may condemn land if and only if the government empowers it to do so. See 127 U.S. 1 action, it is not acting as a private party ; it is a federal delegee bound by the same strictures as the government: It may condemn land on ly for public use, and it must pay just compensation . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Private Takings, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "153 U.S. 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic",
		"context": "Private parties have no power to bring §717f(h) action s on their own accord, or to dictate the routes of their pipelines. No party can bring a §717f(h) action without a FERC certificate , and FERC's close control over the lengthy and detailed siting process ensures \"the exercise of political responsibility for each [condemnation] suit\" the certificate authorizes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Accordingly, to the extent a state takes issue with the decision to take its property to accomplish federal ends, its beef is with FERC, not with the private party who initiates the §717f(h) proceedings . And since the whole point of the 39 §717f(h) action is to augment the state treasury , there is zero threat to the state fisc.3 That reality underscores the absence of any Eleventh Amendment problem here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. New Jersey's Effort to Bifurcate the Eminent Domain Power and the Power to Bring Court Actions to Effectuate It Has No Grounding in Law or Logic",
		"context": "If anything, th e notion that §717f(h) actions inflict some sovereign injury distinct from the None FERC 3 That readily distinguishes §717f(h) from efforts to \"delegate\" the federal government's power to sue states for money damages . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Section 717f(h) does not empower private parties to sue anyone —let alone to sue anyone for money damages, as was the case in Blatchford . It empower s them to effectuate a government -appro ved taking through an in rem proceeding that puts money in the property owner's hands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This language leaves no room for assignor estoppel. \"In patent law, as in all statutory construction, un- less otherwise defined, word s will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-ing.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]138 S. Ct. 1348138 S. Ct. 784 with a 'singular noun in affirmative contexts,' the word 'any' ordinarily 'refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class without distinction or limitation' and in this way 'impl[ies] every member of the class or group.'\" Id. (quoting Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 593",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This language leaves no room for assignor estoppel. \"In patent law, as in all statutory construction, un- less otherwise defined, word s will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-ing.\" 561 U.S. 593[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]138 S. Ct. 784 with a 'singular noun in affirmative contexts,' the word 'any' ordinarily 'refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class without distinction or limitation' and in this way 'impl[ies] every member of the class or group.'\" Id. (quoting Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This language leaves no room for assignor estoppel. \"In patent law, as in all statutory construction, un- less otherwise defined, word s will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common mean-ing.\" 561 U.S. 593138 S. Ct. 1348[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with a 'singular noun in affirmative contexts,' the word 'any' ordinarily 'refer[s] to a member of a particular group or class without distinction or limitation' and in this way 'impl[ies] every member of the class or group.'\" Id. (quoting Oxford English Dictionary (3d ed., Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "8 (em- phases added). This \"clause is both a grant of power and a limitation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Written against a backdrop of the English Crown's practice of \"granting monopo- lies to court favorites in g oods or businesses which had 19 long before been enjoyed by the public,\" the clause is a barrier against use of the patent power to stifle pro- gress by granting patents on material the inventor did not discover. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "383 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "This Court has re- peatedly rejected the Federal Circuit's attempts to read, in the name of equity, such atextual limitations into the patent laws. See, e.g., SCA Hygiene Prods. Ak- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]572 U.S. 545561 U.S. 602 . That is in keeping with this Court's century-old view that courts \"should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.\" Bilski , 561 U.S. at 602; 289 U.S. 178289 U.S. 706.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Ak- 137 S. Ct. 954572 U.S. 545561 U.S. 602 . That is in keeping with this Court's century-old view that courts \"should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.\" Bilski , 561 U.S. at 602; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]289 U.S. 706.",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Patent Act's Text Precludes Assignor Estoppel",
		"context": "Ak- 137 S. Ct. 954572 U.S. 545561 U.S. 602 . That is in keeping with this Court's century-old view that courts \"should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed.\" Bilski , 561 U.S. at 602; 289 U.S. 178[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "Allowing such suits to proceed in that manner would trammel defendants ' rights, which is particularly problematic for the public interest when the suit is against the Government. Whe re the relief would reach beyond the particular parties ' circumstances, the party seeking that relief \"must … satisfy [the] standards for a facial challenge to the extent of that reach. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, where \"claims are bett er read as facial objections \" to a law, courts need \"not separately address the as -applied claims. \" Susan B. Anthony 134 S.Ct. 2334.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "561 U.S. 186. Indeed, where \"claims are bett er read as facial objections \" to a law, courts need \"not separately address the as -applied claims. \" Susan B. Anthony [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Of course, a \"facial challenge to a legislative Act is … the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. \" 481 U.S. 739.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S.Ct. 2334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "Susan B. Anthony 134 S.Ct. 2334. Of course, a \"facial challenge to a legislative Act is … the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"[t]he fact that [the law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, \" id., prevailing in an as -applied challenge is simply not the same as prevailing in a facial challenge. 564 U.S. 552.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 739",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "481 U.S. 739. Because \"[t]he fact that [the law] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid, \" id., prevailing in an as -applied challenge is simply not the same as prevailing in a facial challenge. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sympathetic individu al plaintiffs cannot 36 form the basis for nationwide facial relief, particularly where those individual plaintiffs failed to exhaust the Proclamation 's hardship provisions. Similarly, when plaintiffs with standing purport to represent a class of similarly si tuated persons or entities, the law requires that the protected class is indeed similarly situated .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 552",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "This Court has \"repeatedly held t hat a class represent ative must be part of the class and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as the class members. \" Gen. Tel. Co. of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which can be requi red: Where differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses…. Amch em 521 U.S. 591; 527 U.S. 815. Not every U.S. resident who wish es to interact here with foreign -based aliens can claim the same facts that Hawaii 's universities and Dr. Elshikh claim, so not every such resident should benefit from facial relief that a court premised on those unusual facts .15 15 As indicated throughout this brief, EFELDF does not concede that either Hawaii or Dr. Elshikh have a valid claim here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 147",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "Gen. Tel. Co. of the 457 U.S. 147, which can be requi red: Where differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses…. Amch em [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 527 U.S. 815. Not every U.S. resident who wish es to interact here with foreign -based aliens can claim the same facts that Hawaii 's universities and Dr. Elshikh claim, so not every such resident should benefit from facial relief that a court premised on those unusual facts .15 15 As indicated throughout this brief, EFELDF does not concede that either Hawaii or Dr. Elshikh have a valid claim here. Rather, EFELDF merely argues that 37 Especially where the Proclamation allowed case - by-case waivers for instances of undue hardship, this Court should not allow hijacking national policy based on atypical, cherry -picked facts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 591",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Providing facial relief in as-applied challenges frustrates this Court's precedents on facial and class actions",
		"context": "Gen. Tel. Co. of the 457 U.S. 147, which can be requi red: Where differences among members of a class are such that subclasses must be established, we know of no authority that permits a court to approve a settlement without creating subclasses…. Amch em 521 U.S. 591; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Not every U.S. resident who wish es to interact here with foreign -based aliens can claim the same facts that Hawaii 's universities and Dr. Elshikh claim, so not every such resident should benefit from facial relief that a court premised on those unusual facts .15 15 As indicated throughout this brief, EFELDF does not concede that either Hawaii or Dr. Elshikh have a valid claim here. Rather, EFELDF merely argues that 37 Especially where the Proclamation allowed case - by-case waivers for instances of undue hardship, this Court should not allow hijacking national policy based on atypical, cherry -picked facts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 815",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Other Side Cannot Distinguish The Precedent Holding Analogous Statutory Exhaustion Requirements Jurisdictional",
		"context": "3. Respondent's and the Government's theories also fail because they cannot account for many of this Court's cases holding statutory exhaustion require- ments jurisdictional. 14 In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court affirmed the jurisdictional dis- missal of a claim because the petitioner failed to adhere to a statutory provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) requiring him to \"exhaust[ ] [his] administrative remedies\" before bringing suit. Id. at 113.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Other Side Cannot Distinguish The Precedent Holding Analogous Statutory Exhaustion Requirements Jurisdictional",
		"context": "In the wake of McNeil , nearly every circuit has viewed the FTCA's exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that, under the FTCA, district court lacked jurisdiction because plaintiffs \"failed to exhaust their administrative remedies\"), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "886 F.3d 122",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Other Side Cannot Distinguish The Precedent Holding Analogous Statutory Exhaustion Requirements Jurisdictional",
		"context": "Br. 20-22. For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court considered at length which forms of statutory claims fall within the \"primary jurisdiction\" of the agency and there- 16 fore deprive the district courts of power to \"exercise jurisdiction\" over them. Id. at 49-50 (1998); see id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Other Side Cannot Distinguish The Precedent Holding Analogous Statutory Exhaustion Requirements Jurisdictional",
		"context": "at 31. The Government does not explain what in the stat- ute would permit the Court to infer that Congress intended the exhaustion requirement to function in this way—mandating claim-specific exhaustion, but permitting some lesser form of exhaustion for juris- dictional purposes. The Government relies on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], an SSA case holding that a court will not lightly apply a prudential \"issue exhaustion\" requirement. But the Government seems to have confused the words \"issue\" and \"claim.\" In Sims ,it was undisputed that the plaintiff had presented her only disability benefits claim to 17 both the administrative law judge and the Appeals Council.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "1. This Court has \"taken [care] to construe\" words like \" 'knowing,' 'intentional,' or 'willful' in their particular statutory context.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As used i n the FCA , the words \"know- ing\" and \"knowingly\" encompass circumstances in which persons subjectively believe they are submitting false claims to the government; are aware of a substan- tial risk that their claims are false but deliberately avoid taking readily available steps to obtain clarification ; or act in reckless disregard of known or obvious facts indi- cating a high likelihood of falsity . Whe n a defendant has submitted false claims with one of those culpable states of mind, it cannot escape liability merely by showing that its claims were consistent with an objectively rea- sonable (but wrong) understanding of the law .",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "III 1985). Some courts interpreted that provision to require proof of a specific \"purpose on the p art of [the defendant] to cheat the Government .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 100 Stat. 3153 - 3154 . The 1986 Amendments stated that \" no proof of specific intent to defraud is required,\" and added a new three -pronged definition of \"knowingly.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 F.2d 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "1979) (defining \"knowledge\") . That generally means that the defendant was subjectively \"aware of \" a violation. Intel Corp. In- vestment Policy Comm [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[D]eliberate ignorance \" means that a de- fendant is \"subjective [ly] aware[] \" of a substantial risk that his statement may be false , and avoids taking steps to confirm the statement 's truth or falsity. 922 F.3d 639; see Global -Tech App liances, 563 U.S. 754 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 768",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "Intel Corp. In- vestment Policy Comm 140 S. Ct. 768. \"[D]eliberate ignorance \" means that a de- fendant is \"subjective [ly] aware[] \" of a substantial risk that his statement may be false , and avoids taking steps to confirm the statement 's truth or falsity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Global -Tech App liances, 563 U.S. 754 . And \"reckless disregard \" means an \"aggravated form of gross negligence, \" United States ex rel. 892 F.3d 822; see 418 U.S. 323 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "922 F.3d 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "Intel Corp. In- vestment Policy Comm 140 S. Ct. 768. \"[D]eliberate ignorance \" means that a de- fendant is \"subjective [ly] aware[] \" of a substantial risk that his statement may be false , and avoids taking steps to confirm the statement 's truth or falsity. 922 F.3d 639; see Global -Tech App liances, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And \"reckless disregard \" means an \"aggravated form of gross negligence, \" United States ex rel. 892 F.3d 822; see 418 U.S. 323 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 754",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "922 F.3d 639; see Global -Tech App liances, 563 U.S. 754 . And \"reckless disregard \" means an \"aggravated form of gross negligence, \" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 418 U.S. 323 . By covering all three states of mind, Congress cast a net broad enough to reach those who act in bad fait h or without an appropriate degree of care , even where claims for payment implicate ambiguous legal condi- tions . If a defendant believe s (correctly) that it is vio- lating a legal requirement that make s its claims false and ineligible for payment , the defendant act s with \"ac- tual knowledge \" if it submits the false claim s—even if its lawyers subsequently identify an objectively reason- able (but incorrect) exculpatory interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "892 F.3d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "922 F.3d 639; see Global -Tech App liances, 563 U.S. 754 . And \"reckless disregard \" means an \"aggravated form of gross negligence, \" United States ex rel. 892 F.3d 822; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By covering all three states of mind, Congress cast a net broad enough to reach those who act in bad fait h or without an appropriate degree of care , even where claims for payment implicate ambiguous legal condi- tions . If a defendant believe s (correctly) that it is vio- lating a legal requirement that make s its claims false and ineligible for payment , the defendant act s with \"ac- tual knowledge \" if it submits the false claim s—even if its lawyers subsequently identify an objectively reason- able (but incorrect) exculpatory interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "If a defendant believe s (correctly) that it is vio- lating a legal requirement that make s its claims false and ineligible for payment , the defendant act s with \"ac- tual knowledge \" if it submits the false claim s—even if its lawyers subsequently identify an objectively reason- able (but incorrect) exculpatory interpretation. See United States ex rel. Phalp v. Linca re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If a defendant is aware of a substantial risk that its submissions are false, but ch ooses not to make readil y available inquiries that could clarify their truthfulness , that defendant act s with \"deliberate ignorance. \" 937 F.3d 1201.",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 F.3d 1148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "And if a defendant disregard s warnings about likely falsity from knowled geable sources such as 12 attorneys, internal compliance officers, or government contractors , that defendant act s with \"reckless disre- gard \" of the truthfulness of its claims. See United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. dismissed,138 S. Ct. 2690 . A defendant who submits false claims for payment in such circumstances cannot escape liability by identify- ing wrong -but-reasonable justifications after the fact .",
		"citation_value_orig": "895 F.3d 730",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Seventh Circuit erred in holding that subjective bad faith is never sufficient to establish scienter under the FCA",
		"context": "Third, the FCA applies specifically to claims for gov- ernment money or property . \"[T]hose who seek public funds \" have a heightened duty to \"act with scrupulou s regard for the requirements of law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this case illustrates, moreo- ver, companies that seek funds from the government (particularly on a recurring basis) often have avenues for resolving ambiguity about payment rules —for ex- ample, by seeki ng guidance from their contractual part- ners in state Medicaid agencies or from contractual in- termediaries like pharmacy benefit manager s—that might not be available with respect to more generally applicable requirements . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Framers Wrote Article III To Ensure that Where There Is a Legal Right, There Is a Legal Remedy for Infringement of that Right",
		"context": "This is what we mean properly, when we speak of the protection of the law.\" 1 id. at 56; see Spokeo, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These fundamental rule-of-law values were af- firmed by a number of F ounding -era state constitu- tions, which explicitly guarante ed redress for viola- tions of legal right s. For example, t he Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that \" [e]very 12 subject . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1540",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Framers Wrote Article III To Ensure that Where There Is a Legal Right, There Is a Legal Remedy for Infringement of that Right",
		"context": "Id. at 163. \"From the earliest years of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award ap- propriate remedies to redress injuries acti onable in 13 federal court,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], beginning with Marbury . In Marbury , it did not matter that federal law did not grant an express right of action to Marbury, or even that \"the mandamus, now moved for, i s not for the per- formance of an act expressly enjoined by statute.\" 5 U.S. at 172.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Framers Wrote Article III To Ensure that Where There Is a Legal Right, There Is a Legal Remedy for Infringement of that Right",
		"context": ". as well as to en- sure an independent Judiciary.\" Franklin , 503 U.S. at 74; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Framers' linkage of rights and remedies is di- rectly reflected not only in Article III but in the text and history of the Fourth Amendment as well . As the next Section shows, the Framers o f the Fourth Amend- ment wrote into the Constitution a broad guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures against the backdrop of landmark English cases in which juries awarded damages in civil suits to check abuse of authority by the Crown.",
		"citation_value_orig": "14 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY HERE, WHERE THE JURY NEVER REACHED A VERDICT",
		"context": "U.S. Const. Amend. V.; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], This is simply not the case. This argument blatantly ignores the jury's other diametrically opposed decision, on the critical issue of ultimate fact, finding him not insane. The assertion that any Court could then \"apply\" the insanity finding to the jury's other express and specific finding that McElrath acted with intent is unsupported by law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY HERE, WHERE THE JURY NEVER REACHED A VERDICT",
		"context": "The assertion that any Court could then \"apply\" the insanity finding to the jury's other express and specific finding that McElrath acted with intent is unsupported by law. See 580 U.S. 5.4 Formulated over time, the basic rules under the Double Jeopardy Clause allow a defendant to be re- tried when his conviction is set aside due to an error in the proceedings but not when the reversal is based upon insufficient evidence. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 377 U.S. 463. This Court in Green also stated that jeop- ardy is not regarded as having come to an end such that it bars a second trial where unforeseeable circum- stances during the first trial, such as the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict, makes its completion impos- sible. Green , 355 U.S. at 187-188.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT APPLY HERE, WHERE THE JURY NEVER REACHED A VERDICT",
		"context": "The assertion that any Court could then \"apply\" the insanity finding to the jury's other express and specific finding that McElrath acted with intent is unsupported by law. See 580 U.S. 5.4 Formulated over time, the basic rules under the Double Jeopardy Clause allow a defendant to be re- tried when his conviction is set aside due to an error in the proceedings but not when the reversal is based upon insufficient evidence. 437 U.S. 1; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court in Green also stated that jeop- ardy is not regarded as having come to an end such that it bars a second trial where unforeseeable circum- stances during the first trial, such as the failure of the jury to agree on a verdict, makes its completion impos- sible. Green , 355 U.S. at 187-188.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "17-1406. Sudan raises its jurisdictional challenges here because the question of whether the district court had 21 subject-matter jurisdiction over Petitioners' claims and the power to hear this action is a threshold question that must be decided before this Court addresses the Question Pr esented (and any further question over which Petitioners and the United States seek review). See Lake Country Estates, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"We do not normally address any issues other than those fairly comprised within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari and any cross petitions. An exception to this rule is the question of jurisdiction: even if not raised by the parties, we cannot ignore the absence of federal jurisdiction. \"); see also 556 U.S. 662.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See Lake Country Estates, 440 U.S. 391 (\"We do not normally address any issues other than those fairly comprised within the questions presented by the petition for certiorari and any cross petitions. An exception to this rule is the question of jurisdiction: even if not raised by the parties, we cannot ignore the absence of federal jurisdiction. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sudan challenges subject-matter jurisdiction in the following respects: 1. The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the embassy bombings do not constitute \"an act of .",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "§1350 note. This Court recently recognized that the meaning of §3 of the TVPA should be informed by international law: \"The TVPA — which is codified as a note following the [Alien Tort Statute] — creates an express cause of action for victims of torture and extrajudicial killing in violation of international law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the text, context, and history of §1605A and the TVPA all make clear that an act of \"extrajudicial killing,\" as defined in the TVPA and incorporated into §1605A, is a unique term of art derived from international law. See 138 S. Ct. 816546 U.S. 481.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 1386. Indeed, the text, context, and history of §1605A and the TVPA all make clear that an act of \"extrajudicial killing,\" as defined in the TVPA and incorporated into §1605A, is a unique term of art derived from international law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]546 U.S. 481. 23 Under international law, an act of \"extrajudicial killing\" means a summary execution by a state actor. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "138 S. Ct. 1386. Indeed, the text, context, and history of §1605A and the TVPA all make clear that an act of \"extrajudicial killing,\" as defined in the TVPA and incorporated into §1605A, is a unique term of art derived from international law. See 138 S. Ct. 816[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 23 Under international law, an act of \"extrajudicial killing\" means a summary execution by a state actor. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "23 Under international law, an act of \"extrajudicial killing\" means a summary execution by a state actor. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because Congress chose this term of art under international law, the term should be given its ordinary meaning. See 572 U.S. 844.",
		"citation_value_orig": "70 F.3d 232",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": ", 70 F.3d 232. Because Congress chose this term of art under international law, the term should be given its ordinary meaning. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of \"an act .",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "extrajudicial killing\" within the meaning of §1605(a)(7). 2. The district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because Petitioners have not established jurisdictional causation according to the standard set forth by this Court in Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The D.C. Circuit's ruling that \"[e]stablishing material support and causation for jurisdictional purposes is a lighter burden than proving a winning case on the merits,\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Instead, a plaintiff is required to \"prove\" and \"show (and not just arguably show)\" the actual existence of jurisdiction, and a court is required to resolve factual disputes and reach a decision finding that jurisdiction exists. Compare id. at 1316, 1318-19, 1324 (overruling low \"non-frivolous\" standard articulated in Agudas Chasidei Chabad of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) with Pet. App. 39a (relying on Chabad for \"lighter burden\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 F.3d 934",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "Pet. App. 40a (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to establish the jurisdictional facts. On this \"meager showing,\" the D.C. Circuit affirmed over $10 billion dollars in default judgments and reached the following extraordinary (and untenable) legal conclusion : \"In sum, that the evidence failed to show Sudan either specifically intended or directly advanced the 1998 embassy bombings is irrelevant to proximate cause and jurisdictional causation.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 F. Supp. 3d 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "87a-98a), this time bar is jurisdictional and cannot be forfeited; the D.C. Circuit erred in declining to reach the merits of Sudan's timeliness argument. In Fort Bend [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court reiterated that Congress need not \"incant magic words\" to identify a jurisdictional time bar. 139 S. Ct. at 1850; 135 S. Ct. at 1632. Instead, \"traditional tools of statutory construction must plainly show that Congress imbued a procedural bar with jurisdictional consequences.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The District Court Lacked Subject-Matter Jurisdiction",
		"context": "§2401(a), which bars \"every civil action commenced against the United States\" outside of the six-year limitation 30 period and has been held jurisdictional by a long line of courts. See, e.g. , P & V [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sudan has raised its jurisdictional challenges in this Court more fully in Sudan's pending Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and supporting briefs in Republic of Sudan v. Owens , No. 17-1236, and Sudan's pending Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari and supporting briefs in Republic of Sudan v. Opati , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 F.3d 1021",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Historical practice confirms that juries have no role in the revocation of conditional liberty",
		"context": "The parole board could then \"revoke\" parole and require the prisoner to \"serve the remainder of the sentence originally imposed,\" w ith no reduction for \"the time th e prisoner was out on parole.\" § 6, 36 Stat. 820; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As with all of the predecessor systems, no jury was in- volved. b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "263 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Historical practice confirms that juries have no role in the revocation of conditional liberty",
		"context": "521, 43 Stat. 1259, which adopted a n analogous probation system for federal courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statute gave district courts the power, in cases where the of- fense was not punishable by death or life imprisonment, \"to suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and to place the defendant upon probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as they may deem best.\" 43 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "275 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Historical practice confirms that juries have no role in the revocation of conditional liberty",
		"context": "Ibid. As this Court explained early on, the decision whether to revoke probation \"rests in the court's discre-tion\" and does not require any \"formal procedure,\" such as a jury \"trial upon charges.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The probation statute today similarly empowers courts to impose probation on a limited class of offend-ers, 18 U.S.C. 3561; to set conditions for the probationer to meet while on release, 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "287 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "Seesupra § I.A.2; Ho- dari D. , 499 U.S. at 626; Brower , 489 U.S. at 596-97. It is well-established and uncontested here that no seizure occurs where an officer accidentally brushes against someone's arm. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And no seizure occurs when an officer intentionally touches someone without any in- tent to restrain, such as by tapping someone on the back to get his attention or nudging a sleeping person awake. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 F. Supp. 2d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "And no seizure occurs when an officer intentionally touches someone without any in- tent to restrain, such as by tapping someone on the back to get his attention or nudging a sleeping person awake. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 831 F.2d 822; see392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (\"[N]ot all personal intercourse between po- licemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.\"). 41 This intentional-restraint limitation also as- suages the Tenth Circuit's concern about the suppos- edly \"illogical result[]\" that an officer who throws a stun grenade at a person to stop him but misses does not effect a seizure, but an officer who hits a person with a snowball (or a feather) does. See Brooks , 614 F.3d at 1223 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "621 F.3d 610",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "And no seizure occurs when an officer intentionally touches someone without any in- tent to restrain, such as by tapping someone on the back to get his attention or nudging a sleeping person awake. See, e.g. , 621 F.3d 610; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (\"[N]ot all personal intercourse between po- licemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.\"). 41 This intentional-restraint limitation also as- suages the Tenth Circuit's concern about the suppos- edly \"illogical result[]\" that an officer who throws a stun grenade at a person to stop him but misses does not effect a seizure, but an officer who hits a person with a snowball (or a feather) does. See Brooks , 614 F.3d at 1223 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.2d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "And no seizure occurs when an officer intentionally touches someone without any in- tent to restrain, such as by tapping someone on the back to get his attention or nudging a sleeping person awake. See, e.g. , 621 F.3d 610; 831 F.2d 822; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 19 n.16 (\"[N]ot all personal intercourse between po- licemen and citizens involves 'seizures' of persons.\"). 41 This intentional-restraint limitation also as- suages the Tenth Circuit's concern about the suppos- edly \"illogical result[]\" that an officer who throws a stun grenade at a person to stop him but misses does not effect a seizure, but an officer who hits a person with a snowball (or a feather) does. See Brooks , 614 F.3d at 1223 n.7.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "explicitly re- jected that idea: \"To say that an arrest is effected by the slightest application of physical force, despite the 9 Whether Respondents acted reasonably in this particular case and whether they are entitled to qualified immunity are is- sues beyond the scope of the question presented and were not addressed below. Those questions rest on unresolved factual dis- putes that are for the lower courts to resolve on remand. See Cut- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 arrestee's escape, is not to say that for Fourth Amend- ment purposes there is a continuing arrest during the period of fugitivity.\" 499 U.S. at 625.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "And show-of-authority seizure cases, which require courts to answer just such bedeviling questions about the precise moment of submission, il- lustrate the difficulties of such an approach. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]573 U.S. 373. Making matters worse, Respondents' rule leads to absurd consequences. Even if the passenger of a car is shot dead without reason, for instance, her family will have no Fourth Amendment remedy if the driver of the car keeps going.",
		"citation_value_orig": "609 F.3d 1059",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "Even if the passenger of a car is shot dead without reason, for instance, her family will have no Fourth Amendment remedy if the driver of the car keeps going. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, Respondents' rule leaves many wholly unjustified uses of deadly force untouched by the Fourth Amendment. This case is a prime example: Police officers shot a fleeing per- son twice in the back, temporarily paralyzing her arm and causing such severe injuries she had to be air- lifted to a bigger hospital—and yet by the lower court's reasoning, the shooting is entirely outside the bounds of the Fourth Amendment even if the officers had no reason whatsoever to shoot Ms. Torres and even if they violated clearly established law in doing so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 F.3d 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "2019 WL 4393989. 46 The common-law rule, by contrast, not only ac- cords with the understanding of seizure that pre- vailed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted and subsequently construed, it also \"conserve[s] public in- terests as well as the interests and rights of individ- ual citizens.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The public's interest in deterring unjustified intrusions on per- sonal security is served by clear standards that can be easily applied by both officers in the field and courts after the fact. The common-law rule is clear on both counts: An officer in the field knows what it means to lay his hands on someone intending to restrain her, and a court can easily determine whether the officer made contact with the suspect.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Any policy concerns are misplaced",
		"context": "The public's interest in deterring unjustified intrusions on per- sonal security is served by clear standards that can be easily applied by both officers in the field and courts after the fact. The common-law rule is clear on both counts: An officer in the field knows what it means to lay his hands on someone intending to restrain her, and a court can easily determine whether the officer made contact with the suspect. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Officers who know in advance that their actions may be subject to Fourth Amendment scru- tiny are more likely to exercise their duties with care and within the Constitution's limits. And of course, the existence of qualified immunity and the fact that reasonable uses of force are lawful ensure that officers will not refrain from acting when it is appropriate, or even inappropriate but not clearly so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "782 F. Supp. 1301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "After all, our clients generally do not encounter the same type of tax shelter scrutiny facing CIC Services (hereinafter CIC). However, this case exposes a fundamental tension be-tween the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA) which, if resolved incorrectly, would disproportionately harm low-income taxpayers. 4 The Tax Clinic made a similar argument to the Second Circuit in the case of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which also involved activ- ity targeted by the IRS as a tax shelter. While the Larson case differs factually and procedurally from this case, the same fundamen tal issue of access to the courts exists in both cases. In Larson , the Tax Clinic argued that the proliferation of assessable tax penal- ties over the past few decades necessitates a reconsid- eration of the 'payment-first' rule established by this court in 362 U.S. 145.",
		"citation_value_orig": "888 F.3d 578",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "4 The Tax Clinic made a similar argument to the Second Circuit in the case of 888 F.3d 578, which also involved activ- ity targeted by the IRS as a tax shelter. While the Larson case differs factually and procedurally from this case, the same fundamen tal issue of access to the courts exists in both cases. In Larson , the Tax Clinic argued that the proliferation of assessable tax penal- ties over the past few decades necessitates a reconsid- eration of the 'payment-first' rule established by this court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, assessable penalties can only be challenged in District Court and, under Flora , only after payment. Such a rule juxtaposed with an increase in assessable penalties creates a barrier to access to the court system not contemplated in a different era.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 145",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "Low-income taxpayer s are far less likely to have the resources either to adapt to costly infor-mation-gathering requirements or to pay the penalties that enable them to be heard in court. Accordingly, they are particularly vulnerable to this decision's over-broad reading of the AIA. The Sixth Circuit's holding that forces taxpayers to choose to disregard rules and incur penalties in or- der to challenge an arbitrary and capricious regulation does not constitute the kind of adequate forum for liti- gation to which the Court found taxpayers entitled in South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has held that plaintiffs need not \" 'bet the farm . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "by taking the violative action' before 'testing the validity of the law.' \" Free Enter. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet, this is exactly what the Sixth Circuit requires here. As the Court considers the request for writ of certiorari, it should be note d that this is not a situ- ation where the taxpayer should look to the legislative branch to solve the issue.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "6 I.R.C. § 7421 (2018). 7 Bob Jones [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 A number of lower court cases have held that the AIA serves to bar suits that relate to the IRS's efforts to gather information, both from taxpayers directly and from third parties who may have information that relates to another party's potential liability to taxes or civil tax penalties. 8 By contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Di- rect Marketing held information gathering is separate from the assessment, levy or collection of any underly-ing tax liability.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "8 By contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Di- rect Marketing held information gathering is separate from the assessment, levy or collection of any underly-ing tax liability. 9 Rightfully, the Court understood that information gathering is a distinct step in a taxation process that is separate from \"assessment\" of taxes.10 – the latter of which enjoys AIA protection, while the for- mer does not. In this case, the IRS seemingly understood that the rule-making process around information gathering may not enjoy AIA protection, and therefore made non-compliance with the information gathering require- ments issued in IRS Notice 2016-66 subject to assessable penalties, which are in some cases treated 8 See, e.g., Green Solution Retail, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]824 F.2d 827925 F.3d 247. 10 See id. at 9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "8 By contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Di- rect Marketing held information gathering is separate from the assessment, levy or collection of any underly-ing tax liability. 9 Rightfully, the Court understood that information gathering is a distinct step in a taxation process that is separate from \"assessment\" of taxes.10 – the latter of which enjoys AIA protection, while the for- mer does not. In this case, the IRS seemingly understood that the rule-making process around information gathering may not enjoy AIA protection, and therefore made non-compliance with the information gathering require- ments issued in IRS Notice 2016-66 subject to assessable penalties, which are in some cases treated 8 See, e.g., Green Solution Retail, 855 F.3d 1111[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]925 F.3d 247. 10 See id. at 9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "824 F.2d 827",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "8 By contrast, the Supreme Court's decision in Di- rect Marketing held information gathering is separate from the assessment, levy or collection of any underly-ing tax liability. 9 Rightfully, the Court understood that information gathering is a distinct step in a taxation process that is separate from \"assessment\" of taxes.10 – the latter of which enjoys AIA protection, while the for- mer does not. In this case, the IRS seemingly understood that the rule-making process around information gathering may not enjoy AIA protection, and therefore made non-compliance with the information gathering require- ments issued in IRS Notice 2016-66 subject to assessable penalties, which are in some cases treated 8 See, e.g., Green Solution Retail, 855 F.3d 1111824 F.2d 827[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 See id. at 9.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "14 11 I.R.S. Notice 2016- 66, 2016-47 IRB 745. 12 See CIC Servs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 While the noncompliance penalty is \"treated\" as a tax un- der the Code, it is not, in fact, a tax. Florida Bankers 799 F.3d 1065.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "12 See CIC Servs., 925 F.3d 247. 13 While the noncompliance penalty is \"treated\" as a tax un- der the Code, it is not, in fact, a tax. Florida Bankers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 14 The Sixth Circuit's holding that forces taxpayers to choose to disregard rules and incur penalt ies in order to challenge an ar- bitrary and capricious regulation does not constitute the kind of adequate forum for litigation to which the Court found taxpayers entitled in South 465 U.S. 367. This Court has held that plaintiffs need not \" 'bet the farm .",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 1065",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. INTRODUCTION: THE CURRENT SCOPE OF THE AIA AS INTERPRETED BY THE SIXTH CIRCUIT REACHES TOO BROADLY",
		"context": "13 While the noncompliance penalty is \"treated\" as a tax un- der the Code, it is not, in fact, a tax. Florida Bankers 799 F.3d 1065. 14 The Sixth Circuit's holding that forces taxpayers to choose to disregard rules and incur penalt ies in order to challenge an ar- bitrary and capricious regulation does not constitute the kind of adequate forum for litigation to which the Court found taxpayers entitled in South [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has held that plaintiffs need not \" 'bet the farm . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
		"context": "To the contrary, the Court has stated time and again that to satisfy this first requirement, Congress must simply \"mak[e] its intention to abrogate unmis- takably clear in the language of the statute.\" Coleman , 24 566 U.S. at 35 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726); see Lane , 541 U.S. at 517 (asking \"whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity\" (em- phasis added) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73)); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (\"To determine whether a federal stat- ute properly subjects States to suits by individuals, we apply a simple but stringent test: Congress may abro- gate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.\" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])); Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44; Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234. Congress need not also declare which provi- sion of the Constitution supports that intention. Thus, this Court has repeatedly concluded that the clear-intention-to-abrogate step of the inquiry is satis- fied without examining whether Congress expressly named the source of its abrogating authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
		"context": "To the contrary, the Court has stated time and again that to satisfy this first requirement, Congress must simply \"mak[e] its intention to abrogate unmis- takably clear in the language of the statute.\" Coleman , 24 566 U.S. at 35 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726); see Lane , 541 U.S. at 517 (asking \"whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity\" (em- phasis added) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73)); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (\"To determine whether a federal stat- ute properly subjects States to suits by individuals, we apply a simple but stringent test: Congress may abro- gate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.\" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 491 U.S. 223)); Seminole Tribe of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Atascadero State 473 U.S. 234. Congress need not also declare which provi- sion of the Constitution supports that intention. Thus, this Court has repeatedly concluded that the clear-intention-to-abrogate step of the inquiry is satis- fied without examining whether Congress expressly named the source of its abrogating authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
		"context": "To the contrary, the Court has stated time and again that to satisfy this first requirement, Congress must simply \"mak[e] its intention to abrogate unmis- takably clear in the language of the statute.\" Coleman , 24 566 U.S. at 35 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 726); see Lane , 541 U.S. at 517 (asking \"whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity\" (em- phasis added) (quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73)); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 73 (\"To determine whether a federal stat- ute properly subjects States to suits by individuals, we apply a simple but stringent test: Congress may abro- gate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.\" (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 491 U.S. 223)); Seminole Tribe of 517 U.S. 44; Atascadero State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress need not also declare which provi- sion of the Constitution supports that intention. Thus, this Court has repeatedly concluded that the clear-intention-to-abrogate step of the inquiry is satis- fied without examining whether Congress expressly named the source of its abrogating authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
		"context": "at 74, even though the provisions of the ADEA the Court was discussing were silent on the source of Con- gress's authority to take that action. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Likewise, in Lane, this Court determined that the first question—whether Congress clearly stated its in- tention to abrogate immunity—was \"easily answered\" in the affirmative where the legislation in question stated only that \"[a] State shall not be immune under the eleventh amendment . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. CONGRESS DID NOT NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY ABROGATE STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY",
		"context": "In fact, this Court has recently reaffirmed that the \"question of the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.\" Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In NFIB, this Court upheld a provision of the Affordable Care Act under Congress's taxing power, even though the provision purported to impose \"a 'penalty,' not a 'tax.'\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Elections Clause's text and historical context make clear that it does not authorize state legislatures to ignore state constitutional constraints",
		"context": "1755). And making regulations governing elections is a quintessential form of \"lawmaking.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Clause thus assigns state legislatures their traditional function —\"that of making laws.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IX. An Extreme Ruling in Either Direction Could Devastate the Credibility of the Court; or, Avoiding the \"Constitutional Bends\"",
		"context": "32 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… …….…………. ….35 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .37 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 593 U.S. None… .………22 Planned Parenthood of Se. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1992 )…………………………………… …..5, 33 410 U.S. 113…… …24, 33, 34, 35 CONSTITUTION U.S. Const. pmbl. ………… …………………… ..3, 36, 37 U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 833",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IX. An Extreme Ruling in Either Direction Could Devastate the Credibility of the Court; or, Avoiding the \"Constitutional Bends\"",
		"context": "32 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… …….…………. ….35 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .37 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 593 U.S. None… .………22 Planned Parenthood of Se. 505 U.S. 833 (1992 )…………………………………… …..5, 33 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]…… …24, 33, 34, 35 CONSTITUTION U.S. Const. pmbl. ………… …………………… ..3, 36, 37 U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "(\"A generic term is one that refers to the genus of which the particular product is a species\"). \"A generic mark describes a product in its entirety, and, therefore, neither signifies the source of goods nor distinguishes the particular product from other products on the market.\" George & Co. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Generic terms are never protectable because \"[t]o allow trademark protection for generic terms . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 383",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "would grant the owner of the mark a monopoly, [because] a competitor could not describe [its] goods as what they are.\" CES Pub. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Generic terms include common product names li ke \"CAR,\" \"CIGARETTE,\" and \"LITE BEER.\" While a previously protectable mark can become generic, a generic term, standing alone, can never attain protectable status.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 F.2d 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "Generic terms include common product names li ke \"CAR,\" \"CIGARETTE,\" and \"LITE BEER.\" While a previously protectable mark can become generic, a generic term, standing alone, can never attain protectable status. See generally Kellogg [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Typically, courts will hold that a term is generic because it was already found to be generic in a previous determination or because it is a commonly used term. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "Typically, courts will hold that a term is generic because it was already found to be generic in a previous determination or because it is a commonly used term. Id. ; see also Hunt Masters, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In either case, even where an applicant has submitted evidence tending to show some degree of secondary meaning, its generic status cannot be undone. \"[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 F.3d 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "In either case, even where an applicant has submitted evidence tending to show some degree of secondary meaning, its generic status cannot be undone. \"[N]o matter how much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured into promoting the sale of its merchandise and what success it has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article by its name.\" Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9; accord J. Kohnstam, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When the PTO refuses registration on the grounds that a proposed mark is generic, it \"bears the burden of establishing th at a proposed mark is generic [], and must demonstrate generic status by clear evidence.\" See In re573 F.3d 1300.",
		"citation_value_orig": "280 F.2d 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 537 F.2d at 9; accord J. Kohnstam, 280 F.2d 437. When the PTO refuses registration on the grounds that a proposed mark is generic, it \"bears the burden of establishing th at a proposed mark is generic [], and must demonstrate generic status by clear evidence.\" See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Evidence of the public's understanding of a term can be obtained from any competent source, including dictionary definitions, research da tabases, newspapers, and other publications.\" TMEP § 1209.01(c)(i).",
		"citation_value_orig": "573 F.3d 1300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "Importantly, \"[t]he test for genericness is the same whether the mark is a compound term or a phrase, and the examining attorney should include, if available, evidence showin g use of the mark as a whole in the record.\" Id. (citing Princeton Vanguard, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Once an exam iner determines that a proposed mark is generic, and the TTAB affirms this ruling, the applicant can seek further review in federal court by arguing that the TTAB's conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d 1359.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 960",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "(citing Princeton Vanguard, 786 F.3d 960). Once an exam iner determines that a proposed mark is generic, and the TTAB affirms this ruling, the applicant can seek further review in federal court by arguing that the TTAB's conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence. See Bridgestone/Firestone Research, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To conclude that a particular term is generic, courts generally use a three-part analysis: (1) identify the class of product or servic e to which use of the mark is relevant; (2) identify the relevant purchasing public of the class of product or service; and (3) determine that the primary significance of the mark to the relevant public is to identify the class of product or service to which the mark relates. See 74 F.3d 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "245 F.3d 1359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. GENERIC TERMS",
		"context": "See Bridgestone/Firestone Research, 245 F.3d 1359. To conclude that a particular term is generic, courts generally use a three-part analysis: (1) identify the class of product or servic e to which use of the mark is relevant; (2) identify the relevant purchasing public of the class of product or service; and (3) determine that the primary significance of the mark to the relevant public is to identify the class of product or service to which the mark relates. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the applicant shows that the mark's primary significance is to identify the source or brand (i.e., the applicant's product or service), rather th an the class of product or 11 service, the mark may be distinctive and capable of protection. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 F.3d 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. All Opinions in the Masterpiece Cakeshop Decision Unanimously Recognize Words Cannot be Compelled",
		"context": "In Masterpiece Cakeshop , this Court considered an analogous circumstance, deciding whether Colorado could require a cake baker named Jack Phillips (Phillips) to create custom wedding cakes designed to celebrate same-sex marriages against his will. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like Smith, Phillips was happy to sell his pastry creations to anyone willing to buy them, regardless of status, but he did not want to design custom cakes promoting events and causes defying his religious beliefs, a conviction that put him at odds with Colorado's application of CADA. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STOCK DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAX ACT",
		"context": "3a. Indeed, Congress has sought to encourage employee ownership of employer stock, which is seen as a \"device for expanding the national capital base among employees—an effective merger of the roles of capitalist and worker.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "716 F.2d 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. STOCK DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF COMPENSATION UNDER THE RAILROAD RETIREMENT TAX ACT",
		"context": "But it dismissed the possibility that when Congress used the term \"money\" to define railroad employees' compensation it intended that what was considered \"money\" when the RRTA was enacted would continue to be the basis for defining the compensation that would be subject to payroll taxes in the future. When the history and purpose of the RRTA and RRA are examined it beco mes clear that that is precisely what Congress intended. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 37",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Of The Elections Clause Refutes Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "As Petitioners acknowledge, the word \"Legislature\" at the founding meant \"the repre- sentative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.\" Pet'rs' Br. 14 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see 2 S AMUEL JOHNSON ,ADICTIONARY OF 20 THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1755) (\"legislature\" is the representative body with \"[t]he power that makes laws\"); 2 N OAH WEBSTER ,AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828) (\"legislature\" is the \"body of men in a state or kingdom, invested with power to make and repeal laws\"). This definition rec- ognizes a crucial point: A \"legislature\" is a body em- powered by the people to make laws . The Elections Clause's reference to legislatures re- affirmed—and did not abrogate—the founding-era un- derstanding of a legislature as a lawmaking body con- strained by the constitution that created it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Of The Elections Clause Refutes Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "James Iredell, To the Public (Aug. 17, 1786), in 2 G RIFFITH J.MCREE,LIFE 21 AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 146 (1857). Justice William Paterson—a delegate to the Constitu- tional Convention before President Washington nom- inated him to this Court—agreed, noting that legisla- tures are \"[c]reatures of the Constitution; they owe their existence to the Constitution: they derive their powers from the Constitution: It is their commission; and, therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void.\" VanHorne's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. All these sources thus recognize that a legislature is a representative body constrained by the constitution that created it. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Of The Elections Clause Refutes Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "And when courts enforce those constraints, they do not exercise legislative authority. Judicial re- view \"[i]s a check on the Legislature's power,\" not a usurpation of it. Nixon v.United States , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It does not \"by any means suppose a su- periority of the judicial to the legislative power\" but rather \"supposes that the power of the people is supe- rior to both.\" T HE FEDERALIST NO.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 224",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text Of The Elections Clause Refutes Petitioners' Theory",
		"context": "78, supra , at 467- 68 (Alexander Hamilton). This Court recognized this principle in Marbury v. Madison itself. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Enforcing state constitutions through judicial re- view does not, as Petitioners claim (at 21), deprive the term \"Legislature\" of meaning. Assigning the power to regulate congressional elections to the \"Legisla- ture\" prohibits state constitutions from reassigning that power to a non-legislative actor and reflects a choice to give the legislature primacy over other state actors, such as the state executive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Dis- putes over costs often generate fact-intensive questions that appellate litigation is ill-suited to handle. Many chal- lenges to Rule 39(e) costs \"are factual in nature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 F.2d 679",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Many chal- lenges to Rule 39(e) costs \"are factual in nature.\" 570 F.2d 679. Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , 586 F.3d 219183 F. App'x 514; Champion Produce, 342 F.3d 1016 (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting 35 F.3d 978); Association of Mexican-American 231 F.3d 572; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.3d 309",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]183 F. App'x 514; Champion Produce, 342 F.3d 1016 (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting 35 F.3d 978); Association of Mexican-American 231 F.3d 572; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\"). Each disputed factor can require evidence and fact-finding to sort out. 21 testimony, reviewing evidence , and resolving fact dis- putes in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.3d 219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , 586 F.3d 219[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Champion Produce, 342 F.3d 1016 (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting 35 F.3d 978); Association of Mexican-American 231 F.3d 572; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\"). Each disputed factor can require evidence and fact-finding to sort out. 21 testimony, reviewing evidence , and resolving fact dis- putes in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 F. App'x 514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , 586 F.3d 219183 F. App'x 514; Champion Produce, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting 35 F.3d 978); Association of Mexican-American 231 F.3d 572; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\"). Each disputed factor can require evidence and fact-finding to sort out. 21 testimony, reviewing evidence , and resolving fact dis- putes in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 F.3d 1016",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , 586 F.3d 219183 F. App'x 514; Champion Produce, 342 F.3d 1016 (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Association of Mexican-American 231 F.3d 572; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\"). Each disputed factor can require evidence and fact-finding to sort out. 21 testimony, reviewing evidence , and resolving fact dis- putes in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 978",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Courts invoke a \"'wide range'\" of considerations in determining costs ( 735 F.3d 309), and appellate courts will rarely be ex-posed to the relevant facts in deciding the merits appeal. 5 Cost disputes may require creating a new record, hearing 5 As a rough sense of all the factor s that a court might look to in exercising discretion, see, e.g. , 586 F.3d 219183 F. App'x 514; Champion Produce, 342 F.3d 1016 (\"listing as potential 'good reasons' for denying costs: the prevailing pa rty took actions that unnecessarily prolonged trial or injected meritless issues; costs were excessive; the prevailing party's recovery was so sm all that it was victorious in name only; and the case was close and difficult\") (quoting 35 F.3d 978); Association of Mexican-American [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Guse , 570 F.2d at 681 (considering \"all of the pertinent circum- stances\"). Each disputed factor can require evidence and fact-finding to sort out. 21 testimony, reviewing evidence , and resolving fact dis- putes in the first instance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "231 F.3d 572",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Guse , 570 F.2d at 681. Nor do appellate courts have any special insight or ex- pertise regarding appellate cost s. Like this Court, \"fed- eral courts of appeals genera lly are courts of review, not first view.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 792 F.3d 663. Yet a cost disp ute is collateral to the mer- its; it is not resolved below, and it presents new questions for a court to answer. District courts are better positioned to engage in the necessary fact-finding and record-devel-opment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "857 F.3d 902",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Guse , 570 F.2d at 681. Nor do appellate courts have any special insight or ex- pertise regarding appellate cost s. Like this Court, \"fed- eral courts of appeals genera lly are courts of review, not first view.\" 857 F.3d 902; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet a cost disp ute is collateral to the mer- its; it is not resolved below, and it presents new questions for a court to answer. District courts are better positioned to engage in the necessary fact-finding and record-devel-opment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "792 F.3d 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "Yet a cost disp ute is collateral to the mer- its; it is not resolved below, and it presents new questions for a court to answer. District courts are better positioned to engage in the necessary fact-finding and record-devel-opment. See Republic Tobacco , 481 F.3d at 450; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sudouest Import Sales 102 F.R.D. 264. And district courts will often have greater knowledge of the relevant circumstances (including, for example, why appeal bonds were required or obtained). Rule 39(e) thus channels these disputes exactly where they belong—respecting the appropriate division of respon sibility between district and appellate courts, the comparative advantage of district courts as fact-finders, the fa miliarity of district courts with discretionary cost issues (under Rule 54(d)(1) and Section 1920), and the importan ce of lodging discretion with the body ideally situated to balance case-specific eq-uities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "678 F. Supp. 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Rule 39's design and purpose confirm the district court's discretionary authority under Rule 39(e)",
		"context": "And district courts will often have greater knowledge of the relevant circumstances (including, for example, why appeal bonds were required or obtained). Rule 39(e) thus channels these disputes exactly where they belong—respecting the appropriate division of respon sibility between district and appellate courts, the comparative advantage of district courts as fact-finders, the fa miliarity of district courts with discretionary cost issues (under Rule 54(d)(1) and Section 1920), and the importan ce of lodging discretion with the body ideally situated to balance case-specific eq-uities. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2668 (4th ed. Oct. 2020 update) (\"the fed- eral courts are free to pursue a case-by-case approach and to make their decisions on the basis of the circumstances and equities of each case\"). Th ere is no reason to bog down 22 the appellate court's docket with fact-bound arguments over discretionary costs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "265 U.S. 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Prior Decisions Require Evidence of Both Objective Harm and Specific Intent to Establish a True Threat",
		"context": ". This Court's decisions in Watts and Black point the way. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reversed the conviction of an 18 -year -old defendant for threatening, at a rally against the Vietnam War, 4 to take the life of the Pres ident. Looking at the context in which the words were uttered, the Court concluded that the statement could not be deemed threatening because it was made during a political debate at a public rally at the Washington Monument—circum - stances where such language is often \"vituperative, abusive, and inexact.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's Prior Decisions Require Evidence of Both Objective Harm and Specific Intent to Establish a True Threat",
		"context": "Id. at 708. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court turned its attention more directly to the subjective intent of the speaker. A Virginia statute criminalized the burning of crosses with an \"intent to intimidate,\" but it provided that the co nduct, standing alone, was prima facie evidence of the requisite specific intent. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": ". Stare decisis is not \"an inexorable command,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 10 (quoting State Oil 522 U.S. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted), or a \"mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,\" 501 U.S. 808. It is \"a principle of policy.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": ". Stare decisis is not \"an inexorable command,\" 555 U.S. 223 10 (quoting State Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (internal quotation marks omitted), or a \"mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,\" 501 U.S. 808. It is \"a principle of policy.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": ". Stare decisis is not \"an inexorable command,\" 555 U.S. 223 10 (quoting State Oil 522 U.S. 3) (internal quotation marks omitted), or a \"mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is \"a principle of policy.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": "Between 1810 and 2019, the Court overruled more than two hundred of its decisions, in whole or in part. 4 This Court has always been especially willing to reassess precedents that limit freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For much of our history, when it came to precedent, \"The [C]ourt bow[ed] to the lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so 4 Table of Supreme Court Decisions Overruled by Subsequent Decisions , Cong. Research Serv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": "(last visited May 16, 2020), https://constitution.congress.gov/resources/decisions-overruled/. 11 fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the judicial function.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in Barnette , the Court directly confronted the wrong-headed premises of Gobitis and overruled it without a multi-factor analysis or handwringing. 319 U.S. at 636–42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": "For better or worse, times have changed. Today, reversing a prior case requires a \"special justification.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Factors related to the justification for revisiting a precedent include the quality of the case's reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, the workability of the case's rule, factual and legal developments since the case was decided, and reliance interests related to the rule. 138 S. Ct. 2448; see also Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (adding \"the age of the precedent\" to these factors); Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485 whether \"the prior decision .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2401. Factors related to the justification for revisiting a precedent include the quality of the case's reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, the workability of the case's rule, factual and legal developments since the case was decided, and reliance interests related to the rule. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (adding \"the age of the precedent\" to these factors); Franchise Tax 139 S. Ct. 1485 whether \"the prior decision . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Stare Decisis Does Not Counsel This Court To Preserve Smith",
		"context": "135 S. Ct. 2401. Factors related to the justification for revisiting a precedent include the quality of the case's reasoning, its consistency with related decisions, the workability of the case's rule, factual and legal developments since the case was decided, and reliance interests related to the rule. 138 S. Ct. 2448; see also Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (adding \"the age of the precedent\" to these factors); Franchise Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] whether \"the prior decision . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1485",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The district court applied an improper legal standard for racial predominance",
		"context": "Two Terms ago, this Court vacated the district court 's initial judgment that race did not predominate in any of the 11 challenged districts, faulting the district court for failing to undertake a \" holistic analysis \" as to whether race predominated in the construction of each challenged district. Beth [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On remand, the district court reversed its conclusion but repeated its error: In determining that race predominated in all 11 districts, it again failed to perform a holistic analys is of each individual district. If the Court concludes that the 19 House has standing, it should vacate the district court 's judgment and remand once again for application of the proper legal standard.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' distinction between procedural and substantive state constitutional constraints has no support in text, history, or precedent",
		"context": "II, § 1, Cl. 2, do not muddy the clear Elections Cl ause precedent. Petitioners rely on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which upheld Michigan's determination to elect presidential electors by district. See id. at 24 -25, 42.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' distinction between procedural and substantive state constitutional constraints has no support in text, history, or precedent",
		"context": "They provide no reason to question this Court's more recent decisions squarely holding that state legislatures are subject to state constitu tional checks when they act under the Elections Clause. Petitioners next rely (Br. 41 -42) on this Court's deci- sion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the Court did not ad- dress the effect of such action. Rather, it simply re- manded for the Florida Supreme Court to clarify the basis for its decision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioners' distinction between procedural and substantive state constitutional constraints has no support in text, history, or precedent",
		"context": "at 78. Finally, petitioners invoke (Br. 42) Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the case did not pre- sent , and neither the Court nor Chief Justice Rehn quist addressed , any question about state constitutional lim- its. Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the 25 Florida Supreme Court had infringed on the legisla- ture's aut hority because its interpretation of state elec- tion laws \"impermissibly distorted them beyond what a fair reading required.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
		"context": "at 12 (remanding to determine whether proceedings could continue after sustaining the privilege claim). That three -step analysis is also applied in other circuits. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] The Government als o criticizes the court of appeals for engaging in a \"skeptical\" review of the privilege claim, which the Government calls a \"serious departure\" from precedent (Pet. at 19) that \"displaces deference to the Executive \" (id. at 26) and \"significantly alters th e standard governing the proper disposition of such matters\" ( id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "479 F.3d 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
		"context": "Id. 14a (quoting Mohamed , 614 F.3d at 1082); accord Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 8 -10 (\"[C]omplete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses,\" and, therefore, \"[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]542 U.S. 507. The Government cannot have it both ways: If the Government is content to endorse \"skeptical\" review when it prevails, then it must accept the same standard in all cases.10 The Government was correct 10 The Government does not aid its case by citing this Court's dictum, in United States v. Nixon , that courts should provide \"utmost deference\" to the executive in matters of national security. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
		"context": "Id. 14a (quoting Mohamed , 614 F.3d at 1082); accord Reynolds , 345 U.S. at 8 -10 (\"[C]omplete abandonment of judicial control would lead to intolerable abuses,\" and, therefore, \"[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers. \"); 544 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government cannot have it both ways: If the Government is content to endorse \"skeptical\" review when it prevails, then it must accept the same standard in all cases.10 The Government was correct 10 The Government does not aid its case by citing this Court's dictum, in United States v. Nixon , that courts should provide \"utmost deference\" to the executive in matters of national security. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
		"context": "The Government also argues that any discovery from Mitchell and Jessen in this matter risks harm to national security, and that the court of appeals disregarded the importance of \"official confirmation\" in the context of state secrets. According to the Government, these concerns are heightened where privilege.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court then went on to reject the executive's privilege claim, over the president's objections that disclosure would be detrimental to the public interest . 24 discovery is destined for use in a foreign proceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Court Correctly Applied Settled Precedent, and the Petition Presents Nothing More Than a Call for Error Review",
		"context": "4, 8), it strains credulity to argue that Poland will retaliate against the U.S. or withhold its cooperation if Respondents are permitted to discover the very evidence and provide the very assistance that the Polish Government itself has repeatedly requested. The D.C. Circuit's decision in Military Audit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is inapposite. Casey was a FOIA case, involving discovery requests directed to the Government itself. Here, the district court expressly found this was not an action against the United States or its agents, and the Government did not appeal that ruling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "656 F.2d 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The contrary interpretation of Section 1514A would interfere with the employer-employee relationship",
		"context": "While the company may be able to argue that the employee's belief th at a violation occurred was not \"reasonable,\" 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1), it would be diffi- cult for an employer to ma ke that assessment ex ante, given that the inquiry has both objective and subjective components. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 762 F.3d 214; Lockheed Martin 717 F.3d 1121. At bottom, whatever other si tuations may arise, peti- tioner's interpretation will result in innocent employers being saddled with liability. The elements of causation and intent are distinct, and without the element of intent, an employer can be penalized even when the employee's 24 protected activity did not ac tually motivate the adverse personnel action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "787 F.3d 797",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The contrary interpretation of Section 1514A would interfere with the employer-employee relationship",
		"context": "While the company may be able to argue that the employee's belief th at a violation occurred was not \"reasonable,\" 18 U.S.C. 1514A(a)(1), it would be diffi- cult for an employer to ma ke that assessment ex ante, given that the inquiry has both objective and subjective components. See 787 F.3d 797; 762 F.3d 214; Lockheed Martin [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At bottom, whatever other si tuations may arise, peti- tioner's interpretation will result in innocent employers being saddled with liability. The elements of causation and intent are distinct, and without the element of intent, an employer can be penalized even when the employee's 24 protected activity did not ac tually motivate the adverse personnel action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "717 F.3d 1121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The contrary interpretation of Section 1514A would interfere with the employer-employee relationship",
		"context": "At the pleading stage, \"[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of [the employer's] mind may be alleged generally,\" Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b), allowing a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss by alleging facts that give rise to a plausibl e inference of intent, see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And once the employee proceeds past an y motion to dismiss, the employee will have access to th e full panoply of discovery mechanisms, including docume nt discovery and deposi- tions. See Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court may affirm the decision below on alternate grounds or remand to the Third Circuit for a proper application of the Tinker standard",
		"context": "The question presented by Petit ioner a sks only whether —and not how—Tinker applies to the speech at issue in this case. This Court could therefore de- termine that t he latter issue is bey ond the question presented and remand the case to the Third Ci rcuit for further proceedings consistent with this Cou rt's opinion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Alternatively, this Court generally has the au- thority to affirm a judgment bas ed on any ground ad- equat ely preserved below. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. 33 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court may affirm the decision below on alternate grounds or remand to the Third Circuit for a proper application of the Tinker standard",
		"context": "See 527 U.S. 212 . Alternatively, this Court generally has the au- thority to affirm a judgment bas ed on any ground ad- equat ely preserved below. See Granfinanciera, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Before the Third Circuit , Respondent 's primary argument was that her suspension was not justified by a ny legitimate need on Petitioner's part to prevent a substantial disrup- tion. See Brief of Appel lee, B.L.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Section 1326(d)'s judicial review prong is satisfied here",
		"context": "See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) ; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So when an IJ's mis representation of 7 Palomar -Santiago was represented by counsel at some point in his removal proce edings . But, as the Government conceded in the district court in its response to his motion to dismiss , it is \"unclear .",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 F.3d 674",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit's \"Exacting Scrutiny\" Standard Is Inconsistent with NAACP and Constitutionally Incorrect",
		"context": "See Ams. for Prosperity Found. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also id. at 1017 (ac- knowledging that \"this evidence plainly shows at least the possibility that the plaintiffs' Schedule B contrib- utors would face threats, harassment or reprisals if their information were to become publi c.\") (emphasis in original). Instead, the court held that the plaintiffs must also show a \"reasonable probability\" that the At- torney General would somehow disclose the plaintiffs' Schedule B contributors to the public.",
		"citation_value_orig": "903 F.3d 1000",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": ". Although this Court has made clear in the context of on -campus speech that stu- dents do not \"shed their constitutional rights to free- dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School District No. 478 U.S. 675. This Court has held, for example, that schools may prohibit vulgar speech and speech that en- courages illegal drug u se, and may control speech that appears in school -sponsored publications.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": ". Although this Court has made clear in the context of on -campus speech that stu- dents do not \"shed their constitutional rights to free- dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,\" 393 U.S. 503 , \"the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School District No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has held, for example, that schools may prohibit vulgar speech and speech that en- courages illegal drug u se, and may control speech that appears in school -sponsored publications. And Tinker suggests that s chools also may discipline students for speech that materially and substantially disrupt s school activities.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 675",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "ARGUMENT A. The First Amendment Does Not Categorically Prohibit Public -School Officials From Disciplining Stud ents For Speech That Occurs Off Campus 1. This Court has made clear in the context of on - campus speech that a lthough students do not \"shed 9 their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex- pression at the schoolhouse gate,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , \"the constitutional rights of students in pub- lic school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School Dis- trict No. 478 U.S. 675; accord 551 U.S. 393; Ha- zelwood School Dist 484 U.S. 260 . Instead, the First Amendment \"must be 'ap- plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "The First Amendment Does Not Categorically Prohibit Public -School Officials From Disciplining Stud ents For Speech That Occurs Off Campus 1. This Court has made clear in the context of on - campus speech that a lthough students do not \"shed 9 their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex- pression at the schoolhouse gate,\" 393 U.S. 503 , \"the constitutional rights of students in pub- lic school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School Dis- trict No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 551 U.S. 393; Ha- zelwood School Dist 484 U.S. 260 . Instead, the First Amendment \"must be 'ap- plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.' \" Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506).",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 675",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "The First Amendment Does Not Categorically Prohibit Public -School Officials From Disciplining Stud ents For Speech That Occurs Off Campus 1. This Court has made clear in the context of on - campus speech that a lthough students do not \"shed 9 their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex- pression at the schoolhouse gate,\" 393 U.S. 503 , \"the constitutional rights of students in pub- lic school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School Dis- trict No. 478 U.S. 675; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Ha- zelwood School Dist 484 U.S. 260 . Instead, the First Amendment \"must be 'ap- plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.' \" Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506).",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "The First Amendment Does Not Categorically Prohibit Public -School Officials From Disciplining Stud ents For Speech That Occurs Off Campus 1. This Court has made clear in the context of on - campus speech that a lthough students do not \"shed 9 their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or ex- pression at the schoolhouse gate,\" 393 U.S. 503 , \"the constitutional rights of students in pub- lic school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings ,\" Bethel School Dis- trict No. 478 U.S. 675; accord 551 U.S. 393; Ha- zelwood School Dist [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, the First Amendment \"must be 'ap- plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.' \" Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506).",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 260",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "\" Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506). Among those special characteristics is \"[t] he im- portance of public schools in the preparation of individ- uals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the va lues on which our society rests.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 347 U.S. 483. Because the task of educating the Nation's children vests public schools with responsibility to teach students, a school may pro- hibit student speech that \"would undermine the school's basic educational missi on.\" Fraser , 478 U.S. at 685; see Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (\"A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educa- tional mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 68",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "\" Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Tinker , 393 U.S. at 506). Among those special characteristics is \"[t] he im- portance of public schools in the preparation of individ- uals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the va lues on which our society rests.\" 441 U.S. 68 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because the task of educating the Nation's children vests public schools with responsibility to teach students, a school may pro- hibit student speech that \"would undermine the school's basic educational missi on.\" Fraser , 478 U.S. at 685; see Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. at 266 (\"A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educa- tional mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "(quoting Fraser , 478 U.S. at 685) . For that reason, a number of constitutional rights apply differently in the school setting. See, e.g., New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]515 U.S. 646. The First Amendment is no exception. In Fraser , for example, the Court held that the First Amendment did not preclude a school from puni shing a student for making a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "(quoting Fraser , 478 U.S. at 685) . For that reason, a number of constitutional rights apply differently in the school setting. See, e.g., New 469 U.S. 325[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The First Amendment is no exception. In Fraser , for example, the Court held that the First Amendment did not preclude a school from puni shing a student for making a sexually suggestive speech at a school assembly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "393 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added). That rationale can apply as well to certain off-campus con- duct or speech by the student that would have a sub- stantial and material disruptive or invasive effect . This Court effectively held as much in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which involved a criminal ordinance prohibiting noisy picketing within 150 feet of school property. See id. at 107.",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "The appropriate question is whether and under what circumstances off -campus student speech may, consistent with the First Amendment, be treated as \"school speech\" and therefore potentially subject to discipline by public -school officials. Cf. Kow- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,565 U.S. 1173 . Whether a school may discipline a student for school speech (whether occurring off campus or on) is a separate ques- tion requiring application of this Court's school -speech precedents (including of course Tinker ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "652 F.3d 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Moreover, the court of appeals' categorical hold- ing could undermine schools' efforts to respond to threats to the safety of students and staff. When school administrators are alerted to messa ges by a student that, for instance, suggest plans for violence, they can- not be said to have violated the First Amendment when they take reasonable steps to avert that potential harm. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 494 F.3d 34 (upholding suspension of student who circu- lated an instant -messenger icon depicting \"a pistol fir- ing a bullet at a person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood,\" and below which were the words \" 'Kill Mr. VanderMolen,' \" an English teacher at the school ), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1296 . As the Ninth Circuit has observed, school officials who learn of such messages \"face[] a dilemma every school dreads\": do nothing and risk the safety of the school community, or take action and risk a lawsuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 F.3d 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Moreover, the court of appeals' categorical hold- ing could undermine schools' efforts to respond to threats to the safety of students and staff. When school administrators are alerted to messa ges by a student that, for instance, suggest plans for violence, they can- not be said to have violated the First Amendment when they take reasonable steps to avert that potential harm. See, e.g., 918 F.3d 700; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (upholding suspension of student who circu- lated an instant -messenger icon depicting \"a pistol fir- ing a bullet at a person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood,\" and below which were the words \" 'Kill Mr. VanderMolen,' \" an English teacher at the school ), cert. denied,552 U.S. 1296 . As the Ninth Circuit has observed, school officials who learn of such messages \"face[] a dilemma every school dreads\": do nothing and risk the safety of the school community, or take action and risk a lawsuit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 F.3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "When school administrators are alerted to messa ges by a student that, for instance, suggest plans for violence, they can- not be said to have violated the First Amendment when they take reasonable steps to avert that potential harm. See, e.g., 918 F.3d 700; 494 F.3d 34 (upholding suspension of student who circu- lated an instant -messenger icon depicting \"a pistol fir- ing a bullet at a person's head, above which were dots representing splattered blood,\" and below which were the words \" 'Kill Mr. VanderMolen,' \" an English teacher at the school ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As the Ninth Circuit has observed, school officials who learn of such messages \"face[] a dilemma every school dreads\": do nothing and risk the safety of the school community, or take action and risk a lawsuit. Wynar , 728 F.3d at 1070; see 494 F.3d 978.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 1296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "337 —may require public schools and schools receiving federal financial assis- tance to take action to address harassing speech in the school context directed at students or school employees on the basis of race, sex, disability , or other protected 17 characteristics , depending on the factual circum- stances . For example, school districts may under certain cir- cumstances be held liable for damages if they are \" de- liberately indifferent to [student -on-student] sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the edu- cational opportunities or benefits provided by the school .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Estate of 743 F.3d 982 . Similarly , the Department of Education has ex- plain ed that harassment and bullying of a student with a disability on any basis can rise to the level of denying a free appropriate public education under the Individu- als with Disabilities Education Act , Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "337 —may require public schools and schools receiving federal financial assis- tance to take action to address harassing speech in the school context directed at students or school employees on the basis of race, sex, disability , or other protected 17 characteristics , depending on the factual circum- stances . For example, school districts may under certain cir- cumstances be held liable for damages if they are \" de- liberately indifferent to [student -on-student] sexual harassment, of which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the edu- cational opportunities or benefits provided by the school .\" 526 U.S. 629 ; see Estate of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Similarly , the Department of Education has ex- plain ed that harassment and bullying of a student with a disability on any basis can rise to the level of denying a free appropriate public education under the Individu- als with Disabilities Education Act , Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "743 F.3d 982",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Under those circumstances, schools officials attempting to satisfy their obligations under federal law to address those harms should not be placed in the difficult position of having t o blind them- selves to instances of the harassing or bullying conduct that occurred online . Cf. Tinker , 393 U.S. at 513 (ob- serving that student speech or conduct, \"in class or out of it,\" that involves \"invasion of the rights of others\" is \"not immunized b y the constitutional guarantee of free- dom of speech\") ; Feminist Majority Found [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even aside from those statutory requirements, schools have valid educational reasons to protect stu- dents from bullying and harassment by other students. As the Fourth Circuit has observed, \" student -on- student bullying is a 'major concern ' in schools across the country and can cause victims to become depressed and anxious, to be afraid to go to school, and to have thoughts of suicide. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 674",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "id. at 406 n.2 ; id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . More generally, the vast array of day-to-day off -campu s communication by students is beyond the legitimate reach of school discipline —in other words, should be regarded as protected without even having to consider the application of Tinker or an- other of this Court's school -speech cases to determine whether th e communication could properly be subject to discipline . Conversely, some narrow categories of student speech that occurs off campus nevertheless are properly re- garded as \" school speech \" potentially subject to disci- pline by school officials .",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "There is, in short, no basis for treating the im- mense amount of off -campus speech by students as school speech that would potentially be subject to disci- pline , even if it is about the school or might hav e some effect on other students or the school environment. Some lower courts have adopted multifactor totality - of-the-circumstances tests to determine when off - campus student speech qualifies as school speech. See, e.g., McNeil , 918 F.3d at 707 (setting forth a \"flexible and fact -specific\" test \"based on the totality of the cir- cumstances\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] the degree and likeli- hood of harm to the school caused or augured by the speech, (2) whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would reach and impact the school, and (3) the relation between the content and context of the speech and the school .\" 918 F.3d at 707 (citations omit- ted). One problem with such te sts, however, is that they tend to conflate the inquiries into whether off -campus speech counts as \"school speech\" to begin with and whether , if so, that speech may be subject to discipline consistent with the First Amendment .",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Another problem with multifactor tests is they generally leave both school officials and students with little guidance about how the various factors might apply or be weighted in particular circumstances. Other lower courts have held that off -campus stu- dent speech may qualify as school speech if it i s \"tar- geted at [the school] \" and \" could reasonably be ex- pected to reach the school .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If not further cabined , however, that test has the potential to be overbroad . Students spend much of their lives in school, or at school activities, or doing schoo lwork at home; one might therefore naturally expect much of their speech to \"target\" the school environment in some fashion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "696 F.3d 771",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Such speech might pr operly be regarded as school speech that is potentially subject to discipline by school officials if , for instance , it intentionally targets a feature that is essential to or inherent in the athletic program itself . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (upholding the disqualification of a student from running for class secretary based on off -campus speech demonstrating a lack of \"good citizenship,\" in part be- cause \" participation in voluntary, extracurricular activ- ities is a 'privilege ' that can be rescinded when students fail to comply with the obligations inherent in the activ- ities themselves \") (citation omitted) . For example, a social -media post lambasting the football coach's play -calling might qualify as school speech if written by a member of the football team, be- cause such a message has intentionally targeted the coach and his competence, which could in certain cir- cumstances substantially undermine respect for the coach's authority and team cohesion , both of which are essential components of a well -functioning football team and its educational mission . The coach might thus be justified in disciplining the player for such a post —for example , by benching him —if the speech sufficiently disrupt ed the team's activit ies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 F.3d 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "It is thus reasonable to expect students who wish to join a team to understand that their off-campus speech might be treated as school speech potentially subject to discipline by school officials if that speech intentionally targets the team in a way that could undermine the pro- gram itself, for example by substantially undermining team cohesion or respect for the authority of the coach among the team . Cf. Agency for Int ernational Devel- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is one thing for mem- bers of a team to be forced to endure, say, sustained and 28 profane criticism when it comes from members of the general student body —but quite another when it comes from a fellow teammate. That is not to suggest that admi nistrators of extra- curricular programs have unfettered discretion to dis- cipline student participants for their off -campus speech in ways that other school administrators do not .",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "794(b) (similar, un- der the Rehabilitation Act) ; 42 U.S.C. 2000d -4a (similar, under Title VI); cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor may schools engage in retali- atory behavior against pr otected conduct by those who participate in sports or preclude the reporting of inap- propriate behavior by a coach or teammates . Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 430",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment does not categorically prohibit public school officials from disciplining students for speech that occurs off campus",
		"context": "Nor may schools engage in retali- atory behavior against pr otected conduct by those who participate in sports or preclude the reporting of inap- propriate behavior by a coach or teammates . Cf. Sea- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Ra- ther, the analysis above is simply a circumstance - specific appli cation of th e principle that when a stu- dent's off -campus speech intentionally targets a dis- crete school program in a manner that could substan- tially undermine the essential features of that program , the student should expect that speech to qualify as schoo l speech potentially subject to discipline . 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "206 F.3d 1021",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Acheson's public policy arguments are misplaced.",
		"context": "1, 6 (2006) . Without the possibility of damages for Title III violations, most disabled people are unable to expend the resources necessary to challenge the unlawful accessibility bar- riers they encounter in their daily lives . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 45 Recognizing the unlikelihood of facing suit under Title III, businesses often take a \"wait and see\" ap- proach to Title III compliance, removing accessibility barriers only after someone files a complaint . Ba- genstos , supra, at 12.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 F.3d 1031",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Acheson's public policy arguments are misplaced.",
		"context": "P. 11 , and state bar associations have a range of additional tools to punish attorneys who cross ethical lines. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless , narrow ing Article III is not an appropriate solution to attorney misconduct . Importantly, for all their disdain toward Title III tester plaintiffs, Acheson and its amici offer no mean- ingful alternative for enforcing Title III generally or the Reservation Rule in particular.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 F.3d 1047",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Acheson's public policy arguments are misplaced.",
		"context": "See U.S. Br. 16. Congres s acts well within its authority when it chooses \"to rely in part upon private litigation as a means of securing broad compliance with\" civil rights laws , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 6 Finally , although Acheson portrays itself as a vic- tim of a \"pathological\" lawsuit, Opp . to Suggestion of Mootness 12, Acheson does not dispute that at the time Ms. Laufer filed suit, it provided no accessibility information on its website, in blatant violation of the Reservation Rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 400",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "331, 383- 84 (2004) [hereafter \"Lost Meaning\"]. 7 the articles proposed, remarking parti cularly on the 11th and 12th . [T]he former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation – the latter, as excluding every source of power not within the constitution itself.7 Ultimately, the remaining states were satisfied that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments adequately limited federal power and protected state power and the Bill of Rights was ratified.8 Madison's \"twin principles of federalism\" continued to be used as a \"rule of strict constr uction of federal power\" by both legal treatise writers and courts.9 In cases such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 10 U.S. 87, and Society for the Propagation of the 22 F. Cas. 756, courts upheld state sovereignty on the principles of federalism grounded in the legal authority of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.10 With the arrival of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison's \"twin principles\" of federalism began to be blurred into one – promoting the Tenth Amendment 7 Lash, \"Madison's Report ,\" at 175, n. 87 (explaining the original Ninth and Tenth Amendments were first known as the eleventh and twelfth prior to ratification). 8 See Lash, \"Madison's Report,\" at 175. 9 Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" p. 40; see e.g ., St. George Tucker, John Taylor, and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story discussed in detail in \"Lost Meaning,\" at 396-400.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "331, 383- 84 (2004) [hereafter \"Lost Meaning\"]. 7 the articles proposed, remarking parti cularly on the 11th and 12th . [T]he former, as guarding against a latitude of interpretation – the latter, as excluding every source of power not within the constitution itself.7 Ultimately, the remaining states were satisfied that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments adequately limited federal power and protected state power and the Bill of Rights was ratified.8 Madison's \"twin principles of federalism\" continued to be used as a \"rule of strict constr uction of federal power\" by both legal treatise writers and courts.9 In cases such as 3 U.S. 386, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Society for the Propagation of the 22 F. Cas. 756, courts upheld state sovereignty on the principles of federalism grounded in the legal authority of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.10 With the arrival of the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison's \"twin principles\" of federalism began to be blurred into one – promoting the Tenth Amendment 7 Lash, \"Madison's Report ,\" at 175, n. 87 (explaining the original Ninth and Tenth Amendments were first known as the eleventh and twelfth prior to ratification). 8 See Lash, \"Madison's Report,\" at 175. 9 Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" p. 40; see e.g ., St. George Tucker, John Taylor, and Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story discussed in detail in \"Lost Meaning,\" at 396-400.",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "13 Once the Ninth Amendment was divorced from its original intent and abandoned , it was ripe for refashioning. This is precisely what the Court did in 11 Madison's reference to his opposition to the National Bank ought to have implicated the Ninth Amendment's r ole in restricting federal power . Unfortunately, the absence of an explicit reference to the Ninth Amendment began its diminished role until it was revived as a source of personal \"liberties\" in cases such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 409-14. 12 See e.g., A.L.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 409-14. 12 See e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 298 U.S. 238 and 297 U.S. 1 in which the Supreme Court rejec ted attempts by the federal government to expand its sphere of federal power due to the emergency associated with the Great Depression. See Lash, \"Madison's Report,\" at 189 -90. 13 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 495",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 409-14. 12 See e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 295 U.S. 495, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 297 U.S. 1 in which the Supreme Court rejec ted attempts by the federal government to expand its sphere of federal power due to the emergency associated with the Great Depression. See Lash, \"Madison's Report,\" at 189 -90. 13 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "298 U.S. 238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 409-14. 12 See e.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry 295 U.S. 495, 298 U.S. 238 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] in which the Supreme Court rejec ted attempts by the federal government to expand its sphere of federal power due to the emergency associated with the Great Depression. See Lash, \"Madison's Report,\" at 189 -90. 13 Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "at 192-9 3 (\"After the new deal … the Court uncoupled the determination of the scope of federal power from any consideration of the retained rights of the states. Once the Court established a reasonable link between a legislative act and an enumerated power, Ninth and Tenth Amendment claims necessarily failed.\") 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No longer Madison's strict rule of construction, the Ninth Amendment became the adversary of the Tenth Amendment and repurposed as a fed eral check on state power. Contrary to its adoption by a people desirous to keep federal power limited and checked, Griswold used the Ninth Amendment precisely as the Founders feared: a vehicle for the federal government to suppress the democratic processes in the states and turn federalism on its head.",
		"citation_value_orig": "381 U.S. 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 365-66. 10 Accordingly, the Federal Government ma y act only where the Constitution authorizes it to do so. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 936- 37 (1997 ) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting 5 U.S. 137. The limited and enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government, moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design. Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment , which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights , was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "See Lash, \"Lost Meaning,\" at 365-66. 10 Accordingly, the Federal Government ma y act only where the Constitution authorizes it to do so. 521 U.S. 898, 936- 37 (1997 ) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The limited and enumerated powers granted to the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches of the National Government, moreover, underscore the vital role reserved to the States by the constitutional design. Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment , which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights , was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is removed by the Tenth Amendment , which, like the other provisions of the Bill of Rights , was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the extent of the national power. The Amendment confirms the promise implicit in the original document: 'The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. [T]he Court's approach intrudes less upon the democratic process because the rights it acknowledges are those established by a constitutional history formed by democratic decisions; and the rights it fails to 11 acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not subject to judicial revision. 561 U.S. 742.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "527 U.S. 706. [T]he Court's approach intrudes less upon the democratic process because the rights it acknowledges are those established by a constitutional history formed by democratic decisions; and the rights it fails to 11 acknowledge are left to be democratically adopted or rejected by the people, with the assurance that their decision is not subject to judicial revision. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To my knowledge, no court has ever suggested that the Tenth Amendment which 'reserve[s] to the States' powers not delegated to the Federal Government, could or should be applied against the States. To incorporate that limitation would be to divest the States of all powers not specifically delegated to them, thereby inverting the original import of the Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Founders Relied on the Principles of Federalism.",
		"context": "To my knowledge, no court has ever suggested that the Tenth Amendment which 'reserve[s] to the States' powers not delegated to the Federal Government, could or should be applied against the States. To incorporate that limitation would be to divest the States of all powers not specifically delegated to them, thereby inverting the original import of the Amendment. Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Regardless of the ideological persuasion of the Court over time , the origins and purpose of state sovereignty cannot be altered. The Founding Fathers ordained a system where the principles of federalism operated to restrict federal power and reserve anything not expressly enumerated to the states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": ". sets out just how those powers are to be exercised,\" those gov- erned by the Constitution's restraints have no license to alter or depart from the \"single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure\" set forth in the document. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The exclusive nature of the state legislatures' au- thority is also confirmed by the single textually enu- merated qualification that the Constitution does in- clude: Congress's power to \"make or alter such Regu- lations\" as the legislatures may prescribe. U.S. CONST .",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "That qualification shows that the Framers considered the possibility that state legisla- tures might exercise th eir power in inappropriate ways and, in characteristic fashion, provided a check against any potential abuse: congressional review. Enforcing that allocation of power \" does not imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of stat e legislatures. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other provisions of the Constitution further con- firm that the Election s Clause's reference to state leg- islatures excludes other state entities . The Framers took great car e in identifying which state institutions were assigned particular roles by the federal 19 Constitution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "T he offices of Senator and Representa- tive \"aris[e] from the Constitution itself.\" U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 531 U.S. 510. Indeed, because any state authority to regulate election to fed- eral offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution, the Court has held that such power \"had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.\" U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "T he offices of Senator and Representa- tive \"aris[e] from the Constitution itself.\" U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, because any state authority to regulate election to fed- eral offices could not precede their very creation by the Constitution, the Court has held that such power \"had to be delegated to, rather than reserved by, the States.\" U.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "But when a state legislature regulates congressional elec-tions , it is performing a function assigned to it by the federal Constitution, not any state constitution , so Re- spondents' reliance on background principles of 23 judicial review for compliance with substantive state law falls apart. As this Court explained long ago in the analogous context of the state legislatures' power un- der Article V, \"the function of a state Legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment to the federal Con- stitution, like the function of Congress in proposing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the federal Constitution; and it transcends any limita- tion[ ] sought to be imposed by the people of a state. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Yes, the federal Constitution imposes limits on both the state legislatures' authority to regulate fed-eral elections and Congress's authority to revise those regulations. Thus, where a state legislature's election regulations violate some other provision of the Consti- tutio n, such as the Equal Protection Clause, the Con- stitution itself authorizes the federal or state courts to intervene to secure enumerated constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "See 179 N.E. 526. While a handful of earlier cases invalidated legislative regulations of federal elections, they either concerned (1) state - constitutional procedural requirement s, such as provisions sub- jecting election regulations to revision by referenda, see State of Ohio ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; State ex rel. 127 N.W. 848 ; or (2) state -consti- tutional regulations of voter qualifications, see 14 S.W. 688—which, as noted infra at p. 36, are outside of the scope of the Elections Clause. 26 provision that purported to control congressional dis- tricting.",
		"citation_value_orig": "241 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "That silence—with respect to federal districts but not state ones—is highly probative. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even stronger confirmation, however, is provided by the two States where substant ive constitutional limits governing congressional districts were pro- posed, after 1788, and defeated . Such a limit was pro- posed in Pennsylvania's 1790 constitutional conven- tion: on February 1, Albert Gallatin moved to include in the state constitution a pro vision setting the pro- portion and maximum number of representatives al- located to each congressional district .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "Alternat ively, they could have viewed these state- con- stitutional provisions as setting default rules that would validly apply to Congressional elections until altered by the state legislature through the ordinary lawmaking process. In all events , the fact that a few outlier States im- posed state -constitutional restrictions on their legis- lature's Elections Clause authority is hardly the type of \"irresistible\" post -enactment evidence that could overcome the \"plain and obvious import\" of the Con-stitution's text, Hunter 's Lessee, 1 Wheat. (14 U.S. ) at 338–39— not to mention the preponderance of other historical evidence confirming that plain and obvious import, see District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Taken all together, 21 of the 24 States admitted by 1830 did not impose any substantive state -constitutional limits expressly governing federal elections . 19 States do not appear to have even con sid- ered adopting such restrictions , and Massachusetts and Pennsylvania affirmatively rejected them.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "2. In McPherson v. Blacker , a group of prospective electors in Michigan challenged the state legislature's decision to appoint Michigan's electors through district- by-dis- trict election, rather than statewide . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court rejected their challenge, holding that the Presidential Electors Clause confers \"plenary power to the state legislatures in the matter of the ap- pointment of electors ,\" id. at 35—and further reason- ing that this authority \"cannot be taken from them or modified by their state constitutions any more than can their power to elect senators of the United States ,\" id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Elections Clause Does Not Allow State Courts To Usurp the Authority It Assigns to State Legislatures",
		"context": "(quoting S. Rep. No. 43-395 (1874)). The Court reaffirmed this principle in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the Florida Supreme Court —bas ed in part on principles derived from the state constitution —had interpreted the State's \"elec- tions statutes . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE IS ABOUT WHETHER CFAA LIABILITY EXTENDS TO VIOLATING VERBAL LIMITS ON COMPUTER USE (SOMETIMES CALLED \"CONTRACT-BASED\" RESTRICTIONS)",
		"context": "See Cybercrime's Scope at 1644-46. This covers traditional hacking, such as ex- ploiting a software vulnerability or successfully guess- ing another person's password. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The idea behind the code-based theory is that com- puters are programmed to control who can access them. Someone who intentionally circumvents techno- logical barriers to access violates privacy and the secu-rity of the information st ored on the computer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "928 F.2d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar 482 U.S. 386 ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 635",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "................. 16 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 532 U.S. 275 ........................ 9 American Electric Power 564 U.S. 410 ................................ .......................... 19 446 U.S. 608 ................................ ............................ 4 Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 ................................ ...................... 8, 16 556 U.S. 662 ................................ 13 BMW of North America , 517 U.S. 559 ................................ .......................... 19 487 U.S. 500 ................................ .......................... 19 Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ................................ ............................ 5 II Page Cases —continued: Carlsbad Technology, 556 U.S. 635 ................................ ............................ 6 Caterpillar [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............. 20 City of New 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "18-2188 (2d Cir.) ........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "451 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 F.2d 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 U.S. 590",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 U.S. 301",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., 516 U.S. 199 ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "........................... 19 City of 969 F.3d 895 , petition for cert. filed (Jan. 8, 2021) .............................. 17 417 U.S. 156 .......... 13 Food Marketing 139 S. Ct. 2356 ................................ ............................ 9 Fourth Estate Public Benefit 139 S. Ct. 881 ................................ . 21 Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 .... 10 Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524543 U.S. 335 ................................ .......................... 10 136 S. Ct. 1153570 U.S. 48 ............................... 4 138 S. Ct. 1500 ................................ .......................... 16 Microsoft 564 U.S. 91 ................................ .............................. 9 III Page Cases —continued: 451 U.S. 304 ........................ 20 Mohawk Industries, 558 U.S. 100 ................................ .......................... 13 981 F.2d 443 ................................ ............. 5 87 U.S. 590 ........ 12 136 S. Ct. 1113 ................................ ... 10 559 U.S. 542 ..... 17 138 S. Ct. 2105 ................................ ........................ 17, 18 522 U.S. 470 ................................ .......................... 21 Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507 ................................ .......................... 20 Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 ................................ ............................ 6 211 U.S. 370 ................ 13, 14 399 U.S. 267 ..................... 14 332 U.S. 301 ................................ .................... 19, 20 551 U.S. 537 .............................. 13 Yamaha Motor Corp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ .......................... 11 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. Amend. VI ................................ ........................ 17 Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Indeed, respondent does not even dispute that its reading re- quires the phrase \"order remanding a case\" to have dif- ferent meanings in the first and second clauses of Section 1447(d). R espondent nevertheless argues that statutory \"context\" and \"structure\" mandate such an \"improbable construction .\" Fourth Estate Public Benefit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] should be construed narrowly because it is an \"exception\" to the first clause, which gen- erally prohibits appellate review of remand orders. As a preliminary matter, the first clause could itself be charac- terized as an exception to the rule that a remand order would ordinarily be appealable under 28 U.S.C. 1291.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 881",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "16. But regardless of which clause is the \"excep- tion,\" courts \" normally have no license to give [statutory] exemp tion[s] anything but a fair reading.\" Food Market- ing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] permits re- view of the entire remand \"order .\" To be sure, courts should not \"impl[y]\" \" additional ex- ceptions \" to a \"general\" statutory provision \"[w]here Con- gress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions.\" 446 U.S. 608 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Food Market- ing 139 S. Ct. 2356 permits re- view of the entire remand \"order .\" To be sure, courts should not \"impl[y]\" \" additional ex- ceptions \" to a \"general\" statutory provision \"[w]here Con- gress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But the question here is not whether to imply additional exceptions; it is how to construe the \"exception\" that Con- gress \"explicitly enumerate [d].\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 U.S. 608",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 616. Nor does the plain -text readi ng of the second clause of Section 1447(d) \"undermine\" the first clause in a \"substantial way .\" Mar- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It merely permits normal appellate review in the narrow class of cases that Congress has indisputably exempted from the prohibition on appellate review of other remand orders. ii.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 48",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Instead, that argument rests on what respondent perceives to be Sec- tion 1447( d)'s overarching purpose. But \"even the most formidable argument\" based on statutory purpose cannot \"overcome\" clear statutory language. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In any event, the plain -text interpretation is wholly consis tent with the ap- parent purposes of Section 1447(d) : namely, to reduce the volume of appeals and to avoid delay in remanded cases while protecting the federal interests at issue in federal - officer and civil -rights cases . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Review of such an award may not constitute impermissible \"review[]\" of the remand order , 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), because the fee award is collateral to the merits of the order. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That interpretation would be con- sistent with the broader treatment of fee awards as dis- crete from merits proceedings. See , e.g., 486 U.S. 196 (1988 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 F.2d 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "See, e.g., 981 F.2d 443 . That interpretation would be con- sistent with the broader treatment of fee awards as dis- crete from merits proceedings. See , e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1988 ). Even if the plain -text interpretation were to render Section 1447(c) fee awards unreviewable, however, that interpretation is vastly preferable to respondent's, which would unques- tionably give the phrase \"order remanding a case\" differ- ent meanings in a single statutory provision . iv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 196",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Br. 20 (citation omitted). While not citing the case by name, respondent is describi ng the holding of Thermtron Products, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1976 )—a decision criticized by several Jus- tices . See, e.g., 136 S. Ct. 1153. b. Respondent next pivots (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "20 (citation omitted). While not citing the case by name, respondent is describi ng the holding of Thermtron Products, 423 U.S. 336 (1976 )—a decision criticized by several Jus- tices . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. Respondent next pivots (Br. 23 -31) to an alterna- tive interpretation of Section 1447(d) that it has never be- fore articulated (at least in any detail, see Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "; see Resp. Br. 26 -27 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , even if the motion is denied on the merits. So too here. This Court's decision in Arthur Andersen 556 U.S. 624 , proves the point.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "26 -27 (discussing 138 S. Ct. 2105 , even if the motion is denied on the merits. So too here. This Court's decision in Arthur Andersen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , proves the point. At issue there was 9 U.S.C. 16, which permits appe al of an order \"refus- ing a stay under [S]ection 3\" of the Federal Arbi- tration Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "546. As the Court has explained, Con- gress's \"failure to act\" when making \"only isolated amendments\" to a statute does not demonstrate \"affirm- ative congressional approval of [a prior judicial] interpre- tation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , Congress had reenacted the rel- evant statutory language in full . See IDEA Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "105-17, § 101, 111 Stat. 92 . In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court focused on legislative history specifically showing that Congress had consider ed the relevant judi- cial precedent when it amended the statute at issue. And in Microsoft 564 U.S. 91, the Court declined to weigh competing pol- icy arguments where Congress had repeatedly amended the relevant statute over the course of decades but had \"allowed\" the Federal Circuit 's \"correct\" interpretation to remain in effect . None of those cases is even remotely on point here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "92 . In Texas Department of Housing & Community Affair 135 S. Ct. 2507, the Court focused on legislative history specifically showing that Congress had consider ed the relevant judi- cial precedent when it amended the statute at issue. And in Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court declined to weigh competing pol- icy arguments where Congress had repeatedly amended the relevant statute over the course of decades but had \"allowed\" the Federal Circuit 's \"correct\" interpretation to remain in effect . None of those cases is even remotely on point here. Respondent contends (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 91",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "20 -26) cannot overcome the court of appeals decisions interpreting this one . But Con- gress is \"generally presume[d]\" to be \"knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts ,\" 10 not merely prior interpretations of the particular statute being amended. Goodyear Atomic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court has indi- cated that decisions with only conclusory reasoning pro- vide little support for an inference of congressional ratifi- cation. See, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 553; 543 U.S. 335 (20 05). Given the concededly conclusory reasoning in the cases on which re- spondent's ratification argument relies, the argument for congressional ratification here is exceedingly weak .",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 174",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "But Con- gress is \"generally presume[d]\" to be \"knowledgeable about existing law pertinent to the legislation it enacts ,\" 10 not merely prior interpretations of the particular statute being amended. Goodyear Atomic 486 U.S. 174 , the Court has indi- cated that decisions with only conclusory reasoning pro- vide little support for an inference of congressional ratifi- cation. See, e.g., 137 S. Ct. 553; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (20 05). Given the concededly conclusory reasoning in the cases on which re- spondent's ratification argument relies, the argument for congressional ratification here is exceedingly weak . 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "22 -23. But interlocutory review is permitted of some orders that cannot be reviewed later (for example, where a district court denies summary judg- ment). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And appellate courts routinely review issues of subject - matter jurisdiction on appeal s from final judgment s (for 11 example, where a district court denies a motion to remand and the defendant subsequently prevails on the merits) . See U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "There is no reason to believe that Con- gress wanted to insulate those same issues from review in situations where the remand order is appealable. It simply does not follow from the fact that Congress chose to permit review of certain otherwise unreviewable orders that Congress simultaneously intended to preclude re- view of particular issues in those orders . Respondent makes two additional attempts to distin- guish this Court's decision in Yamaha Motor Corp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . First , respondent notes that , in 28 U.S.C. 1292(b), Congress paired the word \"order\" with the verb \"in volves,\" showing that the review- able issues on appeal must be broader than the certified \"controlling question of law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "28, § 2, 14 Stat. 386 -387. Despite the omission, a divided Court held in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , that Congress had not intended to au- thorize the Court to decide questions of state law. The decision in Murdock is not generalizable to other jurisdictional statutes , because it was driven by federal- ism concerns unique t o the context of Section 1257 (as op- posed to merely the statutory text and history, which pointed in the opposite direction, see, e.g., Jonathan F. Mitchell, Reconsidering 'Murdock': State -Law Reversals As Constitutional Avoidance , 77 U. Chi. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 U.S. 590",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "Respondent next invokes the collateral -order doc- trine, which stems from a \"practical \" construction of the phrase \"final decision\" in 28 U.S.C. 1291. See Moh awk Industries , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . If anything, the collateral -order doctrine favors the plain -text interpretation, not respondent's , be- cause r eview under that doctrine is not limited to the par- ticular i ssue that permitted the appeal. See, e.g., 556 U.S. 662 ; 551 U.S. 537; 417 U.S. 156.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "See Moh awk Industries , 558 U.S. 100 . If anything, the collateral -order doctrine favors the plain -text interpretation, not respondent's , be- cause r eview under that doctrine is not limited to the par- ticular i ssue that permitted the appeal. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 551 U.S. 537; 417 U.S. 156. While review may not necessarily extend to every issue in an appealable collat- eral order, see Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "See Moh awk Industries , 558 U.S. 100 . If anything, the collateral -order doctrine favors the plain -text interpretation, not respondent's , be- cause r eview under that doctrine is not limited to the par- ticular i ssue that permitted the appeal. See, e.g., 556 U.S. 662 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 417 U.S. 156. While review may not necessarily extend to every issue in an appealable collat- eral order, see Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "See Moh awk Industries , 558 U.S. 100 . If anything, the collateral -order doctrine favors the plain -text interpretation, not respondent's , be- cause r eview under that doctrine is not limited to the par- ticular i ssue that permitted the appeal. See, e.g., 556 U.S. 662 ; 551 U.S. 537; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While review may not necessarily extend to every issue in an appealable collat- eral order, see Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "91 -644, § 14, 84 Stat. 1890. Soon after its enactment, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court 14 interpreted the Act to permit review of only the issues enumerated in the statute . The decision in Keitel is of limited significance outside its particular context. There, the Court concluded that the Criminal Appeals Act permitted review only of the enumerated issues because it viewed \"the purpose of the statute\" as permitting review of \"the subject s embraced within the clauses of the statute\" a nd not of \" the whole case.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "211 U.S. 370",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 399. The Court later explained that the Act's \"background and legislative history \" justified the application of a \"principle of strict construction,\" because the history \" reveal[ ed] a stro ng current of congressional solicitude for the plight of a criminal defendant exposed to additional expense and anxiety by a government appeal .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Again, Section 1447(d) does not implicate those unusual considerations —regardless of whether the Court's inter- pretation of the Criminal Appeals Act, made at a time when statutory text carried little weight, was defensible as an original matter. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "399 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "38. That could be said about sanctions in any context, yet this Court has re- peatedly recognized the power of sanctions to deter im- proper conduct by litigants. See , e.g., Henry Schein, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Arthur Andersen , 556 U.S. at 629 ; 513 U.S. 352 . And t he fact that respondent cites cases from every re- gional circuit involving fee awards under Section 1447(c) demonstrates they are readily available as an option to de- ter any gamesmanship . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "38. That could be said about sanctions in any context, yet this Court has re- peatedly recognized the power of sanctions to deter im- proper conduct by litigants. See , e.g., Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524 ; Arthur Andersen , 556 U.S. at 629 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And t he fact that respondent cites cases from every re- gional circuit involving fee awards under Section 1447(c) demonstrates they are readily available as an option to de- ter any gamesmanship . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "If the Court agrees with peti- tioners on the question presented, whether respondent's 17 claims necessarily arise under federal common law affects whether reversal or vacatur is the appropriate disposi- tion. The Court has often decided issues separate from the question on which it granted review in order to deter- mine the correct disposition once that question has been resolved . For example, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court resolved the Sixth Amendment question on which it granted review and proceeded to de- cide whether the trial court's error was structural in na- ture in order to determine whether a new trial was re- quired on remand. See id. at 1510 -1512 & n.4.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 1511 n.4 . Other cases are to the same ef- fect. See, e.g., Bristol -Myers Squibb [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 -2433 (2015 ); 559 U.S. 542 ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent protests that petitioners have \"smug - gl[ed]\" the federal -common -law ground for removal into the case . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 1511 n.4 . Other cases are to the same ef- fect. See, e.g., Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 2431 -2433 (2015 ); 559 U.S. 542 ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent protests that petitioners have \"smug - gl[ed]\" the federal -common -law ground for removal into the case . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 1511 n.4 . Other cases are to the same ef- fect. See, e.g., Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 -2433 (2015 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 430 U.S. 1 . Respondent protests that petitioners have \"smug - gl[ed]\" the federal -common -law ground for removal into the case . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reverse the judgment below",
		"context": "at 1511 n.4 . Other cases are to the same ef- fect. See, e.g., Bristol -Myers Squibb 137 S. Ct. 1773 ; 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 -2433 (2015 ); 559 U.S. 542 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Respondent protests that petitioners have \"smug - gl[ed]\" the federal -common -law ground for removal into the case . See Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring Race-Conscious Redistricting Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"context": "Perversely, it does so 16 in construing a statute passed pursuant to a constitu- tional provision that expressly prohibits discriminat- ing against voters on the basis of race. This must cease. If a State \"may not, absent ex- traordinary justification, se gregate citizens on the ba- sis of race in its public parks , buses , golf courses, beaches, and schools,\" Miller , 515 U.S. at 911 (cit- ing New Orleans City Park Improvement [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]347 U.S. 483517 U.S. 899. A de facto re- quirement of proportional representation is nothing less than \"racial balancing, which is patently uncon-stitutional.\" Grutter , 539 U.S. at 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring Race-Conscious Redistricting Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"context": "Perversely, it does so 16 in construing a statute passed pursuant to a constitu- tional provision that expressly prohibits discriminat- ing against voters on the basis of race. This must cease. If a State \"may not, absent ex- traordinary justification, se gregate citizens on the ba- sis of race in its public parks , buses , golf courses, beaches, and schools,\" Miller , 515 U.S. at 911 (cit- ing New Orleans City Park Improvement 358 U.S. 54[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]517 U.S. 899. A de facto re- quirement of proportional representation is nothing less than \"racial balancing, which is patently uncon-stitutional.\" Grutter , 539 U.S. at 330.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Requiring Race-Conscious Redistricting Violates the Fourteenth Amendment.",
		"context": "Plessy , 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is this \"'moral imperative of racial neutrality [that] is the driving force of the Equal Protection Clause,' and ra- cial classifications are [thus] permitted only 'as a last resort.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 Gingles ' reinterpretation of Section 2 is incompat- ible with this requirement, and it should therefore be overruled.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "See 5 U.S.C. §706(2)(B) -(C); Manhattan Gen. Equip. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that a \"regulation [that] … operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute, is a mere nullity \" because an agency 's \"power … to prescribe rules and regulations … is not the power to make law \" but rather \"the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute \"). DACA suffers from several INA infirmities that render it void. Procedurally, through DAC A, DHS purports to channel aliens into deferred action under prosecutorial discretion, without initiating the statutorily mandated removal pro ceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "§1225(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). \"Congress did not place the decision as to which applicants for admission are placed in removal proceedings into the discretion of the Attorney General, but created mandatory criteria. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[W]hile the Presid ent has broad authority in foreign affairs, that authority does not extend to the refusal to execute domestic laws. \" Massachusetts v. EPA , 549 U.S 497, 534 (2007).",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 F.3d 8",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "Even if some form of deferred action lawfully could apply to some DACA beneficiaries, DACA would remain an invalid form of deferred action. While an agency faced with limited resource s necessarily has discretion to implement congressional mandates as best it can, the power to set priorities for action does not authorize ignoring all statutory mandates: \"the agency administering the statute is required to effectuate the original statuto ry scheme as much as possible , within the limits of the added constraint. \" City of Los [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. DACA, however, did not \"effectuate the original statutory scheme as much as possible \" within the lim its set by the lack of funds. Indeed , DACA was not created because of lack of resources.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.2d 40",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "Memorandu m from Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children 1 (June 15, 2012). Admissions against interest are admissible evidence, but self -serving statements are not. Compare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 F.Supp.3d at 634 -35 (arguing that DAPA would disincentivize illegal aliens from self -deporting); Michael X. Marinelli , INS Enforcement of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: Employer Sanctions During the Citation Period , 37 CATH. U. L.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "The INA cannot be credibly read to delegate to DHS the unres tricted power to grant work authorization to removable aliens, even \"low-priority \" ones. Congress, in making it illegal for illegal aliens to work, wished to discourage illegal entry and to encourage removable aliens to remove themselves, even if enforcement by removal is underfunded and slow to reach low -priority cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Marinelli , at 833 -34. DACA thus exceeds the authority that the INA delegates to DHS. 20 Although the Ninth Circuit viewed 8 U .S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "Indeed, as the Ninth Circuit has held, \"[8 U.S.C. §1324a] merely allows an employer to legally hire an alien (whether admitted or not) while his application [for adjustment of status] is pending. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As explained below, this provision does not delegate any authority , and it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine if it did. First, this pre -1996 definition may imply that the Attorney General has — or at one time had — authority to authorize the employment of certain aliens, but the definition does not itself delegate any authority.",
		"citation_value_orig": "649 F.3d 1086",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "It is simply unreasonable to suppose that Congress, without any clear statement that it was doing so, granted DHS the unrestricted power to overthrow Congress 's own grants of work protection to American workers. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(n) , 1184(g) , 1188 (protecting American workers from competition from aliens); Sure -Tan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Congress intended to grant the Executive Branch such vast discretion, it would have done so clearly, not through \"vague terms or ancillary provisions — it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse holes. \" 531 U. S. 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "§§ 1182(n) , 1184(g) , 1188 (protecting American workers from competition from aliens); Sure -Tan, 467 U.S. 883. If Congress intended to grant the Executive Branch such vast discretion, it would have done so clearly, not through \"vague terms or ancillary provisions — it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouse holes. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, if this definition itself delegated carte blanche authority to authorize employment, it would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which requires \"an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform. \" 488 U.S. 361 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U. S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "531 U. S. 457. Finally, if this definition itself delegated carte blanche authority to authorize employment, it would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which requires \"an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to exercise the delegated authority is directed to conform. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests that this Court should avoid the constitutional nondelegation issue by reading the 22 statutory definition not to delegate any authority. 570 U.S. 1 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. DACA violated the INA",
		"context": "488 U.S. 361 . The doctrine of constitutional avoidance suggests that this Court should avoid the constitutional nondelegation issue by reading the 22 statutory definition not to delegate any authority. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Either way, DACA is unlawful.5 Although the Ninth Circuit viewed 6 U.S.C. §202(5) as authorizing DACA, Suppl.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Amendment prohibits criminally punishing the insane",
		"context": "at 585 (Ethridge, J.). Although this Court's Eighth Amendment jurispru- dence focuses on punishment, the Court has also ap- plied it to prohibit criminal conviction s in certain cases , for reasons that apply fully here . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"I do not see how under our sy stem b eing an addict can be punished as a crime. If addicts can be punished for their addi ction, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. \"); see also 362 U.S. 574 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Eighth Amendment prohibits criminally punishing the insane",
		"context": "See, e.g., 370 U.S. 660 (\"I do not see how under our sy stem b eing an addict can be punished as a crime. If addicts can be punished for their addi ction, then the insane can also be punished for their insanity. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The \" status and condition in the eyes of the world, and under the law, of one convicted of crime, is vastly different from that of on e simply adjudged insane,\" Strasburg , 110 P. at 1025 , and thus an insane person 30 should not \"be branded with the stigma of felony when he was wholly unable to comprehend the na- ture and quality of the act,\" Sinclair , 132 So. at 583 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
		"context": "Accounting for commercial and competitive realities is also consistent with this Court's approach in recent decades to focus on both the potential benefits and costs to consumer welfare arising from antitrust liability. This cost/benefit analysis is borne out in the Court's tailoring of antitrust analysis to specific arrangements that reflect both the federal 15 courts' familiarity with a given economic arrangement, Broad. Music, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as well as the likelihood that the arrangement, on balance, harms competition. Leegin , 551 U.S. at 894-98. These concerns necessarily counsel great caution in applying antitrust law in the context of two-sided markets with which the federal courts are only now developing experience, especially in connection with financial and payment platforms, which benefit consumers greatly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
		"context": "Such an approach would be entirely consistent with the way this Court has proceeded over time in assessing the proper application of the antitrust laws and the need to account for competitive realities and the familiarity of the federal courts with such matters, most particularly how likely a given 3 Available at https://truthonthemarket.com/2010/03/20/politically- mandated-credit-card-interchange-fees-won%e2%80%99t-create- jobs-but-they-will-hurt-consumers-and-the-economy. 16 arrangement is to harm consumers after the benefits of antitrust liability and the costs, including error and litigation costs, are taken into account. See State Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, at one end, this Court treats outright price-fixing and similarly obvious anticompetitive arrangements as per se illegal—illegal without requiring any empirical proof of competitive harm from the specific practice challenged. Leegin , 551 U.S. at 886.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
		"context": "Leegin , 551 U.S. at 886. The federal courts have ample experience with the consequences of price-fixing, and both economic and empirical evidence confirms that price- fixing cartels lead to higher prices, slower innovation, and significant consumer harm both immediately and in the long run. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; White Motor 372 U.S. 253; Easterbrook, supra , at 3 & n.2. At the other, this Court requires an antitrust plaintiff to make a specific threshold showing of a strong likelihood of consumer harm for arrangements that are theoretically capable of hurting consumers on balance, but practically unlikely to do so. Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "457 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
		"context": "Leegin , 551 U.S. at 886. The federal courts have ample experience with the consequences of price-fixing, and both economic and empirical evidence confirms that price- fixing cartels lead to higher prices, slower innovation, and significant consumer harm both immediately and in the long run. See, e.g., 457 U.S. 332; White Motor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Easterbrook, supra , at 3 & n.2. At the other, this Court requires an antitrust plaintiff to make a specific threshold showing of a strong likelihood of consumer harm for arrangements that are theoretically capable of hurting consumers on balance, but practically unlikely to do so. Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 253",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court Should Exercise Justified Caution in Imposing Antitrust Liability on Two-Sided Products",
		"context": "Ibid. Likewise, courts develop familiarity with the likelihood of harm from a practice and, if given sufficient experience, often identify anticompetitive practices as such. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet antitrust enforcement against a harmless practice typically drives that practice from the market altogether. Easterbrook, supra , at 15-16.",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE POLICY REQUIREMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENT OF THE \"GOVERNMENT SPEECH\" DOCTRINE",
		"context": "While that doctrine bolsters the government's ability to oppose sex trafficking and prostitution, the grantees need not bedeemed government speakers to uphold the policy here. \"The Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech; it does not regulate government speech.\" Pleasant Grove [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, however, anyanti-prostitution and anti-sex trafficking policy of grantees is not government speech, but rather a policy the grantee itself adopts. Nor is this a case where the government is dictating the parameters of an entity'sspeech within the four corners of the government program, as in 500 U.S. 173.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 460",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE POLICY REQUIREMENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENT OF THE \"GOVERNMENT SPEECH\" DOCTRINE",
		"context": "Pleasant Grove 555 U.S. 460. Here, however, anyanti-prostitution and anti-sex trafficking policy of grantees is not government speech, but rather a policy the grantee itself adopts. Nor is this a case where the government is dictating the parameters of an entity'sspeech within the four corners of the government program, as in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Hence, the \"government speech\" doctrine is notcontrolling here. The government speech doctrine, however, does not exhaust the government's authority to set rules forgrantees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
		"context": "Despite agreeing that Rule 60 imported the \"mis- take\" phrase from state codes, th e government (at 1 3-15) insists this is a plain -meaning case where dictionary defi- nitions control . But when legal drafters borrow a well - worn phrase, what governs is the \"cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.\" T-Mobile S., 574 U.S. 293 ; McDermott Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As for the S tates, the government (at 22-26) claims Rule 60's drafters cared about only California and that the Golden State took a minority position authorizing relief for various legal errors. That take is fiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 337",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
		"context": "That take is fiction. For nearly a century, California courts consistently held that \"the sum- mary modification of judgments to correct errors of law is not authorized by section 473,\" California's mistake stat- ute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government ignores these cases. The government dismisses other cases holding that California's code did not encompass judicial errors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "178 P.2d 751",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
		"context": "If Rule 60's drafters wanted to buck these authorities, ascribe to California a unique, legal -error- embracing view, and enshrine that ap- proach in Rule 60(b), copying the basic \"mistake\" ph rase that 17 States shared would be an odd way to do it. T he more natural inference is that the drafters preserved \"the meaning generally attached\" to the relevant term. Repub- lic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And the general meaning of \"mistake, inadvert- ence, surprise, or excusabl e neglect\" across state codes excluded legal errors. Finally, the government (at 25) quibbles with whether four other States ' \"mistake\" provisions —New York, 6 North Dakota, Minnesota, and Oregon —covered legal er- rors.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 607",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
		"context": "11 -13. The government (at 30 -32) responds that the Advisory Committee's meeting transcripts refute the notion that Rule 60(b)(6) capture s many legal errors previously ad- dressed through legal or equitable forms . But just as \"leg- islative history is not the law ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , com- mittee meeting transcripts are not the Federal Rules. T he adage that \"statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history\" applies equally to the Rules context. See 137 S. Ct. 929 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. \"Mistake\" Is a Term of Art in Rule 60",
		"context": "But just as \"leg- islative history is not the law ,\" 139 S. Ct. 1804 , com- mittee meeting transcripts are not the Federal Rules. T he adage that \"statements by individual legislators rank among the least illuminating forms of legislative history\" applies equally to the Rules context. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Take the government's claim that a 1943 meeting transcript shows that \"Rules 60(b)(2) and (3) alone would 'preserve[] the substance of the . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 929",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable",
		"context": "(quoting Jardines , 569 U.S. at 12 (Kagan, J., concur- ring)). Collins also can take comfort in the requirement that every search mu st be reasonable. See, e.g., Mary- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[E]very Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 'reasonableness' determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balanc- ing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 1958",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable",
		"context": "\"[E]very Fourth Amendment case, since it turns upon a 'reasonableness' determination, involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balanc- ing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such \"rare exceptions\" include cases where searches and seizures are \"conducted in an ex- traordinary manner\" that is \"unusually harmful to an individual's privacy or even physical interests—such 32 as, for example, seizure by means of deadly force, un- announced entry into a home, entry into a home with- out a warrant, or physical penetration of the body.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable",
		"context": "\"For constitu- tional purposes,\" this Court has held that there is 33 \"no difference\" between those two options—\"[g]iven probable cause to search, eit her course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,\" id.—but Rhodes's brief search was clearly the less intrusive approach. Rhodes's search avoided interfering with the posses- sory interest, if any, that Collins had in his stolen mo- torcycle. Unlike the police officers in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Rhodes conducted the search immediately, during the narrow window of time after he located the motorcycle and before Collins was able to remove the evidence. Fourth, Rhodes did not detour from conducting the primary search; he pro- ceeded directly up the driveway to the motorcycle, and returned directly back down it. There is no assertion that he went beyond the scope of a reasonable, war- rantless search.",
		"citation_value_orig": "403 U.S. 443",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable",
		"context": "There is no assertion that he went beyond the scope of a reasonable, war- rantless search. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For all these reasons, Rhodes's search, supported by probable cause, was reasonable and faithful to the Fourth Amendment. 8 8 In contrast with the \"outright dangerous\" nighttime searches Collins imagines, Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Collins's fears of roving police searches are not justified: a warrantless automobile search must be supported by probable cause, limited in scope, and reasonable",
		"context": "for Pet'r at 20, Rhodes conducted the search here in the light of day. Although this Court has not held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the execution of war-rants at night, but cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a warrantless search conducted at night may be invalidated on other grounds. See, e.g., 34",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 430",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
		"context": "Resp.53 (quoting Favish, 541 U.S. at 171-173). But policy arguments cannot rewrite plain statutory text. See SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FOIA favors government transparency but does not mandate disclosure at any cost. Congress balanced these interests by limiting Exemption 4 to information \"ob- tained from a person\"— i.e., not government information.16 16 Respondent properly abandoned its certiorari-stage assertion that 19 Accordingly, most examples respondent offers would not change under a plain-text interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
		"context": "Congress balanced these interests by limiting Exemption 4 to information \"ob- tained from a person\"— i.e., not government information.16 16 Respondent properly abandoned its certiorari-stage assertion that 19 Accordingly, most examples respondent offers would not change under a plain-text interpretation. For example, in- formation on bank-bailout funds, Resp.54-55, was ordered disclosed because it reported \"actions that were taken by the government.\" Bloomberg, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, the CFPB request, Resp. 56, was for \"[a]ll rec- ords by or between CFPB employees\" regarding the is- sue—not information obtained from a person.",
		"citation_value_orig": "601 F.3d 143",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
		"context": "If certain cat- egories of such information are so critical that they war- rant disclosure despite Exemption 4, that policy judgment is surely for Congress alone. Until Congress acts, how- ever, its unambiguous statutory language governs. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even government spending—unquestionably linked to a tradition of disclosure—does not justify categorical dis- closure under the statute. Nor do all figures related to government spending actually reflect government action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S.Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
		"context": "Even government spending—unquestionably linked to a tradition of disclosure—does not justify categorical dis- closure under the statute. Nor do all figures related to government spending actually reflect government action. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing SNAP data is not \"obtained from a person\"—an already-forfeited and plainly wrong contention. See Cert. Reply 9-11.",
		"citation_value_orig": "375 F.3d 1182",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Giving \"confidential\" its plain meaning advances FOIA's purpose",
		"context": "Store-level SNAP-redemption data memori- alizes actions SNAP beneficiaries take. 21 Health & Human Servs. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, as respondent agrees, commercial interests dominate FOIA. Resp.58.",
		"citation_value_orig": "865 F.2d 320",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government-Speech Doctrine Should Be Limited to Speech That Is Necessary or Intrinsic to a Legitimate Government Function",
		"context": ". Despite the coercion inherently involved in view- point-based government speech, this Court has held that such speech \"is exempt from First Amendment scrutiny.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This aberration from normal constitu- tional protections against compelled speech is suppos-edly necessary because otherwise, government \"would not work.\" 576 U.S. 200.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Government-Speech Doctrine Should Be Limited to Speech That Is Necessary or Intrinsic to a Legitimate Government Function",
		"context": "The government may create such a program and even require house- holders to recycle cans and bottles without taking broader stances on environmental issues that are sub- ject to public controversy. Regulating conduct is 19 generally subject to rational basis review; but compel- ling support for viewpoint -discriminatory speech is subject to heightened scrutiny. See Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2464 (2018) (applying heightened scrutiny to com- pelled support for speech, while not deciding whether the higher standard of strict scrutiny might apply) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There will be difficult line -drawing problems, to be sure. But this Court should not allow the most difficult borderline cases to justify government coercion of all taxpayers to support its viewpoint-based speech on a host of political and social questions—particularly questions that are highly controversial and divisive.",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Language, History, and Judicial Interpretation of the Original Statutes Governing Non-Indian Against Indian Crimes Exclude State Jurisdiction",
		"context": "1802 Act § 19 (em- phasis added). Crimes within Indian country, in other words, were neither \"committed within such state\" nor \"within the ordinary jurisdiction of any of the individ-ual states.\" In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Chief Justice Marshall agreed that the acts excluded state jurisdiction. The Court expressed doubt that it could restrain Georgia's arrest of non-Indians Samuel Worcester and Elizur Butler if the sole complaint was its \"extra-territorial operation.\" 31 U.S. at 561.",
		"citation_value_orig": "31 U.S. 515",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Christian Legal Soc'y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal, Hastings College of the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. , 518 U.S. at 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (\"The public forum doctrine is a rule governing claims of a right of access to public property and has never been thought to extend beyond property generally understood to belong to the government.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. , 518 U.S. at 827 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (\"The public forum doctrine is a rule governing claims of a right of access to public property and has never been thought to extend beyond property generally understood to belong to the government.\") (internal citation and qu otation marks omitted); 7 Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, the Court has often drawn a sharp divide between private and public property when analyzing putative public fora. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (dismissing evidence of speech activity that occurred at rail stations and bus stations as \"irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership\" and concluding that the \"practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport\") (emphasis in original).",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.3d 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "(internal citation and qu otation marks omitted); 7 Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo 657 F.3d 936. Indeed, the Court has often drawn a sharp divide between private and public property when analyzing putative public fora. See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (dismissing evidence of speech activity that occurred at rail stations and bus stations as \"irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership\" and concluding that the \"practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport\") (emphasis in original). To be sure, this Court has sometimes suggested that private property dedicated to public use may be deemed a public forum. Respondents point to two such cases: 473 U.S. 788 and 326 U.S. 501.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (dismissing evidence of speech activity that occurred at rail stations and bus stations as \"irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership\" and concluding that the \"practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport\") (emphasis in original). To be sure, this Court has sometimes suggested that private property dedicated to public use may be deemed a public forum. Respondents point to two such cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and 326 U.S. 501. BIO at 27. But the Court made this suggestion only in dicta in Cornelius4 4 See Petitioner's Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "See Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. 672 (dismissing evidence of speech activity that occurred at rail stations and bus stations as \"irrelevant to public fora analysis, because sites such as bus and rail terminals traditionally have had private ownership\" and concluding that the \"practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport\") (emphasis in original). To be sure, this Court has sometimes suggested that private property dedicated to public use may be deemed a public forum. Respondents point to two such cases: 473 U.S. 788 and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. BIO at 27. But the Court made this suggestion only in dicta in Cornelius4 4 See Petitioner's Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "BIO at 27. But the Court made this suggestion only in dicta in Cornelius4 4 See Petitioner's Br. at 31 (\"Respondents have previously argued that dicta in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], extends the public forum analysis to 'private property dedicated to public use.' Id. at 801.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "See id . at 801-06.\") (emphasis added); see2018 WL 1471939 (\"Although both [ Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]] mentioned that public forums may include 'private property dedicated to public use' . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 727",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": ". both cases addressed whether certain speech restrictions enacted by 8 and Marsh has both been carefully limited to its facts and has long been consider ed a \"public function,\" rather than a public forum case. See Flagg Bros., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is far more instructive. There, the Court held that a \"privately owned . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 149",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Public Forum Analysis is Almost Never Appropriate When Applied to Private Property",
		"context": "It should go without saying that this kind of public forum analysis could not and should not extend to private organizations like amicus curiae 's members, which retain complete ownership and control over their Internet services.5 T h e y a r e , i n t h e w o r d s o f t h i s Court, \"not fora at all.\" Arkansas Educ. Television [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
		"context": "In addition to abridgment s, the First Amendment restricts laws that \"chill\" protected speech . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this way, the First Amendment both vindicates the si- lenced and shields the self -censoring who cannot \"un- dertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating th eir rights through case -by-case litiga- tion.\" 539 U.S. 113 ; see also Citizens 558 U.S. 310 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
		"context": ", 542 U.S. 656. In this way, the First Amendment both vindicates the si- lenced and shields the self -censoring who cannot \"un- dertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating th eir rights through case -by-case litiga- tion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Citizens 558 U.S. 310 . The potential chilling effect should shape the re- sult here. In Manhattan Community Access 139 S. Ct. 1921, the Court explained that \"the state -action doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the individ- ual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
		"context": ", 542 U.S. 656. In this way, the First Amendment both vindicates the si- lenced and shields the self -censoring who cannot \"un- dertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating th eir rights through case -by-case litiga- tion.\" 539 U.S. 113 ; see also Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The potential chilling effect should shape the re- sult here. In Manhattan Community Access 139 S. Ct. 1921, the Court explained that \"the state -action doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the individ- ual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
		"context": "539 U.S. 113 ; see also Citizens 558 U.S. 310 . The potential chilling effect should shape the re- sult here. In Manhattan Community Access [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court explained that \"the state -action doctrine enforces a critical boundary between the government and the individ- ual, and thereby protects a robust sphere of individual liberty.\" Id. at 1934.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Test For State Action On Social Media Platforms Must Be Clear To Avoid Chilling Candidate Expression.",
		"context": "Just as free and open debate on public issues would not exist if incumbent candi- dates were compelled to incorporate discordan t or dis- ruptive expression in their campaign rallies and other events, so too would it be threatened if candidates are not free on social media to control their own political and electoral message s. Under the First Amendment, the government can no more co mpel a candidate to permit a message he does not like on his non-govern- ment resourced social media page than it can compel him to place a sign for an opposition candidate in his front yard. At a minimum, c larity is needed \"to ensure that ambiguity does not chill protected speech.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Already, in some circuits, the test for state action is so unpredictable that NRSC members and other candidates may refrain from fully exercising their First Amendment rights rather than risk litiga- tion that could disrupt their campaign. Indeed, an elected school board member in the Ninth Circuit case \"decide[d] the juice is not worth the squeeze\" and closed his public Facebook page.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 239",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Early Accrual Contravenes the Ripeness Doctrine and Wastes Judicial Resources",
		"context": "This creates a dynamic in which timely lawsuits will in m any cases be unripe. As defined by this Court, \"a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.\" 29 This contingency is present in myriad 28 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 29 523 U.S. 296. 13 ways here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Early Accrual Contravenes the Ripeness Doctrine and Wastes Judicial Resources",
		"context": "As defined by this Court, \"a claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.\" 29 This contingency is present in myriad 28 512 U.S. 477. 29 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 ways here. A defendant presented with false evidence is virtually never going to have proof of its fabrication by those acting under color of law when initially confronted with such evid ence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Early Accrual Contravenes the Ripeness Doctrine and Wastes Judicial Resources",
		"context": "It is wasteful to devote judicial resources to claims based only on a criminal defendant's initial exposure to false evidence. This Court made clear in 30 Schoenberg, supra note 9. 31 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 32 429 U.S. 492. 33 Wallace , supra note 5, at 384.",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Early Accrual Contravenes the Ripeness Doctrine and Wastes Judicial Resources",
		"context": "This Court made clear in 30 Schoenberg, supra note 9. 31 394 U.S. 731. 32 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 33 Wallace , supra note 5, at 384. 14 Iqbal that conclusions are not sufficient to support a claim, but what else can a criminal defendant offer at such a nascent stage of proceedings in support of a claim of fabrication than the conclusion that prosecu-tors or police must be responsible?",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chevron deference does not apply in these circumstances",
		"context": "43 (quoting Salfi , 422 U.S. at 765- 766)), it is not free to erect jurisdictional barriers to judicial review that Congress did not intend. Finally, even if Congress intended the agency to define by regulation the limits of federal court juris- diction, the agency's discretion would be bounded by established substantive canons of construction. See Ramah Navajo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action\" 476 U.S. 667) forecloses the agency from picking among the otherwise permissible readings of Section 405(g) the one that most constrains judicial review. 17",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 1455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chevron deference does not apply in these circumstances",
		"context": "Finally, even if Congress intended the agency to define by regulation the limits of federal court juris- diction, the agency's discretion would be bounded by established substantive canons of construction. See Ramah Navajo 112 F.3d 1455. Here, the \"strong presumption that Congress intends judicial review of administrative action\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) forecloses the agency from picking among the otherwise permissible readings of Section 405(g) the one that most constrains judicial review. 17",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "The SEC lacks the resources to monitor each recommendatio n statement in real-time. E.g., J.I. Case [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Sec- tion 14(e), by design, keep s the process honest. See, e.g., Tellabs, 551 U.S. 308 on a marg inal tender offer.",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 U.S. 426",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "Case 377 U.S. 426. Sec- tion 14(e), by design, keep s the process honest. See, e.g., Tellabs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] on a marg inal tender offer. The pro- posal was an obvious close call, with barely 60% of out-standing shares ultimately tendered. C.A.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "E.R. 96- 97, 261 (44.8% (mean) and 50. 8% (median) versus 26.4% (Emulex)); see Matrixx Initiatives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While this does not automa tically establish the trans- action was unfair, Section 14's entire point is letting the market decide fairness for itself. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. 438 (197 6).",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "8% (median) versus 26.4% (Emulex)); see Matrixx Initiatives, 563 U.S. 27. While this does not automa tically establish the trans- action was unfair, Section 14's entire point is letting the market decide fairness for itself. TSC Indus., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (197 6). Petitioners de- prived shareholders of key information that Goldman Sachs found sufficiently important to include in its own analysis. (Goldman Sachs does not often waste a board's time with irrelevant material.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "If policy-makers believe the tender context is ripe for new regulation, Con- gress is well-equipped to solve the problem. 29 decades. E.g., Blue Chip [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Congress has repeatedly revamped core features of securities liti-gation without once suggesting that these private rights should not exist. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "47 (emphasis omitted). 18 The Supreme Court is \"a cour t of review, not of first view.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Court wants to rethink half a century of settled prac- tice, it should at least wait for a vehicle where the question presented was not expressly abandoned below. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "If the Court wants to rethink half a century of settled prac- tice, it should at least wait for a vehicle where the question presented was not expressly abandoned below. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]472 U.S. 2. 30 \"exceptional\" circumstances, th is Court does not grant re- view on \"questions not pressed or passed upon below\").19 4. Finally, this case arises in an interlocutory posture, a sufficient reason alone for denying the petition.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The petition does not present an important question warranting further review in this case",
		"context": "30 \"exceptional\" circumstances, th is Court does not grant re- view on \"questions not pressed or passed upon below\").19 4. Finally, this case arises in an interlocutory posture, a sufficient reason alone for denying the petition. Hamil- ton-Brown Shoe [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[E]xcept in extraordinary cases, [a] writ [of certio- rari] is not issued until final decree\" ( Hamilton-Brown Shoe , 240 U.S. at 258), and there is nothing at all \"extraor- dinary\" here. This case reac hes the Court from a motion to dismiss.",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 U.S. 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach",
		"context": ". The Founding generation \"crafted the Fourth Amendment as a ' response to the reviled general war- rants and writs of assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activ- ity.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]379 U.S. 476116 U.S. 616. As the history of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Framers viewed civil damage actions —the very kind of suits cognizable under Bivens —as a criti- cal check on abuse of power by the government. The Framers' understanding of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was shaped by a host of foundational English cases decided in the 1760s, see Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach",
		"context": ". The Founding generation \"crafted the Fourth Amendment as a ' response to the reviled general war- rants and writs of assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activ- ity.'\" 138 S. Ct. 2206[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]116 U.S. 616. As the history of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Framers viewed civil damage actions —the very kind of suits cognizable under Bivens —as a criti- cal check on abuse of power by the government. The Framers' understanding of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was shaped by a host of foundational English cases decided in the 1760s, see Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How.",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach",
		"context": ". The Founding generation \"crafted the Fourth Amendment as a ' response to the reviled general war- rants and writs of assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activ- ity.'\" 138 S. Ct. 2206379 U.S. 476[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the history of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Framers viewed civil damage actions —the very kind of suits cognizable under Bivens —as a criti- cal check on abuse of power by the government. The Framers' understanding of the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was shaped by a host of foundational English cases decided in the 1760s, see Wilkes v. Wood , 19 How.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach",
		"context": "Anti-Federalists lamented that, without a Bill of Rights, \" any man may be seized, any property 17 may be taken, in the most arbitrary manner, without any evidence or reason. Every thing the most sacred may be searched and ransacked by the strong hand of power.\" 3 Elliot's Debates at 588; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They feared that \"[t]he officers of Congress may come on you now, fortified with all the terrors of paramount federal authority. \" 3 Elliot's Debates at 448.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Framers of the Fourth Amendment Viewed Civil Damage Suits Against Government Officers as a Critical Bulwark against Government Overreach",
		"context": "Mar- tin, supra , in 3 Farrand's Records at 221-22 (emphasis omitted) . To the Founding generation, \"the right to trial by jury\" was \"' the heart and lungs, the main- spring an d the center wheel ' of our liberties, without which 'the body must die; the watch must run down; the government must become arbitrary. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Elsewhere, too, Anti-Federalist s seeking to add search and seizure protections to the Co nstitution highlighted the need for civil damage remedies to p re- vent abuse of government power , reflecting the lessons of Wilkes . During debates in Pennsylvania in 1787, one Anti -Federalist writer argued that, i f \"a constable, having a warrant to search f or stolen goods, pulled down the clothes of a bed in which there was a woman , and searched under her shift .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
		"context": "This is inappropriate for three reasons. First, this Court will rarely halt proceedings in a case involv ing a facial First Amendment claim for the purpose of allowing state courts to weigh in because such a delay would itself chill freedom of speech. Sorrell , 564 U.S. at 563 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ); City of 482 U.S. 451. Second, even in non-First Amendment cases, certification is proper only when a statute is \"readily susceptible\" to a narrowing interpretation that might nullify the constitutional dispute . Here, there is no obvious, potentially narrowing construction of Section 211B.11(1) that could do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
		"context": "This is inappropriate for three reasons. First, this Court will rarely halt proceedings in a case involv ing a facial First Amendment claim for the purpose of allowing state courts to weigh in because such a delay would itself chill freedom of speech. Sorrell , 564 U.S. at 563 (citing 389 U.S. 241 ); City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second, even in non-First Amendment cases, certification is proper only when a statute is \"readily susceptible\" to a narrowing interpretation that might nullify the constitutional dispute . Here, there is no obvious, potentially narrowing construction of Section 211B.11(1) that could do so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
		"context": "Here, there is no obvious, potentially narrowing construction of Section 211B.11(1) that could do so. The Government 18 The Government's attempt to minimize the penalties arising from a violation of its political apparel ban fails to reduce its chilling effect, as \"even minor punishments can chill protected speech.\" Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 244 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). 23 certainly has not identified one. See 380 U.S. 528.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
		"context": "Free Speech Coalition , 535 U.S. at 244 (citing 430 U.S. 705 ). 23 certainly has not identified one. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Its only suggestion is that a state court might decide to strike out the portion of Section 211B.11(1) that extends the political apparel ban to absentee ballot stations. RB at 57 n.30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS NOT APPROPRIATE FOR STATE COURT CERTIFICATION",
		"context": "Ct. R. 15.2. The delay undercuts the Government's argument, id. ; see also , Mayor of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and in combination with precedent, confirms this case is appropriately resolved in this forum. 19 The Government seems to suggest that the state court might strike the absentee ballot provision on overbreadth grounds. RB at 57 n.30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "415 U.S. 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 ; 669 F.Supp.2d 477 ; 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,622 F.App'x 624 ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,5 N.Y.S.3d 483 ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.3d 234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., 586 F.3d 234 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 669 F.Supp.2d 477 ; 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,622 F.App'x 624 ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,5 N.Y.S.3d 483 ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 F.Supp.2d 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., 586 F.3d 234 ; 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,622 F.App'x 624 ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,5 N.Y.S.3d 483 ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "669 F.Supp.2d 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., 586 F.3d 234 ; 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 ; 669 F.Supp.2d 477 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,622 F.App'x 624 ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,5 N.Y.S.3d 483 ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., 586 F.3d 234 ; 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 ; 669 F.Supp.2d 477 ; 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,5 N.Y.S.3d 483 ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "622 F.App'x 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Standing as Antidote to \"Lawfare\"",
		"context": "Under this para digm, we are warned, a flurry of politically motivated and carefully timed lawsuits will emerge on the eve of every major election, forcing candidates to spend valuable time and resources in the courthouse rather than the campaign trail. See, generally , Brief of Former Attorneys General Edwin Meese III, Michael B. Muka sey, and William P. Barr ; Law Professors Steven Calabresi and Gary Lawson ; and Citizens United as Amici Curiae at 27 -30. If standing to challenge electoral qualifications were to only attach to those with a particularized stake in the outcome, ( e.g., bona fide candidates, political parties, or state actors), as was the rule prior to January 6, 2021, 20 concerns such as these are 20 E.g., 586 F.3d 234 ; 567 F.Supp.2d 1144 ; 669 F.Supp.2d 477 ; 117 Cal.Rptr.3d 207 ; 2013 WL 2294885, aff'd,622 F.App'x 624 ; 2012 WL 1205117, aff'd,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 17 ameliorated. The legitimacy concern is blunted because the legal challenge comes directly from the political adversary (be that an opponent, a party, or a state -level politician). Such suits would be more transparent, would be funded out of both sides' war chests, and would allow those who launch specious suits to be held politically accountable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 N.Y.S.3d 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "12-17) and the several States (Br. 6-11), but not HCC, contend that the First Amend-ment categorically does not limit an elective body's power to formally punish a member for his extra-legis- lative speech. The Court already rejected that proposi-tion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A. The First Amendment \"embraces the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "A. The First Amendment \"embraces the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully all matters of public concern without previous restraint or fear of subsequent punishment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It likewise protects \"the liberty of citizens to petition the government for the redress of their griev- ances.\" Van 497 F.3d 1151.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 88",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "310 U.S. 88. It likewise protects \"the liberty of citizens to petition the government for the redress of their griev- ances.\" Van [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Their exercise may not ordinarily be punished without satisfying strict scrutiny, for \"[w]hen public of-ficials feel free to wield the powers of their office as weapons against those who question their decisions, they do damage not merely to the citizen in their sights but also to the First Amendment liberties and the prom- ise of equal treatment essential to the continuity of our democratic enterprise.\" Van Deelen , 497 F.3d at 1155.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 F.3d 1151",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "Simply put, \"[t]he interest of the public in hearing all sides of a pub- lic issue is hardly advanced by extending more protec-tion to citizen-critics than to legislators.\" Ibid . Accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] legisla- tive discipline entered in response to lawmakers' speech violates the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court's cases have long recognized the constitutionally significant distinction between lawmakers' speech tak- ing place within the \"legislative sphere\" and speech tak- ing place outside of it. 408 U.S. 606.",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "Accord 370 U.S. 375 legisla- tive discipline entered in response to lawmakers' speech violates the First Amendment. On the contrary, the Court's cases have long recognized the constitutionally significant distinction between lawmakers' speech tak- ing place within the \"legislative sphere\" and speech tak- ing place outside of it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See generally id. at 623-625 (ex- ploring the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause).",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "at 623-625 (ex- ploring the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause). Speech within the legislative sphere encompasses statements made \"in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it,\" including in hearings, resolutions, reports, and records. Gravel , 408 U.S. at 617, 624 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). In that unique constitutional context, legislative privilege applies, and lawmakers' speech may \"not be questioned in any other Place.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "In that spe- cial setting, the power to censure elected officials for disruptive or disrespectful speech is unconstrained by the Free Speech Clause. 22 22 Analogous provisions to the Speech or Debate Clause and Disci- pline Clause (often using identica l language) prevailed among state constitutions at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's ratifica- tion. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Tex. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Free Speech Clause protects elected officials from formal punishments for their extra-legislative speech",
		"context": "Within the legislative sphere, members may be disciplined for both their conduct and their speech. In that unique context, \"because citizens may not sue legislators for their legislative acts, legisla-tive bodies are left to police their own members\" accord- ing to their own rules of internal decorum. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Beyond those familiar boundaries, however, the Free Speech Clause forbids an elective governmental body from formally punishing one of its members for engaging in protected political expression outside the legislative sphere. Bond , 385 U.S. at 132-133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The generic nature of an alleged misstatement is evidence that is highly relevant to the price-impact inquiry",
		"context": "Under that approa ch, a report of any kind of wrongdoing can be said to correct a nebulous statement of the type challenged here, even if the connection be-tween the two is tenuous. But the inflation-maintenance theory turns on the \"as- sumption\" that the \"lie's positive effect on the share price\" is equal to \"the additive inve rse of the truth's negative ef- fect.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that as- sumption makes sense only where the alleged misstate-ment closely aligns with the \"corrective disclosure.\" If there is a mismatch in the content of those two state- ments—if the alleged \"lie\" on the front end and the al-leged \"corrective disclosure\" on the back end do not have the same informational content—there is far less reason to infer from the subsequent price drop that the alleged misstatement actually maintained any existing price infla- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.3d 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The generic nature of an alleged misstatement is evidence that is highly relevant to the price-impact inquiry",
		"context": "The more general and aspirational the alleged misstatement, the less likely the alleged \"corrective disclosure\" in fact corrected that 29 statement. Indeed, that is why the inflation-maintenance theory at most makes sense where plaintiffs identify spe- cific misstatements—such as those about a discrete finan- cial or operational metric—that the alleged corrective dis-closure directly corrects. See, e.g., FindWhat Investor [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,568 U.S. 814. c. In sum, the nature of the challenged statement is highly relevant at both the \"front end\" and the \"back end\" in an inflation-maintenance case .",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 F.3d 1282",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The generic nature of an alleged misstatement is evidence that is highly relevant to the price-impact inquiry",
		"context": "It cannot seriously be challe nged, however, that an al- leged misstatement constitutes evidence in a securities case. Plaintiffs could never pr ove a securities claim with- out identifying—and introducing into evidence—the al- leged misstatement. The nature of the statement is also clearly relevant evidence at cl ass certification: plaintiffs invoking the Basic presumption may rely on a statement to establish that the \"misrepresentation[] w[as] publicly known,\" Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and a defendant may submit an \"event study\" in which one of the events is \"the specific misrepresentation asserted by the plaintiffs\" to prove that the alleged misstatement 30 did not affect the price, Halliburton II , 573 U.S. at 281. This Court should reject the co urt of appeals' \"artificial[]\" restriction on the kind of evid ence a court may consider in evaluating price impact at class certification. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "In Abood, the Court has quoted with approval Thomas Jefferson's statement that \"to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical. \"4Abood, 431 U.S. at 234 n.31 and it has recognized that the \"freedom of speech\" guaranteed by the First Amendment \"may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because \"First Amendment values are at serious risk if the government can compel a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that it favors,\" schemes that compel such subsidies \"must pass First Amendment scrutiny.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Id. at 2639. In earlier cases this Court recognized that the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment protects choice in \"the decision of both what to say and what not to say,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and for that reason the Court has repeatedly upheld the principle that people have the right to refrain from subsidizing messages with which they disagree. See, e.g., United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410; 430 U.S. 705. In West Virginia State Bd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 781",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "at 2639. In earlier cases this Court recognized that the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment protects choice in \"the decision of both what to say and what not to say,\" 487 U.S. 781, and for that reason the Court has repeatedly upheld the principle that people have the right to refrain from subsidizing messages with which they disagree. See, e.g., United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In West Virginia State Bd. of 319 U.S. 624, the Court established the principle that the First Amendment protection of the individual's mind, free from compulsion by the state is paramount.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "See, e.g., United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. at 410; 430 U.S. 705. In West Virginia State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court established the principle that the First Amendment protection of the individual's mind, free from compulsion by the state is paramount. Id. at 637, 642.5 In Wooley, the Court began \"with the proposition from Barnette that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to 5 The Barn ette Court concluded that, \"[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or pet ty, can pres cribe what shall be orthod ox in .",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "at 715.6 Scrutiny of compelled political speech or restrictions on speech about public-policy choices is especially rigorous, Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, supra at 340 (citation omitted), because speech concerning public affairs is \"the essence of self-government.\" Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct.1207,1215 (2011).Involuntary subsidization of speech must be justified by a \"compelling state interest that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms,\" Knox, 567 U.S. at 310, quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More specifically germane to the issue in this case, the Court has recognized the importance of workers' free speech rights and has held that it would violate the First Amendment for workers' earnings to be taken by the state and transferred to labor unions for use in promoting political 6 The Abood majo rity saw little conne ction betw een Wool ey and Barn ette and the compelled paym ent of agency fees. Abood cited Wool ey only once, in a footnote string citation for genera l First Ame ndm ent princip les, 431 U.S. at 231 n.28, and referred to Barn ette's\"fixed star\"language only to support its conclusion that unions could not compel contribut ions for \"ideological\" causes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "431 U.S. at 235. 13 messages with which the workers disagree. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Commc'ns Workers of 487 U.S. 735; Abood, 431 U.S. at 244. When a state compels its employees to pay union dues or agency fees that support political activities it is \"an infringement of [the workers'] constitutional rights.\" Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.7 Abood applied these principles to invalidate compelled subsidization of ideological or political union speech, but it created an anomalous exception that permits the compelled subsidization of political speech or association in the context of collective bargaining.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "431 U.S. at 235. 13 messages with which the workers disagree. See 500 U.S. 507; Commc'ns Workers of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Abood, 431 U.S. at 244. When a state compels its employees to pay union dues or agency fees that support political activities it is \"an infringement of [the workers'] constitutional rights.\" Abood, 431 U.S. at 234.7 Abood applied these principles to invalidate compelled subsidization of ideological or political union speech, but it created an anomalous exception that permits the compelled subsidization of political speech or association in the context of collective bargaining.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. COMPELLED PAYMENT OF MONIES TO A LABOR UNION WITH WHOSE POSITIONS ON PUBLIC POLICY AND WORKPLACE ISSUES THE EMPLOYEE DISAGREES VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT",
		"context": "Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2642. The second proposition is contradicted by this Court's opinions in Knox and Harris, and conflicts with this Court's other decisions holding that similar rationales do not justify compelling subsidization of even \"mundane commercial\" speech. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].8",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's sentence is substantively unreasonable",
		"context": "In both Rita and Gall, this Court did not only answer the questions presented regarding how appellate courts should review criminal sentences. It also addressed the merits of each defendant's substantive Section 3553(a) claim. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 552 U.S. 38 . The Government defends the reasonableness of petitioner's sentence, U.S. Br. 32-33, so this Court m ay elect to undertake substantive reasonableness review here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 338",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's sentence is substantively unreasonable",
		"context": "In both Rita and Gall, this Court did not only answer the questions presented regarding how appellate courts should review criminal sentences. It also addressed the merits of each defendant's substantive Section 3553(a) claim. See 551 U.S. 338 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Government defends the reasonableness of petitioner's sentence, U.S. Br. 32-33, so this Court m ay elect to undertake substantive reasonableness review here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's sentence is substantively unreasonable",
		"context": "3 -4. That extra term wa s \"greater than necessary\" to effectuate the purposes of Section 3553(a). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .2 2 At the very least, we agree with the Government that the Court should remand to allow the court of appeals to address the substantive reasonableness of petitioner's sentence in the first instance. U.S. Br. 32 -33.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nothing Has Changed Since CONTU Addressed Many of the Issues Before This Court",
		"context": "Br. 24 (quoting Sega Enters. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as amended (Jan. 6, 1993)); see Ralph Oman, Computer Software As Copyrightable Subject Matter: Oracle v. Google, Legislative Intent, and the Scope of Rights in Digital Works, 31 Harv. J.L. & Tech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "977 F.2d 1510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Nothing Has Changed Since CONTU Addressed Many of the Issues Before This Court",
		"context": "29 ‒30. The Cop- yright Act provides protection from the time of conception, and as will be described in more detail below, a copyrighted work does not lose its protection merely because it is popular. 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). \"This e x- ception would mean that a 'program' consisting of a very few obvious steps could not be a subject of cop y- right.\" Report, supra, at 20.",
		"citation_value_orig": "100 U.S. 82",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Antebellum Decisions of This Court and State Supreme Courts.",
		"context": "Id. at 413. With the practices of King's Bench in mind, the Court grappled with mandamus again in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1795) , where the U.S. Attorney General sought mandamus to order a New York federal judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of a French naval commander. A unanimous Court denied the petition and held that the judge \"was acting in a judicial capacity \" in refusing to issue the warrant , and that the Court had \"no power to compel a Judge to decide according to the dictates of any judgment, but his own.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "3 U.S. 42",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Antebellum Decisions of This Court and State Supreme Courts.",
		"context": "Marbury left no doub t that federal courts ha ve power to issue mandamus to compel government officials to follow ministerial duties. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court quoted the above excerpts from Barker and Blackstone , noting that counsel cited \"many other\" authorities at argument that \"show how far the practice has conformed to the general doctrines that have just been quoted .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Court described cases in which the action complained of by the executive was within the President's discretion, which \"can never be examinable by the courts.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "5 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Antebellum Decisions of This Court and State Supreme Courts.",
		"context": "Id. at 137. The same distinction between discretionary and ministerial duties mattered in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , in which the Court 18 affirmed mandamus against the P ostmaster General to pay amounts due to contractors for the Postal Service as set out by Congress. T he Postmaster General argued that the action was \"a proceeding against him to enforce the performance of an official duty\" for which mandamus could not lie. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "37 U.S. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Antebellum Decisions of This Court and State Supreme Courts.",
		"context": "39 In colonial times, the Provincia l Court of Maryland issued mandamus for a clerk \"to deliver the records\" of the court so a successor could take office. 1 H. & McH. 27. 20 • North Carolina: 6 N.C. 195 ;40 • Pennsylvania : [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "4 U.S. 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Exercising jurisdiction over state-court clerks who effectuate the State's scheme is not only proper but imperative",
		"context": "Enjoining clerks, like enjoining executive officials, does not interfere with any adjudicatory role. In any event, there is no indication this suit has forced Clarkston into a role with which she disagrees. Clarkston, after all, was hardly \"forc ed\" to file a conditional cross -petition for certiorari arguing that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey , 505 U.S 833 (1992), should be overruled. See generally Conditional Cross -Pet., Clarkston v. Whole Woman's Health , No. 21 -587 (U.S. filed Oct. 21, 2021).",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Exercising jurisdiction over state-court clerks who effectuate the State's scheme is not only proper but imperative",
		"context": "There is thus no question that the parties to this proceeding are sufficiently adverse to provide the Court with the requisite sharp presentation of the issues, including with respect to Petiti oners' claims against the clerks. Pet'rs' Br. 44 –45; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Citations to the appendix are to the appendix to the petition for certiorari before judgment. 9",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 919",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reaffirm that Buckley v. Valeo's aberrant use of the de facto officer doctrine (or something like it) has been limited to its facts",
		"context": ". In Buckley v. Valeo , this Court took what was arguably a detour from the traditional approach described above. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, the Court agreed that the creati on of the Federal Elections Commission violat ed the Appointments Clause, but nonetheless concluded that \"[ t]he past acts of the Commission [should be] accorded de facto validity .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court should reaffirm that Buckley v. Valeo's aberrant use of the de facto officer doctrine (or something like it) has been limited to its facts",
		"context": "3d 1206, 1225 (D. Minn. 2018) (same), appeal filed, No. 18 -2506 (8th Cir. July 16, 2018) ; Marine Forests Soc' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To resolve the confusion , this Court should settle the issue once and for all. It should specify in no uncertain terms that Buckley 's use of \"de facto validity \" does not extend to factually dissimilar cases or otherwise excuse noncompliance with the structural protections of the Appointments Clause.",
		"citation_value_orig": "113 P.3d 1062",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Plaintiffs Lack Standing To Press Their Partisan Gerrymandering Claims",
		"context": "The first problem with plaint iffs' partisan gerrymandering claims is that they lack standing to bring them. Indeed, plaintiffs' lack of standing reflects their lack of any justiciable constitutional injury, as interests that neither translate to real- world pocketbook- type injuries nor are protected by clear constitutional prohibitions are too abstract to constitute the requisite \"concrete and particularized\" injury in fact. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . For example, a plaintiff claiming an injury in the denial of the benefits of a republican form of government, as opposed to a concrete dilution of his vote, has a standing problem as well as a justiciability problem. And unlike plaintiffs bringing one-person- one-vote or racial gerrymandering claims, plaintiffs cannot point to a concrete dilution of their vote or a particularized injury from being sorted on the basis of their race.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The '34 Act Did Not Alter The Meaning Or Scope Of The '33 Act's Civil Liability Provisions",
		"context": "But absent an express or implied repeal, the '34 Act could not change the meaning of the provision enacted a year earlier. See, e.g. , New Prime [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 426 U.S. 148. Petitioners respond that the Court should overlook chronology in the name of construing the two statutes \"harmoniously.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The '34 Act Did Not Alter The Meaning Or Scope Of The '33 Act's Civil Liability Provisions",
		"context": "But absent an express or implied repeal, the '34 Act could not change the meaning of the provision enacted a year earlier. See, e.g. , New Prime 139 S. Ct. 532; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners respond that the Court should overlook chronology in the name of construing the two statutes \"harmoniously.\" Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The '34 Act Did Not Alter The Meaning Or Scope Of The '33 Act's Civil Liability Provisions",
		"context": "30 (citation omitted). But this Court has never pursued harmony at the cost of giving either statute less than the full scope Congress intended at the time of enactment. In Huddleston , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court rejected the inverse of petitioners' argument – i.e. , that Section 10(b) should be construed narrowly to avoid overlap with Section 11. The Court explained that \"is hardly a novel proposition that the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act 'prohibit some of the same conduct'\" and therefore provide overlapping remedies.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Race-consciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fifteenth Amendment",
		"context": "And they understood that the persis- tence of racially polarized voting would \"provide an in- centive for intentional discrimination in the regulation of elections.\" N.C. St. Conf. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this respect, race-con- sciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fif- teenth Amendment. This broad enforcement power plainly allows Con- gress to take race and the continuing persistence of ra- cially polarized voting into account to ensure that citi- zens of color, like their white counterparts, can partic- ipate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Race-consciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fifteenth Amendment",
		"context": "In this respect, race-con- sciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fif- teenth Amendment. This broad enforcement power plainly allows Con- gress to take race and the continuing persistence of ra- cially polarized voting into account to ensure that citi- zens of color, like their white counterparts, can partic- ipate in the political process and elect representatives of their choice. Congress need not turn a blind eye to the fact that \"racial discrimination and racially polar- ized voting are not ancient history,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in the text and history of the Fifteenth Amendment supports Alabama's crabbed view of the express power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal political opportunity. Indeed, color-blindness arguments—of the sort Alabama makes here—were invoked to oppose the Fifteenth Amendment and prevent congressional efforts to en- force it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Race-consciousness is baked into the text and history of the Fifteenth Amendment",
		"context": "Alabama's claim that, faced with overwhelming proof of packing and cracking, a federal court cannot require the state to revise its map to create a second district in which Black voters can elect representatives of their choice would license the kind of gerrymandering that state mapmakers have long employed to dilute Black voting strength and turn the Fifteenth Amendment on its head. Prohibitions on discriminatory results—like those contained in the Voting Rights Act—help enforce the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of equality by en- suring that Black citizens, like their white counter- parts, can participate in the political process as equals and elect representatives of their choice. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Striking down dilutive practices that result in a denial of equal political opportunity raises no constitutional concern. 25",
		"citation_value_orig": "731 F.2d 1546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Park Service's Attempt To Regulate Non-Federal Waters Within CSU Boundaries Cannot Be Alternatively Justified by 54 U.S.C. section 100751(b)",
		"context": "After all, if all land and waters within CSU boundaries fall under federal jurisdiction merely because they \"relat[e] to\" adjacent public lands, then Congress's command that non-federal land must be treated differ-ently from federal land wo uld mean nothing at all. Such an interpretation would contravene \"one of the most basic interpretive canons\": \"[a] statute should be construed so that effect is gi ven to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 37",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT",
		"context": "A decision that draws its legal standard from Bob Richards would, at minimum, need to be vacated and reconsidered if Bob Richards were overturned. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Bob Richards did not simply provide the framework for the Tenth Circuit's decision; it also 10 governed the substance of its analysis. \"[A]s di- rected\" by Bob Richards , the panel analyzed \"the written terms of the agreement\" to determine wheth- er the TAA \"unambiguously\" departed from the Bob Richards rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1823",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THIS CASE IS AN EXCELLENT VEHICLE TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUIT SPLIT",
		"context": "11, but that it did not think it was required to consider the applica- ble body of Colorado law at all. Cf. O'Melveny & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Unsurprisingly, application of the wrong legal framework and the wrong mode of analysis led the Tenth Circuit to the wrong result. When the Bank- ruptcy Court applied Colorado trust and agency law, it determined that the tax refund belonged to UWBI.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 79",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Considerable Discretion When It Denied Bucklew's Discovery Request",
		"context": "Federal appellate courts \"review a district court's discovery rulings narrowly and with great deference and will reverse only for a 'gross abuse of discretion resulting in fundamental unfairness.'\" J.A. 870 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). \"That standard of review reflects the district court's superior familiarity with, and understanding of, the dispute; and it comports with the way appellate courts review related matters of case management, discovery, and trial practice .\" 134 S. Ct. 2361 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "622 F.3d 896",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Considerable Discretion When It Denied Bucklew's Discovery Request",
		"context": "870 (quoting 622 F.3d 896 ). \"That standard of review reflects the district court's superior familiarity with, and understanding of, the dispute; and it comports with the way appellate courts review related matters of case management, discovery, and trial practice .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Discovery rulings should be reversed only \"under very unusual circumstances .\" Wright & Miller, 8 FED.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The statutory phrase \"by law\" includes state courts.",
		"context": "This Court interpreted 2 U.S.C. § 2c in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court held : \"The clause 'there shall be established by law a number of districts equal to the number of Representatives to which such State is so entitled' could, to be sure, be so interpreted that the phrase 'by law' refers only to legislative action. Its more common meaning, however, encomp asses judicial decisions as well.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone",
		"context": "§ 1 (emphasis added). The object of that sentence is the contract itself, not the de facto re- lationship between the parties. See Prima Paint C [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Had Congress meant for the S ection 1 exemption to turn on the nature of par- ties' interactions , rather than the legal relationship described in their contract, it would have used far dif- ferent language —just as it did in the very next section of the FAA. Unlike Section 1, Section 2 pr ovides that \"[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving com- merce to settle by arbitration a controversy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone",
		"context": "that the transaction (that the contract 'evidences') must turn out, in fact , to have involved interstate commerce.\" 513 U.S. at 277 (emphasis in original). In reaching this decision , the Court relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which concluded that a contract did not \"evidence 'a transaction involv- ing commerce' within the meaning of § 2 of the Act\" 31 because \"[t]here [wa]s no showing that petitioner while performing his duties under the employment contract was working 'in' commerce, was producing goods for commerce, or was engaging in activity that affected commerce.\" Id. at 200 –01 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "350 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone",
		"context": "at 200 –01 (emphasis added). Reading the term \"contracts of employment\" in Section 1 to require the same inquiry into the eco- nomic realities of the parties' relationship , as the dis- trict court did below, would ignore this important tex- tual distinction, rendering the \"evidencing a transac- tion\" language in Section 2 —critical to this Court's holdings in Bernhardt and Allied -Bruce —mere s ur- plusage . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the employment status of the worker is the merits question at issue; o nce it is determined whether the worker is an employee or independent contractor, there is often nothing left to adjudicate. Thus , \"requiring the parties to litigate the underlying substance of [a putative employee's] claim [s]\" as part of the Section 1 inquiry \"risks depriving [the defend- ant] of the benefits of its contract\" and destroying the arbitration agreement. In re Swift , 830 F.3d at 920 (Ikuta, J., dissenting).",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone",
		"context": "In fact, the same worker may be compelled to arbitrate at one point in time, but allowed to proceed in court at another point in time, if his relationship with the putative employer is found to have evolved in the interim . Third, an interpretation of Section 1 that requires a factfinder to evaluate the parties' underlying rela- tionship would create countless complexities every time a putative employer moves to compel arbitration. \"There is no question that the common -law agency test makes for difficult line drawing,\" FedEx Home De- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and this Court has recognized that \"[t]here are innu- merable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular indi- vidual is an employee or an independent contractor.\" 390 U.S. 254. Requiring a court or arbitrator to undertake this analysis simply to determine whether a dispute should be compelled to arbitration would create \"con- siderable complexity and uncertainty\" that \"would call into doubt the efficacy of alternative dispute reso- lution procedures\" and \"undermin[e] the FAA's proar- bitation purposes [by] 'breeding litigation from a stat- ute that seeks to avoid it.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 F.3d 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. \"Contracts of Employment\" Must Be Identified By The Terms Of The Contract Alone",
		"context": "Third, an interpretation of Section 1 that requires a factfinder to evaluate the parties' underlying rela- tionship would create countless complexities every time a putative employer moves to compel arbitration. \"There is no question that the common -law agency test makes for difficult line drawing,\" FedEx Home De- 563 F.3d 492, and this Court has recognized that \"[t]here are innu- merable situations which arise in the common law where it is difficult to say whether a particular indi- vidual is an employee or an independent contractor.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Requiring a court or arbitrator to undertake this analysis simply to determine whether a dispute should be compelled to arbitration would create \"con- siderable complexity and uncertainty\" that \"would call into doubt the efficacy of alternative dispute reso- lution procedures\" and \"undermin[e] the FAA's proar- bitation purposes [by] 'breeding litigation from a stat- ute that seeks to avoid it.'\" Circuit City , 532 U.S. at 123 (quoting Allied -Bruce , 513 U.S. a t 275 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "390 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
		"context": "at 15- 35, Republic of Sudan v. Opati , No. 17 -1406 (U.S.). Although this Court has held that it will assess its own jurisdiction when \"fairly in doubt,\" Ashcrof [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is no \"doubt\" here. As every other court to address them and the United States ha ve each concluded, these arguments lack merit. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
		"context": "Sudan's argument regarding the standard for causation also lacks merit. Sudan argues (at 27- 28) that the D.C. Circuit ignored Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, the D.C. Cir- cuit expressly applied that decision . Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
		"context": "17 -1406. Nothing in Section 1605A \"clearly state[s]\" that the 22 statute of limitations is jurisdictional. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Sudan does not dispute that non -jurisdictional limitations provisions may be forfeited. 547 U.S. 198; see also Owens Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 709. And Sudan does not dispute that non -jurisdictional limitations provisions may be forfeited. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Owens Br. in Opp. at 21-25, Opati , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SUDAN'S \"THRESHOLD\" ARGUMENTS ARE NOT BEFORE THE COURT AND LACK MERIT",
		"context": "App. 107a. Moreover , Section 1605A(c) says nothing about preempting state -law claims, and this Court has long counseled against inferring preemption from statutory silenc e. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. H ere, the class of plaintiffs eligible 23 to take advantage of the exception to immunity is broader than that eligible to pursue a federal cause of action. Compare 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "To maintain a damages claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest",
		"context": ". \"The First Amendment prohibits government officials from retaliating against a person for havingexercised the right to free speech.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Yet identifying an alleged constitutional violation is \"onlythe threshold inquiry\" in a damages action under 42U.S.C. § 1983, which \"creates a 'species of tortliability' \" for violation of federal rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "To maintain a damages claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest",
		"context": "Yet identifying an alleged constitutional violation is \"onlythe threshold inquiry\" in a damages action under 42U.S.C. § 1983, which \"creates a 'species of tortliability' \" for violation of federal rights. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court \"must still determine the elements of, and rulesassociated with an action seeking damages\" for thealleged violation. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 911",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "To maintain a damages claim for retaliatory arrest in violation of the First Amendment, a plaintiff must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest",
		"context": "The Court \"must still determine the elements of, and rulesassociated with an action seeking damages\" for thealleged violation. Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). To do so, the Court looks to both itsown precedent, Lozman , 138 S. Ct. at 1952, and the common law, \"attend[ing] to th e values and purposes of the constitutional right at issue,\" Manuel , 137. S. Ct. at 921.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship",
		"context": "The majority contends, ante, at 5, that \"there are ways of minimizing the impact of abusive appeals.\" Yes, but the sanctions suggested apply to the frivolous, not to the farfetched ; and as the majority's opinion concludes, such an attenuated claim of equitable estoppel as petitioners raise here falls well short of the sanctionable. Arthur Andersen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 5 5 The Carlisle majority appears to have assumed, in passing, that a Section 16 appeal could divest a district court of jurisdic - tion over an underlying claim. Carlisle , 556 U.S. at 629 (\"Appel - late courts can streamline the disposition of meritless claims and even authorize the district court's retention of jurisdiction when an appeal is certified as frivolous.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship",
		"context": "But the question of a district court's merits jurisdic tion pending a Section 16 appeal was not actually considered or decided in Carlisle . This passing assumption is therefore of no precedential value here. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor 40 In 1997, the Seventh Circ uit admitted that inter - locutory gamesmanship was a \"serious concern,\" but countered that such concerns were lessened by courts' abilities to certify arbitrability appeals as \"frivolous.\" Bradford-Scott, Inc. , 128 F.3d at 506 -07. In practice, however, following this Cour t's arbitrability decisions in recent years, there is no such thing as a \"frivolous\" arbitrability appeal filed by a represented party.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 157",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship",
		"context": "Bradford-Scott, Inc. , 128 F.3d at 506 -07. In practice, however, following this Cour t's arbitrability decisions in recent years, there is no such thing as a \"frivolous\" arbitrability appeal filed by a represented party. See generally, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] DIRECTV, 577 U.S. 47 ; Henry Schein, 139 S. Ct. 524. That is why Coinbase, a quarter - century after Section 16's enactment, does not cite one case in which any court has labeled a Section 16 appeal \"frivolous.\" See generally Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship",
		"context": "Bradford-Scott, Inc. , 128 F.3d at 506 -07. In practice, however, following this Cour t's arbitrability decisions in recent years, there is no such thing as a \"frivolous\" arbitrability appeal filed by a represented party. See generally, e.g., 563 U.S. 333 DIRECTV, 577 U.S. 47 ; Henry Schein, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is why Coinbase, a quarter - century after Section 16's enactment, does not cite one case in which any court has labeled a Section 16 appeal \"frivolous.\" See generally Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 524",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The \"Frivolous\" Exception Presents No Barrier Against Extensive, Expensive Appellate Gamesmanship",
		"context": "Br. Under the above arbitrability precedents and others, if any lawyer can fathom any arbitrability argument in any case, then no other lawyer or judge in the case will be able to label that argument \"friv - olous\" under the Court's recent precedents. Carlisle , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The frivolous exception in six Circuits is no exception at all. Congress properly addressed the \"serious con - cern\" of attracting meri tless appeals in 1988, by refraining from imposing automatic stays pending Section 16 appeals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Admitting the modified version of Stillwell's statement did not violate petitioner's confrontation right",
		"context": "RIGHT This Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], created a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that jurors are presumed to fol- low instructions to consider evidence only for particu- lar purposes . Together with 481 U.S. 200, and 523 U.S. 185, Bruton singles out a particular type of state- ment deemed so inflammatory that a jury should not see it even with a limiting instruction : namely, a co - defendant's out -of-court confession that facial ly impli- cates the defendant by directly naming him, using an equivalent ly personalized descriptor, or inc luding an explicit and obvious redaction . The modified statement here did none of those things.",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 123",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Admitting the modified version of Stillwell's statement did not violate petitioner's confrontation right",
		"context": "RIGHT This Court's decision in 391 U.S. 123, created a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that jurors are presumed to fol- low instructions to consider evidence only for particu- lar purposes . Together with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 523 U.S. 185, Bruton singles out a particular type of state- ment deemed so inflammatory that a jury should not see it even with a limiting instruction : namely, a co - defendant's out -of-court confession that facial ly impli- cates the defendant by directly naming him, using an equivalent ly personalized descriptor, or inc luding an explicit and obvious redaction . The modified statement here did none of those things. It instead included neutral nouns and pro- nouns of the sort that were approved in Gray and cor- respond to normal speech .",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "Admitting the modified version of Stillwell's statement did not violate petitioner's confrontation right",
		"context": "RIGHT This Court's decision in 391 U.S. 123, created a narrow exception to the fundamental principle that jurors are presumed to fol- low instructions to consider evidence only for particu- lar purposes . Together with 481 U.S. 200, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Bruton singles out a particular type of state- ment deemed so inflammatory that a jury should not see it even with a limiting instruction : namely, a co - defendant's out -of-court confession that facial ly impli- cates the defendant by directly naming him, using an equivalent ly personalized descriptor, or inc luding an explicit and obvious redaction . The modified statement here did none of those things. It instead included neutral nouns and pro- nouns of the sort that were approved in Gray and cor- respond to normal speech .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2",
		"context": "This Court looks to state law to determine who has standing to represent Arizona and its officials in federal court. See, e.g. , Va. House of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And under clearly established Arizona law, Brnovich Petitioners have no authority to appeal the decision on the OOP Policy. In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General is prohibited from appealing on behalf of another state official who does not wish to appeal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1945",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2",
		"context": "And under clearly established Arizona law, Brnovich Petitioners have no authority to appeal the decision on the OOP Policy. In fact, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that the Attorney General is prohibited from appealing on behalf of another state official who does not wish to appeal. In Santa Rita Mining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Arizona Supreme Court held that the Attorney General could not appeal a tax suit when the Director of Property Valuation did not wish to appeal. The court acknowledged that Arizona law \"contemplates that the Attorney General act as the legal representative of the people; so that, whenever the State is a party to a law[s]uit, it is the Attorney General who must act as its lawyer.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 P.2d 360",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2",
		"context": "ARP Petitioners also lack standing. They do not represent the State in any capacity. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor do they have any role in formulating or enforcing the OOP Policy. See 570 U.S. 693.",
		"citation_value_orig": "484 U.S. 72",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2",
		"context": "See 484 U.S. 72. Nor do they have any role in formulating or enforcing the OOP Policy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Like the Hollingsworth petitioners, ARP Petitioners have no particularized stake in the appeal because the decision below \"ha[s] not ordered them to do or refrain from doing anything.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. No Petitioner Has Standing to Appeal the Decision on the OOP Policy, Which the Court Below Correctly Held Violates Section 2",
		"context": "at 705. And like the Wittman petitioners, ARP Petitioners have failed to present evidence that they have suffered an injury-in-fact from the ruling. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ARP Petitioners are quintessential \"concerned bystanders,\" whose interest in this litigation is indistinguishable from the general interest of every citizen in Arizona. See Hollingsworth , 570 U.S. at 707.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1732",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy",
		"context": "Gov't Co de §§ 3517, 3519.5(c). The union is required to approach collective bargaining with a \"genuine de- sire to reach agreement.\" San Diego Teachers [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1979) . It cannot come to the negotiating table with a \"'take -it-or-leave-it' at- titude.\" Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 Cal. 3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy",
		"context": "In contract negotiations , the principal audience for the bargaining representative 's speech is the management of a public employer, in privat e sessions . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When consideration of a collective bar- gaining agree ment reaches a public forum —namely, when the Legislature considers whether to approve a tentative contract reached in private negotiation ses- sions, as California law requires , see Cal. Gov't Code § 3517.5— all employees and members of the public are free to express their views , whether in support of or in opposition to the proposed employment terms.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy",
		"context": "Unlike a state requirement that school children salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance, payment of an agency fee does not in- volve an \"affirmation of a belief [or] attitude of mind\" or compel any \"individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of … political ideas.\" W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Agency for Int'l 133 S. Ct. 2321 . Indeed, the bargaining representative's positions cannot reasonably be perceived as those of any indi- vidual employee. As discussed ab ove, in bargaining it is understood that union representatives are express- ing a set of collective positions on behalf of the em- ployee group —not the personal views of any individual employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy",
		"context": "Unlike a state requirement that school children salute the flag or recite the Pledge of Allegiance, payment of an agency fee does not in- volve an \"affirmation of a belief [or] attitude of mind\" or compel any \"individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance of … political ideas.\" W. Va. State Bd. of 319 U.S. 624; see also Agency for Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Indeed, the bargaining representative's positions cannot reasonably be perceived as those of any indi- vidual employee. As discussed ab ove, in bargaining it is understood that union representatives are express- ing a set of collective positions on behalf of the em- ployee group —not the personal views of any individual employee.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Support Specialized Activities That Are Not Analogous to General Lobbying or Political Advocacy",
		"context": "As discussed ab ove, in bargaining it is understood that union representatives are express- ing a set of collective positions on behalf of the em- ployee group —not the personal views of any individual employee. The employer considers the un- ion's statements as the bargaining unit's \"official col- lective position,\" recognizing that \"not every [employee] agrees with the official [union] view on every policy question.\" Knight , 465 U.S. at 276 (dis- cussing meet -and-confer sessions); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Agency fees fund a highly specialized mechanism that enables public employers to address and resolve real-world manage ment needs. They are wholly un- like government efforts to compel dissenting individu- als to endorse an unwanted ideological message or to 20 pay for the political activities or expression of others in a public forum .",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Petitioner's suit to restrain the taxes that enforce the reporting and recordkeeping requirements is barred regardless of the suit's potential effect on the assessment and collection of other taxes",
		"context": "The whole point (and predictable effect) of Con- gress's decision to \" deem [ ]\" specified \"penalties \" to be \" 'taxes ' \" (26 U. S.C. 6671(a)) is to ensure that the Code provisions governing tax assessment and collection will apply to those penalties. \"That use of the word ['tax'] is not literal —any more than when Congress says some- thing like 'a State \"includes\" Puerto Rico and the Dis- trict of Columbia .' \" Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Instead, that provision \"tells readers that a different \" thing —i.e., Subchapter 68B penalties —\"should receive the same treatment\" as taxes and thus be subject to the rest of the Code's provisions governing taxes. Ibid .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "Thus, w hether petitioner 's statements were \"true threats \" has been the dispositive issue at every stage of the case . 2. Colorado next contends that this case is a poor vehicle because it does not implicate Justice Sotomayor 's concerns in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Sotomayor's concern in Perez was that a speaker could be convicted for an ostensibly serious statement nevertheless intended as a joke. Colorado's \"context -driven\" test presents the very same problem.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 853",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Case Is An Excellent Vehicle",
		"context": "Justice Sotomayor's concern in Perez was that a speaker could be convicted for an ostensibly serious statement nevertheless intended as a joke. Colorado's \"context -driven\" test presents the very same problem. Colorado also argues that its true threats test addresses Justice Thomas's concerns in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], because \"Colorado law is distinguishable from the standards at issue 7 in\" that case. Opp. 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1956",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Barring CIC's suit undermines the APA without furthering any goal of the Anti-Injunction Act",
		"context": "Preenforcement review often repre - sents the only realistic way to obtain judicial review of unlawful agency action. Injured parti es cannot be expected to invite the agency to \"'drop the hammer' in order to have their day in court.\" U.S. Army Corps of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This observation applies with equal force to the IRS. Because \"[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity,\" 527 U.S. 150 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Barring CIC's suit undermines the APA without furthering any goal of the Anti-Injunction Act",
		"context": "U.S. Army Corps of 136 S. Ct. 1807 . This observation applies with equal force to the IRS. Because \"[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity to a field full of variation and diversity,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It has refused \"to carve out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 150",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Barring CIC's suit undermines the APA without furthering any goal of the Anti-Injunction Act",
		"context": "62a (Thapar, J., dissental). It administers some of Congress's most far-reaching laws. E.g., Advocate Health Care [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], bit.ly/2YyY9aP. In doing so, it re- solved everything from religious accommoda tions to wellness programs. See K. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 Duke L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Barring CIC's suit undermines the APA without furthering any goal of the Anti-Injunction Act",
		"context": "But applying it here tells taxpayers the opposite—to become \"a lawbreaker.\" Fla. Bankers, 799 F.3d at 1084 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat'l Rest. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is difficult to \"imagine that the Congress intended such an anomalous result in a system which depends for its very existence on the principle of voluntary compli - ance.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 F. Supp. 993",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACE Rule's Statutory Interpretation Improperly Constrained the States' Compliance Choices.",
		"context": "§ 7416 (emphases added) . In other words, so lon g as States adopt plans under Section 7411(d) that achieve emission reductions equal to or greater than the minimum required by the emission guidelines issued by EPA under Section 7411(a)(1), EPA has no lawful basis to interfere with the manner in which state plans regulate sources within their borders. See Union Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], States need not follow EPA's choice of the best system if they may achieve equal or greater emission reductions through some other means. EPA's \"need to rewrite clear provisions of the statute should have alerted EPA that it had taken a wrong interpretive turn.\" Utility Air Reg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 246",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACE Rule's Statutory Interpretation Improperly Constrained the States' Compliance Choices.",
		"context": "But nothing in the decision below disturbed Section 7411's framework for regu - lating existing sources, which borrows the familiar cooperative -federalism regime governing national ambi - ent air quality standards under Section 7410. As this Court has long recognized, th is structure \"plainly charge[s]\" EPA with the authority to issue binding general guidelines, but then leaves to the States \"the process of determining and enforcing the specific, source -by-source emission limitations which are necessary if the [federal] standards [EPA] has set are to be met. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The court of appeals' decision preserves these roles by upholding EPA 's authority to determine the best system of emission reduction while rejecting the ACE Rule's improper constraints on States' discretion to choose complia nce measures that achieve those federal guidelines. (J.A.98-100.)",
		"citation_value_orig": "421 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ACE Rule's Statutory Interpretation Improperly Constrained the States' Compliance Choices.",
		"context": "But that effect is the intended result of the cooperative- federalism scheme . As t his Court has previously explained , in describing the analogous process for national ambient air quality standards, \"the statute speaks without reservation\" about the substantive requirements that a State must address , and EPA has a \"statutory duty\" to ensure that States comply with these minimum requirements. EME Homer City , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] at 508- 09. Indeed, Section 7411 expressly authorizes EPA to review state plans to ensure that they are \"satisfactory,\" 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(2)(A), confirming that EPA has the authority to ensure that minimum federal requirements are satisfied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 489",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": ". When this Court issues a fractured decision, lower courts must apply the analysis proscribed by [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"When a fragmented Court decides a case and no singlerationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed asthat position taken by th ose Members who concurred in the judgements on the narrowest grounds.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 188",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "For example, often lower courts struggle to identify the\"narrowest\" opinion to cite as controlling. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This can lead toconfusion as to what to do when there are multipleopinions in a deeply fractured Court that providemultiple \"narrow\" opinions that can be combined withothers to total a majority. Even Justices of this Court can disagree on which opinion is controlling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "Even Justices of this Court can disagree on which opinion is controlling. See, e.g. , City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 As another example, the Court has never explicitly determined for a rule binding upon lower courts under Marks how much precedential weight this Court should subsequently accord that ca se for purposes of stare decisis. The Court's consideration of Justice Powell'sconcurring opinion from Regents of Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 746",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "7 As another example, the Court has never explicitly determined for a rule binding upon lower courts under Marks how much precedential weight this Court should subsequently accord that ca se for purposes of stare decisis. The Court's consideration of Justice Powell'sconcurring opinion from Regents of Univ. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in 539 U.S. 306, and 539 U.S. 244, or the Court's re cent consideration in Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876, are examples of where suchdevelopment would be helpful. While the Court'sapparent methodology seems to suggest that the Courtis free to work its will in subsequent cases when therule of decision for the lower courts rested upon Marks rather than a majority opinion, lower courts—mostnotably here, the Indiana Supreme Court—wouldbenefit from this Court's expounding further uponwhen and how to follow Marks. Considering the intersection of Marks and stare decisis is hardly an academic conversation; it is centralto this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 265",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "7 As another example, the Court has never explicitly determined for a rule binding upon lower courts under Marks how much precedential weight this Court should subsequently accord that ca se for purposes of stare decisis. The Court's consideration of Justice Powell'sconcurring opinion from Regents of Univ. of 438 U.S. 265, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 539 U.S. 244, or the Court's re cent consideration in Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876, are examples of where suchdevelopment would be helpful. While the Court'sapparent methodology seems to suggest that the Courtis free to work its will in subsequent cases when therule of decision for the lower courts rested upon Marks rather than a majority opinion, lower courts—mostnotably here, the Indiana Supreme Court—wouldbenefit from this Court's expounding further uponwhen and how to follow Marks. Considering the intersection of Marks and stare decisis is hardly an academic conversation; it is centralto this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "7 As another example, the Court has never explicitly determined for a rule binding upon lower courts under Marks how much precedential weight this Court should subsequently accord that ca se for purposes of stare decisis. The Court's consideration of Justice Powell'sconcurring opinion from Regents of Univ. of 438 U.S. 265, in 539 U.S. 306, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], or the Court's re cent consideration in Minnesota Voters 138 S. Ct. 1876, are examples of where suchdevelopment would be helpful. While the Court'sapparent methodology seems to suggest that the Courtis free to work its will in subsequent cases when therule of decision for the lower courts rested upon Marks rather than a majority opinion, lower courts—mostnotably here, the Indiana Supreme Court—wouldbenefit from this Court's expounding further uponwhen and how to follow Marks. Considering the intersection of Marks and stare decisis is hardly an academic conversation; it is centralto this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "7 As another example, the Court has never explicitly determined for a rule binding upon lower courts under Marks how much precedential weight this Court should subsequently accord that ca se for purposes of stare decisis. The Court's consideration of Justice Powell'sconcurring opinion from Regents of Univ. of 438 U.S. 265, in 539 U.S. 306, and 539 U.S. 244, or the Court's re cent consideration in Minnesota Voters [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], are examples of where suchdevelopment would be helpful. While the Court'sapparent methodology seems to suggest that the Courtis free to work its will in subsequent cases when therule of decision for the lower courts rested upon Marks rather than a majority opinion, lower courts—mostnotably here, the Indiana Supreme Court—wouldbenefit from this Court's expounding further uponwhen and how to follow Marks. Considering the intersection of Marks and stare decisis is hardly an academic conversation; it is centralto this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1876",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Indiana Court should have performed a Marks analysis",
		"context": "For purposes of this Court when deciding subsequent cases, each of the opinions of the fracturedCourt should be persuasive authority only—to theextent that any of them persuade—with noprecedential weight given to any. Specifically, theCourt should be wary of assertions of reliance interests,which are often part of a stare decisis analysis. See, 9 e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Justice Breyer declined to join any part ofChief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion for fourJustices, instead positing that in \"borderline cases\"invoking the Establishment Clause, courts shouldreject any formulaic test or objective standard, relyinginstead upon the judge's so und \"legal judgment.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2448",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Circuit Split Petitioner Asserts Is Illusory",
		"context": "In Pharmaceu- tical Care Management Ass'n v. District of Columbia , the D.C. Circuit concluded that ERISA did not preempt several DC law pro visions, belying any char- acterization of its holding as \"categorical.\" See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the D.C. Circuit engaged in precisely the analysis this Court has set forth, considering whether the D.C. law \"sufficiently constrains an [ERISA plan's] deci-sion-making in an area of ERISA concern \" such that ERISA preempts it.",
		"citation_value_orig": "613 F.3d 179",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Circuit Split Petitioner Asserts Is Illusory",
		"context": "25 (citing Rowe , 429 F.3d at 305). But this statement from Rowe is inapplicable to \"connection with\" preemption, as it was made in 15 Had the challenge been to the imposition of a state gross receipts tax, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], petitioner could hardly assert that the Eighth and D.C. Circuits would hold the law categorically preempted because it was imposed on a PBM. Such a law would be outside the areas of ERISA concern.",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "431 U.S. at 234 –35. Requiring a public employee, as a condition of employment, to do more than contribute his or her share of the costs of representation to the union —by becoming a union member or payi ng for speech not related to the representational services he receives —violates the freedom of association. See 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the interests of dissident employees are not the only interests at stake in public workplaces. Individuals who wish to associate in a public employee union, too, have associational interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "See Abood , 431 U.S . at 221 –22 (\"A union -shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders' to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees. \"); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]500 U.S. 507. 2 Accepting Petitioner's invitation to privilege his interests over those of members would come at a steep cost both to those individuals who choose to associate in a union, and to the value of such associations to the state and worker alike. This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "See Abood , 431 U.S . at 221 –22 (\"A union -shop arrangement has been thought to distribute fairly the cost of these activities among those who benefit, and it counteracts the incentive that employees might otherwise have to become 'free riders' to refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees. \"); see also 134 S. Ct. 2618[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2 Accepting Petitioner's invitation to privilege his interests over those of members would come at a steep cost both to those individuals who choose to associate in a union, and to the value of such associations to the state and worker alike. This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly.",
		"citation_value_orig": "500 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly. See, e.g. , Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 357 U.S. 449; 307 U.S. 496; De 299 U.S. 353; 274 U.S. 35. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. 2000) (\"In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 886",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly. See, e.g. , Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622; 458 U.S. 886; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 307 U.S. 496; De 299 U.S. 353; 274 U.S. 35. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. 2000) (\"In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 449",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly. See, e.g. , Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622; 458 U.S. 886; 357 U.S. 449; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; De 299 U.S. 353; 274 U.S. 35. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. 2000) (\"In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "307 U.S. 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly. See, e.g. , Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622; 458 U.S. 886; 357 U.S. 449; 307 U.S. 496; De [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 274 U.S. 35. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. 2000) (\"In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "299 U.S. 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized the fundamental importance of the freedoms of association and assembly. See, e.g. , Jaycees , 468 U.S. at 622; 458 U.S. 886; 357 U.S. 449; 307 U.S. 496; De 299 U.S. 353; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Alexis de Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 492 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba Winthrop, eds. 2000) (\"In democratic countries the science of association is the mother science; the progress of all the others depends on the progress of that one.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 35",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "There is no right to bargain with a government: \"The public employee surely can associate and speak freely and petition openly, and he is protected by the First Amendm ent from retaliation for doing so. But the First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the government to listen, to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bargain with it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, it is the prerogative of a state to choose, as a matter of policy, how to best manage its employees —and whether to choose exclusive bargaining as the most effective manner to do so. This Court has, for well over a century, recognized the government's legitimate need to \"promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper disci pline in the public service.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 463",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "Thus, it is the prerogative of a state to choose, as a matter of policy, how to best manage its employees —and whether to choose exclusive bargaining as the most effective manner to do so. This Court has, for well over a century, recognized the government's legitimate need to \"promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper disci pline in the public service.\" Ex parte[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs.\" 461 U.S. 138.",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "Ex parte106 U.S. 371. \"To this end, the Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and internal affairs.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress, 41 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have made the choice to authorize exclusive representation for at least some public 8 employees. That decision is unsurprising.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 138",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE INVOLVES COMPETING SPEECH AND ASSOCIATIONAL INTERESTS, AS WELL AS VITAL STATE INTERESTS IN LABOR PEACE AND WORKPLACE GOVERNANCE",
		"context": "That decision is unsurprising. Collective bargaining \"is often an essential condition of industrial peace.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. (\"Refusal to confer and negotiate has been one of the most prolific causes of strife. This is such an outstanding fact in the history of labor disturbances that it is a proper subject of judicial notice and requires no citation of instances.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "R. Civ. P. 24 advisory commit- tee's note (1937) . Although \"some elasticity was in- jected,\" Cascade Natural Gas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the rule largely re- flected \"the codification of general doctrines of inter- vention\" as they stood at the time. Missouri- Kansas Pipe Line 312 U.S. 502. The rule authorized intervention as of right in three narrowly defined circumstances.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 U.S. 129",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "P. 24 advisory commit- tee's note (1937) . Although \"some elasticity was in- jected,\" Cascade Natural Gas 386 U.S. 129, the rule largely re- flected \"the codification of general doctrines of inter- vention\" as they stood at the time. Missouri- Kansas Pipe Line [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The rule authorized intervention as of right in three narrowly defined circumstances. First, Rule 24(a)( 1) made intervention mandatory \"when a statute of the United States confers an uncon-ditional right to intervene.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "312 U.S. 502",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "Fed. R. Civ . P. 24 advisory committee's note ( 1966 ); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similar to the rule's original version, the amended ver- sion requires a putative intervenor to establish a legal stake in the \"subject of the action\" by pointing to the intervenor's direct interest relating to the \"property\" or \"transaction\" at issue. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "535 U.S. 55",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "First, the prior requirement that a prospective inter- venor \"may be bound by a judgment in the action\" could produce a paradox for a class member who sought to intervene because he be-lieved the class representatives' representation would be inade- quate: \"if the representation was in fact inadequate, [the class mem- ber] would not be 'bound' by the judgment\" and thus \"was not enti-tled to intervene,\" but \"if the representation was in fact adequate, there was n o occasion or ground for intervention.\" Ibid. (citing Sam Fox Publishing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). By elim- inating the strict res -judicata requirement, the amended version of Rule 24(a) solved that problem. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory com- mittee's note (1966) (citing Atlantic Refining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Inter- national Mortgage & Investment Corp 301 F.2d 857; and 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 F.2d 387",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory com- mittee's note (1966) (citing Atlantic Refining 304 F.2d 387; Inter- national Mortgage & Investment Corp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; and 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 F.2d 857",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "See Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 advisory com- mittee's note (1966) (citing Atlantic Refining 304 F.2d 387; Inter- national Mortgage & Investment Corp 301 F.2d 857; and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "144 F.2d 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "P. 24(b)(2) and (3). That structure demonstrates that the substantial but indirect practical effects of a po- tential judgment are not a sufficient basis for manda- tory intervention: a judicial decision interpreting an agency's regulations or organic statute may have signif- icant practical consequences for the agency's future op- erations , yet Rule 24(b) indicates that such an interest does not entitle the agency to intervene as of right . d. Decisions of this Court and the courts of appeals following the 1966 amendments confirm th at, to justify mandatory intervention, a litigant must establish a \"sig-nificantly protectable interest\" in the litigation, Don- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], mean- ing one that is \"legally protect ible,\" Tiffany Fine Arts, 469 U.S. 310, and \"di- rect and concrete,\" 476 U.S. 54 to acquire testimony and documentary evidence about Donaldson's tax liability. 400 U.S. at 518 -520. The employer and accountant, as the witness -respondents against whom the government sought judicial relief, had the right to \"challenge the summons[es] on any appropriate ground .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 U.S. 517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "P. 24(b)(2) and (3). That structure demonstrates that the substantial but indirect practical effects of a po- tential judgment are not a sufficient basis for manda- tory intervention: a judicial decision interpreting an agency's regulations or organic statute may have signif- icant practical consequences for the agency's future op- erations , yet Rule 24(b) indicates that such an interest does not entitle the agency to intervene as of right . d. Decisions of this Court and the courts of appeals following the 1966 amendments confirm th at, to justify mandatory intervention, a litigant must establish a \"sig-nificantly protectable interest\" in the litigation, Don- 400 U.S. 517, mean- ing one that is \"legally protect ible,\" Tiffany Fine Arts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and \"di- rect and concrete,\" 476 U.S. 54 to acquire testimony and documentary evidence about Donaldson's tax liability. 400 U.S. at 518 -520. The employer and accountant, as the witness -respondents against whom the government sought judicial relief, had the right to \"challenge the summons[es] on any appropriate ground .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "P. 24(b)(2) and (3). That structure demonstrates that the substantial but indirect practical effects of a po- tential judgment are not a sufficient basis for manda- tory intervention: a judicial decision interpreting an agency's regulations or organic statute may have signif- icant practical consequences for the agency's future op- erations , yet Rule 24(b) indicates that such an interest does not entitle the agency to intervene as of right . d. Decisions of this Court and the courts of appeals following the 1966 amendments confirm th at, to justify mandatory intervention, a litigant must establish a \"sig-nificantly protectable interest\" in the litigation, Don- 400 U.S. 517, mean- ing one that is \"legally protect ible,\" Tiffany Fine Arts, 469 U.S. 310, and \"di- rect and concrete,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to acquire testimony and documentary evidence about Donaldson's tax liability. 400 U.S. at 518 -520. The employer and accountant, as the witness -respondents against whom the government sought judicial relief, had the right to \"challenge the summons[es] on any appropriate ground .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 54",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "See Donaldson , 400 U.S. at 531. Indeed, relying o n Donaldson , courts of appeals have recognized that indi- rect economic interests —even substantial ones —are 22 not a sufficient basis for intervening as of right. See, e.g., Mountain Top Condominium [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (holding that \"an eco nomic interest alone is insufficient\" to support intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), because \"such intervention is improper when the intervenor does not itself possess the only substantive legal right it seeks to assert in the action\") , cert. denied, 469 U.S . 1019 (1984) ; see also Medical Liability Mut ual Insur- ance 485 F.3d 1006 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "72 F.3d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "See, e.g., Mountain Top Condominium 72 F.3d 361 (holding that \"an eco nomic interest alone is insufficient\" to support intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), because \"such intervention is improper when the intervenor does not itself possess the only substantive legal right it seeks to assert in the action\") , cert. denied, 469 U.S . 1019 (1984) ; see also Medical Liability Mut ual Insur- ance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A contrary understanding —under which any person who might experience downstream \"economic injury\" from the result of a case is entitled to intervene as of right , Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "485 F.3d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "at 41 ,301; see J.A. 123 . A rule that authorized all such entities to in- 23 tervene as of right unless one of the existing parties ad- equately represented their interests would \"clutter too many lawsuits with too many parties,\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], frustrating the \"just, speed y, and inexpensive determination of every action and pro- ceeding\" that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to accomplish. Fed. R. Civ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "660 F.3d 980",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "An d none of petitioners' three cases (see ibid. ) support s their contrary view . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prospective intervenor's economic interest was too attenuated to support intervention as of right and cited with approval its decision in Greene , supra, which held that even a prospective interven or's \"significant\" economic interest in the subject of litigation was insufficient to support a right to intervene. Greene , 996 F.2d at 976; s ee Alisal Water Corp. , 370 F.3d at 919. In National Parks Conservation 759 F.3d 969, the Eighth Circuit emphasized that economic in-jury is sufficient under Rule 24(a)(2) only where a law- suit implicates an intervenor's \"direct financial inter- ests,\" such as where a \"third party files suit to compel govern ment agency action that would directly harm a regulated company.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "In 370 F.3d 915, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the prospective intervenor's economic interest was too attenuated to support intervention as of right and cited with approval its decision in Greene , supra, which held that even a prospective interven or's \"significant\" economic interest in the subject of litigation was insufficient to support a right to intervene. Greene , 996 F.2d at 976; s ee Alisal Water Corp. , 370 F.3d at 919. In National Parks Conservation [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Eighth Circuit emphasized that economic in-jury is sufficient under Rule 24(a)(2) only where a law- suit implicates an intervenor's \"direct financial inter- ests,\" such as where a \"third party files suit to compel govern ment agency action that would directly harm a regulated company.\" Id. at 976.",
		"citation_value_orig": "759 F.3d 969",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A litigant seeking to intervene as of right must establish a direct, legally protectable interest in the subject matter of the suit",
		"context": "at 976. That case thus tracks the distinction, discussed above, between entities whose legal rights will be directly implicated (such as the oil 24 refiners who stood to lose import quota s in Atlantic Re- fining ) and entities who are affected only indirectly and thus have no right to intervene (such as the oil refiner who would have faced only indirect competitive disad- vantage ). And in Utahns for Better Transp [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that, in compar- ison to other courts of appeals, it \"has tended to follow a somewhat liberal line in allowing intervention.\" Id. at 1115.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 F.3d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "A. \"The general rule is that ' a party is entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment has been entered, in whic h claims of district court error at any stage of th e litigation may be ventilated.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Accordingly, although most interlocutory orders are n ot themselves appealable, an \"appeal from [a] final judgment opens the record and permits review of all rulings that led up t o the judg- ment.\" 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Prac- tice and Procedure § 3905.1, at 250 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 706",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "1992). In some circumstances, however, an interlocutory order is effectively superseded by subsequent develop- ments in the district court . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, this Court held that a court of appeals generally may not review \"an order denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits\" be- cause \"the full record developed [at trial] supersedes the record existing at the time of the summary -judgment motion.\" Id. at 184.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "16 Ortiz , 562 U.S. at 189 (citation omitted) . It is also true that \"[a] motion un der Rule 50(b) is not allowed unless the movant sought relief on similar grounds \" under Rule 50(a). Exxon Shipping [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For two reasons, however, those princi- ples did not preclude the court of appeals from deciding the comity question. First, comity does not concern \"the sufficiency of the evidence .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "702, at 24- 31 (May 10, 2013) . Where , as here, \"the non- moving party fails to object to a Rule 50(b) motion on the gro unds of waiver, the objection itself is deemed waived.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And p etitioners forfeited the argument again by failing to raise it on appeal. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "15) , principles of international comity do not bear on the court's subject -matter ju- risdiction . See 860 F.3d 1193; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts thus have the power, but not a jurisdictional obligation, to raise comity sua sponte. 17 C. The comity issue thus was properly before the court of appeals , even though the court err ed by focus- ing on the motion to dismiss rather than on the full rec- ord.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should deny review of petitioners' contention that the court of appeals erred by reviewing the denial of respondents' motion to dismiss",
		"context": "But those decisions in- volved motions to dism iss for failure to plead facts suf- ficient to state a claim , not motions based on interna- tional co mity. And even if the court of appeals' decision created a circuit conflict, this case would not be an ap-propriate vehicle in which to resolve it because the issue was neither briefed below nor exp licitly addressed by the court of appeals. S ee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE LANHAM ACT ALREADY ACCOUNTS FOR FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS",
		"context": "The Ninth Circuit extended and misapplied the Second Circuit test announced in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], based on its misplaced con-cern that applying the law as drafted by Congress and interpreted by other courts of appeals would not ade-quately protect VIP's purported First Amendment in- terest in selling products found to cause a likelihood of confusion. But the Ninth Circuit's approach upsets the balance between trademark law and the First Amend- ment. Protection of trademarks has existed since be-fore the nation's founding, and trademark law has long accommodated First Amendment interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "875 F.2d 994",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court's \"informational standing\" cases do not support Laufer.",
		"context": "In upholding Laufer's standing, the First Circuit relied on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Public 491 U.S. 440, which held that the denial of information, in some contexts, can be an Article III injury. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 11",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court's \"informational standing\" cases do not support Laufer.",
		"context": "In upholding Laufer's standing, the First Circuit relied on 524 U.S. 11, and Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that the denial of information, in some contexts, can be an Article III injury. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court's \"informational standing\" cases do not support Laufer.",
		"context": "Indeed, a closer look at the reasoning of Akins and Public Citizen demonstrates how different those cases are from this case. Both Akins and Public Citizen involved \"[p]ublic-disclosure laws\" which \"protect the public's interest in evaluating matters of concern to the political community.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] sued under statutes guaranteeing public access to the information. None of those features of Akins and Public Citizen is present here. In Akins , a group of voters filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission (FEC), arguing that the FEC was obliged to require the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) to make disclosures regarding its membership, contributions, and expenditures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 329",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Properly understood, section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not pose a risk of chilling speech protected by the First Amendment",
		"context": "See Gov't Br. at 29-30. 12 Second, because §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) not only targets conduct more than speech , Hicks , 539 U.S. at 122-23, but also targets the solicitation of illegal activity, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the overbreadth doctrine is inapposite. Third, properly construed, §1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) does not reach the hypothetical intra -family conversations and pure advocacy that the Ninth Circuit raised. See Section III.A , infra .",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "109, 128 , 129 (2010). Indeed, \"[t]hat rule is 'perhaps not much less old than' the task of statutory 'construction itself.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S. Ct. 779 . Cf. Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, 12 Oddly, s hortly after the FSA was signed into law, the Sentencing Commission informally advised: \"Courts will have to decide whether a resentencing under the Act is a plenary resentencing proceeding or a more limi ted resentencing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "at 123 . 21 Reading Law 299 (2012) (\" The criterion we favor [for whether lenity applies] is this: whether, after all legitimate tools of interpretation have been applied, 'a reasonable doubt persists.'\" (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But under the rule of lenity, \"ambiguities about the breadth of a criminal statute should be resolved in the defendant's favor. \" Davis , 139 S. Ct. at 2333.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "Smith , 756 F.3d at 1191 ; see also 574 U.S. 528 . \"[T]his principle of statutory construction applies not only to interpre tations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., 511 U.S. 39; see 495 U.S. 575. The rule of lenity thus applies with full force to Section 404, to the extent it contains ambiguities unresolvable even after a full statutory investig ation.13 13 Numerous federal district courts have also found the rule of lenity applicable to the FSA. See, e.g., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133586 ; United States v. 22 \"This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intend ed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 381",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "Smith , 756 F.3d at 1191 ; see also 574 U.S. 528 . \"[T]his principle of statutory construction applies not only to interpre tations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.\" 447 U.S. 381; see, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 495 U.S. 575. The rule of lenity thus applies with full force to Section 404, to the extent it contains ambiguities unresolvable even after a full statutory investig ation.13 13 Numerous federal district courts have also found the rule of lenity applicable to the FSA. See, e.g., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133586 ; United States v. 22 \"This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intend ed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 39",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "Smith , 756 F.3d at 1191 ; see also 574 U.S. 528 . \"[T]his principle of statutory construction applies not only to interpre tations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but also to the penalties they impose.\" 447 U.S. 381; see, e.g., 511 U.S. 39; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The rule of lenity thus applies with full force to Section 404, to the extent it contains ambiguities unresolvable even after a full statutory investig ation.13 13 Numerous federal district courts have also found the rule of lenity applicable to the FSA. See, e.g., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133586 ; United States v. 22 \"This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intend ed.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "495 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "The rule of lenity thus applies with full force to Section 404, to the extent it contains ambiguities unresolvable even after a full statutory investig ation.13 13 Numerous federal district courts have also found the rule of lenity applicable to the FSA. See, e.g., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133586 ; United States v. 22 \"This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intend ed.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, \"when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, [courts] are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.\" 483 U.S. 350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "358 U.S. 169 . Thus, \"when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, [courts] are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Scalia explained: \"This venerable rule not only vindicates the fundamental principle that no citizen should be . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 350",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Rule of Lenity Resolves Any Lingering Doubts",
		"context": "subjected to punishment that is not clearly prescribed. It also places the weig ht of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress's stead.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To the extent this Court , after a thorough and searching statutory investigation, is unable to discern an answer to the question presented using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, this Court should resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of this venerable rule of lenity. And here , at the lea st, the Martin , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition",
		"context": "Defendants have not cross-petitioned on these issues, and a ruling in Defendants' favor on any of them would require changing the judgment below. Thus, far from qualify- ing as threshold issues the Court would need to re-solve before reaching the remedial question presented in Plaintiffs' petition, these are non-jurisdictional is-sues that Defendants could not even properly raise in their merits briefs. See Northwest Airlines, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; R OBERT L. STERN & EUGENE GRESSMAN , SUPREME COURT PRAC- TICE 490–91 (9th ed. 2007) (\"If the rationale of an ar- gument would give the sati sfied party more than the judgment below, even though the party is not asking for more, the Court has held that a cross-petition or cross-appeal must be filed.\"). The one jurisdictional issue Defendants identify is whether Plaintiffs have appellate standing to seek review of the merits of the Fifth Circuit's separation of powers ruling even though Plaintiffs prevailed on that issue below.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no obstacle to the Court reaching the important questions presented in Plaintiffs' petition",
		"context": "The one jurisdictional issue Defendants identify is whether Plaintiffs have appellate standing to seek review of the merits of the Fifth Circuit's separation of powers ruling even though Plaintiffs prevailed on that issue below. SG BIO 15. Standing is assessed on a claim-by-claim rather than an issue-by-issue basis, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Plaintiffs plainly have standing to press their separation of pow-ers claim in this Court give n the Fifth Circuit's deci- sion to withhold a meaningful remedy. In any event, 6 since Defendants are apparently content to allow the Fifth Circuit's separation of powers ruling to remain in place, the Court could simply bypass the first ques-tion presented in Plaintiffs' petition and grant the sec-ond. Defendants do not suggest that Plaintiffs lack ap-pellate standing to argue that the Fifth Circuit erred by refusing to set aside the Net Worth Sweep in light of FHFA's unconstitutional structure, and any such argument would be frivolous.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 724",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The history of Section 924(e)(1) confirms that temporally distinct crimes are committed on occasions different from one another'",
		"context": "V 1987). Nonetheless, the courts of appeals generally \"re- quired that the criminal episodes be distinct in time\" to qualify as separate predicate offenses under the ACCA . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 889 -890 (2d Cir.) (quoting U.S. Br. at 5, 488 U.S. 831 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F.2d 880",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The history of Section 924(e)(1) confirms that temporally distinct crimes are committed on occasions different from one another'",
		"context": "; see i bid. (\"It is appropriate to clarify the statute in this regard, both to avoid future litigation and to insure that its rigorous sentencing provisions apply only as intended in cases meri ting such strict punish- ment.\") ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. The different -occasions clause's origins as a tai- lored response to Petty reinforce the plain import of the 25 statutory text: temporally distinct crimes occur \"on oc- casions different from one another ,\" 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "158 F.3d 1016",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Removal Question is Not Presented",
		"context": "29 First, the question was not pressed or passed on below, which is reason enough not to decide it here. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].16 Second, there is no circuit law on the constitutional validity of the good cause removal standard for ALJs, much less a circuit split. Finally, the question is not only \"not presented\" here (Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
		"context": "In fact, courts have consistently held that the relevant standard is \"shared intent,\" which can be proven by either a subjective agreement or objective indicia demonstrating the two parties' intent.4 1. Second Circuit . In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Second Circuit articulated the following standard for determining habitual resi- dence: First, the court should inquire into the shared intent of those entitled to fix the child's residence (usually the parents) at the latest time that their intent was shared. In making this determination the court should 4 The amicus brief suffers from the same flaw, asserting that the court of appeals' ruling \"removes any consideration of par- ents' subjective intent.\" Amicus Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "396 F.3d 124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
		"context": "Third Circuit . Petitioner also relies (Pet. 21) on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that court, too, focused on \"shared intent\" rather than subjective agreement: [W]e believe that a child's habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physi- cally present for an amount of time sufficient 26 for acclimatization and which has a \"degree of settled purpose\" from the child's perspec- tive. We further believe that a determination of whether any particular place satisfies this standard must focus on the child and consists of an analysis of the child's circumstances in that place and the parents' present, shared intentions regarding their child's presence there.",
		"citation_value_orig": "63 F.3d 217",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
		"context": "21)—quoting an English court deci- sion—simply states that \"the conduct\" and \"the overtly stated intentions and agreement of the par- ents\" are important factors. It thus makes clear that factors other than a subjective agreement between the parents are relevant in ascertaining habitual res- idence, which is precisely what the court below con- cluded here. Petitioner also points to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But that decision repeatedly cites Feder , and applies the \"shared intention\" test set forth in Feder . See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "329 F.3d 330",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
		"context": "See pages 8-13, supra . 3. Fifth Circuit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], applied the same \"shared intent\" standard as the other courts of appeals: the Fifth Circuit stated that it had \"adopted an approach that begins with the parents' shared intent or settled purpose regarding their child's residence\"; and that the \"parents' intentions should be dispositive where, as here, the child is so young that he or she cannot possibly decide the issue of residency.\" Id. at 466 (quotations omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "765 F.3d 456",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Lower Courts' Holding That Subjective Agreement Between Parents Is Not A Necessary Prerequisite To Finding Habitual Residence Does Not Warrant Review.",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit's own analysis therefore makes clear that proof of an actual subjective agree- ment is not required—the requisite \"shared intent\" can be inferred from objective facts demonstrating that the parents shared the intent to make a particu- lar nation the child's habitual residence. 4. Ninth Circuit [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is wholly inapposite because it involved a child who was eight years old at the time of the litigation, and therefore rests in significant part on the acclimatization prong of the standard, which is inapplicable when—as here—the case in- volves an infant. Like the other decisions, Murphy applies the \"shared intent\" standard: \"the proper standard for habitual residence, which takes into account the shared, settled intent of the parents and then asks whether there has been sufficient acclimatization of the child to trump this intent.\" 764 F.3d at 1150.",
		"citation_value_orig": "764 F.3d 1144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
		"context": "at 33 –36. The First Amendment protects an individual's right to associate \"in pursuit of a wide variety of polit- ical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cul- tural ends.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When individuals who associat e for \"the ad- vancement of political goals and ideas,\" 520 U.S. 351 , are in a minority political group, however, they are vulnerable to attempts by the dominant group to stifle their political expression and participation, see Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participati on Re- strictions , 13 Election L.J. 288, 291 –93 (2014) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
		"context": "The First Amendment protects an individual's right to associate \"in pursuit of a wide variety of polit- ical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cul- tural ends.\" 468 U.S. 609 . When individuals who associat e for \"the ad- vancement of political goals and ideas,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , are in a minority political group, however, they are vulnerable to attempts by the dominant group to stifle their political expression and participation, see Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to Voter Participati on Re- strictions , 13 Election L.J. 288, 291 –93 (2014) . 18 The First Amendment thus \"prohibits state regu- lations that discriminatorily burden a political group's ability to influence the electoral process .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "520 U.S. 351",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
		"context": "16 -1161 ) (\"Whitford Election Law Schol- ars Br.\"). Indeed, this Court has long protected minor- ity groups from discriminatory burdens on their right to participate in elections. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]460 U.S. 780414 U.S. 51. These principles apply with full force in the parti- san gerrymandering context, as a group of election law scholars persuasively explained in Whitford. Whitford Election Law Scholars Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 23",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
		"context": "16 -1161 ) (\"Whitford Election Law Schol- ars Br.\"). Indeed, this Court has long protected minor- ity groups from discriminatory burdens on their right to participate in elections. E.g., 393 U.S. 23[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]414 U.S. 51. These principles apply with full force in the parti- san gerrymandering context, as a group of election law scholars persuasively explained in Whitford. Whitford Election Law Scholars Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Maryland's Extreme Partisan Gerrymander Burdened Republicans' First Amendment Rights On A Statewide Basis",
		"context": "16 -1161 ) (\"Whitford Election Law Schol- ars Br.\"). Indeed, this Court has long protected minor- ity groups from discriminatory burdens on their right to participate in elections. E.g., 393 U.S. 23460 U.S. 780[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These principles apply with full force in the parti- san gerrymandering context, as a group of election law scholars persuasively explained in Whitford. Whitford Election Law Scholars Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "414 U.S. 51",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "1. There is an \"essential st ate interest\" in regulating foreclosure that should not be \"displace[d]\" unless Con- gress made its intent to do so \"clear and manifest.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has specifically refused to interpret ambig- uous federal statutes in a way that would disrupt state non-judicial foreclos ure schemes. In BFP , the Court in- terpreted ambiguous language in the Bankruptcy Code to avoid disrupting the \"diverse \" state foreclosure schemes created to \"achieve what each [State] considers the proper balance between the needs of lenders and borrow-ers.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "Id. at 544. Similarly, in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court addressed whether federally created liens could be extinguished by state proceedings in which the federal government did not participate. The Court recognized the need for uniformity in laws relating to col-lecting federal taxes, but it emphasized that, by \"re- sort[ing] to the use of liens, \" Congress \"came into an area of complex property relation ships long since settled and regulated by state law.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "363 U.S. 237",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "382, supra , at 6. It is little wonder, then, that this Court has prev iously recognized the force of \"federalism concern[s]\" in this context and has declined to construe the FDCPA in a manner that would interfere with a core state interest. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Petitioner's interpretation of the FDCPA would extensively intrude into the state-created and state-regu- lated foreclosure process; allow debtors to challenge fore-closures that are entirely proper under state law; and in- terpose an ill-fitting federal framework on state law in a core area of state concern.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1594",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "See 858 F.3d 568 (9 th Cir. ), cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also, e.g., Ala. Code § 35- 10-13; Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 S. Ct. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "26- 27. But in assessing whether federal law infringes on the \"r espect for the States as in- dependent sovereigns in our fede ral system,\" it is \"the his- toric presence of state law,\" not \"the absence of federal regulation,\" that matters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has already recognized that regulat-ing foreclosure is a core state interest; in BFP , it inter- preted the Bankruptcy Code—one of the federal statutes on which petitioner relies—to avoid a conflict with state law. See 511 U.S. at 544-545. c. Petitioner invokes Se ction 1692o, which allows a State to obtain an exemption from the FDCPA if a federal agency determines that the St ate not only subjects debt- collection practices to requirem ents \"substantially similar to those imposed by\" the FD CPA but also provides for \"adequate enfo rcement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The FDCPA should not be construed to interfere with a core area of state concern",
		"context": "The benefits of the FDCPA expa nsion petitioner seeks, in turn, would accrue primarily to the lawyers responsible for the \"cottage industry\" of litigation that has arisen un-der the FDCPA. Cf. Federal Home Loan Mortgage [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court should declin e petitioner's invitation to effect such a dramatic change, and it should instead leave federal law to regulate debt-c ollection practices and state law to regulate foreclosure. The plain language of the FDCPA disposes of this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 F.3d 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
		"context": "As this Court ex- plained, \"damages have been regarded as an ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in lib- erty.\" Id. ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In reaching that result, the Justices embraced Founding -era principles recognizing that \"the judici- ary has a particular responsibility to assure the vindi- cation of constitutional interests such as those em- braced by the Fourth Amendment,\" Bivens , 403 U.S. at 407 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment ), and that \"'rights' and 'remedies '\" are \"link[ed]\" in \"a 1:1 cor- relation ,\" id. at 400 n.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
		"context": "While the Court has been reluctant to apply Bivens outside this context, its cases have reaffirmed Bivens ' \"continued force\" and \"necessity\" in the \"search -and-seizure context in which it arose.\" Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1856. Reflecting these rule-of-law moorings, t his Court's cases have also made clear that Bivens \"is not an au- tomatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and, in a number of cases, this Court has declined to extend Bivens , finding that other remedies were available. See Ziglar , 137 S. 25 Ct. at 1862 (no Bivens claim to \"challenge large -scale policy decisions\" because \"detainees may seek injunc- tive relief\"); 565 U.S. 118; Fed. Deposit Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
		"context": "Ziglar , 137 S. Ct. at 1856. Reflecting these rule-of-law moorings, t his Court's cases have also made clear that Bivens \"is not an au- tomatic entitlement no matter what other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest,\" 551 U.S. 537, and, in a number of cases, this Court has declined to extend Bivens , finding that other remedies were available. See Ziglar , 137 S. 25 Ct. at 1862 (no Bivens claim to \"challenge large -scale policy decisions\" because \"detainees may seek injunc- tive relief\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Fed. Deposit Ins. 510 U.S. 471.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
		"context": "See Ziglar , 137 S. 25 Ct. at 1862 (no Bivens claim to \"challenge large -scale policy decisions\" because \"detainees may seek injunc- tive relief\"); 565 U.S. 118; Fed. Deposit Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Wilkie , this Court synthesized its precedents applying Bivens , setting out two basic considerations. First, \"there is the question whether any alternative, existing process for protecting the interest amounts to a convincing reason for the Judicial Branch to refrain from providing a new and freestanding remedy in damages.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. A Bivens Action is Appropriate To Enforce the Fourth Amendment When There Are No Alternative Remedies Available",
		"context": "at 550. Permitting this suit to go forward under Bivens would not be fashion ing a newly minted cause of action , cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but simply recogniz- ing what the text and history of the Fourth Amend- ment reflect: its Framers u nderstood that civil damage suits were an appropriate method of redressing viola- tions of the Fourth Amendment by federal officers. At the Foundin g, trespass actions encompassed the un- lawful use of force. See 5 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgment of Law 157 (6 th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is No Circuit Conflict Regarding What Type of Assistance Constitutes Aiding and Abetting Under Section 2333(d)(2)",
		"context": "The interpretation of section 2333(d)(2) adopted by the Second, Ninth and D.C. Circuits is correct. The Findings adopted by Congress as part of the bill enacting the aiding-and-abetting provision of sec-tion 2333(d)(2) expressly endorsed the legal standard 21 regarding civil aiding-and-abetting claims set out in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 130 Stat. 852, § (a)(2).",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.2d 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
		"context": ". The Seventh Circuit's rule rests on the bedrock principle that \"[e]vidence is not 'substantial' if vital testimony has been conjured out of whole cloth.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, \"an expert is free to give a bottom line, provided that the underlying data and reasoning are available on demand.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "279 F.3d 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
		"context": "If an expert refuses to provide the data, the expert's testimony is not stricken from the record. Rather, without the underlying data, a court cannot find substantial evidence that \"a significant number of jobs were available to [the applicant]\" based on the unsupported testimony alone. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Seventh Circuit's rule vindicates this Court's instruction that substantial evidence requires \"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\" Consol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "368 F.3d 907",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
		"context": "The Seventh Circuit's rule vindicates this Court's instruction that substantial evidence requires \"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.\" Consol. Edison Co. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pet. Br. 21–30.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
		"context": "Edison , 305 U.S. at 230. The government does not cite a single decision of this Court in which an expert witness's unsubstantiated claims about data have been deemed \"substantial evidence,\" let alone when the expert identified but then refused to provide the data underlying her claims. The government claims Federal Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], supports its position. Gov't Br. 39–40.",
		"citation_value_orig": "404 U.S. 453",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Substantial Evidence Demands More Than Bottom-Line Conclusions For Which The Expert Refuses To Provide Support",
		"context": "If a vocational expert testified that there existed 1,500 sorter positions in Southeast Michigan and, when asked for the basis of this testimony, responded, \"I have a source, but I just don't feel like identifying it or sharing it with you,\" surely the government would not claim the expert's testimony alone could constitute substantial evidence upon which 7 an ALJ could base a benefits determination. Regardless of the witness's tenure as a vocational expert, the blanket refusal to provide any numerical basis for the testimony undercuts the testimony's reliability and probative value. In much the same way, while a police officer's general experience might aid him in determining whether probable cause exists that a crime has been committed, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], no court would accept an officer's testimony that a suspect had a 0.08% blood alcohol concentration absent an officer conducting a breathalyzer examination and providing the court with test results evidencing that conclusion. These hypotheticals demonstrate a basic proposition: when an expert testifies regarding the results of a data-driven analysis and is questioned regarding that analysis, a court or agency cannot reasonably rely on the testimony absent provision of the analysis or data itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 690",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "Section 1782's focus on governmental adjudicators is confirmed by its use of the word \"tribunal\" as part of the unified phrase \"foreign tribunal.\" This Court has often recognized that \"two words together may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When construing such a phrase, courts should not merely determine the definition of each word and then mechanically glue those definitions together, but should instead consider the phrase as a unified whole. Here, the phrase \"foreign tribunal\" is more than just the sum of its parts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "But a private arbitral body does not count. c. The government-centric understanding of \"foreign tribunal\" set forth above is fully consistent with how Congress, this Court, and legal commentators regularly used those terms in the run- up to the 1964 Act. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Before 1964, in every instance in which Congress had previously used the term \"tribunal,\" it had referred only to courts, equivalent governmental bodies, or intergovernmental adjudicative bodies. 6 That practice continued after 1964.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 365",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "§ 290k-11 (same for awards resolving disputes arising under treaty provisions involving Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency); 16 U.S. C. § 973n (discussing U.S. government selection of arbitrat or for \"arbitral tribunal\" under South Pacific Tuna Treaty). 24 For example, this Court's forum non conveniens decisions instructed lower courts to consider whether \"the litigation can more appropriately be conducted in a foreign tribunal.\" Gulf Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].9 And the Court had used the phrase \"arbitral tribunal\" to refer to international tribunals established by sovereign governments.10 Legal scholars and government officials used the key terms the same way. For example, the 1939 Draft Convention on Judicial Assistance (the Harvard Convention), which served as a major influence on the creation and work of the Rules Commission, infra at 33-34, stated that \"[t]he term 'tribunal' as here used includes all courts and a limited number of administrative agencies,\" and \"must be an authority created by the State or a political subdivision.\" 33 Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 168 U.S. 250; 159 U.S. 113; 154 U.S. 256; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 159 U.S. 113; 154 U.S. 256; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "168 U.S. 250",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; 168 U.S. 250; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 154 U.S. 256; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; 168 U.S. 250; 159 U.S. 113; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "154 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; 168 U.S. 250; 159 U.S. 113; 154 U.S. 256; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "45 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; 168 U.S. 250; 159 U.S. 113; 154 U.S. 256; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]171 U.S. 110. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "202 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. A Private Commercial Arbitration Panel Is Not A \"Foreign Tribunal\"",
		"context": "J. Int'l L. Supp. 11, 36 (1939). The Convention 9 See also, e.g., Canada Malting 285 U.S. 413; 168 U.S. 250; 159 U.S. 113; 154 U.S. 256; 45 U.S. 467; In re261 Fed. 652202 U.S. 1[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 25 further noted that the term excluded \"a tribunal of arbitration set up by private parties to adjudicate controversies between them . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "171 U.S. 110",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant",
		"context": "This should not be surprising. The Guidelines are \"the starting point and the initial benchmark\" of all 24 federal sentencing . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see Freeman , 564 U.S. at 529 (plurality) . Accordingly, the parties bargain against the backdrop of the applicable Guidelines range. T he Principles of Federal Prosecution instruct federal prosecutors to use the Guidelines \"as a touchstone,\" and to \"seek sen- tences that reflect an appropriate balance of the fac- tors set forth in § 3553\" —which, \"[i]n the typical case,\" will be \"reflected by the applicable guideline range.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant",
		"context": "The same will be true when the agreement calls for a Guidelines -based sentence, but the judge justifies and then imposes the sentence on non- Guidelines grounds . Under those circumstances, the parties' Guidelines -based rationale did not cause the sentence that the judge ultimately imposed. Whether this is thought of as a lack of sufficient legal cause, see supra 15-16, or akin to \"an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation, \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the basis for the sen- tence is the judge's reasons and rationale, not the Guidelines. 28 In United States v. Garrett , for example, the judge noted his disagreement with the Gu idelines range for a crack cocaine offense. 758 F.3d 749.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant",
		"context": "Whether this is thought of as a lack of sufficient legal cause, see supra 15-16, or akin to \"an intervening cause breaking the chain of causation, \" 553 U.S. 639 , the basis for the sen- tence is the judge's reasons and rationale, not the Guidelines. 28 In United States v. Garrett , for example, the judge noted his disagreement with the Gu idelines range for a crack cocaine offense. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He nevertheless accepted the recommended within -Guidelines sentence based on his independent view that such a sentence was appropriate \"for pur- poses of deterrence.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F.3d 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant",
		"context": "at 755.5 For sim ilar reasons, if the judge and parties disagree on the proper calculation of the Guidelines range, the sentence is \"based on\" the range calculated by the judge, not the parties. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 705 F.3d 479 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 F.3d 102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Guidelines often but not always will bear a reasonably close connection to the sentence of a C-type defendant",
		"context": "at 755.5 For sim ilar reasons, if the judge and parties disagree on the proper calculation of the Guidelines range, the sentence is \"based on\" the range calculated by the judge, not the parties. E.g. , 844 F.3d 102 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 479",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Arizona Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) Is Interwoven With Federal Law",
		"context": "See Lynch , 578 U.S. at 614-615. The Arizona Supreme Court held as much, stating that Lynch \"reversed our decision that the possibility of executive clem- ency did not justify refusing the parole-ineligible in- struction.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The State below similarly conceded that \"Lynch overruled a well-established line of Arizona Supreme Court opinions holding that Simmons did not\" apply in Arizona. JA307.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 P.3d 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Arizona Supreme Court's Interpretation of Rule 32.1(g) Is Interwoven With Federal Law",
		"context": "JA307. Nor is there any doubt that the precedent Lynch overruled was binding in Arizona. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, the State below initially did not even dispute that Lynch was a significant change in the law, be- cause, as the State noted, Lynch overturned \"the un- ambiguous rule\" in Arizona \"that defendants were not entitled to Simmons instructions.\" JA311.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 P.3d 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Federal Circuit Rewrote Edmond",
		"context": ". recourse to common sense.\" KSR Int'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Categorization of federal Officers requires pragmatism and context; it cannot be reduced to a mechanical checklist. And viewed through the pragmatic lens of Edmond, it is clear that APJs are inferior, not principal, Officers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF REVOCATION-UPON-DEATH LAWS IN SETTLING ESTATES",
		"context": "The decedent's intent is the polestar for settling estates. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The public policy of most, if not all states, is to expedite the resolution of estates an d distribute assets to the beneficiaries as quickly as possible. See878 N.W.2d 510.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 F.2d 1238",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF REVOCATION-UPON-DEATH LAWS IN SETTLING ESTATES",
		"context": "See In re463 F.2d 1238. The public policy of most, if not all states, is to expedite the resolution of estates an d distribute assets to the beneficiaries as quickly as possible. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For these reasons and the obvious inability of the decedent to cure any ambiguities or to now adjust to changed circumstances such as divorce, rules of construction to establish a decedent's probable intent are common to each state, for example, pretermitted spouse laws, pretermitted children laws, simultaneous death of spouse laws, antilapse and ademption laws, and revocation-upon-divorce laws. At first blush, the application of some of these rules of construction, like revocation-upon-divorce laws, to documents in existence before the law became effective appears offensive to traditional presumptions against retroactively applied laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 N.W.2d 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF REVOCATION-UPON-DEATH LAWS IN SETTLING ESTATES",
		"context": "At first blush, the application of some of these rules of construction, like revocation-upon-divorce laws, to documents in existence before the law became effective appears offensive to traditional presumptions against retroactively applied laws. But, this particular rule of construction applies only to the revocable aspects of will substitutes, including 17 a life insurance policy—not to any right vested in a beneficiary. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And, the rule only applies in default of a decedent changing his or her plan after divorce to clarify his or her intentions. Further, recall that will substitutes have only recently been added to the statutory framework of revocation-upon-divorce, which previously only applied to wills.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 F.2d 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. VOISINE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BECAUSE IT INVOLVED A STATUTE WITH DIFFERENT TEXT AND A DIFFERENT PURPOSE FROM ACCA",
		"context": "In addition to these textual differences, ACCA and the MCDV Act impose vastly different consequences and serve far different purposes. Recognizing these differences, one court described attempts to analogize the statutes as \"compar[ing] plums with pomegran- ates.\" United S [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st 14 Under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), it is a federal offense for any person convicted of a \"misdemeanor crime of domestic violence\" to possess a firearm. That phrase is defined in 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "175 F.3d 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. VOISINE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION BECAUSE IT INVOLVED A STATUTE WITH DIFFERENT TEXT AND A DIFFERENT PURPOSE FROM ACCA",
		"context": "; see Bennett , 868 F.3d at 21 (\"Specifically, 30 ACCA seeks to protect society at large from a diffuse risk of injury or fatality at the hands of armed, recid- ivist felons. By contrast [the MCDV Act] addresses an acute risk to an identi fiable class of victims —those in a relationship with a perpetrator of domestic vio- lence.\" (internal citations and quotation marks omit- ted)); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court in Voisine recognized as much: \"Con- gress enacted [the MCDV Act] . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "644 F.3d 12",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "XII. The Current Presidency Is a Particularly Bad Time to Loosen the Reins on the Chief Executive, Due to That Official's Lack of Recognition of His Proper Boundaries",
		"context": "of Recognition of His Proper Boundaries ……24 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… ………………. …..29 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .31 iii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ……………………………………….. 3, 20 CONSTITUTION U.S. Const. pmbl…………………… .…………… .7-8, 29 U.S. Const. art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "XII. The Current Presidency Is a Particularly Bad Time to Loosen the Reins on the Chief Executive, Due to That Official's Lack of Recognition of His Proper Boundaries",
		"context": "Respondent claim s that indictment/trial/prison is undue for a President under Article II, but he may not be correct here, or correc t that the President needs to be immunized against \"stigma\". And Court avoidance of considering various privileges against criminal process for the President, if consideration of those particular privileges is not needed, may be appropriate. Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is apposite, too, in that its protection against oppressive government reminds us that the President should not be an unpunished oppressor and criminal himself. John Ronald Reuel Tolkien has lessons not only re national injunctions (as a Court Member may have noted), but also re the danger of letting the President cloak himself in invisibility and arrogance, if he insists he is above criminal proceedings. A Biblical view, seeing King David repenting after Nathan revealed his sin to him, and the Lord telling Ezekiel to warn people of their sins, is relevant here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "XII. The Current Presidency Is a Particularly Bad Time to Loosen the Reins on the Chief Executive, Due to That Official's Lack of Recognition of His Proper Boundaries",
		"context": "IX. CITIZENS UNITED AND THE SCENARIO OF A PRESIDENT HILLARY CLINTON WHO AVOID S CRIMINAL PROCESS FOR 8 YEARS By the way, Amicus is not going to cite much case law in this brief, as Respondent has done an excellent job in that category. However, Amicus will mention Citizens [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , for its use in combatting government oppression. In very broad brush , that case was about people not having to be punish ed if, say, they wrote or disseminated a book attacking Hillary Clinton too close to an election. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action",
		"context": "Even if these measures might be inadequate in rare cases, these con-cerns would not justify more than a brief refusal to re-linquish possession of property of the estate without court approval. of the estate . This Court's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], therefore, implies the conclusion that the right of possession is property of the estate. Otherwise, § 542(a) would not have required the IR S to relinquish its possession. 11 The Court has provided a framework for balancing requirements of § 362(a) against a creditor's right to request stay relief.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 198",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action",
		"context": "Otherwise, § 542(a) would not have required the IR S to relinquish its possession. 11 The Court has provided a framework for balancing requirements of § 362(a) against a creditor's right to request stay relief. In Citizens Bank of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that a bank's \"temporary\" refusal to pay an amount due to the estate (by virtue of a checki ng account deposit) while the creditor sought stay r elief for a setoff did not vio- late the prohibition on exercising \"the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor\" under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). The Court found the bank's administrative hold acceptable because denying it would \"evi scerate\" § 542(b)'s excep- tion to the duty to pay a debt to the estate when the debt is subject to setoff, requiring the creditor \"to do that which § 542(b) specifically excuses it from doing.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Even if creditors are entitled to withhold possession of property of the estate in rare cases, the argument for doing so justifies only temporary action",
		"context": "The Code, moreover, generally places the burden of requesting adequate prote ction and stay relief on the creditor. See TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] beyond the minimum time necessary to obtain a court determination on a prompt request for emergency relief would allow the creditor to obtain the relief sought without making the request that the Code requires. 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "234 B.R. 676",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes",
		"context": "In Kiobel, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that conduct occurring in the United States would be considered domestic , not extraterritoria l. Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 124 (emphasizing that \"all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States\"). Since Kiobel , the Circuit courts have reached different results applying the \"touch and concern .\" Compare Al [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], with 782 F. 3d 576. Respondents' allegations satisfy even the narrow approach adopted by the Second Circuit in 770 F. 3d 170 , whic h the Court below followed . Mastafa held that allegations of aiding and abetting conduct from U.S. soil were sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality even where both the violations aided and abetted and injuries occurred abroad .",
		"citation_value_orig": "758 F. 3d 516",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes",
		"context": "In Kiobel, the Court explicitly left open the possibility that conduct occurring in the United States would be considered domestic , not extraterritoria l. Kiobel , 569 U.S. at 124 (emphasizing that \"all the relevant conduct took place outside the United States\"). Since Kiobel , the Circuit courts have reached different results applying the \"touch and concern .\" Compare Al 758 F. 3d 516, with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' allegations satisfy even the narrow approach adopted by the Second Circuit in 770 F. 3d 170 , whic h the Court below followed . Mastafa held that allegations of aiding and abetting conduct from U.S. soil were sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality even where both the violations aided and abetted and injuries occurred abroad .",
		"citation_value_orig": "782 F. 3d 576",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes",
		"context": "Since Kiobel , the Circuit courts have reached different results applying the \"touch and concern .\" Compare Al 758 F. 3d 516, with 782 F. 3d 576. Respondents' allegations satisfy even the narrow approach adopted by the Second Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , whic h the Court below followed . Mastafa held that allegations of aiding and abetting conduct from U.S. soil were sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality even where both the violations aided and abetted and injuries occurred abroad . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F. 3d 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes",
		"context": "First, n one involved a statute focused on acts that touch ed and concern ed the United States , as the ATS does . See §§I.B and C.1, supra . Second, RJR Nabisco and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] addressed what was both the focus and text of the statute – and none remotely announce d a \"domestic injury rule.\" Everything the statute addresses —a tort in violation of the law of nations —occurred here. There is no extraterritorial application at all , and no reason to rewrite the statute's text and purpose .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 247",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Respondents' Claims Are Not Extraterritorial Based on the \"Focus\" Test Usually Applicable to Conduct Regulating Statutes",
		"context": "Everything the statute addresses —a tort in violation of the law of nations —occurred here. There is no extraterritorial application at all , and no reason to rewrite the statute's text and purpose . Microsoft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a patent case, offered no such rule and considered the non-extraterritorial interpretation consistent with the purpose and text, and offered no reason to ignore both and alter a statute here.12 12 Microsoft in particular noted that supplying goods and services from the United States —exporting assistance from here—was domestic conduct. Id. at 457.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 437",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. UNIONS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO GARNISH WORKERS' WAGES FOR ANY PURPOSE",
		"context": "at 321 (the risk of pecuniary loss must lie with the \"side whose constitutional rights are not at stake,\" i.e., the unions). Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The special benefits legislatively g iven to unions to garnish wages a re not only inc onsistent with constitutionally protected individual rights, but they are frankly anti -constitutional. Public employee collective bargaining distorts the democratic process \"because it gives one interest group, public employees and their unions, an avenue of access that is unavailable to other interest groups and may, as a practical matter, preempt the voices of competing 28 interest groups.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. UNIONS HAVE NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO GARNISH WORKERS' WAGES FOR ANY PURPOSE",
		"context": "341, 388 (2016) . This distortion of the political process that entrenches one type of political interest group— public -sector unions —at the expense of individual workers' First Amendment rights, demands especially close judicial scrutiny. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The combination of the politically weak position of dissenting workers, the unions' documented and pervasive abuses of the state- granted ability to garnish wages, 27 the lack of protection in administrative agencies,28 and the fundamental 26 United Federation of Teachers, 50 Years: 1960 -2010, http:// www.uft.org/files/attachments/uft -50-years -book.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2017) . The union won certification on the vote of 20,045 teachers.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ICWA WAS GUIDED BY, AND FURTHERED, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIAN TRIBES AND CONGRESS'S PLENARY AUTHORITY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS",
		"context": "The July 1978 House Report (No. 1386) affirmed that Congress's plenary auth ority in Indian affairs authorized its legislation in Indian child welfare. The findings contained in the House Report include an extensive discussion of the constitutional foundations and Supreme Court precedent undergirding congres - sional plenary power in Indian affairs, from the Indian Commerce Clause and the Marshall Trilogy to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the Court's then - recent decision in 435 U.S. 313. See H.R. REP. NO 95 -1386, at 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "118 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ICWA WAS GUIDED BY, AND FURTHERED, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIAN TRIBES AND CONGRESS'S PLENARY AUTHORITY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS",
		"context": "The July 1978 House Report (No. 1386) affirmed that Congress's plenary auth ority in Indian affairs authorized its legislation in Indian child welfare. The findings contained in the House Report include an extensive discussion of the constitutional foundations and Supreme Court precedent undergirding congres - sional plenary power in Indian affairs, from the Indian Commerce Clause and the Marshall Trilogy to 118 U.S. 375, and the Court's then - recent decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See H.R. REP. NO 95 -1386, at 13.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. ICWA WAS GUIDED BY, AND FURTHERED, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S TRUST RESPONSIBILITY TO INDIAN TRIBES AND CONGRESS'S PLENARY AUTHORITY IN INDIAN AFFAIRS",
		"context": "(emphasis added). Having thoroughly considered the constitutionality of ICWA, Congress's judgement in passi ng the law appropriately merits the deference customarily accorded by the Court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "453 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The First Circuit and the BIA gave no consideration to the fundamental humanitarian purposes of cancellation of removal",
		"context": "The First Circuit made no effort to construe the stop- time rule in light of the fundamental humanitarian purposes of cancellation. Neither did the BIA. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is a glaring omission. The stop-time rule— whose purposes the First Circuit misapplied—does not exist in a vacuum.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 I. & N. Dec. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ADEA's Private-Sector Provision Has No Bearing On The Question Presented",
		"context": "Gov't Cert. Response 14-17. In doing so, it relies heavily on this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which held that the private-sector provision requires such but-for causation. But as this Court has recognized, \"the prohibitory language in the ADEA's federal-sector provision differs sharply from that in the corresponding ADEA provision relating to private-sector employment.\" 553 U.S. 474.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ADEA's Private-Sector Provision Has No Bearing On The Question Presented",
		"context": "In doing so, it relies heavily on this Court's decision in 557 U.S. 167, which held that the private-sector provision requires such but-for causation. But as this Court has recognized, \"the prohibitory language in the ADEA's federal-sector provision differs sharply from that in the corresponding ADEA provision relating to private-sector employment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Gross's construction of the private- sector's language thus has no bearing on the text at issue here. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ADEA's Private-Sector Provision Has No Bearing On The Question Presented",
		"context": "See supra at 22-27. Section 633a(a) also uses maximalist language (\"free from\" and \"any\") that is notably absent from the private-sector provision. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized the \"sharp\" difference between these provisions: It has described Section 633a as a \"broad, general ban on 'discrimination based on age,\" in contrast to the private-sector provision's \"specific list of forbidden [age-based] employer practices.\" Gomez-Perez , 553 U.S. at 488, 486-87.",
		"citation_value_orig": "271 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The ADEA's Private-Sector Provision Has No Bearing On The Question Presented",
		"context": "In fact, for the reasons noted above, the language of the federal-sector ban is actually more protective of such employees than the original private-sector provision was. Supra at 30-38. In Price [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a majority of this Court interpreted Title VII's original private-sector provision to allow a plaintiff to establish liability by showing that his employer's conduct was a \"motivating\" factor in a private-sector 57 employment decision. Id. at 258 (plurality); id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Split conceded, Goertz claims that \"it is unclear whether the Eleventh Circuit would reach the same outcome if it decided the issue today.\" Opp. 26.",
		"context": "As Goertz recognizes (Opp. 28 n.14) , a panel later made clear that the \"end\" can be as late as this Court 's denial of cert. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Goertz doesn't dispute that Reed's claim is timely under this rule. Second , the ordinary understanding is that litiga- tion does not end before denial of a timely filed request for rehearing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 F. App'x 879",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The sufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, as measured by the substantial-evidence test, is distinct from procedural questions concerning the creation of that record",
		"context": "Id. at 229 -230. The Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is similar. In Campbell , SSA had rel ied on its medical -vocational guidelines to determine that \"a significant number of jobs existed\" that the claimant could perform. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 458",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The sufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, as measured by the substantial-evidence test, is distinct from procedural questions concerning the creation of that record",
		"context": "2. This Court has applied similar principles in the criminal context. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the State relied at trial on a DNA expert who, the State later conceded, made significant error s in her testimony, including testimony that erro- neously indicat ed that DNA testing had show n only \"a 0.000033% chance that [the defendant] was innocent.\" Id. at 127 -128.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The sufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, as measured by the substantial-evidence test, is distinct from procedural questions concerning the creation of that record",
		"context": "That argu- ment asserting procedural error, the Court concluded, had not been preserved by making a sufficiency -of-the- evidence argument. Id. at 135 -136; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30 The same logic applies with equal force to judicial review of evidentiary sufficiency under the substantial - evidence standard. So long as the agency could have rationally made its factual finding on the evidence in the administrative record be fore it, i.e., so long as that evi- dence is \"sufficien[t]\" for a \"reasonable mind\" to accept it \"as adequate to support\" the agency's factfinding, Consolidated Edison , 305 U.S. at 229 (emphasis omit- ted), substantial evidence support s the agency finding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The sufficiency of the evidence in the administrative record, as measured by the substantial-evidence test, is distinct from procedural questions concerning the creation of that record",
		"context": "As a result, petitioner continues (ibid. ), \"[w]hen no one questions the vocational expert's foundation or reasoning, an ALJ is entitled to accept the vocational expert's conclusion\" as \"substantial evidence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But, petitioner contends , \"if [the expert's testimony is] challenged\" by the claimant at the hearing, the \"voca- tional expert [must] make available the data underlying the expert's opinion\" in order qualify the expert's testi- mony as \"substantial evidence .\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "279 F.3d 441",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule",
		"context": "The plain-text reading of Section 314(d) is again con- firmed by this Court's direct ive that \"'[j]urisdictional rules should be clear.'\" Direct Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 1. This Court has consiste ntly emphasized the im- portance of clarity and certaint y in jurisdictional statutes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1124",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule",
		"context": "1. This Court has consiste ntly emphasized the im- portance of clarity and certaint y in jurisdictional statutes. E.g., Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court interprets jurisdictional provisions to create \"clear and administrable rules,\" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 136 S. Ct. 1562, and to avoid \"vague and obscure boundar[ies],\" Direct Mktg. , 135 S. Ct. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule",
		"context": "This Court has consiste ntly emphasized the im- portance of clarity and certaint y in jurisdictional statutes. E.g., Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312. The Court interprets jurisdictional provisions to create \"clear and administrable rules,\" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and to avoid \"vague and obscure boundar[ies],\" Direct Mktg. , 135 S. Ct. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). A jurisdictional provision should be construed to \"remain as simple as possible,\" Hertz 559 U.S. 77: \"'The boundary between judicial power and nullity should if possible, be a br ight line, so that very little thought is required to enable judges to keep inside it.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule",
		"context": "The Court interprets jurisdictional provisions to create \"clear and administrable rules,\" Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith 136 S. Ct. 1562, and to avoid \"vague and obscure boundar[ies],\" Direct Mktg. , 135 S. Ct. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). A jurisdictional provision should be construed to \"remain as simple as possible,\" Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"'The boundary between judicial power and nullity should if possible, be a br ight line, so that very little thought is required to enable judges to keep inside it.'\" U.S.C. 312(c) (2000).",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The proper construction of Section 314(d) is compelled by the need for a clear and administrable jurisdictional rule",
		"context": "This establishe s a clear pattern of Congress re- moving uncertainty by reinforcing traditional limits on review—while otherwise not upsetting Article III's traditional role in checking agency action that exceeds statutory authority, 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(C). 29 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This emphasis on \"administrative simplicity\" promotes predictability, pres erves judicial and party re- sources, and minimizes unnecessary litigation. Hertz , 559 U.S. at 94-95.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Factor one: Google's use was commercial and for the same purpose as Oracle's.",
		"context": "See TCA Television , 839 F.3d at 182. Otherwise, transformative use would swallow the de- rivative-work right because every derivative work \"adds something new.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Movies, for example, convert books' descriptions and prose to im- ages and dialogue, just as Google updated the imple- menting code for resource-constrained devices. GB43.",
		"citation_value_orig": "766 F.3d 756",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Factor one: Google's use was commercial and for the same purpose as Oracle's.",
		"context": "Besides, there are plenty of transformative uses for Oracle's declaring code that align with the classic uses listed in §107, such as copying to teach, analyze, or critique code, develop a tool for detecting code plagiarism, or research how to make an interop- erable program that does not itself infringe. Sony Comput. Entm't, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, however, Google took popular, recognizable expression and used it \"to get attention\" and \"avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh.\" Camp- bell, 510 U.S. at 580.",
		"citation_value_orig": "203 F.3d 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "This Court adopted a clear rule in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens: The \"longstanding interpretive presumption that 'person' does not i nclude the sovereign … may be disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Federal Circuit did not follow that rule in holding that the Postal Service is a \"person\" entitled to petition for CBM review. In- deed, the Federal Circuit did not mention, much less analyze , Vermont 's affirmative -showing requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "Like the Federal Circuit, it does not acknowledge or ad-dress Vermont 's affirmative -showing requirement. Although the Government argues that there \"is no 10 hard and fast rule of exclusion,\" Opp. 9 (quoting Geor- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]), that response is a red herring. This Court explained in Vermont that the presumption against cla ssifying the government as a \"person\" is not a \"hard and fast rule of exclusion\" under Georgia precisely because the presumption can be overcome by an \"affirmative showing\" of statutory intent. 529 U.S. at 781.",
		"citation_value_orig": "316 U.S. 159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "Thus, the principle that \"identical words used in dif- ferent parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning,\" Opp. 11 (citation omitted), \"readily 11 yields to context\" where, as here, a term \"take[s] on distinct characters from association with distinct stat- utory objects calling for different implementation strategies,\" Util. Air Regulatory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 6 2. The Federal Circuit's reading of the AIA's \"sued for infringement\" requirement is equally off -base.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "Congress enact ed the AIA, including its CBM provisions, against the backdrop of that established framework . See Mississippi ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 6 The rule that equitable estoppel does not lie against the Gov- ernment , Opp. 13-14, does not support the Federal Circuit's ruling.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 161",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "16, that does not establish that Return Mail \"sued\" the Postal Service \"for in- fringement\" under AIA § 18(a)(1)(B). On the contrary, the 12 The Government also fails to account for the prin- ciple that \"claim[s] for infringement ,\" which \"soun[d] in tort,\" are \"totally distinct in the law\" from \"claim[s] of compensation for an authorized use\" by the govern- ment. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Infringe- ment suits also differ from section 1498(a) actions in several other meaningful ways, including the forum for review, the scope of liability, and the measure of damages. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "155 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "Finally, although the Government cites cases that refer in passing to section 1498(a) actions as suits fo r \"infringement,\" see Opp. 17, none of th e cases turned on that issue . 8 For example, General Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], described 282 U.S. 508, as \"involv[ing] a patent infringement suit against t he United States.\" But Waite more accurately characterized that claim as a \"suit … to recover for the unlicensed use of a pa- tented invention,\" 282 U.S. at 508, without making any mention of \"infringement.\" The Government's ar- gument thus runs headlong into the rule that \"[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record \" do not complaint pled a single count for \"unlicensed use of the '548 pa- tent\" under section 1498(a), which does not mention \"infringement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "Finally, although the Government cites cases that refer in passing to section 1498(a) actions as suits fo r \"infringement,\" see Opp. 17, none of th e cases turned on that issue . 8 For example, General Motors 461 U.S. 648, described [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as \"involv[ing] a patent infringement suit against t he United States.\" But Waite more accurately characterized that claim as a \"suit … to recover for the unlicensed use of a pa- tented invention,\" 282 U.S. at 508, without making any mention of \"infringement.\" The Government's ar- gument thus runs headlong into the rule that \"[q]uestions which merely lurk in the record \" do not complaint pled a single count for \"unlicensed use of the '548 pa- tent\" under section 1498(a), which does not mention \"infringement.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "282 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S JUDGMENT IS INCORRECT",
		"context": "22 -23. 13 \"constitute precedents.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "A. \"As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution es- tablishes a system of dual sovereignty between the -6- States and the Federal Government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This foundational princi- ple offers \"numerous advantages.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "at 459 . States are \"en- dowed with all the functions essential to separate and independent existence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As James Madison put it, the \"powers reserved in the State governments\" extend \"to all objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.\" The Fede ral- ist No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "74 U.S. 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "1961) . Of those powers reserved to States, the authority to structure labor relations with its employees \"is as sover- eign a power as any that a State possesses.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A State's \"extra power\" to regulate its labor relations derives from \"the nature of the government's mission as employ er.\" Waters , 511 U.S. at 674 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "(LMRA) ( same); Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, Am. Fed'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1949 ); 431 U.S. 209 . 1. Congress was first to act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 U.S. 5",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "(LMRA) ( same); Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129, Am. Fed'n of 335 U.S. 5 (1949 ); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 1. Congress was first to act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 209",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "§ 151, to \"create[] a system for dispute resolu- tion.\" Burlington N. R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . At the heart of this system was a model of exclusive representation: \"[I]n recognition of the expenses and burd ens incurred by the unions,\" the RLA enabled workers to select one union that would serve as their exclusive representative in collective -bargaining negotiations . The law also imposed a corresponding duty on the union to represent all em- ployees fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "At the heart of this system was a model of exclusive representation: \"[I]n recognition of the expenses and burd ens incurred by the unions,\" the RLA enabled workers to select one union that would serve as their exclusive representative in collective -bargaining negotiations . The law also imposed a corresponding duty on the union to represent all em- ployees fairly, in good faith, and without discrimination. See Int'l Ass'n of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As amended, the RLA specifically authorize s \"union -shop\" arrange ments and include s provisions requiring workers to pay fees to the union designated as their exclusive -bargaining representative as a condition of continued employment. 45 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "§ 152 ; see also Ry. Emp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Congress carried that framework for ward when , in 1935, it passed the National Labor Relations Act —one of -8- the most far -reaching federal laws regulating private - sector labor relations. As with the RLA, Congress sought to end labor strife and to reduce the need for labor strikes by fostering a collective -bargaining pro- cess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 225",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "And Congress once again selecte d a system found- ed on exclusive representation as the best model for achieving labor peace. See First Nat'l Maint. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 674 –75 (1981 ). To protect the effec- tive operation of the exclusive -representation system, the NLRA also authorized \"agency shop\" agreements requiring all represented employees to pay fees to cover costs of collective bargaining. See Commc'ns Worke rs of 487 U.S. 735 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "452 U.S. 666",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "452 U.S. 666, 674 –75 (1981 ). To protect the effec- tive operation of the exclusive -representation system, the NLRA also authorized \"agency shop\" agreements requiring all represented employees to pay fees to cover costs of collective bargaining. See Commc'ns Worke rs of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But these agency fees could not fund unrelated political lobbying; instead, they could only compensat e the union for actual collective -bargaining -related activi ties. Street , 367 U.S. at 749 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 735",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "2. This Court, too, has repeatedly recognized the important interests in exclusive representation in both the private and public sectors. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Empo- rium Capwell 420 U.S. 50 ; Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emps.",
		"citation_value_orig": "301 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "2. This Court, too, has repeatedly recognized the important interests in exclusive representation in both the private and public sectors. See, e.g., 301 U.S. 1 ; Empo- rium Capwell [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emps.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 U.S. 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emps. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also Abood , 431 U.S. at 220 –21; 551 U.S. 177 . On the federal side, this Court has shown unwaver- ing support for the exclusive -representation approach. In Street , for instance, the Court explained that exclusive representa tion gives unions \"a clearly defined and delin- eated role\" in \"stabilizing labor relations in [an] indus- try.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Emps. , 466 U.S. 435 ; see also Abood , 431 U.S. at 220 –21; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . On the federal side, this Court has shown unwaver- ing support for the exclusive -representation approach. In Street , for instance, the Court explained that exclusive representa tion gives unions \"a clearly defined and delin- eated role\" in \"stabilizing labor relations in [an] indus- try.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 177",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "at 761 . Eliminating the \"free rider\" problem is, therefore, an \"essential justifica- tion\" for union fees . Ellis , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But this Court has confirmed Congress's requirement that chargeable activitie s must be germane to collective -bargaining activ- ity; they cannot include unrelated political lobbying. Street , 367 U.S. at 764 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "See Bonner School Dist. No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Und er the MCA, rank -and-file employees of State and local governments enjoy rights parallel to those protected under federal legislation: the rights to organize themselves; to join, -11- form , and assist a labor organization ; to bargain collec- tively ; and to engage in secret -ballot representation elections. Compare § 39-31-201, § 208 with 29 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "176 P.3d 262",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "§ 39-31-208(5) . The chosen exclusive representa- tive must also comply with a duty of fair representation to all employees in the unit, whether or not they are union members. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Teamsters Local No. 724 P.2d 189 . And, like federal frameworks, Montana law also permits public employers and unions to enter into collec- tive-bargaining agreements contain ing agency -shop clauses.",
		"citation_value_orig": "598 P.2d 604",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Montana's sovereign authority to structure its own government programs is well established",
		"context": "The chosen exclusive representa- tive must also comply with a duty of fair representation to all employees in the unit, whether or not they are union members. See 598 P.2d 604 ; Teamsters Local No. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And, like federal frameworks, Montana law also permits public employers and unions to enter into collec- tive-bargaining agreements contain ing agency -shop clauses. See § 39-31-401(3) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "724 P.2d 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Con- clusion. Despite the ample evidence that Title VII's statuto- ry scheme bars jurisdiction over claims that have not been presented to the EEOC in the first instance, 33 several courts of appeals—including the Fifth Circuit below—have concluded that Zipes v.Trans World Airlines, Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], dictates that the EEOC's exhaustion requirement is non- jurisdictional. Those courts are incorrect. Zipes addressed the jurisdictional status of Title VII's timeliness requirement, not its exhaustion require- ment, and the Zipes Court deemed the timeliness requirement non-jurisdictional for reasons that have no application to the statute's exhaustion provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 385",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Id. And the Court's prior cases had repeatedly \"referred to the provision as a limita- tions statute\" and treated it as such. Id.at 395-396 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Albemarle Paper Co. v.Moody , 422 U.S. 405). For all these reasons, the Court viewed the timeliness requirement as non-jurisdictional. But all of those reasons are germane solely to the statute's timeliness requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "424 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Id. And the Court's prior cases had repeatedly \"referred to the provision as a limita- tions statute\" and treated it as such. Id.at 395-396 (citing424 U.S. 747; Albemarle Paper Co. v.Moody , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). For all these reasons, the Court viewed the timeliness requirement as non-jurisdictional. But all of those reasons are germane solely to the statute's timeliness requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 405",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "See infra pp. 42, 48-49. Thus, while the Court has sometimes loosely referred to Zipes as holding that \"Title VII's EEOC filing requirement was nonjurisdictional,\" Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.Much- nick, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Union Pac. R.R. Co.v.Bhd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "R.R. Co.v.Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], there is no question that the case's holding is confined to the \" timely filing\" requirement. Zipes , 455 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). 35 Indeed, the Zipes Court could not have issued a holding with respect to the jurisdictional nature of the exhaustion requirement because the \"plaintiff class filed its charge with the EEOC\" before initiat- ing suit.",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Zipes , 455 U.S. at 393 (emphasis added). 35 Indeed, the Zipes Court could not have issued a holding with respect to the jurisdictional nature of the exhaustion requirement because the \"plaintiff class filed its charge with the EEOC\" before initiat- ing suit. In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The only question was whether that charge came too late for some of the class members. Id.at 1147-48.",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.2d 1142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Id.at 1147-48. Accordingly, this Court's more recent precedents have correctly re- ferred to Zipes as a case about the jurisdictional nature of a time bar. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Nor is there any other reason to assume that the non-jurisdictional nature of Title VII's timeliness requirement necessarily extends to the statute's exhaustion requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Nor was this a mere oversight: McNeil 'streatment of the exhaustion requirement as jurisdictional was discussed by the parties in their briefing and refer- enced at oral argument. SeeTr. of Oral Argument at 27-29, McNeil , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 92-6033), 1993 WL 751850; U.S. Br. at 15-16, McNeil , 508 U.S. 106 (No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "of Oral Argument at 27-29, McNeil , 508 U.S. 106 (No. 92-6033), 1993 WL 751850; U.S. Br. at 15-16, McNeil , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 92-6033), 1993 WL 347205. Yet the Court never hinted that its decision in Wong had any effect on McNeil.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "To begin, statutory time limits and exhaustion provisions are enacted against very different legal backdrops. The principle that statutory time limits are subject to equitable tolling and therefore non- jurisdictional is \"a long-established feature of Ameri- can jurisprudence derived from 'the old chancery rule.' \"Lozano v.Montoya Alvarez , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Based on this common-law rule, courts presume that Congress intended equitable tolling to apply so long as it is \"consistent with the statute.\" Id.at 11; see Astoria Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Id.at 11; see Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The opposite is true with respect to exhaustion. In 1945, the Court was already able to point to a \"long- settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "The opposite is true with respect to exhaustion. In 1945, the Court was already able to point to a \"long- settled rule of judicial administration that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.\" Levers v.Anderson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court's practice has long been to construe 38 statutory exhaustion requirements strictly, \"refusing to add unwritten limits onto their rigorous textual requirements\" and \"rejecting every attempt to devi- ate from [their] textual mandate[s].\" 136 S. Ct. 1850.",
		"citation_value_orig": "326 U.S. 219",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Levers v.Anderson , 326 U.S. 219. And the Court's practice has long been to construe 38 statutory exhaustion requirements strictly, \"refusing to add unwritten limits onto their rigorous textual requirements\" and \"rejecting every attempt to devi- ate from [their] textual mandate[s].\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In other words, while courts have historically used their equitable discretion to create exceptions to statutorily mandated time limits, they have long \"refus[ed]\" to exercise the same authority with respect to statutory exhaustion mandates. Given that backdrop, it is reasonable to assume that Con- gress expects its statutory deadlines to be enforced flexibly, while expecting its exhaustion requirements to be enforced as jurisdictional prerequisites.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "§ 2000e-5(f)(1). This language is \"similar to other\" exhaustion requirements \"that this Court has deemed jurisdictional.\" Patchak v.Zinke , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For example, inMathews , the exhaustion requirement that the Court found jurisdictional stated that \" '[a]ny indi- vidual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to which he was a party may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action.' \" 424 U.S. at 328.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 897",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "\" 424 U.S. at 328. Moreover, Section 2000e-5(f)(1) is \"house[d]\" in the same section as the statute's \"jurisdictional grant,\" and is \"link[ed]\" to the provision vesting jurisdiction in federal courts. Wong , 135 S. Ct. at 1633; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a section that the Zipes Court described—in its entirety—as \"[t]he provision granting district courts jurisdiction under Title VII.\" 455 U.S. at 393. That is likely because all three components of Section 2000e-5(f) work together to establish jurisdiction over Title VII claims: Sec- tion 2000e-5(f)(1) sets out the circumstances in which the Commission or the Attorney General \" may bring a civil action,\" and the conditions under which a \"civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the charge\" by \"the person claiming to be aggrieved.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 428",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Id.§ 2000e- 44 5(g)(1). As a consequence, a court cannot award these forms of relief without \"work[ing] a kind of linguistic havoc\" on the statute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, all of the provisions governing judicial review repeatedly refer to the \"charge\" and the \"respondent,\" demon- strating that Congress did not envision any judicial review where there was merely a \"complaint\" and a \"defendant.\" See 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "John R. Sand , 552 U.S. at 133. Section 2000e- 5(f) serves this goal directly by ensuring that state sovereign immunity is abrogated for a claim brought against a state employer only if the State has had an opportunity to resolve the claim outside of court first. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] also indirectly prevents the Federal Gov- ernment from enduring a waiver of its sovereign immunity that is broader than Congress intended: Section 2000e-16 governs Title VII claims against the Federal Government, and it explicitly incorpo- rates the exhaustion requirement of Section 2000e- 5(f). See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d).7 7InIrwin v.Department of Veterans Affairs , 498 U.S. 89, this Court suggested that the timeliness requirement in Section 2000e-5 and the timeliness requirement in Section 2000e-16 should both be deemed non-jurisdictional because permitting \"equitable tolling\" would \"amount[ ] to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver\" of sovereign immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "See538 U.S. 721 also indirectly prevents the Federal Gov- ernment from enduring a waiver of its sovereign immunity that is broader than Congress intended: Section 2000e-16 governs Title VII claims against the Federal Government, and it explicitly incorpo- rates the exhaustion requirement of Section 2000e- 5(f). See42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d).7 7InIrwin v.Department of Veterans Affairs , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court suggested that the timeliness requirement in Section 2000e-5 and the timeliness requirement in Section 2000e-16 should both be deemed non-jurisdictional because permitting \"equitable tolling\" would \"amount[ ] to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver\" of sovereign immunity. 498 U.S. at 95. The opposite is true for the exhaustion requirement: Whereas permitting equitable tolling merely affects the timing of a suit, requiring a plaintiff to follow the administrative 47 Third ,Title VII's exhaustion requirement \"pro- mot[es] judicial efficiency,\" John R. Sand , 552 U.S. at 133, by facilitating the voluntary resolution of claims, mandating efforts at informal conciliation, and—if a suit is necessary—giving the expert agency an opportunity to take the lead in bringing any litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "498 U.S. 89",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "Irwin therefore suggests that the exhaus- tion requirement should be treated as jurisdictional to avoid significantly broadening the congressional waiver of sovereign immunity. 48 As to Title VII in particular: Shortly after the statute's enactment, this Court twice held that the filing of \"charges of employment discrimination with the Commission\" is one of \"the jurisdictional prereq- uisites to a federal action.\" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.Green , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; seeAlexan- der, 415 U.S. at 47 (same). In the years since, the Court has refined those blunt statements: In Zipes , the Court clarified that the Act's \" timely filing\" requirement is not jurisdictional. 455 U.S. at 392- 393 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "And the Court's precedent since then has confirmed the jurisdictional nature of the exhaustion requirement: In Waffle House , the Court explained that Title VII grants the EEOC \"exclusive jurisdiction over [a] claim for 180 days,\" 534 U.S. at 288 (emphasis added). That statement would be false if courts have jurisdiction to hear Title VII clams whenever they are brought. Most recently, in Arbaugh v.Y & H Corp. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court held that Title VII's employee numerosity requirement is not jurisdictional. But the analysis that led the Court to that conclusion points in the opposite direction with respect to the exhaustion requirement. Notably, the Court held that the numerosity requirement was non- jurisdictional because (1) \"[n]othing in the text of Title VII indicates that Congress\" wants courts to be able to raise numerosity \"on their own motion\"; (2) numerosity is properly regarded as an \"element\" of the claim that should be left to a jury to decide; and (3) it would be inequitable to force courts to dismiss claims that do not meet the numerosity requirement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "In Reed Elsevier , the Court held that a requirement will be deemed jurisdictional where the \"Court's interpretation of similar provi- sions\" shows that the requirement is of a \"type that is properly ranked as jurisdictional absent an express designation.\" 559 U.S. at 168. The Reed Elsevier Court further explained that in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court had deemed an appellate filing deadline jurisdictional because it \"was of a type [the Court] had long held didspeak in jurisdictional terms even absent a jurisdictional 51 label\" and because \"nothing about [the provision's] text or context, or the historical treatment of that type of limitation, justified a departure from this view.\" 559 U.S. at 168 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same is true with respect to Title VII's exhaus- tion provision.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Zipes Does Not Support A Contrary",
		"context": "In the absence of an explicit statutory indication like that found in the PLRA, the Court has consist- 53 ently refused to treat statutory exhaustion require- ments as non-jurisdictional. Indeed, in Hall- strom v.Tillamook Cty. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court confronted a statutory provision that required a litigant to give a federal agency, a State, and an alleged violator 60 days' notice before filing suit regarding certain environmental violations. The statute did not set out any detailed administrative process in connection with the notice requirement, and it contained an express exception permitting litigants to forgo notice with respect to suits raising certain violations. See42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "493 U.S. 20",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Defendants' Limiting Construction Would Eviscerate the Civil Remedy Congress Created in Section 1810",
		"context": "Defendants acknowledge that Congress meant to \"creat[e] a private cause of action for damages\" in 49 1810 to remedy unlawful elec tronic surveillance, Br. 41, but their construction eviscerates that remedy by permitting the Government to win dismissal of virtually all such suits by invoking state secrets. See Mobil Oil [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 50 U.S.C. 1810, Congress provided victims of unlawful surveillance a civil damages remedy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "436 U.S. 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": "A court conducting review under the APA \"may not accept appellate counsel's post hoc rationalizations for agency action.\" Burlington Truck Lines , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners have argued in these proceedings that the terminat ion decision may be justified on an alternati ve \"litigation risk\" rationale. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": "See Dep't of Commerce , 139 S. Ct. at 2573; Camp , 411 U.S. at 143. If the decision cannot be sustained on that basis, the proper course is normally to vacate the decision and remand to the agency for further con- sideration. See Camp , 411 U.S. at 143; Fla. Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see gen- erally 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Vacatur allows the agency to \"deal with the problem afresh,\" Chenery II , 332 U.S. at 201, and it serves an important \"'think -it-over' func- tion,\" Friendly, Chenery R evisited , 1969 Duke L.J.",
		"citation_value_orig": "470 U.S. 729",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": "At its most formal this practice is known as \"remand without vacatur ,\" and it is not without controversy.19 But it has been recognized by the D.C. Circuit , see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and finds some support in this Court's jurisprudence , see Camp , 411 U.S. at 143; Overton Park , 401 U.S. at 420. It affords the agency 19 See, e.g. , 23 F.3d 452.",
		"citation_value_orig": "925 F.3d 1279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": ", 925 F.3d 1279, and finds some support in this Court's jurisprudence , see Camp , 411 U.S. at 143; Overton Park , 401 U.S. at 420. It affords the agency 19 See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 49 an opportunity to submit \"an amplified articulation\" of the rationale it originally advanced . Local 814, Int'l Bhd.",
		"citation_value_orig": "23 F.3d 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": "49 an opportunity to submit \"an amplified articulation\" of the rationale it originally advanced . Local 814, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What it does not afford is an opportunity to defend an old de- cision on new rationales. Whether the \"additional explanation \" is obtained through a formal remand, id., or through a less formal procedure, it \"should be merely explanatory of the original record and should contain no new rationalizations.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 F.2d 989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. \"Litigation risk\"",
		"context": "Envtl. Def. Fund, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court's decision in Camp underscores that limitation . The Court acknowledged the possibility of seeking \"additional explanation\" of the agency 's \"curt\" stated rationale, which rested on a \"finding that a new bank was an uneconomic venture.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.2d 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Jurisprudence Is the Forerunner of the Wands Factors and the Manner in Which the Federal Circuit Applies Them to Functional Claims.",
		"context": "Importantly, the Court invariably consid- ers the very factor attacked by Amgen in this case— how unpredictability will affect the skilled artisan's ability to extrapolate the function of a disclosed em- bodiment to undisclosed embodiments captured by the claimed genus, and how that unpredictability, com- bined with the breadth of the claim, will impact the amount of experimentation necessary to practice the full scope. The Court first addressed the issue head-on in the seminal decision O'Reilly v. Morse , which involved Samuel Morse's patenting of the \"electric-magnetic telegraph\" for transmitting \"characters, signs or let- ters at a distance.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Morse described and claimed \"specific machin- ery\" for accomplishing the transmission. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "56 U.S. 62",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Jurisprudence Is the Forerunner of the Wands Factors and the Manner in Which the Federal Circuit Applies Them to Functional Claims.",
		"context": "This Court's decisions following O'Reilly take ac- count of the same factual considerations and reach similar conclusions. The patent in Béné v. Jeantet claimed a method of subjecting hair \"to the action of chemicals\" (without limitation) defined only by their ability to reduce hair diameter; the specification dis- closed a single chemical mixture having that function. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court recognized that 13 the effectiveness of using chemicals in the method re- mained unpredictable, even in view of the patent's teachings, and would have to be determined case-by- case through experimentation for each undisclosed chemical candidate: [T]he specification is not full and clear enough to give one skilled in chemistry such an idea of the particular kinds and character of the chemicals, or combina- tion of chemicals, with the relative pro- portions of each, as would enable him to use the invention without having to re- sort to experiments of his own to discover those ingredients. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "129 U.S. 683",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Jurisprudence Is the Forerunner of the Wands Factors and the Manner in Which the Federal Circuit Applies Them to Functional Claims.",
		"context": "Because \"no one can tell, except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device,\" the Court declared the patent \"void.\" Id. at 474; see also Corona Cord Tire [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (claim to all disubstituted guanidines that function as an accelerator in vulcanizing rubber not enabled where the breadth of the claim covered up to 100 substances; only one example in the patent and no \"showing that there is any general quality common to disubstituted guanidines which made them all ef- fective as accelerators\"; and the art was unpredicta- ble—\"[t]he catalytic action of an accelerator cannot be forecast by its chemical composition, for such action is not understood and is not known except by actual test\"); Holland Furniture 277 U.S. 245. The Court's reasoning in these cases rests on two basic principles. First, predictability in the art is in- versely proportional to the quantity of experimental effort: the less predictable the art, the more work will need to be done to establish whether the claimed func- tion of a disclosed embodiment is a universal property that can be extrapolated to any one of the undisclosed embodiments within the claimed genus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "276 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. This Court's \"Full Scope\" Enablement Jurisprudence Is the Forerunner of the Wands Factors and the Manner in Which the Federal Circuit Applies Them to Functional Claims.",
		"context": "Because \"no one can tell, except by independent experiments, how to construct the patented device,\" the Court declared the patent \"void.\" Id. at 474; see also Corona Cord Tire 276 U.S. 358 (claim to all disubstituted guanidines that function as an accelerator in vulcanizing rubber not enabled where the breadth of the claim covered up to 100 substances; only one example in the patent and no \"showing that there is any general quality common to disubstituted guanidines which made them all ef- fective as accelerators\"; and the art was unpredicta- ble—\"[t]he catalytic action of an accelerator cannot be forecast by its chemical composition, for such action is not understood and is not known except by actual test\"); Holland Furniture [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court's reasoning in these cases rests on two basic principles. First, predictability in the art is in- versely proportional to the quantity of experimental effort: the less predictable the art, the more work will need to be done to establish whether the claimed func- tion of a disclosed embodiment is a universal property that can be extrapolated to any one of the undisclosed embodiments within the claimed genus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "277 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
		"context": "Alaska Air- lines , 480 U.S. at 686. The Court regards such clauses as merely \"provid[ing] a rule of construction which may sometimes aid in determining [congressional] in-tent\" with respect to severance of a defective provi-sion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A severability clause \"is an aid merely; not an inexora- ble command.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
		"context": "Dodd-Frank's severability clause does not permit severance of the removal bar because that provision is \"inextricably bound together\" with the remainder of Title X. Planned Parenthood of Cent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 259 U.S. 44. From the Bureau's conception through to its enactment in Dodd-Frank, the central organizing principle for it was that complete insulation from po-litical control would allow it to serve consumers' in-terests in a way that other agencies—beholden to Congress, the President, or both and too often cap- tured by industry—could not and did not. That intention is reflected throughout Title X, be- ginning with its establishment of an \"independent bu- reau,\" through the at-will removal bar, its independ-ence from the Federal Reserve, its independence from 18 the appropriations process, the authority to adminis- ter scores of preexisting independent-agency statutes, its independent litigation authority, and ultimately the vesting of enormous unila teral authority in a Di- rector whose freedom from oversight and restraint would facilitate presidential-style dispatch and vigor to advance consumer interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
		"context": "Dodd-Frank's severability clause does not permit severance of the removal bar because that provision is \"inextricably bound together\" with the remainder of Title X. Planned Parenthood of Cent. 428 U.S. 52; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. From the Bureau's conception through to its enactment in Dodd-Frank, the central organizing principle for it was that complete insulation from po-litical control would allow it to serve consumers' in-terests in a way that other agencies—beholden to Congress, the President, or both and too often cap- tured by industry—could not and did not. That intention is reflected throughout Title X, be- ginning with its establishment of an \"independent bu- reau,\" through the at-will removal bar, its independ-ence from the Federal Reserve, its independence from 18 the appropriations process, the authority to adminis- ter scores of preexisting independent-agency statutes, its independent litigation authority, and ultimately the vesting of enormous unila teral authority in a Di- rector whose freedom from oversight and restraint would facilitate presidential-style dispatch and vigor to advance consumer interests.",
		"citation_value_orig": "259 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
		"context": "Had Congress enacted a \"fallback\" like in Bowsher , 478 U.S. at 735–36, that replaced the single-head structure with a multi-member commission, its inten-tions for the Bureau could be preserved, at least in some measure. But it did not, and the Court lacks the authority to frame a new regulatory body itself. Severance would rewrite the statute no less than the Court's legislating a commission to replace the Di-rector, because it would \"create a program quite dif-ferent from the one the legislature actually adopted,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And that would \"be a more extreme exercise of the judicial power than striking the whole statute.\" National Fed- eration of Independent 567 U.S. 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "413 U.S. 825",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Act's Severability Clause Does Not License Rewriting the Statute",
		"context": "Severance would rewrite the statute no less than the Court's legislating a commission to replace the Di-rector, because it would \"create a program quite dif-ferent from the one the legislature actually adopted,\" 413 U.S. 825. And that would \"be a more extreme exercise of the judicial power than striking the whole statute.\" National Fed- eration of Independent [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The author ity to take that drastic step resides exclusively with Congress. 19",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 F.3d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 F.3d 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F. Supp. 2d 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 F. Supp. 3d 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". ...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 F.3d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................7 891 F.3d 1311 (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "...............7 m. Any Recommendation that the Court Grant Certiorari Should Include the Conditional Cross-Petition. ........... ..............11 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 692 F.3d 661 2 317 F.3d 954 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 12 Bolivarian Republic of 137 S. Ct. 1312 2, 5, 12 439 U.S. 379 7 891 F.3d 1311 12 397 U.S. 471 7 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084 de 139 S. Ct. 784 7 777 F.3d 847 8, 9 JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,412 F.3d 418 8 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 10 785 F.3d 545 2 248 F. Supp. 3d 59 1, 7, 9 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Abelesz v. Magltar Nemzeti Bank, 692F.3d661 (7thCir.20l2) ..,.........2 317 F.3d 954 .... 2, 12 Arch Trading 839 F.3d 193 ..........t2 Bolivarian Republic of Venezuelav. Helmerich & Payne International Drilling Co., 137 S. Ct. 13 ....................3 616 F.3d 1019 2,5, t2 439 U.S. 379 .......................7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (11thCir.2018) .,......,.............r2 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 47t (re70) ........................7 Davoyan v. Republic of Turkey, 116 F. Srpp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "891 F.3d 1311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C.V., 4t2F.3d4rg (2d Cir. 2005) ........... 8 Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362F. Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 3 550 F.3d 822 11 911 F.3d 1172 8 971 F.2d 989 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 785 F.3d 545 ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 3 550 F.3d 822 11 911 F.3d 1172 8 971 F.2d 989 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) 1, 5, 10 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: 114-319 (2016) 9 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, H.R. 6130, Public Law 114-308 4 OTHER Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Philipp et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 785 F.3d 545 ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 11 911 F.3d 1172 8 971 F.2d 989 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) 1, 5, 10 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: 114-319 (2016) 9 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, H.R. 6130, Public Law 114-308 4 OTHER Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Philipp et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 785 F.3d 545 ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 3 550 F.3d 822 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 8 971 F.2d 989 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) 1, 5, 10 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: 114-319 (2016) 9 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, H.R. 6130, Public Law 114-308 4 OTHER Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Philipp et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 785 F.3d 545 ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 3 550 F.3d 822 11 911 F.3d 1172 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.461 U.S. 480 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) 1, 5, 10 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: 114-319 (2016) 9 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, H.R. 6130, Public Law 114-308 4 OTHER Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Philipp et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "971 F.2d 989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Supp.2d298 (D.D.C.200s) ............... 10 785 F.3d 545 ........2 Philipp v. Federal Republic of Germany, 248F. Supp.3d 59 (D.D.C. 2017) 1,J,9 11 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 3 550 F.3d 822 11 911 F.3d 1172 8 971 F.2d 989 7 917 F.3d 586 7 Verlinden B. V.[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2, 3, 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976) 1, 5, 10 Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: 114-319 (2016) 9 Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act, H.R. 6130, Public Law 114-308 4 OTHER Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, Philipp et al.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "17-7064 (consolidated with No. 17-7117) (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2017) 10 iii Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. t34 (2014) ....................1, 8 Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....................... 3 550 F.3d 822 .........11 Simonv. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172 ........................8 United States v. Lieberman, 97t F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992) ............7 Unrted States v. Street, 917 F3d 586 (7th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "17-7064 (consolidated with No. 17-7117) (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2017) 10 iii Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. t34 (2014) ....................1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 ....................... 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .........11 Simonv. Republic of Hungary, 911 F.3d 1172 ........................8 United States v. Lieberman, 97t F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992) ............7 Unrted States v. Street, 917 F3d 586 (7th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "17-7117) (D.C. Cir. Dec. 1, 2017) 10 iii Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 573 U.S. t34 (2014) ....................1, 8 Republic of 541 U.S. 677 ....................... 3 550 F.3d 822 .........11 Simonv. Republic of Hungary, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................8 United States v. Lieberman, 97t F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1992) ............7 Unrted States v. Street, 917 F3d 586 (7th Cir. 2019) ...........7 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.480 (1983) ........................3 DOCKETED CASES 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489 2,3,12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "That leaves the very different question of prudential exhaustion, which the Court of Appeals rightly rejected consistent with this Court's guidance in Republic of 573 U.S. 134. To the extent that judicial abstention may be appropriate in some cases brought under the FSIA, this is already available through forum non conveniens—a defense of which Petitioners availed themselves but abandoned on appeal after the District Court ruled against them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put another way, this case does not present a vehicle to vindicate any U.S. interest. Introduction Germany-the perpetrator of the Holocaust and the reason the term genocide was coined-has asked the Court to take this case and to side with the argument that Nazi persecution of German Jews did not violate international law within the meaning of the expropriation exception of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (\"FSIA,\" 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "248 F. Supp. 3d 59",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "True, the D.C. Circuit's holding—the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings—follows a decision that the Seventh Circuit reached years earlier. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But in fact, both the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits were preceded by the Ninth Circuit, which held Austria and Spain, respectively, were amenable to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception for Nazi art thefts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "But in fact, both the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits were preceded by the Ninth Circuit, which held Austria and Spain, respectively, were amenable to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception for Nazi art thefts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 616 F.3d 1019; 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084. Moreover, the Amicus Brief's footnote citation to the holding in Mezerhane v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela shows that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings. 785 F.3d 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "317 F.3d 954",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "But in fact, both the Seventh and the D.C. Circuits were preceded by the Ninth Circuit, which held Austria and Spain, respectively, were amenable to jurisdiction under the expropriation exception for Nazi art thefts. 317 F.3d 954; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084. Moreover, the Amicus Brief's footnote citation to the holding in Mezerhane v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela shows that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings. 785 F.3d 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "317 F.3d 954; see also 616 F.3d 1019; 116 F. Supp. 3d 1084. Moreover, the Amicus Brief's footnote citation to the holding in Mezerhane v. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela shows that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recently, a District Court in the Fourth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's holding in this case in ruling that the theft of an art collection from a Dutch Jew properly states a claim for a taking in violation of international law that satisfies that element of § 1605(a)(3).",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Altmannv. Republic of Aus.,3l7 F.3d954,968 (9th Cir. 2002); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 16 F. Supp. 3d 1084. Moreover, the Amicus Brief s footnote citation to the holding in Mezerhane v. Repilblica Bolivariana de Venezuela shows that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings. 785 F.3d 545.",
		"citation_value_orig": "616 F.3d 1019",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "2002); see also 616 F.3d 1019; 16 F. Supp. 3d 1084. Moreover, the Amicus Brief s footnote citation to the holding in Mezerhane v. Repilblica Bolivariana de Venezuela shows that the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that the expropriation exception applies to genocidal takings. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Recently, a District Court in the Fourth Circuit adopted the D.C. Circuit's holding in this case in ruling that the theft of an art collection from a Dutch Jew properly states a claim for a taking in violation of intemational law that satisfies that element of $ 1605(a)(3).1 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84489.In other words, I This case from the Fourth Circuit, which the Amicus Brief does not acknowledge, belies the Amicus Brief s claim that fuither development in the Courts of Appeal is unlikely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "785 F.3d 545",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "This Court recently clarified that this is a high bar, and it protects many defendants from ever addressing the merits of a case. A court must \"decide the foreign sovereign's immunity defense `[a]t the threshold' of the action.\" Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiff faces a substantial burden on a motion to dismiss under the FSIA. \"Where .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "at 1324. In the relatively few cases where jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign does exist, \"statutes of limitations, personal jurisdiction and venue requirements, and the doctrine of forum non conveniens will limit the number of suits brought in American courts.\" Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals has merely left open a very narrow door, available to very few plaintiffs. Indeed, in the Berg case noted above, the defendant Dutch instrumentalities successfully moved to dismiss at the threshold stage notwithstanding the applicability of the FSIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "A court must \"decide the foreign sovereign's immunity defense '[a]t the threshold' of the action.\" Bolivarian Republic of Venez. v. Helmerich & Payne Int'l Drilling Co.,l37 S. Ct. 1312,1314;1324 (2017) (quoting Verlinden [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The plaintiff faces a substantial burden on a motion to dismiss under the FSIA. \"Where .",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 480",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "at 1324. In the relatively few cases where jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign does exist, \"statutes of limitations, personal jurisdiction and venue requirements, and the doctrine of .forum non conveniens will limit the number of suits brought in American courts.\" Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In deciding this case, the Court of Appeals has merely left open a very naffow door, available to very few plaintiffs. Indeed, in the Berg case noted above, the defendant Dutch instrumentalities successfully moved to dismiss at the threshold stage notwithstanding the applicability of the FSIA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Even if Plaintiffs had never made the argument, however, they would be free to do so now. \"Appellees, as the prevailing parties, may of course assert any ground in support of that judgment, `whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]16 F. App'x 333971 F.2d 989. II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Even if Plaintiffs had never made the argument, however, they would be free to do so now. \"Appellees, as the prevailing parties, may of course assert any ground in support of that judgment, `whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial court.' 439 U.S. 37916 F. App'x 333[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review.",
		"citation_value_orig": "971 F.2d 989",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Even if Plaintiffs had never made the argument, however, they would be free to do so now. \"Appellees, as the prevailing parties, may of course assert any ground in support of that judgment, 'whether or not that ground was relied upon or even considered by the trial couft.\"' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Much as an appellee is free to argue altemative grounds to support a judgment without filing a cross-appeal, the government was free to argue different grounds supporting the same bottom- line recommendation[. ]\"); 16 F. App'x 333 (\"[A]nappelleemayproffer alternative arguments to support the district court's decision without filing a cross-appeal.\"). II.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 U.S. 379",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": ". permits courts to recognize the 'legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation[.] \"' Amicus Brief, 3 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) (emphasis added). This case does not involve any \"judicial acts\" by Germany. There is neither a judgment already reached abroad, nor a related proceeding in a German court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "There is neither a judgment already reached abroad, nor a related proceeding in a German court. This case, therefore, does not present the issue of what deference our courts may show to ongoing proceedings or judicial resolutions abroad. See JP Morgan Chase Bank v. Altos Hornos de Mex., S.A. de C. V.,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Amicus Brief's devotion to the topic expresses the desire to foster enforcement of final judgments, a desire that cannot be vindicated or resolved in this case. Whether NML Capital's guidance affects adjudicatory comity is therefore not a question before the Court, and the Amicus Brief effectively talks past this actual case in leading with a discussion of adjudicatory comity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 F.3d 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Whether NML Capital's guidance affects adjudicatory comity is therefore not a question before the Court, and the Amicus Brief effectively talks past this actual case in leading with a discussion of adjudicatory comity. Germany, of course, champions the more controversial doctrine of prudential exhaustion, arguing that plaintiffs with valid FSIA claims should be required to exhaust their remedies abroad—an argument that depends on a Seventh Circuit decision which, in the words of the RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), \"add[ed] a substantive requirement for jurisdiction that is not supported by the statute or its legislative history.\" § 455, Reporter's Note 11 (discussing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Consistent with that reasoning, the Court of Appeals has disallowed the novel defense of prudential exhaustion but has also held: \"the ancient doctrine of forum non conveniens is not displaced by the FSIA.\" 911 F.3d 1172.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.3d 847",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "§ 455, Reporter's Note 11 (discussing 777 F.3d 847). Consistent with that reasoning, the Court of Appeals has disallowed the novel defense of prudential exhaustion but has also held: \"the ancient doctrine of forum non conveniens is not displaced by the FSIA.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Further, the Amicus Brief concedes that Fischer is wrong: \"The Seventh Circuit, however, mistakenly described its application of comity as `impos[ing] an exhaustion requirement that limits where plaintiffs may assert their international 8 v. Guyot, 159 U.S. Il3, 164 (1895)) (emphasis added). This case does not involve any 'Judicial acts\" by Germany.",
		"citation_value_orig": "911 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "That temporal distance does not affect the language's plain meaning. More relevant-but unaddressed-is Congress's revision of this very exception in 2016 inthe Foreign Cultural Exchange Jurisdictional Clarification Act, Public Law No: ll4-319 (2016) (the \"FCEJCA\"). The FCEJCA amended § 1605(a)(3) to exclude temporary exhibition loans of cultural objects from the \"commercial activity\" necessary to satisfy the commercial nexus component of the expropriation exception (effectively overruling by statute the result in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Yet while narrowing FSIA jurisdiction —now forty years after the enactment of the FSIA (to use the Amicus Brief's frame of reference) and exactly twenty years after the insertion of the terrorism exception —Congress made an explicit exception for claims concerning Nazi-looted art. In other words, in enacting a law that limited the reach of the FSIA expropriation exception and having already articulated an exhaustion requirement for terrorism claims, Congress expressly preserved the scope of such claims when they arise out of Nazi confiscation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 F. Supp. 2d 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Are No Issues of International Comity That Warrant Review",
		"context": "Further, Germany's denial of responsibility disposes of the prudential exhaustion requirement entirely, even if Plaintiffs could obtain some remedy in Germany (which they cannot). Finally, exhaustion is not required for claims of \"universal concern,\" such as allegations regarding genocide. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH), § 413. Even if Germany could mount a comity-based exhaustion defense, the defense would fail, and there is no basis to remand for that futile assertion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F.3d 822",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit Overbroadly Defined an \"Expressive Work\" as Any Product that Contains Any Expression",
		"context": "Thus, the district court ruled the \"standard trademark likelihood of confusion analysis, not Rogers , is appropriate.\" Id. (citing AMF [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 6, abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, 353 F.3d 792). 6. In Sleekcraft , the court held that the factors relevant to a determination whether a defendant's use constitutes trademark infringement include (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) the proximity of the parties' goods in the marketplace; (3) the similarity of the parties' marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used by the parties; (6) the type of goods at issue and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood of expansion of the parties' product lines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "599 F.2d 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Ninth Circuit Overbroadly Defined an \"Expressive Work\" as Any Product that Contains Any Expression",
		"context": "Thus, the district court ruled the \"standard trademark likelihood of confusion analysis, not Rogers , is appropriate.\" Id. (citing AMF 599 F.2d 341 6, abrogated on other grounds by Mattel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 6. In Sleekcraft , the court held that the factors relevant to a determination whether a defendant's use constitutes trademark infringement include (1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark, (2) the proximity of the parties' goods in the marketplace; (3) the similarity of the parties' marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used by the parties; (6) the type of goods at issue and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) the defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) the likelihood of expansion of the parties' product lines.",
		"citation_value_orig": "353 F.3d 792",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Plessy v. Ferguson",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court upheld a state law enforcing \"separate but equal\"public accommodations for black and white citizens,saying: We consider [a] fallacy . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 537",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "at 8a. This Court has recognized three \"conditions\" that limit a court's authority to issue a writ of mandamus un- der the All Writs Act . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. First, \" the party seek- ing issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "As previously expl ained, t o the extent respondents objected to the use of pretrial re- straints in their own criminal cases, they could have sought to overturn their convictions in the normal course following final judgment . See Deck , 544 U.S. at 635 ( reversing and remanding based on defendant's due process challenge to use of restraints during capital sentencing) ; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And insofar as respondents sought to challenge the security policy as a gener al matter —separate from whether the use of restraints in their individual cases provided a basis for challenging their convictions on appeal —that challenge would more properly have been brought in a civil suit, as a class ac- 29 tion if appropriate, with appel late review available fol- lowing issuance or denial of the requested relief . See, e.g., Florence , supra; McLaughlin , supra ; Bell, supra.",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "Proce edings on a writ of supervisory mandamus — which, inter alia , are unlikely to allow for the develop- ment of a full record —cannot take the place of an or- derly civil action. Second , respondents cannot show that their \" right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable,\" Cheney , 542 U.S. at 381 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In rejecting respondents' claims , the district court relied on the Ninth Circuit's prior decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which had upheld the Central Dist rict of California's policy of maintaining leg restraints on criminal defendants dur- ing their initial appearances. Howard , in turn, relied on this Court's statement in Deck that the common -law rule against physically restraining criminal defendants \"did not apply at ' the time of arraignment, ' or like pro- ceedings before the judge.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 F.3d 1005",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "87a (district court observing that respondent s were \" essen- tially arguing the losing position in Howard \"). \"Manda- mus, i t must be remembered, does not run the gauntlet of reversible errors.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although the district court failed to anticipate that a bare majority of Ninth Circuit judges sitting on the en banc panel would distinguish this case from Howard , \"the most that can be claimed on this rec- ord is that [the district court] may have erred in ruling on matters within [its] jurisdiction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "389 U.S. 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "Be- cause the \" general policy against piecemeal appeals takes on added weight in criminal cases ,\" Will , 389 U.S. at 96, this Court has been particularly reluctant to allow mandamus review in such cases . See id. at 96 -98; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although mandamus may be appropriate in certain cir- cumstances , such as \"willful disobedi ence of the rules laid down by this Court,\" Will , 389 U.S. at 100, or \" a deliberate policy in open defiance of the federal rules in matters of pretrial criminal discovery ,\" id. at 102, the district court's \"good faith effort to follow [circuit] case law\" h ere does not present such a circumstance.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 U.S. 513",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The Ninth Circuit did not have authority to issue a writ of \"supervisory mandamus\"",
		"context": "53a (Ikuta, J., dissenting). Rather, because the \"district court has acted within its jurisdiction and has rendered a decision which, even if erroneous, invo lved no abuse of judicial power,\" the Ninth C ircuit in this case \"has done no more than substitute mandamus for an appeal contrary to the statutes and the policy of Con- gress, which has restricted that court 's appellate review to final judgments of the district court. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 31",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Court should require the Ninth Circuit to honor its Rule 23 obligations and avoid deprivations of due process",
		"context": "7 -8 (\"we scrutinize the proceedings to discern whether t he [lower] court sufficiently 'account[ed] for the possibility that class representatives and their counsel have sacrificed the interests of absent class members for their own benefit\"), 10 (\"we benchmark whether the district court discharged its obligatio n to assure that the settlement is 'fair, adequate, and free from collusion.'\") It did so, however, without once 17 mentioning the requirement of a \"rigorous analysis.\" Having previously expressed its unwillingness to inquire too rigorously into the nature of a cy pres award because to do so would be \"an intrusion into the private parties' negotiations [that] would be improper and disruptive to the settlement process ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit maintained its perverse standard here by \"quickly dispos[ing]\" of claims that a cy pres -only settlement appropriated the class members' legal claims for the personal benefit of class counsel and defendant. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "696 F.3d 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Court should require the Ninth Circuit to honor its Rule 23 obligations and avoid deprivations of due process",
		"context": "Pet. App. 12 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Once again, however, the lower court failed to engage in a r igorous analysis —or even mention the requirement —a decision which fell short of the required \"higher level of scrutiny for evidence of collusion or other conflicts of interest.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.3d 1034",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Court should require the Ninth Circuit to honor its Rule 23 obligations and avoid deprivations of due process",
		"context": "Pet. App. 25 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) That the lower court failed to engage in any form of rigorous analysis is made worse by its acknowledgement that \"the district court cannot as effectively monitor for collusion and other abuses.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "654 F.3d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "That argument is premised on a definition of \"function\" that has no support in the a ct or the decisions of this or any other Court. When C oNTU and Congress referred to \"function\" in connection with computer programs, they spoke in terms of the \"electromechanical functioning of a machine,\" C oNTU r eport at 20, or the \"certain result\" that is brought about when the program is used in a computer, as set forth in the definition of \"computer program\" in § 101 of the a ct: \"a 'computer program' is 9. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10. 499 U.S. 340.",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.3d 1339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "750 F.3d 1339. 10. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.\" The function on which Google rests its merger argument is not the \"electromechanical functioning of a machine\" but simply the \"function\" of replicating elements of Java.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "That looks less like innovation, and more like the pursuit of a larger market by riding the coattails of an earlier innovator, one who was ready, willing and able to enter into a license agreement with Google for precisely this use. even among the developer community, Google admits that there were \"countless new developers\" of a ndroid products who did not even know Java before a ndroid 11. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. a s Campbell makes clear, \"avoid[ing] the drudgery of working up something fresh\" is exactly what the Copyright a ct prohibits the creators of derivative works from doing. 10 launched.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "The district court granted summary judgment for Castle rock, and the Second Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the facts depicted in a Seinfeld episode are utterly unlike the facts depicted in a biography, historical text, or compilation. Seinfeld is fiction; both the \"facts\" in the various episodes, 12. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13. 150 F.3d 132.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE COURT SHOULD REJECT GOOGLE'S FAIR USE ARGUMENT",
		"context": "499 U.S. 340. 13. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 11 and the expression of those facts, were created by the show's producers. So too here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "831c(b). As this Court has explained, \"[c]ourts have read\" that provision to \"mak[e] the TVA liable to suit in tort, subject to cer- tain exceptions. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], both of which held that TVA's sue-and-be-sued clause does not waive immunity from tort suits arising from the agency's exercise of discre- tionary functions. See People's Nat'l Bank , 812 F.2d at 684-685 (finding TVA immune from tort claim aris ing from agency's development and administration of a loan program); Queen , 689 F.2d at 84- 85 (finding TVA im- mune from tort claim arising from agency's actions pur-suant to a statutory mandate directing TVA to conduct studies and experiments to promote the wider and bet- ter use of electric power). Subsequent decisions from 17 those circuits adhere to the holding that TVA may in- voke discretionary function immunity .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "See People's Nat'l Bank , 812 F.2d at 684-685 (finding TVA immune from tort claim aris ing from agency's development and administration of a loan program); Queen , 689 F.2d at 84- 85 (finding TVA im- mune from tort claim arising from agency's actions pur-suant to a statutory mandate directing TVA to conduct studies and experiments to promote the wider and bet- ter use of electric power). Subsequent decisions from 17 those circuits adhere to the holding that TVA may in- voke discretionary function immunity . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 255 F.3d 318 that TVA is immune from tort actions based on the perfor- mance of discretionary function s is consistent with this Court's decision s addressing sue -and-be-sued clauses. This Court has long recognized that such waivers must \"be construed with reference to the powers conferred by the provisions to which they relate\" and are subject to implied limitations in appropriate circumstances. People of Porto 227 U.S. 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 F.3d 1294",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "See People's Nat'l Bank , 812 F.2d at 684-685 (finding TVA immune from tort claim aris ing from agency's development and administration of a loan program); Queen , 689 F.2d at 84- 85 (finding TVA im- mune from tort claim arising from agency's actions pur-suant to a statutory mandate directing TVA to conduct studies and experiments to promote the wider and bet- ter use of electric power). Subsequent decisions from 17 those circuits adhere to the holding that TVA may in- voke discretionary function immunity . See 855 F.3d 1294 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that TVA is immune from tort actions based on the perfor- mance of discretionary function s is consistent with this Court's decision s addressing sue -and-be-sued clauses. This Court has long recognized that such waivers must \"be construed with reference to the powers conferred by the provisions to which they relate\" and are subject to implied limitations in appropriate circumstances. People of Porto 227 U.S. 270.",
		"citation_value_orig": "255 F.3d 318",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "This Court has long recognized that such waivers must \"be construed with reference to the powers conferred by the provisions to which they relate\" and are subject to implied limitations in appropriate circumstances. People of Porto 227 U.S. 270. In Federal Housing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the Court stated that alt- hough a waiver of immunity from suit through a ge neral sue-and-be-sued clause should be \"liberally construed, \" implied limitations to the waiver may be warranted in certain circumstances. Id. at 245.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 242",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "Ibid. The Court observed in Burr that \"w hen Congress es- tablishes an agency, authorizes it to engage in commercial and business transactions with the public, and permits it to 'sue and be sued,' it cannot be lightly assumed that restrictions on that authority are to be im- plied.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Court further explained that a sue -and-be-sued clause may be subject to implied limitations if it can be show n \"[1] that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitu-tional scheme, [2] that an implied restriction of the gen- eral authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or [3] that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ' sue and be sued ' clause in a narrow sense. \" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 U.S. 245",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "But the Court further explained that a sue -and-be-sued clause may be subject to implied limitations if it can be show n \"[1] that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitu-tional scheme, [2] that an implied restriction of the gen- eral authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or [3] that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ' sue and be sued ' clause in a narrow sense. \" Ibid. (footnote omitted); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see also 510 U.S. 471. As an example of the first category , the Court cited People of Porto Rico , which held that an organic act pro- vision giving Puerto Rico's gov ernment the power \"to sue and be sued\" did not waive Puerto Rico's sovereign immunity. 227 U.S. at 277.",
		"citation_value_orig": "486 U.S. 549",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Sue-and-be-sued clauses embody limitations on the waiver of sovereign immunity applicable in appropriate circumstances",
		"context": "But the Court further explained that a sue -and-be-sued clause may be subject to implied limitations if it can be show n \"[1] that certain types of suits are not consistent with the statutory or constitu-tional scheme, [2] that an implied restriction of the gen- eral authority is necessary to avoid grave interference with the performance of a governmental function, or [3] that for other reasons it was plainly the purpose of Congress to use the ' sue and be sued ' clause in a narrow sense. \" Ibid. (footnote omitted); see 486 U.S. 549 ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As an example of the first category , the Court cited People of Porto Rico , which held that an organic act pro- vision giving Puerto Rico's gov ernment the power \"to sue and be sued\" did not waive Puerto Rico's sovereign immunity. 227 U.S. at 277.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 471",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": ". It is well-established that independent review can cure sentencing error because \"state appellate courts can and do give each defendant an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant's circumstances, his background, and the crime.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 136 S. Ct. 616, did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 738",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "It is well-established that independent review can cure sentencing error because \"state appellate courts can and do give each defendant an individualized and reliable sentencing determination based on the defendant's circumstances, his background, and the crime.\" 494 U.S. 738. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\" Clemons , 494 U.S. at 748 (citing 468 U.S. 447; 462 U.S. 862; 455 U.S. 104; 438 U.S. 586.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 616",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 616, did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\" Clemons , 494 U.S. at 748 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 462 U.S. 862; 455 U.S. 104; 438 U.S. 586. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court's independent review, which requires the court to review the findings of aggravation and mitigation and \"independently determine if the mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation,\" A.R.S. § 13-755, achieves those twin objectives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 616, did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\" Clemons , 494 U.S. at 748 (citing 468 U.S. 447; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 455 U.S. 104; 438 U.S. 586. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court's independent review, which requires the court to review the findings of aggravation and mitigation and \"independently determine if the mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation,\" A.R.S. § 13-755, achieves those twin objectives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 862",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 616, did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\" Clemons , 494 U.S. at 748 (citing 468 U.S. 447; 462 U.S. 862; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 438 U.S. 586. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court's independent review, which requires the court to review the findings of aggravation and mitigation and \"independently determine if the mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation,\" A.R.S. § 13-755, achieves those twin objectives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "136 S. Ct. 616, did not overrule Clemons and does not change this. \"The primary concern in the Eighth Amendment context has been that the sentencing decision be based on the facts and circumstances of the defendant, his background, and his crime.\" Clemons , 494 U.S. at 748 (citing 468 U.S. 447; 462 U.S. 862; 455 U.S. 104; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, the Arizona Supreme Court's independent review, which requires the court to review the findings of aggravation and mitigation and \"independently determine if the mitigation the supreme court finds is sufficiently substantial to warrant leniency in light of the existing aggravation,\" A.R.S. § 13-755, achieves those twin objectives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Requiring resentencing to correct Eddings error violates the principles of finality",
		"context": "Moreover, this logical procedure aligns with the principles of finality. As this Court has recognized, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be permitted to \"litigate his claims indefinitely in hopes that [this Court] will one day have a change of heart.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respecting finality, this Court should hold that a state court can conduct error correction in a collateral independent review proceeding without reopening direct review, such that neither the application of current law, nor resentencing, is required.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
		"context": "That is because religious liberty claims are best decided, and typically decided, on a retail rather than wholesale basis. The reason lies with the nature of Free Exercise claims, which must be rooted in religious conscience in order to be valid. In contrast to Free Speech claims, where the First Amendment protects the \"marketplace of ideas,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Free Exercise Clause protects re ligious conscience as it manifests itself in public or in private. That is why a Free Exercise plaintiff must prove sincerity, while a Free Speech plaintiff need not. That is also why in making out her claim a Free Exercise plaintiff must explain the nature and religiosity of her beliefs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
		"context": "That is also why in making out her claim a Free Exercise plaintiff must explain the nature and religiosity of her beliefs. \"[P]hilosophical and personal rather than religious\" beliefs are not enough. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The plaintiff's contested actions or omissions must be manifestations of a sincere reli- gious belief. And because a Free Exercise plaintiff must prove up both sincerity and the specific nature of her religious beliefs and practices, it is difficult for courts to decide Free Exe rcise claims in gross.",
		"citation_value_orig": "406 U.S. 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
		"context": "And because a Free Exercise plaintiff must prove up both sincerity and the specific nature of her religious beliefs and practices, it is difficult for courts to decide Free Exe rcise claims in gross. This retail focus is true as well of the govern- ment's strict scrutiny affirmative defense. As the 34 Court put it in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause is evaluated \"through application of the challenged law 'to the person'—the particular claimant whose sincere exer- cise of religion is being substantially burdened.\" 546 U.S. at 430-31 (citat ion omitted). \"In [ 374 U.S. 398 and Yoder ], this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specif- ic exemptions to particular religious claimants.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
		"context": "As the 34 Court put it in 546 U.S. 418, strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause is evaluated \"through application of the challenged law 'to the person'—the particular claimant whose sincere exer- cise of religion is being substantially burdened.\" 546 U.S. at 430-31 (citat ion omitted). \"In [ [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] and Yoder ], this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specif- ic exemptions to particular religious claimants.\" Ibid. Given this fact-specific, \"to the person\" approach, on remand Respondents should establish, and the lower courts should determine, the factual circum-stances of both the nature and sincerity of Respond- ents' claims, as well as the specific justifications the government has for applying the Proclamation to the \"particular claimant[s]\" who can make out a proper showing of burden on a sincere religious exercise.",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A proper Free Exercise analysis would focus on the facts concerning specific plaintiffs",
		"context": "Yet no one has had a chance to engage in this sen- sible fact-specific and plaintiff-specific approach be-cause the lower courts have followed the failed Lem- on test rather than the proven Lukumi analysis. \"Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie,\" Lem- on continues to sow confusion in the lower courts, de- spite \"being repeatedly killed and buried\" by this Court. Lamb's [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court should resolve the confusion, and make clear that Lukumi , rather than Lemon , controls religious-targeting claims like this one. It is said that bad fa cts make bad law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 922(g)'s regulatory prohibition of firearm-related conduct by certain categories of people applies irrespective of a regulated person's mens rea",
		"context": "Section 922(g)'s prohibitions are not contingent on mens rea. The provision does not i nclude any such re- quirement explicitly, and a mens rea requirement can- not be inferred implicitly. The presumption of mens rea that may apply when a defendant faces \"punishment for a harmful act,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not apply to a regulatory pro- vision that merely specifies whether certain conduct is lawful, without attaching any punishment. It would not be sensible to construe Section 922(g) as, for example, allowing someone \"adjudicated as a mental defective,\" 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(4), to possess a gun, so long as his men-tal deficiency precludes him from remembering the ad- judication.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 922(g)'s regulatory prohibition of firearm-related conduct by certain categories of people applies irrespective of a regulated person's mens rea",
		"context": "Nor would an alien unlawfully in the United States be entitled under Section 922(g)(5) (A) to possess a gun, where he is reckless or ne gligent about his immi- gration status. As this Court has recognized, Section 922(g) is de- signed \"to keep guns out of the hands of those who have demonstrated that they may not be trusted to possess a firearm without becoming a threat to society.\" Dicker- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], either textually or otherwise, suggests that someone who falls into a class deemed to present such a danger would be entitled to possess a gun based on his lack of self-awareness about the circumstances that make him dangerous. Rather, \"the persons Congress classified as potentially irre- sponsible and dangerous are comprehensively barred by the [statute] from acquiring firearms by any means.\" 423 U.S. 212 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 922(g)'s regulatory prohibition of firearm-related conduct by certain categories of people applies irrespective of a regulated person's mens rea",
		"context": "Dicker- 460 U.S. 103, either textually or otherwise, suggests that someone who falls into a class deemed to present such a danger would be entitled to possess a gun based on his lack of self-awareness about the circumstances that make him dangerous. Rather, \"the persons Congress classified as potentially irre- sponsible and dangerous are comprehensively barred by the [statute] from acquiring firearms by any means.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2. The absence of any mens rea requirement in Sec- tion 922(g) itself is particularly instructive when com- pared to other neighboring firearm regulations that do contain such requirements.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 U.S. 212",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 922(g)'s regulatory prohibition of firearm-related conduct by certain categories of people applies irrespective of a regulated person's mens rea",
		"context": "The absence of any mens rea requirement in Sec- tion 922(g) itself is particularly instructive when com- pared to other neighboring firearm regulations that do contain such requirements. \"Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute bu t omits 17 it in another section of the same Act, it is generally pre- sumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the dis parate inclusion or exclusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —including where the recipient is an alien \"illegally or unlawfully in the United S tates.\" 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(5)(A) (emphasis added) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit has also adopted Rogers , and ap- pears to have followed the lead of the Second Circuit in moving away from the \"explicitly misleading\" inquiry, in favor of requiring a particularly compelling likeli- hood of confusion to outweig h the public interest in free expression where use of the mark is relevant to an artistic or parodic work. See Westchester [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but the court nevertheless af- firmed the lower court's finding of a particularly 18 compelling likelihood of confusion, pointing to evidence that defendant's intent was to trade on the goodwill and reputation of the mark owner's clothing brand, as well as survey evidence of actual confusion and evi-dence that the products \"target the same consumers and on occasion use the same retail outlets.\" Id. at 668.",
		"citation_value_orig": "214 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "at 668. The other two circuits to have adopted the Rogers doctrine, the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, appear to apply the explicitly misleading requirement more rig-idly, even outside the context of titles, though in both circuits the doctrine is relatively undeveloped. See ETW [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of 683 F.3d 1266.",
		"citation_value_orig": "332 F.3d 915",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "See ETW 332 F.3d 915; Univ. of Ala. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not ado pted the more specific Rogers doctrine (requiring no artistic relevance or explicitly misleadingness) despite having had opportunities to do so, and have offered some criticism and skepticism of at least the strongest versions the doctrine, such as suggesting that it may be unnecessary because the likelihood of confusion test itself can sufficiently ac- count for First Amendment interests. The Fourth Circuit has suggested that a proper application of the Lanham Act should generally be enough to protect free speech.",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 1266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have not ado pted the more specific Rogers doctrine (requiring no artistic relevance or explicitly misleadingness) despite having had opportunities to do so, and have offered some criticism and skepticism of at least the strongest versions the doctrine, such as suggesting that it may be unnecessary because the likelihood of confusion test itself can sufficiently ac- count for First Amendment interests. The Fourth Circuit has suggested that a proper application of the Lanham Act should generally be enough to protect free speech. See Radiance Found., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Fourth Circuit has reasoned that when marks are \"used to parody, satirize, criticize, comment or compare,\" that use should be considered in the ap- plication of the likelihood of confusion test, generally weighing against confusion. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "786 F.3d 316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "at 324-25. For example, in Louis Vuitton , the Fourth Circuit found that dog toys loosely resembling small Louis Vuitton handbags were not likely to confuse consumers into thinking that they were made or sponsored by Louis Vuitton, in part because the dog toys were \"suc- cessful parodies of LVM handbags and the LVM marks and trade dress.\" Louis Vuitton Malletier [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court explained that a \"parody relies upon a differ- ence from the original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to produce its desired effect,\" such that although a finding of parody is not dispositive as to likelihood of confusion, \"an effective parody will actually diminish the likelih ood of confusion, while an ineffective parody does not.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "at 260-61. The Third Circuit has similarly suggested that Rogers may be unnecessary, stating that \"the Lanham Act customarily avoids violating the First Amendment, in part by enforcing a trademark only when consumers are likely to be misled or confused by the alleged in- fringer's use.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Tenth Circuit has also suggested that the more specific Rogers test is unnecessary because trade- mark law already has a \"bu ilt-in mechanism\" to avoid 20 First Amendment concerns, in that \"the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion, but, in the case of a good trademark parody, there is little likeli- hood of confusion, since the humor lies in the difference between the original and the parody.\" Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 F.3d 1007",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "542 F.3d 1007. The Tenth Circuit has also suggested that the more specific Rogers test is unnecessary because trade- mark law already has a \"bu ilt-in mechanism\" to avoid 20 First Amendment concerns, in that \"the Lanham Act requires proof of a likelihood of confusion, but, in the case of a good trademark parody, there is little likeli- hood of confusion, since the humor lies in the difference between the original and the parody.\" Cardtoons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A district court in that circuit has criticized the test as \"needlessly rigid and failing to ac- count for the realities of each situation.\" 460 F. Supp. 3d 1133.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 F.3d 959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "460 F. Supp. 3d 1133. The Eighth Circuit has applied the more general balancing of public interest in free expression versus public interest in avoidin g confusion, but has not ap- plied the more specific Rogers test of no artistic rele- vance or explicitly misleading, and has made clear that courts should consider the likelihood of confusion prior to considering whether the First Amendment bars trademark protection. See Anheuser-Busch, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is consonant with the appro ach of the Seventh Circuit, which found it \"unnecessary to consider possible con- stitutional defenses to trademark enforcement\" in a case where the complaint had failed to allege likeli-hood of confusion as to source, and \"any such allegation would be too implausible to support costly litigation.\" Eastland Music Group, 707 F.3d 869.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 F.3d 769",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Most Other Circuits Have Declined To Adopt The Ninth Circuit's Rigid Explicit Misleadingness Approach",
		"context": "See Anheuser-Busch, 28 F.3d 769. This is consonant with the appro ach of the Seventh Circuit, which found it \"unnecessary to consider possible con- stitutional defenses to trademark enforcement\" in a case where the complaint had failed to allege likeli-hood of confusion as to source, and \"any such allegation would be too implausible to support costly litigation.\" Eastland Music Group, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no per se rule against estopping the government",
		"context": "Return Mail , 868 F.3d at 1364. Although the Government has not been subject to estoppel in other contexts , see Office of Pers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the unavailability in one context does not show that Congress intended for the government to be f ree from the estoppel flowing from AIA post- grant proceedings. Richmond stands for the unremarkable proposition that the g overnment is not equitably estopped from denying statutory benefits to a claimant seeking public funds even if a government employee misapplies a statute. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 414",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no per se rule against estopping the government",
		"context": "The overarching premise supporting the Richmond decision is that \"the United States is neither bound nor estopped by acts of its officers or agents in 24 entering into an arrangement or agreement to do or cause to be done what the law does not sanction or permit.\" Id. (quoting Utah Power & Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The Richmond Court recognized that there was no per se rule precluding government estoppel. Richmond , 496 U.S. at 423 (\"We leave for another day whether an est oppel claim could ever succeed against the Government.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "243 U.S. 389",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. There is no per se rule against estopping the government",
		"context": "Furthermore , the nature of the estoppel considered in Richmond is materially different than the estoppel built directly into the AIA provisions. 25 The equitable estoppel at issue in Richmond \"rests on misleading .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Unlike the federal employee in Richmond who provided misinformation to the benefits claimant, there are no wrongful activities at play here —only the scope and meaning of a statu tory term, \"person,\" and whether certain patent challenges are permissible. Moreover, Richmond narrowly relate s to the disbursement of public funds to claimants, and, in denying that estoppel attached, the Richmond Court observed that it took \"a most strict approach to estoppel claims involving public funds.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 663",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THROUGH DETERMINED EVASION, RECALCITRANT STATES HAVE SUBORDINATED THE RIGHTS TO SERVE ON AND BE TRIED BY FAIRLY CONSTITUTED JURIES TO ANTI-BLACK DISCRIMINATION",
		"context": "Of course, enslaved Black persons were deprived of the rights of citizenship. But even in the \"free\" Northern states, it appears that no African Americans served on a jury before two served in Massachusetts in 1860.3 It took a Civil War and three Reconstruction Amendments to defeat the claim that African Americans could not be full citizens of this country. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And since 1880, it has been clear that the racial exclusion of jurors violates the Fourteenth Amendment. See Batson , 476 U.S. at 85 (citing Strauder ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 742",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONERS PLEADED VIOLATIONS OF RESPONDENTS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES",
		"context": "Petitioners validly pleaded that respondents vio- lated their fiduciary duties. A complaint survives a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs' factual allegations \"'allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'\" Matrixx Initiatives, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]550 U.S. 544. Applying these standards, the Amended Complaint easily surpasses the pleading hurdle: petitioners' well-pleaded factual allegations – taken as true – state plausible claims th at respondents breached ERISA's duty of prudence by making (or failing to make) decisions that result ed in erosion of partici- pants' retirement savings by excessive fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. PETITIONERS PLEADED VIOLATIONS OF RESPONDENTS' FIDUCIARY DUTIES",
		"context": "Petitioners validly pleaded that respondents vio- lated their fiduciary duties. A complaint survives a motion to dismiss when plaintiffs' factual allegations \"'allo[w] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'\" Matrixx Initiatives, 563 U.S. 27[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Applying these standards, the Amended Complaint easily surpasses the pleading hurdle: petitioners' well-pleaded factual allegations – taken as true – state plausible claims th at respondents breached ERISA's duty of prudence by making (or failing to make) decisions that result ed in erosion of partici- pants' retirement savings by excessive fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 U.S. 544",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Domain Names Can Represent Source Identifying Locations on the Internet",
		"context": "IpO believes that the addition of a \".com\" or other g e n e ri c TL D to d e n o te a s pecifi c, s o urce i d e n tifyin g location on the internet can result in a protectable mark. Unlike general terms for traditional brick-and-mortar companies such as \"crab house,\" see Hunt Masters, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], looking to the component parts of a domain name may not unambiguously represent the primary significance of the term as a whole. See In re Hotels. com, 573 F.3d at 1305 (acknowledging that \"consumers may automatically equate a domain name with a brand name\") (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "240 F.3d 251",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
		"context": "Buckley , 424 U.S. at 71-72. But, as shown by a substantial body of evidence, significant hostility, harassment, and reprisals frequently arise against those people and groups pu blicly identified with controversial issues. Although many incidents likely have gone unreported, 5 available sources help 5 See Declaration of Sarah Troupi s in Support of Defendant- Intervenors' Motion for a Protective Order at 4, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 3:09- 10 illustrate what the New Yo rk Times has called the \"ugly specter of intimidation \" experienced by people who supported Prop 8,6 as well as harassment and reprisals experienced by others outside California and in contexts other than Prop 8. The Supreme Court has recognized that harassment and reprisals against donors are \"cause for concern.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
		"context": "The Supreme Court has recognized that harassment and reprisals against donors are \"cause for concern.\" Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 370 (referring to examples of \"recent events in which donors to certain causes we re blacklisted, threatened, or otherwise targeted for retaliation.\"). See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 08-205) (describing \"widespread economic reprisals against financial supporters of . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
		"context": "6 Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Sh ows Disclosure Law Is 2- Edged Sword , N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU3. 11 See, e.g. , Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Marriage and Public Policy in Support of Defendant-Intervenors, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17-18, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559); Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defense Fund in Support of Appellant at 17-22, Citizens United , 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205); Cleta Mitchell, Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First Amendment , 96 Minn. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "704 F. Supp. 2d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
		"context": "6 Brad Stone, Prop 8 Donor Web Site Sh ows Disclosure Law Is 2- Edged Sword , N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 2009, at BU3. 11 See, e.g. , Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Marriage and Public Policy in Support of Defendant-Intervenors, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17-18, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 09-559); Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defense Fund in Support of Appellant at 17-22, Citizens United , 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205); Cleta Mitchell, Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First Amendment , 96 Minn. L. Rev.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The Public Threats, Harassment, Intimidation, and Retaliation Faced by Donors of Controversial Organizations Are Real, Not Speculative",
		"context": "11 See, e.g. , Brief of Amicus Curiae Institute for Marriage and Public Policy in Support of Defendant-Intervenors, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921; Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 17-18, 561 U.S. 186 (No. 09-559); Brief of Amicus Curiae Alliance Defense Fund in Support of Appellant at 17-22, Citizens United , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (No. 08-205); Cleta Mitchell, Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First Amendment , 96 Minn. L. Rev. 1755, 1760-61 (2012) (stating that \"evidence of the harassment campaign against donors to Proposition 8\" was \"extensive\" and \"widespread\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "558 U.S. 310",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pursuing Damages Under the Guise of Equity Deprives Defendants of their Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right.",
		"context": "By labeling their monetary demand as \"equitable\" relief, the FTC deprives defendants of their Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in \"[s]uits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "28 U.S. 433",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pursuing Damages Under the Guise of Equity Deprives Defendants of their Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right.",
		"context": ". to 'actions brought to enforce statutory rights that are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or admiralty.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because deception cases sound in fraud—a classic legal action—the second inquiry is paramount. The FTC camouflages its demand for legal damages by labeling it \"restitution, the refund of monies paid, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Pursuing Damages Under the Guise of Equity Deprives Defendants of their Seventh Amendment Jury Trial Right.",
		"context": "Whether restitution is legal or equitable depends on the nature of the remedy sought. Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see generally John E. Villafranco & Daniel S. Blynn, Consumer Redress Under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act: Correcting the Record , Regulatory Focus (Nov. 2010) (explaining the difference between equitable and legal restitutions, and FTC's history of seeking ultra vires legal damages in Section 13(b) actions), http://bit.ly/2JZrBiO. Restitution may be equitable \"where money or property identified as belonging in good conscience to the plaintiff could clearly be traced to particular funds or property in the defendant's 26 possession.\" Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "In ascertaining the meaning of that phrase, this C ourt must apply the \" fundamental princi- ple of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from the context in which it is used. \" Yates v. United States , 135 S. Ct . 1074, 1082 (2015) (plurality opinion); accord Star Athletica, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ERISA 's extensive mandatory disclosure provisions make clear that Con- gress intended the required disclosures to confer knowledge of the information they contain on plan par- ticipants. Those provisions establish that a plan partic- ipant \"ha[s] actual knowledge \" of information that is in his possession because it was conveyed to him pursuant to ERISA 's disclosure scheme —regardless of whether he actually read the disclosures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1002",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "The precise mean ing of the phrase \"had actual knowledge \" can vary according to the statutory context. At a high level of generality, \" actual knowledge \" can con- note subjective awareness of a particular fact. See UMG Recordings, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But, depending on the context, the term \"actual knowledge \" can be, and often has been, construed to encompass more than that. 23 For instance, it is well established that the term \"ac- tual knowledge \" can include willful blindness, i.e., situ- ations in which a party does not subjectively know a fact because he deliberately avoided acquiring that knowledge.",
		"citation_value_orig": "718 F.3d 1006",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "But, depending on the context, the term \"actual knowledge \" can be, and often has been, construed to encompass more than that. 23 For instance, it is well established that the term \"ac- tual knowledge \" can include willful blindness, i.e., situ- ations in which a party does not subjectively know a fact because he deliberately avoided acquiring that knowledge. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a statutory knowledge requirement is construed to include willful blindness, proof of subjective knowledge of the relevant fact is unnecessary. 163 F.3d 889.",
		"citation_value_orig": "741 F.3d 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "See, e.g., 741 F.3d 452. When a statutory knowledge requirement is construed to include willful blindness, proof of subjective knowledge of the relevant fact is unnecessary. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Simi- larly, some courts have also held that a person has the statutorily required \"actual knowledge, \" despite a claim of ignorance, \" when the means of knowledge are imme- diately at his hand; or at least [he has] the possession of complete means of information, \" such as possession of a document containing the information. 69 S.W. 595.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 F.3d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "69 S.W. 595. Still others have held that \" actual knowledge \" goes beyond \" express cognition \" to encompass \"awareness implied from knowledge of circumstances \" that are sufficiently clear to suggest that the failure to learn the relevant fact is a product of \" bad faith. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord, e.g., Knowledge , Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining \" implied actual knowledge \" as distinct from \" constructive knowledge \"). And courts have held, in the context of a California stat- ute construed to require \" actual knowledge \" of one' s ob- ligation to register, tha t one who forgets to register has the requisite actual knowledge, even though technically \"a person cannot be said to know something if he or she has forgotten it. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 A.2d 677",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "2009) (defining \" implied actual knowledge \" as distinct from \" constructive knowledge \"). And courts have held, in the context of a California stat- ute construed to require \" actual knowledge \" of one' s ob- ligation to register, tha t one who forgets to register has the requisite actual knowledge, even though technically \"a person cannot be said to know something if he or she has forgotten it. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 24 As these examples show, an \"actual knowledge \" re- quirement may, depending on the context, be satisfied by circumstances that do not establish purely subjective cognition of a particular fact. To determine the meaning of \"had actual knowledge \" in Section 1113(2), therefore, this Court must l ook to the statutory structure and con- text in which that phrase is used.",
		"citation_value_orig": "96 P.3d 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "24 As these examples show, an \"actual knowledge \" re- quirement may, depending on the context, be satisfied by circumstances that do not establish purely subjective cognition of a particular fact. To determine the meaning of \"had actual knowledge \" in Section 1113(2), therefore, this Court must l ook to the statutory structure and con- text in which that phrase is used. See Home Depot U.S.A., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The language delin- eating those requirements, as well as Congress 's evident intent that the disclosure provisions will enable partici- pants to police their plan s, establish that a plan partici- pant \"ha[s] actual knowledge \" of facts that are in his possession because they were disclosed to him pursuant to ERISA. a. ERISA 's disclosure provisions are the foundation upon which the statutory enforcement scheme rest s. The express purpose of those provisions is to ensure that employees have \"sufficient information and data to ena- ble them to know whether the plan [i]s financially sound and being administered as intended. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "§ 1021. A participant \" ha[s] actual knowledge \" when he has possession of the information because he has received it in the manner that ERISA and its implementing reg ulations require. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That reading makes perfect sense. The most com- mon way to confer knowledge of a fact on someone else is to tell them that fact.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 F.3d 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "The most com- mon way to confer knowledge of a fact on someone else is to tell them that fact. Courts have generally held that a party who is told a fact has actual knowledge of that fact, without further epistemological inquiry into the party 's state of mind. See, e.g ., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Estate of Mapes , No. A136086, 2014 WL 2467009. ERISA 's disclosure requirements are designed to provide the written equiv alent of orally conveying all the necessary information to plan participants.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 F.3d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "As a practical matter, plaintiffs will be able to avoid summary judgment on a Section 1113(2) limitations de- fense as a mat ter of course. Plaintiffs can simply retreat behind the veil of ignorance, asserting that they did not read or do not specifically remember the relevant disclo- sures —assertions that, under the Ninth Circuit 's rule, are sufficient in themselves to create a material factual dispute. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even conscientious plan participants may fail to recall, years after the fact, whether they read spe- cific plan disclosures or what those disclosures sai d. In every case in which the plaintiff simply says that he can- not remember reading a particular document —which may be most if not all cases —the existence of actual 30 knowledge will then turn on the defendant 's ability to prove that, despite the failure of recollection, the plain- tiff did in fact read the document years before. This case well illustrates the problem.",
		"citation_value_orig": "550 F. Supp. 2d 416",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "See 2005 WL 31. Defendants will therefore be hard pressed to overcome a plaintiff 's testimony that he lacked subjective knowledge of pa rticular facts about his retirement plan. See Flores [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As a result, the Ninth Circuit 's construction will mean that an ERISA defendant will almost never suc- ceed in invoking the three -year limitations period of Sec- tion 1113(2) at summary judgment, and will face the daunting ta sk at trial of seeking to disprove a plaintiff 's claim of subjective ignorance through circumstantial ev- idence —except in those rare cases where the plaintiff voluntarily concedes prior subjective knowledge of the facts underlying his claim. Section 1113(2) will thus be deprived of any meaningful practical effect in many cases challenging plan investment strategies, leaving Section 1113 to function as a single six -year limitations period.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 646",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "Against that backdrop, a participant 's professed failur e to read disclosed material must be viewed as a willful decision by the plaintiff to remain ignorant. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Reeves , 2005 WL 2347242 (plaintiff who threw dis- closures away must not be permitted to \" disavow 'actual knowledge ' of an alleged fiduciary breach by deliber- ately ignori ng information that is clearly presented \"). Permitting participants to evade Section 1113(2)' s three -year limitations period by refusing to read infor- mation in their possession rewards them for acting in a manner that defeats the knowledge -conferring purpose of the disclosure regime. The phrase \"had actual knowledge \" cannot be con- strued to countenance that sort of evasion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.3d 133",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Section 1113(2)'s text, construed in light of ERISA's disclosure provisions, establishes that a plan participant has actual knowledge of the information contained in a fiduciary's disclosures",
		"context": "While a willfully blind per- son does not have subjective knowledge of all the facts in question, the \" traditio nal rationale for this doctrine is that defendants who behave in this manner are just as culpable as those who have actual knowledge. \" Ibid . ; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such a construction of ac- tual knowledge is necessary to ensure that parties are unable to manufacture an end run around the statute in question by manipulating the state of their own subjec- tive knowledge. Here too, the purposes of ERISA 's dis- closure regime and the three -year limitations period are best serv ed by construing \" had actual knowledge \" in a manner that prevents plaintiffs from benefitting from their disregard of the very information that Congress has required plan administrators to give them in order to enable them to enforce their rights.2 2 For that reason, the lower courts to consider the issue have overwhelmingly held that a defendant need not prove that plain- tiffs actually re ad plan disclosures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "87 F.3d 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A minority of circuits have misinterpreted the holding of Gonzalez",
		"context": "Brief at 7. Indeed, the Sixth, Sevent h, and Third Circu its exclude all motions filed under Rule 59(e) from successive 18 petition analysis. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]664 F.3d 397. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach, holding that Gonzalez's successive petition analysis applies to a Rule 59(e) motion only when the motion raises new claims. 822 F.3d 482.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 F.3d 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A minority of circuits have misinterpreted the holding of Gonzalez",
		"context": "Brief at 7. Indeed, the Sixth, Sevent h, and Third Circu its exclude all motions filed under Rule 59(e) from successive 18 petition analysis. See 533 F.3d 472[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach, holding that Gonzalez's successive petition analysis applies to a Rule 59(e) motion only when the motion raises new claims. 822 F.3d 482.",
		"citation_value_orig": "664 F.3d 397",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. A minority of circuits have misinterpreted the holding of Gonzalez",
		"context": "See 533 F.3d 472664 F.3d 397. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a hybrid approach, holding that Gonzalez's successive petition analysis applies to a Rule 59(e) motion only when the motion raises new claims. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, such reasoning discounts the reach of the Gonzalez holding. The Court in Gonzalez defines a successive application under AEDPA's successive provision as a filing that contains one or more claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "822 F.3d 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
		"context": "Temporary physical invasions should not be evaluated using the same standard as regulatory takings because they more closely resemble a perma-nent physical invasion. See First Eng. Evangelical Church of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"[A] distinction between 'temporary' and 'permanent' prohibition is tenuous. \"); 952 F.2d 1364, 1376–77 (arguing that the idea of a temporary taking is \"illogical\" since \"[a]ll takings are 'temporary,' in the sense that the govern-ment can always change its mind at a later time\"). The danger of substituting the standard for temporary physical invasions with the standard for regulatory takings is not theoretical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "482 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
		"context": "See First Eng. Evangelical Church of 482 U.S. 304 (\"[A] distinction between 'temporary' and 'permanent' prohibition is tenuous. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 1376–77 (arguing that the idea of a temporary taking is \"illogical\" since \"[a]ll takings are 'temporary,' in the sense that the govern-ment can always change its mind at a later time\"). The danger of substituting the standard for temporary physical invasions with the standard for regulatory takings is not theoretical. 13 Under the Ninth Circuit's approach, owners whose properties are subject to actual physical inva- sions will find themselves without recourse unless they can prove serious financial harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "952 F.2d 1364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
		"context": "This Court must not allow such a misunderstanding of the doc- trine to stand. Other courts have adopted similarly flawed approaches. For example, in Franklin Mem'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the First Circuit denied compensation to an owner whose prop-erty was subject to \"periodic and intermittent\" physi- cal invasions, id. at 126 n.4, in part because the inva- sion at issue did not pose a \"threat to [the owner's] economic viability\" even though the court acknowledge that the property owner faced significant economic harm. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "575 F.3d 121",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
		"context": "at 127. In light of this Court's rea- soning in Portsmouth that multiple intrusions consti- tute a taking, that holding cannot be correct. Similarly concerning is the holding Hilton Wash- ington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], where the D.C. Circuit also denied compen- sation in a temporary physical invasion case because the property owner did not demonstrate that the in- vasion caused a \"significant economic impact.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "777 F.2d 47",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should reaffirm the categorical difference between physical invasions and regulations of property use",
		"context": "Id. at 50. And in Cienega [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Federal Circuit held that a property owner subject to a physical invasion was re- quired to show \"serious financial loss\" from the regu-lation at issue in order to prove a taking. Id. at 1338, 1340.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 F.3d 1319",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "The impetus for Amicus to raise all of these arguments was, of course, the dramatic adverse effect th at the increase in the quarterly fees had on Amicus. 15 The unfortunate scenario which was faced by Amicus as the result of the increase in quarterly fees imposed by the 2017 Act raises questions as to whether the dramatic increase in quarterly fees under the 2017 Act, as applied to Amicus , violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Carlton , this Court noted that \"[s] ome of its decisions have stated that the validity of a retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause depends upon whether 'retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation ,'\" citing 305 U.S. 134 , quoted in 476 U.S. 558 . This Court then explained that \"[t] he 'harsh and oppressive' formulation, however, ' does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation' that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 26",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "15 The unfortunate scenario which was faced by Amicus as the result of the increase in quarterly fees imposed by the 2017 Act raises questions as to whether the dramatic increase in quarterly fees under the 2017 Act, as applied to Amicus , violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See 512 U.S. 26. In Carlton , this Court noted that \"[s] ome of its decisions have stated that the validity of a retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause depends upon whether 'retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation ,'\" citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , quoted in 476 U.S. 558 . This Court then explained that \"[t] he 'harsh and oppressive' formulation, however, ' does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation' that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy. Pension Benefit Guaranty 467 U.S. 717. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 134",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "15 The unfortunate scenario which was faced by Amicus as the result of the increase in quarterly fees imposed by the 2017 Act raises questions as to whether the dramatic increase in quarterly fees under the 2017 Act, as applied to Amicus , violated the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See 512 U.S. 26. In Carlton , this Court noted that \"[s] ome of its decisions have stated that the validity of a retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause depends upon whether 'retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation ,'\" citing 305 U.S. 134 , quoted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court then explained that \"[t] he 'harsh and oppressive' formulation, however, ' does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation' that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy. Pension Benefit Guaranty 467 U.S. 717. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "476 U.S. 558",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "In Carlton , this Court noted that \"[s] ome of its decisions have stated that the validity of a retroactive tax provision under the Due Process Clause depends upon whether 'retroactive application is so harsh and oppressive as to transgress the constitutional limitation ,'\" citing 305 U.S. 134 , quoted in 476 U.S. 558 . This Court then explained that \"[t] he 'harsh and oppressive' formulation, however, ' does not differ from the prohibition against arbitrary and irrational legislation' that applies generally to enactments in the sphere of economic policy. Pension Benefit Guaranty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \" Id., 512 U.S. at 26, 30 . That the effect of the increase in quarterly fees, as applied to Amicus, was \"harsh and oppressive\" cannot be denied.",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "Similarly, the \"harsh and oppressive\" effect of the quarterly fee increase, when coupled with the fact that no such quarterly f ee increase went into effect in the Bankruptcy Administrator Districts for any Chapter 11 cases filed prior to October 1, 2018, see Petitioner's Brief at pp. 20 -23, raises a legitimate question as to whether the quarterly fee increase violated the equal p rotection component of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See, e.g., Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is worth noting that the definition of \"disbursements\" in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) for purposes of computing quarterly fees owed to the OUST is such that the computation of these quarterly fees is often completely divorced from the amount of cash available to pay those fees.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 336",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "It is worth noting that the definition of \"disbursements\" in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) for purposes of computing quarterly fees owed to the OUST is such that the computation of these quarterly fees is often completely divorced from the amount of cash available to pay those fees. See , e.g., St. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , Robiner v. Danny's Mkts., Inc. (In re266 F.3d 523. Consider a situation where a Chapter 11 debtor's business generates quarterly revenue of $40 million and the company pays operating expenses of $39,600,000, leaving a net profit of $400,000. The 17 \"disbursements\" which are used to compute quarterly fees are $39,600,000, not $400,000, resulting in a quarterly fee of $250,000 under the 2017 Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "38 F.3d 1525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. A Holding That the Increase in Quarterly Fees Violates the Bankruptcy Uniformity Clause Will Permit the Courts to Avoid Deciding an \"As Applied\" Challenge to This Same Law on Due Process Grounds and on Equal Protection Grounds",
		"context": "It is worth noting that the definition of \"disbursements\" in 28 U.S.C. § 1930(a)(6) for purposes of computing quarterly fees owed to the OUST is such that the computation of these quarterly fees is often completely divorced from the amount of cash available to pay those fees. See , e.g., St. 38 F.3d 1525 , Robiner v. Danny's Mkts., Inc. (In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consider a situation where a Chapter 11 debtor's business generates quarterly revenue of $40 million and the company pays operating expenses of $39,600,000, leaving a net profit of $400,000. The 17 \"disbursements\" which are used to compute quarterly fees are $39,600,000, not $400,000, resulting in a quarterly fee of $250,000 under the 2017 Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "266 F.3d 523",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The assignment/cooperation provision reinforces the payment-recovery provision's limits on the State's rights",
		"context": "See 547 U.S. at 280 n.9, 281-82; 286-87. Given the provi- sion's focus on authorizing the State to pursue claims against third parties, some courts have concluded that it is inapplicable where, as here, the State seeks reim- bursement from a tort recovery obtained by a benefi-ciary's own efforts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; S.W. 249 P.3d 1104. This Court in Ahl- born merely assumed, without deciding, that the 29 assignment/cooperation provision applied to a State's lien against a beneficiary's own tort recovery.",
		"citation_value_orig": "54 A.3d 474",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The assignment/cooperation provision reinforces the payment-recovery provision's limits on the State's rights",
		"context": "Given the provi- sion's focus on authorizing the State to pursue claims against third parties, some courts have concluded that it is inapplicable where, as here, the State seeks reim- bursement from a tort recovery obtained by a benefi-ciary's own efforts. See 54 A.3d 474; S.W. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court in Ahl- born merely assumed, without deciding, that the 29 assignment/cooperation provision applied to a State's lien against a beneficiary's own tort recovery. 547 U.S. at 280 n.9, 281, 284.",
		"citation_value_orig": "249 P.3d 1104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The assignment/cooperation provision reinforces the payment-recovery provision's limits on the State's rights",
		"context": "This Court need not, however, hold the assign- ment/cooperation provision to b e i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e State's right to recover from a third-party payment. Rather, as Ahlborn recognized, the assignment/coop- eration provision—read in light of the principle that \"[i]t is this Court's duty to interpret Congress's stat- utes as a harmonious whole,\" Epic Sys. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—r einforces the limita- tions on the State's rights stated in the payment-re- covery provision. Moreover, even if there were tension, or conflict, between those provisions, the more re- cently enacted and specifica lly applicable payment-re- covery provision would control. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1612",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.",
		"context": "This Court should deny certiorari because the court below rejected Petitioners' Elections Clause arguments on an independent state - law ground. This 34 Court lacks jurisdiction over appeals from state - court decisions that rest on state - law grounds. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under North Carolina law, \"[i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make.\" N.C. R. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.",
		"context": "See Dogwo od Dev. & Mgmt. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioners' failure to raise their Elections Clause argument during the merits stage deprived the trial court of the opportunity to consider Petitioners' novel theory. Petitioners also argue that, even if they failed to preserve their Elections Clause argument, the state supreme court addressed the argument anyway .",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 S.E.2d 361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. An adequate, independent state ground exists for rejecting Petitioners' arguments.",
		"context": "25. But the \"desire to decisively 'settle important disputes for the sake of convenience and efficiency' must yield to the 'overriding and time - honored concern about keeping the Judi ciary's power within its proper constitutional sphere.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 36",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property",
		"context": "Under the familiar Penn Central standard for regu- latory takings , the Court considers (1) \"[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the claimant\"; (2) \"the character of the government action\"; and (3) \"the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment -backed expectations.\" 438 U.S. at 124. And although those factors represent \"important guide- posts\" for the Court's consideration, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court has also looked to \"the purpose of the regulation\" and, more broadly, whe ther \"the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.\" 503 U.S. 519. The Court has made clear in applying that standard , however, that government- authorized physical inva- sions are a particularly serious intrusion on property rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property",
		"context": "438 U.S. at 124. And although those factors represent \"important guide- posts\" for the Court's consideration, 533 U.S. 606, the Court has also looked to \"the purpose of the regulation\" and, more broadly, whe ther \"the regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court has made clear in applying that standard , however, that government- authorized physical inva- sions are a particularly serious intrusion on property rights. The Court has explained that the right to ex- clude is \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property",
		"context": "The Court has made clear in applying that standard , however, that government- authorized physical inva- sions are a particularly serious intrusion on property rights. The Court has explained that the right to ex- clude is \"one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.\" Loretto , 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Thus, \"[a] 'tak- ing' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical inva- sion by government, than when interferenc e arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and bur-dens of economic life to promote the common good.\" Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal 480 U.S. 470, for example, the Court con- sidered whether the Uni ted States' physical invasion of another's property by gun fire amounted to a taking.",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property",
		"context": "Loretto , 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser 444 U.S. 164). Thus, \"[a] 'tak- ing' may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical inva- sion by government, than when interferenc e arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and bur-dens of economic life to promote the common good.\" Penn Central , 438 U.S. at 124 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for example, the Court con- sidered whether the Uni ted States' physical invasion of another's property by gun fire amounted to a taking. The petitioner alleged that the United States had taken a servitude across its property located between the gov- ernment's land and the ocean , by \"set[ting] up heavy coast defense guns with the intention of firing them over [ petitioner's ] land\" and doing so on several occa- sions. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 470",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Government-authorized physical invasions impose harms distinct from government restrictions on the use of property",
		"context": "Indeed, i f the United States had the \"admitted intent to fire across the claimants' land at will\" and fire d even \"a single shot,\" the \"taking of a right would be complete.\" Ibid. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is similar . In that case , the United States entered into a month -to-month lease with a private airport for use dur- ing World War II. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. HCC's contrary position is untenable",
		"context": "\"[I]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional co nstellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics.\" W. Va. State Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1943 ). Yet that is just what HCC asks this Court to approve: The majority of HCC's Board assert the right to speak officially for a governmental body in condemning Wilson for making statements that \"criticize other Board members for taking positions that differ from his own.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. HCC's contrary position is untenable",
		"context": "Likewise, a censure would be permissible for sl ander, but not for state- ments that merely criticize. Concerning matters within the legislative process, censure remains available fo r both conduct and speech. As we noted at the outset, the deliberations of an elect- ed body's members within th e \"legislative sphere\" are immune from judicial scrutiny ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) and may be \"questioned\" only by the la wmaking body itself (U.S. Const. Art I, § 6 cl. 1).",
		"citation_value_orig": "408 U.S. 606",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. HCC's contrary position is untenable",
		"context": "Thus, the power to censure members for speech or conduct \"integral\" to lawmaking \"processes\" ( Gravel , 408 U.S. at 625) is undeniable. \"[B]ecause citizens may not su e legislators for their leg- islative acts, legislative bodies are left to police their own members\" for such acts. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Beyond those settled boundaries, however, the First Amendment does not permit a lawmaking body to punish one of its own, with the imprimatur of official government action, simply for engaging in protected political expression.",
		"citation_value_orig": "112 F.3d 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. WINONA AND THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF DENYING AFRICAN AMERICANS EQUAL RIGHTS",
		"context": ". As in any case concerning purposeful discrimination, the context matters. See Batson , 476 U.S. at 93 (requiring \"'a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available'\") (quoting Arlington [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Here, that context is comprised in significant part by the history of racial discrimination in Winona and the Fifth Judicial District. White residents of Winona and the Fifth Judicial District have long endeavored to deny African Americans full citizenship.",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 U.S. 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. WINONA AND THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT HAVE A LONG HISTORY OF DENYING AFRICAN AMERICANS EQUAL RIGHTS",
		"context": "71 AP, Grenada Negroes Beaten at School , N.Y. Times (Sept. 13, 1966), https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1966/09/13/79 311321.html?action=click&contentCollection=Archives&module=ArticleEndCTA&region=ArchiveBody&pgtype=article&pageN umber=1. 72 Letter from Paul Brest, Miriam Wright, and Iris Brest to parents (Dec. 20, 1966), https://www.crmvet.org/docs/6612_grenada_parents-letter.pdf . 73 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 26 the spirit of the injunction. Grenada hired more African American police officers, but the police department forbade them from arresting white residents.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 F. Supp. 390",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
		"context": "Experts have testified in copyright cases for well over a century, and courts have long recognized that expert testimony is helpful to proving essential elements of infringement, such as similarity between two works. See, e.g. , 15 F. Cas. 26; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, in the years leading up to the 1976 Act's enactment, expert testimony was common, as the following cases illustrate: • In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder , the district court granted an injunction preventing enforcement of a copyright, in part based on expert testimony that the defendant's plastic toy bank was a copy of the plaintiff's metal one. See536 F.2d 486.",
		"citation_value_orig": "154 F.2d 464",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
		"context": ", 15 F. Cas. 26; 154 F.2d 464. Indeed, in the years leading up to the 1976 Act's enactment, expert testimony was common, as the following cases illustrate: • In L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder , the district court granted an injunction preventing enforcement of a copyright, in part based on expert testimony that the defendant's plastic toy bank was a copy of the plaintiff's metal one. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 • In Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc. , experts testified regarding the amount of damages and profits the defendant owed for infringing the plaintiff's copyright. See420 F. Supp. 404.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 F.2d 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
		"context": "See536 F.2d 486. 9 • In Baldwin Cooke Co. v. Keith Clark, Inc. , experts testified regarding the amount of damages and profits the defendant owed for infringing the plaintiff's copyright. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The practical necessity of expert testimony could not have been lost on the Congress that enacted the 1976 Act. Beyond the ample case law involving experts leading up to the 1976 Act, Congress more generally understood that copyrightable works might include complex material, like software, making expert testimony necessary in many infringement cases.",
		"citation_value_orig": "420 F. Supp. 404",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
		"context": "46 n.3 (2006) (statement of the U.S. Copyright Office) (\"If expert witnesses are used, as is not uncommon in copyright cases, additional thousands of dollars or more in expenses can be incurred. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These costs will be part of the calculus when any sensible copyright holder is deciding whether to bring suit and, ultimately, can affe ct an author's decision on whether to create. See Balganesh, supra , at 2292–93.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 F. App'x 863",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Categorically Excluding Nontaxable Costs From \"Full Costs\" Would Thwart Congress's Intent",
		"context": "Precisely how the inability to recover expert witness costs (and other nontaxable costs) would impact innovation and copyright infringement litigation is difficult to quantify. From 2008 to 2017, more than 30 percent of copyright infringement cases were filed in the Ninth Circuit—which, of course, interprets \"full costs\" to include nontaxable costs. See Twentieth Century Fox Film [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied11 U.S. 919.4 Another 14.1 percent are brought in the Second Circuit. And while the Second Circuit has not itself opined on this issue, the Southern District of New York—where near ly three-quarters of copyright cases within the Second Circuit are filed—has awarded nontaxable costs as part of \"full costs.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "429 F.3d 869",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text and structure show that the phrase \"in aid of the collection\" requires a direct connection between a summons and obtaining payment, not merely the possibility of obtaining information.",
		"context": "1979) (Black's Fifth ); see also The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary 49 (1971) (Compact OED ) (same). The definitions of \"support,\" \"help,\" and \"assist,\" for their part, \"are overlapping and circular, w ith each one pointing to another in the group.\" Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Assist\" means \"help \" or \"aid,\" Black's Fifth 111; see also Compact OED 128 (same); \"help\" means affording \"aid or assistance,\" Compact OED 1287; and \"support\" means \"assis- tance,\" Compact OED 3167. These words mean a direct connection between the activity providing aid and th e object of the aid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1752",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text and structure show that the phrase \"in aid of the collection\" requires a direct connection between a summons and obtaining payment, not merely the possibility of obtaining information.",
		"context": "These words mean a direct connection between the activity providing aid and th e object of the aid. In- deed, as this Court has recognized, the phrase \"'in aid of' … does not enlarge\" its subject. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Phrases like \"relating to\" or \"in connection with,\" on the other hand, \"generally [have] a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a pro- vision covers not only its subject but also matters relating to that subject.\" Lamar , 138 S. Ct. at 1760.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Statutory text and structure show that the phrase \"in aid of the collection\" requires a direct connection between a summons and obtaining payment, not merely the possibility of obtaining information.",
		"context": "See I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(E)(i) (exception applies when a summons is issued \"in connection with\" a criminal IRS investigati on); I.R.C. § 7609(f)(1) (requirement for John Doe Summonses that \"the summons relate[] to the investigation of a particular person or ascertaina- ble group or class of persons\") ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. b. \"Collection\" means obtaining payment or liquidation of a debt, including through legal proceedings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Any Reasonable Focus Inquiry",
		"context": "569 U.S. at 125. By definition, a domestic corpora- tion always engages in high-level supervision from its U.S. corporate headquarters. See Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And Plain- tiffs do not attempt to meaningfully distinguish this Court's other cases finding even more domestic conduct to be insufficient to displace the presump- tion. Opening Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Any Reasonable Focus Inquiry",
		"context": "This litigation started 15 years ago, and the opera- tive second amended complaint was filed three years after Kiobel and a month after RJR Nabisco . It is too late for yet a fourth bite at the apple. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] a Second Circuit decision. If it is persuasive, it cuts against Plaintiffs—it rejected the kind of \"conclusory\" allegations about domestic \"decisionmaking\" that Plaintiffs rely on. 770 F.3d 170; see Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "371 U.S. 178",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs Cannot Satisfy Any Reasonable Focus Inquiry",
		"context": "See 371 U.S. 178 a Second Circuit decision. If it is persuasive, it cuts against Plaintiffs—it rejected the kind of \"conclusory\" allegations about domestic \"decisionmaking\" that Plaintiffs rely on. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pet. 18-19. 13 \"repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed\"); Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "770 F.3d 170",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Fair Use Factor Is The \"Purpose and Character of the Use\" — Not Petitioner's Watered-Down \"Meaning or Message\" Standard",
		"context": "The first fair use factor is \"the purpose and character of the use\" of the original work. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is not merely whether the \"meaning or message\" of the new work is different from that of the original. Petitioner fashions its test by plucking out of context one part of one phrase from the Court's explication of th e first factor's purpose in Campbell and promoting it to the status of the entire first factor itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Circuit Has Applied Rogers To Ordinary Commercial Products, As Traditional Trademark Principles Provide Ample First Amendment Protections.",
		"context": "However, INTA does emphasize that traditional trademark principles already afford ample protection to claimed parodists and commenters, as they often win even without the heightened protections of Rogers . See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, 674 Fed.Appx. 16; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. , 12 507 F.3d at 263 (4th Cir. 2004); Jordache Enters., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959. With respect to ordinary commercial products, a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit still must carry its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, which frequently is a fact-intensive analysis. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's alternative approach means that any seller of an ordinary commercial product who uses a humorous message with another's mark will be wholly insulated from any potential liability so long as the mark has some artistic relevance to the product—a standard the Ninth Circuit has lowered to anything \"above zero,\" E.S.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "828 F.2d 1482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Circuit Has Applied Rogers To Ordinary Commercial Products, As Traditional Trademark Principles Provide Ample First Amendment Protections.",
		"context": "However, INTA does emphasize that traditional trademark principles already afford ample protection to claimed parodists and commenters, as they often win even without the heightened protections of Rogers . See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, 674 Fed.Appx. 16; Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. , 12 507 F.3d at 263 (4th Cir. 2004); Jordache Enters., 828 F.2d 1482; Cardtoons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. With respect to ordinary commercial products, a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit still must carry its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, which frequently is a fact-intensive analysis. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's alternative approach means that any seller of an ordinary commercial product who uses a humorous message with another's mark will be wholly insulated from any potential liability so long as the mark has some artistic relevance to the product—a standard the Ninth Circuit has lowered to anything \"above zero,\" E.S.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "95 F.3d 959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. No Other Circuit Has Applied Rogers To Ordinary Commercial Products, As Traditional Trademark Principles Provide Ample First Amendment Protections.",
		"context": "With respect to ordinary commercial products, a plaintiff in a trademark infringement suit still must carry its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion, which frequently is a fact-intensive analysis. In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's alternative approach means that any seller of an ordinary commercial product who uses a humorous message with another's mark will be wholly insulated from any potential liability so long as the mark has some artistic relevance to the product—a standard the Ninth Circuit has lowered to anything \"above zero,\" E.S.S. Ent'mt 2000 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—and does not present an overwhelming likelihood of confusion. A s d i s c u s s e d b e l o w, s uch a standard fails to strike the proper balance between trademark law and the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 F.3d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
		"context": "15-17. CBD ignores this statutory text, and the Service (at 21) buries it deep in its argument, flouting the cardinal principle that \"[s]tatutory interpretation, as [this Court] always say[s], begins with the text.\" Ross v.Blake , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. FWS then gives away the case by admitting (at 22) that \"'habitat' and 'critical habitat'\" are \"distinct concepts.\" It follows that designated areas must be \"habitat\" because the ESA requires the presence of both \"habitat\" and \"critical habitat\" in designated areas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
		"context": "139a (Jones, J.). And the fact that the issue \"was addressed by the court below\" in any event preserves it for review. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The issue is case-dispositive and properly presented. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
		"context": "12. But Chevron \"does not license interpretive gerry- manders under which an agency keeps parts of statutory context it likes while throwing away parts it does not.\" Michigan v.EPA , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Respondents' reading clashes with the statutory definition of \"occupied\" \"critical habitat,\" which requires \"those physical or biological features\" that are \"essential to the conservation of the species.\" 16 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2699",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
		"context": ", 567 U.S. at 548-549. FWS argues (at 32) that \"there is no circuit split\" while ignoring considerable dissent. SeeRancho Viejo, LLC v.Norton , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that this case is a \"poor vehicle\" to consider our Commerce Clause argument because a designation is \"not the direct regulation of petitioners' conduct.\" But, 7 as FWS and the panel noted, the designation \"'immediately'\" reduced Unit 1's value. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "334 F.3d 1158",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Fifth Circuit Misinterpreted The ESA's Critical Habitat Provisions, In Conflict With The Ninth Circuit.",
		"context": "As in SWANCC , our argument is statutory, and the avoidance canon applies because FWS's interpretation raises significant constitutional concerns and is not compelled by \"unmistakably clear\" \"language of the statute.\" Raygor v.Regents of Univ. of Minn., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. CBD's inability (at 26) to cite statutory language proves that the ESA does not overcome the canon's clear statement rule. 8 be \"habitab[le]\" but \"occupied land\" must be habitable.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 533",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Under the Vanity Fair Test Promotes Access to Justice, Efficiency, and the Rule of Law.",
		"context": "The ABA believes that the Vanity Fair framework best promotes the critical interests of justice, efficiency, and the rule of law. The Lanham Act's basic purpose is to protect the goodwill that the trademark holder \"spent energy, time, and money to obtain\" and to protect consumers' \"ability to distinguish among the goods of competing manufacturers.\" Inwood [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such trademark protection is desirable \"because trade- marks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.\" 137 S. Ct. 1744.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Under the Vanity Fair Test Promotes Access to Justice, Efficiency, and the Rule of Law.",
		"context": "Inwood 456 U.S. 844. Such trademark protection is desirable \"because trade- marks foster competition and the maintenance of quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Adequately protecting these U.S. trademark in- terests necessarily requires extraterritorial applica- tion of the Lanham Act in appropriate cases. In a hypothetical legal regime where the Act cannot apply extraterritorially—which would be contrary to the Act's plain language and this Court's settled prece- dent—those interests are easily undermined.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Extraterritorial Application of the Lanham Act Under the Vanity Fair Test Promotes Access to Justice, Efficiency, and the Rule of Law.",
		"context": "Cf. Kerotest Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The ABA has observed that trademark practitioners and their clients already face such challenges in trademark litigation across the country because of some circuits' application of standards inconsistent with the Vanity Fair standard. Petitioners' approach 6 See U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec.",
		"citation_value_orig": "342 U.S. 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable",
		"context": "for Rehearing En Banc 14 (9th Cir. May 4, 2018), ECF No. 63; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners then renewed the argument at the certiorari stage as an explicit part of their broader contention that there is no inferred private right for negligence (if there is no inferred private right at all, then there is, of course, no private right for negligence). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "335 F.3d 889",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable",
		"context": "i, 20; Cert. Reply 10. The points are simply \"separate arguments in support of a single claim,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—that there is no inferred private right of action covering the conduct al leged in the complaint. Likewise, both arguments are plainly included within the Question Presented. 44 425 U.S. at 210 (footnote omit ted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable",
		"context": "After this Court held in Aaron that Section 17(a)(2) and (3) applied to negligent conduct, however, lower courts revisited their precedent and held that, with negligence in the mix, there could be no inferred right of action under Sectio n 17(a) at all. As the Second Circuit explained, \" Aaron broke the link between rule 10b-5 and § 17(a)\" by holding that, \"unlike an action under rule 10b-5, in an action [under Section 17(a)] the SEC did not have to establish scienter.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Accordingly,\" the court reasoned, \"we can no longer justify the private right of action under § 17(a) on the ground that rule 10b-5 provides the same cause of action anyway.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "962 F.2d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable",
		"context": "Id. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all reached the same result using the same reasoning— each overturning their prior precedent and holding that there is no implied right of action under Section 17(a). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]866 F.2d 935 extends to negligence would knock out a linchpin on which the inferred private right of action rested. Just as the lower courts recognized with respect to Section 17(a), if Section 14(e) really did proscribe negligent wrongdoing, as the Ninth Circuit held, then any basis for implying a private right of action under Section 14(e) would collapse: The upshot of rejecting a standard under which \"scienter is required\" for \"private plaintiffs\" is that \"there is no private right of action under [Section 14(e)]\" at all. Finkel , 962 F.2d at 175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "862 F.2d 1099",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. If Section 14(e) Really Did Proscribe Negligent Conduct, Then It Plainly Could Not Be Privately Enforceable",
		"context": "Id. The Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all reached the same result using the same reasoning— each overturning their prior precedent and holding that there is no implied right of action under Section 17(a). See 862 F.2d 1099[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] extends to negligence would knock out a linchpin on which the inferred private right of action rested. Just as the lower courts recognized with respect to Section 17(a), if Section 14(e) really did proscribe negligent wrongdoing, as the Ninth Circuit held, then any basis for implying a private right of action under Section 14(e) would collapse: The upshot of rejecting a standard under which \"scienter is required\" for \"private plaintiffs\" is that \"there is no private right of action under [Section 14(e)]\" at all. Finkel , 962 F.2d at 175.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.2d 935",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Eighth Circuit's Interpretation Of The Saving Clause Raises Serious Constitutional Concerns",
		"context": "\"[W]hen deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of constitutional problems, the other should prevail.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This canon of constitutional avoidance \"is a tool for choosing between competing plausible interpretations of a statutory text, resting on the reasonable presumption that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts. The canon is thus a means of giving effect to congressional intent, not of subverting it.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 371",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights",
		"context": ". Due process requires that landowners have fair notice of whether their ordinary land use activities are subject to CWA regulation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Experience shows that the CWA and its implementing regulations are plagued with vagueness problems. See,138 S. Ct. 617; Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807; Sackett, 566 U.S. 120; Rapanos , 547 U.S. 715 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights",
		"context": "See 135 S. Ct. 2551. Experience shows that the CWA and its implementing regulations are plagued with vagueness problems. See,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807; Sackett, 566 U.S. 120; Rapanos , 547 U.S. 715 . Given this vagueness, e ven before the lower courts ' expansion of the CWA to impose federal control of groundwater, landowners were forced to play a constant high -stakes guessing game in hopes of complying with the CWA. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights",
		"context": "See 135 S. Ct. 2551. Experience shows that the CWA and its implementing regulations are plagued with vagueness problems. See,138 S. Ct. 617; Hawkes Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sackett, 566 U.S. 120; Rapanos , 547 U.S. 715 . Given this vagueness, e ven before the lower courts ' expansion of the CWA to impose federal control of groundwater, landowners were forced to play a constant high -stakes guessing game in hopes of complying with the CWA. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights",
		"context": "See 135 S. Ct. 2551. Experience shows that the CWA and its implementing regulations are plagued with vagueness problems. See,138 S. Ct. 617; Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807; Sackett, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Rapanos , 547 U.S. 715 . Given this vagueness, e ven before the lower courts ' expansion of the CWA to impose federal control of groundwater, landowners were forced to play a constant high -stakes guessing game in hopes of complying with the CWA. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 120",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Regulating Groundwater Under the Act Violates Landowners' Due Process Rights",
		"context": "See 135 S. Ct. 2551. Experience shows that the CWA and its implementing regulations are plagued with vagueness problems. See,138 S. Ct. 617; Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807; Sackett, 566 U.S. 120; Rapanos , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Given this vagueness, e ven before the lower courts ' expansion of the CWA to impose federal control of groundwater, landowners were forced to play a constant high -stakes guessing game in hopes of complying with the CWA. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 715",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "Sokolow , 490 U.S. at 11; see Navarette , 572 U.S. at 404 (\"[A] n officer who already has such a reasonable suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to person- ally observe suspicious driving.\"). The mere potential for further investigation that does not involve a traffic stop provides no reason to raise the bar for what is required to establish reasonable suspicion. A State's \"vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are perm itted to operate motor vehi- cles,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], out- weighs the minimal intrusion of a traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion . Individuals have \" a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle\" both \"because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of pers onal effects, \" and because vehicles \"are subject to pervasive and con- tinuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. \" New 475 U.S. 106 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "A State's \"vital interest in ensuring that only those qualified to do so are perm itted to operate motor vehi- cles,\" 440 U.S. 648, out- weighs the minimal intrusion of a traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion . Individuals have \" a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle\" both \"because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of pers onal effects, \" and because vehicles \"are subject to pervasive and con- tinuing governmental regulation and controls, including periodic inspection and licensing requirements. \" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, t raffic stops intrude on privacy only mod- estly, because while they interfere with a motorist 's freedom of movement, see Prouse , 440 U.S. at 657, this Court has recognized that \"most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry [v. Ohio ],\" under which an officer with reasonable suspicion may \"detain [a] person briefly\" and \"as k a moderate number of ques- tions.\" 468 U.S. 420 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 106",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "New 475 U.S. 106 . Moreover, t raffic stops intrude on privacy only mod- estly, because while they interfere with a motorist 's freedom of movement, see Prouse , 440 U.S. at 657, this Court has recognized that \"most traffic stops resemble, in duration and atmosphere, the kind of brief detention authorized in Terry [v. Ohio ],\" under which an officer with reasonable suspicion may \"detain [a] person briefly\" and \"as k a moderate number of ques- tions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . A stop may last no longer than \"the time needed to handle the mat ter for which the stop was made \" and \"attend to related safety concerns.\" 135 S. Ct. 1609.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "468 U.S. 420 . A stop may last no longer than \"the time needed to handle the mat ter for which the stop was made \" and \"attend to related safety concerns.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In the case of a stop of the sort at issue here , that time may be quite short . If, for example, an officer learns upon approaching a stopped vehicle that the driver is defi- nitely not the registered owner suspected of driving without a license ( say, because the driver and the owner are different genders), then the driver \"must be allowed to go on his way,\" Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 12 6, without any further delay, Rodriguez , 135 S. Ct. at 1614, unless the officer \"independently\" acquires reasonable suspicion of a different crime , id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "If, for example, an officer learns upon approaching a stopped vehicle that the driver is defi- nitely not the registered owner suspected of driving without a license ( say, because the driver and the owner are different genders), then the driver \"must be allowed to go on his way,\" Wardlow , 528 U.S. at 12 6, without any further delay, Rodriguez , 135 S. Ct. at 1614, unless the officer \"independently\" acquires reasonable suspicion of a different crime , id. at 1616 . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A traffic stop based on that sort of reasonable -but-ultimately -incorrect suspi- cion should last only a few moments. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "918 N.E.2d 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "Even if the possibility of that maneuver w ere legally relevant, imposing it as a constitutional requirement would be impractical and unsafe. For one thing, the tactic would not work in many cases— where the weather is bad, the car has tinted win- dows, or the road has only one lane going in a particu lar direction , among other situations . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that the rea sonable -suspicion inquiry could take account of such difficulties. The que stion under the Fourth Amendment is whether the officer had enoug h information to reasonably suspect criminal activity , not whether he could have , in theory, acquire d more. See Navarette , 572 U.S. at 404.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.3d 951",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Respondent provides no sound basis for disputing the reasonableness of the traffic stop in this case",
		"context": "Because such a maneuver would be unsafe, police officers are trained not to attempt it. Officers instead are trained generally to keep their vehicles positioned behind a suspect's vehicle. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2002 WL 1034108 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2 002) ( describing officer's testimony that his \"normal procedure was to pull behind a vehicle because it was dangerous to pull alongside a suspect vehicle \"); Jean Reynolds, Police Officer Training: 8 Ways to Ensure Safety During Traffic Stops , Virtual Acad emy (Jan. 17, 2016) (noting safety advantages created by an officer keeping his patrol vehi cle behind a suspect's 19 vehicle), https://virtualacademy.com/ensuring -officer - safety -during -traffic -stops/.XMiYAOhKhjU . The Fourth Amendment does not force officers to adopt a different approach.",
		"citation_value_orig": "804 F.3d 1317",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "See, e.g ., Rafaeli , 505 Mich. at 460 (distinguishing successful challenge to Michigan's similar forfeiture statute on that ground) ; Hall, 51 F.4th at 196. More importantly, Nelson 's takings discussion is nonbinding and unpersuasive dicta. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The property owners in Nelson did not argue a takings claim in the lower courts, and therefore could not raise it in this Court. Because Nelson 's discussion of the takings issue was unnecessary to the Court's resolution of the case, it was dicta.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "The property owners in Nelson did not argue a takings claim in the lower courts, and therefore could not raise it in this Court. Because Nelson 's discussion of the takings issue was unnecessary to the Court's resolution of the case, it was dicta. Kirtsaeng , 568 U.S. at 548; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nelson 's dicta also conflict with this Court's takings decisions . Nelson suggests that an owner must seek compensation for a taking in a state court proceeding before the taking occurs .",
		"citation_value_orig": "289 U.S. 553",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "A property owner who experiences a taking cannot be required to seek compensation by filing a claim in state court be fore the taking has even occurred. \"[T]he act of taking\" is the \"event which gives rise to the claim for compensation.\" U nited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"Compensation under the Takings Clause is a remedy for the constitutional violation that the landowner has already suffered at the time of the uncompensated taking.\" 139 S.Ct. 2162 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "357 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "U nited 357 U.S. 17 . \"Compensation under the Takings Clause is a remedy for the constitutional violation that the landowner has already suffered at the time of the uncompensated taking.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Moreover, a property owner may sue for just compensation in federal court notwith standing the existence of \"a state law procedure that will eventually result in just compensation.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "Moreover, a property owner may sue for just compensation in federal court notwith standing the existence of \"a state law procedure that will eventually result in just compensation.\" Id. at 2171; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is the opposite of Nelson 's dicta, which disparaged a federal 32 takings claim on the grounds that plaintiffs should have instead pursued a state court procedure to recover the surplus value of their confiscated property. 352 U.S. at 109.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Nelson v. City of New York does not apply here and its comments about the Takings Clause are dicta",
		"context": "Polonsky, 173 N.H. at 239 ( \"when a municipality acquires property by tax deed and the equity in the property exceeds the amount owed, a taking has occurred, regardless of whether the former owner took steps\" to redeem) . Tyler does not challenge the procedures involved in foreclosing on her property as a matter of due process ; she challenges the County's taking of her equity without compensation. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, a window to avoid a taking by paying a debt does not satisfy the Takings Clause. In Horne, this Court held that requiring the owners to donate a 33 portion of their raisin crop to the government was a taking and that it was irrelevant that the owner s had an opportunity to avoid the taking by selling the grapes for juice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 528",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text And Context Of The WPA And SOX Are Materially Different",
		"context": "16, 32. \"When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume it intends its amend-ment to have real and substantial effect.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What's more, the WPA retained a separate prohi- bition on \"discriminat[ion] … on the basis of\" certain protected statuses, but did not include that term in the whistleblower provision. See 5 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text And Context Of The WPA And SOX Are Materially Different",
		"context": "at 1115 (original enactment of pa ragraph (b)(1)). It is presumed \"that Congress acts intentionally and pur- posely when it includes particular language in one 37 section of a statute but omits it in another.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The deletion of \"reprisal\" from the retaliation pro- vision and the failure to require \"discrimination\" in the WPA may indicate that intent is not required un- der that statute, but that outcome is not the product of the WPA's burden-allocation provision—and it says nothing about SOX, which does expressly require proof of \"discriminat[ion].\" Congress \"deliberately prescribed a distinct statutory scheme applicable only to the federal sector, and in doing so, it eschewed the language used in the private-sector provision.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "511 U.S. 531",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text And Context Of The WPA And SOX Are Materially Different",
		"context": "Lawson , 571 U.S. at 446; Bhd. of R.R. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is particularly true here, since the WPA deleted the \"reprisal\" language from the substantive prohibitions on retaliation that origi- nally appeared in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. See supra 36.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Text And Context Of The WPA And SOX Are Materially Different",
		"context": "Federal govern- ment employees, on the other hand, are generally sub- ject to strict civil service regulations, which in practice make it exceedingly difficult to terminate or demote them. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Federal civil servants are now protected by an elaborate, comprehensive scheme that encom- passes substantive provisions forbidding arbitrary ac- tion by supervisors and procedures—administrative 40 and judicial—by which improper action may be re- dressed. They apply to a multitude of personnel deci- sions that are made daily by federal agencies.\"). The WPA operates within that special system of civil ser- vice protection.",
		"citation_value_orig": "462 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": ". Assuming arguendo that this action were moot, this Court s till would have some discretion on how to resolve the matter : \"there is no unyielding juris - dictional hierarchy \" that requires dismissal for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction before dismissing on another threshold basis. Ruhrgas [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits. \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 574",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "\"[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court proposes to issue a judgment on the merits. \" Id. (interior quotation marks omitted); Steel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On the question of how to dismiss the case, \"a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits. \" Sinochem Int 'l 549 U.S. 422.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 83",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "(interior quotation marks omitted); Steel 523 U.S. 83. On the question of how to dismiss the case, \"a federal court has leeway to choose among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits. \" Sinochem Int 'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The decision on how to dismiss a case \"is rooted in equity. \" 138 S.Ct. 1790 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "Sinochem Int 'l 549 U.S. 422. The decision on how to dismiss a case \"is rooted in equity. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Barring an exception to moot ness, federal court s cannot reach the merits of a moot case , but they nonetheless must \"determine[e] what will be 'most consonant to justice ' in view of the conditions and circumstances of the particular case. \" Hamburg - American Co. , 239 U.S. at 478 (quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining 145 U.S. 300 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1790",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "138 S.Ct. 1790 . Barring an exception to moot ness, federal court s cannot reach the merits of a moot case , but they nonetheless must \"determine[e] what will be 'most consonant to justice ' in view of the conditions and circumstances of the particular case. \" Hamburg - American Co. , 239 U.S. at 478 (quoting South Spring Hill Gold Mining [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Here, that may require dismissing the plaint iffs' underlying case, as opposed to denying intervention. Equity gives this Court broad flexibility in choosing how to proceed here: The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the neces sities of the particular case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "145 U.S. 300",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "Equity gives this Court broad flexibility in choosing how to proceed here: The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the neces sities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished it. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], then -Judge Alito would have decided an issue of appellate jurisdiction, but his two panel colleagues elected to decide the Article III issue of mootness. Here, if the Arizona parties ' claims were indeed moot —they are not—the Court nonetheless could focus instead on the plaintiffs ' lack of Article III standing. A court simply is not bound by a hierarch al order in which to decide these jurisdictional issues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 7",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. There is no \"unyielding jurisdictional hierarchy\" on the bases for dismissal",
		"context": "A court simply is not bound by a hierarch al order in which to decide these jurisdictional issues. In addition to alternate jurisdictional bases on which to dismiss, the Court also c an look to prudential ones. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even if the canon against \"friendly \" or collusive litigation is not juris - dictional, therefore, the Court also could consider that basis for dismissing this litiga tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 413",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The City maintains direct and effective control over the flagpoles and messages conveyed through its flag raisings",
		"context": "See supra pp. 11-13. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that advertisements promoting the sale of beef products constituted government speech because the government established the program and specified in general terms what the campaigns should and should not contain. That is exactly what the City's published intentions and goals do here. The City has also adopted a more specific written Flag Raising Policy memorializing the criteria for a flag-raising event.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. No Other Mechanism Exists To Protect Small Refineries From Disproportionate Economic Hardship",
		"context": "88a. While even this conclusion is disputed, that dispute is immaterial here. The Fourth Circuit explained why in Ergon -West Virginia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Basic principles of economics establish that producers in a competitive market cannot pass through to consumers all taxes and other regulatory costs. See Pindyck & Rubinfeld, Microeco- nomic s 338–40 (9th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 F.3d 600",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. No Other Mechanism Exists To Protect Small Refineries From Disproportionate Economic Hardship",
		"context": "\"); Pub. Utils. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 There , EPA defended its denial of a hardship exemp- tion by relying on this same \"pass -through\" study. The court of appeals vacated EPA's action as arbitrary, be- cause EPA's study \"merely determined that the refin- ing industry as a whole is not burdened by rising RIN prices.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "24 F.3d 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An \"Overall Harm\" Requirement Is Not Supported by a Danger of \"False Positives\"",
		"context": "at 52. This Court has held that, as a general matter, anticompetitive harm in one market may not be offset by benefits that may ac- crue in other markets. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 374 U.S. 321. Since this case does not turn on whether an exception to the out -of-market benefits rule is ap- propriate, the Court need not reach the Solicitor General's pro-posal. To the extent the Court does address it, any exception to the out -of-market benefits rule under the rule of reason must be predicated on benefits to the co mpetitive process and consumers generally .",
		"citation_value_orig": "405 U.S. 596",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. An \"Overall Harm\" Requirement Is Not Supported by a Danger of \"False Positives\"",
		"context": "at 52. This Court has held that, as a general matter, anticompetitive harm in one market may not be offset by benefits that may ac- crue in other markets. See, e.g., 405 U.S. 596; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since this case does not turn on whether an exception to the out -of-market benefits rule is ap- propriate, the Court need not reach the Solicitor General's pro-posal. To the extent the Court does address it, any exception to the out -of-market benefits rule under the rule of reason must be predicated on benefits to the co mpetitive process and consumers generally .",
		"citation_value_orig": "374 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Blaine Amendment Attempted to Enshrine Anti-Catholic Prejudice in the United States Constitution Under the Guise of Promoting \"Non-Sectarian\" Education",
		"context": "was that public schools must be \"nonsectarian\" (which was usually understood to allow Bible reading and other Protestant observances) and public money must not support \"sectarian\" schools (which in practi cal terms meant Catholic). And this sentiment played a significant role in creating a movement that sought to 10 amend several state constitutions (often successfully), and to amend the United States Constitution (unsuccessfully) to make certain that governme nt would not help pay for \"sectarian\" (i.e., Catholic) schooling for children. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Consideration of the amendment arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general, and it was an open secret that 'sectarian' was code for 'Catholic. '\"); Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 219, 287 (2002); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, \"A Political History of the Establishment Clause,\" 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 299 – 301 (2001).",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Blaine Amendment Attempted to Enshrine Anti-Catholic Prejudice in the United States Constitution Under the Guise of Promoting \"Non-Sectarian\" Education",
		"context": "After the national effort failed, many states amended their own constitutions to include provisions similar to the national amendment, collectively known as Blaine Amendments. See e.g. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These constitutional prov isions enshrined at the state level the same anti -Catholic sentiment that failed to pass into a federal amendment in 1876. \"Nativist Protestants .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The reasonable-procedures claim",
		"context": "(quoting Owner -Operator Indep. Drivers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). The Ninth Circuit tried to remedy that problem by claiming that the mere existence of the \"potential match\" information put every class member at \"material risk\" of having a credit report containing it disseminated, even though that risk never materi alized for more than 75% of the class. Pet.App.22.",
		"citation_value_orig": "879 F.3d 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The reasonable-procedures claim",
		"context": "at 1549. Indeed, even false information is not presumed to be injurious at common law; defamation per se is instead reserved for a narrow set of false statements that expose individuals to \"hatred, contempt, or ridicule.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Yet Ramirez never presented a single piece of evidence showing that any absent class member suffered any injury on account of having a credit report containing a \"potential match\" alert disseminated to a third party. For all the record shows, the potential creditor or employer who received such a report quickly dismissed the \"potential match\" alert after cross -checking it against additional information, such as a birthdate —just as TransUnion instructed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
		"context": "That focus on economic substance, rather than labels, makes good sense: Regardless whether the defendant in an antitrust case is deemed a \"manu- facturer,\" a \"distributor,\" or something else, a theory of the case that relies on pass-through damages presents the same practical and policy concerns that Illinois Brick sought to avoid. To the extent that respondents argue that digital distribution models like Apple's App Store present less complicated pass-through analyses than other market 12 models, that argument is precluded by this Court's precedents. The Court considered and rejected that same contention in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, two States acting as parens patriae brought an antitrust lawsuit on behalf of consumers against a gas pipeline company and several gas production companies, alleging that they fixed prices. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "497 U.S. 199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
		"context": "Stare decisis also weighs heavily against recog- nizing any exceptions to the Illinois Brick rule. The Court has often observed that stare decisis \"is 'a foundation stone of the rule of law.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That is so for three reasons. First , adhering to prior precedents is essential to \"maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 2401",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
		"context": "That is so for three reasons. First , adhering to prior precedents is essential to \"maintaining public faith in the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned judgments.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By committing generally to follow prior decisions rather than routinely calling them into question, courts foster public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judicial process. Second , stare decisis \"further[s] fair and expedi- tious adjudication by eliminating the need to relitigate every relevant proposition in every case.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
		"context": "A key component of the predictability of the law is the assurance provided by stare decisis that settled precedents can be relied upon not to change. The Court is therefore especially reluctant to overturn existing precedents when \"individuals may have arranged their affairs in reliance on the expected stability of deci- sion\"—as is often true in \"area[s] of commercial law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These rationales apply strongly with respect to the direct purchaser rule of Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick . That rule is one of the most venerable doctrines in antitrust law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "365 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Illinois Brick Precludes All Claims Based On Pass-Through Damages, Regardless Of The Particular Distribution Model",
		"context": "The resulting flood of litigation, and the associated increase in antitrust exposure for digital companies, will redound to the detriment of consumers. To be sure, this Court has overturned prior anti- trust decisions—but it has done so only when those de- cisions have been shown to be ill-reasoned or otherwise \"flawed.\" See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 16 Here, by contrast, the reasoning underlying Illinois Brick is as strong today as it was when the case was decided. This Court need not and should not invite these harmful consequences by holding that a digital \"distributor\" like Apple is somehow outside the reach of Illinois Brick .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 877",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is A Strong Public Interest In Promoting Interoperability And Portability.",
		"context": "The 1996 Telecommunications Act, Pub.L. 104 –104, 110 Stat. 56, for example, required incumbent local telephone companies \"to share [their] network with competitors,\" AT&T [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], by offering unbundled services and interconnection access, which created a degree of interoperability enabl ing competition in previously monopolized landline telephone markets. Congress also recognized the importance of portability in encouraging mobile phone compet ition. See Cent ral Texas Tel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is A Strong Public Interest In Promoting Interoperability And Portability.",
		"context": "Congress also recognized the importance of portability in encouraging mobile phone compet ition. See Cent ral Texas Tel. Co -op., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has recognized that common rules for interoperability, even among competitors, can enable products and services that would not otherwise be possible. E.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 468 U.S. 85.",
		"citation_value_orig": "402 F.3d 205",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is A Strong Public Interest In Promoting Interoperability And Portability.",
		"context": "Co -op., 402 F.3d 205. This Court has recognized that common rules for interoperability, even among competitors, can enable products and services that would not otherwise be possible. E.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Interoperability is especially important in network markets, where a product's value is dependent upon its capacity to interact with others. Thus, in Lotus v. Borland , the First Circuit denied copyrig ht protection to a user interface that had become the de facto standard in the industry, in part because of interoperability considerations.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. There Is A Strong Public Interest In Promoting Interoperability And Portability.",
		"context": "Thus, in Lotus v. Borland , the First Circuit denied copyrig ht protection to a user interface that had become the de facto standard in the industry, in part because of interoperability considerations. Lotus Dev. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Judge Boudin put it, \"to the extent that Lotus' menu is an important standard in the industry, it might be argued that any use ought to be deemed privileged.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "49 F.3d 807",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The cases relied on by the lower court are incorrect and distinguishable",
		"context": "Circuit was incorrect to rely on a statutory canon of construct ion to analyze a constitu- tional claim. And the majority provided little in the way of analysis to support its argument that the extra- territorial nature of the claim was a \"special factor\" counseling hesitation. Its sole justification was a cita- tion to a Seventh Circuit case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Then-Judge Kavanaugh concurred, also finding that the extraterritorial nature of the complaint was a \"special factor\" counseling hesitation in the creation of a non-statutory remedy. He r elied, however, on the ar- gument that the parties could not point to a single case in which a federal court recognized a Bivens action for conduct by U.S. officials abroad.",
		"citation_value_orig": "701 F.3d 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "In the twentieth century, the charitable corpora- tion displaced the charitable trust as the dominant form for nonprofit organizations in the United States, but State Attorneys General have retained their cen- tral role as the protectors of charitable assets . See James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Cor- poration Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 Emory L.J. 617, 650 ( 1985) ; see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under California law, the Attorney General has a duty to en- sure that assets contributed to charity are used in ac- cordance with the promises made to donors . See In re8 Cal. App. 3d 902 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "257 P.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "617, 650 ( 1985) ; see also In re257 P.2d 1 . Under California law, the Attorney General has a duty to en- sure that assets contributed to charity are used in ac- cordance with the promises made to donors . See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This duty is all the more essential because in most cases, if the Attorney General does not act to halt the misuse of charitable assets, no one else will. See 394 P.2d 932 (\"Since there is usually no one willing to assume the burdens of a legal action, or who could properly represent the interests of the trust or the public, the Attorney General has been empow- ered to oversee charities as the representative of the public, a practice having its origin in the early com- mon law.\")",
		"citation_value_orig": "8 Cal. App. 3d 902",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "See In re8 Cal. App. 3d 902 . This duty is all the more essential because in most cases, if the Attorney General does not act to halt the misuse of charitable assets, no one else will. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Since there is usually no one willing to assume the burdens of a legal action, or who could properly represent the interests of the trust or the public, the Attorney General has been empow- ered to oversee charities as the representative of the public, a practice having its origin in the early com- mon law.\") . A donor may have standing to sue a char- 9 itable corporation or trust for mi suse of charitable as- sets in certain circumstances, but donor standing is of limited use when the donors are dispersed or dead .",
		"citation_value_orig": "394 P.2d 932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Vill. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Gospel 163 P.2d 704 . To facilitate over- sight, most States require charities that solicit funds in the State to register with the Attorney General, Secretary of State, or other s tate-level consumer -pro- tection authority or financial regulator . Cindy M. Lott et al., State Regula tion & Enforcement in the Charitable Sector v, 41 app.B (Urban Inst .",
		"citation_value_orig": "444 U.S. 620",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Vill. of 444 U.S. 620 ; Gospel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To facilitate over- sight, most States require charities that solicit funds in the State to register with the Attorney General, Secretary of State, or other s tate-level consumer -pro- tection authority or financial regulator . Cindy M. Lott et al., State Regula tion & Enforcement in the Charitable Sector v, 41 app.B (Urban Inst .",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 P.2d 704",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State Attorneys General have primary responsibility for nonprofit-sector oversight within the U.S. federalist system",
		"context": "The IRS intervenes, for example, in cases of private inurement and private benefit, see, e.g., Educ. Assistance Found. for Descendants of Hun- garian Immigrants in the Performing Arts, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Korean -American Senior Mut. Ass'n , 2020 WL 5414864 , but it would have no basis for intervening when an organi- zation applies funds to a dif ferent charitable purpose than the purpose for which a donor contributed. And the FTC— although it is empowered to act on its own to prevent unfair or deceptive acts o r practices in or affecting commerce —almost always moves in tandem with State Attorneys G eneral when it takes enforce- ment actions against nonprofit organizations.3 Alt- hough the IRS and the FTC play valuable roles, State 3 See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "111 F. Supp. 3d 34",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Relator's Critical Role in Recouping Government Funds from Fraudsters Requires Equal Access to the Act's Limitations Periods",
		"context": "The legislative history of the FCA's 1986 amendments shows a firm congressional commit- ment to bolstering the FCA's private right of action and to fortifying the means to expose hidden fraud. These FCA purposes are fundamentally at odds with depriving relators—that critical \"posse of ad hoc depu- ties [which] uncover and pro secute frauds against the government,\" United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (4th Cir. (1992)—of (b)(2)'s discovery rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 F.2d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "1442(a)(1) . A private party acts \"un- der\" a federal officer or agency when its conduct is sub- ject to federal \"subjection, guidance, or control\" and the party is involved in \"an effort to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.\" Wats [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Businesses —and in particular government contrac- tors—are often in this position. The federal government has increasingly turned to businesses through public - private partnerships to achieve its goals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 142",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Moiz Syed & David Willis, 20 ProPublica, Tracking Fed eral Purchases to Fight the Coronavirus , https://projects.propublica.org/coronavirus - contracts/ (May 27, 2020, last updated Nov. 20, 2020). As a result, the federal -officer removal issue arises in a wide range of contexts, including aviation, see Lu Jun- hong, 792 F.3d at 807, health -care insurance plan ad- ministration, Decatur Hosp. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and oil and gas pro- duction , as here. In these and many other contexts, busi- nesses work closely with the federal go vernment, carry- ing out partnerships to provide goods and services es- sential to a government's function. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "854 F.3d 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Even whe re the appellate court det ermines that fed- eral-officer or civil -rights removal is unavailable, the de- fendants may still have \"a right and privilege secured … by the [C]onstitution and laws of the United States\" on some other basis to have their case heard in federal court. S. Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 546 U.S. 132. Without full review, th ose in- dependent rights to a federal forum would be lost even when the remand order is on appeal and the court of ap- peals could readily determine that it is erroneous. Moreover, the justifications for providing a federal fo- rum do not evaporate simply because th e federal -officer 21 or civil -rights removal ground is ultimately unavailing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "146 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Even whe re the appellate court det ermines that fed- eral-officer or civil -rights removal is unavailable, the de- fendants may still have \"a right and privilege secured … by the [C]onstitution and laws of the United States\" on some other basis to have their case heard in federal court. S. Pac. 146 U.S. 202; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Without full review, th ose in- dependent rights to a federal forum would be lost even when the remand order is on appeal and the court of ap- peals could readily determine that it is erroneous. Moreover, the justifications for providing a federal fo- rum do not evaporate simply because th e federal -officer 21 or civil -rights removal ground is ultimately unavailing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 132",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Moreover, the justifications for providing a federal fo- rum do not evaporate simply because th e federal -officer 21 or civil -rights removal ground is ultimately unavailing. For example, this Court has recognized that diversity jurisdiction protects \"those who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice against out -of-state parties.\" Hertz [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And federal - question removal \"protect[s] federal rights\" and \"pro- vide[s] a forum that could more accurately interpret fed- eral law.\" Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. 235; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 308.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 77",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Hertz 559 U.S. 77. And federal - question removal \"protect[s] federal rights\" and \"pro- vide[s] a forum that could more accurately interpret fed- eral law.\" Boys Mkts., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 308. Indeed, courts have no ted the overlap between the ra- tionales for federal -officer removal and \"both diversity and federal question jurisdiction\": \"As with federal question jurisdiction, there is a desire to have the fed- eral courts decide the federal issues that often arise in cases involving federal officers.\" 817 F.3d 457, over- ruled on other grounds by 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 U.S. 235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Hertz 559 U.S. 77. And federal - question removal \"protect[s] federal rights\" and \"pro- vide[s] a forum that could more accurately interpret fed- eral law.\" Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. 235; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, courts have no ted the overlap between the ra- tionales for federal -officer removal and \"both diversity and federal question jurisdiction\": \"As with federal question jurisdiction, there is a desire to have the fed- eral courts decide the federal issues that often arise in cases involving federal officers.\" 817 F.3d 457, over- ruled on other grounds by 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Complete review is important to the business community and accords with congressional policy",
		"context": "Boys Mkts., 398 U.S. 235; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., 545 U.S. 308. Indeed, courts have no ted the overlap between the ra- tionales for federal -officer removal and \"both diversity and federal question jurisdiction\": \"As with federal question jurisdiction, there is a desire to have the fed- eral courts decide the federal issues that often arise in cases involving federal officers.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], over- ruled on other grounds by 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020 ) (en banc). Even if federal -officer or civil -rights removal is unavail- able in a given case, those underlying federal interests may remain present in full force.",
		"citation_value_orig": "817 F.3d 457",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Takings Clause cannot be circumvented by abrogating traditional property rights",
		"context": "Br. 24-27), one of the through-lines in Takings Clause precedent is that \"the government does not have unlimited power to redefine property rights.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"As a gen- eral matter, it is true that the property rights protected by the Takings Clause are creatures of state law.\" Cedar Point Nursery , 141 S. Ct. at 2075-76.",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 419",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Takings Clause cannot be circumvented by abrogating traditional property rights",
		"context": "Cedar Point Nursery , 141 S. Ct. at 2075-76. But that does not mean a State can \"sidestep\" the Clause simply \"by disa- vowing traditional property interests long recognized un- der state law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While state law may inform whether a particular property right exists, it is not the only con- sideration in determining whether the government has taken private property in a way that implicates the Tak- ings Clause. If a property right is \"traditional\" or rooted in the \"English common law,\" for example, a State cannot redefine that right out of existence, claim ownership over it, and thereby circumvent the Fifth Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 156",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Takings Clause cannot be circumvented by abrogating traditional property rights",
		"context": "Indeed, any time government takes prop- erty pursuant to a statute, the law could be depicted as having \"abrogated\" the original owner's right to the prop- erty taken. The taking in Knick v. Township of Scott could have been restyled a municipal abrogation of the pe- titioner's traditional right to exclude the public from her family cemetery. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The taking in Horne v. Department of Agriculture could have been restyled an administrative abrogation of the petitioners' traditional right to keep their raisins. 576 U.S. 350.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2162",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Takings Clause cannot be circumvented by abrogating traditional property rights",
		"context": "In holding differently, the court of appeals started and ended with a mistaken premise: that the government's power to redefine property rights is a matter of state law alone, unchecked by constitutional limits. That holding conflicts with decades of precedent. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And if accepted, it would offer a blueprint for governments nationwide to re- define out of existence all manner of protected property rights. If the Court determines that Tyler's case impli- cates the Takings Clause, the decision below is thus a straightforward candidate for reversal.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Petitioner's copying was not fair use",
		"context": "The equitable doctrine of fair use limits the exclusive rights that a copyright otherwise confers. The doctrine permits court s to consider whether \"rigid application of the copyright statute\" in a particular case \"would stifle the very creativity which that law is de- signed to foster.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But t he fair use doctrine does not permit a new market entrant to 27 copy valuable parts of a n established work simply to at- tract fans to its own comp eting commercial product. To the contrary , copying \"to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working up something fr esh\" actively dis- serves copyright's goals.",
		"citation_value_orig": "510 U.S. 569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court Should Avoid Finding a Protected Property Interest in \"Equity\" Independent of State Law",
		"context": "Finally, WCA respectfully urges the Court not to issue a decision that would have the effect of recognizing the \"equity interest\" or \"surplus proceeds\" claimed by Petitioner as a \"traditional property right\" entitled to federal constitutional protection regardless of its 21 treatment under state law. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] As Respondents ably demonstrate there \"has never been a universal common-law or constitutional rule\" regarding the treatment of the surplus value in excess of the tax debt of a forfeited property and \"forfeiture of an entire interest in land has a long historical pedigree, including in the specific context of the failure to pay property taxes.\" Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 F.3d 1194",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court Should Avoid Finding a Protected Property Interest in \"Equity\" Independent of State Law",
		"context": "This Court should avoid a ruling that would effectively federalize an issue that resides squarely within the realm of one of the core state powers: tax administration. See Nat'l Priv. Truck Council, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Leigh , 193 U.S. at 87. Rather, this Court should, as it generally does, assess the existence of a property interest here through reference to state law. While Minnesota's statutes and similar statutes of other states may seem harsh to some, by allowing for an owner's entire interest in land to be forfeited as satisfaction of unpaid taxes when the value 22 of the land may otherwise exceed the amount of unpaid taxes, to others Minnesota's approach may represent an appropriate balance between the interests of property owners and the government's interest in ensuring the collection of tax revenues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 582",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court Should Avoid Finding a Protected Property Interest in \"Equity\" Independent of State Law",
		"context": "9a-10a. To conclude that a forfeiture is subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause, this Court \"must determine that it can only be explained as serving in part to punish.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. When a government obtains title to real property via an in rem proceeding due to unpaid property taxes, however, the intent is not to punish the former property owner. Rather, the purpose of such proceedings is \"to ensure the payment of taxes and the collection of revenue.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This Court Should Avoid Finding a Protected Property Interest in \"Equity\" Independent of State Law",
		"context": "When a government obtains title to real property via an in rem proceeding due to unpaid property taxes, however, the intent is not to punish the former property owner. Rather, the purpose of such proceedings is \"to ensure the payment of taxes and the collection of revenue.\" Waukesha [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Although in some cases in rem forfeiture can result in a government acquiring property that is worth more than the unpaid tax liability, resulting in lost value to the former property owner, in other cases the former property owner benefits because the property is worth less than the outstanding debt that is extinguished. As the United States explains: \"A program with those potential benefits to taxpayers— without any consideration of 'fault' or 'innocence'—cannot be considered punitive.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "106 Wis. 2d 244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "Even the courts have admitted the difficulty of properly applying Price Wa- terhouse and Oncale to claims brought by gay and les- bian employees. See, e.g. , Prowel , 579 F.3d at 291 (noting that \"the line between sexual orientation dis- crimination and discrimination 'because of sex' can be difficult to draw\"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 52 overruled by Zarda , 883 F.3d 100 (noting that \"the effort to [remove the 'sex' from 'sexual orien-tation'] has led to confus ing and contradictory re- sults\"). For example, some courts dismiss claims for sex discrimination where the plaintiff alleges verbal har- assment reflecting a perception that he or she is gay, while others do not. Compare, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "398 F.3d 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "Even the courts have admitted the difficulty of properly applying Price Wa- terhouse and Oncale to claims brought by gay and les- bian employees. See, e.g. , Prowel , 579 F.3d at 291 (noting that \"the line between sexual orientation dis- crimination and discrimination 'because of sex' can be difficult to draw\"); 398 F.3d 211, 52 overruled by Zarda , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (noting that \"the effort to [remove the 'sex' from 'sexual orien-tation'] has led to confus ing and contradictory re- sults\"). For example, some courts dismiss claims for sex discrimination where the plaintiff alleges verbal har- assment reflecting a perception that he or she is gay, while others do not. Compare, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "883 F.3d 100",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "For example, some courts dismiss claims for sex discrimination where the plaintiff alleges verbal har- assment reflecting a perception that he or she is gay, while others do not. Compare, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (per- mitting a claim for same-sex sexual harassment to pro-ceed where a male plaintiff alleged he was harassed because of his \"perceived se xual preference,\" because the fact that \"some of the harassment alleged . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "187 F.3d 862",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": ". . \" did not make the complaint one for sexual orientation discrimina- tion) and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] with Kay , 142 F. App'x at 50-51 (affirming the dismissal of a complaint because the epithets directed toward the plaintiff, including \"faggot,\" \"fem,\" and suggesting he was not a 53 \"real man\" indicated sexual orientation discrimination and not sex stereotype discrimination). Other courts seek to di vine whether the employer is motivated to discriminate because of the employee's sexual orientation or his failure to conform to a sex ste- reotype by tabulating and comparing the \"relative fre-quency\" of comments reflecting either type of bias. See Zarda , 883 F.3d at 121 (citing and discussing cases).",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F. Supp. 2d 883",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "Importantly, the fact that discrimination based on a person's failure to conform to a sex stereotype is so often indistinguishable from discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta tion further reinforces the 56 common sense conclusion that a heterosexual orienta- tion is a sex-based stereotype. Ultimately, a refusal to recognize that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination invites ju- dicial speculation into whether and to what extent sex- based discrimination is based on sex stereotypes ra- ther than sexual orientation, and leads to confusing and contradictory results.15 The Court must therefore 15 This infects other areas of Ti tle VII jurisprudence as well. For example, the \"opposition clause\" of Title VII protects employ-ees from retaliation based on their opposition to practices made unlawful under Title VII, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], but many lower courts require employees al leging retaliation for protected opposition activity must demonstr ate that their belief that they were opposing conduct made unl awful under Title VII was rea- sonable, which is often measured by the substantive law, see, e.g. , 518 F.3d 542; 176 F.3d 1346. To the extent that it is unclear whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and whether an employee is being lawfully discriminated agai nst because of sexual orienta- tion or unlawfully on the basis of a sex stereotype, the scope of the opposition clause of Title VII al so remains unclear, and the reme- dial policy of the statute is undermined.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 271",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "Ultimately, a refusal to recognize that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination invites ju- dicial speculation into whether and to what extent sex- based discrimination is based on sex stereotypes ra- ther than sexual orientation, and leads to confusing and contradictory results.15 The Court must therefore 15 This infects other areas of Ti tle VII jurisprudence as well. For example, the \"opposition clause\" of Title VII protects employ-ees from retaliation based on their opposition to practices made unlawful under Title VII, 555 U.S. 271, but many lower courts require employees al leging retaliation for protected opposition activity must demonstr ate that their belief that they were opposing conduct made unl awful under Title VII was rea- sonable, which is often measured by the substantive law, see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 176 F.3d 1346. To the extent that it is unclear whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and whether an employee is being lawfully discriminated agai nst because of sexual orienta- tion or unlawfully on the basis of a sex stereotype, the scope of the opposition clause of Title VII al so remains unclear, and the reme- dial policy of the statute is undermined. Another example is the question of whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative reme dies before the Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Commission as required before bringing a lawsuit in court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 F.3d 542",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "Ultimately, a refusal to recognize that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination invites ju- dicial speculation into whether and to what extent sex- based discrimination is based on sex stereotypes ra- ther than sexual orientation, and leads to confusing and contradictory results.15 The Court must therefore 15 This infects other areas of Ti tle VII jurisprudence as well. For example, the \"opposition clause\" of Title VII protects employ-ees from retaliation based on their opposition to practices made unlawful under Title VII, 555 U.S. 271, but many lower courts require employees al leging retaliation for protected opposition activity must demonstr ate that their belief that they were opposing conduct made unl awful under Title VII was rea- sonable, which is often measured by the substantive law, see, e.g. , 518 F.3d 542; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To the extent that it is unclear whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and whether an employee is being lawfully discriminated agai nst because of sexual orienta- tion or unlawfully on the basis of a sex stereotype, the scope of the opposition clause of Title VII al so remains unclear, and the reme- dial policy of the statute is undermined. Another example is the question of whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative reme dies before the Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Commission as required before bringing a lawsuit in court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "176 F.3d 1346",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "To the extent that it is unclear whether Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination, and whether an employee is being lawfully discriminated agai nst because of sexual orienta- tion or unlawfully on the basis of a sex stereotype, the scope of the opposition clause of Title VII al so remains unclear, and the reme- dial policy of the statute is undermined. Another example is the question of whether a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative reme dies before the Equal Employ- ment Opportunity Commission as required before bringing a lawsuit in court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Gene rally speaking, \"a plaintiff 's judicial complaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investiga-tion which can reasonably be expect ed to grow out of the charge of discrimination,\" which depends on whether the court deter-mines that the charge alleged su fficient facts to put the Commis- sion and the employer on notice of the allegations. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 F.3d 1277",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Attempt to Distinguish Between Sex Stereotype Discrimination Based on Gay or Lesbian \"Traits\" and Sexual Orientation Discrimination is Profoundly Unworkable",
		"context": "If the court decides that the employee did not provide enough factual information in the charge, then she will 57 recognize that Title VII prohibits sexual orientation discrimination because the alternative is a continua- tion of the confusing mess that threatens the con- sistency and predictability required for the rule of law in this area. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. ---------------------------------  ---------------------------------",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 57",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Making Concessions Can Be a Sound Trial Strategy",
		"context": "Concessions may, for example, preserve credibility or focus the jury's attention on the most material and advantageous issues in a case. Particularly in bifurcated capital cases, concessions of guilt at times may seem helpful in focusing the jury's attention on the penalty phase 7 contradict the essence of the defendant's decision regarding testimony would make counsel the \"master\" rather than the \"assistant\" and thus strip the defense of the personal character that the Constitution demands. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Bergerud, 223 P.3d at 702. B.A Defense Lawyer's Trial Strategy May Not Override A Client's Express Decision To Maintain Innocence Defense counsel may not employ a trial strategy that overrides a defendant's express decision to maintain innocence. Certainly, conceding particular factual or legal issues at trial can sometimes be a useful trial tactic, and many concessions will not rise to the level of constitutional harm.",
		"citation_value_orig": "422 U.S. 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Making Concessions Can Be a Sound Trial Strategy",
		"context": "Nixon, 543 U.S. at 562-63. The determination, however, on this bedrock issue—the guilt or innocence of the defendant— cannot supersede express constitutional protections that guard a defendant's dignity and autonomy. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Cooke, 977 A.2d at 842 (\"[T]he defendant has autonomy to make the most basic decisions affecting his case . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "465 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, this Court should narrowly construe \"good cause\" restrictions on removing ALJs",
		"context": "1201.140(b) (MSPB \"will specify the penalty to be im- posed\"); see also, e.g. , Social Sec. 27 M.S.P.R. 242[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (Fed. Cir. ), cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "787 F.2d 1559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, this Court should narrowly construe \"good cause\" restrictions on removing ALJs",
		"context": "This construction provides agencies with constitution- ally sufficient latitude to remove an ALJ for appropri- ate job-related reasons; i t ensures the agen cy head's control —and, by extension, the President's —over the important executive functions performed by these infe- rior officers . This construction, in addition to being the best reading of the text, is therefore supported by well - established p rinciples of constitutional avoidance. See Public [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under the foregoing construction of the \"for cause\" standard, an ALJ would still be protected from removal for invidious reason s otherwise prohibited by law. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, this Court should narrowly construe \"good cause\" restrictions on removing ALJs",
		"context": "55 This case, howev er, does not implicate those consti- tutional concerns. Agencies currently possess the au- thority to reassign responsibilities away from ALJ s while awaiting MSPB review of a removal decision. S ee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,134 S. Ct. 2724 . That author- ity avoids the possibility that an ALJ might continue to adjudicate cases beyond the point at which the Depart- ment Head has lost confidence in the ALJ's ability to exercise appropriate judgment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "721 F.3d 633",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. To avoid serious constitutional concerns, this Court should narrowly construe \"good cause\" restrictions on removing ALJs",
		"context": "That author- ity avoids the possibility that an ALJ might continue to adjudicate cases beyond the point at which the Depart- ment Head has lost confidence in the ALJ's ability to exercise appropriate judgment. Other concerns with an ALJ's compensation or continued employment within the agency (albeit without his duties) do not bear on a private litigant's constitutional right to an adjudication before a properly appointed decision -maker. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Such concerns bear only on the Executive Branch's ability to adequate ly supervise ALJs, and thus should be addressed in appropriate cases be- tween employing agencies and their ALJs. 56 CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. Does the law discriminate between religions?",
		"context": "? Finally, laws that discriminate between religions, rather than just between religion and nonreligion, also violate the Free Exercise Clause. Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 536 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); Smith , 494 U.S. at 877 (same). Thus, in applying the other six categories of the Lukumi analysis, if a law's text, \"object,\" exemptions, or (pos- sibly) motive demonstrate a preference for conduct by members of some religions over others, rather than for secular conduct over religious conduct, the law nonetheless triggers strict scrutiny. Larson , 456 U.S. 29 (describing this as a rule against \"denomi- national preferences\").8",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "7. Does the law discriminate between religions?",
		"context": "Lukumi , 508 U.S. at 536 (citing 456 U.S. 228); Smith , 494 U.S. at 877 (same). Thus, in applying the other six categories of the Lukumi analysis, if a law's text, \"object,\" exemptions, or (pos- sibly) motive demonstrate a preference for conduct by members of some religions over others, rather than for secular conduct over religious conduct, the law nonetheless triggers strict scrutiny. Larson , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (describing this as a rule against \"denomi- national preferences\").8",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "§1252(a)(2)(D). That more limited exception, distinct from the approach by some courts of appeals, undermines any ratification theory. See TC Heartland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 434 U.S. 575508 U.S. 152. The 41 The uniformity of the court of appeals is overstated. Before and after 2005, Seventh Circuit decisions rejected the \"discre- tionary \" / \"non-discr etionary\" dichotomy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1514",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "§1252(a)(2)(D). That more limited exception, distinct from the approach by some courts of appeals, undermines any ratification theory. See TC Heartland 137 S. Ct. 1514; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]508 U.S. 152. The 41 The uniformity of the court of appeals is overstated. Before and after 2005, Seventh Circuit decisions rejected the \"discre- tionary \" / \"non-discr etionary\" dichotomy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "434 U.S. 575",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "§1252(a)(2)(D). That more limited exception, distinct from the approach by some courts of appeals, undermines any ratification theory. See TC Heartland 137 S. Ct. 1514; see also 434 U.S. 575[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The 41 The uniformity of the court of appeals is overstated. Before and after 2005, Seventh Circuit decisions rejected the \"discre- tionary \" / \"non-discr etionary\" dichotomy .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "The 41 The uniformity of the court of appeals is overstated. Before and after 2005, Seventh Circuit decisions rejected the \"discre- tionary \" / \"non-discr etionary\" dichotomy . See Kharkhan , 336 F.3d at 604; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . After 2005, additional circui t court decisions concluded questions of fact were unreviewable . See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "446 F.3d 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "After 2005, additional circui t court decisions concluded questions of fact were unreviewable . See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Arambula- 572 F.3d 824; see also Lee, 592 F.3d at 620; Xiao Ji 471 F.3d 315. 52 idea that Congress so \"ratified\" using words markedly different than what those courts were saying is a bridge too far. And no congressional ratification the- ory can overcome what Congress actually said.",
		"citation_value_orig": "617 F.3d 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "After 2005, additional circui t court decisions concluded questions of fact were unreviewable . See, e.g. , 617 F.3d 67 ; Arambula- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Lee, 592 F.3d at 620; Xiao Ji 471 F.3d 315. 52 idea that Congress so \"ratified\" using words markedly different than what those courts were saying is a bridge too far. And no congressional ratification the- ory can overcome what Congress actually said.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 F.3d 824",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congressional repudiation, not ratification",
		"context": "After 2005, additional circui t court decisions concluded questions of fact were unreviewable . See, e.g. , 617 F.3d 67 ; Arambula- 572 F.3d 824; see also Lee, 592 F.3d at 620; Xiao Ji [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 52 idea that Congress so \"ratified\" using words markedly different than what those courts were saying is a bridge too far. And no congressional ratification the- ory can overcome what Congress actually said.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 F.3d 315",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The inter partes review process balances the interests of patent owners and patent challengers",
		"context": ". whether to institute' review\" in some cases. Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]] applies where the grounds for attacking the de-cision to institute inter partes review consist of ques- tions that are closely tied to the application and interpre- tation of statutes related to the Patent Office's decision to initiate inter partes review. \"); see also SAS Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1348. 10 The effect of inter partes review on the length and expense of proceedings is mixed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The inter partes review process balances the interests of patent owners and patent challengers",
		"context": "whether to institute' review\" in some cases. Cuozzo Speed Techs., 136 S. Ct. 2131] applies where the grounds for attacking the de-cision to institute inter partes review consist of ques- tions that are closely tied to the application and interpre- tation of statutes related to the Patent Office's decision to initiate inter partes review. \"); see also SAS Inst., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 The effect of inter partes review on the length and expense of proceedings is mixed. On average, a chal- lenge may be resolved faster through inter partes re- view than district court litigation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1348",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Jur., Costs, § 63 (1936) (\"The term 'costs' or 'expenses' as used in a statute is not understood ordinarily to include attorneys' fees.\"). State courts generally have persisted in rejecting the contention that \"expenses\" encompasses \"attorneys' fees\" throughout the twentieth century up until the present. E.g., 1912 WL 3724170 N.Y.S.2d 382[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]238 Ga. App. 369284 S.W.3d 303165 So. 3d 816. Likewise, other federal courts that have considered this issue have held that th e term \"expenses\" does not include \"attorneys' fees.\" See, e.g., 896 F.2d 750.",
		"citation_value_orig": "320 Ark. 501",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Jur., Costs, § 63 (1936) (\"The term 'costs' or 'expenses' as used in a statute is not understood ordinarily to include attorneys' fees.\"). State courts generally have persisted in rejecting the contention that \"expenses\" encompasses \"attorneys' fees\" throughout the twentieth century up until the present. E.g., 1912 WL 3724170 N.Y.S.2d 382320 Ark. 501[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]284 S.W.3d 303165 So. 3d 816. Likewise, other federal courts that have considered this issue have held that th e term \"expenses\" does not include \"attorneys' fees.\" See, e.g., 896 F.2d 750.",
		"citation_value_orig": "238 Ga. App. 369",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Jur., Costs, § 63 (1936) (\"The term 'costs' or 'expenses' as used in a statute is not understood ordinarily to include attorneys' fees.\"). State courts generally have persisted in rejecting the contention that \"expenses\" encompasses \"attorneys' fees\" throughout the twentieth century up until the present. E.g., 1912 WL 3724170 N.Y.S.2d 382320 Ark. 501238 Ga. App. 369[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]165 So. 3d 816. Likewise, other federal courts that have considered this issue have held that th e term \"expenses\" does not include \"attorneys' fees.\" See, e.g., 896 F.2d 750.",
		"citation_value_orig": "284 S.W.3d 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "Jur., Costs, § 63 (1936) (\"The term 'costs' or 'expenses' as used in a statute is not understood ordinarily to include attorneys' fees.\"). State courts generally have persisted in rejecting the contention that \"expenses\" encompasses \"attorneys' fees\" throughout the twentieth century up until the present. E.g., 1912 WL 3724170 N.Y.S.2d 382320 Ark. 501238 Ga. App. 369284 S.W.3d 303[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Likewise, other federal courts that have considered this issue have held that th e term \"expenses\" does not include \"attorneys' fees.\" See, e.g., 896 F.2d 750.",
		"citation_value_orig": "165 So. 3d 816",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Longstanding Judicial Precedent Demonstrates That \"Expenses\" Do Not Include \"Attorneys' Fees\"",
		"context": "E.g., 1912 WL 3724170 N.Y.S.2d 382320 Ark. 501238 Ga. App. 369284 S.W.3d 303165 So. 3d 816. Likewise, other federal courts that have considered this issue have held that th e term \"expenses\" does not include \"attorneys' fees.\" See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, as discussed further below, the Fourth Circuit in Shammas only reached a contrary result because it erroneously concluded that the American Rule's presumption did not apply to § 145. Against this backdrop, the PTO's argument that \"in 'ordinary parlance,' .",
		"citation_value_orig": "896 F.2d 750",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": ". A State may not, by statute or common law, create a cause of action under § 1983 against an entity whom Congress has not subjected to liability.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and 10 legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and ch aracterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.\" 471 U.S. 261.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "496 U.S. 356. \"Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and 10 legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and ch aracterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has been clear: states do not have authority to create causes of action under federal provisions. \"Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "This Court has been clear: states do not have authority to create causes of action under federal provisions. \"Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In our constitutional system, states have never been empowered to expand federal law of their own volition; Congress, and Congress alone, has authority to create enforcement mechanisms for the provisions of the Constitution and federal law. The Amar Amici cite Military Governor Canby's reliance on Section Three to bar elected officials from taking office in former confederate states as purported evidence that the Amendment was understood to be self-executing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "(CRSCC Br. § 2) (See this Court's cases cited therein emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment contains \"a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). It does not of its own strength create a cause of action. City of 521 U.S. 507, is not to the contrary, and in fact cites Katzenbach .",
		"citation_value_orig": "384 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "384 U.S. 641). It does not of its own strength create a cause of action. City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is not to the contrary, and in fact cites Katzenbach . Id. at 517.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "City of Boerne holds that Congress cannot inflate the scope of constitutional rights, id. ; it does not say that states or individual litigants themselves have enforcement power. Anderson Respondents would dismiss this analysis with a citation to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and its discussion of Ex parte Young . But Vail casts no doubt on the black-letter principle that all causes of action under federal law must originate with Congress. Ex parte Young , a case awarding injunctive relief, did not create a cause of action nor did it suggest that provisions of the Constitution could be self-executing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "Ex parte Young , a case awarding injunctive relief, did not create a cause of action nor did it suggest that provisions of the Constitution could be self-executing. Instead, it provided a mechanism for surmounting sovereign immunity, not a cause of action in itself. See Seminole 12 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In Alexander , 532 U.S. at 286, this Court made these principles clear when plaintiffs sued a state official, seeking injunctive relief under the Fourteenth Amendment. If Anderson Respondents were right, the Alexander plaintiffs would have stated a cause of action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 44",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "[w]hat is required is that Congress created a cause of action for injunctive relief in the statute or otherwise made § 1983 available. Mich. Corr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But Chief Justice Chase's decision in Davis casts no doubt on Griffin's Case . Davis concerned an attempt to use Section Three as a defense, a \"shield\" in a criminal proceeding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "774 F.3d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "That is, of course, not how Griffin's Case was understood by subsequent authorities, which treated it as operative and highly persuasive authority despite the fact that it involved a person who held office before promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Griffin 's holding was not limited or based on that specific fact: \"the intention of the people of the United States, in adopting the fourteenth amendment, was to create a disability, to be removed in proper cases by a two-thirds vote, and to be made operative in other cases by the legislations of congress in its ordinary course.\" Griffin's Case , 11 F. Cas.",
		"citation_value_orig": "586 F.2d 311",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "For example, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the congressionally enacted mechanism for enforcement of Section One, claims against a state or state official are precluded. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Can litigants circumvent this by proceeding directly under a self-executi ng Section One? What is the statute of limitation s and what procedural mechanisms apply?",
		"citation_value_orig": "491 U.S. 58",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "While fifty-one different solutions may be a great idea for federalist experimentation in other contexts, Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law (2018), in deciding the 18 qualification of presidential candidates it is a recipe for national disaster. \"In lig ht of the Framers' evident concern that States woul d try to undermine the National Government; they could not have intended States to have the power to set qualifications.\" United States Term [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Colorado Election Code cannot provide a means for a work-around of congressional authority to apply and implement Section Three. Anderson Respondents would place the burden on the CRSCC to cite a \"constitutional provision stripping states of the powe r to enforce constitutional qualifications for the Presidency.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Enforcement of Section Three Has Always Occurred Pursuant to Congressional Authorization, and Never Through a Self-Executing State or Individual Action.",
		"context": "19 Congress, and Congress alone, possesses enforcement authority. A state could no more claim for itself the authority to enforce Section Three than it could claim for itself the authority to expel legislators from Congress, or , as this Court rejected when California tried it, to redefine the enforcement mechanisms of § 1983. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Only Congress can do so. Congress, representing the Nation's various interests and constituencies, is the best and only judge of when and how to authorize Section Three's affirmative enforcement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 693",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. State laws both diverge widely and often provide little relief.",
		"context": "Most states, however, provide less—and in many cases, far less—protection for servicemembers than USERRA. For example, in Delaware, 29 Delaware Code Annotated § 5105(a) purports to give state employees reemployment rights upon return from military service, and 20 Delaware Code Annotated § 905 might appear to grant these employees a legal action to enforce these rights against the state, but the Delaware Supreme Court ruled that such actions are still barred by sovereign immunity. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The upshot is that soldiers who served alongside each other overseas might find themselves with vastly different rights and remedies depending upon where they happen to call home in the United States. A key function of USERRA is provide a uniform floor of rights and remedies for servicemembers nationwide so that no 15 servicemembers forgo protections simply by residing in a particular state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "981 A.2d 1166",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. State laws both diverge widely and often provide little relief.",
		"context": "Indeed, \"[t]he relationship between the Government and members of its armed forces is distinctively federal in character,\" Feres , 340 U.S. at 143 (quotation omitted), and federal remedies are necessary and appropriate for servicemembers returning to civilian life. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Given how important antidiscrimination protection and reemployment rights are to the military's ability to recruit and retain soldiers, these matters simply cannot be left to the patchwork vagaries of state law. Putting aside the crucial need for uniformity, the schemes of many states—including many states with large veteran populations or important military bases—provide insufficient relief for veterans, especially compared to USERRA.",
		"citation_value_orig": "548 U.S. 163",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS",
		"context": "§ 22 (2012) (emphasis added). Interpreting that Act, this Court held that states have authority to enact laws more protective than existing federal law. Butte City Water [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Re jecting the argument that Montana state regulations were impermissibly more stringent than Congressional intent, this Court reasoned that Congress had clearly recognized the existence of state law in its statutory language, including those that were \"applicable and not inconsistent\" with federal law. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "196 U.S. 119",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS",
		"context": "The Court noted the state might reasonably want to guard against the risk of false land claims and to create a record of mining claims for future reference. Id. at 128; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In addition to The Mining Act of 1872, Congress similarly adopted state law to function as federal law in \"organic acts\" that established new territories within the United States. An organic act is \"an act providing and establishing a government.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "377 P.3d 818",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS",
		"context": "L. 841 (extending Arkansas state law into the territory \"so far as the same may be applicable and not inconsistent with any law of Congress\"). In determining that Arkansas state laws applied in the territory, this Court held that the language of the statute showed that \"Congress intended they should have the same force and meaning there they had in Arkansas.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The organic act establishing the Oregon Territory also used language simila r to OCSLA by giving the new government legislative power that should \"extend to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.\" Act of Aug. 14, 1848, ch.",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 417",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS",
		"context": "323 (emphasis added). This Court interpreted the language to empower the Oregon legislature to pass a legislative divorce because that action was not deemed to violate any fede ral law or constitutional protection. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court was not concerned with any gap between state and federal law, but assumed the power of the state to legislate, as long as the legislation was not inconsistent with federal protections. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "125 U.S. 190",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. THE COURT BELOW'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH STATE INTERESTS",
		"context": "The Court was not concerned with any gap between state and federal law, but assumed the power of the state to legislate, as long as the legislation was not inconsistent with federal protections. Id. ; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In short, as recognized by this Court's precedent, Congress has long used the phrase \"applicable and not inconsistent\" to allow application of state law on 6 federal property without regard to the existence of any \"gap\" in federal law. II.",
		"citation_value_orig": "80 U.S. 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Cannot Be Attributed to Employees Because Employees Have No Choice in the Fees",
		"context": "See Pet'r's Br. 42 (quoting Wis. Educ. Ass'n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; emphasis added). Therefore, the employee's transmis - sion of these agency fees does not constitute compelled speech by the employee under this Court's genuine choice doctrine. That the agency fees are called \"wages\" when they pass through the employee's paycheck does not alter their treatment under the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "705 F.3d 640",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Agency Fees Cannot Be Attributed to Employees Because Employees Have No Choice in the Fees",
		"context": "This is true in other contexts, as well. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius , for example, th e Court concluded that the health care mandate in the Affordable Care Act qualified as a tax under the Constitution, even though Congress did not regard it as a tax. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under Zelman and its progeny, the agency fees at issue in this case should be attributed to the govern - mental employer who originated the fees, and this Court should conclude that employees have not been compelled to subsidize speech with which they dis - agree in violation of the First Amendment.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the ballot-collection ban was enacted with intentional discrimination",
		"context": "While some legislators may have had \"a sincere, though mistaken, non-race-based belief that there had been fraud in third-party ballot collection,\" that belief resulted from uncritical reliance upon \"far-fetched\" and \"demonstrably false\" allegations and explicit racial appeals. JA.677; cf. Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , Petitioners argue that the court \"had no justification for inferring that race rather than partisanship was at play.\" Republicans.Br.48.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the ballot-collection ban was enacted with intentional discrimination",
		"context": "And unlike in the redistricting cases Petitioners cite, \"where states may consider race and partisanship to a certain extent, legislatures cannot restrict voting access on the basis of race.\" N.C. State Conf. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 18 \"[I]intentionally targeting a particular race's access to the franchise because its members vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes discriminatory purpose.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "831 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the ballot-collection ban was enacted with intentional discrimination",
		"context": "Id. at 222- 23. Petitioners also argue that, under Crawford , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Ninth Circuit was required to ignore 18 Nor \"can legislatures restrict access to the franchise based on the desire to benefit a certain political party.\" Id. (citing 460 U.S. 780).",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 181",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Ninth Circuit correctly held that the ballot-collection ban was enacted with intentional discrimination",
		"context": "Petitioners also argue that, under Crawford , 553 U.S. 181, the Ninth Circuit was required to ignore 18 Nor \"can legislatures restrict access to the franchise based on the desire to benefit a certain political party.\" Id. (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). -61- the complete absence of fraud connected to third- party ballot collection in Arizona. Not so.",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "35-36. Thus, if any are op- tional, as the BIA held, they all are optional, as the BIA admitted: It described its interpretation of the statute as one that \"does not impose substantive re- quirements for a notice to appear\" to trigger the stop- time rule. Matter of Camarillo , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On the BIA's reading, the govern-ment could treat as an effective \"notice to appear\" a document that does not even inform the respondent why the government seeks to remove her from the country. The government urges this Court to simply dodge this issue because nothing beyond the \"time and place\" information was omitted in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "25 I. & N. Dec. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "The stop-time rule refers only to a \"notice to appear,\" a term defined only in para- graph (1). That is a much more natural explanation for the difference in wording than the strained infer- ence the government tries to draw. 15 This Court's decision in Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], interpreted a very different provision. See Gov't Br. 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "See Pet. Br. 36-38; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Even an immigrant who accrues the required resi- dence will only receive cancellation if she meets the other, rigorous eligibility requirements and is deemed worthy of dis cretionary relief. The government agrees (at 46) that only the \"most deserving immigrants\" can ultimately obtain cancel-lation; the government argues, though, that those who benefit from interpreting a \"notice to appear un- der section 1229(a)\" as notice of the information re-quired by that section are somehow less deserving.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 184",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "The government notes that a statute's text can have effects not discussed in the legislative history. See Gov't Br. 41 (citing Pittston Coal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). But to make a non-textual ar- gument based on the statute's purpose, the govern- ment must have some evidence supporting its char- 19 acterization of that purpose. The government has none.",
		"citation_value_orig": "488 U.S. 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "3. To the extent any slight ambiguities \"linger[]\" after considering the statute's text, structure, and history, the \"longstanding principle of construing [such] ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor of the alien\" resolves them. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Pet. Br. 44-48.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 289",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional Interpretive Tools Confirm The Statute's Plain Meaning",
		"context": "44-48. The govern- ment disputes neither this established rule of con-struction, nor that \"normal tools of statutory inter- pretation\" apply at Chevron 's first step. Esquivel- 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government also admits (at 51) that this Court applied this precise rule in St. Cyr in finding no ambiguity under Chevron 's first step. The government's only argument (at 50-51) is that this interpretive canon is not \"dispositive\" in a case governed by Chevron .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Determination as to Whether an Individual Has Engaged in Insurrection Under Section 3 Does Not Require a Prior Criminal Conviction",
		"context": "7 did no more than create a limitation on who could hold office, eschewing in the body of the text criminal restrictions or the need for any preexisting determination, criminal or otherwise. When interpreting Section 3, just as any other matter in the Constitution, courts must prefer ordinary meaning over \"secret or technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation.\" District of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in the text would lead an ordinary citi zen in 1868 to assume that Section 3 requires a prior cr iminal conviction before disqualification can be imposed. To the contrary, the text suggests that anyone who engaged in insurrection is automatically disqualified, regardless of whether they have been convicted of a crime or not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 570",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Determination as to Whether an Individual Has Engaged in Insurrection Under Section 3 Does Not Require a Prior Criminal Conviction",
		"context": "Consider O.J. Simpson, who was famously acquitted of criminal charges in the murder of his ex-wife Nic ole Brown Simpson, and Ron Goldman, but later lost a civ il case filed by the victims' families. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] offense. \"); see2022 WL 4295619 (\"[N]either the courts nor Congress have ever required a criminal conviction for a person to be disquali fied under Section Three.\"). 12 See Myles S. Lynch, \"Disloyalty & Disqualification: Reconstructing Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment,\" 30 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 153 (2021), pp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 Cal.Rptr.2d 492",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "2. The term \"leg- islatur e\" was not \"of uncertain meaning when incor- porated into the Constitution.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The legislature was \"the repre- sentative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.\" 285 U.S. 355.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 U.S. 221",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "253 U.S. 221 . The legislature was \"the repre- sentative body which ma[kes] the laws of the people.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, \"every state constitution from the Founding Era that used the term legislature defined it as a distinct mul- timember entity comprised of representatives.\" Ariz .",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 U.S. 355",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "That provision empowers the \"Legislature\" of each state to ratify constitutional amendments. Yet that authority \"transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Similarly, absent a conven - tion, Article V allows States to ratify a constitutional amendment only by a vote of its institutional legis - lature —a public referendum will not do. Hawke, 53 U.S. at 225, 2 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "258 U.S. 130",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "Online at 132. That power comes not from the States' residual sovereignty, but from \"a direct grant of authority\" in the federal constitution. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The elections clauses are \"'express dele- gations of power ' that confer upon state legislatures the power to ' provide a complete code ' for federal elec- tions .\" Morley, 109 Nw.",
		"citation_value_orig": "531 U.S. 70",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "U. L. Rev. Online at 13 2 (quot- ing U.S. Term Limits, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Smiley , 285 U.S. at 366). The Supremacy Clause makes this constitutional grant override con-trary state constitutions, not the other way around. 7 The Articles of Confederation do not help the critics either.",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 U.S. 779",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "The term \"reservation\" has long been \"used in the land law to describe any body of land reserved … from sale for any purpose. It may be a military 6 reservation, or an Indian reservation ... [W]hen Congress has once established a reservation, all tracts included within it remain a part of the reservation until separated therefrom by Congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The statutory and treaty text creating a new homeland for the Nation establish that it readily satisfies this definition. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 authorized the President to divide public domain lands into defined \"districts \" for tribes removing to the Indian territory.",
		"citation_value_orig": "215 U.S. 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "NCAI Br. 10-13. Neither this Court nor Congress has deemed title determinative of reservation status, see, e.g., In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And in the Nation's case any distinction was insubstantial, as its patent was highly restricted: The Nation could not sell the lands, see 25 U.S.C. § 177, and the United States retained both a reversionary interest in and supervisory power over them, §§ 3, 7, 4 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "72 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "And in the Nation's case any distinction was insubstantial, as its patent was highly restricted: The Nation could not sell the lands, see 25 U.S.C. § 177, and the United States retained both a reversionary interest in and supervisory power over them, §§ 3, 7, 4 Stat. at 412; 8 see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It was the treaties that \"solemnly guarantied\" the Nation's lands. Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "295 U.S. 103",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "504-505. In statute after stat- ute, Congress ended tribal governance, supplanted tribal law, and left the Tribes powerless to exert sovereignty 31 over their former domains. Supra Part II; accord Wash- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 247 U.S. 288. By this point, the Creeks were not unlike the tribe in Venetie : \"sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sovereigns without territorial reach.\" 522 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "235 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "504-505. In statute after stat- ute, Congress ended tribal governance, supplanted tribal law, and left the Tribes powerless to exert sovereignty 31 over their former domains. Supra Part II; accord Wash- 235 U.S. 422; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By this point, the Creeks were not unlike the tribe in Venetie : \"sovereign entities for some purposes, but as sovereigns without territorial reach.\" 522 U.S. at 526 (citation omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "247 U.S. 288",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "Petitioner deems this jurisdictional transformation insignificant, claiming (at 34) that \"this Court's disestab- lishment cases have never looked to government powers.\" That is wrong; tribal sovereignty has always been rele- vant to the disestablishment analysis. E.g., Rosebud Sioux [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; DeCoteau , 420 U.S. at 446. In Yankton , for instance, res- ervation status was determined in light of Congress's in- tentions as to \"tribal governance within the original res- ervation boundaries.\" 522 U.S. at 348; id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "Br. 23. Although allotment can be \"consistent with continued reservation status,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it can also be an integral part of disestablishment. See DeCoteau , 420 U.S. at 437- 439; Rosebud , 430 U.S. at 629. Indeed, this Court's cases often acknowledge that allotted lands were removed from a reservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 481",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Text",
		"context": "The Creek, after all, had already yielded \"all right, title, and interest\" in allotted lands. Such a \"disclaimer of right and title by the State was a disclaimer of proprietary rather than governmental interest.\" Organized Village of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1 similarly preserved then-existing \"rights of person or property pertaining to the Indians of said Ter- ritories,\" but only \"so long as such rights shall remain un- extinguished\"—that is, until the land was sold. 34 Stat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "369 U.S. 60",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Designing an Elegant Set of Packages Was Central to Java's Success",
		"context": "It is well-settled that th e Copyright Act applies to computer programs. 8 See, e.g., Atari Games [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, the Java code and organization are protectable as a general matter if they are expressive and have \"at least some minimal degree of creativity.\" Feist Publ'ns, 499 U.S. 340.",
		"citation_value_orig": "975 F.2d 832",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Designing an Elegant Set of Packages Was Central to Java's Success",
		"context": "8 See, e.g., Atari Games 975 F.2d 832. Thus, the Java code and organization are protectable as a general matter if they are expressive and have \"at least some minimal degree of creativity.\" Feist Publ'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As described below , this standard is easily satisfied here. 8 The statute defines a \"computer program\" as \"a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about a certain result.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "at 13 n.3, Barnes , supra (No. 01 -682) . The same is true of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a case in which the Court addressed the re-quirements for a damages action under Title IX of the Education Amendments . Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 629",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "97 -843) . And, m ore recently, the Court unani- mously held that a plaintiff seeki ng monetary damages under Section 504 and Title II of the ADA need not ex- haust administrative remedies, in a case in which the \"money damages\" petitioner sought were for \"emo- tional injury.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. Precedents from the courts of appeals similarly support the availability of compensatory damages for emotional distress .",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 743",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "3 n.1 (collecting cases) . For example, in 1998 , the Sixth Circuit affirmed the availability of compensatory damages und er Section 504 22 and Title II of the ADA in a case where the plaintiff sought damages for, among other things, \"humiliation and embarrassment, anxiety, and pain and suffering.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 572 -573. The Sixth Circuit observed th at, while its precedent fore- closed the availability of punitive damages under Sec- tion 504 (and therefore Title II, see p. 4, supra ), case law from this Court and its \"sister circuits\" uniformly rec- ognized the availability of compensatory damages un- der Section 504. 151 F.3d at 573.",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 F.3d 564",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "151 F.3d at 573. In the same year, the First Circuit observed that it might be fair to predict \"that the Supreme Court might well allow damages for emotional distress under Section 504 in some circum- stances.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A nd, a fter Barnes was decided in 200 2, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that compensatory damages are available for claims of emotional distress under Section 504 . 505 F.3d 1173.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 F.3d 286",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. For at least three decades, courts and the federal government have recognized that federal-funding recipients are subject to compensatory damages for emotional distress",
		"context": "139 F.3d 286. A nd, a fter Barnes was decided in 200 2, the Eleventh Circuit expressly held that compensatory damages are available for claims of emotional distress under Section 504 . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contrast, between 1992 when Franklin was de- cided and the court of appeals' decision in this case in 2020, no court of appeals had found that compensatory damages for emotional distress are barred in cases in- volving Title VI, Section 504, or related statutes. See 2021 WL 409824 (observing that the plaintiff had cit ed \"numerous \" \"district court and appellate decisions support ing the availability of emo- tional distress damages\" under Section 504, while the defendant could point only to the decision in this case and two isolated decisions from the New Mexico district court finding such damages foreclosed) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 F.3d 1173",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits",
		"context": "Setting aside the rare category of PennEast \"delegatee\" suits against States, the Court has established an especially strong presumption that 4 A seemingly analogous scenario might be qui tam suits, but this Court has declined to answer \"whether an action in federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.\" Vt. Agency Nat. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Circuit courts are divided on the matter, although none has addressed it post- PennEast . Compare United States ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits",
		"context": "Circuit courts are divided on the matter, although none has addressed it post- PennEast . Compare United States ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]653 F.3d 898. 12 non-consenting States did not surrender immunity from private suits. The Court's 1989 Union Gas plurality opinion opined that the Commerce Clause gave Congress broad power to authorize pr ivate suits against States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "961 F.2d 46",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits",
		"context": "Circuit courts are divided on the matter, although none has addressed it post- PennEast . Compare United States ex rel. 961 F.2d 46[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 non-consenting States did not surrender immunity from private suits. The Court's 1989 Union Gas plurality opinion opined that the Commerce Clause gave Congress broad power to authorize pr ivate suits against States.",
		"citation_value_orig": "653 F.3d 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Concluded There Is a Strong Presumption that States Did Not Surrender Immunity from Purely Private Suits",
		"context": "The Court has subsequently rejected additional private suits against non-co nsenting States premised on other Article I powers. See Allen , 140 S. Ct. at 1002 (holding that Congress's \"power\" granted \"under Article I stops when it runs into sovereign immunity\"); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These cases 14 make clear that there is a strong presumption that States did not surrender th eir immunity from private lawsuits in the plan of the convention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 627",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. When the Eighth Amendment was ratified, the right to be free from excessive fines was already deeply rooted in the Anglo-American legal tradition",
		"context": "2, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441 (1689), quoted in Brown- ing-Ferris Indus. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Blackstone traced the protection against excessive fines bac k further still, to Magna Carta, and before that to the reign of Henry II. 4 Wil-liam Blackstone, Commentaries 372; see also Brown- ing-Ferris Indus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 257",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. A professional's unique talents, without more, do not move her from the ius privatum to the ius publicum.",
		"context": "The mere lack of perfect fungibility b etween one provider and anoth er is obviously a far cry from what Wolff required to justify inter vention to pre- vent monopo listic control , namely, \"the indispensa- ble nature of the service and the exorbitant charges and arbitrar y control to which the public m ight be subjected without re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. No one will be subject to exorbi- tant charges simply becau se Ms. Smith is allowed to compete in the wed ding-services ma rket. Greater supply will obviously reduce prices .",
		"citation_value_orig": "262 U.S. 538",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 223",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 398",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "528 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "267 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "555 U.S. 488",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................................................. 3 138 S. Ct. 1532 ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. : Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "........................... 12 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 562 U.S. 223 .................. 21 568 U.S. 398 ............ 5 Department of 139 S. Ct. 2551 .................................. 5 Department of Homeland 140 S. Ct. 1959505 U.S. 788 ....... passim Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. 167 .......................................... 7 267 U.S. 228 ................................ ...... 17 507 U.S. 292 ................................ ..... 22 555 U.S. 488 ........... 6 II Cases —Continued: Page U.S. Bancorp Mortg. 513 U.S. 18 ................................................................. 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ...... 12 Constitution and statutes: U.S. Const. : Art.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "They do not dispute that the sole injury found be- low is no longer being redressed by the judgment , and instead rely on alleged harms that the district court it- self suggested are too speculative . On the merits, ap- pellees relegate to the back of their briefs their defense of the court's lead holding —that the Memorandum is proc edurally flawed because it will result in an appor- tionment not based on the results of the census . That is understandable because both the governing provisions and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , plainly allow the President to request two sets of num- bers from the Census Bureau. Appellees instead devote the bulk of their briefs to defending the district court's substantive objection that the Memorandum will not in- clude in the apportionment base all \"persons in each State. \" J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 788",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "Instead, they assert that this case fits within the exception to mootness for claims that are ca- pable of repetition yet evading review , but they meet neither of the requirements for that limited exception. First , appellees have not demonstrated that \"the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], not plaintiffs' particular al- leged injuries, see ACLU Br. 21 . Here, the challenged conduct is the Executive Branch 's implement ation of the Memorandum, which plainly can be litigated after 3 the implementation , even if on the basis of different in- juries .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1532",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. There is no substantive requirement compelling the President to include all illegal aliens in the apportionment base",
		"context": "Appellees in-voke the exception to vacatur that applies when the party seeking review caused the mootness after the ad- verse judgment was entered . See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 24- 26 (1994 ). But neither of the two circumstances on which they rely—the timing of the Memorandum's issuance and the",
		"citation_value_orig": "513 U.S. 18",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide",
		"context": "Unlike the Fifth Circuit, these other courts overwhelmingly endors e a district court's \"'broad discretion in awarding costs, '\" \"includ[ing] costs taxable in the district court under Rule 39(e).\" L-3 Commc'ns, 607 F.3d at 30; see Republic Tobacco , 481 F.3d at 449 (district courts have \"broad discretion to deny costs to a successful [party] under Rule 39(e)\"); Ericsson 2020 WL 3469220.6 That consistent view has been widely ac- cepted at the district and a ppellate level, and it has effec- tively governed costs questions for decades.7 6 See also, e.g., Standard Concrete Prods. 175 F. App'x 932[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]907 F.2d 617; 878 F.2d 297789 F.2d 1642020 WL 19742052017 WL 4227951878 F.2d 298; Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. 2017 WL 2303502 the Fifth Circuit. Every court of ap- peals currently follows the sa me approach in administer- ing Rule 39(e) costs: while the circuits themselves process non-Rule 39(e) costs at the ap pellate level, Rule 39(e) costs are delegated for resoluti on in district court. Not a single circuit with a form bill of costs invites the submis-sion of Rule 39(e) costs, and multiple circuits expressly forbid parties from seeking Rule 39(e) costs outside dis- trict court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "73 F. App'x 605",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide",
		"context": "Unlike the Fifth Circuit, these other courts overwhelmingly endors e a district court's \"'broad discretion in awarding costs, '\" \"includ[ing] costs taxable in the district court under Rule 39(e).\" L-3 Commc'ns, 607 F.3d at 30; see Republic Tobacco , 481 F.3d at 449 (district courts have \"broad discretion to deny costs to a successful [party] under Rule 39(e)\"); Ericsson 2020 WL 3469220.6 That consistent view has been widely ac- cepted at the district and a ppellate level, and it has effec- tively governed costs questions for decades.7 6 See also, e.g., Standard Concrete Prods. 175 F. App'x 93273 F. App'x 605[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 878 F.2d 297789 F.2d 1642020 WL 19742052017 WL 4227951878 F.2d 298; Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. 2017 WL 2303502 the Fifth Circuit. Every court of ap- peals currently follows the sa me approach in administer- ing Rule 39(e) costs: while the circuits themselves process non-Rule 39(e) costs at the ap pellate level, Rule 39(e) costs are delegated for resoluti on in district court. Not a single circuit with a form bill of costs invites the submis-sion of Rule 39(e) costs, and multiple circuits expressly forbid parties from seeking Rule 39(e) costs outside dis- trict court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "907 F.2d 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide",
		"context": "Unlike the Fifth Circuit, these other courts overwhelmingly endors e a district court's \"'broad discretion in awarding costs, '\" \"includ[ing] costs taxable in the district court under Rule 39(e).\" L-3 Commc'ns, 607 F.3d at 30; see Republic Tobacco , 481 F.3d at 449 (district courts have \"broad discretion to deny costs to a successful [party] under Rule 39(e)\"); Ericsson 2020 WL 3469220.6 That consistent view has been widely ac- cepted at the district and a ppellate level, and it has effec- tively governed costs questions for decades.7 6 See also, e.g., Standard Concrete Prods. 175 F. App'x 93273 F. App'x 605907 F.2d 617; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]789 F.2d 1642020 WL 19742052017 WL 4227951878 F.2d 298; Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. 2017 WL 2303502 the Fifth Circuit. Every court of ap- peals currently follows the sa me approach in administer- ing Rule 39(e) costs: while the circuits themselves process non-Rule 39(e) costs at the ap pellate level, Rule 39(e) costs are delegated for resoluti on in district court. Not a single circuit with a form bill of costs invites the submis-sion of Rule 39(e) costs, and multiple circuits expressly forbid parties from seeking Rule 39(e) costs outside dis- trict court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.2d 297",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide",
		"context": "Unlike the Fifth Circuit, these other courts overwhelmingly endors e a district court's \"'broad discretion in awarding costs, '\" \"includ[ing] costs taxable in the district court under Rule 39(e).\" L-3 Commc'ns, 607 F.3d at 30; see Republic Tobacco , 481 F.3d at 449 (district courts have \"broad discretion to deny costs to a successful [party] under Rule 39(e)\"); Ericsson 2020 WL 3469220.6 That consistent view has been widely ac- cepted at the district and a ppellate level, and it has effec- tively governed costs questions for decades.7 6 See also, e.g., Standard Concrete Prods. 175 F. App'x 93273 F. App'x 605907 F.2d 617; 878 F.2d 297[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2020 WL 19742052017 WL 4227951878 F.2d 298; Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. 2017 WL 2303502 the Fifth Circuit. Every court of ap- peals currently follows the sa me approach in administer- ing Rule 39(e) costs: while the circuits themselves process non-Rule 39(e) costs at the ap pellate level, Rule 39(e) costs are delegated for resoluti on in district court. Not a single circuit with a form bill of costs invites the submis-sion of Rule 39(e) costs, and multiple circuits expressly forbid parties from seeking Rule 39(e) costs outside dis- trict court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "789 F.2d 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Fifth Circuit's contrary approach would dramatically upset longstanding norms and settled practice in appellate courts nationwide",
		"context": "39(a) (limiting \"[a]llow- \"discretion not to tax the losing pa rty with all costs enumerated in Rule 39(e)\") (citing Campbell , 209 F. App'x at 875-876); Muniauction, 2009 WL 4378832008 WL 11322890.8 There is no obvious mechanism in any circuit for claiming Rule 39(e) costs at the circui t level—and thus no obvious means of objecting to unwarra nted or inequitable costs, and no obvious means for the circuit to resolve (at-that- point-still-unknown) Rule 39(e) cost disputes. See, e.g. , Metso Minerals [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 Petitioner is unaware of an y resource suggesting this division of authority has generated any problems, much less any support for reassigning this traditional district-court function to the appellate level. Yet if respondents prevail here, it will mark an inexplicable sea change in this area.",
		"citation_value_orig": "594 F. App'x 649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Racial Disparities in Housing and Income Drive an Inequitable Education System, Which Impedes Black Students' Access to Postsecondary Education",
		"context": "Initiative, S EGREGATION IN AMERICA (2018), https://segregationinamerica.eji.org/report/acknowledgment.html (\"Millions of white parents nationwide acted to deny Black children equal education by voting to close and defund public schools, transferring their children to private, white-only schools, and harassing and violently attacking Black students while their own children watched or participated.\") Some state governments openly resisted school integration orders, requiring this Court's intervention. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the Court refused to tolerate Arkansas officials' attempt to continue de jure segregation in Cooper , the Court has taken the opposite approach to systemic racial inequality and de facto segregation. Twenty years after Brown , the Court in 418 U.S. 717 struck down a lower courts' proposed \"interdistrict remedy\" to desegregate schools in the Detroit metropolitan area by redistributing students among a predominantly Black district in central Detroit and several predominantly white districts in adjacent suburbs.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Racial Disparities in Housing and Income Drive an Inequitable Education System, Which Impedes Black Students' Access to Postsecondary Education",
		"context": "See 358 U.S. 1. While the Court refused to tolerate Arkansas officials' attempt to continue de jure segregation in Cooper , the Court has taken the opposite approach to systemic racial inequality and de facto segregation. Twenty years after Brown , the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] struck down a lower courts' proposed \"interdistrict remedy\" to desegregate schools in the Detroit metropolitan area by redistributing students among a predominantly Black district in central Detroit and several predominantly white districts in adjacent suburbs. Id. at 753.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 717",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Racial Disparities in Housing and Income Drive an Inequitable Education System, Which Impedes Black Students' Access to Postsecondary Education",
		"context": "Nor has the Court permitted local governments to proactively implement programs that aim to ameliorate de facto segregation in elementary and secondary education in the absence of a previous judicial desegregation order. See Parents Involved in Cmty. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Since Milliken , the housing segregation that has kept students of different races in different school districts has been given full legal effect, and federal courts have allowed racial boundaries in housing to drive racial boundaries in elementary and secondary schools. See EdBuild, Dismissed: America's Most Divisive School District Borders at 11 (2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/edbuild.org/public/projects/dismissed/report/EdBuild+Divisive+Borders+2019.pdf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Communications Have Long Been Protected as Confidences Without Proof of Further Harm",
		"context": "1880). \"[I]n breach of confidence cases, the harm\" occurred \"when the plaintiff 's trust in the breaching party\" was \"violated.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Those decisions have particular force here. Since at least 1758, see Duke of Queensberry , 28 Eng.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 1200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Communications Have Long Been Protected as Confidences Without Proof of Further Harm",
		"context": "The Complaint alleges that Google's disclosure of search terms violated its Terms of Service. Those terms recognized that users \"retain ownership of any intellectual property rights [they] hold in\" their \"content\"—a term defined \"broadly\" to include \"written text and search queries used on Google.com.\" App., infra , 15a (¶ 35); see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Google's Privacy Policy, for example, promises that Goo- gle will share \"personal information\" only in \"limited circumstances\": with user's \"consent,\" with affiliated companies or trusted businesses, and as required by law. App., infra , 8a-9a(¶ 25); see App., infra , 10a-12a(¶ 29).",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Communications Have Long Been Protected as Confidences Without Proof of Further Harm",
		"context": "10-11, supra ; cf. Bd. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "198 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Present opt-out mechanisms for class-action participation result in effectively zero participation by class members",
		"context": "Id. at 813. See also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rule 23 provides that class members be notified of the lawsuit, ostensibly providing class members with an opportunity to become informed about their legal claims and p articipate meaningfully in legal proceedings. Fed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "517 U.S. 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Present opt-out mechanisms for class-action participation result in effectively zero participation by class members",
		"context": "See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class Action Settlements , 59 Fla. L. Rev. 71 (2007). See also Oxford Health Plans [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Having suffered relatively small injuries , class members have little incentive to learn of the existence of class action s in which they may ha ve 6 legal interests. Class counsel, meanwhile, having already assembled their named plaintiffs, have no incentive to provide meaningful notice to the rest of the class.",
		"citation_value_orig": "133 S. Ct. 2064",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Affirmance Can Improve Law Enforcement on the Creek Reservation",
		"context": "Affirming reservation sta- tus, however, will enhance the intergovernmental co-operation already occurring, remove the need to search tract books to determine jurisdiction, and make avail- able much-needed tribal and federal resources. Importantly, Oklahoma will continue to play the central law enforcement role within the boundaries of 31 the Creek Reservation. Rega rdless of reservation sta- tus, states have jurisdiction over non-Indians commit- ting crimes against non-Indians, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and victimless crimes. So- lem, 465 U.S. at 465 n.2. The vast majority of crimes committed within the Creek Reservation will, there- fore, remain under state jurisdiction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "164 U.S. 240",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Recognized Courts' Ability To Consider Intervening Legal And Factual Developments",
		"context": "1. The Court has long recognized that because \"the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime,\" courts have \"wide discretion in the sources and types of evidence \" they consi der when sentencing a defendant including \"the fullest information possible concerning the defendant 's life and characteristics .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 84 Stat. 922 , 951 (1970) . Even when Congress overhauled sentencing procedures in 1984, it kept this practice.",
		"citation_value_orig": "337 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Recognized Courts' Ability To Consider Intervening Legal And Factual Developments",
		"context": "Section 3661 does not require courts to use blinders when resentencing defendants. 10 Ten years ago, the Court held that \"a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant 's postsentencing rehabilitation .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . As this Court explained, \"Congress could not have been clearer \" when it passed Section 3661. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Congress Has Recognized Courts' Ability To Consider Intervening Legal And Factual Developments",
		"context": "Rule 35 recognizes that sometimes a defendant cannot provide the substantial assistance until after sentencing. In these cases, district courts must consider these changed circumstances when resentencing a defendant. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. True, the government did not file a Rule 35 motion here. But the point is that resentencing under the First Step Act should be considered in pari materia with other sentencing procedures.",
		"citation_value_orig": "663 F.3d 1042",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law",
		"context": "Two lines of authority from this Court are im- portant to acknowledge at the outset. First , the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution does not proscribe \"taking\" of property, but only \"taking without just compensation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 3 (quotation omitted); Cherokee 135 U.S. 641. Thus, where state law pro- vides an adequate avenue for seeking compensation for an alleged taking of property, ordinarily an essential element of a takings claim is not present unless the plaintiff has pursued such av enues and failed to obtain just compensation. This requirement is now known as the \"second prong\" of the Williamson County rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 216",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law",
		"context": "Two lines of authority from this Court are im- portant to acknowledge at the outset. First , the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution does not proscribe \"taking\" of property, but only \"taking without just compensation.\" 538 U.S. 216 3 (quotation omitted); Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, where state law pro- vides an adequate avenue for seeking compensation for an alleged taking of property, ordinarily an essential element of a takings claim is not present unless the plaintiff has pursued such av enues and failed to obtain just compensation. This requirement is now known as the \"second prong\" of the Williamson County rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law",
		"context": "This requirement is now known as the \"second prong\" of the Williamson County rule. See Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Second , the Williamson County second prong does not apply where—as here—a facial takings claim is at issue. 2 In San Remo 545 U.S. 323, th is Court recognized that the second prong does not apply to facial takings challenges.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law",
		"context": "Reg'l Planning 473 U.S. 172. Second , the Williamson County second prong does not apply where—as here—a facial takings claim is at issue. 2 In San Remo [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], th is Court recognized that the second prong does not apply to facial takings challenges. As Justice Stev ens' opinion for the Court explained: [P]etitioners have overstated the reach of Wil- liamson County throughout this litigation. Pe- titioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint – the claim that the [ordinance] was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest – in state court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 323",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court's current jurisprudence recognizes a general need to \"complete\" a takings claim by first seeking just compensation under state law",
		"context": "As Justice Stev ens' opinion for the Court explained: [P]etitioners have overstated the reach of Wil- liamson County throughout this litigation. Pe- titioners were never required to ripen the heart of their complaint – the claim that the [ordinance] was facially invalid because it failed to substantially advance a legitimate state interest – in state court. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners there- fore could have raised most of their fa- cial takings challenges, which by their 2 Petitioner stated in her Petition for Writ of Certiorari that her Second Amended Complaint included both facial and as-applied takings claims. (Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's Approach Would Cause Confusion",
		"context": "10 D. The Second Circuit's Decision Advances SOX's Goals. SOX's whistleblower protections will be undermined if the applicable standard is uncle ar and human resource professionals are left to guess about what conduct it covers. Congress' goal in enacting the whistleblower protections was to help \"ward off another Enron debacle,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and to protect employees who \"are [often] the only firsthand witnesses to . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's Approach Would Cause Confusion",
		"context": "The employer still has to rebut that showing through the heightened \"clear and convincing\" evidence standard. But Congress clearly intended that, in order for the employe r to be faced with that heightened evidentiary standard on rebuttal, a plaintiff would have to meet his or her affirmative burden of proof at trial to demonstrate a SOX violation , including retaliatory intent. Although some courts have held otherwise, prim arily by relying on the Federal Circuit's interpretation of an inapplicable statute in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]],4 many courts interpreting the \"contributing factor\" standard have agreed with the Second Circuit here that \"retaliatory intent\" is required. See, e.g., 968 F.3d 724 4 See, e.g., 708 F.3d 152. 13 (applying the Federal Railroad Safety Act (\"FRSA\"), which incorporates the Section 42121(b) framework; collecting supporting cases).",
		"citation_value_orig": "2 F.3d 1137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's Approach Would Cause Confusion",
		"context": "But Congress clearly intended that, in order for the employe r to be faced with that heightened evidentiary standard on rebuttal, a plaintiff would have to meet his or her affirmative burden of proof at trial to demonstrate a SOX violation , including retaliatory intent. Although some courts have held otherwise, prim arily by relying on the Federal Circuit's interpretation of an inapplicable statute in 2 F.3d 1137,4 many courts interpreting the \"contributing factor\" standard have agreed with the Second Circuit here that \"retaliatory intent\" is required. See, e.g., 968 F.3d 724 4 See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 (applying the Federal Railroad Safety Act (\"FRSA\"), which incorporates the Section 42121(b) framework; collecting supporting cases). As the Eighth Circuit held, \"the 'contributing factor that an employee must prove is intentional retaliation prompted by the employee engaging in protected activity.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "708 F.3d 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Petitioner's Approach Would Cause Confusion",
		"context": "As the Eighth Circuit held, \"the 'contributing factor that an employee must prove is intentional retaliation prompted by the employee engaging in protected activity.'\" Id. at 728 (italics in original) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) ; see also, e.g., 880 F.3d 377. In addition to being inconsistent with the plain langua ge of the statute and similar statutory regimes, Petitioner's approach would be unworkable. Under Petitioner's approach, employers would be placed in the position of having to prove a negative, and to do so by clear and convincing evidence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "Triggering at 49 n.84 (addressing Track 1), 69 n.181 (addressing Track 2). 12 F.3d 787, the tests for the constitutionality of law triggering Track 1 burdens, supra at 6, go to tailoring, not the government interest, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, 556 F.3d 1021 ; 519 F.2d 821572 U.S. 1. \"Thus , pounding the table about the government interest in regulating political speech is no answer to the tailoring part of constitutional scrutiny.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "751 F.3d 804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "12 F.3d 787, the tests for the constitutionality of law triggering Track 1 burdens, supra at 6, go to tailoring, not the government interest, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 751 F.3d 804 ; Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; 519 F.2d 821572 U.S. 1. \"Thus , pounding the table about the government interest in regulating political speech is no answer to the tailoring part of constitutional scrutiny.\" Triggering at 50 & n.89, 64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 F.3d 1021",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "12 F.3d 787, the tests for the constitutionality of law triggering Track 1 burdens, supra at 6, go to tailoring, not the government interest, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 751 F.3d 804 ; Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, 556 F.3d 1021 ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]572 U.S. 1. \"Thus , pounding the table about the government interest in regulating political speech is no answer to the tailoring part of constitutional scrutiny.\" Triggering at 50 & n.89, 64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.2d 821",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "12 F.3d 787, the tests for the constitutionality of law triggering Track 1 burdens, supra at 6, go to tailoring, not the government interest, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, 751 F.3d 804 ; Canyon Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, 556 F.3d 1021 ; 519 F.2d 821[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Thus , pounding the table about the government interest in regulating political speech is no answer to the tailoring part of constitutional scrutiny.\" Triggering at 50 & n.89, 64.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "Triggering at 50 & n.89, 64. In other words, the government interest —e.g., in particula r information, Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66- 67 (addressing Interest 1); Triggering at 50 n.88—is not 13 \"Overbreadth\" applies to both as -applied and facial claims. E.g., Alaska Right to Life [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Triggering at 41- 42 n.53. 13 the point here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 F.3d 773",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "While Citizens United considers \"the informational interest alone,\" 558 U.S. at 369, this —rather than demoting tailoring — considers only Interest 1, not 2 or 3, from Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66- 68. 14 As for, e.g., \"promoting transparency and accountability,\" Ams. for Prosperity Found., 919 F.3d at 1180 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ),15 it goes to the government interest, not tailoring. Id. ; s ee Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66- 67 (addressing Interest 1) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Petitioners and the Ninth Circuit rehearing en banc denial dissent understate tailoring for political speech disclosure law",
		"context": "\"First Amendment rights are all too often sacrificed for the sake of transparency in federal and state elections.\" Del. Strong [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 2376 14 Besides, Interest 2 —government's interest in preventing quid -pro-quo corruption or the appearance of quid - pro-quo corruption, compare Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67 (addressing Interest 2), with McC utcheon, 572 U.S. at 192, 207- 08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (defining these terms)—cannot apply to independent spending for political speech, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 357- 61, or contributions not directed to candidates/officeholders, McCutcheon, 572 U.S. at 211 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at 310 (Kennedy, J., concurring/dissenting)).",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 2376",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Township Fails To Justify the Preclusion Barrier",
		"context": "Nevertheless, the Township argues federal courts are not suited to deal with takings claims that may implicate state law property issues. Again, the Court has rejected this argument. In Stop the Beach Renourishment, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a plurality of Justices rejected the idea that federal courts \" lack the knowledge of state law\" needed to decide takings cases . Id. The plurality noted that federal courts \"often decide what state property rights exist\" in due process cases, id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 702",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Township Fails To Justify the Preclusion Barrier",
		"context": "at 726, and have the same capability in takings claims. Id. at 726- 27 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). As an example of an issue within the federal courts' competence, the Stop the Beach plurality cited the \"background principles of the State 's law and property \" inquiry in takings cases —the same standard which the Township fingers in questioning federal competence to address takings disputes. 560 U.S. at 725- 27.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 1003",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Township Fails To Justify the Preclusion Barrier",
		"context": "Home Tel. & Tel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "227 U.S. 278",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
		"context": ". See 331 F.3d at 1162. To answer that question, the court of appeals looked to this Court's decisions in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 416 U.S. 505. See 331 F.3d at 1162. Those decisions considered a different provision, Sectio n 2518(10)(a)(i), which re- quires the suppression of \"unlawfully intercepted\" com- munications.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
		"context": ". See 331 F.3d at 1162. To answer that question, the court of appeals looked to this Court's decisions in 416 U.S. 562, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See 331 F.3d at 1162. Those decisions considered a different provision, Sectio n 2518(10)(a)(i), which re- quires the suppression of \"unlawfully intercepted\" com- munications.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
		"context": "Id. at 23a. The court of appeals acknowledged that its conclusion that the territorial-jurisdict ion limitation did not impli- cate a \"core concern\" of Title III conflicted with the deci- sion of the District of Columbia Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "736 F.3d 509",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
		"context": "Congress specifically ch ose to provide for suppres- sion regardless of whether a wiretap order's facial insuf- ficiency implicates a \"core concern\" of Title III. That choice cannot be negated under the guise of statutory in- terpretation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and 416 U.S. 505, do not support the court of appeals' imposition of an additional, atextual \"core concerns\" requirement. In those decisions, the Court adopted the \"core concerns\" test as a construc- tion of the phrase \"unlawfully intercepted\" in subpara- 16 graph (i) of Section 2518(10)(a) , and it did so for the spe- cific purpose of distinguishing subparagraph (i) from sub- paragraphs (ii) and (iii). That test is not, and was not in- tended to be, a substantive li mitation on Title III's sup- pression remedy as a whole.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Title III requires the suppression of evidence obtained pursuant to a facially insufficient wiretap order",
		"context": "Congress specifically ch ose to provide for suppres- sion regardless of whether a wiretap order's facial insuf- ficiency implicates a \"core concern\" of Title III. That choice cannot be negated under the guise of statutory in- terpretation. 416 U.S. 562, and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], do not support the court of appeals' imposition of an additional, atextual \"core concerns\" requirement. In those decisions, the Court adopted the \"core concerns\" test as a construc- tion of the phrase \"unlawfully intercepted\" in subpara- 16 graph (i) of Section 2518(10)(a) , and it did so for the spe- cific purpose of distinguishing subparagraph (i) from sub- paragraphs (ii) and (iii). That test is not, and was not in- tended to be, a substantive li mitation on Title III's sup- pression remedy as a whole.",
		"citation_value_orig": "416 U.S. 505",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Correcting Guidelines Errors In The Ordinary Case Still Leaves Room For Countervailing Factors In Particular Cases",
		"context": "Puckett , 556 U.S. at 142– 43. In- deed , there are ready examples in which a court might choose to do so, notwithstanding a defendant's success on the first three prong s. For one, a court of appeals may decide, under the fourth prong, that a plain Guidelines error does not overcome a defend- ant's waiver in a plea agreement of his or her right to appeal sentences that did not \"unreasonably exceed[ ] the Guidelines range determined by the Court .\" Unit- ed [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 9 24 (3d Cir. 2008 ). 18 For another, the court of appeals may decline relief when the sentence was already completed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 F.3d 921",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Correcting Guidelines Errors In The Ordinary Case Still Leaves Room For Countervailing Factors In Particular Cases",
		"context": "2008 ). 18 For another, the court of appeals may decline relief when the sentence was already completed. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Or, a defendant might have a con- currently running sentence, such that remand to cor- rect the Guidelines error in one sentence would ac- complish nothing of any value . In each of those in- stances, the Guidelines error may well satisfy the third prong —because the district court might have imposed a different sentence but for the error —but \"countervailing factors\" nevertheless counsel against the exercise of discretion under the fourth prong.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 F.3d 1273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. This case is a poor vehicle for addressing the ATDS issue",
		"context": "The holding in Marks was a sufficient basis for the ruling in this case that the complaint stated a claim under the TCPA, but it was not necessary: The complaint al- leged, in considerable detail, that Facebook's system in fact had the present capacity to generate random numbers. Those plausibly pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss un- der Rule 12(b)(6). See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Thus, even if Fa cebook were correct in asserting that all ATDSs must possess random or se-quential number-generating capacity, the Ninth Cir- cuit would still be required to consider whether the district court erred in finding the complaints' allega- tions too conclusory to pass muster under that standard. Moreover, if the Court were to undertake to delve into the question of what constitutes an ATDS, it would be far better to do so on a fully developed fac- 34 tual record that made clear what capacities Face- book's system in fact has.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 662",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
		"context": "Thus, while Plaintiffs may try to analogize their detentions to compelled detention in the criminal or civil contexts that apply to residents of this Natio n, that analogy is inapposite. Contrary to compelled detainees, the detainees here \"carry the keys of their prison in their own pockets. \" Penfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The detainees ' ability to escape det ention by simply leaving the United States undermines Plaintiffs ' claims in two respects, one going to the equities and the other to jurisdiction. First, because the detainees choose detention over the other perfectly viable and lawful choice —leaving the U nited States —they cannot credibly ask a court to compare them to lawful residents facing compelled civil or criminal detention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 585",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
		"context": "First, because the detainees choose detention over the other perfectly viable and lawful choice —leaving the U nited States —they cannot credibly ask a court to compare them to lawful residents facing compelled civil or criminal detention. Since no one is keeping them here, they cannot challenge the legislative grace that allows them to stay at the taxpayers ' expens e. It does not matter whether detainees knew the law prior to coming here: \"We have long recognized … that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 426 U.S. 660. Amicus IRLI does not dispute that the detainees may have an Article III case or controversy with the United States on whether the detainees can enter the United States, but \"standing is not dispensed in gross. \" 518 U.S. 343; DaimlerChrysler 547 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
		"context": "First, because the detainees choose detention over the other perfectly viable and lawful choice —leaving the U nited States —they cannot credibly ask a court to compare them to lawful residents facing compelled civil or criminal detention. Since no one is keeping them here, they cannot challenge the legislative grace that allows them to stay at the taxpayers ' expens e. It does not matter whether detainees knew the law prior to coming here: \"We have long recognized … that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally. \" 559 U.S. 573; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Amicus IRLI does not dispute that the detainees may have an Article III case or controversy with the United States on whether the detainees can enter the United States, but \"standing is not dispensed in gross. \" 518 U.S. 343; DaimlerChrysler 547 U.S. 332.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 660",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
		"context": "559 U.S. 573; 426 U.S. 660. Amicus IRLI does not dispute that the detainees may have an Article III case or controversy with the United States on whether the detainees can enter the United States, but \"standing is not dispensed in gross. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; DaimlerChrysler 547 U.S. 332. Plaintiffs cannot bootstrap a Due Process claim to release into the United States when their actual case involves only an immigration claim on whether they can enter or 20 remain in the United States. Until their immigration claims resolve, Plaintiffs must choose between detention and leaving.",
		"citation_value_orig": "518 U.S. 343",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Plaintiffs' detentions are self-inflicted injuries, and thus raise no Article III case or controversy",
		"context": "559 U.S. 573; 426 U.S. 660. Amicus IRLI does not dispute that the detainees may have an Article III case or controversy with the United States on whether the detainees can enter the United States, but \"standing is not dispensed in gross. \" 518 U.S. 343; DaimlerChrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs cannot bootstrap a Due Process claim to release into the United States when their actual case involves only an immigration claim on whether they can enter or 20 remain in the United States. Until their immigration claims resolve, Plaintiffs must choose between detention and leaving.",
		"citation_value_orig": "547 U.S. 332",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "That evidence is not before us.\" Thus, the majority concluded sex discrimination did not offer \"a useful analytic framework for determining pl aintiffs' rights under the Common Benefits Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In a separate opinion, one justice disagreed about the sex discrimination claim but still clearly distin-guished sex-based and sexual orientation-based classi- fications: \"I recognize, of course, that although the classification here is sex-based on its face, its most di-rect impact is on lesbians and gay men, the class of in- dividuals most likely to seek same-sex marriage.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "744 A.2d 864",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "Id. at 906 (Johnson, J., concurring and dissenting). In the first U.S. court de cision to hold as a matter of state constitutional law that the government must issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, the major- ity analogized [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], saying the marriage statute there and Massachusetts' law \"deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental legal, personal, and social significance— 8 the institution of marriage—because of a single trait: skin color in Perez and Loving , sexual orientation here.\" 798 N.E.2d 941. It did not consider the sex discrimination argument advanced in a concur- rence (which did not address the question of sexual ori- entation).",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "In 2006, New York's highest court rejected the sex discrimination claim as applied to marriage laws: \"By limiting marriage to opposite -sex couples, [the State] is not engaging in sex discrimination. The limitation does not put men and women in different classes and give one class a benefit not given to the other.\" Hernan- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court point- edly distinguished the sexual orientation claim: \"However, the legislation d oes confer advantages on the basis of sexual prefer ence. Those who prefer rela- tionships with people of th e opposite sex and those who prefer relationships with people of the same sex are not treated alike.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "855 N.E.2d 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "at 11. In a Washington Supreme Court decision later the same year, the plurality opinion rejected the sex dis- crimination claim because \"[m]en and women are treated identically under\" the state's marriage law and the history of the state's Equal Rights Amendment specifically disavowed any effect on marriage laws. An- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which would clearly not have been the case if sexual 9 orientation was a subset of sex in a state with an Equal Rights Amendment. This reasoning is particularly rel- evant here because the court in Andersen was being asked to interpret a constitutional provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex as this Court is being asked to interpret a statutory bar on discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, Maryland's high court also found that \"the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not draw a sex-based classification\" 932 A.2d 571.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 P.3d 963",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "An- 138 P.3d 963, which would clearly not have been the case if sexual 9 orientation was a subset of sex in a state with an Equal Rights Amendment. This reasoning is particularly rel- evant here because the court in Andersen was being asked to interpret a constitutional provision barring discrimination on the basis of sex as this Court is being asked to interpret a statutory bar on discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, Maryland's high court also found that \"the prohibition on same-sex marriage did not draw a sex-based classification\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It held that \"the primary purpose of the ERA was to eliminate discrimination as between men and women as a class\" and \"to subject to closer scrutiny any governmental action which singled out for disparate treatment men or women as discrete clas-ses.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "932 A.2d 571",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. State and federal appellate decisions on same-sex marriage consistently treated sex and sexual orientation classifications as distinct",
		"context": "The California Supreme Court's opinion holding that state's marriage law was unconstitutional on state constitutional grounds treated sex and sexual orientation as distinct. It noted the trial court had con-cluded the marriage law constituted sex discrimina- tion but concluded \"that the challenged statutes cannot properly be viewed as discriminating on the ba- sis of sex or gender for pu rposes of the California equal protection clause.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court described relevant precedent as squarely rejecting the argument made in this case: \"past judicial decisions, in California and else- where, virtually uniformly hold that a statute or policy that treats men and women equally 10 but that accords differential treatment either to a couple based upon whether it consists of persons of the same sex rather than opposite sexes, or to an individual based upon whether he or she generally is sexually attracted to persons of the same ge nder rather than the opposite gender, is more accurately character-ized as involving differential treatment on the basis of sexual orientation rather than an in- stance of sex discrimination , and properly should be analyzed on the former ground. These cases recognize that, in realistic terms, a statute or policy t hat treats same-sex cou- ples differently from o pposite-sex couples, or that treats individuals who are sexually at- tracted to persons of the same gender differ-ently from individuals who are sexually attracted to persons of the opposite gender, does not treat an individual man or an indi-vidual woman differently because of his or her gender but rather accords differential treat- ment because of the individual's sexual orien- tation .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 P.3d 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Criticisms Of The Statutory Knowledge Standard Are Incorrect",
		"context": "In Camp , for example, the Eighth Cir- cuit explained that \"a party whose actions are routine and part of normal everyday business practices would need a higher degree of knowledge for liability as an aider and abettor to attach.\" 948 F.2d at 459. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Fifth Circuit similarly noted that the \"scienter requirement scales upward when activity is more remote.\" See also Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "522 F.2d 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Plaintiffs' Criticisms Of The Statutory Knowledge Standard Are Incorrect",
		"context": "Likewise, while Plaintiffs contend (Taamneh.Br.69-70) that remoteness in Woodward con- cerned a party's \"location,\" that case tied remoteness to \"silence and inaction,\" and explained that \"[i]f the evi- dence shows no more than transactions constituting the daily grist of the mill, we wo uld be loathe to find … lia- bility without clear proof of intent to violate the securi- ties laws,\" 522 F.2d at 96-97. 11 11 Contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion (Taamneh.Br.67), Twitter has never \"proposed\" an inte nt \"rule.\" Twitter cited [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to ex- plain that courts have declined to impose secondary liability for 19 Second, Plaintiffs contend Halberstam requires on- ly that a defendant genera lly \"know it is assisting wrongdoing\" with \"some understanding of the role of its assistance,\" even if the defendant does not \"hav[e] any idea how that [assistance] is occurring.\" E.g., Taamneh.Br.63-64. But Halberstam requires both that the defendant \"be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious ac tivity at the time that he provides the assistance,\" and that \"the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal viola-tion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "579 F.2d 793",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The reliance interests of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico favor a decision that the rule established in Ramos is not retroactive to cases on collateral review",
		"context": ". In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court stated that Teague 's retroactivity rule was motivated by a resp ect for the States' strong interest in the finality of criminal convictions and the recognition that they should not be penalized for rely- ing on the constitutional standards prevailing at the time the original proceedings took place, and validates reasonable interpretations of those precedents even if they are shown to be contrary to later decisions. There- fore, the reliance interests of the States in the finality of their criminal convictions is possibly accounted for in the Teague test, which, as shown before, mandates the nonretroactivity of this Court's holding in Ramos 4. Nevertheless, it is important to point out the adverse effects that retroactivity would have on the integrity of the criminal process in Puerto Rico.",
		"citation_value_orig": "506 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. The reliance interests of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico favor a decision that the rule established in Ramos is not retroactive to cases on collateral review",
		"context": "The performance of these im-portant duties towards the victims of crime in Puerto Rico could be severely limited by the sheer volume of reopened cases. Moreover, those persons who are victims of the criminal acts committed by the defendants, many of whom are witnesses, would have to revive their expe-rience during the commission of those acts, suffering new harm. These victims would also have to suffer 6 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in which this Court discu ssed the reliance interests of States and the possible effects of retroactive application of new criminal rules of procedure in the context of the three-factor anal-ysis used before Teague . 21 harm from the uncertainty that a new trial would cause and the possibility that, this time, the evidence could not be sufficient to process a case that had been final for years. Further, some victims may even have to relocate for fear of reprisal from the defendant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 255",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Practical considerations favor judicial review",
		"context": "Judicial review of administrative agency deci- sions provides critically important protections against arbitrary, irrational, and unlawful adminis- trative actions. Congress provides for judicial review \"as an additional assurance that its policies\" will be executed properly. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That purpose is especially important in the con- text of disability benefits decisions, given the im- portance of these benefits to the lives of the statute's beneficiaries and the large number of Americans af- fected. The Social Security Administration received more than two million claims for supplemental secu- rity income in fiscal year 2016 and a similar number of claims for disability payments.",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING",
		"context": "3a-4a; Richardson , 998 F.2d at 467-468. In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court, Washington Supreme Court, and Second Circuit hold that current law applies in sentence correction and resentencing proceedings, unless a sentence correc- tion is purely ministerial. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 216 P.3d 393; 467 F.3d 160. That division in authority—which is not in dispute— is reason enough to grant certiorari. The State nevertheless argues that the split \"is not as stark\" as McKinney suggests because it does not extend to the First or Fourth Circuits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "61 So.3d 399",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING",
		"context": "3a-4a; Richardson , 998 F.2d at 467-468. In contrast, the Florida Supreme Court, Washington Supreme Court, and Second Circuit hold that current law applies in sentence correction and resentencing proceedings, unless a sentence correc- tion is purely ministerial. See 61 So.3d 399; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 467 F.3d 160. That division in authority—which is not in dispute— is reason enough to grant certiorari. The State nevertheless argues that the split \"is not as stark\" as McKinney suggests because it does not extend to the First or Fourth Circuits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "216 P.3d 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING",
		"context": "Opp. 7. According to the State, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is distinguishable because 4 in that case, the defendant was \"awaiting resentenc- ing when Alleyne was decided,\" whereas \"the error correction instruction in Petitioner's case did not issue until more than ten years had elapsed since the advent of Ring. \" Opp. 8.",
		"citation_value_orig": "772 F.3d 284",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING",
		"context": "But that is precisely the point: In both Pizarro and the case at bar, the de- fendant's sentence was reconsidered after a change in the law. In that situation, the First Circuit ap- plies current law, while the Arizona Supreme Court does not, creating a clear split that requires this Court's intervention. The same is true of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There, the defendant's sentence became final on direct review. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 F.3d 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. AS THE STATE ACKNOWLEDGES, THERE IS A CLEAR SPLIT WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER COURTS MUST APPLY CURRENT LAW WHEN CORRECTING A SENTENCE OR RESENTENCING",
		"context": "Id. at 658. While the defendant's rehearing petition was pending, this Court decided [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. On rehearing, the Fourth Circuit concluded that because the dis- trict court had \"corrected\" the defendant's sentence— and the appeal of the sentence correction was still pending— Booker applied to the defendant's case. See Hadden , 475 F.3d at 660, 670-671.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 220",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress Has Repeatedly Rejected Proposals To Regulate This Subject Matter And Thereby Preempt State Laws Like Proposition 12",
		"context": "Any such law, if enacted, would of course preempt state law (including Proposition 12). See S. Pac. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But despite extensive consideration, Con- gress has, to date, rejected multiple proposals for fed-eral regulation in this arena. One such proposal, the Egg Products Inspection Act Amendments of 2013, was introduced on April 25, 2013 by a bipartisan group of representatives to pro- vide a uniform national standard for the housing and treatment of egg-laying hens, prohibiting the sale of eggs in interstate commerce that fail to meet certain 15 outlined requirements.10 The Senate companion bill was introduced on the same day by a bipartisan group of senators.11 The bills had 149 and 15 bipartisan co- sponsors, respectively, and extensive public support from Agriculture and Egg Producers, Veterinary Groups, Consumer Protection Groups, Animal Welfare Groups and numerous egg farmers from at least 34 states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "325 U.S. 761",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Congress Has Repeatedly Rejected Proposals To Regulate This Subject Matter And Thereby Preempt State Laws Like Proposition 12",
		"context": "\"). 18 between what is and what is not commerce among the states.\" H. P. Hood & Sons, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If Congress were inclined to see California's adoption of a nondiscriminatory in-state sales regulation as a truly excessive burden on inter- state commerce, it could have and surely would have seized the many opportunities presented to implement uniform federal standards. In the absence of Congres- sional action, the decision to regulate which pork prod- ucts may be sold within a State's borders remains in the hands of that State's government.",
		"citation_value_orig": "336 U.S. 525",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Philadelphia fails strict scrutiny",
		"context": "U.S.Br.15 -16; Pet'rs .Br.14 -15, 23 -24. Even under intermediate scrutiny, \"Such '[u]nder- inclusiveness raises serious doubts about whether the government is in fact pursuing the interest it invokes, rather than disfavoring a particular speaker or view- point. '\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Deputy Commissioner Ali 's concession was spot-on, and dispositive : Philadelphia's interest here is \"no stronger or no weaker than enforcing any other pol- icy.\" J.A.148.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Philadelphia fails strict scrutiny",
		"context": "Twenty -nine othe r agen- cies can provide the certification, and Respondents (and their amici) have failed to find a single same -sex couple who even approached CSS. Strict scrutiny can be satisfied only with evidence of an \"actual problem\" in need of solving . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Even intermediate scrutiny is fatal because Philadelphia exclu ded CSS and its already -certified foster families , leaving homes empty when the City admittedly needed more fami- lies—\"hardly a narrowly tailored solution .\" 573 U.S. 464 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Philadelphia fails strict scrutiny",
		"context": "But race discrimination has a unique history. Com- paring Loving and Obergefell illustrates the differ- ence: Loving said, \"There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial dis- crimination .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . By contrast, Obergefell spoke of \"decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises\" that should not be \"disparaged.\" 576 U.S. 644 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "388 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Philadelphia fails strict scrutiny",
		"context": "388 U.S. 1 . By contrast, Obergefell spoke of \"decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises\" that should not be \"disparaged.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court has since warned against such \"un- due disrespect to sincere religious beliefs .\" Master- piece , 138 S. Ct. at 1732.",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 644",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "At about the same time, Congress expanded the duties of examiners-in-chief. In 1980, for example, 46 Congress empowered examiners-in-chief to preside over \"ex parte reexamination\" of previously issued pa-tents. Cuozzo Speed Techs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 1984, Congress added patenta-bility issues to interferen ce proceedings and merged the two boards—one comprisi ng examiners-in-chief, the other interference examiners—such that examin-ers-in-chief would conduct all interference proceed-ings. See Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "§ 6 (2000). After an influential article noted that the Director is not a Head of Department author-ized to appoint inferior Officers, Congress amended the statute to vest \"the power of appointment [in] the Secretary.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Congress did so expressly to \"eliminat[e] the issue of unconstitutional appointments going for-ward.\" DBC, 545 F.3d at 1380.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 F.3d 1373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "385, 390–91 (2012); Matthew A. Smith et al., Inter Partes Revocation Pro-ceedings: Inter Partes Review , Post-Grant Review and Inter Partes Reexamination , at v (West 2012 ed.) (IPRs \"resemble reexamination substance superimposed onto an interference framework\"). By continuing to assign the Executive Branch's \"second look\" at issued patent claims \"to the very same bureaucracy that granted the patent in the first place,\" Thryv, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the AIA maintained the longstanding tradition of APJs serving under the direction and supervision of the Director. The political branches' historical \"chosen method\" for appointing APJs and their predecessors—appoint-ment by a Head of Department, for reasons of conven- ience—thus demonstrates \"that neither Congress nor the President thought [APJs] were principal officers.\" Weiss, 510 U.S. at 194 (Souter, J., concurring).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Noel Canning , 573 U.S. at 524 (alteration in original; citation omitted). Because the inferior-of- ficer question \"concerns the legitimacy of a classifica- tion made by Congress pursuant to its constitution- ally-assigned role in vest ing appointment authority,\" it \"counsels judicial deference.\" In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (D.C. Cir.) (R.B .",
		"citation_value_orig": "838 F.2d 476",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "(R.B . Ginsburg, J., dissent- ing), rev'd sub nom. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. While the Judiciary ultimately has the last word on the proper categorization of federal officials, \"a page of history is worth a volume of logic.\" N.Y. Tr.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 654",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "While the Judiciary ultimately has the last word on the proper categorization of federal officials, \"a page of history is worth a volume of logic.\" N.Y. Tr. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Just recently, this Court noted that \"Congress' practice of requiring advice and consent\" to appoint territorial governors with important federal duties \"supports the inference\" that they are Officers of the United States. Fin.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 345",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. The Co-Equal Branches Have Always Treated APJs And Their Predecessors As Inferior Officers",
		"context": "Over- sight & Mgmt. Bd. for [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And the Court has \" never invalidated an appointment made by the head of\" a Department, like the Secretary. Free Enter.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. State Constitutions Have Consistently Regulated Federal Elections Since the Founding",
		"context": "On the contrary, from the Founding on, state con- stitutions have done exactly that. Indeed, \"our whole experience as a Nation,\" Noel Canning , 573 U.S. at 557 (quotation marks omitted), makes plain that the peo- ple of a state may adopt constitutional provisions that limit partisan manipulation of the electoral process by the legislative branch and give state courts the respon- sibility to declare legislative enactments to the con- trary null and void. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 23 Smiley, 285 U.S. at 369 (observing that \"long and con- tinuous interpretation in the course of official action\" is particularly salient \"in the case of constitutional provisions\" such as the Elections Clause \"governing the exercise of political rights\"). The Elections Clause does not prevent state courts from curbing violations of state constitutions in regulating congressional elec- tions, and that is all the North Carolina Supreme Court did in this case. The history of state constitutional regulation of federal elections goes all the way back to the earliest days of our nation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2316",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 2703 is part of an interlocking trio of substantive provisions focused on protecting \"communications in electronic storage.\"",
		"context": "Its core purpose was to limit governmental ac- cess to digital letters to pr event \"erosion of this pre- cious right\" to privacy, in the face of the third-party doctrine, Id. at 5; see also id. at 3 (citing[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])—not \"to protec[t] the government's interest in obtaining [them].\" Gov't Br. 23 (quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "425 U.S. 435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 2703 is part of an interlocking trio of substantive provisions focused on protecting \"communications in electronic storage.\"",
		"context": "Even where there is not such a close logical connection, the usual rule is that provisions that cross-reference each other are read together. See, e.g. , Utility Air Regulatory [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; BedRoc 541 U.S. 176. The Government incorrectly suggests (Br. 18-20) that Morrison and RJR Nabisco override this basic precept of statutory construction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2427",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 2703 is part of an interlocking trio of substantive provisions focused on protecting \"communications in electronic storage.\"",
		"context": "Even where there is not such a close logical connection, the usual rule is that provisions that cross-reference each other are read together. See, e.g. , Utility Air Regulatory 134 S. Ct. 2427; BedRoc [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Government incorrectly suggests (Br. 18-20) that Morrison and RJR Nabisco override this basic precept of statutory construction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 176",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO REFUTE THE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING WILLIAMSON COUNTY",
		"context": "This is especially true when the Court is asked to reconsider one of its precedents . The Court must consider whether the subject precedent is \"unworkable in practice.\" Swift & Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This obviously allows and, indeed, requires consideration of the 5 overall impact of the precedent on the area of law and human activity on which it operates. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "382 U.S. 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO REFUTE THE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING WILLIAMSON COUNTY",
		"context": "This obviously allows and, indeed, requires consideration of the 5 overall impact of the precedent on the area of law and human activity on which it operates. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The fact that this case does not directly involve the removal-ripeness or res judicata problems arising from Williamson County and decried by Justices of this Court, Arrigoni , 136 S. Ct. at 1410- 11 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), has no bearing on its suitability for review. This case directly challenges the state litigation ripeness principle creating those problems .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO REFUTE THE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING WILLIAMSON COUNTY",
		"context": "The Township's second argument— that review of Williamson County is unwarranted because the Court has denied certiorari in other cases —is equally inapt. The denial of certiorari in a particular case does not imply anything about the merits of the case. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Certainly, it does not suggest that the issues in the denied petition are unworthy of review. After all, the Justices of this Court may decline review for 6 numerous, often differing, procedural and resource- based reasons.",
		"citation_value_orig": "338 U.S. 912",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE TOWNSHIP FAILS TO REFUTE THE SUBSTANTIAL REASONS FOR RECONSIDERING WILLIAMSON COUNTY",
		"context": "; Lingle , 544 U.S. at 544. Williamson County 's state litigation doctrine is a constitutionally imbued ripeness concept, \"whose 'underpinnings' have been 'eroded' by subsequent deve lopments of constitutional law.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. It is time for the Court to engage in the needed and inevitable 7 reassessment of Williamson County , and the Township has provided no good reason for avoiding that step.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 99",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Treaty-Based Protections the State Recognizes Differ Dramatically from Respondents' Alternative Theories",
		"context": "First, the State has acknowledged what Fishing Vessel said: that a court overseeing salmon allocation can \"enjoin those who would interfere with\" the res. Fishing Vessel , 443 U.S. at 692 n.32. This narrow power allows a court to enjoin acts that 19 threaten a salmon run with extinction, as in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], when the Ninth Circuit enjoined a tribe from fishing one run during a year in which \"precariously low numbers of that salmon were\" returning and \"the safe passage of every salmon was necessary to preserve the species.\" But Respondents have not alleged and could not plausibly allege that State culverts meet this standard. Second, the State has acknowledged what this Court held in the Puyallup cases: State regulation cannot discriminate against the Tribes.",
		"citation_value_orig": "657 F.2d 1009",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Treaty-Based Protections the State Recognizes Differ Dramatically from Respondents' Alternative Theories",
		"context": "Second, the State has acknowledged what this Court held in the Puyallup cases: State regulation cannot discriminate against the Tribes. As the Ninth Circuit explained in a later-vacated opinion in this case: \"Reckless or malicious disregard for the effects of State projects on the f ishery, leading to drastic decline in the available fish, very likely would be barred under the 'discriminatory regulation' standard of Puyallup I .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]759 F.2d 1353 . But here again, Respondents have not alleged that the State, in building culverts to federal design standards, acted with reckless or malicious disregard for the effects on fish. To the contrary, it was the State that first recognized—in the 1990's—that federal culvert designs could be inadequate for salmon.",
		"citation_value_orig": "694 F.2d 1374",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The Treaty-Based Protections the State Recognizes Differ Dramatically from Respondents' Alternative Theories",
		"context": "Second, the State has acknowledged what this Court held in the Puyallup cases: State regulation cannot discriminate against the Tribes. As the Ninth Circuit explained in a later-vacated opinion in this case: \"Reckless or malicious disregard for the effects of State projects on the f ishery, leading to drastic decline in the available fish, very likely would be barred under the 'discriminatory regulation' standard of Puyallup I .\" 694 F.2d 1374[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But here again, Respondents have not alleged that the State, in building culverts to federal design standards, acted with reckless or malicious disregard for the effects on fish. To the contrary, it was the State that first recognized—in the 1990's—that federal culvert designs could be inadequate for salmon.",
		"citation_value_orig": "759 F.2d 1353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Been Rightly Declining to Rely on Lemon, Which Minimizes Any Reliance Society or Courts Place on It",
		"context": "But the trend has been one of increasing avoidance. The Court seems not to have appli ed it with any force since 2005 and has begun looking more closely at the history and text to interpret the b oundaries of the Establishment Clause. See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 14 Societal changes also warrant discarding Lemon under Janus' s \"later developments\" factor . Janus , 138 S. Ct. at 2478 –82.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Court Has Been Rightly Declining to Rely on Lemon, Which Minimizes Any Reliance Society or Courts Place on It",
		"context": "Not only has government's relationship with reli- gion changed, but society itself has become more plu- ralistic . Many religions are afforded monuments on public land: the L ibrary of Congress contains statues of Mos es and depictions of Greek gods; the Capitol con- tains a statue of a Franciscan monk; the postal service released forever -stamps featuring the Arabic script for 15 \"holiday\" during Christmas, and the Sixth Circuit con- cluded that a Buddhist friendship bell was equally welcome in the public sphere. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . These ex- amples show that America's religious landscape has become more diverse since the Founding. This devel- opment has been naturally reflected in state and local governments ' accommodating myriad religions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "222 F.3d 259",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Amicus Takes No View With Respect to the Federal Circuit's Weighing of the Second Factor",
		"context": "Under the second statutory fair use factor, the Federal Circuit held that the Java Code copied by Google was newsletter for use by multiple staff members held not fair use; even if copying was done only for educational and research purposes, defendant saved money by photocopying one subscription instead of purchasing the number of subscriptions it actually required). 26. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 27. 471 U.S. at 562.",
		"citation_value_orig": "239 F.3d 1004",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2.Legislative history only confirms the plain-text meaning",
		"context": "Regardless, the Senate and the House Reports ac- companying the bill that became FOIA only confirm that Congress intended the plain-text meaning of \"confiden- tial.\" Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Senate Report explains that Exemption 4 gives federal agencies discretion to withhold non-governmental commercial or financial information that \"would custom- arily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.\" S. Rep. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 73",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation",
		"context": "XIV , § 5. But this 53 language \"neither explicitly precludes the states\" from enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment \"nor grants such authority exclusively to the federal government.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because no federal law preempts state regulation here, 19 Colorado remains free to enforce Section 3 through its own laws . Indeed, the Supremacy Clause \"charges [its] state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce\" the Constitution under \"their regular modes of procedure.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "412 U.S. 546",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation",
		"context": "Because no federal law preempts state regulation here, 19 Colorado remains free to enforce Section 3 through its own laws . Indeed, the Supremacy Clause \"charges [its] state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce\" the Constitution under \"their regular modes of procedure.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 2. In any event, the Fourteenth Amendment's plain text and this Court's precedent foreclose the claim that the amendment is inoperative without federal legislation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation",
		"context": "And to hold otherwise would eviscerate the supermajority requirement, allowing a simple majority of Congress to nullify Section 3 merely by repealing (or not passing) enforcement legislation. This Court's controlling precedent confirms the Fourteenth Amendment 's provisions \"are self- executing.\" City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In City of Boerne , the Court characterized Congress's Section 5 power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment as purely \"remedial\" rather than \"substantive.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 507",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation",
		"context": "at 15 -16. This Court's decision in Ex Parte Young \"sanctioned the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a sword as well as a shield against unconstitutional conduct .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]109 U.S. 3. Nothing in its text or history suggests Section 3 is somehow different in this respect from all other provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 3 does not require federal enforcement legislation",
		"context": "at 15 -16. This Court's decision in Ex Parte Young \"sanctioned the use of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as a sword as well as a shield against unconstitutional conduct .\" 430 U.S. 327[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nothing in its text or history suggests Section 3 is somehow different in this respect from all other provisions of the Reconstruction Amendments. 3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "109 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. State and local concealed carry regulations reflect important public safety concerns",
		"context": "See Violence Policy Center: Concealed Carry Killers, ht tps://concealedcarrykillers.org/con- cealed -carry -killers -background/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2021). Such 20 Second , the increased circulation of firearms via con- cealed carry heightens the risk that such firearms will be lost or s tolen and then used by criminals, persons in crisis, or those not competent to handle them, such a s children. See W [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. At the margin, w ith more citizens walk- ing the street s, going to work, and running errands carry- ing firearm s, there is an increased risk that bystanders, co-workers, or other individuals can misappropriate the weapons —or come across them by accident —and cause serious injury to themselves or others. Third , as the ABA has observed, the \"concealed car- rying of firearms also places law enforcement officers at heightened risk of gun violence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "712 F.3d 865",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Agency Deference Violates Due Process by Requiring Judges to Bias Their Decisions in Favor of One Party",
		"context": "But for acourt to abandon its independent judgment in a 24 manner that favors an actual litigant before the court violates due process. This Court has held that even the appearance of potential bias toward a litigant violates the Due Process Clause. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (agreeing that the Constitution forbids agency or judicial proceedings that are \"infected by ...bias\"). Whenever Chevron is applied in a case in which the government is a party, the courts are denying dueprocess by showing favoritism to the government's interpretation of the law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 868",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Agency Deference Violates Due Process by Requiring Judges to Bias Their Decisions in Favor of One Party",
		"context": "This Court has held that even the appearance of potential bias toward a litigant violates the Due Process Clause. 556 U.S. 868. See also Masterpiece Cakeshop, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (agreeing that the Constitution forbids agency or judicial proceedings that are \"infected by ...bias\"). Whenever Chevron is applied in a case in which the government is a party, the courts are denying dueprocess by showing favoritism to the government's interpretation of the law. See Tetra Tech , 914 N.W.2d at 50 (prohibiting Chevron deference in the Wisconsin state courts because its \"systematic favor deprives the non-governmental party of an independent andimpartial tribunal.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. Neither The Defendants Nor The United States Propose A Plausible Standard for Determining Which Types of Assistance To A Terrorist Enterprise Would And Would Not Be Covered by section 2333(d)(2)",
		"context": "This crabbed interpretation would exclude from the scope of §2333(d)(2) virtually all the aiding and abetting that would be of any practical importance. The most common form of ou tside assistance on which foreign terrorist organizations rely is money. \"Many of the terrorist organizations designated by the Secretary [of State under §1189] derive a significant portion of their overall financing from fundraising conducted out- side of their area of operat ions....\" Declaration of Ken- neth R. McKune, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], J.A. 134. Th e ability of existing for- eign terrorist organizations to engage in acts of terror- ism often depends on such outside funding.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This case does not present the question whether Iskanian forecloses arbitration of PAGA claims",
		"context": "at 133; see also id . at 157 (Chin, J., concurring), did not have that consequence because fundamental FAA principles prohibit requiring par-ties to arbitrate claims they have agreed not to arbi- trate. See Granite Rock [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Rivas , 842 F. Appx. at 58 (Bumatay , J., concurring); 393 P.3d 84. Some lower California courts have subsequently stated that agreements to arbitrate PAGA claims are unenforceable, absent consent by the State, in light of Iskanian 's reasoning.",
		"citation_value_orig": "561 U.S. 287",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. This case does not present the question whether Iskanian forecloses arbitration of PAGA claims",
		"context": "Some lower California courts have subsequently stated that agreements to arbitrate PAGA claims are unenforceable, absent consent by the State, in light of Iskanian 's reasoning. Those statements are them- selves dicta to the extent that they were issued in cases concerning agreements that barred arbitration of PAGA representative claims rather than requiring arbitration of such claims. See, e.g., 244 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied138 S. Ct. 356. Moreover, given Iskanian's clear statement of its holding, and the repetition of that holding in ZB, the conclusion that PAGA claims are nonarbitrable cannot be attributed to the California Supreme Court.",
		"citation_value_orig": "210 Cal. Rptr. 3d 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
		"context": "This 25 would presumably include the fact that Members might not receive certain benefits promised under the Plan ( i.e., their benefits might be illusory) in light of Act 900's decline-to-dispense provision. This Court has cautioned against includin g unnecessary legalese or overcomplicated descriptions because it diminishes the utility of SPDs. CIGNA [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Things like imprecise language, repre- sentations, and omissions in SPDs have become a fer- tile source of litigation. See generally M. R. Bosau, \"Defining the Parameters: When an ERISA Summary Plan Description Trumps the Corresponding Plan Doc- ument,\" Megan R. Bosau, Defining the Parameters: When an ERISA Summary Plan Description Trumps the Corresponding Plan Document , 7 DePaul Bus.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 421",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Act 900 Improperly Affects Plan Design",
		"context": "Considering the adverse economic effects—and the risk of potential civil and criminal liability resulting from Act 900 and similar laws, should J.B. Hunt re- quire the Plan Members to pay a greater share of the cost of their prescription drugs? Or should J.B. Hunt simply eliminate prescription drug benefits altogether? See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These are the very real questions that plan sponsors are cur- rently confronting as they draft and amend their ERISA benefit plans in the wake of oppressive and con- flicting state regulation. --------------------------------- ♦ --------------------------------- 27",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 506",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Interpreting the First Step Act to Provide Relief to People Sentenced for Crack-Cocaine Offenses Pursuant to section 841(b)(1)(C) Accords with the Act's Broad Remedial Purpose",
		"context": "By reading the First Step Act to deprive district court judges of the author- ity to revisit the sentences of individuals sentenced for crack-cocaine offenses pursuant to § 841(b)(1)(C), the court below ignored a driving purpose behind the Act: enhancing district court discretion for certain less cul- pable offenders. As this Court has repeatedly noted, there is \"no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The text of § 404 of the First Step Act, read together with § 841, unambiguously expresses a rule that directly aligns with Congress's purpose: to provide an oppor- tunity for all crack-cocaine offenders convicted of vio- lating § 841(a) to seek reduced sentences under the Fair Sentencing Act's more just regime. This Court should give effect to that text and purpose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 534",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The agency's stated premise that DACA is unlawful is incorrect",
		"context": "An agenc y's \"action must be upheld, if at all, on the basis a rticulated by the agency itself .\" Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When the agency's stated rationale rests on a \"determination of law,\" the action \"may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law \"—even if the action might have been justified on some other ground . Chenery I , 318 U.S. at 94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "As noted above, in their response brief filed in the Tenth Circuit, Officers Madrid and Williamson showed that, not only was petitioner not \"seized\" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, petitioner failed to meet her burden of supplying \"clearly established\" law support- ing her Fourth Amendment claim. To support a clearly established constitutional right, \"existing precedent must have placed the statut ory or constitutional ques- tion beyond debate \" (emphasis supplied). [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has \"not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.\" 138 S.Ct. 577; see also 935 F.3d 444; 566 U.S. 658; City of Escondido 139 S.Ct. 500.",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "563 U.S. 731. This Court has \"not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 935 F.3d 444; 566 U.S. 658; City of Escondido 139 S.Ct. 500. The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" 849 F.3d 970.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "563 U.S. 731. This Court has \"not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.\" 138 S.Ct. 577; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 566 U.S. 658; City of Escondido 139 S.Ct. 500. The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" 849 F.3d 970.",
		"citation_value_orig": "935 F.3d 444",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "563 U.S. 731. This Court has \"not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.\" 138 S.Ct. 577; see also 935 F.3d 444; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; City of Escondido 139 S.Ct. 500. The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" 849 F.3d 970.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 658",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "563 U.S. 731. This Court has \"not yet decided what precedents—other than [its] own—qual- ify as controlling authority for purposes of qualified immunity.\" 138 S.Ct. 577; see also 935 F.3d 444; 566 U.S. 658; City of Escondido [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" 849 F.3d 970.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S.Ct. 500",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "138 S.Ct. 577; see also 935 F.3d 444; 566 U.S. 658; City of Escondido 139 S.Ct. 500. The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consequently, the unanimous Tenth Circuit panel below properly looked to its own published opin- ions, particularly Brooks v. Gaenzle , supra , as well as the court's later opinion in 878 F.3d 933, to find that petitioner was not \"seized.\" See generally App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 970",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "The Tenth Cir- cuit has stated that the \"clearly established\" law stand- ard \"requires either that there is a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or that the 'clearly es-tablished weight of authority from other courts [has] found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.' \" 849 F.3d 970. Consequently, the unanimous Tenth Circuit panel below properly looked to its own published opin- ions, particularly Brooks v. Gaenzle , supra , as well as the court's later opinion in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to find that petitioner was not \"seized.\" See generally App. 7a-9a.",
		"citation_value_orig": "878 F.3d 933",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "The burden is—and always has been— on petitioner to identify a case where police officers acting under similar circumstances as Officers Madrid and Williamson were held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. See White , 137 S.Ct. at 552; see also Car- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 714 F.3d 1048. In 136 S.Ct. 479, and re- manded \"for further consideration in light of \" 136 S.Ct. 305. Following remand from this Court, the Tenth Circuit held \"that the three law-enforcement of- ficers [we]re entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "847 F.3d 1203",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "The burden is—and always has been— on petitioner to identify a case where police officers acting under similar circumstances as Officers Madrid and Williamson were held to have violated the Fourth Amendment. See White , 137 S.Ct. at 552; see also Car- 847 F.3d 1203; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 136 S.Ct. 479, and re- manded \"for further consideration in light of \" 136 S.Ct. 305. Following remand from this Court, the Tenth Circuit held \"that the three law-enforcement of- ficers [we]re entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "714 F.3d 1048",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "See White , 137 S.Ct. at 552; see also Car- 847 F.3d 1203; 714 F.3d 1048. In 136 S.Ct. 479, and re- manded \"for further consideration in light of \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Following remand from this Court, the Tenth Circuit held \"that the three law-enforcement of- ficers [we]re entitled to qualified immunity because they did not violate clearly established law.\" Aldaba , 844 F.3d at 871.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S.Ct. 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "Similarly, in 137 S.Ct. 2241, and remanded for further consideration in light of White v. Pauly , supra . On 29 remand, the Ninth Circuit found that, even if the De- fendant Officer had acted unreasonably, the plaintiff \"failed to identify any clearly established law putting [Defendant] on notice that, under these facts, his con-duct was unlawful.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] decide whether the Defendant violated the Fourth Amend-ment when he used deadly force against Hughes. For even assuming a Fourth Amendment violation oc- curred—a proposition that was not at all evident on the facts before this Court—Defendant Kisela was at least entitled to qualified immunity. Kisela , 138 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "697 F. App'x 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "Kisela , 138 S.Ct. at 1153; see also City of Escondido v. Emmons , supra , 139 S.Ct. at 503, on remand , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As in Aldaba and Kisela , the cases relied upon by petitioner and her amici \"differ too much from this one, so reading them would not apprise every objectively reasonable officer\" that their actions would amount to excessive force. Aldaba , 844 F.3d at 877.",
		"citation_value_orig": "921 F.3d 1172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "Petitioner cannot and does not point to a single case where police officers in the position of Officers William- son and Madrid, in similar circumstances, violated the Fourth Amendment. On the \"clearly established\" prong alone, the officers remain entitled to qualified immun- ity as against petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims in this case. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 870 F.3d 273. Strikingly, if petitioner is correct that there is a circuit split on the issue prese nted in this case, Officers Madrid and Williamson are all the more entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., 503 F. App'x 672; 641 F.3d 947.",
		"citation_value_orig": "888 F.3d 1030",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "Petitioner cannot and does not point to a single case where police officers in the position of Officers William- son and Madrid, in similar circumstances, violated the Fourth Amendment. On the \"clearly established\" prong alone, the officers remain entitled to qualified immun- ity as against petitioner's Fourth Amendment claims in this case. See 888 F.3d 1030; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Strikingly, if petitioner is correct that there is a circuit split on the issue prese nted in this case, Officers Madrid and Williamson are all the more entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., 503 F. App'x 672; 641 F.3d 947.",
		"citation_value_orig": "870 F.3d 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "See 888 F.3d 1030; see also 870 F.3d 273. Strikingly, if petitioner is correct that there is a circuit split on the issue prese nted in this case, Officers Madrid and Williamson are all the more entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 641 F.3d 947. Reasonable police officers are not expected to conduct \"an exhaustive study of 31 case law\" in connection with their day-to-day opera- tions. See 763 F.3d 936.",
		"citation_value_orig": "503 F. App'x 672",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "See 888 F.3d 1030; see also 870 F.3d 273. Strikingly, if petitioner is correct that there is a circuit split on the issue prese nted in this case, Officers Madrid and Williamson are all the more entitled to qualified immunity. See, e.g., 503 F. App'x 672; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Reasonable police officers are not expected to conduct \"an exhaustive study of 31 case law\" in connection with their day-to-day opera- tions. See 763 F.3d 936.",
		"citation_value_orig": "641 F.3d 947",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. THE RESPONDENT OFFICERS REMAIN ENTITLED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY, AS NO CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW WOULD HAVE PUT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IN THIS MATTER BEYOND DEBATE",
		"context": "See, e.g., 503 F. App'x 672; 641 F.3d 947. Reasonable police officers are not expected to conduct \"an exhaustive study of 31 case law\" in connection with their day-to-day opera- tions. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In sum, it would not have been clear to Of- ficers Madrid and Williamson that firing at petitioner on July 15, 2014 was a violation of petitioner's clearly established constitutional rights. Even if petitioner was \"seized\" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the dismissal of her claims should be upheld on the al- ternative ground that the Officers are entitled to qual-",
		"citation_value_orig": "763 F.3d 936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Jennings Distinguished \"Clear\" Sections 1225 and 1226 From \"Ambiguous\" Section 1231(a)(6)",
		"context": "Sections 1225 and 1226, by contrast, \"provide for detention for a specified period of time.\" Id. at 844, 846; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—restrict the government's discretion to release detained noncitizens. This Court pointed out that section 1225 uses the word \"shall,\" while section 1231(a)(6) says noncitizens \" may be detained.\" 138 S. Ct. at 850 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "538 U.S. 510",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Constitution does not give Congress plenary power to enact ICWA",
		"context": ". Because the enumeration of Congress's powers \"' pre- supposes something not enumerated ,' the Constitution 's express conferral of some powers makes clear that it does not grant others. \" Sebelius , 567 U.S. at 534 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). And Congress \"can exercise only the powers granted to it.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "22 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The Constitution does not give Congress plenary power to enact ICWA",
		"context": "The Constitution does not empower Con- gress to regulate domestic relations just because an In- dian may be involved. The Court previously recognized that \"[t]he source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the sub- ject of some confusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the Court has since identified the Indian Comm erce and Treaty Clauses as the primary sources of Congress's au- thority to legislate regarding Indian affairs. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "411 U.S. 164",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "1. This Court has long recognized that \"the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our consti- tutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For this reason, courts may not read statutes to override the \"usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers\" where Congress has not clearly expressed its intention to do so. Bond v. United States , 134 S. C t. 2077, 2089 (2014) (quoting Gregory , 501 U.S. at 460).",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "That would raise serious constitutional questions . This Cour t has repeatedly noted that the ADEA's cov- erage of public employers —no less than priv ate busi- nesses —is an \"exercise of Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause.\" Gregory , 501 U.S. at 464 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). And other statutes show that when Congress brings public enti- ties within the reach of federal power, it includes a Commerce Clause hook. Title VII, the ADA, and the Fair Labor Standards Act, for example, all include provisions that expressly qualify the public entities they reach as those engaged in an \"industry affecting commerce\" or an \"enterprise engaged in commerce.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "460 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "For this reason alone, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, which \"mili- tates against\" statutory interpretations that rai se \"se- rious questions of constitutionality,\" negates the Ninth Circuit's reading. Scalia & Garner, supra , at 247-48; see, e.g. , Clark , 543 U.S. at 380- 81 (interpre- tation that does not \"raise a multitude of constitu- tional problems … should prevail\"); NL [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the second sentence does not negate the first sentence's \"affecting commerce\" limitation, then it cannot negate the 20 -employee minimum either. In- deed, the \"affecting commerce\" limitation works 42 hand -in-glove with the employee threshold .",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 490",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "In- deed, the \"affecting commerce\" limitation works 42 hand -in-glove with the employee threshold . Employee threshold s like these can be viewed as reflect ing \"Con- gress's determination … that any employer \" above the stated employee threshold \" necessarily im plicates in- terstate commerce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Aspects of Title VII's legislative history support that view: \" The bill proceeds upon a theory … that the quantum of em- ployees is a rational yardstick by which the interstate commerce concept can be measured.\" H.R .",
		"citation_value_orig": "948 F.2d 305",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of applying the minimum-employee requirement",
		"context": "None of these scenarios would have any appreciable effect on interstate commerce. And w ithout an effect on interstate commerce, the ap- plication would be unconstitutional. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court must avoid these constitutional landmines , see Scalia & Garner, supra, at 249, by in- terpreting both lim itations in § 630(b)'s first sentence to apply to all state agencies and political subdivi- sions .",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "Guam's reading of Section 113(f )(3)(B) would frus- trate the provision's purposes. Congress enacted CER- CLA to promote the timely cleanup of contaminated sites, s ee Atlantic Richfield [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and the Act acknowledges that settle- ments can \"minimize l itigation,\" \"expedite effective re- medial actions,\" and promote \"the public interest ,\" 42 U.S.C. 9622(a). Section 113(f )(3)(B) in particular serves \"to encourage settlements.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "\"Congress gave no indication that it mat- ters whether the authority governing the settlement is CERCLA or something else. Its focus was, instead, on cleaning up hazardous waste sites.\" ASARCO [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"An interpretation that limits the contribution right under § 113(f )(3)(B) to CERCLA settlements would undercut private parties' incentive to settle,\" thus undermining the provision's evident purpose. Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "866 F.3d 1108",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "Guam's reading also would upset a near consensus in the courts of appeals about Section 113(f )(3)(B)'s mean- ing. F our c ircui ts have held , all through unanimous 23 panels and all in reliance on the statutory text, that Sec- tion 113(f )(3)(B) encompasse s settlements that resolve claims brought under statutes other than CERCLA . See Trinity Industries, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Refined Metals 937 F.3d 928; ASARCO , 866 F.3d at 1120 (9th Cir. ); Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.3d 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "17a. Only one court of appeals , the Second Circuit, has limited Section 113(f )(3)(B) to settlements that resolve CERCLA claims. Consolidated Edison [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , cert. denied,551 U.S. 1130 . The Second Circuit reached that con- clusion based largely on the \"legislative history ,\" ibid., but it later acknowledged that \"there is a great dea l of force\" to the contrary view \"given the language of the statute ,\" Niagara Mohawk Power 596 F.3d 112.",
		"citation_value_orig": "423 F.3d 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "Consolidated Edison 423 F.3d 90 , cert. denied,551 U.S. 1130 . The Second Circuit reached that con- clusion based largely on the \"legislative history ,\" ibid., but it later acknowledged that \"there is a great dea l of force\" to the contrary view \"given the language of the statute ,\" Niagara Mohawk Power [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally, Guam's approach would create uncertainty about which settlements fall within Section 113(f )(3)(B). Guam argues (Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "596 F.3d 112",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "5. Additional considerations reinforce the conclusion that Section 113(f)(3)(B) covers settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "In the l atter scenario, it is unclear whether Guam would view it as necessary for the re- lease to refer specifically to CER CLA liability, or whether it would be sufficient that the settlement pro- vide d a general release from liability . All of those ques- tions have actually arisen in the Second Circuit, the only court of a ppeals that has limited Section 113(f )(3)(B) 24 along the lines Guam proposes. See Niagara Mohawk , 596 F.3d at 124 -127; W.R. Grace & Co. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Guam's brief leaves these questions unansw ered.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 F.3d 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Because of the Purpose of the Ministerial Exception, a Minister Must Be Defined by Virtue of Religious Functions",
		"context": "Any definitionof minister that confines ministers to particular titles 14 The \"prospect of government intrusion raises concern that a religious organization may be chilled in its free exercise activity. While a church may regard the conduct of certain functions as integral to its mission, a court may disagree.\" Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Ch rist of Latter-Day [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 or that prefers ministers in particular organizational structures, such as hierarch ical, formal churches, must be rejected. Likewise, any definition that requiresjudicial scrutiny into religious doctrinal questions mustalso be rejected.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Because of the Purpose of the Ministerial Exception, a Minister Must Be Defined by Virtue of Religious Functions",
		"context": "13 understood faiths. See 633 F.3d 723. Suchquestions would be exceptiona lly difficult to answer in the context of certain faith traditions, such as theNative American traditions at issue in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The case involved a schoolthat mixed the spiritual and cultural heritage ofvarious Native American tribes as well as otherreligions. The court noted that the \"line between sacredand profane does not exist in Native Americancultures,\" recognizing \"the interconnectedness ofNative American culture and religion.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 F.Supp.2d 858",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "In the First Amendment context, as in others, \"[f ]acial challenges are disfavored.\" Washington State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2008) . Among other things, such challenges \"often rest on speculation ,\" \"run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint ,\" and \"t hreaten to short circuit the democratic process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "A facial overbreadth challenge —in which a defend- ant asserts that a statute, constitutionally applied to him, is nevertheless invalid because it would be uncon- stitutional in a \"substantial n umber\" of other cases, Washington State Grange , 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (citation omitted) —is even more exceptional. \"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu- tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu- tionally to others in situations not before the Court.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see 362 U.S. 17. That normal third -party standing rule , to which overbreadth claims are a \"limited\" exception, re- flects \"two cardinal principles of our constitutional or- der: the personal nature of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation mark s omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "A facial overbreadth challenge —in which a defend- ant asserts that a statute, constitutionally applied to him, is nevertheless invalid because it would be uncon- stitutional in a \"substantial n umber\" of other cases, Washington State Grange , 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (citation omitted) —is even more exceptional. \"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu- tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu- tionally to others in situations not before the Court.\" New 458 U.S. 747; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That normal third -party standing rule , to which overbreadth claims are a \"limited\" exception, re- flects \"two cardinal principles of our constitutional or- der: the personal nature of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation mark s omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation mark s omitted). Accordingly, the Court has taken care to ensure that the overbreadth exception does not \"swallow\" the tradi- tional rule preferring as-applied challenges to facial ones . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Because of the wide -reac hing effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own con- duct may be punished despite the First Amendment,\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 (citation omit- ted), this Court \"has repeatedly warned that invalida- tion for F irst Amendment overbreadth is strong medi- cine that is not to be casually employed,\" 140 S. Ct. 1575 . The Court has therefore \"vigorously enforced the re- quirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "\"Because of the wide -reac hing effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own con- duct may be punished despite the First Amendment,\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 (citation omit- ted), this Court \"has repeatedly warned that invalida- tion for F irst Amendment overbreadth is strong medi- cine that is not to be casually employed,\" 140 S. Ct. 1575 . The Court has therefore \"vigorously enforced the re- quirement that a statute's overbreadth be substantial relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some imper- missible applications of a statute is not sufficient to ren- der it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.\" Mem- bers of the City 466 U.S. 789.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "553 U.S. 285 . \"[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some imper- missible applications of a statute is not sufficient to ren- der it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.\" Mem- bers of the City [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, \"there must be a realistic danger that the statute itself will significantly compro- 20 mise recognized First Amendment protections of par- ties not before the C ourt.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "In the First Amendment context, as in others, \"[f ]acial challenges are disfavored.\" Washington State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 2008) . Among other things, such challenges \"often rest on speculation ,\" \"run contrary to the fundamental principle of judicial restraint ,\" and \"threaten to short circuit the democratic process.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 442",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "Facial overbreadth challenges —in which a defend- ant asserts that a statute, constitutionally applied to her, is nevertheless invalid because it would be uncon- stitutional in a \"substa ntial number\" of other cases, Washington State Grange , 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (citation omitted) —are even more exceptional. \"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu- tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu- tionally to others in situations not before the Court.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see United 17 362 U.S. 17. That normal third -party standing rule , to which overbreadth claims are a \"limited\" exception, re- flects \"two cardinal principles of our constitutional or- der: the personal natu re of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "458 U.S. 747",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "Facial overbreadth challenges —in which a defend- ant asserts that a statute, constitutionally applied to her, is nevertheless invalid because it would be uncon- stitutional in a \"substa ntial number\" of other cases, Washington State Grange , 552 U.S. at 449 n.6 (citation omitted) —are even more exceptional. \"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitu- tionally be applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitu- tionally to others in situations not before the Court.\" New 458 U.S. 747; see United 17 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That normal third -party standing rule , to which overbreadth claims are a \"limited\" exception, re- flects \"two cardinal principles of our constitutional or- der: the personal natu re of constitutional rights and the prudential limitations on constitutional adjudication.\" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "362 U.S. 17",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 -40 (citation s and inte rnal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court has taken care to ensure that the overbreadth exception does not \"swallow\" the tradi- tional rule favoring as-applied challenges. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Because of the wide - reaching effects of striking down a statute on its face at the request of one whose own conduct may be punished despite the First Amendment,\" the Court has recog- nized that overbreadth is \" 'strong medicine' \" to be em- ployed \" 'only as a last resort.' \" Los Angeles Police Dep't , 528 U.S. at 39 (quoting Ferber , 458 U.S. at 769); cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "Hicks , 539 U.S. at 119 ( noting the \"substantial social costs created by the overbreadth doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally unprotected conduct\") (emphasis omitted) . The Court has therefore \"vigorously enforced the re- quirement that a statute' s overbreadth be substantial relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . \"[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some imper- missible applications of a statute is not sufficient to ren- der it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.\" Mem- bers of the City 466 U.S. 789.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Respondent's convictions are invalid only if the statute of conviction is substantially overbroad in its potential application in other cases",
		"context": "553 U.S. 285 . \"[T]he mere fact that one can conceive of some imper- missible applications of a statute is not sufficient to ren- der it susceptible to an overbreadth challenge.\" Mem- bers of the City [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Rather, \"there must be a real- 18 istic danger that the statute itself will significantly com- promise recognized First Amendmen t protections of parties not before the Court.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 789",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The burden of proving eligibility imposed by the INA and regulations applies to the issue of whether an alien was convicted of a crime that renders him ineligible",
		"context": "But this case concerns the antecedent step of deter- mining which crime an alien was convicted of commit- ting. And identifying \"the offense of conviction itself ' is a factual determination, not a legal one. ' \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (5th Cir. 2016 ) (citation and inte rnal quotation marks omitted). A n adjudicator determining the fact of a prior conviction resolve s whether a partic- ular prior prosecution resul ted in a judgment of convic- tion against the alien , and under what statute, by exam- ining the record of conviction in that specific prior case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "819 F.3d 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The burden of proving eligibility imposed by the INA and regulations applies to the issue of whether an alien was convicted of a crime that renders him ineligible",
		"context": "That lack of sufficient certainty \"foreclose[d]\" consideration of the various legal arguments petitioner raised as to the classification of his prior conviction. Ibid. Petitioner cites two cases —Moncrieffe and Cara churi- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —for his view that \"burdens of proof have not played a role\" even \"in cases where the noncitizen bore the burden of proof .\" Pet. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 563",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The burden of proving eligibility imposed by the INA and regulations applies to the issue of whether an alien was convicted of a crime that renders him ineligible",
		"context": "B r. 43, 45 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 43-50. Even if they were well founded, such concerns could not \"justify disregard[ing] the clear mean- ing of the statutory language,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which unequivocally places the \" burden of proof \" on the alien to \"establish that\" he \"satisfies the applicable eligibility require- ments,\" 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(A)(i). In any event, peti- tioner's policy arguments are unavailing.",
		"citation_value_orig": "553 U.S. 377",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties To A Class Action Are Broadly Free To Structure A Settlement Agreement As They Wish, Provided That It Is \"Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate\"",
		"context": "As long as a proposed settlement agreement \"is 'fair, adequate and free from collusion' [it] will pass judicial muster.\" Volkswagen at 610 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Indeed, a guiding principle of a Rule 23(e) fairness review is that th e court will not intru[de] upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement … [except] to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair , reasonable, and adequate to all concerned. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv.",
		"citation_value_orig": "150 F.3d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Parties To A Class Action Are Broadly Free To Structure A Settlement Agreement As They Wish, Provided That It Is \"Fair, Reasonable, and Adequate\"",
		"context": "Indeed, a guiding principle of a Rule 23(e) fairness review is that th e court will not intru[de] upon what is otherwise a private consensual agreement … [except] to the extent necessary to reach a reasoned judgment that the agreement is not the product of fraud or overreaching by, or collusion between, the negotiating parties, and that the settlement, taken as a whole, is fair , reasonable, and adequate to all concerned. Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n , 688 F.2d at 625; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp. , 150 F.3d at 1027 (\"[T]he question we address is not whether the final product could be prettier, smarter or snazzier, but whether it is fair, adequate and free from collusion\"). Because courts are loath to disturb a settlement of class claims unless its terms are unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate, the parties have considerable latitude in fashioning the terms of a settlement agreement in 11 a manner that takes into account the particular circumstances and context in which the dispute arose.",
		"citation_value_orig": "696 F.3d 811",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD ESTABLISHES THREE PERTINENT RULES GOVERNING REVIEW OF AGENCY FINDINGS",
		"context": "It dictates an essentially back- ward-looking inquiry: A court applying the substan- tial-evidence standard \"looks to an existing adminis- trative record and asks whether it contains 'suffi- cien[t] evidence' to support the agency's factual deter- minations.\" Id. (quoting Consolidated Edison [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). The reviewing court 18 does not evaluate or weigh the evidence itself, but as- sesses \"the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it.\" 373 U.S. 709.",
		"citation_value_orig": "305 U.S. 197",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE STANDARD ESTABLISHES THREE PERTINENT RULES GOVERNING REVIEW OF AGENCY FINDINGS",
		"context": "(quoting Consolidated Edison 305 U.S. 197). The reviewing court 18 does not evaluate or weigh the evidence itself, but as- sesses \"the reasonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the evidence before it.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As pertinent here, the substantial-evidence test consists of three parts, which together ensure that the agency offered a sufficient and adequately reasoned basis for its factual findings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "373 U.S. 709",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Common Cause Appellees Proved Vote-Dilution Injury",
		"context": "N.E. Fla. Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Con- tractors of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Moreover, although Appellees are not required to show that their preferred candidates would have won absent the gerrymander , Drs. Chen and Mattingly 's analys es show clearly that under a map drawn with- 31 out partisan discrimination, there would be more than three Democratic distri cts.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 656",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Lanham Act's Extraterritoriality Does Not Depend on a Defendant's U.S. Citizenship",
		"context": "Some circuit tests for Lanham Act extraterritori- ality have assigned varying weight to a defendant's U.S. citizenship . Compare Vanity Fair, 234 F.2d at 642 (absen ce of U.S. citizenship \"might well be deter- minative\" of extraterritoriality) with [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] could not be a foreign enterprise because the \"fo-cus\" of RICO was domestic enterprises. RJR , 579 U.S. at 342 (quoting Morrison, 561 U.S., at 267, n. 9). But RICO, like the Lanham Act, applies extraterritorially and, therefore, the \"focus\" was not relevant under the 17 Morrison framework.",
		"citation_value_orig": "417 F.3d 107",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Lanham Act's Extraterritoriality Does Not Depend on a Defendant's U.S. Citizenship",
		"context": "It was not crit- ical to the merits. See, e.g., Steele, 344 U.S. at 286 (\"With respect to [an extraterritorial] exercise of au-thority [on a citizen] there is no question of interna- tional law, but solely of the purport of the municipal law which establishes the duty of the citizen in rela-tion to his own government.\") (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Moreover, the Court focused on how Steele's con- duct affected U.S. commerce, not just Steele's U.S. cit- izenship: In the light of the broad jurisdictional grant in the Lanham Act, we deem its scope to en- compass petitioner's activities here. His oper-ations and their effects were not confined within the territorial limits of a foreign na-tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Lanham Act's Extraterritoriality Does Not Depend on a Defendant's U.S. Citizenship",
		"context": "See, e.g., Vacuum Oil Co 154 F. 867 , aff'd,162 F. 671; 156 N.Y.S. 1103 (Sup. Ct.) , aff'd,158 N.Y.S. 1123. Moreover, in distinguishing American Banana [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , where a U.S. defendant was found not liable under the Sher- man Act based on acts committed ab road, Steele rein- forced its focus on conduct not citizenship: \"[u]nlawful effects in this country, absent in the posture of [ Amer- ican Banana], are often decisive.\" Steele, 344 U.S. 256-57. 7 Accordingly, RJR and Steele control, regardless of the defendant 's citizenship.",
		"citation_value_orig": "213 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Lanham Act's Extraterritoriality Does Not Depend on a Defendant's U.S. Citizenship",
		"context": "Ct.) , aff'd,158 N.Y.S. 1123. Moreover, in distinguishing American Banana 213 U.S. 347 , where a U.S. defendant was found not liable under the Sher- man Act based on acts committed ab road, Steele rein- forced its focus on conduct not citizenship: \"[u]nlawful effects in this country, absent in the posture of [ Amer- ican Banana], are often decisive.\" Steele, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]-57. 7 Accordingly, RJR and Steele control, regardless of the defendant 's citizenship.",
		"citation_value_orig": "344 U.S. 256",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Harmful Consequences of Petitioners' Theory Threaten All Aspects of Federal Elections",
		"context": "art. VII, § 4—an important safeguard against voter intimidation and vote-buying schemes. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Under the ISLT, if the majority party in such a State believed that it could benefit from discov- ering and publicizing how individual citizens voted, the legislature could revoke the secret ballot. As these examples illustrate, the ISLT would ena- ble legis latures to revoke voters' well-established state constitutional rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Has Long Provided Critical Protection for Religious Minorities",
		"context": "See Wajahat Ali et al., Center for American Progress, Fear, Inc. The Roots of the Islamaphobia Network in America 38 (August 2010), https://bit.ly/ 2CRiSe5. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], a Muslim plaintiff alleged that a proposed amendment to the Oklahoma Constitution prevent- ing Oklahoma state courts from \"considering or us- ing\" shar'iah law in state court violated his First Amendment rights. The Court held that the amendment amounted to condemnation of the plain- tiff's Islamic faith, recognizing that \"[t]he harm al- leged by Mr. Awad stems from a constitutional di- rective of exclusion and disfavored treatment of a particular religious . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "670 F.3d 1111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Has Long Provided Critical Protection for Religious Minorities",
		"context": "The spike in hate crimes, and the government speech that inspires it, reinforces concerns over adopting the coercion test advocated by Petitioners and various amici. Under such a test, the govern- ment could freely associate with one religion, with out officially \"establishing\" the religion, and effectiv ely \"identify nonadherents as outsiders,\" ultimately \"e n- croach[ing] upon the individual's decision about whether and how to worship.\" McCreary [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For instance, adherence to a government-supported faith could in- crease an individual's social or political status. See Cty.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 844",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Establishment Clause Has Long Provided Critical Protection for Religious Minorities",
		"context": "For instance, adherence to a government-supported faith could in- crease an individual's social or political status. See Cty. of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. By contras t, religious minority communities would suffer further loss in influence. See id (\"Endorsement sends a mes- sage to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not f ull members of the political community, and an accom- panying message to adherents that they are insiders , favored members of the political community.\").",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 U.S. 573",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Perez's policy arguments fail.",
		"context": "But lost -income damages likely aren't available under the Cummings Spending Clause inquiry , either . Sec- tion 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (and Title II of the ADA , by extension ) does not expressly provide for lost - income damages , and lost -income damages are not traditionally available because students cannot bring \"a breach of contract claim attacking the general qual- ity of an education.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And Cummings 30 aside, even if lost -income damages are available , they depend on the quality of the education and any FAPE alread y—or still to be—provided . Given all this, the Court should be particularly cautious to adopt the cir- cumvention rule Perez seeks.",
		"citation_value_orig": "957 F.2d 410",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "1. It is well- established that the federal government's eminent -domain power is \" essential \" and \"inseparable from sovereignty\" and cannot depend on \" the will of a state.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . New Jersey thus does not dispute that \"the Federal Government has power to condemn land within the States ,\" including state - owned land. NJ.Br.18.",
		"citation_value_orig": "91 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "§ 48:3-17.6. It is little surprise, then, when this Court squarely held that \"[t]he fact that land is owned by a state is no barrier to its condemnation by the United States, \" Okla homa ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , both this Court and Oklahoma focused entirely on the indignity of the taking itself , not the indignity of the lawsuit. T his Cour t ruled when the federal government acts within its legitimate realm, it possesses an unfettered eminent -domain authority and is not distinctly hamstrung in exercising that power vis -à-vis state property. See i d. (\"'Whenever the constitutional powers of the federal government and those of the state come into conflict, the latter must yield.",
		"citation_value_orig": "313 U.S. 508",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "The state's distinct interest in parcels in which they also possess a property interest certainly entitles them to just comp ensation , but that pecuniary interest in compensation is far less sovereign tha n their governmental interest in regulating all lands 9 within their borders. Indeed , the takings clause by its terms applies to \"private property,\" and state s are entitle d to the same just -compensation remedy as private -property owners when state property is taken, but no remedy when sovereign regulatory authority is displaced. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Block v. N orth Dakota ex rel. Bd. Of Univ.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 24",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "Of Univ. & Sch . Lands , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Thus, a sovereign imm unity that kicks in only when the federal government's designee initiates process to effect uate a FERC- authorized taking and provide just compensation for the state's \" private property\" would be a strange beast indeed. Not surprisingly, New Jersey's effort to bifurcate the power to take property and the power to bring eminent -domain proceedings is inconsistent with bedrock principles of sovereign immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "461 U.S. 273",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "NJ.Br.19 . Yet it is \" hornbook law \" that foreign nations have \"no immunity from jurisdiction with respect to actions relating to immovable property ,\" including eminent -domain actions. Upper Skagit Indian [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . New Jersey tries to dismiss the immovable- property doctrine as \"premised\" on the private capacity in which the \" inferior\" sovereign owns t he property . NJ.Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1649",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "See Permanent Mission , 551 U.S. at 199. A sovereign that accepts the authority of a nother sovereign with superior authority over land—whether in the plan of the convention or by purchasing property with in the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign —cannot assert an immunity from suit against the superior sovereign or its delegee when it com es to that land. This Court recognized as much in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . There, consistent with long-settled sovereign -immunity principles, this Court held that Georgia had no immunity from an eminent -domain proceeding to take property it own ed in Tennessee—even though the action was initiated by Tennessee's delegee, the City of Chat tanooga . The Court did not rest its decision o n any general lack of immunity from suits in the courts of a sister sovereign.",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "A n eminent -domain action is always brought under the authority of the sovereign, because the eminent - domain power is \"an attribute of sovereignty\" that \"appertains\" only to sovereigns. Miss. & Rum River Boom [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . When the action is brought by a delegee it acts \"for this purpose … as a public agent.\" Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 562 (1868 ).",
		"citation_value_orig": "98 U.S. 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Tenn . Student Assistance [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , Californi 523 U.S. 491 ; Georgia, 264 U.S. 472 , it does not create immunities inconsistent with the p lan of the convention . 13 Respondents' effort to draw support from Vermont Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 , is unavailing .3 While New Jersey invokes Stevens' expression of \"serious doubt\" that the Eleventh Amendment would permit a qui tam relator to sue a state, that is because a qui tam action is not just about the \"governmental function [of] recovering public dollars,\" NJ.B r.22, but \"gives the relator himself \" the right to collect a bounty and continue the suit even over the United States' objection. 529 U.S. at 772 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 440",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Tenn . Student Assistance 541 U.S. 440 , Californi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Georgia, 264 U.S. 472 , it does not create immunities inconsistent with the p lan of the convention . 13 Respondents' effort to draw support from Vermont Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 , is unavailing .3 While New Jersey invokes Stevens' expression of \"serious doubt\" that the Eleventh Amendment would permit a qui tam relator to sue a state, that is because a qui tam action is not just about the \"governmental function [of] recovering public dollars,\" NJ.B r.22, but \"gives the relator himself \" the right to collect a bounty and continue the suit even over the United States' objection. 529 U.S. at 772 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 491",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Tenn . Student Assistance 541 U.S. 440 , Californi 523 U.S. 491 ; Georgia, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , it does not create immunities inconsistent with the p lan of the convention . 13 Respondents' effort to draw support from Vermont Agency of Natural 529 U.S. 765 , is unavailing .3 While New Jersey invokes Stevens' expression of \"serious doubt\" that the Eleventh Amendment would permit a qui tam relator to sue a state, that is because a qui tam action is not just about the \"governmental function [of] recovering public dollars,\" NJ.B r.22, but \"gives the relator himself \" the right to collect a bounty and continue the suit even over the United States' objection. 529 U.S. at 772 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "264 U.S. 472",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": ", Tenn . Student Assistance 541 U.S. 440 , Californi 523 U.S. 491 ; Georgia, 264 U.S. 472 , it does not create immunities inconsistent with the p lan of the convention . 13 Respondents' effort to draw support from Vermont Agency of Natural [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is unavailing .3 While New Jersey invokes Stevens' expression of \"serious doubt\" that the Eleventh Amendment would permit a qui tam relator to sue a state, that is because a qui tam action is not just about the \"governmental function [of] recovering public dollars,\" NJ.B r.22, but \"gives the relator himself \" the right to collect a bounty and continue the suit even over the United States' objection. 529 U.S. at 772 . Moreover, unlike an eminent -domain action, see infra Part I.B, a qui tam action unque stionably \"subject [s] an unwilling State to a coercive judicial process\" and \" seek[s] monetary damages .\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 765",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "NJ.Br.19. Any doubt was settled by this Court's decision in Kohl , which New Jersey disclaims any interest in having this Court reconsider. And there was no doubt at the framing or 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which dealt with whether the government may delegate its bare power to sue states, is no more helpful. Section 717(h) does not delegate a bare power to sue; it authorizes a FERC certificate hold er to effectuate the route approved in the certificate and ensure just compensation. 14 at any time since that th e eminent -domain authority can be delegated .",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 775",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "\"). Thus , once it is conceded that the federal eminent -domain authority can be exercised with in states and vis-à-vis state property (and New Jersey concedes both points), there is no basis for suggesting that it cannot be delegated in those circumstances . To the contrary, the fact that whether the federal eminent -domain power extended beyond federal enclaves was unsettled , while the delegability of whatever power existed had \"long been settled,\" Cooley , supra 536; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , underscores the incoherence of New Jersey's objection only to the latter. The former was controv ersial (but the controversy has been settled); the latter was not. New Jersey emphasizes broad statements from the framers about the inviolability of sovereign immunity.",
		"citation_value_orig": "10 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "But that just underscores that the threat to sovereignty comes from the taking and not the means of transferring title and furnishing just compensation. Thus, while the Tenth Amendment likely protects the powers that be in Trenton from federal seizure of the state -house , cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , there is no distinct Eleventh Amendment problem with an action to effectuate an otherwise valid taking and provide compensation . New Jersey claims that Cherokee 135 U.S. 641 , is irrelevant because the Cherokee Nation was not viewed as fully sovereign, NJ. Br.16, but the Court made clear that the same taking would pass muster if it were state land .",
		"citation_value_orig": "221 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. States Have No Immunity From the Federal Eminent Domain Power",
		"context": "Thus, while the Tenth Amendment likely protects the powers that be in Trenton from federal seizure of the state -house , cf. 221 U.S. 559 , there is no distinct Eleventh Amendment problem with an action to effectuate an otherwise valid taking and provide compensation . New Jersey claims that Cherokee [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , is irrelevant because the Cherokee Nation was not viewed as fully sovereign, NJ. Br.16, but the Court made clear that the same taking would pass muster if it were state land . See Cherokee, 135 U.S. at 656- 57.",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 U.S. 641",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder",
		"context": "The notice -and-comment procedure is a salutary and essential feature of modern administrative law. In mandating it, \"Congress made a judgment that notions of fairness and informed administrative decisionmaking require that agency decisions be made only after affording interested persons notice and an opportunity to comment.\" Chrysler [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The Biden Administration's strategy bypassed notice and comment completely. After the Government arranged for the Rule's vacatur by the courts, the agency rapidly arranged for its vacatur by executive fiat.",
		"citation_value_orig": "441 U.S. 281",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder",
		"context": "In addition to taking up time and energy, the notice -and- comment process also comes with exacting judicial scrutiny, even when the agency's new rule merely restores a prior status quo. See State Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Ethical rules and longstanding traditions are (apparently) no longer enough to stop this tactic. The only way to check norm -breaking actions like those at issue here is by allowing parties who would be injured by a judicial invalidation to intervene once the Government stops defending the rule.",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder",
		"context": "In other words, any intervenor seeking to appeal a judgment that the origin al parties do not challenge must establish its own actual or imminent injury, traceable to the judgment below, 40 and redressable by a favorable appellate decision. Food Mktg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That requirement ensures only those parties with \"a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy\" will be able to continue a lawsuit, while the vast majority of interested onlookers will not. 477 U.S. 131 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Denying intervention in these circumstances would sow disorder",
		"context": "139 S. Ct. 2356 . That requirement ensures only those parties with \"a sufficient stake in the outcome of the controversy\" will be able to continue a lawsuit, while the vast majority of interested onlookers will not. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Article III's real limitations have and will continue to prevent improper parties from abusing intervention. In fact, it is the Government's position that would engend er a flood of intervention motions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "477 U.S. 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT",
		"context": "The ESA does not define \"habitat\" or \"essent ial.\" Absent a definition, the C ourt must read these words consistent with their plain meaning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of congress.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "348 F.3d 1263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT",
		"context": "\"In the interpretation of statutes, the function of the courts is easily stated. It is to construe the language so as to give effect to the intent of congress.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text. See Hughes Aircraft 525 U.S. 432 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 534",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT",
		"context": "310 U.S. 534 . The starting point in discerning congressional intent is the existing statutory text. See Hughes Aircraft [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This Court assumes the ordinary meaning of language employed by Congress accurately expresses its legislative purpose. See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT",
		"context": "See Hughes Aircraft 525 U.S. 432 . This Court assumes the ordinary meaning of language employed by Congress accurately expresses its legislative purpose. See Park 'N Fly, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Where the words are clear, they are controlling. See L 540 U.S. 526; Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "469 U.S. 189",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE SERVICE VIOLATED THE TEXT AND INTENT OF THE ESA BY DESIGNATING UNIT 1 CRITICAL HABITAT",
		"context": "See Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. 189 . Where the words are clear, they are controlling. See L [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Am. Truckin g Ass'ns , 310 U.S . at 543 (\"There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose of a statute than the words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes .",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 526",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
		"context": "Indeed, judic ial review of respond- ents' constitutional challenge becomes particularly important. By placing the immigration power in the hands of a \"deliberate and deliberative\" body, Chadha , 462 U.S. at 959, the Framers introduced structural \"safeguard[s] [for] individual liberty.\" NLRB v.Noel Canning , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. If the Presid ent may set immigration policy free of any meaningful limits imposed by Congress, then this Court becomes the primary protector of the liberties set out in the Bill of Rights. The Government argues the opposite.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 2550",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
		"context": "That is not the law. \"[N]ati onal-security concerns\" are not \"a talisman used to ward off inconvenient claims—a 'label' used to ' cover a multitude of sins.'\" Ziglar v.Abbasi , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Mandel andDindo not suggest otherwise. First , this Court has never suggested that Mandel andDin supply the applicable f ramework for analyz- ing a constitutional challenge to a sweeping Execu- tive policy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1843",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
		"context": "(emphasis added). When Congress exercises that power, it is subject to the structural safeguards afforded by b icameralism and present- ment, which substantially ameliorate the threat to individual liberty posed by its \"plenary power\" over immigration. See Chadha , 462 U.S. at 957-958; see[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But the President is subject to n o such safeguards when he makes immigration policy, leaving judicial review as the only remaining check. If this Court afforded the President the massive defe rence he requests, that safeguard too would fall and the immigration power would be subject to the \"fi nal arbitrary action of one 64 person.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 700",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
		"context": "Rather, those cases concerned asser- tions that the Executive had offered an inadequate explanation for an exclus ion that burdened a consti- tutional right. In Mandel , the challengers argued that the Executive's rationa le for excluding a profes- sor was too flimsy in light of the burden it placed on the First Amendment rights of those who wished to hear the professor speak. 408 U.S. at 760.20And in Din, the Court considered whether the Executive was required to provide a more robust explanation 19Sessions v.Morales-Santana , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], is inapposite. In that case, the Court explained that it typicallyapplies \"minimal scrutiny (rational-basis review)\" in reviewing constitutional challenges to immigration statutes ,a sac o n s e - quence of \" Congress' 'exceptionally broad power' to admit or exclude aliens.\" Id.at 1693 (emphasis added) (quoting Fiallo , 430 U.S. at 792, 794).",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1678",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Judicial Branch Must Enforce The Constitution",
		"context": "Respondents' challenge is premised on the assertion that a reasonable observer would neces- sarily view the President as pursuing a different, unconstitutional purpo se to exclude Muslims. This Court has made crystal clear that in that form of First Amendment challenge, \"[f]acial neutrality is not determinative.\" Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.City of Hialeah, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And because neither Mandel nor Din involved a credible claim of an unconstitutional purpose, they do not displace that precedent. Third ,e v e ni f Mandel andDin did supply the ap- plicable framework, they woul d not require deference in this case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
		"context": "But that mis- understands the nature and purpose of the findings. Congress frequently adopts statutory findings \"to support and justi fy the action taken as a constitu- tional exertion of the legislative power.\" United State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Often, as here, it uses them to memorialize its judg-ment that a statute is within the scope of its Com- merce Clause powers because the statute regulates activity that \"substantially affect[s] interstate com- merce.\" 529 U.S. 598.",
		"citation_value_orig": "304 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
		"context": "United State 304 U.S. 144. Often, as here, it uses them to memorialize its judg-ment that a statute is within the scope of its Com- merce Clause powers because the statute regulates activity that \"substantially affect[s] interstate com- merce.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This type of finding \"does not govern, and is not particularly relevant to, the different question of severability.\" 648 F.3d 1235, aff'd567 U.S. 519.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
		"context": "529 U.S. 598. This type of finding \"does not govern, and is not particularly relevant to, the different question of severability.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], aff'd567 U.S. 519. And whatever these findings tell us about the intent of the Congress that adopted them in 2010—before the ACA took effect and thus before it began 42 \"creating effective health insurance markets,\" 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) —they tell us nothing about what a different Congress intended when it reduced the al- ternative tax to zero seven y ears later.",
		"citation_value_orig": "648 F.3d 1235",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The district court's severability analysis is wrong in every respect",
		"context": "529 U.S. 598. This type of finding \"does not govern, and is not particularly relevant to, the different question of severability.\" 648 F.3d 1235, aff'd[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And whatever these findings tell us about the intent of the Congress that adopted them in 2010—before the ACA took effect and thus before it began 42 \"creating effective health insurance markets,\" 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I) —they tell us nothing about what a different Congress intended when it reduced the al- ternative tax to zero seven y ears later.",
		"citation_value_orig": "567 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because religious freedom is the first and foremost right of the Bill of Rights, infringements upon free exercise of religion should be accorded \"strict scrutiny.\"",
		"context": "Religious liberty is the first of all human rights because rights them selves are the gift of God , and because religious liberty involves matters eternal rather than merely matters temporal . The foundational document of the American nation, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the \"laws of nature and of nature's God\" and says the rights of human beings are \"unalienable\" because they are \"endowed by their Creator.\" Justice Douglas wrote in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that \"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,\" and in 366 U.S. 420 he wrote in dissent, The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression were not given to us by the government through the 4 First Amendment; they are, as the Declaration of Indepen dence says, \"endowed by [the] Creator.\" Government through the Constitution only \"secures\" the rights that God has already granted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 306",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. Because religious freedom is the first and foremost right of the Bill of Rights, infringements upon free exercise of religion should be accorded \"strict scrutiny.\"",
		"context": "Religious liberty is the first of all human rights because rights them selves are the gift of God , and because religious liberty involves matters eternal rather than merely matters temporal . The foundational document of the American nation, the Declaration of Independence, recognizes the \"laws of nature and of nature's God\" and says the rights of human beings are \"unalienable\" because they are \"endowed by their Creator.\" Justice Douglas wrote in 343 U.S. 306 that \"We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,\" and in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] he wrote in dissent, The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State; that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter; that the individual possesses rights, conferred by the Creator, which government must respect. Freedom of religion and freedom of expression were not given to us by the government through the 4 First Amendment; they are, as the Declaration of Indepen dence says, \"endowed by [the] Creator.\" Government through the Constitution only \"secures\" the rights that God has already granted.",
		"citation_value_orig": "366 U.S. 420",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Delaware is free to achieve politically balanced courts by constitutional rule.",
		"context": "And outside of the separation-of-powers context, constitu- tional rights generally run against legislative (or con- stitutional) and executive state action to the same ex- tent. \"If the action of the [executive] is official action it is subject to constitutional infirmity to the same but no greater extent than if the action were taken by the state legislature.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This is especially clear of constitutional claims against States, which may not \" make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.\" U.S. Const.",
		"citation_value_orig": "321 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "................... 8 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .................................................. 8, 13 210 F.2d 375 .............................................................. 7 Bolivarian Republic of Vene 137 S. Ct. 1312 ............................................... 5 Hartford Fire Ins. 509 U.S. 764 ............................................................ 11 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "................... 8 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES 692 F.3d 661 .................................................. 8, 13 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............................................................. 7 Bolivarian Republic of Vene 137 S. Ct. 1312 ............................................... 5 Hartford Fire Ins. 509 U.S. 764 ............................................................ 11 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.",
		"citation_value_orig": "210 F.2d 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "................... 8 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES 692 F.3d 661 .................................................. 8, 13 210 F.2d 375 .............................................................. 7 Bolivarian Republic of Vene [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................... 5 Hartford Fire Ins. 509 U.S. 764 ............................................................ 11 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "................... 8 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page CASES 692 F.3d 661 .................................................. 8, 13 210 F.2d 375 .............................................................. 7 Bolivarian Republic of Vene 137 S. Ct. 1312 ............................................... 5 Hartford Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................ 11 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "It. : Greece Intervening) , Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 3) .................................................... 5 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........ 9 Republic of 573 U.S. 134 .............................................. 10 Sachs (judgment dated 16 March 2012, file no. V ZR 279/10) (Fed'l Ct. of Justice) ....................... 12 STATUTES 28 U.S.C. § 1605 ....................................................... 2 28 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "§ 1605. This exception to immunity has always been an outlier in customary international law: As this Court has previously recognized, no other na- tion's sovereign immunity law recognizes a similar ex- ception. Bolivarian Republic of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Consistent with its plain language, which focuses on the law of expropriation, courts have long interpreted the exception to apply only to alleged violations of the established international law of tak- ings. That meant the exception did not apply to a state's alleged taking of it s own nationals' property, be- cause such \"domestic takings\" are the concern of do- mestic, not international, law.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1312",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "9-11, but ignore the international law of takings that is the very object of the expropriation exception. See Pet. 18, 21-22; see also Helmerich , 137 S. Ct. at 1320-21 (noting that the expropriation excep- tion \"on its face emphasizes conformity with interna- tional law\"); F. Hoffmann-La Roche [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Plaintiffs make no effort to explain how the D.C. Circuit's interpretation of the expropria-tion exception can be squared with the other provisions of the FSIA or with other statutes using language nearly identical to the ex propriation exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "542 U.S. 155",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "The military law applied only in the part of occupied Germany administered by the U.S. 7 (per its Art. 95); the occupation ended decades before the FSIA was enacted. The press release was filed in connection with a case against a private defendant, not a foreign sovereign, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and was released decades before the FSIA. Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the question pre- sented is an \"attack [on] the FSIA itself.\" Opp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "210 F.2d 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "In any event, the argument lacks merit. As Plaintiffs themselves recognize, the only federal appeals court to actually decide this question squarely rejected Plain- tiffs' argument . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And even if the Plaintiffs' ancestors' citizenship under German domestic law were somehow relevant, the tak- ing alleged here occurred be fore passage of the Nurem- berg laws, which denied German citizenship to Jews. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "692 F.3d 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "The split remains and is stark. Plaintiffs assert it \"is resolving,\" Opp. 28, but cite only a single case, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which involves neither the expropriation exception nor the common-law doctrine of comity abstention. 2 They also maintain that the decision did not \"set forth a 'new na- tional rule',\" Opp. 29, though they do not deny that the venue statute always allows suit in D.C. for claims against foreign states.",
		"citation_value_orig": "926 F.3d 21",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. This Court should resolve the acknowledged circuit split over whether courts may abstain, based on international comity, from adjudicating cases under the FSIA expropriation exception",
		"context": "Comity abstention includes ex-haustion, but is not limited to it. See Hartford Fire Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 12 The opposing German-law experts presented to the district court agreed that the post-war-era restitution statutes specific to the Nazi era had expired. See App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 764",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate",
		"context": "Petitioner asks th is Court to make it easier for the politically well- connected to sue for libel, but this risks replacing the current apolitical actual malice standard with a heavily politicized new rule that favors elite operators like Petitioner. This danger is underscor ed by a recent (and solitary) dissenting opinion by a Court of Appeals judge, who argues that the actual malice standard should be abolished to diminish the power of the press to report misconduct . 991 F.3d 231[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]310 F.3d 1118874 F.2d 124494 N.Y.S.3d 75339 F. Supp. 3d 915. 24 claims brought by public figures accused of corruption related to the sale of state- owned resources . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "669 F.3d 50",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate",
		"context": "Petitioner asks th is Court to make it easier for the politically well- connected to sue for libel, but this risks replacing the current apolitical actual malice standard with a heavily politicized new rule that favors elite operators like Petitioner. This danger is underscor ed by a recent (and solitary) dissenting opinion by a Court of Appeals judge, who argues that the actual malice standard should be abolished to diminish the power of the press to report misconduct . 991 F.3d 231669 F.3d 50[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]874 F.2d 124494 N.Y.S.3d 75339 F. Supp. 3d 915. 24 claims brought by public figures accused of corruption related to the sale of state- owned resources . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 F.3d 1118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Weakening the Actual Malice Standard Will Chill Political Debate",
		"context": "Petitioner asks th is Court to make it easier for the politically well- connected to sue for libel, but this risks replacing the current apolitical actual malice standard with a heavily politicized new rule that favors elite operators like Petitioner. This danger is underscor ed by a recent (and solitary) dissenting opinion by a Court of Appeals judge, who argues that the actual malice standard should be abolished to diminish the power of the press to report misconduct . 991 F.3d 231669 F.3d 50310 F.3d 1118[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]94 N.Y.S.3d 75339 F. Supp. 3d 915. 24 claims brought by public figures accused of corruption related to the sale of state- owned resources . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "874 F.2d 1244",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "The legal system presumes \" that jurors, conscious of the gravity of their task, attend closely the particu- lar language of the trial court 's instructions in a crimi- nal case and strive to understand, make sense of, and follow the instructions given t hem.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is the rare trial , civil or criminal, that does not involve some evidence that is admissible only against a partic- ular party, or only for a particular purpose, and not 15 others. Accordingly, when a jury of laypersons is the finder of fact, the court \" restrict [s] the evidence to its proper scope and instruct [s] the jury accordingly. \"",
		"citation_value_orig": "507 U.S. 725",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "Without a strong presumption that such instructions are effective, jury trials could not function. This Court has adhered to th at presumption in a wide variety of contexts, including when constitutional rights are implicated. The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will follow instructions to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to testify, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; to consider an un warned confession for im- peachment purposes only, 401 U.S. 222 ; to disregard inadmissible eyewitness evidence, 449 U.S. 341; to consider a defendant's prior convic- tion only for purposes of sentencing and not guilt, 459 U.S. 422 ; and to consider death -penalty -related evidence against only one defendant and not another , 577 U.S. 108 . As those exa mples illustrate , even in \"sensitive\" and \"life -and-death matters,\" \"juries are presumed to fol- low the court's instructions.\" CSX Transp., 556 U.S. 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 333",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "Without a strong presumption that such instructions are effective, jury trials could not function. This Court has adhered to th at presumption in a wide variety of contexts, including when constitutional rights are implicated. The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will follow instructions to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to testify, 435 U.S. 333 ; to consider an un warned confession for im- peachment purposes only, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; to disregard inadmissible eyewitness evidence, 449 U.S. 341; to consider a defendant's prior convic- tion only for purposes of sentencing and not guilt, 459 U.S. 422 ; and to consider death -penalty -related evidence against only one defendant and not another , 577 U.S. 108 . As those exa mples illustrate , even in \"sensitive\" and \"life -and-death matters,\" \"juries are presumed to fol- low the court's instructions.\" CSX Transp., 556 U.S. 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "Without a strong presumption that such instructions are effective, jury trials could not function. This Court has adhered to th at presumption in a wide variety of contexts, including when constitutional rights are implicated. The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will follow instructions to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to testify, 435 U.S. 333 ; to consider an un warned confession for im- peachment purposes only, 401 U.S. 222 ; to disregard inadmissible eyewitness evidence, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; to consider a defendant's prior convic- tion only for purposes of sentencing and not guilt, 459 U.S. 422 ; and to consider death -penalty -related evidence against only one defendant and not another , 577 U.S. 108 . As those exa mples illustrate , even in \"sensitive\" and \"life -and-death matters,\" \"juries are presumed to fol- low the court's instructions.\" CSX Transp., 556 U.S. 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "449 U.S. 341",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "Without a strong presumption that such instructions are effective, jury trials could not function. This Court has adhered to th at presumption in a wide variety of contexts, including when constitutional rights are implicated. The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will follow instructions to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to testify, 435 U.S. 333 ; to consider an un warned confession for im- peachment purposes only, 401 U.S. 222 ; to disregard inadmissible eyewitness evidence, 449 U.S. 341; to consider a defendant's prior convic- tion only for purposes of sentencing and not guilt, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; and to consider death -penalty -related evidence against only one defendant and not another , 577 U.S. 108 . As those exa mples illustrate , even in \"sensitive\" and \"life -and-death matters,\" \"juries are presumed to fol- low the court's instructions.\" CSX Transp., 556 U.S. 838.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "The Court has presumed, for example, that jurors will follow instructions to not draw an adverse inference from a defendant's decision not to testify, 435 U.S. 333 ; to consider an un warned confession for im- peachment purposes only, 401 U.S. 222 ; to disregard inadmissible eyewitness evidence, 449 U.S. 341; to consider a defendant's prior convic- tion only for purposes of sentencing and not guilt, 459 U.S. 422 ; and to consider death -penalty -related evidence against only one defendant and not another , 577 U.S. 108 . As those exa mples illustrate , even in \"sensitive\" and \"life -and-death matters,\" \"juries are presumed to fol- low the court's instructions.\" CSX Transp., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And doubts about the ju ry's ability to do so 16 lack robust \"empirical support .\" 21A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5066 & nn.135 -138 (2d ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "556 U.S. 838",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. The presumption that jurors follow their instructions is a core tenet of our legal system",
		"context": "Richardson , 481 U.S. at 211. Disre- garding the presumption , or creating unnecessary ex- ceptions to it, \"would make inroads into th [e] entire complex code of state criminal evidentiary law \" as well as federal evidentiary law , \"and would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see Pennsylvania Co., 102 U.S. at 459 (observing that a contrary rule \" would of- ten seriously obstruct the course of business in the courts \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "385 U.S. 554",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1231(a)(6) is Ambiguous as to the Procedure Required, and the Courts Below Properly Construed It to Require Bond Hearings",
		"context": "See Guerrero -Sanchez , 905 F.3d at 221 (\"While Zadvydas limited the substantive scope of § 1231(a)(6),\" it left open \"construing § 1231(a)(6) to include additional procedural protections during the statutorily authorized detention period,\" to avoid constitutional concerns). For over a century, the federal courts have likewise construed immigration statutes to include additional procedures to avoid due process problems. See Wong Yang [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; release on bond pursuant to those custody reviews; and a hearing before an IJ for indiv iduals deemed \"specially 32 dangerous.\" 8 C.F.R. 241.4, 241.5(b), 241.5, 241.13, 241.14(a)(2), (f- k).",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 U.S. 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Appellants Have Identified First Amendment Harms Caused By Maryland's 2011 Congressional Redistricting",
		"context": "to band together in pro- moting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political views .\" Cal. Democratic [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The entire process , from start to finish , was animated by improper partisan discrimination , in violation of the First Amendment . The map -makers in charge of Maryland's 2011 con- gressional redistricting candidly admitted that an overriding goal of the map -drawing exercise was to maximize Maryland Democrats' representation in the U.S. House of Representatives.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 567",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. Appellants Have Identified First Amendment Harms Caused By Maryland's 2011 Congressional Redistricting",
		"context": "41a –42a. The goal of such \"cracking\" is always to dilute the voting stren gth of the members of the disfavored political party as com- pared to the voting strength of members of the gerry- mandering party . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . That is exactly what happened here —since 2011, Mar- yland Republican s have elected one fewer Republican to Congress, and Maryland Democrats have elected an additional Democrat to Congress . JA656, 666; Appel- lants J.S.",
		"citation_value_orig": "541 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Neither Northwest Austin nor Shelby County Extended Boerne to the Fifteenth Amendment.",
		"context": "Furthermore, Shelby 10 That is especially true in cases involving congressional —rather than state legislative or municipal —redistricting. Under the Elections Clause, Congress has broad authority to preempt state laws over such matters. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Franita Tolson, The Spec- trum of Congressional Authority Over Elections , 99 B.U. L. Rev. 317, 367 -68 (2019).",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Mandatory Resentencing Rule Would Contradict Language From Prior Cases And Undermine The Interests Of Justice",
		"context": "To announce a per se rule requiring trial-level re- sentencing for all Eddings errors would require the Court to disavow its prior suggestion that appellate correction in the Eddings context was appropriate. In Hitchcock v. Dugger , the Court cited the availabil- ity of harmless-error review for an Eddings violation. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (sentence adjudged invalid only after Court noted that \"Respondent has made no attempt to argue that [the Eddings ] error was harm- less\"; \"[i]n the absence of such a showing, our cases hold that the exclusion of mitigating evidence of the sort at issue here renders the death sentence inva- lid\"). And the Court has similarly acknowledged the importance of other types of appellate harmlessness review in related contexts. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 393",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Mandatory Resentencing Rule Would Contradict Language From Prior Cases And Undermine The Interests Of Justice",
		"context": "And the Court has similarly acknowledged the importance of other types of appellate harmlessness review in related contexts. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 141–147 ( 1998) (court of appeals erred by failing to apply Brecht to claim that jury instruction may have misled jurors into believ-ing they could not consider certain mitigation). 31 Moreover such a per se rule would constitute a categorical deviation from Clemons . See494 U.S. 748–749.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 141",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Mandatory Resentencing Rule Would Contradict Language From Prior Cases And Undermine The Interests Of Justice",
		"context": ", 525 U.S. 141, 141–147 ( 1998) (court of appeals erred by failing to apply Brecht to claim that jury instruction may have misled jurors into believ-ing they could not consider certain mitigation). 31 Moreover such a per se rule would constitute a categorical deviation from Clemons . See[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]–749. Automatic trial-court resentencing would also fail to acknowledge the damage to the interests of justice that comes with sending a category of long-ago-final convictions back for resentencing no matter the possibility of remedying any constitutional error through a process short of full trial-court proceed- ings. Not only is unnecessary trial-level resentenc- ing a waste of valuable resources that could be better used providing timely due process for other defend- ants and victims, but, as Justice Harlan well- explained in a related context, forcing states \"to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of witnesse s whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed\" is a poor way to do justice; \"This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "494 U.S. 748",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A Mandatory Resentencing Rule Would Contradict Language From Prior Cases And Undermine The Interests Of Justice",
		"context": "Automatic trial-court resentencing would also fail to acknowledge the damage to the interests of justice that comes with sending a category of long-ago-final convictions back for resentencing no matter the possibility of remedying any constitutional error through a process short of full trial-court proceed- ings. Not only is unnecessary trial-level resentenc- ing a waste of valuable resources that could be better used providing timely due process for other defend- ants and victims, but, as Justice Harlan well- explained in a related context, forcing states \"to relitigate facts buried in the remote past through presentation of witnesse s whose memories of the relevant events often have dimmed\" is a poor way to do justice; \"This very act of trying stale facts may well, ironically, produce a second trial no more reliable as a matter of getting at the truth than the first.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "401 U.S. 667",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "s TanDaRD OF REVIEW The matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. \"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 119 S. Ct. 1661. III. analYsIs a. a ll Claims Regarding Grievance One are Untimely Under the Foreign Service Act (\"FSA\") , 22 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "355 U.S. 41",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "s TanDaRD OF REVIEW The matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. \"[A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.\" 355 U.S. 41; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. III. analYsIs a. a ll Claims Regarding Grievance One are Untimely Under the Foreign Service Act (\"FSA\") , 22 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "119 S. Ct. 1661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are therefore untimely. Plaintiff argues that his grievance does not allege gender discrimination, but rather, sexual-orientation discrimination, which is not protected under Title VII. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2d Cir.2000); 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.1999); 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.1989). Plaintiff therefore asserts that he had 180, not 90 days, within which to file this action. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's grievance is based on a theory of gender discrimination, 5 not sexual orientation discrimination, and is therefore subject to a 90 day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII type claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "232 F.3d 33",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are therefore untimely. Plaintiff argues that his grievance does not allege gender discrimination, but rather, sexual-orientation discrimination, which is not protected under Title VII. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.2000); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (1st Cir.1999); 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir.1989). Plaintiff therefore asserts that he had 180, not 90 days, within which to file this action. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's grievance is based on a theory of gender discrimination, 5 not sexual orientation discrimination, and is therefore subject to a 90 day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII type claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "194 F.3d 252",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims are therefore untimely. Plaintiff argues that his grievance does not allege gender discrimination, but rather, sexual-orientation discrimination, which is not protected under Title VII. 232 F.3d 33 (2d Cir.2000); 194 F.3d 252 (1st Cir.1999); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (8th Cir.1989). Plaintiff therefore asserts that he had 180, not 90 days, within which to file this action. For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's grievance is based on a theory of gender discrimination, 5 not sexual orientation discrimination, and is therefore subject to a 90 day statute of limitations applicable to Title VII type claims.",
		"citation_value_orig": "876 F.2d 69",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "First, when CPB ranked Plaintiff below other candidates based in part on his comment, it did not know Plaintiff's sexual orientation, and therefore could not 5. It should be noted that \"sex\" and \"gender\" are not distinct concepts for Title VII purposes. See Price [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] imputed stereotypically male personality traits to him, i.e. , assumed that he had chauvinistic attitudes about women because he is a man; and then (2) made an employment decision based on its stereotyping, i.e., chose to rank him below other candidates for promotion. Claims challenging gender stereotyping in employment decisions are exactly the sort of claims contemplated by Title VII.",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 228",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": ", assumed that he had chauvinistic attitudes about women because he is a man; and then (2) made an employment decision based on its stereotyping, i.e., chose to rank him below other candidates for promotion. Claims challenging gender stereotyping in employment decisions are exactly the sort of claims contemplated by Title VII. Price Waterhouse supra ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Therefore, an employer that makes employment decisions based on assumptions about typical or atypical, male or female behavior is engaging in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. 204 F.3d 1187 Plaintiff's grievance is similar to these stereotyping cases, as Plaintiff is alleging that CPB unfairly stereotyped him by assuming he was expressing stereotypical male attitudes about women.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 P.3d 864",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "E. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Affirmed the Lower Court's Decision",
		"context": "Price Waterhouse supra ; 256 P.3d 864. Therefore, an employer that makes employment decisions based on assumptions about typical or atypical, male or female behavior is engaging in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] Plaintiff's grievance is similar to these stereotyping cases, as Plaintiff is alleging that CPB unfairly stereotyped him by assuming he was expressing stereotypical male attitudes about women. Appendix B11a Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's grievance is based on a theory of gender discrimination, not sexual orientation discrimination, and that consequently, a 90 day statute of limitations period for filing judicial actions applies. Given that Plaintiff filed this action 176 days after final agency action, his complaint with respect to his first grievance is untimely.",
		"citation_value_orig": "204 F.3d 1187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Allowing review of Appeals Council dismissals will cause only a slight increase in federal court filings",
		"context": "§ 404.621(a)(1). 40 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); HALLEX I-2-4-40(J); accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 899 F.2d 1127; 820 F.2d 1391; 472 Fed. Appx. 488; 833 F.3d 896. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "957 F.2d 1384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Allowing review of Appeals Council dismissals will cause only a slight increase in federal court filings",
		"context": "§ 404.621(a)(1). 40 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); HALLEX I-2-4-40(J); accord 957 F.2d 1384; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 820 F.2d 1391; 472 Fed. Appx. 488; 833 F.3d 896. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "899 F.2d 1127",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Allowing review of Appeals Council dismissals will cause only a slight increase in federal court filings",
		"context": "§ 404.621(a)(1). 40 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); HALLEX I-2-4-40(J); accord 957 F.2d 1384; 899 F.2d 1127; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 472 Fed. Appx. 488; 833 F.3d 896. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "820 F.2d 1391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Allowing review of Appeals Council dismissals will cause only a slight increase in federal court filings",
		"context": "§ 404.621(a)(1). 40 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1); HALLEX I-2-4-40(J); accord 957 F.2d 1384; 899 F.2d 1127; 820 F.2d 1391; 472 Fed. Appx. 488; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 30",
		"citation_value_orig": "833 F.3d 896",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "By treating the Lanham Act as applicable to for- eign sales that created n o likelihood of consumer confu- sion within the United States, the court of appeals' de- cision could undermine this system of international trademark protection . 2. The decision below also conflicts with the Fourth Circuit's decision in Tire Engineering & Dis tribution, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In Tire Engineering , the Fourth Circuit rejected a Lanham Act claim that relied on a diversion -of-sales theory, concl uding that \" harm to a U.S. company 's income from foreign infringement \" did not support the application of the Lanham Act where the defendant that used the mark was a foreign com- pany. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "682 F.3d 292",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1562",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir.",
		"citation_value_orig": "607 F.3d 647",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "................................ ................................ ................. 6 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases: 523 U.S. 614 ...................... 3 570 U.S. 254 ................ 10 Esquivel 137 S. Ct. 1562 ................................ ........ 9 136 S. Ct. 2243 ...................... 4 136 S. Ct. 1850 ........................ 10 607 F.3d 647 (10th Cir. ), cert. denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 392 ................................................................................ 9 481 U.S. 828 .... 4, 5 II Cases —Continued: Page 634 Fed. Appx. 606 ...................................................................... 10 861 F.3d 1010 ............................................................................. 7, 8, 10 359 F.3d 1088 .................................................................. 8, 11 406 Fed. Appx. 177 ........................................................................ 9 946 F.3d 548 ........................................................................ 9 799 F.3d 117, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 F.3d 90",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 392 ................................................................................ 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] .... 4, 5 II Cases —Continued: Page 634 Fed. Appx. 606 ...................................................................... 10 861 F.3d 1010 ............................................................................. 7, 8, 10 359 F.3d 1088 .................................................................. 8, 11 406 Fed. Appx. 177 ........................................................................ 9 946 F.3d 548 ........................................................................ 9 799 F.3d 117, cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 1236 .............................................................................. 11 Statutes: Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. 3601 note ......................................................................................... 2 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 392 ................................................................................ 9 481 U.S. 828 .... 4, 5 II Cases —Continued: Page 634 Fed. Appx. 606 ...................................................................... 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ............................................................................. 7, 8, 10 359 F.3d 1088 .................................................................. 8, 11 406 Fed. Appx. 177 ........................................................................ 9 946 F.3d 548 ........................................................................ 9 799 F.3d 117, cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 1236 .............................................................................. 11 Statutes: Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. 3601 note ......................................................................................... 2 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 1010",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "denied,562 U.S. 944 ..................... 4 769 F.3d 626 .................................................................. 7, 10 238 Fed. Appx. 278 ................................................................. 9 825 F.3d 819 ............................................................... 11 445 F.3d 90 .............. 5 642 Fed. Appx. 737 .................................................... 10 932 F.3d 1198 (9th Cir. ), cert. denied,140 S. Ct. 392 ................................................................................ 9 481 U.S. 828 .... 4, 5 II Cases —Continued: Page 634 Fed. Appx. 606 ...................................................................... 10 861 F.3d 1010 ............................................................................. 7, 8, 10 359 F.3d 1088 .................................................................. 8, 11 406 Fed. Appx. 177 ........................................................................ 9 946 F.3d 548 ........................................................................ 9 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,136 S. Ct. 1236 .............................................................................. 11 Statutes: Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 18 U.S.C. 3601 note ......................................................................................... 2 8 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "799 F.3d 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See Pet. 11. This Court's decision i n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], does not support respondent's contention (Br. in Opp. 22 -24) that administrative review should be con- sidered to have been \"unavailable\" whenever a defend- ant claims that an immigration judge misclassified his prior o ffense .",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1850",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "And the immigration judge's dec ision did not suggest that respondent could not appeal and argue —as others later successfully did—that then- current law was incorrect. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . While the substantive question whether a particular offense qualifies as an \"aggravated felony\" sometimes raise s difficult ques- tions under the categorica l approach, see id. at 23, such difficulties do not make the process for administrative review unavailable under Section 1326(d)(1).1 b.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "As the government has explained (Pet. 13- 14), when originally enacted, Section 1326 did not allow an unlawful- reentry defendant to col- laterally attack the underlying removal order. I n [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that because the \"determination made in [a removal] proceeding play[s] a critical role in the subsequent imposition of a criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding.\" Id.at 837-838. I t accordingly determined that \"where the deportation proceeding effectively eliminates t he right of the alien to obtain judicial re- view,\" that alien \"must be permitted\" to collaterally at- tack his removal in a later unlawful -reentry prosecu- tion.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "at 839 . Section 1326(d) reflects Congress 's \"in- corporat[ion ]\" of that judgment \" into statutory law .\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (10th Cir.) (Gorsuch, J.) (quoting Ira J. Kurzban, Immigra- tion Law Sourcebook 186 (10th ed.",
		"citation_value_orig": "607 F.3d 647",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "1 Despite respondent's citation of it (Br. in Opp. 22), the decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], provides no basis for excusing respondent's failure to exhaust his administrative rem- edies. Unlike Section 1326(d)(1), the statute at issue in McKart \"said nothing which would require\" a criminal defendant \"to raise all [his] claims\" in a previous administrative process. Id .",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 U.S. 185",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "See 948 F.3d 148; 2020 WL 5200979. The petition for a writ of certior ari in Davis v. Saul , supra (No. 20 -105)— which presents the same question as this case —discounts (at 16 -17) the Tenth Circuit's decision on the ground that it conflicts with that court's previous decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], allowing a claimant to raise an issue in court even though he had not raised it before the ALJ in SSA . Hackett , however, involved a different issue— namely, reliance on expert evidence that allegedly conflicted with an official government publication. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "395 F.3d 1168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "405(g). This Court has held that a district court's judgment of reversal under Section 405(g) is a \"final decision\" under Section 1291, even if the district court also rema nds the case to the agency. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Sul- 496 U.S. 617. The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction over petitioners' appeals from the district courts' judgments of reversal in this cas e. The petition for a writ of certiorari in Davis, supra (No. 20 -105), presents the same question as this case 15 and would also be an appropriate vehicle for resolving that question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 266",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "405(g). This Court has held that a district court's judgment of reversal under Section 405(g) is a \"final decision\" under Section 1291, even if the district court also rema nds the case to the agency. 524 U.S. 266; Sul- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court of appeals thus had jurisdiction over petitioners' appeals from the district courts' judgments of reversal in this cas e. The petition for a writ of certiorari in Davis, supra (No. 20 -105), presents the same question as this case 15 and would also be an appropriate vehicle for resolving that question.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 617",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Although the court of appeals re- jected petitioner 's ch allenge to the 2017 amendment, two other federal appellate courts have invalidated the same statute on constitutional grounds. This Court of- ten grants certiorari to \" review the exercise of the grave power of annulling an Act of Congress. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g. , 137 S. Ct. 1744; 576 U.S. 1 ; see also Stephe n M. Shapiro 22 et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.12, at 4 -35 (11th ed. 2019) (\" Where the decision below holds a federal statute unconstitutional certiorari is usually granted be- cause of the obvious importance of the case.",
		"citation_value_orig": "380 U.S. 63",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "This Court of- ten grants certiorari to \" review the exercise of the grave power of annulling an Act of Congress. \" 380 U.S. 63; see, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 576 U.S. 1 ; see also Stephe n M. Shapiro 22 et al., Supreme Court Practice § 4.12, at 4 -35 (11th ed. 2019) (\" Where the decision below holds a federal statute unconstitutional certiorari is usually granted be- cause of the obvious importance of the case. \").",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1744",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The question presented warrants this Court's review",
		"context": "Reply Br. 17 -18, and the reme- dial question is fairly included in the scope of a question about a law's constitutionality, such that th is Court would be able to resolve it in this case if it were to agree with petitioner about the merits. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For that reason, this Court need not await a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Second or Tenth Circuits, which have ad- dressed the remedial issue after finding the statute invalid . See Clinton Nurseries , 998 F.3d at 69- 70; John Q. Hammons , 15 F.4th at 1025- 1026.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2044",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Incorporating the Excessive Fines Clause Will Prevent Indiana, and Other States, from Ignoring an Essential Element of Ordered Liberty",
		"context": ". was to limit the government's power to punish,\" with the Excessive Fines Clause forming an integral part of the Amendment's three-part framework by \"limit[ing] the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, 'as punish ment for some offense.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It \"would be anomalous indeed\" if other sanctions under the Eighth Amendment were subject to review under federal constitutional principles but excessive fines were not. Solem , 463 U.S. at 289.",
		"citation_value_orig": "509 U.S. 602",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "The Court grounded this distinction in the difference between patent and copyright: patent gives the inventor \"an exclusive property\" in the process itself, whereas copyright merely protects the particular expression or description of the process. Id. ; see also, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As to computer programs specifically, CONTU and Congress both recognized that all computer programs are in some sense functional, yet the Copyright Act 14 explicitly protects compu ter programs anyway. See 17 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "347 U.S. 201",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "As in Baker , courts have long recognized that while an underlying computer method, function, or process may not be copyrightable, the expression that implements that method or function, as articulated in the computer code, is protectable. See, e.g. , Lexmark Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mitel, 124 F.3d 1366; Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435; Kepner-Tregoe, 12 F.3d 527; Altai , 982 F.2d at 703; Atari , 975 F.2d at 839-40; Toro 787 F.2d 1208; Franklin Comput. , 714 F.2d at 1251. Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "387 F.3d 522",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "As in Baker , courts have long recognized that while an underlying computer method, function, or process may not be copyrightable, the expression that implements that method or function, as articulated in the computer code, is protectable. See, e.g. , Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d 522; Mitel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435; Kepner-Tregoe, 12 F.3d 527; Altai , 982 F.2d at 703; Atari , 975 F.2d at 839-40; Toro 787 F.2d 1208; Franklin Comput. , 714 F.2d at 1251. Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "124 F.3d 1366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "As in Baker , courts have long recognized that while an underlying computer method, function, or process may not be copyrightable, the expression that implements that method or function, as articulated in the computer code, is protectable. See, e.g. , Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d 522; Mitel, 124 F.3d 1366; Apple Comput., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Kepner-Tregoe, 12 F.3d 527; Altai , 982 F.2d at 703; Atari , 975 F.2d at 839-40; Toro 787 F.2d 1208; Franklin Comput. , 714 F.2d at 1251. Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "35 F.3d 1435",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "As in Baker , courts have long recognized that while an underlying computer method, function, or process may not be copyrightable, the expression that implements that method or function, as articulated in the computer code, is protectable. See, e.g. , Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d 522; Mitel, 124 F.3d 1366; Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435; Kepner-Tregoe, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Altai , 982 F.2d at 703; Atari , 975 F.2d at 839-40; Toro 787 F.2d 1208; Franklin Comput. , 714 F.2d at 1251. Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "12 F.3d 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "As in Baker , courts have long recognized that while an underlying computer method, function, or process may not be copyrightable, the expression that implements that method or function, as articulated in the computer code, is protectable. See, e.g. , Lexmark Int'l, 387 F.3d 522; Mitel, 124 F.3d 1366; Apple Comput., 35 F.3d 1435; Kepner-Tregoe, 12 F.3d 527; Altai , 982 F.2d at 703; Atari , 975 F.2d at 839-40; Toro [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Franklin Comput. , 714 F.2d at 1251. Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "787 F.2d 1208",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "Moreover, protection of the expressive elements of copyrighted works protects not only the literal words or numbers on the page (or in the computer hard drive), but also the non-literal aspects of the work, including its structure, sequence, and organization. See, e.g. , Feist Publ'ns, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Courts have consistently extended this principle to computer programs as well. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 340",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "Courts have consistently extended this principle to computer programs as well. See, e.g. , Gen. Universal Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Whelan Assocs., 797 F.2d 1222. As one lower court explaine d, \"[i]f the non-literal structures of literary works are protected by copyright, and if compute r programs are literary works . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "379 F.3d 131",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Functional aspects of a work do not preclude copyright protection of the work as a whole",
		"context": "Courts have consistently extended this principle to computer programs as well. See, e.g. , Gen. Universal Sys., 379 F.3d 131; Whelan Assocs., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As one lower court explaine d, \"[i]f the non-literal structures of literary works are protected by copyright, and if compute r programs are literary works . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "797 F.2d 1222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "For the past thirty-six ye ars, lower courts have wrestled with how to inte rpret this Court's language in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], spe- cifically the portions of Justice John Paul Stevens's decision that discuss the NCAA's eligibility rules con-cerning the amateur status of college athletes. In his conclusion to this decision , Justice Stevens wrote that the NCAA \"plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 85",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "6 It is in that call for \"ample latitude\" where courts have struggled with formulating a proportional response under the Board of Regents precedent. As frequently discussed by the Petitioners, the Seventh Circuit cited this language to find that NCAA bylaws that \" 'fit into the same mold' as eligibility rules\" and \"clearly pro- tect[ ] amateurism\" require a finding by a court \"to deem such rules procompetitive,\" as \"they define what it means to be an amateur or a student-athlete, and are therefore essential to the very existence of the product of college football.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation of Board of Regents as having compelled courts to give wide-ranging deference for NCAA amateurism activi-ties can also be shown thro ugh its spread to other ar- eas of law. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently cited Board of Regents to hold that college athletes can- not be subject to federal wage and hour law, as, in their view, the \"revered tradition of amateurism in college sports\" cited by Justice Stevens \"defines the economic reality of the relationship between student athletes and their schools.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "683 F.3d 328",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "The Seventh Circuit's broad interpretation of Board of Regents as having compelled courts to give wide-ranging deference for NCAA amateurism activi-ties can also be shown thro ugh its spread to other ar- eas of law. For example, the Seventh Circuit recently cited Board of Regents to hold that college athletes can- not be subject to federal wage and hour law, as, in their view, the \"revered tradition of amateurism in college sports\" cited by Justice Stevens \"defines the economic reality of the relationship between student athletes and their schools.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As such, the Seventh Circuit found that the standard multifactor tests for employment status \" 'fail to capture the true nature of the relationship' be- tween student athletes and their schools\" and thus found that relationship to not represent an employ- ment relationship. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "843 F.3d 285",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "As such, the Seventh Circuit found that the standard multifactor tests for employment status \" 'fail to capture the true nature of the relationship' be- tween student athletes and their schools\" and thus found that relationship to not represent an employ- ment relationship. Id. (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].) 7 Conversely, in the presently appealed case the Ninth Circuit properly affirmed the district court's use of the Rule of Reason test to determine the legality of the disputed NCAA bylaws. See In re958 F.3d 1239.",
		"citation_value_orig": "974 F.2d 806",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "While Justice Stevens did writ e of rules that \"are jus- tifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefor e procompetitive,\" no lan- guage by the Board of Regents Court explicitly stated that those rules should be fully above the law. Id. This essential point was noted by the Third Circuit in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], vacated on 9 other grounds , 525 U.S. 459, as they stated that \"no court of appeals expressly has ad- dressed the issue of whether antitrust laws apply to the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility rules.\" Given that Smith was decided fourteen years after Board of Regents , one can reasonably assume that the Third Circuit was aware of this Court's call for \"ample lati-tude\" in Board of Regents and did not read \"ample lat- itude\" as representing a wholesale exemption from antitrust law. Supporting this much more limited reading of Board of Regents is entirely consistent with this Court's long disfavor of implicit, court-made exemp- tions to the antitrust laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 F.3d 180",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "While Justice Stevens did writ e of rules that \"are jus- tifiable means of fostering competition among amateur athletic teams and therefor e procompetitive,\" no lan- guage by the Board of Regents Court explicitly stated that those rules should be fully above the law. Id. This essential point was noted by the Third Circuit in 139 F.3d 180, vacated on 9 other grounds , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], as they stated that \"no court of appeals expressly has ad- dressed the issue of whether antitrust laws apply to the NCAA's promulgation of eligibility rules.\" Given that Smith was decided fourteen years after Board of Regents , one can reasonably assume that the Third Circuit was aware of this Court's call for \"ample lati-tude\" in Board of Regents and did not read \"ample lat- itude\" as representing a wholesale exemption from antitrust law. Supporting this much more limited reading of Board of Regents is entirely consistent with this Court's long disfavor of implicit, court-made exemp- tions to the antitrust laws.",
		"citation_value_orig": "525 U.S. 459",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "See, e.g. , Goldfarb v. Vir- ginia State Bar , 421 U.S. at 777 (\"[O]ur cases have repeatedly established that there is a heavy presump- tion against implicit exemptions [to § 1 of the Sherman Act]\"); California v. FPC , 369 U.S. at 485 (\"Immunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied\"). 3 A 3 While this Court held in American [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that \"teams that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law\" as their shared interests \"provide[ ] perfectly sen-sible justification for making a host of collective decisions,\" that holding was clear that Rule of Reason analysis is still required to weigh that justification against its anticompetitive costs, even if that analysis \"can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye.\" Id. at 202-04 (quoting Board of Regents , 468 U.S. at 110).",
		"citation_value_orig": "560 U.S. 183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. There is No Existing Basis Under Board of Regents or Other Supreme Court Precedent to Grant the Petitioners a Broad, Threshold-Level Exemption from the Antitrust Laws",
		"context": "Instead, Petitioners seek a ruling—based on the Seventh Circuit's holdings in Agnew , 683 F.3d at 341-42, and Deppe , 893 F.3d at 501-02—that all restrictions of the college athlete labor market in furtherance of amateurism are presumptively procompetitive, thus automatically outweighing any alleged anticompetitive harm put before the court. This request is not consistent with American Needle . 10 wholesale \"procompetitive presumption\"—as formu- lated by the Seventh Circuit in Agnew v. NCAA , 683 F .3d at 341-42, and applied in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]—is too close to a blanket exemption from th e Sherman Act to be war- ranted under the law. By contrast, the Ninth Circuit's approach in this litigation, which places the onus on the Petitioners to prove that their alleged pr ocompetitive rationales—including the defense and maintenance of amateurism—outweigh the clear anticompetitive ef-fects of the Petitioners' price fixing schemes, is the ap- proach that should be adopted moving forward.",
		"citation_value_orig": "893 F.3d 498",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "This Court has drawn a clear divide between claims properly raised through § 1983 and those that must proceed through the federal habeas statute. While both statutes \"provide access to a federal forum for claims of unconstitutional treatment at the hands of state officials,\" the similarities end there: the schemes \"differ 24 in their scope and operation.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As Justice Scalia explained in that seminal opinion, habeas is the narrower of the two in scope, and the more specific in operation: it is the proper vehicle only for claims that \" necessarily imply the invalidity of [the defendant's] conviction or sentence.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 477",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "Nelson , 541 U.S. at 643 (emphasis added). Habeas's limited domain has been clear since the Founding, when it was understood that the writ of habeas corpus \"simply provided a means of contesting the lawfulness of restraint and securing release.\" Dep't of Homeland [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Over the last three decades, this Court's decisions interpreting the federal habeas statute have maintained that narrow scope in the statutory context. \"Th[ose] cases, taken together, indicate that\" a claim sounds exclusively in habeas only if \"success in [the] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1959",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "Over the last three decades, this Court's decisions interpreting the federal habeas statute have maintained that narrow scope in the statutory context. \"Th[ose] cases, taken together, indicate that\" a claim sounds exclusively in habeas only if \"success in [the] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of confinement or its duration.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Conversely, claims that identify unlawfulness in the implementation of a prisoner's sentence—rather than in the fact or duration of that sentence—sound in § 1983. See id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 74",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "See id. at 83 (\" Heck uses the word 'sentence' to refer not to prison procedures, but to substantive determinations as to the length of confinement.\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. He must do so instead via § 1983. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 749",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "Heck, 512 U.S. at 487. In Wolff v. McDonnell , for example, state prisoners challenged disciplinary proceedings on Due Process grounds, contending that they were improperly deprived good- time credits. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They sought two kinds of relief—restoration of good-time credits and a declaratory judgment that the disciplinary proceedings were unconstitutional. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 539",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. This Court Has Articulated A Clear Divide Between Section 1983 And Habeas.",
		"context": "Thus, to fall within habeas's domain, it is not enough that a successful claim would provide the possibility of a change in the fact or duration of confinement; habeas requires a strict cause and effect. If that strict condition is not met—if \"the prisoner's claim would not 'necessarily spell speedier release'\"—then the \"suit may be brought under § 1983.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. In the context of the Mandate, Section 6033(a) irrationally discriminates against the separately incorporated ministries of Catholic dioceses",
		"context": ". Among the hundreds of religious organizations that challenged the Mandate and the so-called accommoda-tion are twelve Catholic dioceses and archdioceses, three of which were before the Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: the Arch diocese of Washington, the Diocese of Pittsburgh, and the Diocese of Erie. Ministries within these dioceses are prime examples of why it was so unreasonable for the government to use the tax code to determine which ministries are exempt \"religious employers\" and which are not.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": ". Twenty -six years ago, the Fifth Circuit correctly con- cluded that the R estoration Act controls the Tribe's gam- ing activities in Texas. Ysleta I , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That court looked to (1) \"the plain language of § 107(a)\" of the Res- toration Act, (2) \"the tribal resolution to which § 107(a) expressly refers,\" including its discussion of how previ- ous attempts by the Tribe to gain federal -trust status failed due to gaming regulations deemed insufficiently robust, and (3) two separate provisions of IGRA that \"ex-pressly stated\" that it \"should be consider ed in light of other federal law .\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "36 F.3d 1325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "This Court does not lightly presume congre ssional carelessness. To the contrary, it presumes that Congress includes each word in a statute for a purpose, and that words not included were purposefully omitted. E.g., Kirt [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And , \"courts mus t give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statut e.\" 140 S. Ct. 1936. These presumptions are particularly important here where the clause in question goes to the central debate behind the passage of the entire statute —namely, whether and to what extent the Tribe would be permit-ted to conduct high- stakes gambling on tribal lands.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 519",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "To the contrary, it presumes that Congress includes each word in a statute for a purpose, and that words not included were purposefully omitted. E.g., Kirt 568 U.S. 519. And , \"courts mus t give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statut e.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These presumptions are particularly important here where the clause in question goes to the central debate behind the passage of the entire statute —namely, whether and to what extent the Tribe would be permit-ted to conduct high- stakes gambling on tribal lands. E.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1936",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "These presumptions are particularly important here where the clause in question goes to the central debate behind the passage of the entire statute —namely, whether and to what extent the Tribe would be permit-ted to conduct high- stakes gambling on tribal lands. E.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Finally , the Restoration Act ensures that Congress cannot lightly change these restrictions by stating that only \"laws and rules of law of the United States . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "576 U.S. 473",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "L. 100 -89, §§ 103(a), 203(a). That is not to say that Congress could never change the terms of t he Restora- tion Act, but \"it must clearly express its intent to do so.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And it cannot do so by means of an act of \"general application.\" Pub.",
		"citation_value_orig": "526 U.S. 172",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "Pub. L. No. 100- 89, § 103(a); see Passamaquoddy [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As discussed below (at I.C), Congress has rejected any effort to amend the Restoration Act to per- mit the type of gaming in which the Tribe wishes to en-gage . Taken together, the se provisions of the Restoration Act grant the Pueblo \"status as a federally recognized tribe and limit [] its gaming operations according to state law.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "75 F.3d 784",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "2. The Pueblo 's primary textual argument does not change this outcome. The Tribe argues (at 1 3-18) that section 107(b) incorporates this Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and require s the Court to distinguish be- tween laws that regulate gaming from those that crimi- nally prohibit it. The reasoning goes like this: Cabazon Band , 480 U.S. at 214- 21, recognized a general principle that \"States lack regulatory authority over gaming activ-ity o n tribal lands absent express congressional permis- sion.\" Am.",
		"citation_value_orig": "480 U.S. 202",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "2524, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2007) (citing three separate opinions and inserting language to prevent application of Buckhannon Bd . & Care Home, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). It did not do so here. The only evidence that Congress was even consider- ing Cabazon Band to which the Tribe and its amici can point is a statement by Senator Udall that section 10 7(b) is \"in line with the rational[e] \" of Cabazon Band .",
		"citation_value_orig": "532 U.S. 598",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "This Cou rt has repeatedly held that States may not exercise limitless control over tribal lands of federally recognized tribes absent congressional consent. For ex- ample, in Bryan v. Itasca County —upon which Cabazon Band , 480 U.S. at 208, relied —this Court examined whether the civil jurisdiction contained in Public Law 83- 280 \"subject[ed] reservation Indians to the full sweep of state laws,\" including state property taxes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court concluded that it did not. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "McGirt , 140 S. Ct. at 2479. And, since Cabazon Band , this Court and others have consisten tly refused to import the criminal -prohibitory/ civil-regula- tory distinction from the Public Law 83- 280 context to other, more specific laws governing tribal affairs. E.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Put another way, t he Cabazon Band \"line of cases\" fashioned a solu- tion unique to the facially broad grant of civil -regulatory jurisdiction in Public Law 83- 280 \" [t]o narrow the reach of that statute.\" 205 F.3d 840 (\"Like the Sixth and Tenth Circuits , 'we think it inappropriate to apply here the 16 criminal/prohibitory -civil/regulatory test which was de- veloped in a different context to address different con- cerns.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 713",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "E.g., 463 U.S. 713. Put another way, t he Cabazon Band \"line of cases\" fashioned a solu- tion unique to the facially broad grant of civil -regulatory jurisdiction in Public Law 83- 280 \" [t]o narrow the reach of that statute.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Like the Sixth and Tenth Circuits , 'we think it inappropriate to apply here the 16 criminal/prohibitory -civil/regulatory test which was de- veloped in a different context to address different con- cerns.'\" (quoting 796 F.2d 186 )); accord United State 951 F.2d 261. The lower courts corre ctly applied this later, limited understanding of Cabazon Band —as the Fifth Circuit did in Ysleta I.",
		"citation_value_orig": "205 F.3d 840",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "Put another way, t he Cabazon Band \"line of cases\" fashioned a solu- tion unique to the facially broad grant of civil -regulatory jurisdiction in Public Law 83- 280 \" [t]o narrow the reach of that statute.\" 205 F.3d 840 (\"Like the Sixth and Tenth Circuits , 'we think it inappropriate to apply here the 16 criminal/prohibitory -civil/regulatory test which was de- veloped in a different context to address different con- cerns.'\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] )); accord United State 951 F.2d 261. The lower courts corre ctly applied this later, limited understanding of Cabazon Band —as the Fifth Circuit did in Ysleta I. In stark contrast to Public Law 83- 280, the Restoration Act does not grant general ju risdiction to regulate all aspects of life on the Pueblo's reservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "796 F.2d 186",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "Put another way, t he Cabazon Band \"line of cases\" fashioned a solu- tion unique to the facially broad grant of civil -regulatory jurisdiction in Public Law 83- 280 \" [t]o narrow the reach of that statute.\" 205 F.3d 840 (\"Like the Sixth and Tenth Circuits , 'we think it inappropriate to apply here the 16 criminal/prohibitory -civil/regulatory test which was de- veloped in a different context to address different con- cerns.'\" (quoting 796 F.2d 186 )); accord United State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The lower courts corre ctly applied this later, limited understanding of Cabazon Band —as the Fifth Circuit did in Ysleta I. In stark contrast to Public Law 83- 280, the Restoration Act does not grant general ju risdiction to regulate all aspects of life on the Pueblo's reservation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "951 F.2d 261",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "Id. When Congress \"expressly permit[s]\" specific state regulations, any distinction that Cabazon Band drew between prohibitions and regulations of on - reservation activity is inapplicable. Cabazon Band , 480 U.S. at 214; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. As a fallback , the Pueblo and its amici repeatedly point to the so -called Indian canon of construction that any ambiguity in a statute should be resolved in favor of the tribe.",
		"citation_value_orig": "435 U.S. 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "E.g. , Pet. 15 (citing White Mountain Apache [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) ; Am. Br. 24 (citing 471 U.S. 759) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "448 U.S. 136",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "15 (citing White Mountain Apache 448 U.S. 136) ; Am. Br. 24 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]) . But such argument s presume there is an ambiguity . The Fifth Circuit confirmed in Alabama- Coushatta that its interpretation of the Restoration Act is based on that statute's unambiguous language.",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 759",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "The Fifth Circuit confirmed in Alabama- Coushatta that its interpretation of the Restoration Act is based on that statute's unambiguous language. 17 Alabama- Coushatta , 918 F.3d at 447-48 (rejecting the application of Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], in the absence of am- biguous language) . In the face of unambiguous language, the so -called Indian canon of construction has no role to play, and the Pueblo's suppo sedly textualist defense of its position fails. See Chickasaw 534 U.S. 84.",
		"citation_value_orig": "545 U.S. 967",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Restoration Act controls the Tribe's gaming and federalizes Texas Law",
		"context": "Ass 545 U.S. 967, in the absence of am- biguous language) . In the face of unambiguous language, the so -called Indian canon of construction has no role to play, and the Pueblo's suppo sedly textualist defense of its position fails. See Chickasaw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 84",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Decision to Dismiss This Qui Tam Suit Is Not Subject to Judicial Review, But That Decision Was Reasonable in Any Event",
		"context": "That approach to statutory interpretation stands the relevant interpretive canon on its head. Con- gress's decision to authorize judicial review of the rea- sonableness of settlements, but not dismissals, demonstrates that Congress did not authorize judicial review of the reasonableness of dismissals. See, e.g , Russello , 464 U.S. at 23; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Nor is it irrational for Congress to treat dismissals and settlements differently. A voluntary dismissal is 12 Petitioner generally argues for the Ninth Circuit's test for re- viewing Government dismissal decisions.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Decision to Dismiss This Qui Tam Suit Is Not Subject to Judicial Review, But That Decision Was Reasonable in Any Event",
		"context": "But that court acknowledged that \"[t]he qui tam statute itself does not create a particular standard for dismissal.\" United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The court instead based its standard (in- correctly) on substantive due process case law. See infra Part III.B.",
		"citation_value_orig": "151 F.3d 1139",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Decision to Dismiss This Qui Tam Suit Is Not Subject to Judicial Review, But That Decision Was Reasonable in Any Event",
		"context": "44 not the same as a zero-dollar settlement. The dismis- sal is typically without prej udice, which does not pre- clude the Government from refiling its claims. See Cooter & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A settle- ment, on the other hand, may extinguish the Govern- ment's claims. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "496 U.S. 384",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Decision to Dismiss This Qui Tam Suit Is Not Subject to Judicial Review, But That Decision Was Reasonable in Any Event",
		"context": "The hearing requirement serves the valuable purpose of providing the relator an opportunity to bring any rel- evant evidence or considerations that the Government may have overlooked to its attention. Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] \"gives the judiciary general oversight of the Executive's judg- ment.\" Swift , 318 F.3d at 252. To the contrary, that provision provides \"[t]he Government\"—\"meaning the Executive Branch, not the Judicial [Branch]\"—with the authority to dismiss.",
		"citation_value_orig": "407 U.S. 67",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) applies only to injunctions that enjoin the operation of the referenced sections of the Act",
		"context": "It does not limit injunctions that me rely require the agency to adhere to the statute as properly interpreted. \"Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 1252(f)(1) does not, either by its words or by \"a necessary and inescapable inference,\" bar injunctive relief here. Rather, the statute prohibits lower courts from \"enjoin[ing] or restrain[ing] the operation of the statute,\" such as where the court invalidates the 50 statute itself, but not where the court merely requires the agency to comply with the statute.",
		"citation_value_orig": "328 U.S. 395",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) applies only to injunctions that enjoin the operation of the referenced sections of the Act",
		"context": "In contrast, 1252(f)(1) addresses only injunctive relief that would enjoin or restrain \"the operation of\" the statute. \"[W]hen Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Petitioners' interpretation would impermissibly render the term \"implementation\" su perfluous. Petitioners argue that the statute's first phrase, \"[r]egardless of the nature of the action or claim or identity of the party or parties,\" is evidence that it encompasses more than challenges to the statute 52 itself.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 438",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 1252(f)(1) applies only to injunctions that enjoin the operation of the referenced sections of the Act",
		"context": "At the same time, injunctions for claims under both the Constitution and statutes remain available if they do not enjoin the \"operation of\" Sections 1221 –1231. Nor does the court's interpretation run \"counter to IIRIRA's 'theme' of protecting the Executive's discretion,\" see Pet'rs Br. 25, as the agency has no discretion to violate the sta tute, see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]'s function as a jurisdictional bar.\" Pet'rs Br. 21.",
		"citation_value_orig": "445 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "Just as important, the government is wrong on the merits. Under traditional abuse -of-the-writ doctrine, prisoners could excuse an earlier failure to raise a claim in two ways: showing (1) \"cause for failing to raise it and prejudice therefrom\" or (2) that \"a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from a failure to entertain the claim,\" which required a \"colorable showing of factual innocence.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 2. Jones has cause for failing to raise his Rehaif claim in his first 2255 motion —it would have been novel .",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 467",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "21 2. Jones has cause for failing to raise his Rehaif claim in his first 2255 motion —it would have been novel . Lower courts uniformly applied a no -scienter interpre tation of § 922(g)'s felon -status element \"for more than 30 years\" prior to [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], held that a prisoner satisfies cause when \"th ere was no reasonable basis in existing law\" for raising his claim. \"[O]vertur[ ning] a longstanding and widespread practice to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near -unanimous body of lower court authority has expressly approved\" qualifies as a situation in which prior litigants had \"no reasonable basis in existing law\" for pressing their claims. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2191",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "Rehaif , 139 S. Ct. at 2201 ( Alito , J., dissenting). Before Rehaif , petitioner's claim would have been a frivolous pipe dream . The government reads [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], for more than it is worth. See Gov't Br. 23 n.. Bousley held only that \"futility cannot constitute cause if it means simply that a claim was 'unacceptable to that particular court at th at particular time.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "Bousley , 523 U.S. at 623 ( emphasis added) . Before Rehaif , Jones' claim was unacceptable to every court for decades . The law was far less settled at the time of Bousley's conviction for \"use\" of a firearm in relation to drug traffickin g. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The circuits were \"in conflict both in the standards they [had] articulated\" and \"in the results they [had] reached.\" Ibid.",
		"citation_value_orig": "516 U.S. 137",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "The government need not prove knowledge.\"). \" [C]laims will ordinarily not be entertained under § 2255 that have already been rejected on direct review.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has only recognized a single exception : \"upon showing an intervening change in the law.\" Davis , 417 U.S. at 342.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 339",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "Whether Jones suffered \"actual prejudice\" from the jury's failure to apply the correct law would be best decided by a court of first impression. Jones must show \"there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have returned a different verdict\" had t hey applied the correct rule. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This inquiry is fact -dominated. See 456 U.S. 152 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 263",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. Jones need not prove actual innocence",
		"context": "527 U.S. 263. This inquiry is fact -dominated. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The record contains little information regarding petitioner's state of mind . The Court ne ed not —and should not —reach beyond the legal issues before it to 23 conduct a purely speculative inquiry on an incomplete record.",
		"citation_value_orig": "456 U.S. 152",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Placement Preferences Impermissibly Commandeer State Courts And State Agencies",
		"context": "1. The Constitution does not allow Congress \"to require the States to govern according to Congress' in-structions.\" New [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . This anti -commandeering principle pro- hibits Congress from commanding Stat e legislatures to \"regulat[e] pursuant to Congress's direction.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Placement Preferences Impermissibly Commandeer State Courts And State Agencies",
		"context": "at 175. Nor can Congress \"circumvent\" the anti -com- mande ering principle by \"conscripting the State's of- ficers directly.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 2. ICWA's placement preferences violate this principle by commanding state courts to carry out a federal program of sending Indian children to Indian adults, forcing those court s to effectively amend their 18 own state -law causes of action and graft onto them ICWA's p references.",
		"citation_value_orig": "521 U.S. 898",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Placement Preferences Impermissibly Commandeer State Courts And State Agencies",
		"context": "There is no loophole in the anti - commandeering doctrine that subjects the state judi- cial branch to the mercy of Congress. Congress is per- mitted to rely on state courts to adjudicate federal causes of action. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But it may not rewrite the substantive stand- ards to be applied in state causes of action. ICWA's placement preferences commandeer state agencies, too.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 386",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Roe relied on the absence of consensus on the beginning of human life",
		"context": "In Roe, the Court recognized that \"[i]f this suggestion of personhood is established, the appellant's case, of cours e, collapses, for the fetus' right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Fourteenth] Amendment. \"3 However, at that moment in time, in 1973, the Court did not conclude that a fetus is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.4 Notably, apar t from apparently inconclusive usage of the term \"person\" in the Constitution , the Court relied on insufficient consensus on when human life begins. The Court explained, \"When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theolo gy are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge , is not in a position to speculate as to the 3 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 4 Id. at 158; but see Joshua J. Craddock, Protecting Prenatal Persons: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit Abortion?",
		"citation_value_orig": "410 U.S. 113",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Roe relied on the absence of consensus on the beginning of human life",
		"context": "This consensus analysis is similar to the Court's consensus analysis employed to identify cruel and unusual punishment and protect human dignity . Under that consensus analysis, a majority consensus6 of state laws7 has been enough to signal 5 Roe, 410 U.S. at 159 (emphasis added). 6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 7 \"The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.\" Roper , 543 U.S. at 564; accord Atkins , 536 U.S. at 312 (\"We have pinpoint ed that the 'clearest and most reliable objective 5 that a harsh form of punishment departs from the dignity owed to fellow human beings, rendering it uncon stitutional.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 304",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Roe relied on the absence of consensus on the beginning of human life",
		"context": "Justice Blackmun acknowledged in his memorandum accompanying his sec ond draft of the Roe decision that selecting viability as the critical moment would be as arbitrary as selecting (as he did in his second draft) the end of the first trimester as critical.10 Selection of viability as evidence of contemporary values is the legislation enacted by the country's legislatures.' \"). 8 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 9 See Roe , 410 U.S. at 156-57. 10 Justice Blackmun, Cover Memoran dum Accompanying 2nd Draft of Roe v. Wade, (Nov. 21, 1972) (stating, \"You will observe that I have concluded that the end of the first trimester is critical.",
		"citation_value_orig": "428 U.S. 153",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "To the contrary, the Commission, lower courts, and this Court have long upheld the imposition of liabil- ity under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b -5(a) and (c) for fraudul ent conduct that involves misstatements , even in the absence of liability for making misstatements under Rule 10b -5(b). 1. Petitioner relies heavily on this Court's decision in Janus Capital Group, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , which interpreted Rule 10b- 5(b). See id. at 141.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "Id. at 146 -147. The Court in Janus also relied on its prior decisions in Central Bank and Stoneridge Investment Partners, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . See Janus , 564 U.S. at 142-146. In both of those cases 24 (discussed further below in Section C ), the Court de- clined to extend primary liability to secondary actors who did not directly deceive investors, but rather played a behind -the-scenes role in facilitating the fraud.",
		"citation_value_orig": "552 U.S. 148",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "The Janus Court had no occasion to address, and did not address, the scope of Rule 10b -5(a), Rule 10b -5(c), or Section 17(a). The district court in the underlying litigation d ismissed claims brough t under Rule 10b -5(a) and (c), a nd the court of appeals did not address 25 that holding. See In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]566 F.3d 111 , rev'd, 564 U.S. 135 . In this Court, the Janus petitioners emphasized that the only issue presented for review involved the scope of Rule 10b -5(b). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 F. Supp. 2d 618",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "The Janus Court had no occasion to address, and did not address, the scope of Rule 10b -5(a), Rule 10b -5(c), or Section 17(a). The district court in the underlying litigation d ismissed claims brough t under Rule 10b -5(a) and (c), a nd the court of appeals did not address 25 that holding. See In re487 F. Supp. 2d 618[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , rev'd, 564 U.S. 135 . In this Court, the Janus petitioners emphasized that the only issue presented for review involved the scope of Rule 10b -5(b). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 F.3d 111",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "The Janus Court had no occasion to address, and did not address, the scope of Rule 10b -5(a), Rule 10b -5(c), or Section 17(a). The district court in the underlying litigation d ismissed claims brough t under Rule 10b -5(a) and (c), a nd the court of appeals did not address 25 that holding. See In re487 F. Supp. 2d 618566 F.3d 111 , rev'd, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . In this Court, the Janus petitioners emphasized that the only issue presented for review involved the scope of Rule 10b -5(b). See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "564 U.S. 135",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "And this Court's opinion did not even cite, let alone interpret, Rule 10b-5(a), Rule 10b -5(c), or Section 17(a)(1). The Janus Court's construction of the term \"make\" in Rule 10b -5(b), moreover, has no necessary implica- tions for the scope of other antifraud provisions that do not use that word. See U.S. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]725 F.3d 279 to provisions that do not include that term would contravene the presumptio n that \"differences in language convey differences in meaning .\" Hen- 137 S. Ct. 1718 . Imposing this Court's interpretation of Rule 10b -5(b) on other provisions would be especially inappropriate in light of this Court's decisions empha- sizing that the subparts of Section 17(a) and Rule 10b -5 26 are each \"meant to cover additional kinds of illegali- ties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "And this Court's opinion did not even cite, let alone interpret, Rule 10b-5(a), Rule 10b -5(c), or Section 17(a)(1). The Janus Court's construction of the term \"make\" in Rule 10b -5(b), moreover, has no necessary implica- tions for the scope of other antifraud provisions that do not use that word. See U.S. 783 F.3d 786[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] to provisions that do not include that term would contravene the presumptio n that \"differences in language convey differences in meaning .\" Hen- 137 S. Ct. 1718 . Imposing this Court's interpretation of Rule 10b -5(b) on other provisions would be especially inappropriate in light of this Court's decisions empha- sizing that the subparts of Section 17(a) and Rule 10b -5 26 are each \"meant to cover additional kinds of illegali- ties.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "725 F.3d 279",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "The Janus Court's construction of the term \"make\" in Rule 10b -5(b), moreover, has no necessary implica- tions for the scope of other antifraud provisions that do not use that word. See U.S. 783 F.3d 786725 F.3d 279 to provisions that do not include that term would contravene the presumptio n that \"differences in language convey differences in meaning .\" Hen- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Imposing this Court's interpretation of Rule 10b -5(b) on other provisions would be especially inappropriate in light of this Court's decisions empha- sizing that the subparts of Section 17(a) and Rule 10b -5 26 are each \"meant to cover additional kinds of illegali- ties.\" Naftalin , 441 U.S. at 774; see Affiliated Ute , 406 U.S. at 152 -153.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1718",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "Imposing liability on petitioner for fraudulent conduct even though he did not make a misstatement is also consistent with deeply rooted understandings of se- curities fraud as interpreted by the Commission, lower courts, and this Court. When interpreting the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, this Court has loo ked to the common law while \"eschew[ing] rigid common- law bar- riers.\" Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That approach reflects the recognition that \"an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rec tify perceived deficiencies in the available common -law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.\" Herman & 459 U.S. 375 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 299",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, 472 U.S. 299. That approach reflects the recognition that \"an important purpose of the federal securities statutes was to rec tify perceived deficiencies in the available common -law protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities industry.\" Herman & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It therefore \"is well known that the federal se- curities laws provide broader fraud protection than the common law, having been enacted in response to the common law's perceived failure at stamping out fraud in the securities markets.\" MBIA Ins.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 375",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "It therefore \"is well known that the federal se- curities laws provide broader fraud protection than the common law, having been enacted in response to the common law's perceived failure at stamping out fraud in the securities markets.\" MBIA Ins. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A fortiori , if petitioner's conduct would have exposed him to liability under the common law, it is covered by the federal antifraud provisions. Petitioner's willful dissemination of material mis- statements to potential investors would have consti-tuted actionable fraud at common law, even though the misstatements that petitioner disseminated were made by Gregg Lorenzo.",
		"citation_value_orig": "426 F.3d 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "In Affiliated Ute , the Court held that two defendants who had \"devised a plan and induced\" certain sellers of stock \"to dispose of their shares\" without knowing material facts about the value of the stock had engaged in \"a 'course of business ' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that operated as a fraud\" on others. 406 U.S. at 153 (citation omitted) . The Court reached that conclusion even 3 See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; (three subsections violated through failure \"to disclose a fact coming to [directors' and officers'] knowledge by reason of their position, which wo uld materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction\"); Charles Hughes & 139 F.2d 434 (\"Although the Commission has neglected to make any finding\" addressing whether petitioner made \"false statements of m aterial fact,\" \"we need not remand for a specific finding resolving this conflict, for we feel that petitioner's mark -up policy operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers, as well as constituting an omission to state a material fact\" under Section 17(a). ), cert. denied,321 U.S. 786 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "99 F. Supp. 808",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "In Affiliated Ute , the Court held that two defendants who had \"devised a plan and induced\" certain sellers of stock \"to dispose of their shares\" without knowing material facts about the value of the stock had engaged in \"a 'course of business ' or a 'device, scheme, or artifice' that operated as a fraud\" on others. 406 U.S. at 153 (citation omitted) . The Court reached that conclusion even 3 See 99 F. Supp. 808; (three subsections violated through failure \"to disclose a fact coming to [directors' and officers'] knowledge by reason of their position, which wo uld materially affect the judgment of the other party to the transaction\"); Charles Hughes & [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Although the Commission has neglected to make any finding\" addressing whether petitioner made \"false statements of m aterial fact,\" \"we need not remand for a specific finding resolving this conflict, for we feel that petitioner's mark -up policy operated as a fraud and deceit upon the purchasers, as well as constituting an omission to state a material fact\" under Section 17(a). ), cert. denied,321 U.S. 786 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 F.2d 434",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Petitioner is liable for fraudulent conduct under Section 17(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) even though he did not \"make\" misstatements under Rule 10b-5(b)",
		"context": "Id. at 150- 153. Similarly in Chadbourne & Parke [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court recently indicated that false statements may form the basis for liability under Rule 10b -5(a). The Court described Rule 10b- 5 as \"for- bid[ding] the use of any 'device, scheme, or artifice to defraud' (including the making of 'any untrue state- ment of a mat erial fact' or any similar 'omi[ssion]') 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.' \" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "134 S. Ct. 1058",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Wilburn Boat, state law applies to determine the enforceability of the choice-of-law clause unless there is established federal law to the contrary",
		"context": "Under Wilburn Boat , therefore, the rule for whether a choice-of-law provision in a maritime insurance contract is enforced is drawn from state law—unless there is a well-established federal rule governing the enforceability of choice-of-law provisions in maritime insurance contracts that supplants it. Great Lakes steadfastly avoids using Wilburn Boat 's methodology. Instead, Great Lakes presents its arguments for reversal through the framework of this Court's ruling in Dutra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]— a case presenting the question whether a mariner injured while working as a deckhand may recover punitive damages on a claim of unseawor- thiness. The question presented in Dutra Group — involving a well-established federal admiralty law claim and whether a particular form of damages was recoverable thereunder—has nothing to do with maritime insurance. Wilburn Boat , not Dutra , provides the applicable test here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 2275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statute Provides a Practical Test",
		"context": "44 Consistent with those standa rds, defendants challeng- ing validity may prove failure to enable in several ways. They may prove that skilled artisans, using the specifica- tion, cannot construct the claimed invention at all. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. They may prove that the disclosures are insufficient in certain details to produce the invention wi thout experimentation that exceeds what skilled artisans typically do, forcing them to invent in their own right just to create an operative em-bodiment. See Consol.",
		"citation_value_orig": "253 U.S. 447",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statute Provides a Practical Test",
		"context": "See Consol. Elec. Light [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; pp. 45-48, infra . The claims may also fail to enable a distinct category of embodiments that are produced or operate through a dif- ferent mechanism.",
		"citation_value_orig": "159 U.S. 465",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statute Provides a Practical Test",
		"context": "Auto. Techs. Int'l, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In such ca ses, it is the failure to describe how to make distinct types of embodiments that operate by different means (m echanical versus electron- ic)—not the number of potential variations one could produce following the patent' s disclosures—that creates the potential for non- enablement. A patent may also fail if it leaves skilled artisans \"searching for a needle in a haystack\" for the operative in-vention.",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 F.3d 1274",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The Statute Provides a Practical Test",
		"context": "15a. When the \"number of inoper ative combinations\" skilled 45 artisans must make before finding an operative one \"be- comes significant\"—forcing sk illed artisans to search among billions of permutations to identify anything that works—the claim is not enabled. Atlas Powder [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, the effo rt to practice the invention crosses the line from the work of a mechanic following in- structions, to an unreasonable demand that artisans en- gage in undue experimentation.5",
		"citation_value_orig": "750 F.2d 1569",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE IS A POOR CANDIDATE FOR CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR REVIEWING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S UNANIMOUS DECISION",
		"context": "Ct. R. 10. \"[T]his Court is not equipped to correct every perceived error coming from the lower federal courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"er- ror correction . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "454 U.S. 364",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THIS CASE IS A POOR CANDIDATE FOR CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS FAILED TO IDENTIFY ANY COMPELLING REASONS FOR REVIEWING THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S UNANIMOUS DECISION",
		"context": ". . that govern the grant of certiorari\")); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The \"compelling reasons\" for granting certiorari include the existence of conflicting decisions on issues of law among federal courts of appeals, among state courts of last resort, or between federal courts of ap- peals and state courts of last resort. Sheehan , 135 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "565 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Buck v. Bell",
		"context": "In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court upheld a coercive Virginia eugenics law that allowedthe forcible sterilization of Carrie Buck, diagnosed as \"feeble minded.\" Id. at 205.",
		"citation_value_orig": "274 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "(2020) (agreed to in House ) (adopting recommendation to reprimand and impose $50,000 fine on Rep. David Schweikert) . The Senate has censured nine Members . See Butler & Wolff xxix ; see also In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . To be sure, a legislative body's power to discipline its members appeared to be an outgrowth of the even older and broader parliamentary power to punish members of the public , which the Constitution does not grant to the Houses of Congress . See Clarke 173 (describing the evolution of punitive measures against members of the House of Commons \"until it came to be true that almost any punishment inflicted on outsiders might also be ap-plied to persons within the house itself \"); Clarke 185; 103 U.S. 168.",
		"citation_value_orig": "166 U.S. 661",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "See Butler & Wolff xxix ; see also In re166 U.S. 661 . To be sure, a legislative body's power to discipline its members appeared to be an outgrowth of the even older and broader parliamentary power to punish members of the public , which the Constitution does not grant to the Houses of Congress . See Clarke 173 (describing the evolution of punitive measures against members of the House of Commons \"until it came to be true that almost any punishment inflicted on outsiders might also be ap-plied to persons within the house itself \"); Clarke 185; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As this Court has observed, \"[n]o general power of inflicting punishment by the Congres s of the United States is found in [the Constitution] .\" Kilbourn, 103 U.S. at 182.",
		"citation_value_orig": "103 U.S. 168",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "It follows that the punishment, including censure , of a Representative or Senator does not violate the First Amendment. Cf. Seila L aw [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]572 U.S. 565256 U.S. 15. 3. There is no sound basis to draw a different con- clusion with respect to state legislatures and local leg- islative bodies that censure their own members .",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 2183",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "It follows that the punishment, including censure , of a Representative or Senator does not violate the First Amendment. Cf. Seila L aw 140 S. Ct. 2183[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]256 U.S. 15. 3. There is no sound basis to draw a different con- clusion with respect to state legislatures and local leg- islative bodies that censure their own members .",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "It follows that the punishment, including censure , of a Representative or Senator does not violate the First Amendment. Cf. Seila L aw 140 S. Ct. 2183572 U.S. 565[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. There is no sound basis to draw a different con- clusion with respect to state legislatures and local leg- islative bodies that censure their own members .",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 U.S. 15",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "As noted above, the power of the House and Senate to dis- cipline their members for disorder ly behavior , although expressly included in the Constitution, originated in the widespread practice of colonial assemblies, which were the precursors to state legislatures. Indeed, j ust as the Speech or Debate Clause reflected the traditional \"priv- ilege o f legislators to be free from arrest or civil process for what they do or say in legislative proceedings ,\" the constitutional provision granting each House the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior \"was a reflection of political principles already firmly estab- lished in the States.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . And nothing i n the Constitution, including the Fourteenth Amendment, purports to ab- rogate or abridge that traditional power in the States. Cf.",
		"citation_value_orig": "341 U.S. 367",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "So too with censure resolutions passed by local and municipal elected bodi es against their respective mem- bers . To continue the analogy to Tenney , this Court has made clear that the absolute immunity enjoyed by state legislators for their legislative activities also extends to regional and local legislators. Lake Country Est ates, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As the Court explained, such immunity enjoyed a \"venera- ble tradition\" in the common law, and \"the rationales for such immunity\" at the federal and state levels \"are fully applicable to local legislators.\" Bogan , 523 U.S. at 49.",
		"citation_value_orig": "440 U.S. 391",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The First Amendment did not abrogate the longstanding power of elected bodies to discipline their members, including by censure",
		"context": "See Pet. Br. 25-28 (discuss- ing examples) ; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The court of appeals thus erred in holding that the censure here could violate respondent's constitutional free-speech rights. As a local or regional elected body, the board enjoys the traditional and historical power to discipline its members, including for a member's speech, as explained above.",
		"citation_value_orig": "34 F.3d 359",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Disestablishment In The States Involved Removing Coercive Laws And Allowing Freedom Of Conscience",
		"context": "This Court frequently has found Virginia's disestablishment to be particularly instructive as to the Establishment Clause's meaning, both because it was contemporaneous with the creation of the Federal Constitution, and because several of the Founders—most notably James Madiso n and Thomas Jefferson— played leading roles. See, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Virginia began its move toward disestablishment with the enactment of its Declaration of Rights in 1776. That Declaration reflected the principle of John Locke that \"religion ...a n d t h e m anner of discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or violence[.]\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 783",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Arguments Fail",
		"context": "Minerals Separation , 242 U.S. at 271; see Pet.Br.29-32. The government ignores the rule that it is \"not necessary to describe in the specification[] all possible forms in which the claimed prin- ciple may be reduced to practice.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government asserts that Amgen's 26 example anti- bodies \"do not capture even the degree of structural variation in their competitors' antibodies.\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "294 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. The Government's Arguments Fail",
		"context": "Rep. 1266, 1273-1274 (Exch.). In biological arts, inventions may be implemented by biological generation—not structural assembly—even when described by function. See Dia- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court's recognition of such cl aims laid the foundation for the Nation's biotech industry. See A. Mossoff & M. Dowd, Fearmongering Obscures the Historical, Pro-Innovation Role of Genus Claims , Westlaw Today (Mar.",
		"citation_value_orig": "447 U.S. 303",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines",
		"context": "833, 839-41 (2013). This Court likewise has recognized that link. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has viewed the Eighth Amendment in the same light, holding that an individual's ability to pay directl y bears on a fine's \"excessiveness.\" See 499 F.3d 105.",
		"citation_value_orig": "524 U.S. 321",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines",
		"context": "See 524 U.S. 321. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has viewed the Eighth Amendment in the same light, holding that an individual's ability to pay directl y bears on a fine's \"excessiveness.\" See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In United States v. Levesque , the court found that a forfeiture— for current purposes the equivalent of a fine—could be so onerous as to deprive a defendant of his or h er future ability to earn a living, thus implicating t he historical concerns underlying the Excessive Fines Clause.\" 546 F.3d 78.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 F.3d 105",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines",
		"context": "See 499 F.3d 105. In United States v. Levesque , the court found that a forfeiture— for current purposes the equivalent of a fine—could be so onerous as to deprive a defendant of his or h er future ability to earn a living, thus implicating t he historical concerns underlying the Excessive Fines Clause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Alon g similar lines, the Second Circuit has held that \"wh en analyzing a forfeiture's proportionality under the Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider—in addition to the four factors we have previously derived from Bajakajian —whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his livelihood, i.e. , his 'future ability to earn a living.'\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 F.3d 78",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. A Key Function of the Excessive Fines Clause is to Ensure Equity in the Imposition of Fines",
		"context": "Alon g similar lines, the Second Circuit has held that \"wh en analyzing a forfeiture's proportionality under the Excessive Fines Clause, courts may consider—in addition to the four factors we have previously derived from Bajakajian —whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his livelihood, i.e. , his 'future ability to earn a living.'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These sources establish that the Excessive Fines Clause requires courts, in imposing fines, to take into account the defendant's ability to pay. 13",
		"citation_value_orig": "814 F.3d 104",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. Respondents' resort to statutory purpose and policy is unavailing",
		"context": "They claim (at 19) that courts \"have overwhelmingly recognized that negligence is sufficient to state a claim under Section 14(a),\" and say there has been no 22 \"concrete harm\" (at 22) in that context. In fact, lower courts are divided about the proper standard in Section 14(a) cases. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and the SEC has drawn those rules to cover a much narrower class of statements than Section 14(e). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9, 240.14a-1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "623 F.2d 422",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "That evidence easily clears the low bar for admissi- bility . All relevant evidence is admissible at sentenc- ing upon a showing of \"minimal indicia of reliability.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Waltham evidence was far better than minimally reli- able. It was reliable enough f or the government to use, and it was corroborated in multiple respects.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 F.3d 313",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "996-1002. The Fourth Amendment requires that those statements — as \"information put forth [in a warrant affidavit] \"—are \"believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 164 -165 (1978 ). The warrant affidavit therefore reflected the 28 government's official conclusion —memorialized in a sworn declaration —that the recounted statements were sufficiently reliable to support probable cause. This Court should not countenance the govern- ment's unjustified attempt to disavow that conclusion now.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 154",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "This Court should not countenance the govern- ment's unjustified attempt to disavow that conclusion now. The government's claim (Br.44) that the affidavit need only have \"truthfully describ[ed] what T odashev had claimed\" is irreconcilable with Franks , ibid. (em- phasis omitted) , and with the government's obligation to independently conclude that the recounted evidence suffices for probable cause, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under the government's view, it can seek a warrant based on statements that it knows to be unreliable or false, so long as they are accurately transcribed. That cannot be right.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "Dzhokhar 's knowledge that Tamerlan had commit- ted jihad in Waltham could have been established by Kadyrbayev's proffer statement , whose reliability the government has never questioned . Kadyrbayev could have testified , or if necessary, his statement could have been admitted . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . b. The government does not mention, much less se- riously challenge the reliability of, the mutually rein- forcing pieces of evidence just described .",
		"citation_value_orig": "492 F.3d 652",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "Finally, it is impor tant to place the government's claim s of unreliability in context. In a capital sentenc- ing proceeding, the government is routinely permitted to present aggravating evidence of uncharged conduct through hearsay or circumstantial e vidence with sim- ilar indic ia of reliability . See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Courts have recognized in that context that \"the jury, not the judge, \" is the primary adjudicator of reliability . 707 F.3d 475.",
		"citation_value_orig": "519 F.3d 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "3. The Waltham evidence was more than reliable enough to go to the jurors.",
		"context": "See, e.g., 519 F.3d 716 . Courts have recognized in that context that \"the jury, not the judge, \" is the primary adjudicator of reliability . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That principle must apply with no less force to mitigating evidence.",
		"citation_value_orig": "707 F.3d 475",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "The Court does not review cases that involve only questions of state law. See, e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This case in- volves a direct appeal, which means \"the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional. Because this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficien t to support the judg- ment, resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "324 U.S. 117",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "This case in- volves a direct appeal, which means \"the independent and adequate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional. Because this Court has no power to review a state law determination that is sufficien t to support the judg- ment, resolution of any independent federal ground for the decision could not affect the judgment and would therefore be advisory.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Though he invokes the Sixth Amendment and uses the phra se \"ineffective assistance of counsel,\" Kaushal's petition fundamentally raises only one is- sue: whether Indiana law required the state trial court to grant his presentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The only relief Kaushal sought below is withdraw al of his guilty plea under Indiana Code sec- tion 35 -35-1-4(b).",
		"citation_value_orig": "501 U.S. 722",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "As his case currently stands, however, Kaushal's state -law motion presents no fed- eral question. Nor does Kaushal's motion implicitly incorporate a question of federal law. The Indiana Court of Ap- peals grounded its decision denying Kaushal's state - law claim on Indiana law, relying primarily on the In- diana Supreme Court's decision in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], which set the standard Indiana courts use to determine whether a defendant has \"establish[ed] prejudice\" from \"counsel's errors in advice as to penal consequences.\" Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "749 N.E.2d 496",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "App. 15. While Segura may have drawn on Supreme Court prece- dents that address Sixth Amendment ineffective -as- sistance claims —such as [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , and 529 U.S. 362 — that fact standing alone does not bring Kaushal's case within the Court's jurisdiction. In Michigan v. Long , the Court held that it determines whether a state - court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground by looking to \"the face of the opinion.\" 463 U.S. 1032.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 52",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "App. 15. While Segura may have drawn on Supreme Court prece- dents that address Sixth Amendment ineffective -as- sistance claims —such as 474 U.S. 52 , and [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] — that fact standing alone does not bring Kaushal's case within the Court's jurisdiction. In Michigan v. Long , the Court held that it determines whether a state - court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground by looking to \"the face of the opinion.\" 463 U.S. 1032.",
		"citation_value_orig": "529 U.S. 362",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The Court Does Not Have Jurisdiction to Review the Denial of Kaushal's Motion",
		"context": "While Segura may have drawn on Supreme Court prece- dents that address Sixth Amendment ineffective -as- sistance claims —such as 474 U.S. 52 , and 529 U.S. 362 — that fact standing alone does not bring Kaushal's case within the Court's jurisdiction. In Michigan v. Long , the Court held that it determines whether a state - court decision rests on an adequate and independent state ground by looking to \"the face of the opinion.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Court does not look behind the opinion to see whether the s tate-court de- cisions it cites —or the state -court decisions those de- cisions cite —rely on Supreme Court case law. Such an 9 inquiry would have no stopping point and would de- feat the very purpose of Long : \"obviat[ing] in most in- stances the need to examine state law in order to de- cide the nature of the state court decision.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "463 U.S. 1032",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "Judge Smith, author of the court of appeals' unan- imous opinion, also wrote a special concurrence, con- cluding that the School District had the authority to enforce its policy regarding on-the-job conduct to pro- tect against legal liability for violating students' and parents' Establishment Clause rights. This Court has made clear that there is \"play in the joints\" between the Establishment and Free Exer-cise Clauses that affords flexibility for government to remain neutral on matters of religion. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord 540 U.S. 712. Th e need for this flex- ibility \"is particularly acute in the public-school con- text\" (Texas Coaches' Amicus Br. 18), where school districts \"with even the best intentions are often una-ble to avoid costly litigation\" ( id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "Judge Smith, author of the court of appeals' unan- imous opinion, also wrote a special concurrence, con- cluding that the School District had the authority to enforce its policy regarding on-the-job conduct to pro- tect against legal liability for violating students' and parents' Establishment Clause rights. This Court has made clear that there is \"play in the joints\" between the Establishment and Free Exer-cise Clauses that affords flexibility for government to remain neutral on matters of religion. 397 U.S. 664; accord [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Th e need for this flex- ibility \"is particularly acute in the public-school con- text\" (Texas Coaches' Amicus Br. 18), where school districts \"with even the best intentions are often una-ble to avoid costly litigation\" ( id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "540 U.S. 712",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "18), where school districts \"with even the best intentions are often una-ble to avoid costly litigation\" ( id. at 19). And avoiding Establishment Clause violations is a compelling gov-ernmental interest that justifies reasonable re-strictions on speech (see Good News [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). High-school coaches have a unique position of au- thority and influence over their players. See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 98",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "That is especially true for football coaches, because football plays so central a role in high-school life (see Santa Fe Indep. Sch. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). 23 Judge Smith thus reasoned that while petitioner \"might not ' intentionally involve students in his on- duty religious activities,' [there was] no reason to believe that the pressure emanating from his position of authority would dissipate.\" Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 290",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "\"Accordingly, many students\"—including the players and others re- quired to attend games—\"would feel pressure to join [petitioner's] religious acti vity to avoid marking them- selves as outsiders or alie nating themselves from the team.\" Id. at 44-45 (Smith, J., concurring); see also Santa Fe , 530 U.S. at 312; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And indeed, the record evi- dence is that the Bremerton students never prayed on the field except when petitioner did . See Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "505 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. The School District was constitutionally entitled to protect itself against legal liability and to respect students' rights",
		"context": "Cf., e.g., Locke , 540 U.S. at 725. \"There can be no doubt that the First Amendment protects the right to pray.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Neither the School District nor the courts below have ever suggested oth- erwise. Yet \"there are clearl y circumstances in which [government] may lawfully prevent someone from praying at a particular time and place.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2561",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The original meaning of seizure in the Fourth Amendment included common-law arrests, which did not require the suspect to submit in response to intentional physical force",
		"context": "Jones , 565 U.S. at 411; see id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"The Court argues— and I agree—that 'we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that ex- 15 isted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'\" (al- teration in original) (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])); see also 138 S. Ct. 2206. This Court has long recognized that the Fourth Amendment has, since its inception, protected against unreasonable \"searches and seizures\" in ac- cordance with the common-law meaning of those terms. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 27",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The original meaning of seizure in the Fourth Amendment included common-law arrests, which did not require the suspect to submit in response to intentional physical force",
		"context": "Jones , 565 U.S. at 411; see id. at 420 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (\"The Court argues— and I agree—that 'we must assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that ex- 15 isted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.'\" (al- teration in original) (quoting 533 U.S. 27)); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. This Court has long recognized that the Fourth Amendment has, since its inception, protected against unreasonable \"searches and seizures\" in ac- cordance with the common-law meaning of those terms. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 2206",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "To the contrary , this Court has recognized the \"inherent risk\" that unchecked government power may be used \"not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas o r information.\" Turner Broad. Sys., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 For example, some public -school official s have \"lump [ed] religious speech with obscenity and libel for outright prohibition.\" 9 F.3d 1295.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "Sys., 512 U.S. 622. 10 For example, some public -school official s have \"lump [ed] religious speech with obscenity and libel for outright prohibition.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Others have equate d students' attempts to share their religious beliefs as rising to the level of \"fighting words.\" 2021 WL 850106 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "9 F.3d 1295",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "at 398. Public school officials have even argued that recog- nizing a Christian student group on campus would mean that public schools \"lose the power to combat bias and discrimination,\" such that schools would be- come \"balkanized\" and \"hate -filled.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Business Leaders in 2021 WL 1080556; Mot. to Dismiss at 17, InterVarsity Christian Fellowship/USA v. Board of Governors of Wayne State Univ. , No.",
		"citation_value_orig": "85 F.3d 839",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "353, 400 (2018) (finding that a d isproportionate share of 13 RFRA cases involve small religious minorities). Minor- ity religions often are unfamiliar to public officials and judges , and lack the political or finan cial clout to de- fend against confusion over their beliefs and practices . See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- day [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Religious minorities are thus particularly suscepti- ble to suffering unfair restrictions on their faith . See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (rejecting a law that deliberately targeted only Santer ia beliefs); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d 144, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "483 U.S. 327",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- day 483 U.S. 327. Religious minorities are thus particularly suscepti- ble to suffering unfair restrictions on their faith . See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ( 1993) (rejecting a law that deliberately targeted only Santer ia beliefs); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d 144, cert. denied,539 U.S. 942; LeBlanc- Stern- 67 F.3d 412; Islamic Soc'y of Basking 226 F. Supp. 3d 320. 14 And public school administrators are no exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 520",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "See Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- day 483 U.S. 327. Religious minorities are thus particularly suscepti- ble to suffering unfair restrictions on their faith . See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (rejecting a law that deliberately targeted only Santer ia beliefs); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,539 U.S. 942; LeBlanc- Stern- 67 F.3d 412; Islamic Soc'y of Basking 226 F. Supp. 3d 320. 14 And public school administrators are no exception.",
		"citation_value_orig": "309 F.3d 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "Religious minorities are thus particularly suscepti- ble to suffering unfair restrictions on their faith . See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (rejecting a law that deliberately targeted only Santer ia beliefs); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d 144, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; LeBlanc- Stern- 67 F.3d 412; Islamic Soc'y of Basking 226 F. Supp. 3d 320. 14 And public school administrators are no exception. See, e.g., A.A. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "539 U.S. 942",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "Religious minorities are thus particularly suscepti- ble to suffering unfair restrictions on their faith . See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. 520 ( 1993) (rejecting a law that deliberately targeted only Santer ia beliefs); Tenafly Eruv Ass'n, 309 F.3d 144, cert. denied,539 U.S. 942; LeBlanc- Stern- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Islamic Soc'y of Basking 226 F. Supp. 3d 320. 14 And public school administrators are no exception. See, e.g., A.A. ex rel.",
		"citation_value_orig": "67 F.3d 412",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "14 And public school administrators are no exception. See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 2018 WL 6804595; cf. 351 F. Supp. 2d 858 . Petitioner asks this Court for sweeping authority to police all student speech , while gesturing at \"[o]ther legal principles\" which could be used to stop schools from engaging in viewpoint discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "611 F.3d 248",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Religious speech is often targeted for government censure",
		"context": "See, e.g., A.A. ex rel. 611 F.3d 248; 2018 WL 6804595; cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Petitioner asks this Court for sweeping authority to police all student speech , while gesturing at \"[o]ther legal principles\" which could be used to stop schools from engaging in viewpoint discrimination. Pet 'r Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "351 F. Supp. 2d 858",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AUTHORIZING COURTS TO \"ENJOIN\" VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "\" Meghrig , 516 U.S. at 484. \"Injunctive relief constitutes a distinct type of equitable relief; it is not an umbrella term that encompasses restitution or disgorgement.\" Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Ass'n, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], reh'g en banc denied,410 Fed. Appx. 295, cert. denied,565 U.S. 814. Nor can SEC disgorgement be characterized as an ancillary remedy pursuant to a court's equitable au- thority to order an injunction.",
		"citation_value_orig": "622 F.3d 1307",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. SEC DISGORGEMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE UNDER PROVISIONS OF THE SECURITIES LAWS AUTHORIZING COURTS TO \"ENJOIN\" VIOLATIONS",
		"context": "§ 53(b), which is worded similarly to sections 20(b) of the Securities Act and 21(d)(1) of the Exchange Act. Overruling its own precedent, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the statute does not authorize disgorge- ment as relief ancillary to an injunction. See 937 F.3d 764[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] [of the FTCA],\" because that section applies only where the defendant is \" 'violating' or 'about to violate' the law.\" Credit Bureau Center , 937 F.3d at 772. See 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "877 F.3d 1234",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "Although petitioner is wrong in multiple respects, his cardin al sin is reading Section 42121(b)(2)(B) \"in isolation.\" Dubin , 143 S. Ct. at 1566 (quotations omitted). When AIR-21 is read \"as a whole,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], it is evident that the statute's prohibition on retaliation requires the plaintiff to prove retalia- tory intent. 1. Start with Section 42121(b)(1), which petition- er ignores.",
		"citation_value_orig": "502 U.S. 215",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "§ 42121(b)(3). Another standard rule in litigation is that the plaintiff must prove his entitlement to re- lief. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Schaffer ex rel. 546 U.S. 49. Here, this means that the plain- tiff must prove exactly what he alleged—i.e., inten- 2 Petitioner may contend that Se ction 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii) can be read as not actually requiring the plaintiff to prove the com- plaint's allegation of an unlaw ful personnel action, but only that protected activity contributed to the unlawful personnel action alleged in the complaint.",
		"citation_value_orig": "557 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "Another standard rule in litigation is that the plaintiff must prove his entitlement to re- lief. See 557 U.S. 167; Schaffer ex rel. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Here, this means that the plain- tiff must prove exactly what he alleged—i.e., inten- 2 Petitioner may contend that Se ction 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii) can be read as not actually requiring the plaintiff to prove the com- plaint's allegation of an unlaw ful personnel action, but only that protected activity contributed to the unlawful personnel action alleged in the complaint. This interpretation, while un- likely, would not help petitioner in any event.",
		"citation_value_orig": "546 U.S. 49",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "That is because the phrase \"only if\" in Section 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii) \"describes a necessary condition, not a sufficient condition.\" Twp. of Tini- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] did not directly require the plaintiff to prove the unlawful personnel action alleged in the complaint, it would not follow that the plaintiff is relieved of that burden altogether—i.e., the elements required by Section 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii) woul d be necessary, but not sufficient, to es- tablish the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. See 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv) (prohibiting relief based on employer's showing).",
		"citation_value_orig": "582 F.3d 482",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "17 tional discrimination because of protected activity in violation of Section 42121(a). Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] that retaliatory intent is required for an AIR-21 re- taliation claim, but he asserts that Congress deviat- ed from the traditional structure of litigation through a different sub-sub-sub-subsection of AIR- 21: Section 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). That provision, he suggests, \"place[s] the burden\" to disprove retaliato- ry intent on the defendant-employer. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "487 U.S. 977",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). This pr ovision \"shift[s] the bur- den of persuasion to the employer to establish the absence of but-for cause.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also Comcast , 140 S. Ct. at 1017 (requiring th e defendant to prove \"that it would have made the same decision even if it had not taken the\" protected trait or activity into account \"[i]n essence\" takes \"the burden of proving but-for causation from the plaintiff and hand[s] it to the de- 18 fendant as an affirmative defense\"). But causation is not the same as intent. See Staub , 562 U.S. at 418- 22 (distinguishing causation and intent); Hartman , 547 U.S. at 260 (same); Resp.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 204",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "The Energy Reorganization Act (\"ERA\"), has the same structure as the provisions at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and has b een (correctly) interpret- ed to require a showing of retaliatory intent. See 20 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 400 F.3d 1001; 285 F.3d 243; 78 F.3d 352. So too for the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20109, which like SOX explicitly adopts AIR-21's burden-allocation scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "745 F.3d 521",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "The Energy Reorganization Act (\"ERA\"), has the same structure as the provisions at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and has b een (correctly) interpret- ed to require a showing of retaliatory intent. See 20 745 F.3d 521; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 285 F.3d 243; 78 F.3d 352. So too for the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20109, which like SOX explicitly adopts AIR-21's burden-allocation scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "400 F.3d 1001",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "The Energy Reorganization Act (\"ERA\"), has the same structure as the provisions at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and has b een (correctly) interpret- ed to require a showing of retaliatory intent. See 20 745 F.3d 521; 400 F.3d 1001; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 78 F.3d 352. So too for the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20109, which like SOX explicitly adopts AIR-21's burden-allocation scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "285 F.3d 243",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "The Energy Reorganization Act (\"ERA\"), has the same structure as the provisions at issue here, 42 U.S.C. § 5851, and has b een (correctly) interpret- ed to require a showing of retaliatory intent. See 20 745 F.3d 521; 400 F.3d 1001; 285 F.3d 243; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. So too for the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), 49 U.S.C. § 20109, which like SOX explicitly adopts AIR-21's burden-allocation scheme.",
		"citation_value_orig": "78 F.3d 352",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "§ 20109(d)(2)(A)(i); see, e.g. , 983 F.3d 74; Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp 948 F.3d 940; 968 F.3d 724; 880 F.3d 377; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 849 F.3d 723; 768 F.3d 786. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 716",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "§ 20109(d)(2)(A)(i); see, e.g. , 983 F.3d 74; Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp 948 F.3d 940; 968 F.3d 724; 880 F.3d 377; 849 F.3d 716; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 768 F.3d 786. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "849 F.3d 723",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Section 42121(b) Confirms That A Retaliation Plaintiff Must Prove The Elements Of Retaliation Under Section 42121(a)",
		"context": "§ 20109(d)(2)(A)(i); see, e.g. , 983 F.3d 74; Dakota, Minn. & E. R.R. Corp 948 F.3d 940; 968 F.3d 724; 880 F.3d 377; 849 F.3d 716; 849 F.3d 723; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21",
		"citation_value_orig": "768 F.3d 786",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. The FAA Was Never Designed To Cover Statutory Claims",
		"context": "In Mitsubishi Motors [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the Court misread Sec- tion 2 of the FAA, the FAA's core provision, and as a result, the Court radically transformed and expanded the meaning of the statute. The text of the FAA is lim-ited to written provisions in a contract to arbitrate dis- putes arising out of that contract. 9 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied Dudenhoeffer",
		"context": "This standard of care is ev en higher than its anteced- ent in the common law of trusts. Dudenhoeffer , 573 U.S. at 422-23 (noting that, \"by contrast to the rule at com-mon law, 'trust documents ca nnot excuse trustees from their duties under ERISA' \" (quoting Cent. States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])). Prudence claims brought against other ERISA fi- duciaries are not encumbered by a presumption that 23 only one meritorious claim may be found amidst a sea of frivolous ones, so why should ESOP prudence claims be any different? If ESOP prudence claims must be pleaded according to a standard that is \"more restric-tive\" than that of a typica l ERISA prudence claim, then this Court's holding in Dudenhoeffer that \"ESOP fidu- ciaries are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general\" is vitiated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "472 U.S. 559",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Second Circuit Correctly Applied Dudenhoeffer",
		"context": "Prudence claims brought against other ERISA fi- duciaries are not encumbered by a presumption that 23 only one meritorious claim may be found amidst a sea of frivolous ones, so why should ESOP prudence claims be any different? If ESOP prudence claims must be pleaded according to a standard that is \"more restric-tive\" than that of a typica l ERISA prudence claim, then this Court's holding in Dudenhoeffer that \"ESOP fidu- ciaries are subject to the same duty of prudence that applies to ERISA fiduciaries in general\" is vitiated. 2 ---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 2 In a footnote, Petitioners also argue that the Second Cir- cuit's decision \"conflicts\" with this Court's holding in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Pet. App.",
		"citation_value_orig": "530 U.S. 211",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment",
		"context": "Litigation is, by definition, a controversy. Relying upon controversy could create a \"heckler's veto,\" as happened in this case, which would doom not only monuments, but such acceptable practices as Sunday closing 42 laws, school funding, and legislative prayer, all of which the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional. See e.g., Town of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. What is relevant, then, is whether history reveals that a practice has established or tended to establish religion. A historical analysis should look for the best understanding of the purposes of the Establishment Clause for which there is some agreement.",
		"citation_value_orig": "572 U.S. 565",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment",
		"context": "Some general assumptions regarding the meaning of the Establishment Clause include that government cannot establish a church, discriminate among sects, or objectively compel a certain sectarian belief. This Court has declared that the Establishment Clause permits government funding of religious activities or education in the form of vouchers, scholarships, transportation, books, teaching materials, projectors, onsite training by public school teachers, interpreters, remedial education, buildings, revenue bonds, and construction grants. 3 The Court has also 3 See e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]392 U.S. 236. 43 said that property tax exemptions, a government-funded hospital run by a Roman Catholic order, and Medicare funds used by sectarian healthcare providers pose no constitutional problem. 4 Although a guiding principle in government funding cases centers on neutrally available benefits and private choices, the fact remains that the religious mission of the institution is advanced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment",
		"context": "Some general assumptions regarding the meaning of the Establishment Clause include that government cannot establish a church, discriminate among sects, or objectively compel a certain sectarian belief. This Court has declared that the Establishment Clause permits government funding of religious activities or education in the form of vouchers, scholarships, transportation, books, teaching materials, projectors, onsite training by public school teachers, interpreters, remedial education, buildings, revenue bonds, and construction grants. 3 The Court has also 3 See e.g., 536 U.S. 639[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 43 said that property tax exemptions, a government-funded hospital run by a Roman Catholic order, and Medicare funds used by sectarian healthcare providers pose no constitutional problem. 4 Although a guiding principle in government funding cases centers on neutrally available benefits and private choices, the fact remains that the religious mission of the institution is advanced.",
		"citation_value_orig": "392 U.S. 236",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. History And Ubiquity, Properly Applied, Would Distinguish Acknowledgment From Establishment",
		"context": "If funding cases have not raised the shadow of an established religion, then passive displays will not. Surely this Court is \"unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or other powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the religious heritage, long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of government. Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of 4 See e.g., Zelman, 536 U.S. at 667- 68; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 44 establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed.\" Lynch, 465 U.S. at 686.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 664",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "Statutory construction begins, and absent a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, ends, with the plain language of the statute. Bread Political Action [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A term otherwise undefined in a statute is given its ordinary meaning. 566 U.S. 560.",
		"citation_value_orig": "455 U.S. 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "Bread Political Action 455 U.S. 577. A term otherwise undefined in a statute is given its ordinary meaning. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Section 213(b) exemption at issue here ex empts from overtime pay \"any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 560",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "Assuming for the moment then that a service advisor is a sal esman,2 Petitioner must acknowledge that a service advisor is not \"servicing\" a car like the partsman or mechanic. When the partsman and mechanic complete their work on a car with faulty brakes , the car is repaired. When the service a dvisor's work is done, diagnosing that brake work is 2 While the duties of service advisors include sales of service, making them salesman \"of a sort,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], that job has additional duties that are not sales duties. Id. at 927.",
		"citation_value_orig": "845 F.3d 925",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "at 3, 27-28, the duties covered by the Section 213(b)(10)(A) exemption are separated by the disjunctive \"or,\" and not, as Petitioner's interpretation demands, a combination of those terms that would read \"selling servicing.\" For this same reason, a service advisor is not \"functionally similar\" to partsman or mechanic. Contra [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . It is black letter law in FLSA jurisprudence that exemptions are applied vel non by examination of the actual duties of a position, and not the position's title. See e.g., 358 U.S. 207 .",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 F.2d 1095",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "Contra 475 F.2d 1095 . It is black letter law in FLSA jurisprudence that exemptions are applied vel non by examination of the actual duties of a position, and not the position's title. See e.g., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . But comparing the tasks of the service advisor and those of the partsman or mechanic does not yield the same set of duties. The combined work of the partsman and mech anic allows a customer to drive away from the dealership in a functioning car.",
		"citation_value_orig": "358 U.S. 207",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. THE \"MOST NATURAL READING\" OF THE SECTION 213(b)(10)(A) EXEMPTION EXCLUDES SERVICE ADVISORS",
		"context": "Id. \"That a definition is broad enough to encompass one sense of a word does not establish that the word is ordinarily understood in that sense. \" Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at ___; 132 S. Ct. at 2003 (emphasis in original) citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] exemption is \"the most natural reading of the statute.\" Navarro , 845 F.3d at 934. That is, reading the plain language of the statute and giving undefined terms their common meaning, Congress did not intend to include service advisors",
		"citation_value_orig": "490 U.S. 296",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities",
		"context": "20-21. Because neither argument was advanc ed or passed upon in the courts below, they are not properly before this Court. E.g., McLane Co., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In any case, both lack merit. Taking the second point first, whether milling- and-tailings-related concerns were the \"sole\" motiva- tion for the ban is completely irrelevant.",
		"citation_value_orig": "137 S. Ct. 1159",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "IV. Respondents Have Repeatedly Conceded that Virginia's Ban Is Grounded in Impermissible Radiological Safety Concerns Related to Milling and Tailings Activities",
		"context": "As Respondents admit, in at least some contexts this Court has co nsidered the issue of a State's motivation as \"a question of fact,\" and it is un- clear why the inquiry would be any different here. Re-spondents' Br. 41 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]); see also Hunt , 526 U.S. at 549 (equal protection); Taylor , 477 U.S. at 140-45 (dormant com- merce clause).",
		"citation_value_orig": "471 U.S. 222",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": ". \"A defendant is entitled to post-conviction relief\" in Arizona \"when '[t]here has been a significant change in the law that if determined to apply to defendant's case would probably overturn the defendant's convic- tion or sentence[.]'\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For more than 30 years, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that \"a significant change\" occurs when an appellate court overrules binding precedent. In 1989, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Rule 32.1(g) permitted review where an intervening decision over- ruled state-court precedent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "386 P.3d 392",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": "For more than 30 years, the Arizona Supreme Court has held that \"a significant change\" occurs when an appellate court overrules binding precedent. In 1989, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled that Rule 32.1(g) permitted review where an intervening decision over- ruled state-court precedent. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In 2009, the Arizona Su- preme Court confirmed that the \"archetype\" of a sig- nificant change in the law \"occurs when an appellate court overrules previously binding case law.\" Shrum , 203 P.3d at 1178.",
		"citation_value_orig": "776 P.2d 353",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": "And just last year, the Arizona Su- preme Court yet again noted that the \"archetype of such a change occurs when an appellate court over- rules previously binding case law.\" 492 P.3d 1020 regardless of whether the intervening decision overruled precedent of the same or a subordinate court. In Shrum , the Arizona Su- preme Court found \"a significant change in the law\" where this Court in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], \"expressly overruled\" its own prior decision. Shrum , 203 P.3d at 1178-79 (citing 64 P.3d 828). By the same token, the Ar- izona Supreme Court in Slemmer found a significant change in the law where the state high court over- turned a practice that \"a near-unanimous body of lower court authority had expressly approved.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "536 U.S. 584",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": "492 P.3d 1020 regardless of whether the intervening decision overruled precedent of the same or a subordinate court. In Shrum , the Arizona Su- preme Court found \"a significant change in the law\" where this Court in 536 U.S. 584, \"expressly overruled\" its own prior decision. Shrum , 203 P.3d at 1178-79 (citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). By the same token, the Ar- izona Supreme Court in Slemmer found a significant change in the law where the state high court over- turned a practice that \"a near-unanimous body of lower court authority had expressly approved.\" 823 P.2d at 49 (alteration and quotation marks omitted).",
		"citation_value_orig": "64 P.3d 828",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": "776 P.2d at 354-355. As particularly relevant here, an Arizona appellate court previously found a significant change in the law where this Court overruled Arizona state-court prece- dent on a federal-law question. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the court held that 559 U.S. 356 , consti- tuted a significant change in the law because it over- ruled \"the law in Arizona\" on a federal question. The court thus found a significant change in the law even though Padilla overruled an Arizona state-court deci- sion rather than a decision of this Court. Poblete , 260 P.3d at 1105.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 P.3d 1102",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Under Three Decades Of Arizona Law, Rule 32.1(g) Permits Review Where An Appellate Court Overrules Prior Precedent",
		"context": "776 P.2d at 354-355. As particularly relevant here, an Arizona appellate court previously found a significant change in the law where this Court overruled Arizona state-court prece- dent on a federal-law question. In 260 P.3d 1102, the court held that [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , consti- tuted a significant change in the law because it over- ruled \"the law in Arizona\" on a federal question. The court thus found a significant change in the law even though Padilla overruled an Arizona state-court deci- sion rather than a decision of this Court. Poblete , 260 P.3d at 1105.",
		"citation_value_orig": "559 U.S. 356",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Neither petitioner is entitled to an as-applied exemption on this record",
		"context": "2. The Foundation briefly suggests (at 52) that confidential submission of its Schedule B to the Regis-try could also lead to reprisals from state officials. In [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], this Court held that 52 campaign disclosure provisions of Ohio law could not constitutionally be applied to the 60 -member Socialist Workers Party in Ohio. The district co urt had found substantial evidence of both governmental and private hostility toward the organization based on, among other things, a \"massive\" FBI surveillance program, efforts to disrupt the organization, and police harass- ment of a candidate . Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "459 U.S. 87",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Neither petitioner is entitled to an as-applied exemption on this record",
		"context": ", Foundation Br. 52 (noting form er Attorney General's call for change in public disclosure laws) ; see generally U.S. Postal [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Tellingly, petitioners have submitted their Sched- ule Bs to the IRS for years , including at times when that agency's data -security and other practices were the subject of significant public criticism. E.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "534 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "In his dissent in Lathrop v. Donohue , Justice Black noted: \"I can think of few plainer, more direct abridgments of the freedoms of the First Amendment than to compel persons to support candidates, parties, ideologies or causes that they are against.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In its deci sion in Janus , this Court has come to accept Justice Black's point of view, ruling that gov- ernment compelled support of ideological causes \"is al- ways demeaning\" and therefore violates the core prin- ciples of the First Amendment.3 Janus , 138 S.Ct. at 2 Because the lower court's rationale only compels speech by in- dividuals opposed to same -sex marriage based on this past state discrimination ag ainst homosexual individuals, the Colorado law also discriminates on the basis of content ( NIFLA , 138 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 820",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "at 2378 -79 (Kennedy , J. concurring ). 3 Amic us here use the term \"ideological\" in its broadest sense. As this Court noted in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Keller v. State Bar of California , 496 U.S., at 15 -16 (1990); 430 U.S. 705 ; Board of 319 U.S. 624, 633 -34 (1943 ) . This conclusion comports with the original meaning of the freedom speech pro- tected by the First Amendment Evidence of congressional intent or ratification arguments concerning the Free Speech Clause is scarce, at best. There was clear consensus that the measure prohibited \"censorship\" but there wa s debate about the extent to which government could punish speech after it was published.",
		"citation_value_orig": "431 U.S. 3",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "at 2378 -79 (Kennedy , J. concurring ). 3 Amic us here use the term \"ideological\" in its broadest sense. As this Court noted in 431 U.S. 3 ; Keller v. State Bar of California , 496 U.S., at 15 -16 (1990); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Board of 319 U.S. 624, 633 -34 (1943 ) . This conclusion comports with the original meaning of the freedom speech pro- tected by the First Amendment Evidence of congressional intent or ratification arguments concerning the Free Speech Clause is scarce, at best. There was clear consensus that the measure prohibited \"censorship\" but there wa s debate about the extent to which government could punish speech after it was published.",
		"citation_value_orig": "430 U.S. 705",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "at 2378 -79 (Kennedy , J. concurring ). 3 Amic us here use the term \"ideological\" in its broadest sense. As this Court noted in 431 U.S. 3 ; Keller v. State Bar of California , 496 U.S., at 15 -16 (1990); 430 U.S. 705 ; Board of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 633 -34 (1943 ) . This conclusion comports with the original meaning of the freedom speech pro- tected by the First Amendment Evidence of congressional intent or ratification arguments concerning the Free Speech Clause is scarce, at best. There was clear consensus that the measure prohibited \"censorship\" but there wa s debate about the extent to which government could punish speech after it was published.",
		"citation_value_orig": "319 U.S. 624",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "There was clear consensus that the measure prohibited \"censorship\" but there wa s debate about the extent to which government could punish speech after it was published. That debate is revealed in the sources recounting the debates over the Sedi- tion Act of 1798. See History of Congress, February, 1799 at 2988; New York Times [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. But did the founding generation intend the First Amendment to protect against compelled speech? For that answer we must resort to the \"prac- tices and beliefs of the Founders\" in general.",
		"citation_value_orig": "376 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "But did the founding generation intend the First Amendment to protect against compelled speech? For that answer we must resort to the \"prac- tices and beliefs of the Founders\" in general. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]: \"But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters —to take a nonexhaustive list of labels —is not entitled to full First Amendment protection. Union membe rs in both the public and private sectors may find that a variety of union activ- ities conflict with their beliefs. Nothing in the First Amendment or our cases discussing its meaning makes the question w hether the adjective 'political' can properly be atta ched to those beliefs the critical constitutional inquiry.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "514 US 334",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "4 While there was no discussion of compelled sup- port for political activity, there was significant debate over compelled financial support of churches in Mas- sachusetts and Virginia, the Virginia debate being the most famous. This Court has often quoted Jefferson's argument \"That to compel a man to furnish cont ribu- tions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves and abhors is sinful and tyrannical.\" Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779) in 5 The Founders Constitution, Uni- versity of Chicago Press (1987) at 77; quoted in Keller v. State Bar , 496 U.S., at 10; Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson , 475 U.S., at 305, n.15; Abood , 431 U.S., at 234-35 n.31; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Jefferson went on to note, \"That even forcing him to support this or that teacher of h is own religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfort- able liberty of giving his contributions to the particu- lar pastor whose morals he would make his pattern.\" Jefferson , Religious Freedom, supra at 77.",
		"citation_value_orig": "330 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "He is forced to broadcast counterfeited public opi nion, distorting de- mocracy , and losing his freedom in one fell swoop. This is flatly incompatible with the First Amendment with its \"respect for the conscience of the individual [that] honors the sanctity of thought and belief.\" Pub- lic Utilities Commissi [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Freedom of conscience and the dignity of the in- dividual are the foundations underlying the liberty enshrined in the First Amendment. They lay at the core of Jefferson's and Madison's arguments that have influenced the separate opinions regarding the Free- dom of Speech of Justices Black ( 367 U.S. 740, and Stone ( Minersville School Dis- 310 U.S. 586, to name but a few.",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 451",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "Pub- lic Utilities Commissi 343 U.S. 451. Freedom of conscience and the dignity of the in- dividual are the foundations underlying the liberty enshrined in the First Amendment. They lay at the core of Jefferson's and Madison's arguments that have influenced the separate opinions regarding the Free- dom of Speech of Justices Black ( [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], and Stone ( Minersville School Dis- 310 U.S. 586, to name but a few. They also lay at the heart of this Court's opinion in Janus . This Court recognized these principles in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. at 641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "367 U.S. 740",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "Pub- lic Utilities Commissi 343 U.S. 451. Freedom of conscience and the dignity of the in- dividual are the foundations underlying the liberty enshrined in the First Amendment. They lay at the core of Jefferson's and Madison's arguments that have influenced the separate opinions regarding the Free- dom of Speech of Justices Black ( 367 U.S. 740, and Stone ( Minersville School Dis- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], to name but a few. They also lay at the heart of this Court's opinion in Janus . This Court recognized these principles in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette , 319 U.S. at 641.",
		"citation_value_orig": "310 U.S. 586",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "at 604 (Stone, J. dissenting). Since, Justice Stone's dissent Minersville was vindicated in cases from Barnette to Janus . This Court has ruled that the freedom of conscience and human dignity protected by the First Amendment were violated in compelled flag salutes ( Barnette , 319 U.S. at 641), required membership in a political party [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], 356 -57 (plurality) (1976) ), compelled display of state messages on license plate frames ( Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. at 713 ), re- quired distribution of other organization's newsletters (Pacific Gas & Electric 475 U.S. 1. These are the rights that are at stake in this case. The Court should grant review to determine when, if ever, the state may force an individual to create and publish the sp eech with which he disagrees in order to promote the speech of another individual.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 347",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "I. The First Amendment Was Intended to Protect Against Compelled Speech",
		"context": "at 604 (Stone, J. dissenting). Since, Justice Stone's dissent Minersville was vindicated in cases from Barnette to Janus . This Court has ruled that the freedom of conscience and human dignity protected by the First Amendment were violated in compelled flag salutes ( Barnette , 319 U.S. at 641), required membership in a political party 427 U.S. 347, 356 -57 (plurality) (1976) ), compelled display of state messages on license plate frames ( Wooley v. Maynard , 430 U.S. at 713 ), re- quired distribution of other organization's newsletters (Pacific Gas & Electric [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. These are the rights that are at stake in this case. The Court should grant review to determine when, if ever, the state may force an individual to create and publish the sp eech with which he disagrees in order to promote the speech of another individual.",
		"citation_value_orig": "475 U.S. 1",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Acted Within Its Constitutional Authority in Conferring on the FHFA Director Some Degree of Independence from the President",
		"context": "For over a century, and consistent with constitu- tional text and history, this Court has repeatedly reit- erated that Congress may limit the President's author- ity to remove certain officers without cause. See, e.g., Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2192 (\"we need not and do not revisit our prior decisions allowing certain limitations on the President's removal power\"); Free Enter. Fund , 561 U.S. at 501 (noting that the Court does not \"take issue with for-cause limitations in general\"); Morrison , 487 U.S. at 692 (upholding for-cause removal re- strictions for an independent counsel); Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. at 627-28 (upholding for-cause removal restrictions for the members of the Federal Trade Commission); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. To be sure, last Term, this Court held in Seila Law that a for-cause restriction on the President's power to remove the CFPB's single Director violates the sepa- ration of powers. 140 S. Ct. at 2201.",
		"citation_value_orig": "116 U.S. 483",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Acted Within Its Constitutional Authority in Conferring on the FHFA Director Some Degree of Independence from the President",
		"context": "61 (quoting Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2200). But where the FHFA acts as conservator or receiver of, for example, Fannie Mae, it steps \"into Fannie Mae's pri- vate shoes\" and \"shed[s] its government character\" al- together. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 21 Thus, when the FHFA acts as conservator or receiver, it is no different from an Article II perspective than the CEOs of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The FHFA's activities as conservator or receiver therefore should not trigger separation-of-powers concerns.",
		"citation_value_orig": "861 F.3d 160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Acted Within Its Constitutional Authority in Conferring on the FHFA Director Some Degree of Independence from the President",
		"context": "That distinction is important. After all, \"[t]he struc- tural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual.\" Bond, 564 U.S. at 222; see Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2202 (\"structural protections\" are \"critical to preserving liberty\" (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]])); Wellness Intern. Net- work, 135 S. Ct. 1932. In fact, in Seila Law , this Court contrasted the CFPB with the independent counsel at issue in Morri- son, noting that although the independent counsel had the power to initiate criminal investigations and pros- ecutions, its power was \"trained inward to high-rank- ing Governmental actors identified by others.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "478 U.S. 714",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Congress Acted Within Its Constitutional Authority in Conferring on the FHFA Director Some Degree of Independence from the President",
		"context": "After all, \"[t]he struc- tural principles secured by the separation of powers protect the individual.\" Bond, 564 U.S. at 222; see Seila Law , 140 S. Ct. at 2202 (\"structural protections\" are \"critical to preserving liberty\" (quoting 478 U.S. 714)); Wellness Intern. Net- work, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In fact, in Seila Law , this Court contrasted the CFPB with the independent counsel at issue in Morri- son, noting that although the independent counsel had the power to initiate criminal investigations and pros- ecutions, its power was \"trained inward to high-rank- ing Governmental actors identified by others.\" 140 S. 22 Ct. at 2200 (emphasis added).",
		"citation_value_orig": "135 S. Ct. 1932",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Montana Supreme Court's Interpretation of section 122(e)(6) Is Flawed",
		"context": "11a (emphasis added). But the ordinary meaning of \"any challenges\" does not chan ge depending on who is im- plementing the remedy. See McClellan Ecological Seep- age [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And \"any challenges\" sweeps broadly for good reason: it would have been pointless for Congress to enact the juris- dictional bar in § 113(h) if liti gants could circumvent it by cleverly targeting private pa rties whom EPA requires to carry out its remedy, rather than EPA itself. 2.",
		"citation_value_orig": "47 F.3d 325",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Montana Supreme Court's Interpretation of section 122(e)(6) Is Flawed",
		"context": "As the four-dec ade history of the Anaconda 32 cleanup shows, Superfund remediation plans are breath- takingly complex and evolving processes. This Court should decline to thwart \"Congress's overall goal that CERCLA free EPA to conduct forthwith cleanup-related activities at a hazardous site\" without interfering litiga- tion. Boarhead [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. II. Section 122(e)(6) Bars Respondents' Restoration Remedy Section 122(e)(6), entitled \"Inconsistent Response Ac- tion,\" independently bars re spondents' restoration rem- edy.",
		"citation_value_orig": "923 F.2d 1011",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "It uses the general terms \"liability,\" \"response action,\" and \"settlement,\" not nar- rower terms such as \"liability under this Act,\" \"resp onse action under this Act,\" or \"settlement under this Act.\" This C ourt should not narro w the provision's scope by adding limiting words that Congress left out . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Section 113(f )(3)(B)'s elaborate detail underscores that point. Section 113(f )(3)(B) sets out in meticulous terms the co nditions that a person must satisfy before bringing a claim for contribution.",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1721",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "Congress's enu- meration of tho se requirements implies the absence of a further, unstated requirement that the settled liabil- ity arise under the Act. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius . See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 17 Reinforcing that conclusion, Section 113(f )(3)(B) as a whole bespeaks breadth . The clause's string of five \"or's\"— \"resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or ju- dicially ap proved settlement,\" 42 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 830",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "What Congress made broad, a court should not seek to narrow. Further, a lthough this Court never \"lightly as- sume[s] that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it n onetheless intends to apply,\" the Court' s \"reluctance is even greater\" when \"Con- gress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; see 464 U.S. 16. Other CERCLA provisions ex- press ly limit the availability of contribution to claims arising under particular source s of law. The nearby Section 113(f )(1), for example, authorizes a person to seek contribution during or after \"any civil action under [Section 106] or under [Section 107(a)] \" of the Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 335",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "What Congress made broad, a court should not seek to narrow. Further, a lthough this Court never \"lightly as- sume[s] that Congress has omitted from its adopted text requirements that it n onetheless intends to apply,\" the Court' s \"reluctance is even greater\" when \"Con- gress has shown elsewhere in the same statute that it knows how to make such a requirement manifest.\" 543 U.S. 335 ; see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Other CERCLA provisions ex- press ly limit the availability of contribution to claims arising under particular source s of law. The nearby Section 113(f )(1), for example, authorizes a person to seek contribution during or after \"any civil action under [Section 106] or under [Section 107(a)] \" of the Act.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Congress's failure to include the words \"under this Act\" or similar language in Section 113(f)(3)(B) confirms that the provision reaches settlements that resolve claims brought under other laws",
		"context": "9613(a). The original text in the Statutes at Large takes precedence over the edited text in the Code. See United States National [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 19 Seve ral aspects of the Act make the contrast be- tween those provisions and Section 113(f )(3)(B) partic- ularly conspicuous. While t he CERCLA provisions enumerated above use otherwise parallel language— \"liability under this Act,\" \"settlements under this Act,\" and \"response action under t his Act\" —Section 113(f )(3)(B) refers to \"liability,\" \"settlement\" and \"re- sponse action\" simpliciter .",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 439",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent",
		"context": "That is incorrect. As a textual matter, the word \"discriminate\" typi- cally mean s \"[t]o make a difference in treatment or fa- vor (of one as compared with others) .'' [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]544 U.S. 167140 S. Ct. 1740 means. And a prohibition against such different treat- ment \"does not depend on why the employer discrimi- nates\" or the presence of \"malevolent motive.\" Inter- national 499 U.S. 187; see, e.g., Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (discuss- ing cases imposing Title VII disparate -treatment liabil- ity even though the employer \"tend ed to favor hiring women \" or sought to treat categories of men and women \"equal[ly]\" withou t \"animosity\" against women).",
		"citation_value_orig": "140 S. Ct. 1731",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent",
		"context": "That is incorrect. As a textual matter, the word \"discriminate\" typi- cally mean s \"[t]o make a difference in treatment or fa- vor (of one as compared with others) .'' 140 S. Ct. 1731[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]140 S. Ct. 1740 means. And a prohibition against such different treat- ment \"does not depend on why the employer discrimi- nates\" or the presence of \"malevolent motive.\" Inter- national 499 U.S. 187; see, e.g., Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (discuss- ing cases imposing Title VII disparate -treatment liabil- ity even though the employer \"tend ed to favor hiring women \" or sought to treat categories of men and women \"equal[ly]\" withou t \"animosity\" against women).",
		"citation_value_orig": "544 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent",
		"context": "140 S. Ct. 1731544 U.S. 167140 S. Ct. 1740 means. And a prohibition against such different treat- ment \"does not depend on why the employer discrimi- nates\" or the presence of \"malevolent motive.\" Inter- national [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see, e.g., Bostock , 140 S. Ct. at 1743 (discuss- ing cases imposing Title VII disparate -treatment liabil- ity even though the employer \"tend ed to favor hiring women \" or sought to treat categories of men and women \"equal[ly]\" withou t \"animosity\" against women). 26 Section 1514A(a) identifies a short list of specific types of acts constituting forbidden differential treatment \"because of \" protected whistleblowing: \"discharge, de- mot[ion] , suspen [sion] , threat [s], [and] harass [ment] .\" 18 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "499 U.S. 187",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent",
		"context": "i n Opp. 16) that it makes no sense \"[t]o speak of retaliation without intent \" and that, \"[b]y definition, retaliation is disparate treatment on account of protected activity.\" But although the title of Section 1514A describes the provision as affording 27 protection against \" retaliation, \" see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , the operative statutory text does not contain the word \"retaliation.\" Nor does it use the term \"intentional re- taliation .\" The settled elements of the complainant's burden of proof under the WPA, and Sections 42121 and 1514A, req uire proof only that the employer had knowledge of the employee's protected activ ity, and that the protected activity was a contributing factor in the employer's action.",
		"citation_value_orig": "571 U.S. 429",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "1. Section 1514A(a) does not require proof of retaliatory intent",
		"context": "generally require that the actor intend the c onse- quences of a n act ,\" Br. in Opp. 16 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (2011 )), is similarly misplaced. That principle is relevant where (as in Staub ) a plaintiff relies on a statute that prohibits cer- tain employment actions taken with discriminatory in- tent to hold an employer liable for an action taken by a second -level supervisor who lacked any discriminatory \"animus\" but who based her decision on a report by a first -line supervisor who acted with such animus . 562 U.S. at 417 -418.",
		"citation_value_orig": "562 U.S. 411",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": ". Retention of jurisdiction provisions are generally construed to preserve excl usive jurisdiction in the court that issued the judgment or decree or approved the settlement agreement over which jurisdiction was retained. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"The reason why exclusivity is inferred is that it would make no sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judg-ment to the future conduct contemplated by the judg- ment, yet have a state court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment.\"). This has been 22 described as a \"mandatory jurisdictional limitation.\" State 339 F.3d 804, citing 212 U.S. 118; 260 U.S. 226.",
		"citation_value_orig": "174 F.3d 1007",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See 174 F.3d 1007 (\"The reason why exclusivity is inferred is that it would make no sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judg-ment to the future conduct contemplated by the judg- ment, yet have a state court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment.\"). This has been 22 described as a \"mandatory jurisdictional limitation.\" State [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], citing 212 U.S. 118; 260 U.S. 226. For one court to adjudicate issues within the re- tained jurisdiction of another court, let alone the high- est court in the land, is not permissible. See 333 F.2d 169, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "339 F.3d 804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See 174 F.3d 1007 (\"The reason why exclusivity is inferred is that it would make no sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judg-ment to the future conduct contemplated by the judg- ment, yet have a state court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment.\"). This has been 22 described as a \"mandatory jurisdictional limitation.\" State 339 F.3d 804, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; 260 U.S. 226. For one court to adjudicate issues within the re- tained jurisdiction of another court, let alone the high- est court in the land, is not permissible. See 333 F.2d 169, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "212 U.S. 118",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "See 174 F.3d 1007 (\"The reason why exclusivity is inferred is that it would make no sense for the district court to retain jurisdiction to interpret and apply its own judg-ment to the future conduct contemplated by the judg- ment, yet have a state court construing what the federal court meant in the judgment.\"). This has been 22 described as a \"mandatory jurisdictional limitation.\" State 339 F.3d 804, citing 212 U.S. 118; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For one court to adjudicate issues within the re- tained jurisdiction of another court, let alone the high- est court in the land, is not permissible. See 333 F.2d 169, cert.",
		"citation_value_orig": "260 U.S. 226",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "State 339 F.3d 804, citing 212 U.S. 118; 260 U.S. 226. For one court to adjudicate issues within the re- tained jurisdiction of another court, let alone the high- est court in the land, is not permissible. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied379 U.S. 904. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Lapin : [F]or a non-issuing court to entertain an ac- tion for such relief would be seriously to inter- fere with, and substantially to usurp, the inherent power of the issuing court .",
		"citation_value_orig": "333 F.2d 169",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "to su- pervise its continuing decree by determining from time to time whether and how the decree should be supplemented, modified or discon- tinued in order properly to adapt it to new or changing circumstances. Id. at 172 (citations omitted); see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; Mann Mfg., 439 F.2d 403. Water adjudications are in the nature of an in rem proceeding involving a res. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. , supra 174 F.3d at 1014.",
		"citation_value_orig": "783 F.2d 1418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "to su- pervise its continuing decree by determining from time to time whether and how the decree should be supplemented, modified or discon- tinued in order properly to adapt it to new or changing circumstances. Id. at 172 (citations omitted); see also 783 F.2d 1418; Mann Mfg., [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Water adjudications are in the nature of an in rem proceeding involving a res. United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. , supra 174 F.3d at 1014.",
		"citation_value_orig": "439 F.2d 403",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Doctrine of Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Precludes the District Court from Exercising Jurisdiction",
		"context": "United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. , supra 174 F.3d at 1014. In a wa- ter rights case, where an entitlement by one dimin- ishes the amount remaining for others, it is particularly important to avoid multiple adjudications 23 by different courts. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] a limited resource invites chaos, as neither users nor system operators will have the certainty that a water adjudication is supposed to provide to attract the in- vestments needed to reclaim desert lands for irrigation and to develop and maintain an urban civilization.",
		"citation_value_orig": "438 U.S. 696",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "Const., amend. I. 10 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 15 The freedom to speak includes the right not to speak. Janus , 138 S.Ct.",
		"citation_value_orig": "393 U.S. 503",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "at 2476 (cleaned up). Consequently, \" [g]overnments must not be allowed to force persons to express a message contrary to their deepest convictions.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In this case, forcing Petitioners to speak a message with which they disagree under the guise of a public -accom modation law undoubtedly violates the Free Speech Clause. While Petitioners are in the business of helping promote weddings, spreading the news about a wedding is not the kind of life - sustaining service that the common law required a victualler to promote .",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 2361",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "11 And as this Court held in Janus and Justice Kennedy wrote in his NIFLA concurrence, protecting the right not to speak on a controversial matter in which a person 11 Opponents of this view often argue that eradicating discrimination against people is nev er good reason to turn down a customer. But as Justice Gors uch astutely observed, it 's not the identity of the customer but the content of the message that matters to people like Petitioners. See Masterpiece Cakeshop [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. It held that the State may not do so. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S.Ct. 1719",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "Because of my faith, however, I am selective about the messages that I create or promote – while I will serve anyone I am always careful to avoid communicating ideas or messages, or promoting events, products, services, or 18 organizations, that are inconsistent with my religious beliefs.12 That statement sounds very similar to how a newspaper editor might describe how he decides what stories, columns, and opinions to run in his newspaper. The following language from Miami Herald Pub . [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]] , the Court has expressed sensitivity as to whether a restriction or requirement constituted the compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print. The clear implication has been that any such a compulsion to publish that which \"reason\" tells them should not be published' is unconstitutional. A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution, and , like many other virtues, it cannot be legislated.",
		"citation_value_orig": "418 U.S. 241",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Freedom of Speech",
		"context": "The Florida statute operates as a command in the same sense as a statute or regulation forbidding appellant to publish specified matter. Governmental restraint on publishing need not fall into familiar or traditional patterns to be subject to constitutional limitations on governmental powers. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The Florida statute exacts a penalty on the basis of the content of a newspaper. The first phase of the penalty resulting from the compelled printing of a reply is exacted in terms of the cost in printing and composing time and materials an d in taking up space that could be devoted to other material the newspaper may have preferred to print.",
		"citation_value_orig": "297 U.S. 233",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The government does not always have a compelling interest to enforce public accommodations laws in First Amendment cases",
		"context": "The Supreme Court has decided several cases that consider the interaction between public accommodations laws and the First Amendment. And in these cases, the Court has found that the government generally has a compelling interest to enforce public accommodations law. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; id. at 628 (\" . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "468 U.S. 609",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The government does not always have a compelling interest to enforce public accommodations laws in First Amendment cases",
		"context": ". acts of invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils that government has a compelling interest to prevent-wholly apart from the point of view such conduct may transmit. \"); [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. However, in the instant case, the lower court, as well as the Respondents, do not point to any state's historical practice of-as the question presented states-\"applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent.\" Indeed, one 19 of the earliest such precedents is barely a decade old.",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 557",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "F. The government does not always have a compelling interest to enforce public accommodations laws in First Amendment cases",
		"context": "Hurley recognized that the state's interest is weaker when the excluded parties have other available channels to achieve their goal. Id. (quoting Turner Broadcasting System, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"Considering that GLIB presumably would have had a fair shot ... at obtai~ing a parade permit of its own, respondents have not shown that petitioners enjoy the capacity to 'silence the voice of competing speakers,' as cable operators do with respect to program providers who wish to reach subscribers.\"). In this regard, Hurley was distinguishable from Turner. In Turner, the federal government had a sufficient interest to require monopolistic cable operators to set aside certain channels for broadcast signals because there were no alternate avenues.",
		"citation_value_orig": "512 U.S. 622",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The Fifth Circuit's exercise in semantics leaves duly elected boards without any guidance as to when they allegedly run afoul of the First Amendment",
		"context": "at 158-60. The Ninth Circuit in Blair observed the plaintiff was not \"prototypical\" given his status as an elected official. 5. see [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 10 Blair , 608 F.3d at 543-44. Indeed, the plaintiff's removal from a leadership position on the school board did not trigger his First Amendment rights because \"his authority as a member of the [b]oard\" remained unaffected in that \"he retained the full range of rights and prerogatives that came with having been publicly elected.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "391 U.S. 563",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": ". This Court's traditional exigent-circumstances standard focuses directly on the considerations relevant to the \"ultimate touchstone\" of the Fourth Amendment: the \"reasonableness\" of acting without a warrant. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. A categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception, in contrast, would ignore the relevant Fourth Amend-ment interests and focus instead on whether a case met the technical requirements of the exception. Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him?",
		"citation_value_orig": "563 U.S. 452",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29933 F.3d 577844 P.2d 780256 F.3d 895183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "658 S.E.2d 796",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]2014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29933 F.3d 577844 P.2d 780256 F.3d 895183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "427 U.S. 38",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]933 F.3d 577844 P.2d 780256 F.3d 895183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "612 N.W.2d 29",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]844 P.2d 780256 F.3d 895183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "933 F.3d 577",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29933 F.3d 577[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]256 F.3d 895183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "844 P.2d 780",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29933 F.3d 577844 P.2d 780[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]183 Cal. App. 3d 1199. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "256 F.3d 895",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Consider just a few of the questions that this Court would have to answer to define a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception: • Does a suspect have to know officers are pursuing him? Compare, e.g. , 658 S.E.2d 796427 U.S. 382014 WL 288936612 N.W.2d 29933 F.3d 577844 P.2d 780256 F.3d 895[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because this Court's few pursuit cases have turned on case-by-case assessments of exigency, it has had no occasion to define \"hot pursuit\" with precision. But a categorical misdemeanor-pursuit exception 34 would transform pursuit from a relevant circumstance into its own legal rule, requiring courts to define the boundaries of \"hot pursuit\" by answering all of these questions—and many more.",
		"citation_value_orig": "183 Cal. App. 3d 1199",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. A categorical exception would turn on formalities rather than the relevant Fourth Amendment interests",
		"context": "Those circumstances have at best a loose relationship to the pertinent law-enforcement interests. The traditional case-by-case approach, in contrast, targets those interests directly by allowing warrantless home entry when an \"emergency\" leaves \"insufficient time to seek a warrant.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 2160",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Further Percolation In The Circuit Courts Is Warranted In Light Of The Developing Case Law.",
		"context": "But Humphrey did not involve a domestic judgment as is the case here 18 and in Armada. In Humphrey , the plaintiff was a Chi- nese corporation whose business involved assisting \"foreign companies doing business in China with American anti -bribery compliance.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In that case, the plaintiff complained that its business was destroyed by defendant's bribery conduct in China. Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "905 F.3d 694",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Allowing The Decision Below To Stand Would Eviscerate Dudenhoeffer And Threaten Serious Practical Consequences",
		"context": "See John L. Utz, Internal Trustees of ESOPs 11 (Aug. 25, 2015), available at 58 https://bit.ly/31hrHZk (describing advantages of company officers as ESOP fiduciaries).7 2. Allowing the decision below to stand would also create an obvious end -run around the strict standa rds that Congress has enacted to rein in abusive securities litigation. See Tellabs, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As noted, when there is a stock -price drop occasioned by the disclosure of adverse information, a securities action often follows, with a tag -along ERISA claim filed as well. This case itself provides a prime example of that common pattern and how affirmance would undermine Congress' effort to weed out meritless stock- drop suits.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 308",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Allowing The Decision Below To Stand Would Eviscerate Dudenhoeffer And Threaten Serious Practical Consequences",
		"context": "8 As long as they can find a plan participant , they can simply rewrite their complaint to 8 That includes not only the PSLRA's heightened pleadi ng standard , but also its limitations on damages and attorney's fees, its mandatory sanctions for frivolous litigation, and its stay on discovery pending resolution of any motion to dismiss . See 15 U.S.C. §78u -4; Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 60 allege an ERISA claim. And if reframing those suits as ERISA claims will allow them to survive a motion to dismiss, the burden of discovery will allow the very \"extraction of extortionate settlements of frivolous claims\" that the PSLRA was meant to prevent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "III. Allowing The Decision Below To Stand Would Eviscerate Dudenhoeffer And Threaten Serious Practical Consequences",
		"context": "60 allege an ERISA claim. And if reframing those suits as ERISA claims will allow them to survive a motion to dismiss, the burden of discovery will allow the very \"extraction of extortionate settlements of frivolous claims\" that the PSLRA was meant to prevent. Amgen [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Finally, allowing the decision below to stand would \"conflict with the complex … corporate disclosure requirements imposed by the federal securities laws [and] with the objectives of those laws.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "568 U.S. 455",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "ses Instead of Destroying Them ……… .13 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… ………………. …..15 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .16 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …………………………………………………6 372 U.S. 144 …………………………………………………8 Masterpiece 370 P.3d 272, cert. granted (U.S. June 26, 2017) ……………. 2, 11, 12 582 U.S. None …………………….",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "ses Instead of Destroying Them ……… .13 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… ………………. …..15 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .16 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 315 U.S. 568 …………………………………………………6 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] …………………………………………………8 Masterpiece 370 P.3d 272, cert. granted (U.S. June 26, 2017) ……………. 2, 11, 12 582 U.S. None …………………….",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "ses Instead of Destroying Them ……… .13 (ANTECONCLUSION )………… ………………. …..15 CONCLUSION ……………………………………… .16 ii TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES 315 U.S. 568 …………………………………………………6 372 U.S. 144 …………………………………………………8 Masterpiece [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. granted (U.S. June 26, 2017) ……………. 2, 11, 12 582 U.S. None …………………….",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 P.3d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "Nevertheless, the Court should not \"overcompensate\" by per se banning al l viewpoint discrimination, since some unusual circumstance might come up requiring some such temporary \"discrimination\" to prevent disaster, e.g., in circumstances related to \"fighting words\" or \"shouting 'Fire' in a crowded theater\". And manda tory disclosures re pro-life clinics' being unlicensed as medical facilities , or not having licensed medical providers , are good things , since women have a right to know. There are useful comparisons to make with the \"gay wedding cake\" case, Masterpiece Cak [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. granted (U.S. June 26, 2017) , re the need for mandatory disclosures by businesses or other institutions to clients or potential clients. The State could amend current law, o r make new laws, to mandate, instead of abortion referral, clinics offering referrals for measures purely for promoting the life and health of the unborn and mothers .",
		"citation_value_orig": "370 P.3d 272",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "So, what get s count ed as \"free speech\" is becoming somewhat fluid these days. Hence, for example, the \"fighting words\" doctrine could be overturned if there can never be any \"viewpoint dis crimination\". Amicus has always wondered about the \"fighting words\" doctrine: \"damned fascist/racketeer\" sounds a little tame these days, pace [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Still, there might be \"fighting words\" in some circumstances, a nd if someone argues that he always has a right to the \"viewpoint\" of calling someone a ny kind of insult at any time without being suppressed by the State, even i n circumstances that could likely cause a deadly riot, then there might be no more \"fightin g words\" doctrine, or at least not much of an effective one. Moreover , if someone either yells \"Fire!\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "315 U.S. 568",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "V. The State May Amend the FACT Act, or Pass New Laws, to Offer Referrals Which Nurture Fetuses Instead of Destroying Them",
		"context": "That is worth overturning (and, sadly, there are 8 plenty of self-labeled \"Christian\" groups who have not come out in favor of overturning that burden on religious freedom) , but it is not worth it to make some paranoid decision to outlaw all \"viewpoint discrimination\" under all circumstances, even if it kills us. Cf. Ke [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] : \"[W] hile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact. \" (Goldberg, J.) And th e present a bortion -related case should not make the Court throw out the ba by with the bathwater (so to speak) vis-à-vis viewpoint discrimination.",
		"citation_value_orig": "372 U.S. 144",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Judicial Equation Of Rejection Of A Trademark License With Termination Improperly Engrafts A New Exception Onto The Statutory Effect Of Rejection Of Such Licenses",
		"context": "21 way created or authorized the courts to create treatments wholly inconsistent with Section 365 in general. \"While the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, the Bankruptcy Code 'does not authorize freewheeling consideratio n of every conceivable equity.'\" Midlantic Nat'l [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; accord RadLAX Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639. \"Equitable treatment\" of trademark licenses that results in divestiture of the licens ee's rights following the debtor's deemed breach (through rejection) departs entirely from the historical understanding and operation of rejection. See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967-68 (Ambro, J., concurring) (because rejection only constitutes a breach under Section 365(g), \"rather than reasoning from negative inference to apply [ Lubrizol ] to this dispute, the Courts here should have used, I believe, their equitable powers to give [the debtor] a fresh start without stripping [the license e] of its fairly procured trademark rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "474 U.S. 494",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Judicial Equation Of Rejection Of A Trademark License With Termination Improperly Engrafts A New Exception Onto The Statutory Effect Of Rejection Of Such Licenses",
		"context": "21 way created or authorized the courts to create treatments wholly inconsistent with Section 365 in general. \"While the Bankruptcy Court is a court of equity, the Bankruptcy Code 'does not authorize freewheeling consideratio n of every conceivable equity.'\" Midlantic Nat'l 474 U.S. 494; accord RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. \"Equitable treatment\" of trademark licenses that results in divestiture of the licens ee's rights following the debtor's deemed breach (through rejection) departs entirely from the historical understanding and operation of rejection. See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967-68 (Ambro, J., concurring) (because rejection only constitutes a breach under Section 365(g), \"rather than reasoning from negative inference to apply [ Lubrizol ] to this dispute, the Courts here should have used, I believe, their equitable powers to give [the debtor] a fresh start without stripping [the license e] of its fairly procured trademark rights.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "D. Judicial Equation Of Rejection Of A Trademark License With Termination Improperly Engrafts A New Exception Onto The Statutory Effect Of Rejection Of Such Licenses",
		"context": "\"Equitable treatment\" of trademark licenses that results in divestiture of the licens ee's rights following the debtor's deemed breach (through rejection) departs entirely from the historical understanding and operation of rejection. See In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 967-68 (Ambro, J., concurring) (because rejection only constitutes a breach under Section 365(g), \"rather than reasoning from negative inference to apply [ Lubrizol ] to this dispute, the Courts here should have used, I believe, their equitable powers to give [the debtor] a fresh start without stripping [the license e] of its fairly procured trademark rights. \"); accord Sunbeam Prods., Inc. , [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (\"If rejection terminates the contract or lease, such termination may have consequences that affect parties other than the debtor and the other party to the contract or lease . . .",
		"citation_value_orig": "686 F.3d 372",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state",
		"context": "To establish a due-process violation here, the Trust has the burden of satisfying two elements. • First, the Trust must show that North Carolina lacks a \"minimum connection\" with \"the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax.\" Quill [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. • Second, the Trust must show that the \"income attributed to the State for tax purposes\" is not \"rationally related to 'values connected with the taxing State.' \" Quill , 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 298",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state",
		"context": "• Second, the Trust must show that the \"income attributed to the State for tax purposes\" is not \"rationally related to 'values connected with the taxing State.' \" Quill , 504 U.S. at 306 (quoting Moorman Mfg. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]). Here, the Kaestner Trust cannot satisfy either of these elements. First, Ms. Kaestner's residency in North Carolina establishes the required connection with the state.",
		"citation_value_orig": "437 U.S. 267",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state",
		"context": "Under a fairness-based analysis, a trust has the required connection with a taxing state when a trust beneficiary lives in that stat e. A trust, after all, is not a distinct entity like a corporation. Instead, it is just an abstraction that describes a fiduciary relationship between people. See Americold Realty [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Because a trust has no entity status, the state supreme court erred by demanding connections between the Kaestner Trust \"itself \" and North Carolina. Pet.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state",
		"context": "For purposes of due-process connections with the states , a trust has no \"self.\" Instead, the only way a trust can make contact with a state is through the trust's constituents—the grantor, the trustee, and the beneficiary. That conclusion follows not only from trust law, but also from [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]136 S. Ct. 1012. See infra pp. 25–28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "331 U.S. 486",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "The Due Process Clause does not prohibit a state from taxing a trust with beneficiaries in that state",
		"context": "For purposes of due-process connections with the states , a trust has no \"self.\" Instead, the only way a trust can make contact with a state is through the trust's constituents—the grantor, the trustee, and the beneficiary. That conclusion follows not only from trust law, but also from 331 U.S. 486[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. See infra pp. 25–28.",
		"citation_value_orig": "136 S. Ct. 1012",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Classifications Cannot Survive Any Standard Of Review",
		"context": "Moreover, neither Congress nor Respondents have made an effort to justify ICWA's intrusive re- gime with evidence of circumstances that e xist today, or offered a basis to believe States today would return to the severe abuses of 50 years ago. Congress cannot wield such a drastic remedy based solely on historical problems; those needs must persist in the present. See Shelby [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs 551 U.S. 701 . 43 Even accepting that the government continues to have a compelling interest in safeguarding \"the con- tinued existence and integrity of Indian tribes,\" 25 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 529",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Classifications Cannot Survive Any Standard Of Review",
		"context": "Congress cannot wield such a drastic remedy based solely on historical problems; those needs must persist in the present. See Shelby 570 U.S. 529 ; Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . 43 Even accepting that the government continues to have a compelling interest in safeguarding \"the con- tinued existence and integrity of Indian tribes,\" 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) , ICWA is not remotely tailored to Congress's asserted interest.",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 701",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. ICWA's Classifications Cannot Survive Any Standard Of Review",
		"context": "417 U.S. at 555 (emphasi s added). That review is not a rubber stamp. See City of [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The govern- ment \"may not rely on a classification whose relation-ship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the distinction arbitrary or irrational.\" Id.",
		"citation_value_orig": "473 U.S. 432",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "A. Wyoming's Admission to the Union Did Not Terminate the Treaty Right",
		"context": "Pet.Br.23-26. Wyoming all but ignores Mille Lacs when addressing the merits. 1 For example, citing [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], Wyoming maintains that the hunting right was a \"temporary right not intended to survive Wyoming's statehood,\" Resp.Br.20, and it argues that this Court \"should adopt\" Race Horse 's \"conclusion that [the] 'temporary and precarious' off-reservation hunting right has expired,\" Resp.Br.55. But Mille Lacs rejected \"the 'temporary and precarious' language in Race Horse \" as 1 As it did in opposing certiorari, Wyoming claims there is insufficient record evidence to address the merits. Resp.Br.3.",
		"citation_value_orig": "163 U.S. 504",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Traditional civil penalties offer an instructive contrast with equity forfeitures like Tyler's",
		"context": "Third, the different remedies available under the Tak- ings Clause and the Excessive Fines Clause (and their precursors) illustrate another contrast between tradi- tional civil penalties and Minnesota's equity forfeitures. Civil monetary penalties are among the modern-day 10 descendants of the \"amercements\" addressed in Magna Carta. See generally [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. And much like Magna Carta, the Excessive Fines Clause does not forbid these economic sanctions al- together, but provides only that they may not be \"exces- sive.\" Equity forfeitures like Minnesota's, by contrast, more closely resemble a different historical predecessor: the English crown's tendency to seize property for debt and \"refuse[] to disgorge the surplus.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 682",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Interpretation Is Implausibly Narrow and Atextual, and Ignores Contemporaneous Legislation",
		"context": "But section 1254a(f)(4) applies by its terms to all TPS recipients and cross -references the entirety of sec- tion 1255. If Congress \"intended to refer\" only to section 1255(c)(2) , \"it presumably would have done so —just by adding a letter, a number, and a few parentheticals.\" Cyan, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government responds (at 28) that Congress may have avoided an explicit cross -reference \"for the simple reason that it recognized that other portions of Section 1255 could be ame nded to include lawful -status require- ments.\" But the government's speculation is not a valid reason to ignore basic rules of statutory interpretation.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 1061",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Interpretation Is Implausibly Narrow and Atextual, and Ignores Contemporaneous Legislation",
		"context": "33, but Congress added the words \"as a nonimmigrant\" in section 1254a(f)(4). The government's tracking argument improperly treats the words \"as a nonimmigrant \" as sur- plusage. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government conspicuously excises those words through- out its brief. See, e.g.",
		"citation_value_orig": "533 U.S. 167",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Interpretation Is Implausibly Narrow and Atextual, and Ignores Contemporaneous Legislation",
		"context": "33-35. The \"natural implication\" of Congress' choice of broader language in section 1254a(f)(4) is that it \"did not intend\" the narrower alternative. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], the CTPSA would have cre- ated a TPS -like program . Future beneficiaries of that program would be considered as \"being in, and maintain- ing, lawful status as a nonimmigrant\" for purposes of ad- justing status. H.R.",
		"citation_value_orig": "139 S. Ct. 1804",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. The Government's Interpretation Is Implausibly Narrow and Atextual, and Ignores Contemporaneous Legislation",
		"context": "§ 3(b). These provisions' cohabitation in the very same prede- cessor bill—a fact the government's brief ignores — proves that Congress' omission of language limiting the benefit of section 1254a(f)(4) to persons already having nonimmigrant status and its addition of the phrase \"being in\" were intentional. See [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. The government speculates that \"[t]hose provisions may have been dr afted that way simply to follow the course charted by past EVD orders, including President Bush's Executive Order for Chinese nationals.\" U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "464 U.S. 16",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "In Louisiana's view, j ury unanimity does not have the \"overall effect\" of \"improv[ing] the accuracy of fact- finding in criminal trials.\" Id . at 33 (quoting [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ). Louisiana's crabbed view of \"accuracy\" is wrong, and disregards the presumptions of innocence and jury regularity that are pillars of criminal procedure. 1.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "Louisiana's crabbed view of \"accuracy\" is wrong, and disregards the presumptions of innocence and jury regularity that are pillars of criminal procedure. 1. Relying on [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] , Louisiana claims an inaccurate c on- viction means only \" the conviction of someone who is factually innocent .\" Resp. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "523 U.S. 614",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "Br. 33 , but because of \" the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding process. \" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The risk of an \"unreliable verdict is intolerably high\" when a defendant is deprived of 11 counsel, id., because th at assistance effectuates other constitutional guarantees and ensures that the prose- cution goes through the \" crucible ,\" 466 U.S. 648. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that Gideon would qualify as a watershed rule today , Whorton , 549 U.S. at 419, even though counsel may s pare from convic- tion a factually guilty defendant .",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 406",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "33 , but because of \" the relationship of that rule to the accuracy of the factfinding process. \" 549 U.S. 406 . The risk of an \"unreliable verdict is intolerably high\" when a defendant is deprived of 11 counsel, id., because th at assistance effectuates other constitutional guarantees and ensures that the prose- cution goes through the \" crucible ,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Indeed, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that Gideon would qualify as a watershed rule today , Whorton , 549 U.S. at 419, even though counsel may s pare from convic- tion a factually guilty defendant . NACDL Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "466 U.S. 648",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "18 –19. In addition to its \"an- cient\" origins, jury unanimity is an \"essential\" and \"indispensable\" feature of the factfinding process. Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1396, 1401; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 570 U.S. 254. For ex- ample, in tracing the rule's English origins, one commentator observed that \"only a unanimous ver- dict was considered trustworthy.\" Daniel D. Peck, The Unanimous Jury Verdict: Its Valediction in Some Criminal Cases, 4 Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "508 U.S. 275",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "18 –19. In addition to its \"an- cient\" origins, jury unanimity is an \"essential\" and \"indispensable\" feature of the factfinding process. Ramos , 140 S. Ct. at 1396, 1401; see also 508 U.S. 275; see also [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. For ex- ample, in tracing the rule's English origins, one commentator observed that \"only a unanimous ver- dict was considered trustworthy.\" Daniel D. Peck, The Unanimous Jury Verdict: Its Valediction in Some Criminal Cases, 4 Tex.",
		"citation_value_orig": "570 U.S. 254",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "36–37. Our legal system has developed independently from Eng- land's for the last 244 years, and does not follow modern British law. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 13 variance, it was statistically significant that no unan- imous -rule juries reached the \"legally untenable\" verdict of first -degree murder, while many non- unanimous juries did. Reid Hastie et al., Inside the Jury, 61–62 (1983) .",
		"citation_value_orig": "543 U.S. 551",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "\"). It also flies in the face of the pre- sumption s of jury regularity and innocence. Richard- [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] ; In re397 U.S. 358 . Contrary to the government's assertion , the fact that at a first trial, the jury hung six votes to six does not mean that six jurors got it wrong if the defendant is convicted by a unani mous jury on retrial. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "481 U.S. 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "\"). It also flies in the face of the pre- sumption s of jury regularity and innocence. Richard- 481 U.S. 200 ; In re[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . Contrary to the government's assertion , the fact that at a first trial, the jury hung six votes to six does not mean that six jurors got it wrong if the defendant is convicted by a unani mous jury on retrial. U.S. Br.",
		"citation_value_orig": "397 U.S. 358",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. Jury unanimity is necessary to prevent an impermissibly large risk of legally inaccurate convictions",
		"context": "Yet no one disputes that jur y unanimity is necessary for ensuring accurate outcomes in capital cases . Cf. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. 3. Louisiana looks to exoneration rates in a hand- ful of other States (like Illinois, Texas , and New York ) to show that non -unanimous juries are not measura- bly more inaccurate than unanimous juries .",
		"citation_value_orig": "527 U.S. 373",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chenery Is No Bar To This Court's Reliance On Statutory Grounds",
		"context": ". Nothing in [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], bars this Court from upholding the Reconsideration Order under the correct interpretation of Section 202(h). Resp.Br.26. The question on the table is whether the Third Circuit correctly construed Section 202(h) in setting aside the Order based on the panel's policy preferences about minority and female ownership.",
		"citation_value_orig": "318 U.S. 80",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chenery Is No Bar To This Court's Reliance On Statutory Grounds",
		"context": "The question on the table is whether the Third Circuit correctly construed Section 202(h) in setting aside the Order based on the panel's policy preferences about minority and female ownership. The Constitution assigns \"to the judiciary the duty of interpreting [laws] and applying them in cases properly brought before the courts.\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under Chenery , courts refrain from making policy judgments \"exclusively entrusted to an administrative agency,\" 318 U.S. at 88; but they can and must make \"determination[s] of 14 law\" about what the agency was—or was not— required to do in the first place, id. at 94.",
		"citation_value_orig": "138 S. Ct. 897",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chenery Is No Bar To This Court's Reliance On Statutory Grounds",
		"context": "at 94. Moreover, \"[t]he Chenery doctrine has no application\" where an agency lacks discretion, even if it \"provided a different rationale for the necessary result.\" Morgan Stanley Capital [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. That well-established exception applies here because the Commission's unchallenged competition findings precluded it from lawfully retaining the rules it repealed or modified s olely to promote minority and female ownership. Industry.Br.36-37.",
		"citation_value_orig": "554 U.S. 527",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "C. Chenery Is No Bar To This Court's Reliance On Statutory Grounds",
		"context": "That well-established exception applies here because the Commission's unchallenged competition findings precluded it from lawfully retaining the rules it repealed or modified s olely to promote minority and female ownership. Industry.Br.36-37. Even if the FCC's analysis of that issu e were found deficient, remand \"would be an id le and useless formality,\" Morgan Stanley , 554 U.S. at 545, because the FCC lacks \"discretion\" to overcome the statutorily required competition determination based \"on reasoning divorced from the statutory text,\" [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]; see also 5 U.S.C. § 706 (\"due account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error\"). In any event, Chenery is satisfied here.",
		"citation_value_orig": "549 U.S. 497",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the Court agrees that petitioner's exclusive distribution rights claim is not within the question presented, the case is moot",
		"context": "\"[A]n actual controversy must be extant at all stages of review . If an intervening circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit, the ac- tion can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as moot.\" Genesis Healthcare [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. There is no ongoing dispute about enforceability of peti- tioner's non-exclusive trademark license, which has ex- pired. Nor is there a live controversy concerning peti- tioner's trademark rights between rejection and the li- cense's expiration, because petitioner never used the trademark during that period.",
		"citation_value_orig": "569 U.S. 66",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. If the Court agrees that petitioner's exclusive distribution rights claim is not within the question presented, the case is moot",
		"context": "39 (emphasis added). Article III does not confer jurisdiction ov er hypothetical disputes. [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] . The hypothetical nature of the dispute explains why re- spondent did not appeal from the BAP's ruling that pe- titioner retained its trademark license post-rejection. Resolution of the issue has no practical significance to respondent.",
		"citation_value_orig": "504 U.S. 555",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "B. The Court will consider granting certiorari before judgment when there is a need for a final authoritative decision on the merits not subject to further review",
		"context": "The Court gave it to them. The same can be said, though to a lesser degree, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer38 and Nixon v. United States .39 The cases indicate that this Court will grant certiorari before judgment when there is a need for a final authoritative decision on the merits not subject to further review. 38 [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] 16",
		"citation_value_orig": "343 U.S. 579",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "1125(c)(2)(C). For example, the owner of a famous mark could bring a dilution -by-tarnishment claim against a person who use s a similar mark in an obscene commer- cial film —e.g., to create a sense of verisimilitude —on the theory that using the similar mark is likely to harm the famous mark's reputation by producing an associa- tion in viewers' minds between the famous mark and the objectionable content of the film. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] (S.D.N.Y.) (state -law dilution claim), aff 'd, 604 F.2d 200. Under t he Lanham Act , proof of likel y confusion about source or association is not an element of a trademark -dilution claim .",
		"citation_value_orig": "467 F. Supp. 366",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "For example, the owner of a famous mark could bring a dilution -by-tarnishment claim against a person who use s a similar mark in an obscene commer- cial film —e.g., to create a sense of verisimilitude —on the theory that using the similar mark is likely to harm the famous mark's reputation by producing an associa- tion in viewers' minds between the famous mark and the objectionable content of the film. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.) (state -law dilution claim), aff 'd, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. Under t he Lanham Act , proof of likel y confusion about source or association is not an element of a trademark -dilution claim . See 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "604 F.2d 200",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "L. No. 104 -98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985; [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. As amended, the Lanham Act excludes from dilution liability three categories of uses . 15 U.S.C.",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 418",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "App. 33a (cita- tions omitted). On that view —which the court had adopted in a prior case based largely on its reading of the legislative history , see Mattel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]], cert. denied,537 U.S. 1171 —any use of a mark that convey s an expressive message would be \"noncommercial ,\" even when the mark is being used to sell goods for profit. That interpretation is unsound.",
		"citation_value_orig": "296 F.3d 894",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "33a (cita- tions omitted). On that view —which the court had adopted in a prior case based largely on its reading of the legislative history , see Mattel, 296 F.3d 894, cert. denied,[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] —any use of a mark that convey s an expressive message would be \"noncommercial ,\" even when the mark is being used to sell goods for profit. That interpretation is unsound. It render s the anti- dilution provision' s first two exclusions largely super- fluous and thus violate s the principle that court s should \"normally seek to construe Congress's wor k 'so that ef- fect is given to all provisions, so that no part will be in- operative or superfluous.'",
		"citation_value_orig": "537 U.S. 1171",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "II. The court of appeals erred in holding that respondent is shielded from liability for trademark dilution under the statutory exclusion for noncommercial use",
		"context": "33a-34a. Although the three exclusions might overlap, the usual rule in statutory construction is that \"the spe- cific governs the general.\" RadLAX Gateway Hotel, [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. More general neighboring language should not be construed to negate the limit that Con- gress placed on a specific exclusion for parody. This Court should vacate the judgment entered be- low on dilution liability and remand for further proceed- ings.",
		"citation_value_orig": "566 U.S. 639",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend To In Rem Actions To Establish Rights In Immovable Property",
		"context": "That statute is a \"codification ofinternational [common] law at the time of the FSIA'senactment.\" Perm. Mission of India to the [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]. In particular, FSIA \"'codif[ied]. .",
		"citation_value_orig": "551 U.S. 193",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend To In Rem Actions To Establish Rights In Immovable Property",
		"context": ".the pre-existing real property exception to sovereign immunityrecognized by international practice.'\" Id. at 200 (quoting Asociacion de [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]]11 U.S. 116 of Foreign Relation s Law of the United States § 68(b), cmt. d). This exception comports with the longstanding principle that \"property ownership is notan inherently sovereign function.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "735 F.2d 1517",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend To In Rem Actions To Establish Rights In Immovable Property",
		"context": ".the pre-existing real property exception to sovereign immunityrecognized by international practice.'\" Id. at 200 (quoting Asociacion de 735 F.2d 1517[[[CITATION REQUIRED]]] of Foreign Relation s Law of the United States § 68(b), cmt. d). This exception comports with the longstanding principle that \"property ownership is notan inherently sovereign function.\"",
		"citation_value_orig": "11 U.S. 116",
		"query_contains_other_citations": true
	},
	{
		"section_header": "2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Does Not Extend To In Rem Actions To Establish Rights In Immovable Property",
		"context": ". within that jurisdiction's limits.\" Okla. Tax [[[CITATION REQUIRED]]].",
		"citation_value_orig": "515 U.S. 450",
		"query_contains_other_citations": false
	}
]